1. Territory is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the state.

Territory as an element of a state means an area over which a state has effective control. It
includes land, maritime areas, airspace, and outer space (begins at 50 – 100 miles from earth).
Under Article 1, Section 1, the scope of national territory is defined as; (1) The Philippine
Archipelago; (2) All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction;
(3) The territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves and other submarine areas corresponding
to (1) and (2) which consist of terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains. Control over territory is of
the essence of a state (Las Palmas case). Certain rights and authority are exercised within the
state’s territory.

Territories covered under the definition of Article 1

1. Those ceded to the US by virtue of the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898
2. Those defines in the treaty concluded between the US and Spain (Treaty of Washington) on
November 7, 1990, which were not defined in the Treaty of Paris, specifically the islands of
Cagayan, Sulu and Sibuto.
3. Those defined in treaty concluded on January 2, 1930, between the US and Great Britain (Treay
with Great Britain), specifically the Turtle and Mangsee islands
4. The island of batanes, which was covered under a genera statement in the 1935 Constitution.
5. Those contemplated in the phrase “belonging to th Philipines by historic right or legal title in the
1973 Constitution.
 Amigable V. Cuenca

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

MAKALINTAL, J

Facts:

The appellant, Victor Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City
as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-3272 which was issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. There is no
annotation of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the
certificate. However, the government used a portion of the aid lot with an area of 6167 square meters
for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues, this is done without prior expropriation.

It appears that said avenues were already existing in and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in
1924, and the formal construction in 1925.

On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April
17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in
his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership. She also sought the
payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land,
moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the
suit.

defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint, following affirmative
defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office
of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due
the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the
claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the
Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu
that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no
cause of action against the defendants.

On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the
ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.

Held:

Yes, in the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu,1 involving a claim for payment of the
value of a portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through
Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a private
landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale,
the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the
price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government.3 In
addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the
trial court after hearing.
 Minucher V.CA

G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003

VITUG, J

Facts:

Philippine police narcotic agents conducted a buy bust operation in the house of Minucher, an Iranian
national, where a quantity of heroin (prohibited drug) was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents
were accompanied y private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would become one of the principal
witnesses for the prosecution

On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
19, of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug
trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case.

He came to know the defe ndant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his house and
introduced to him by a certain Jose Iñigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iñigo,
on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several
Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines.

On May 27, 1986, at about 3:00 in the afternoon, the defendant came back at the plaintiffs house, Abbas
Torabias, plaintiff’s countrymen was also there, and there the plaintiff gave the defendant a 2,000 to
obtain his wife a Visa. The defendant invited the plaintiff outside to meet his cousin, however, 30-40
Filipino soldiers arrested the plaintiff together with Torabian. Plaintiff was not told why he was being
handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was invaded by defendant

Issue:

whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes, A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as
long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The job
description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after
having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the
arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo
hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. This Court is
constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the
problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954

PARAS, C.J

Facts:

Fernando A. Froilan, the plaintiff-appellee, filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping Co., on
February 3, 1951, claiming that the Shipping Commission had sold him the vessel FS-197 for P200,000,
with P50,000 down and the balance to be paid in installments. He also claimed that he had executed a
chattel mortgage of the said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission to secure the payment of the
balance. But the Shipping Commission took possession of the aforesaid vessel and considered the sale
contract cancelled for a number of reasons, including the non-payment of the installments.

Subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, the Shipping Commission chartered and
delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. He appealed the action of the
Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines, and the Cabinet restored him to all of his rights
under his original contract with the Shipping Commission in its meeting on August 25, 1950. He had
repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but
the latter refused to do so.

On February 3, 1951, the lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue
thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel (Rec. on App. p. 47).

The Cabinet's action on August 25, 1950, restoring Froilan to his rights under his original contract with
the Shipping Commission was allegedly void because Froilan had not complied with the conditions
precedent set by the Cabinet for the restoration of his rights to the vessel under the original contract;
that starting on March 1, 1951, it suffered losses for wrongful replevin in the amount of P17,651.84
every month and P22,764.59 in damages in the month of February 1951. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed
its response on March 1, 1951, denying Froilan's right to possession of the aforementioned vessel.

it alleged that it had incurred necessary and useful expenses on the vessel amounting to P127,057.31
and claimed the right to retain said vessel until its useful and necessary expenses had been reimbursed
(Rec. on App. pp. 8-53).

On November 10, 1951, after the leave of the lower court had been obtained, the intervenor-appellee,
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan had
failed to pay to the Shipping Commission (which name was later changed to Shipping Administration)
the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel in question, the interest thereon, and its advances
on insurance premium totalling P162,142.95, excluding the dry-docking expenses incurred on said vessel
by the Pan Oriental Shipping Co.

Issue:

Whether or not, the lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground of alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the intervenor Republic of the Philippines.

Held:
Yes, The lower court also erred in holding that, as the intervenor had not made any claim against the
defendant, the latter's counterclaim had no foundation. The complaint in intervention sought to recover
possession of the vessel in question from the plaintiff, and this claim is logically adverse to the position
assumed by the defendant that it has a better right to said possession than the plaintiff who alleges in
his complaint that he is entitled to recover the vessel from the defendant. At any rate a counterclaim
should be judged by its own allegations, and not by the averments of the adverse party. It should be
recalled that the defendant's theory is that the plaintiff had already lost his rights under the contract
with the Shipping Administration and that, on the other hand, the defendant is relying on the charter
contract executed in its favor by the intervenor which is bound to protect the defendant in its
possession of the vessel. In other words, the counterclaim calls for specific performance on the part of
the intervenor. As to whether this counterclaim is meritorious is another question which is not now
before us.

The other ground for dismissing the defendant's counterclaim is that the State is immune from suit. This
is untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect waived its right of
non-suability.
 US V. Ruiz

G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985

ABAD SANTOS, J.

Facts:

The United States invited the submission of bid to repair offender system and to repair typhon damage
in their naval base in Subic, Zambales sometime in May, 1972. The base was one of those provided in
the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the
company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and
for the name of its bonding company which means they are accepting bid pursuant to the defendant.
The company complied with the requests.

In June, 1972, the company received a letter that was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director, Contracts
Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the
United States, who is one of the petitioners herein. It stated there that the company did not qualify to
receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating.

the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion
and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant
petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The petition is highly impressed with merit.

Issue:

Whether or not, the United State can be sued by the defendant.

Held:

No,

No, the traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and
Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
 US V. Guinto

G.R. NO. 76607 FEBRUARY 26, 1990

CRUZ, J

Facts:

In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the
said base. On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S.
Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among those
who submitted their bids were private respondents in this case.

The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, on June 30, 1986,
the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual
petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon

On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary
injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America, which
had not waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as official employees of the U.S. Air Force,
were also immune from suit.

On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. On December 11, 1986, following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order against further
proceedings in the court below.

Issue:

Whether or not, the petitioners can be immune from suit.

Held:

No, the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States government are
commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed
Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicem en. These being
the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents
in the court below. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial, the conclusion reached in the
United States of America v. Ruiz case cannot be applied here.

In G.R. NO. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the
hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order was LIFTED.