1

Game Theory

Project Report submitted to the University of Kerala, Thiruvananthapuramin

partial fulfilment of the requirement for the completion of the FDP in Bach-
elor of Science in Mathematics in affliated colleges.

by

.
Akshay Asok : Candidate code : 22019146002
Ajith.S : Candidate code : 22019146008
Firoz Muhammed : Candidate code : 22019146012
Harikrishne. B : Candidate code : 22019146014
Yedhukrishnan. D : Candidate code : 22019146019

under the guidance of

Vishnu Namboothiti. K
Associate Professor
Department of Mathematics
Government College, Ambalapuzha

Exam Code:22018602 Project Code:MM1646

2

DECLARATION
We hereby declare that the project report entitled Game Theory submitted
to the University of Kerala,in partial fulfilment of the requirement of the FDP
in Bachelor of Science (Mathematics) is a bonafide work carried out by one
of us and it has not been submitted earlier or elsewhere for similar purposes
according to the best of our knowledge and belief.

1. Akshay Asok - 22019146002

2. Ajith. S - 22019146008

3. Firoz Muhammed - 22019146012

4. Harikrishne. B - 22019146014

5. Yedhukrishnan. D - 22019146019

Ambalapuzha
25-03-2022
 3

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the project entitled Game Theory submitted to the
University of Kerala,in partial fulfilment of the requirement of the FDP in
Bachelor of Science(Mathematics)by

1. Akshay Asok - 22019146002

2. Ajith. S - 22019146008

3. Firoz Muhammed - 22019146012

4. Harikrishne. B - 22019146014

5. Yedhukrishnan. D - 22019146019

is a bonafide work carried out by them under my supervision and it has not
been submitted earlier or elsewhere for similar purposes according to the best
of my knowledge and belief.

Ambalappuzha Dr. Vishnu Namboothiri. K

25/03/2022 Associate Professor
4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We express our sincere thanks to our project supervisor Dr. Vishnu Nam-
boothiri. K,Associate Professor of Mathematics for motivating,directing and
advising us so that we could complete this project succesfully. We also thank
Sir Asokan C.K,Head of the Depmartment of Mathematics for his whole-
hearted support. We thank the Principal of our college and Librarian of the
college for providing all kind of infrastructural facilities.

1. Akshay Asok - 22019146002

2. Ajith. S - 22019146008

3. Firoz Muhammed - 22019146012

4. Harikrishne. B - 22019146014

5. Yedhukrishnan. D - 22019146019

Ambalapuzha
25-03-2022
Contents

1 Chapter 1 6
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Classification of Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

2 Chapter 2 10
2.1 Matrix multiplication and basic probability concept . . . . . . 10
2.2 Two person zero sum matrix game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Fundamental theorem of Zero Sum Game . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

3 Chapter 3 19
3.1 Optimal strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

4 Chapter 4 24
4.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

5
Chapter 1

Chapter 1

1.1 Overview
Game Theoryis an approach to modelling behaviour in situations where the
outcome of your decisions depends on the decisions of others. Game theory
is the study of strategic, interactive decision making among rational individ-
uals or organizations. Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that
provides tools for analyzing situations in which parties ( called players) make
decisions that are interdependent. This interdependence causes each player
to consider the other player’s possible decisions( or strategies) in formulating
strategy. In addition, a player need not be an individual; it may be a nation,
a corporation, or a team comprising many people with shared interests. A
solution to a game describes the optimal decisions of the players, who may
have similar, opposed, or mixed interests, and the outcomes that may re-
sult from these decisions. Game theory is applied for determining different
strategies in the business world. It offers valuable tools for solving strategy
problems.

6
1.2. INTRODUCTION 7

1.2 Introduction
Game theory is a type of decision theory in which one’s choice of action
is determined after taking into account all possible alternatives available to
an opponent playing the same game, rather than just by the possibilities of
several outcome results. Game theory does not insist on how a game should
be played but tells the procedure and principles by which action should be
selected. Thus it is a decision theory useful in competitive situations. Game
is defined as an activity between two or more persons according to a set of
rules at the end of which each person receives some benefit or suffers loss.
The set of rules defines the game. Going through the set of rules once by the
participants defines a play.
8 CHAPTER 1. CHAPTER 1

1.3 History
The individual closely associated with the creation of the theory of games
is John von Neumann, one of the greatest mathematicians of this century.
Although others proceeded him in formulating a theory of games - notably
Emile Borel - it was von Neumann who published in 1928 the paper that
laid the foundation for the theory of two-person zero-sum games. The the-
ory of Games was born in 1944 with the publication of Theory of Games
and Economic Behaviour by Hungarian-born American mathematician John
von Neumann and his Princeton University colleague Oskar Morgenstern, a
German-born American economist. In their book, . They observed that eco-
nomics is much like a game, wherein players anticipate each other’s moves,
and therefore requires a new kind of mathematics, which they called game
theory. Their choice of title was a little unfortunate, since it quickly got
shortened to “Game Theory,” Nobel Laureate and a Father of Game Theory,
Lloyd S. Shapley(92), who shared the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Eco-
nomic Science for work on game theory that has been used to study subjects
as diverse as matching couples and allocating costs.
1.4. CLASSIFICATION OF GAME THEORY 9

1.4 Classification of Game Theory

It broadly classified into three main sub-categories of study;

1. Classical Game Theory: It focuses on optimal play in situations

where one or more people must make a decision and the impact of that
decision and the decisions of those involved is known. Decisions may be
made by use of a randomizing device like piping a coin . It focuses on
questions like, What is my best decision in a given economic scenario,
where a reward function provides a way for me to understand how my
decision will impact my result. Examples: Poker, Strategic military
decision making, Negotiations.

2. Combinatorial Game Theory: It focuses on optimal play in two-

player games in which each player takes turns changing in pre-defined
ways. In other word, combinatorial game theory does not consider
games with chance (no randomness). Generally two player strategic
games played on boards. Moves change the structure of a game board.
Examples: Chess, Checkers, Go.

3. Dynamic Game Theory: It focuses on the analysis of games in which

players must make decisions over time and in which those decisions
will affect the outcome at the next moment in time. It often relies on
differential equations to model the behaviour of players over time. It
can help optimize the behaviour of unmanned vehicles or it can help
you capture your baby sister who has escaped from her playpen. In
general games with time, Games with motion or a dynamic component.
Examples: Optimal play in a dog fight, Chasing your brother across a
room.
Chapter 2

Chapter 2

2.1 Matrix multiplication and basic probabil-

ity concept
In this section we discuss a general game in which two competing players
choose separate strategies to reach opposing objectives. The optimal strategy
of each player is found in certain cases with the use of matrix techniques.
To introduce the basic concepts in the theory of games, we will consider
the following carnival-type game that two people agree to play. We will
call the participants in the game player R and player C. Each player has a
stationary wheel with a movable point on it as in figure 2.1. For reasons that
will become clear, we will call player R’s wheel the row - wheel and player
C ’s wheel the column - wheel. The row - wheel is divided into three sector
numbered 1, 2 and 3 and the column - wheel is divided into four sectors 1,
2, 3 and 4. The fractions of the area occupied by the various sectors are
indicated in the figure. To play the game, each player spins the pointer of his
or her wheel and lets it come to rest at random. The number of the sector in
which each pointer to rest is called the move of that player. Thus, player R
has three possible moves and player C has four possible moves. Depending
on the move each player makes, player C then makes a payment of money
to player R according to the table given below.
For example, if the row - wheel pointer comes to rest in sector 1 (Player
R makes move 1), and the column - wheel pointer comes to rest in sector
2 (Player C makes move 2), then player C must pay player R the sum of
$ 5. Some of the entries in the table are negative, indicating that player

10
2.1. MATRIX MULTIPLICATION AND BASIC PROBABILITY CONCEPT11

Figure 2.1: wheel of player C

Figure 2.2: wheel of player R

C makes a negative payment to player R. By this we mean that player R

makes a positive payment to player C. For example, if the row - wheel shows
2 and the column - wheel shows 4, then player R pays player C the sum of
$ 4. Because, the corresponding entry in the table is -4 $ . In this way, the
positive entries of the table are the gains of player R and the losses of player
C and the negative entries are the gains of player C, the losses of player R.
12 CHAPTER 2. CHAPTER 2

Player C’s Move

1 2 3 4
Player R’s move 1 $3 $5 -$2 -$1
2 -$2 $4 -$3 -$4
3 $6 -$5 $0 $3

Table 2.1: Payment of player R

2.2 Two person zero sum matrix game

The game described above is an example of a two-person zero-
Sum matrix game. The term zero-sum means that in each play
of the game, the positive gain of one player equal to the negative
gain (loss) of the other player. That is, the sum of the two gain
is zero. The term matrix game is used to describe a two-person
game in which each player has only a finite number of moves, so
that all possible outcomes of each play, and the corresponding
gains of the players, may be displayed in tabular or matrix form,
as in table 2.1.
In a general game of this type, let player R have m possible moves
and let player C have n possible moves. In a play of the game.
each player makes one of his or her possible moves, and then
a payoff is made from player C to player R, depending on the
moves.For i = 1, 2, 3 . . . , m and j = 1, 2, 3 . . . , n , let us set
aij = payoff that player C makes to player R if
player R makes move i and player C makes move j.

This payoff need not be money; it may be any type of commodity

to which we can attach a numerical value. As before, if an entry
aij is negative, we mean that player C receives a payoff of —aij —
from player R. We arrange these mn possible payoffs in the form
of an m × n matrix
 
a11 a12 . . . a1n
 a21 a22 . . . a2n 
A =  ..
 
.. .. 
 . . . 
am1 am2 . . . amn
2.2. TWO PERSON ZERO SUM MATRIX GAME 13

which we will call the payoffs matrix of the game.

Each player is to make his or her moves on a probabilistic basis.
For example, for the game discussed in the introduction, the ra-
tio of the area of a sector to the area of the wheel would be the
probability that the player makes the move corresponding to that
sector.Thus from figure we see that player R would make move 2
with probability 31 ,and player C would make move 2 with proba-
bility 14 .In the general case we make the following definitions
pi = probability that player R makes move i (i =
1,2,3, . . . , m)
qj = probability that player C makes move j (j =
1,2,3, . . . , n)
It follows from these definition that
p1 + p2 + . . . + pm = 1
and
q 1 + q2 + . . . + qn = 1
with the probabilities pi and qj we form two vectors:
 
q1
 q2 
   
p = p1 p2 . . . pm and q =  .. 
.
qn

We call the row vector p the strategy of player R and the

column vector q the strategy of player C . For example, from
figure 2.1 and 2.2. 1
4
1 1 1
 1
p= and q =  4
6 3 2 1
3
1
6
for the carnival game described earlier.

From the theory of probability, if the probability that the player

R makes move i is pi and independently the probability that the
player C makes move j is qj , then pi qj is the probability that for
any one play of the game player R makes move i and player C
makes move j. the payoff to player R for such a pair of moves
is aij . If we multiply each possible payoff by its corresponding
14 CHAPTER 2. CHAPTER 2

probability and sum over all possible payoffs, we obtain their ex-
pression

a11 p1 q1 + a12 p1 q2 + . . . + a1n p1 qn + a21 p2 q1 + . . . + amn pm qn

(2.1)

Equation 2.1 is a weighted average of the payoffs to player R; each

payoff is weighted according to the probability of its occurance.
In the theory of probability, this weighted average is called the
expected payoff to player R. It can be shown that if the game
is played many times, the long-term average payoff per play to
player R is given by this expression. We denote this expected
payoff by E(p,q) to emphasize the fact that it depends on the
strategies of the two players.From the definition of the payoff
matrix A and the strategies p and q, it can be verified that we
may express the expected payoff
 in matrix notation
  as
a11 a12 . . . a1n q1
   a21 a22 . . . a2n   q2 
  
E(p,q) = p1 p2 . . . pm  .. ..   ..  = pAq

..
 . . .   .
am1 am2 . . . amn qn
Because E(p,q) is the expected payoff to player R, it follows that
-E(p,q) 1s tne expected payoff of player C.

Example 1. Expected Payoff to Player R

For the carnival game described earlier, we have  
  1
1 1 1 3 5 −2 −1 4
1 13
E(p,q) = pAq = 6 3 2 −2 4 −3 −4  4
1 = 2
=
6 −5 0 3 3
1
6
0.1805

Thus,in the long run, player R can expect to revive an average of

about18 cents from a player C in each play of the game.

So far we have been discussing the situation in which each player

has predetermined strategy. We will now consider the more diffi-
cult situation in which both players may change their strategies
2.2. TWO PERSON ZERO SUM MATRIX GAME 15

independently. For example, in the game described in the intro-

duction, we would allow both players to alter the areas of the
sectors of their wheels and thereby control the probabilities of
their respective moves. This qualitatively changes the nature of
the problem and puts us firmly in the field of true game theory. It
is understood that neither player knows what strategy the other
will choose. It is also assumed that each player will make the best
possible choice of strategy and that the other player knows this.
Thus, player R attempts to choose a strategy p such that E (p.
q) is as large as possible for the best strategy q that player C can
choose; and similarly. player C attempts to choose a strategy q
such E (p.q) that is as small as possible for the best strategy
p player R can choose. To see that such choices are actually
possible, we shall need the following theorem, called the Fun-
damental Theorem of Two-Person Zero-Sum Games.
(The general proof, which involves ideas from the theory of linear
programming,will be omitted.However,later we shall prove two
special cases of the theorem.)
16 CHAPTER 2. CHAPTER 2

2.3 Fundamental theorem of Zero Sum Game

Theorem 1. Fundamental Theorem of Zero-Sum Games
There exist strategies p* and q* such that
E(p*,q) ≥ E(p*,q*) ≥ E(p,q*)
for all strategies p and q

The strategies p* and q* in this theorem are the best possible

strategies for players R and C, respectively. To see why this is so,
let v = E (p*,q*). The left-hand inequality of Theorem 1 then
reads
E (p*,q) ≥ v for all strategies q This means that if player R
chooses the strategy p*. then no matter what strategy q player
C chooses, , the expected payoff to player R will never be below
v. Moreover, it is not possible for player R to achieve an expected
payoff greater than v.To see why,suppose there is some strategy
p** that player R can choose such that
E (p**,q) > v for all strategies q Then, in particular,
E (p**,q*). > v But this contradicts the right-hand inequality of
Theorem 1, which requires that v ≥ E (p**,q*). Consequently,
the best player R can do is prevent his or her expected payoff
from falling below the value v. Similarly, the best player C can
do is ensure that player R’s expected payoff does not exceed v,
and this can be achieved by using strategy q*. On the basis of
this discussion, we arrive at the following definitions.

Definition 1. If p* and q* are strategies such that

E(p*,q) ≥ E(p*,q*) ≥ E(p,q*) (2.2)

for all strategies p and q, then

1. p* is called an optimal strategy for player R.

2. q* is called an optimal strategy for player C.

3. v = E(p*,q*) is called the value of the game.

2.3. FUNDAMENTAL THEOREM OF ZERO SUM GAME 17

The wording in this definition suggests that optimal strategies are not
necessarily unique. This is indeed the case. However, it ean be proved that
any two sets or optimal strategies always result in the same value v of the
game. That is, if p*,q* and p**,q** are optimal strategies, then

E(p*,q*) = E(p**,q**) (2.3)

The value of a game is thus the expected payoff to player R when both
choose any possible optimal strategies.
To find optimal strategies we must find vectors p* and q* that satisfy Equa-
tion 2.2 This is generally done by using linear programming techniques. Next,
we discuss special cases for which optimal strategies may be found by more
elementary techniques. now introduce the following definition.

Definition 2. An entry ars in a payoff matrix A is called a saddle point

if :

1. ars is the smallest entry in its row, and

2. ars is the largest entry in its column.

A game whose payoff matrix has a saddle point is called strictly deter-
mined.

For example, the shaded elements in each of the

 following payoffmatrices
  0 −3 5 −9
  30 −50 −5
3 1  15 −8 −2 10 
is a saddle point: 60 90 75   
−4 0  7 10 6 9
−10 60 −30
6 11 −3 2
If a matrix has a saddle point ars , it turns out that the following strate-
gies are optimal strategies for the two players:
 
0
0
.
.
  .
p* = 0 0 . . . 1 . . . 0 q* =  
1
.
 .. 
0
18 CHAPTER 2. CHAPTER 2

That is, an optimal strategy for player R is to always make the rth
move, and an optimal strategy for player C is to always make the
sth move. Such strategies for which only one move is possible are
called pure strategies. Strategies for which more than one move
is possible are called mixed strategies.To show that the above
pure strategies are optimal,the reader may verify the following
three equations:

E(p*.q*) = p*Aq* = ars (2.4)

E(p*.q) = p*Aq ≥ ars (2.5)

E(p.q*) = pAq* ≤ ars (2.6)

Together,these three equations imply that

E(p*.q) ≥ E(p*.q*) ≥ E(p.q*) (2.7)

for all strategies p and q.Because this is exactly Equation 2.2. It follows
that p* and q* are optimal strategies. From Equation 2.4 the value of a
strictly determined game is simply the numerical value of a saddle point
ars .It is possible for a payoff matrix to have several saddle points,but then
the uniqueness of the value of a game guarantees that the numerical values
of all saddle points are the same.
Chapter 3

Chapter 3

3.1 Optimal strategies

Example 2. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES TO MAXIMIZE A VIEWING AU-
DIENCE

Two competing television networks, R and C are scheduling one-

hour programs in the same time period. Network Rcan schedule
one of three possible programs, and network C can schedule one
of four possible programs. Neither network knows which pro-
gram the other will schedule. Both networks ask the same out-
side polling agency to give them an estimate of how all possible
pairings of the programs will divide the viewing audience. The
agency gives them each Table 3.1, whose (i. j)-th entry is the
percentage of the viewing audience that will watch network R if
network R’s program i is paired against network C ’s program
j. What program should each network schedule in order to max-
imize its viewing audience?

19
20 CHAPTER 3. CHAPTER 3

Network C ’s Program
1 2 3 4
Network R’s Program 1 60 20 30 55
2 50 75 45 60
3 70 45 35 30

Table 3.1: Audience Percentage for Network R

Solution
Subtract 50 from cach entry in 3.1 to construct the following
matrix:
 
10 −30 −20 5
 0 25 −5 10 
20 −5 −15 −20

This is the payoff matrix of the two-person zero-sum game in which each
network is considered to start with 50% of the audience, and the (i, j )-th
entry of the matrix is the percentage of the viewing audience that network
C loses to network R if programs i and j are paired against each other.It is
easy to see that the entry
a23 = −5
is a saddle point of the payoff matrix. Hence, the optimal strategy of network
R is to schedule program 2, and the optimal strategy of network C is to
schedule program 3. This will result in network R’s receiving 45% of the
audience and network C ’s receiving 55% of the audience.
2 × 2 matrix
Another case in which the optimal strategies can be found by elementary
means occurs when each player has only two possible moves. In this case,
the payoff matrix is a 2 x 2 matrix
 
a11 a12
A=
a21 a22
If the game is strictly determined, at least one of the four entries of A is
a saddle point, and the techniques discussed above can then be applied to
determine for optimal strategies the two players. If the game is not strictly
determined, we first compute payoff for arbitrary strategies p and q :
3.1. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 21
  
  a11 a12 q1
E(p, q) = pAq = p1 p2
a21 a22 q2

= a11 p1 q1 + a12 p1 q2 + a21 p2 q1 + a22 p2 q2 (3.1)

Because

p1 + p2 = 1 and q1 + q2 = 1 (3.2)

we may substitute p2 = 1 − p1 and q2 = 1 − q1 into (3.1) to obtain

E(p, q) = a11 p1 q1 + a12 p1 (1 − q1 ) + a21 (1 − p1 )q1 + a22 (1 − p1 )(1 − q1 )

(3.3)

If we rearrange the terms in Equation(11),we may write

E(p, q) = [(a11 + a22 − a12 − a21 )p1 − (a22 − a21 )]q1 + (a12 − a22 )p1 + a22
(3.4)

By examining the coefficient of the q1 term in (3.4), we see that if we set

a22 − a21
p1 = p∗1 = (3.5)
a11 + a22 − a12 − a21
then that coefficient is zero, and (3.4) reduces to

a11 a22 − a12 a21

E(p*, q) = (3.6)
a11 + a22 − a12 − a21
Equation (3.6) is independent of q; that is, if player R chooses the strategy
determined by (3.5), player C cannot change the expected payoff by varying
his or her strategy. In a similar manner, it may be verified that if player C
chooses the strategy determined by
a22 − a12
q1 = q1∗ = (3.7)
a11 + a22 − a12 − a21
then substituting in (3.4) gives
a11 a22 − a12 a21
E(p, q*) = (3.8)
a11 + a22 − a12 − a21
22 CHAPTER 3. CHAPTER 3

Equations (3.6) and (3.8) show that

E(p*, q) = E(p*, q*) = E(p, q*) = (3.9)
for all strategies p and q. Thus, the strategies determined by (3.5), (3.7) and
(3.2) are optimal strategies for players R and C respectively and so we have
the following result.
Theorem 2. Optical Strategies for a 2 × 2 Matrix Game
For a 2 × 2 matrix game that is not strictly determined, optimal strategies
for players R and C are
22 −a21 a11 −a12
p∗ = a11 +aa22
 
−a12 −a21 a11 +a22 −a12 −a21

and
 a22 −a12 
∗ a11 +a22 −a12 −a21
q = a11 −a21
a11 +a22 −a12 −a21

The value of the game is

a11 a22 −a12 a21
v= a11 +a22 −a12 −a21

In order to be complete, we must show that the entries in the vectors p*

and q* are numbers strictly between 0 and 1.
Equation (3.9) is interesting in that it implies that either player may
force the expected payoff to be the value of the game by choosing his or her
optimal strategy, regardless of which strategy the other player chooses. This
is not true, in general, for games in which either player has more than two
moves.
Example 3. Using Theorem 2 The federal government desires to inoculate
its citizens against a certain flu virus.The virus has two strains, and the
proportions in which the two strains occur in the virus population is not
known. Two vaccines have been developed. Vaccine 1 is 85% efective against
strain 1 and 70% effective against strain 2. Vaccine 2 is 60% effective against
strain 1 and 90% effective against strain 2. What inoculation policy should
the government adopt?
Solution
We may consider this a two-person game in which player R (the government)
desires to make the payoff (the fraction of citizens resistant to the virus) as
large as possible and player C ( the virus) desires to make the payoff as small
as possible. The payoff matrix is
3.1. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 23

Strain
1 2
 
1 .85 .70
Vaccine
2 .60 .90
This matrix has no saddle points, so Theorem 2 is applicable.Consequently,
p∗1 = a11 +aa22−a 21
22 −a12 −a21
.90−.60
= .85+.90−.70−.60 = .30
.45
= 23
q1∗ = a11 +aa22−a 12
22 −a12 −a21
.90−.70
= .85+.90−.70−.60 = .20
.45
= 49
v = a11a11 a22 −a12 a21
+a22 −a12 −a21
= (.85)(.90)−(.70)(.60)
.85+.90−.70−.60
= .345
.45
= .7666 . . .
Thus the optimal strategy for the government is to inoculate 23 of the citizens
with vaccine 1 and 31 of the citizens with vaccine 2. This will guarantee that
about 76.7% of the citizens will be resistant to a virus attack regardless of the
distribution of the two strains.
In contrast, a virus distribution 94 of strain 1 and 59 of strain 2 will result
in the same 76.7% of resistant citizens, regardless of the inoculation strategy
adopted by the government.
Chapter 4

Chapter 4

4.1 Conclusion
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions
among rational agents.[1] It has applications in all fields of social science,
as well as in logic, systems science and computer science. Originally, it
addressed two-person zero-sum games, in which each participant’s gains or
losses are exactly balanced by those of other participants. In the 21st century,
game theory applies to a wide range of behavioral relations; it is now an
umbrella term for the science of logical decision making in humans, animals,
as well as computers.

24
Bibliography

[1] Vladimir Mazalov. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications . Joh

Wiley and Sons Inc,2014

[2] Howard Anton, Chris Rorres Elementary Linear Algebra and Applications
.9th Edition , John Wiley and Sons Canada,Limited, 2010.

[3] Steven Tadelis. Game Theory An Introduction,Princeton University

Press, 2013.

25