Lawrence Sulla

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. RALPH C. LANTION

G.R. No. 139465, Jan. 18, 2000
MELO, J.:

FACTS:
June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of
arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and
other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers
submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States
with violation of the provisions of the United States Code (USC)

On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating
and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case
pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the
panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the
extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found
that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not
attached to the request and that there are some other matters that needed to
be addressed"

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private

respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to
petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U. S.
Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and
that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested
that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.

In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-

letter dated July 13, 1999 denied the foregoing requests on August 6, 1999,
private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region a petition for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition
with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction.

August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order to maintain the status quo
from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the
United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner. Forthwith,
petitioner initiated the instant proceedings
Lawrence Sulla

ISSUES:
WON private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty.

RULING:

First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to
pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves
only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to
private respondent on foreign relations.

The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental
maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their
agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties
under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution
which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine
of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land
and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in
the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p.
12).

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and
municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of
the land are not pitted against each other. There is no occasion to choose
which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No.
1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at
the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier
abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing
are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the
law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures
also manifests this silence.

We disagree with the petitioner’s interpretation as this silence as

unavailability of these rights, that the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte
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technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the

supporting documents.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair
play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and
hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the
Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective
extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition
pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as
explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of
the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he
does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35
C.J.S. 410).

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law,
as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any
prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an
application by analogy.

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of

due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling
complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC,
273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278
SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence,
procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283
SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of
constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty.

Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the
Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition
Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we

upheld the due process rights of the respondent.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present
danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may
eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The
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convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the... extradition request and

the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing

currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of
freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. RALPH C. LANTION

G.R. No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000
PUNO, J.:

FACTS:
February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration against the January 18, 2000 court decision assailing that
the decision on the ground: "The majority decision failed to appreciate the
following facts and points of substance and of value which, if considered,
would alter the result of the case

April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and

Maintenance of Action and Filing of Reply. August 18, 2000, a Motion to
Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7, 2000 Manifestation with its
attached note verbales.

ISSUES:
WON the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

RULING:
We end where we began. A myopic interpretation of the due process clause
would not suffice to resolve the conflicting rights in the case at bar. With the
global village shrinking at a rapid pace, propelled as it is by technological
leaps in transportation and communication, we need to push further back our
horizons and work with the rest of the civilized nations and move closer to
the universal goals of "peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity with all nations." In the end, it is the individual who will reap... the
harvest of peace and prosperity from these efforts.

Yes, we now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Lawrence Sulla

First. P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty
provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition
for extradition as well as its supporting papers. Hence, there is no provision
in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an
extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies
of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting
documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing
evaluation.

Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be

interpreted in light of their intent.
We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still
on his prosecution. Justice is best served when done without delay.

Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the

parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as the general
interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties
with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power
to interpret treaties, the meaning given them by the departments of
government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is
accorded great weight.

Fourth. Private respondent, however, peddles the postulate that he must be

afforded the right to notice and hearing as required by our Constitution. An
extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which
will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. As a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by
one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation.

Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of
his right to notice and hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty
"which may be more priceless than life." The supposed threat to private
respondent's liberty is perceived to come from several provisions of the RP-
US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and
temporary detention.

Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that
private respondent may be provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the
request for extradition. Our DFA has long received the extradition request
from the United States and has turned it over to the DOJ. It is undisputed
that until today, the United States has not requested for private respondent's
Lawrence Sulla

provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private respondent's liberty has

passed. It is more imagined than real.

Sixth. To be sure, private respondent's plea for due process deserves serious
consideration involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. In the case
at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondent's claim to
due process predicated on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which
provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law . . ."Without a bubble of doubt, procedural due
process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which accords
paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the
weight it deserves.

Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its
evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private
respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is
weak, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government
thru the petitioner Secretary of Justice.

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses
that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at
all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings.
Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due,
when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior
determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all
due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an
individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."

P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an
extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the
petition is filed in court. The extraditee's right to know is momentarily
withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to
accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of
potential extraditees which can be precipitated by... premature information
of the basis of the request for his extradition.
Lawrence Sulla

GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S. v. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN

G.R. No. 148571, Sep. 24, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States
Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine
Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by
Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by... duly authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as
Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the
secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice
(SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was
granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the Court.

On October 17, 2000 the Court issued a Resolution to reconsidered and

reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process and making the Resolution as final and executory

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of

America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed on May 18, 2001 the
appropriate Petition for Extradition. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that
Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States
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District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The
warrant had been issued in connection with the charges being incurred.

In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance
of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion," which prayed that petitioner's application for an arrest warrant be
set for hearing. In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the
Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that
hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by
the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUES:
1. WON Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his
arrest can be issued.
2. WON he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending.

RULING:
1. No, though both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their
arguments. We rule in the negative.
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses
the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification
would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving
facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present
such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
considered "immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a
mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of
urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.

By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is
not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected
to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual
situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge
and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a
good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy
initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by

Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest
Lawrence Sulla

warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath
or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There
is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of
warrants of arrest.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely

further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case,
validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing
the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with
the rationale for the entire system.

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action
is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective
of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more
restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of
respondent's demonstrated predisposition to flee.

2. No, Jimenez is not entitled to bail and to provisional liberty. The Court
agrees with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the

extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that
country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before
those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with
the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process
now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place
with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would
encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut
short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the
Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for
their speedy disposition.