Chapter 7: Voting Systems

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Chapter 7: Voting Systems

Section 7.1: Voting Methods

Every couple of years or so, voters go to the polls to cast ballots for their choices for
mayor, governor, senator, president, etc. Then the election officials count the ballots and
declare a winner. But how do the election officials determine who the winner is. If there
are only two candidates, then there is no problem figuring out the winner. The candidate
with more than 50% of the votes wins. This is known as the majority. So the candidate
with the majority of the votes is the winner.

Majority Rule: This concept means that the candidate (choice) receiving more than 50%
of the vote is the winner.

But what happens if there are three candidates, and no one receives the majority? That
depends on where you live. Some places decide that the person with the most votes wins,
even if they don’t have a majority. There are problems with this, in that someone could
be liked by 35% of the people, but is disliked by 65% of the people. So you have a
winner that the majority doesn’t like. Other places conduct runoff elections where the top
two candidates have to run again, and then the winner is chosen from the runoff election.
There are some problems with this method. First, it is very costly for the candidates and
the election office to hold a second election. Second, you don’t know if you will have the
same voters voting in the second election, and so the preferences of the voters in the first
election may not be taken into account.

So what can be done to have a better election that has someone liked by more voters yet
doesn't require a runoff election? A ballot method that can fix this problem is known as a
preference ballot.

Preference Ballots: Ballots in which voters choose not only their favorite candidate, but
they actually order all of the candidates from their most favorite down to their least
favorite.

Note: Preference Ballots are transitive: If a voter prefers choice A to choice B and also
prefers choice B to choice C, then the voter must prefer choice A to choice C.

To understand how a preference ballot works and how to determine the winner, we will
look at an example.

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Example 7.1.1: Preference Ballot for the Candy Election
Suppose an election is held to determine which bag of candy will be opened. The
choices (candidates) are Hershey’s Miniatures (M), Nestle Crunch (C), and Mars’
Snickers (S). Each voter is asked to fill in the following ballot, by marking their
first, second, and third place choices.

Figure 7.1.1: Preference Ballot for the Candy Election

Candy Preference
Crunch _________
Miniatures _________
Snickers _________

Each voter fills out the above ballot with their preferences, and what follows is
the results of the election.

Table 7.1.2: Ballots Cast for the Candy Election

Voter Anne Bob Chloe Dylan Eli Fred
st
1 choice C M C M S S
nd
2 choice S S M C M M
rd
3 choice M C S S C C

Voter George Hiza Isha Jacy Kalb Lan

1st choice S S S M C M
2nd choice M M M C M C
3rd choice C C C S S S

Voter Makya Nadira Ochen Paki Quinn Riley

1st choice S S C C S S
2nd choice M M M M M M
3rd choice C C S S C C

Now we must count the ballots. It isn’t as simple as just counting how many voters like
each candidate. You have to look at how many liked the candidate in first-place, second
place, and third place. So there needs to be a better way to organize the results. This is
known as a preference schedule.

Preference Schedule: A table used to organize the results of all the preference ballots in
an election.

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Example 7.1.2: Preference Schedule for the Candy Election

Using the ballots from Example 7.1.1, we can count how many people liked each
ordering. Looking at Table 7.1.2, you may notice that three voters (Dylan, Jacy,
and Lan) had the order M, then C, then S. Bob is the only voter with the order M,
then S, then C. Chloe, Kalb, Ochen, and Paki had the order C, M, S. Anne is the
only voter who voted C, S, M. All the other 9 voters selected the order S, M, C.
Notice, no voter liked the order S, C, M. We can summarize this information in a
table, called the preference schedule.

Table 7.1.3: Preference Schedule for the Candy Election

Number of voters 3 1 4 1 9
1st choice M M C C S
2nd choice C S M S M
rd
3 choice S C S M C

Methods of Counting Ballots:

Now that we have organized the ballots, how do we determine the winner? There are
several different methods that can be used. The easiest, and most familiar, is the Plurality
Method.

Plurality Method: The candidate with the most first-place votes wins the election.

Example 7.1.3: The Winner of the Candy Election—Plurality Method

Using the preference schedule in Table 7.1.3, find the winner using the Plurality
Method.

From the preference schedule you can see that four (3 + 1) people choose
Hershey’s Miniatures as their first choice, five (4 + 1) picked Nestle Crunch as
their first choice, and nine picked Snickers as their first choice. So Snickers wins
with the most first-place votes, although Snickers does not have the majority of
first-place votes.

There is a problem with the Plurality Method. Notice that nine people picked Snickers as
their first choice, yet seven chose it as their third choice. Thus, nine people may be happy
if the Snickers bag is opened, but seven people will not be happy at all. So let’s look at
another way to determine the winner.

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The Borda Count Method (Point System): Each place on a preference ballot is
assigned points. Last place receives one point, next to last place receives two points, and
so on. Thus, if there are N candidates, then first-place receives N points. Now, multiply
the point value for each place by the number of voters at the top of the column to find the
points each candidate wins in a column. Lastly, total up all the points for each candidate.
The candidate with the most points wins.

Example 7.1.4: The Winner of the Candy Election—Borda Count Method

Using the preference schedule in Table 7.1.3, find the winner using the Borda
Count Method.

Table 7.1.3: Preference Schedule for the Candy Election

Number of voters 3 1 4 1 9
st
1 choice M M C C S
nd
2 choice C S M S M
rd
3 choice S C S M C

The third choice receives one point, second choice receives two points, and first
choice receives three points. There were three voters who chose the order M, C, S.
So M receives 3*3 = 9 points for the first-place, C receives 3*2 = 6 points, and S
receives 3*1 = 3 points for those ballots. The same process is conducted for the
other columns. The table below summarizes the points that each candy received.

Table 7.1.4: Preference Schedule of the Candy Election with Borda Count
Points
Number of voters 3 1 4 1 9
st
1 choice M M C C S
9 3 12 3 27
nd
2 choice C S M S M
6 2 8 2 18
rd
3 choice S C S M C
3 1 4 1 9

Adding up these points gives,

M = 9 + 3 + 8 + 1 + 18 = 39
C = 6 + 1 + 12 + 3 + 9 = 31
S = 3 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 27 = 38

Thus, Hershey’s Miniatures wins using the Borda Count Method.

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So who is the winner? With one method Snicker’s wins and with another method
Hershey’s Miniatures wins. The problem is that it all depends on which method you use.
Therefore, you need to decide which method to use before you run the election.

The Plurality with Elimination Method (Sequential Runoffs): Eliminate the

candidate with the least amount of 1st place votes and re-distribute their votes amongst
the other candidates. Repeat this process until you find a winner. Note: At any time
during this process if a candidate has a majority of first-place votes, then that
candidate is the winner.

Example 7.1.5: The Winner of the Candy Election—Plurality with Elimination

Method
Using the preference schedule in Table 7.1.3, find the winner using the Plurality
with Elimination Method.

Table 7.1.3: Preference Schedule for the Candy Election

Number of voters 3 1 4 1 9
1st choice M M C C S
nd
2 choice C S M S M
rd
3 choice S C S M C

This isn’t the most exciting example, since there are only three candidates, but the
process is the same whether there are three or many more. So look at how many
first-place votes there are. M has , C has , and S has 9. So M is
eliminated from the preference schedule.

Table 7.1.5: Preference Schedule for the Candy Election with M Eliminated
Number of voters 3 1 4 1 9
st
1 choice M M C C S
nd
2 choice C S M S M
rd
3 choice S C S M C

So the preference schedule becomes:

Table 7.1.6: Preference Schedule for the Candy Election with M Eliminated
Number of voters 3 1 4 1 9
st
1 choice C S C C S
nd
2 choice S C S S C

And then we can condense it down to:

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Table 7.1.7: Preference Schedule for the Candy Election Condensed
Number of voters 8 10
st
1 choice C S
2nd choice S C

So C has eight first-place votes, and S has 10. So S wins.

The Method of Pairwise Comparisons: Compare each candidate to the other candidates
in one-on-one match-ups. Give the winner of each pairwise comparison a point. The
candidate with the most points wins.

Example 7.1.6: The Winner of the Candy Election—Pairwise Comparisons Method

Using the preference schedule in Table 7.1.3, find the winner using the Pairwise
Comparisons Method.

Table 7.1.3: Preference Schedule for the Candy Election

Number of voters 3 1 4 1 9
st
1 choice M M C C S
nd
2 choice C S M S M
rd
3 choice S C S M C

If you only have an election between M and C (the first one-on-one match-up),
then M wins the three votes in the first column, the one vote in the second
column, and the nine votes in the last column. That means that M has thirteen
votes while C has five. So M wins when compared to C. M gets one point.

If you only compare M and S (the next one-on-one match-up), then M wins the
first three votes in column one, the next one vote in column two, and the four
votes in column three. M has eight votes and S has 10 votes. So S wins compared
to M, and S gets one point.

Comparing C to S, C wins the three votes in column one, the four votes in column
three, and one vote in column four. C has eight votes while S has 10 votes. So S
wins compared to C, and S gets one point.

To summarize, M has one point, and S has two points. Thus, S wins the election
using the Method of Pairwise Comparisons.

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Table 7.1.8: Summary of One-on-One Match-Ups for the Candy Election

Match-Up 1 Match-Up 2 Match-Up 3
M vs. C M vs. S S vs. C
13 to 5 8 to 10 10 to 8
Winner of Match-Up 1: M Winner of Match-Up 2: S Winner of Match-Up 3: S

M: 1
S: 2
C: 0
Thus, S wins the election.
Note: If any one given match-up ends in a tie, then both candidates receive ½ point each
for that match-up.

The problem with this method is that many overall elections (not just the one-on-one
match-ups) will end in a tie, so you need to have a tie-breaker method designated before
beginning the tabulation of the ballots. Another problem is that if there are more than
three candidates, the number of pairwise comparisons that need to be analyzed becomes
unwieldy. So, how many pairwise comparisons are there?

In Example 7.1.6, there were three one-on-one comparisons when there were three
candidates. You may think that means the number of pairwise comparisons is the same as
the number of candidates, but that is not correct. Let’s see if we can come up with a
formula for the number of candidates. Suppose you have four candidates called A, B, C,
and D. A is to be matched up with B, C, and D (three comparisons). B is to be compared
with C and D, but has already been compared with A (two comparisons). C needs to be
compared with D, but has already been compared with A and B (one more comparison).
Therefore, the total number of one-on-one match-ups is 3 + 2 + 1 = 6 comparisons that
need to be made with four candidates. What about five or six or more candidates?
Looking at five candidates, the first candidate needs to be matched-up with four other
candidates, the second candidate needs to be matched-up with three other candidates, the
third candidate needs to be matched-up with two other candidates, and the fourth
candidate needs to only be matched-up with the last candidate for one more match-up.
Thus, the total is 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 =10 pairwise comparisons when there are five candidates.

Now, for six candidates, you would have 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 15 pairwise comparisons to

do. Continuing this pattern, if you have N candidates then there are
( N − 1) + ( N − 2 ) +  + 3 + 2 + 1 pairwise comparisons. For small numbers of candidates,
it isn’t hard to add these numbers up, but for large numbers of candidates there is a
shortcut for adding the numbers together. It turns out that the following formula is true:

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N ( N − 1)
( N − 1) + ( N − 2 ) +  + 3 + 2 + 1 = . Thus, for 10 candidates, there are
2
10 (10 − 1) 10 ( 9 )
9 + 8 + 7 + 6 + 5 + 4 + 3 + 2=
+1 = = 45 pairwise comparisons. So you
2 2
can see that in this method, the number of pairwise comparisons to do can get large quite
quickly.

Now that we have reviewed four different voting methods, how do you decide which
method to use? One question to ask is which method is the fairest? Unfortunately, there is
no completely fair method. This is based on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: No voting system can satisfy all four fairness criteria
in all cases.

This brings up the question, what are the four fairness criteria? They are guidelines that
people use to help decide which voting method would be best to use under certain
circumstances. They are the Majority Criterion, Condorcet Criterion, Monotonicity
Criterion, and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion.

Fairness Criteria:
The Majority Criterion (Criterion 1): If a candidate receives a majority of the 1st-place
votes in an election, then that candidate should be the winner of the election.
The Condorcet Criterion (Criterion 2): If there is a candidate that in a head-to-head
comparison is preferred by the voters over every other candidate, then that candidate
should be the winner of the election. This candidate is known as the Condorcet candidate.
The Monotonicity Criterion (Criterion 3): If candidate X is a winner of an election
and, in a re-election, the only changes in the ballots are changes that favor X, then X
should remain a winner of the election.
The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion (Criterion 4): If candidate X
is a winner of an election and one (or more) of the other candidates is removed and the
ballots recounted, then X should still be a winner of the election.

Example 7.1.7: Condorcet Criterion Violated

Suppose you have a vacation club trying to figure out where it wants to spend
next year’s vacation. The choices are Hawaii (H), Anaheim (A), or Orlando (O).
The preference schedule for this election is shown below in Table 7.1.9.

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Table 7.1.9: Preference Schedule of Vacation Election

Number of voters 1 3 3 3
st
1 choice A A O H
nd
2 choice O H H A
rd
3 choice H O A O
Using the Plurality Method, A has four first-place votes, O has three first-place
votes, and H has three first-place votes. So, Anaheim is the winner. However, if
you use the Method of Pairwise Comparisons, A beats O (A has seven while O
has three), H beats A (H has six while A has four), and H beats O (H has six while
O has four). Thus, Hawaii wins all pairwise comparisons against the other
candidates, and would win the election. In fact Hawaii is the Condorcet candidate.
However, the Plurality Method declared Anaheim the winner, so the Plurality
Method violated the Condorcet Criterion.

Example 7.1.8: Monotonicity Criterion Violated

Suppose you have a voting system for a mayor. The resulting preference schedule
for this election is shown below in Table 7.1.10.

Table 7.1.10: Preference Schedule of Mayoral Election

Number of voters 37 22 12 29
st
1 choice Adams Brown Brown Carter
nd
2 choice Brown Carter Adams Adams
rd
3 choice Carter Adams Carter Brown

Using the Plurality with Elimination Method, Adams has 37 first-place votes,
Brown has 34, and Carter has 29, so Carter would be eliminated. Carter’s votes go
to Adams, and Adams wins. Suppose that the results were announced, but then the
election officials accidentally destroyed the ballots before they could be certified,
so the election must be held again. Wanting to “jump on the bandwagon,” 10 of
the voters who had originally voted in the order Brown, Adams, Carter; change
their vote to the order of Adams, Brown, Carter. No other voting changes are
made. Thus, the only voting changes are in favor of Adams. The new preference
schedule is shown below in Table 7.1.11.

Table 7.1.11: Preference Schedule of Mayoral Re-election

Number of voters 47 22 2 29
st
1 choice Adams Brown Brown Carter
nd
2 choice Brown Carter Adams Adams
rd
3 choice Carter Adams Carter Brown

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Now using the Plurality with Elimination Method, Adams has 47 first-place votes,
Brown has 24, and Carter has 29. This time, Brown is eliminated first instead of
Carter. Two of Brown’s votes go to Adams and 22 of Brown’s votes go to Carter.
Now, Adams has 47 + 2 = 49 votes and Carter has 29 + 22 = 51 votes. Carter
wins the election. This doesn’t make sense since Adams had won the election
before, and the only changes that were made to the ballots were in favor of
Adams. However, Adams doesn’t win the re-election. The reason that this
happened is that there was a difference in who was eliminated first, and that
caused a difference in how the votes are re-distributed. In this example, the
Plurality with Elimination Method violates the Monotonicity Criterion.

Example 7.1.9: Majority Criterion Violated

Suppose a group is planning to have a conference in one of four Arizona cities:
Flagstaff, Phoenix, Tucson, or Yuma. The votes for where to hold the conference
are summarized in the preference schedule shown below in Table 7.1.12.

Table 7.1.12: Preference Schedule for Conference City

Number of voters 51 25 10 14
st
1 choice Flagstaff Phoenix Yuma Tucson
nd
2 choice Phoenix Yuma Phoenix Phoenix
rd
3 choice Tucson Tucson Tucson Yuma
th
4 choice Yuma Flagstaff Flagstaff Flagstaff

If we use the Borda Count Method to determine the winner then the number of
Borda points that each candidate receives are shown in Table 7.1.13.

Table 7.1.13: Preference Schedule for Conference City with Borda Points
Number of voters 51 25 10 14
st
1 choice Flagstaff Phoenix Yuma Tucson
4 points 204 100 40 56
nd
2 choice Phoenix Yuma Phoenix Phoenix
3 points 153 75 30 42
rd
3 choice Tucson Tucson Tucson Yuma
2 points 102 50 20 28
4th choice Yuma Flagstaff Flagstaff Flagstaff
1 point 51 25 10 14

The totals of all the Borda points for each city are:

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Flagstaff: 204 + 25 + 10 + 14 =
253 points
Phoenix: 153 + 100 + 30 + 42 =
325 points
Yuma: 51 + 75 + 40 + 28 =
194 points
Tucson: 102 + 50 + 20 + 56 =
228 points

Phoenix wins using the Borda Count Method. However, notice that Flagstaff
actually has the majority of first-place votes. There are 100 voters total and 51
voters voted for Flagstaff in first place (51/100 = 51% or a majority of the first-
place votes). So, Flagstaff should have won based on the Majority Criterion. This
shows how the Borda Count Method can violate the Majority Criterion.

Example 7.1.10: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion Violated

A committee is trying to award a scholarship to one of four students: Anna (A),
Brian (B), Carlos (C), and Dmitri (D). The votes are shown below.

Table 7.1.14: Preference Schedule for Scholarship

Number of voters 5 5 6 4
st
1 choice D A C B
nd
2 choice A C B D
rd
3 choice C B D A
th
4 choice B D A C

Using the Method of Pairwise Comparisons:

A vs B: 10 votes to 10 votes, A gets ½ point and B gets ½ point
A vs C: 14 votes to 6 votes, A gets 1 point
A vs D: 5 votes to 15 votes, D gets 1 point
B vs C: 4 votes to 16 votes, C gets 1 point
B vs D: 15 votes to 5 votes, B gets 1 point
C vs D: 11 votes to 9 votes, C gets 1 point

So A has 1½ points, B has 1 point, C has 2 points, and D has 1 point. So Carlos is
awarded the scholarship.

Now suppose it turns out that Dmitri didn’t qualify for the scholarship after all.
Though it should make no difference, the committee decides to recount the vote.
The preference schedule without Dmitri is below.

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Table 7.1.15: Preference Schedule for Scholarship with Dmitri Removed
Number of voters 10 6 4
st
1 choice A C B
2nd choice C B A
rd
3 choice B A C

Using the Method of Pairwise Comparisons:

A vs B: 10 votes to 10 votes, A gets ½ point and B gets ½ point
A vs C: 14 votes to 6 votes, A gets 1 point
B vs C: 4 votes to 16 votes, C gets 1 point

So A has 1½ points, B has ½ point, and C has 1 point. Now Anna is awarded the
scholarship instead of Carlos. This is an example of The Method of Pairwise
Comparisons violating the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion.

In summary, every one of the fairness criteria can possibly be violated by at least one of
the voting methods as shown in Table 7.1.16. However, keep in mind that this does not
mean that the voting method in question will violate a criterion in every election. It is just
important to know that these violations are possible.

Table 7.1.16: Summary of Violations of Fairness Criteria

Plurality Borda Count Plurality with Pairwise
Elimination Comparisons
Majority * Violation * *
Criterion Possible
Condorcet Violation Violation Violation *
Criterion Possible Possible Possible
Monotonicity * * Violation *
Criterion Possible
Independence Violation Violation Violation Violation
of Irrelevant Possible Possible Possible Possible
Alternatives
Criterion
* The indicated voting method does not violate the indicated criterion in any election.

Insincere Voting:
This is when a voter will not vote for whom they most prefer because they are afraid that
the person they are voting for won’t win, and they really don’t want another candidate to
win. So, they may vote for the person whom they think has the best chance of winning
over the person they don’t want to win. This happens often when there is a third party

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candidate running. As an example, if a Democrat, a Republican, and a Libertarian are all

running in the same race, and you happen to prefer the Libertarian candidate. However,
you are afraid that the Democratic candidate will win if you vote for the Libertarian
candidate, so instead you vote for the Republican candidate. You have voted insincerely
to your true preference.

Approval Voting:
Since there is no completely fair voting method, people have been trying to come up with
new methods over the years. One idea is to have the voters decide whether they approve
or disapprove of candidates in an election. This way, the voter can decide that they would
be happy with some of the candidates, but would not be happy with the other ones. A
possible ballot in this situation is shown in Table 7.1.17:

Table 7.1.17: Approval Voting Ballot

Candidate Approve Disapprove
Smith X
Baker X
James X
Paulsen X

This voter would approve of Smith or Paulsen, but would not approve of Baker or James.
In this type of election, the candidate with the most approval votes wins the election.

One issue with approval voting is that it tends to elect the least disliked candidate instead
of the best candidate. Another issue is that it can result in insincere voting as described
above.
As a reminder, there is no perfect voting method. Arrow proved that there never will be
one. So make sure that you determine the method of voting that you will use before you
conduct an election.

Section 7.2: Weighted Voting

Voting Power:
There are some types of elections where the voters do not all have the same amount of
power. This happens often in the business world where the power that a voter possesses
may be based on how many shares of stock he/she owns. In this situation, one voter may
control the equivalent of 100 votes where other voters only control 15 or 10 or fewer
votes. Therefore, the amount of power that each voter possesses is different. Another
example is in how the President of the United States is elected. When a person goes to the

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polls and casts a vote for President, he or she is actually electing who will go to the
Electoral College and represent that state by casting the actual vote for President. Each
state has a certain number of Electoral College votes, which is determined by the number
of Senators and number of Representatives in Congress. Some states have more Electoral
College votes than others, so some states have more power than others. How do we
determine the power that each state possesses?
To figure out power, we need to first define some concepts of a weighted voting system.
The individuals or entities that vote are called players. The notation for the players is
P1 , P2 , P3 , , PN , where N is the number of players. Each player controls a certain number
of votes, which are called the weight of that player. The notation for the weights is
w1 , w2 , w3 , , wN , where w1 is the weight of P1, w2 is the weight of P2, etc. In order for a
motion to pass, it must have a minimum number of votes. This minimum is known as the
quota. The notation for quota is q. The quota must be over half the total weights and
cannot be more than total weight. In other words,
w1 + w2 + w3 +  wN
< q ≤ w1 + w2 + w3 +  + wN
2

The way to denote a weighted voting system is [ q : w1 , w2 , w3 , , wN ] .

Example 7.2.1: Weighted Voting System

A company has 5 shareholders. Ms. Lee has 30% ownership, Ms. Miller has 25%,
Mr. Matic has 22% ownership, Ms. Pierce has 14%, and Mr. Hamilton has 9%.
There is a motion to decide where best to invest their savings. The company’s by-
laws define the quota as 58%. What does this voting system look like?

Treating the percentages of ownership as the votes, the system looks like:

Example 7.2.2: Valid Weighted Voting System

Which of the following are valid weighted voting systems?

a. [8 : 5, 4, 4,3, 2]

The quota is 8 in this example. The total weight is 5 + 4 + 4 + 3 + 2 = 18 . Half of

18 is 9, so the quota must be 9 < q ≤ 18 . Since the quota is 8, and 8 is not more
than 9, this system is not valid.

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b. [16 : 6,5,3,1]

The quota is 16 in this example. The total weight is 6 + 5 + 3 + 1 =15 . Half of 15 is

7.5, so the quota must be 7.5 < q ≤ 15 . Since the quota is 16, and 16 is more than
15, this system is not valid.

c. [9 : 5, 4, 4,3,1]

The quota is 9 in this example. The total weight is 5 + 4 + 4 + 3 + 1 =17 . Half of

17 is 8.5, so the quota must be 8.5 < q ≤ 17 . Since the quota is 9, and 9 is more
than 8.5 and less than 17, this system is valid.

d. [16 : 5, 4,3,3,1]

The quota is 16 in this example. The total weight is 5 + 4 + 3 + 3 + 1 =16 . Half of

16 is 8, so the quota must be 8 < q ≤ 16 . Since the quota is 16, and 16 is equal to
the maximum of the possible values of the quota, this system is valid. In this
system, all of the players must vote in favor of a motion in order for the motion to
pass.

e. [9 :10,3, 2]

The quota is 9 in this example. The total weight is 10 + 3 + 2 = 15 . Half of 15 is

7.5, so the quota must be 7.5 < q ≤ 15 . Since the quota is 9, and 9 is between 7.5
and 15, this system is valid.

f. [8 : 5, 4, 2]

The quota is 8 in this example. The total weight is 5 + 4 + 2 = 11 . Half of 11 is

5.5, so the quota must be 5.5 < q ≤ 11 . Since the quota is 8, and 8 is between 5.5
and 11, the system is valid.

In Example 7.2.2, some of the weighted voting systems are valid systems. Let’s examine
these for some concepts. In the system [ 9 :10,3, 2] , player one has a weight of 10. Since
the quota is nine, this player can pass any motion it wants to. So, player one holds all the
power. A player with all the power that can pass any motion alone is called a dictator. In
the system [16 : 5, 4,3,3,1] , every player has the same amount of power since all players

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are needed to pass a motion. That also means that any player can stop a motion from
passing. A player that can stop a motion from passing is said to have veto power. In the
system [8 : 5, 4, 2] , player three has a weight of two. Players one and two can join
together and pass any motion without player three, and player three doesn’t have enough
weight to join with either player one or player two to pass a motion. So player three has
no power. A player who has no power is called a dummy.

Example 7.2.3: Dictator, Veto Power, or Dummy?

In the weighted voting system [57 : 23, 21,16,12] , are any of the players a dictator
or a dummy or do any have veto power.

Since no player has a weight higher than or the same as the quota, then there is no
dictator. If players one and two join together, they can’t pass a motion without
player three, so player three has veto power. Under the same logic, players one
and two also have veto power. Player four cannot join with any players to pass a
motion, so player four’s votes do not matter. Thus, player four is a dummy.

Now that we have an understanding of some of the basic concepts, how do we quantify
how much power each player has? There are two different methods. One is called the
Banzhaf Power Index and the other is the Shapely-Shubik Power Index. We will look at
each of these indices separately.

Banzhaf Power Index:

A coalition is a set of players that join forces to vote together. If there are three players
P1 , P2 and P3 then the coalitions would be:
{P1},{P2 },{P3},{P1 , P2 },{P1 , P3},{P2 , P3},{P1 , P2 , P3} .
Not all of these coalitions are winning coalitions. To find out if a coalition is winning or
not look at the sum of the weights in each coalition and then compare that sum to the
quota. If the sum is the quota or more, then the coalition is a winning coalition.

Example 7.2.4: Coalitions with Weights

In the weighted voting system [17 :12,7,3] , the weight of each coalition and
whether it wins or loses is in the table below.

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Table 7.2.1: Coalition Listing

Coalition Weight Win or Lose?
{P1} 12 Lose

{P2 } 7 Lose

{P3} 3 Lose

{P1 , P2 } 19 Win

{P1 , P3} 15 Lose

{P2 , P3} 10 Lose

{P1 , P2 , P3} 22 Win

In each of the winning coalitions you will notice that there may be a player or
players that if they were to leave the coalition, the coalition would become a
losing coalition. If there is such a player or players, they are known as the critical
player(s) in that coalition.

Example 7.2.5: Critical Players

In the weighted voting system [17 :12,7,3] , determine which player(s) are critical
player(s). Note that we have already determined which coalitions are winning
coalitions for this weighted voting system in Example 7.2.4. Thus, when we
continue on to determine the critical player(s), we only need to list the winning
coalitions.

Table 7.2.2: Winning Coalitions and Critical Players

Coalition Weight Win or Lose? Critical Player
{P , P }
1 2
19 Win P1, P2

{P1 , P2 , P3} 22 Win P1, P2

Notice, player one and player two are both critical players two times and player
three is never a critical player.

Banzhaf Power Index:

The Banzhaf power index is one measure of the power of the players in a weighted voting
system. In this index, a player’s power is determined by the ratio of the number of times
that player is critical to the total number of times any and all players are critical.

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Bi
Banzhaf Power Index for Player Pi =
T
where Bi = number of times player Pi is critical
and T = total number of times all players are critical

Example 7.2.6: Banzhaf Power Index

In the weighted voting system [17 :12,7,3] , determine the Banzhaf power index
for each player.

Using table 7.2.2, Player one is critical two times, Player two is critical two times,
and Player three is never critical. So T = 4, B1 = 2, B2 = 2, and B3 = 0. Thus:
2 1
Banzhaf power index of P1 is = = 0.5 = 50%
4 2
2 1
Banzhaf power index of P2 is = = 0.5 = 50%
4 2
0
Banzhaf power index of P3 is = 0 = 0%
4
So players one and two each have 50% of the power. This means that they have
equal power, even though player one has five more votes than player two. Also,
player three has 0% of the power and so player three is a dummy.

How many coalitions are there? From the last few examples, we know that if there are
three players in a weighted voting system, then there are seven possible coalitions. How
about when there are four players?

Table 7.2.3: Coalitions with Four Players

1 Player 2 Players 3 Players 4 Players
{P1},{P2 },{P3},{P4 } {P1 , P2 },{P1 , P3},{P1 , P4 } {P1 , P2 , P3},{P1 , P2 , P4 } {P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 }
{P2 , P3},{P2 , P4 },{P3 , P4 } {P1 , P3 , P4 },{P2 , P3 , P4 }

So when there are four players, it turns out that there are 15 coalitions. When there are
five players, there are 31 coalitions (there are too many to list, so take my word for it). It
doesn’t look like there is a pattern to the number of coalitions, until you realize that 7, 15,
and 31 are all one less than a power of two. In fact, seven is one less than 23 , 15 is one
less than 24 , and 31 is one less than 25 . So it appears that the number of coalitions for N
players is 2 N − 1 .

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Example 7.2.7: Banzhaf Power Index

Example 7.2.1 had the weighted voting system of [58 : 30, 25, 22,14,9] . Find the
Banzhaf power index for each player.

Since there are five players, there are 31 coalitions. This is too many to write out,
but if we are careful, we can just write out the winning coalitions. No player can
win alone, so we can ignore all of the coalitions with one player. Also, no two-
player coalition can win either. So we can start with the three player coalitions.

Table 7.2.4: Winning Coalitions and Critical Players

Winning Coalition Critical Player
{P1 , P2 , P3} P1 , P2 , P3
{P1 , P2 , P4 } P1 , P2 , P4
{P1 , P2 , P5} P1 , P2 , P5
{P1 , P3 , P4 } P1 , P3 , P4
{P1 , P3 , P5} P1 , P3 , P5
{P2 , P3 , P4 } P2 , P3 , P4
{P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 }
{P1 , P2 , P3 , P5} P1
{P1 , P2 , P4 , P5} P1 , P2
{P1 , P3 , P4 , P5} P1 , P3
{P2 , P3 , P4 , P5} P2 , P3 , P4
{P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 , P5}

So player one is critical eight times, player two is critical six times, player three is
critical six times, player four is critical four times, and player five is critical two
times. Thus, the total number of times any player is critical is T = 26.

8 4
Banzhaf power index for P1 = = = 0.308 = 30.8%
26 13
6 3
Banzhaf power index for P2 = = = 0.231 = 23.1%
26 13
6 3
Banzhaf power index for P3 = = = 0.231 = 23.1%
26 13

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4 2
Banzhaf power index for P4 = = = 0.154 = 15.4%
26 13
2 1
Banzhaf power index for P5 = = = 0.077 = 7.7%
26 13

Every player has some power. Player one has the most power with 30.8% of the
power. No one has veto power, since no player is in every winning coalition.

Shapely-Shubik Power Index:

Shapely-Shubik takes a different approach to calculating the power. Instead of just
looking at which players can form coalitions, Shapely-Shubik decided that all players
form a coalition together, but the order that players join a coalition is important. This is
called a sequential coalition. Instead of looking at a player leaving a coalition, this
method examines what happens when a player joins a coalition. If when a player joins the
coalition, the coalition changes from a losing to a winning coalition, then that player is
known as a pivotal player. Now we count up how many times each player is pivotal, and
then divide by the number of sequential coalitions. Note, that in reality when coalitions
are formed for passing a motion, not all players will join the coalition. The sequential
coalition is used only to figure out the power each player possess.

As an example, suppose you have the weighted voting system of [17 :12,7,3] . One of the
sequential coalitions is P1 , P2 , P3 which means that P1 joins the coalition first, followed
by P2 joining the coalition, and finally, P3 joins the coalition. When player one joins the
coalition, the coalition is a losing coalition with only 12 votes. Then, when player two
joins, the coalition now has enough votes to win (12 + 7 = 19 votes). Player three joining
doesn’t change the coalition’s winning status so it is irrelevant. Thus, player two is the
pivotal player for this coalition. Another sequential coalition is P1 , P3 , P2 . When player
one joins the coalition, the coalition is a losing coalition with only 12 votes. Then player
three joins but the coalition is still a losing coalition with only 15 votes. Then player two
joins and the coalition is now a winning coalition with 22 votes. So player two is the
pivotal player for this coalition as well.

How many sequential coalitions are there for N players? Let’s look at three players
first. The sequential coalitions for three players (P1, P2, P3) are:
P1 , P2 , P3 , P1 , P3 , P2 , P2 , P1 , P3 , P2 , P3 , P1 , P3 , P1 , P2 , P3 , P2 , P1 .

Note: The difference in notation: We use {} for coalitions and sequential

coalitions.

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So there are six sequential coalitions for three players. Can we come up with a
mathematical formula for the number of sequential coalitions? For the first player in the
sequential coalition, there are 3 players to choose from. Once you choose one for the first
spot, then there are only 2 players to choose from for the second spot. The third spot will
only have one player to put in that spot. Notice, 3*2*1 = 6. It looks like if you have N
players, then you can find the number of sequential coalitions by multiplying
N ( N − 1)( N − 2 ) ( 3)( 2 )(1) . This expression is called a N factorial, and is denoted by
N!.

Most calculators have a factorial button. The process for finding a factorial on the TI-
83/84 is demonstrated in the following example.

Example 7.2.8: Finding a Factorial on the TI-83/84 Calculator

Find 5! on the TI-83/84 Calculator.
First, note that 5! = 5* 4 * 3* 2 *1 , which is easy to do without the special button
on the calculator, be we will use it anyway. First, input the number five on the
home screen of the calculator.

Figure 7.2.5: Five Entered on the Home Screen

Then press the MATH button. You will see the following:

Figure 7.2.6: MATH Menu

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Now press the right arrow key to move over to the abbreviation PRB, which
stands for probability.

Figure 7.2.7: PRB Menu

Number 4:! is the factorial button. Either arrow down to the number four and
press ENTER, or just press the four button. This will put the ! next to your five on
the home screen.

Figure 7.2.8: 5! on the Home Screen

Now press ENTER and you will see the result.

Figure 7.2.9: Answer to 5!

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Notice that 5! is a very large number. So if you have 5 players in the weighted voting
system, you will need to list 120 sequential coalitions. This is quite large, so most
calculations using the Shapely-Shubik power index are done with a computer.

Now we have the concepts for calculating the Shapely-Shubik power index.

Si
Shapely-Shubik Power Index for Player Pi =
N!
where Si is how often the player is pivotal
N is the number of players and N! is the number of sequential coalitions

Example 7.2.9: Shapely-Shubik Power Index

In the weighted voting system [17 :12,7,3] , determine the Shapely-Shubik power
index for each player.

First list every sequential coalition. Then determine which player is pivotal in
each sequential coalition. There are 3! = 6 sequential coalitions.

Table 7.2.10: Sequential Coalitions and Pivotal Players

Sequential coalition Pivotal player
P1 , P2 , P3 P2
P1 , P3 , P2 P2
P2 , P1 , P3 P1
P2 , P3 , P1 P1
P3 , P1 , P2 P2
P3 , P2 , P1 P1
So, S1 = 3 , S2 = 3 , and S3 = 0 .
3 1
Shapely-Shubik power index for P1= = = 0.5 = 50%
6 2
3 1
Shapely-Shubik power index for P2= = = 0.5 = 50%
6 2
0
Shapely-Shubik power index for P3= = 0 = 0%
6

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This is the same answer as the Banzhaf power index. The two methods will not
usually produce the same exact answer, but their answers will be close to the
same value. Notice that player three is a dummy using both indices.

Example 7.2.10: Calculating the Power

For the voting system [ 7 : 6, 4, 2] , find:

a. The Banzhaf power index for each player

The first thing to do is list all of the coalitions and determine which ones are
winning and which ones are losing. Then determine the critical player(s) in
each winning coalition.

Table 7.2.11 Coalitions and Critical Players

Coalition Weight Win or Lose? Critical Player
{P1} 6 Lose

{P2 } 4 Lose

{P3} 2 Lose

{P1 , P2 } 10 Win P1, P2

{P1 , P3} 8 Win P1, P3

{P2 , P3} 6 Lose

{P1 , P2 , P3} 12 Win P1

So, B1 = 3, B2 = 1, B3 = 1, T = 3 + 1 + 1 = 5
3
Banzhaf power index of P1 = = 0.6 = 60%
5
1
Banzhaf power index of P2 = = 0.2 = 20%
5
1
Banzhaf power index of P3 = = 0.2 = 20%
5

b. The Shapely-Shubik power index for each player

The first thing to do is list all of the sequential coalitions, and then determine
the pivotal player in each sequential coalition.

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Table 7.2.12: Sequential Coalitions and Pivotal Players

Sequential Coalition Pivotal Player
P1 , P2 , P3 P2
P1 , P3 , P2 P3
P2 , P1 , P3 P1
P2 , P3 , P1 P1
P3 , P1 , P2 P1
P3 , P2 , P1 P1

So=
S1 4,=
S2 1,=
S3 1,=
3! 6
4 2
Shapely-Shubik power index of P1= = = 0.667 = 66.7%
6 3
1
Shapely-Shubik power index of P2 = = 0.167 = 16.7%
6
1
Shapely-Shubik power index of P3 = = 0.167 = 16.7%
6

Notice the two indices give slightly different results for the power distribution,
but they are close to the same values.

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Chapter 7 Homework

1. An organization recently made a decision about which company to use to redesign

its website and host its members’ information. The Board of Directors will vote
using preference ballots ranking their first choice to last choice of the following
companies: Allied Web Design (A), Ingenuity Incorporated (I), and Yeehaw Web
Trends (Y). The individual ballots are shown below. Create a preference schedule
summarizing these results.
AIY, YIA, YAI, AIY, YIA, IAY, IYA, IAY, YAI, YIA, AYI, YIA, YAI

2. A group needs to decide where their next conference will be held. The choices are
Kansas City (K), Lafayette (L), and Minneapolis (M). The individual ballots are
shown below. Create a preference schedule summarizing these results.
KLM, LMK, MLK, LMK, MKL, KLM, KML, LMK, MKL, MKL, MLK, MLK

3. A book club holds a vote to figure out what book they should read next. They are
picking from three different books. The books are labeled A, B, and C, and the
preference schedule for the vote is below.
Number of voters 12 9 8 5 10
st
1 choice A B B C C
nd
2 choice C A C A B
rd
3 choice B C A B A

a. How many voters voted in the election?

b. How many votes are needed for a majority?
c. Find the winner using the Plurality Method.
d. Find the winner using the Borda Count Method.
e. Find the winner using the Plurality with Elimination Method.
f. Find the winner using the Pairwise Comparisons Method.

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4. An election is held for a new vice president at a college. There are three
candidates (A, B, C), and the faculty rank which candidate they like the most. The
preference ballot is below.
Number of voters 8 10 12 9 4 1
st
1 choice A A B B C C
nd
2 choice B C A C A B
rd
3 choice C B C A B A
a. How many voters voted in the election?
b. How many votes are needed for a majority?
c. Find the winner using the Plurality Method.
d. Find the winner using the Borda Count Method.
e. Find the winner using the Plurality with Elimination Method.
f. Find the winner using the Pairwise Comparisons Method.

5. A city election for a city council seat was held between 4 candidates, Martorana
(M), Jervey (J), Riddell (R), and Hanrahan (H). The preference schedule for this
election is below.
Number of voters 60 73 84 25 110
st
1 choice M M H J J
nd
2 choice R H R R M
rd
3 choice H R M M R
th
4 choice J J J H H

a. How many voters voted in the election?

b. How many votes are needed for a majority?
c. Find the winner using the Plurality Method.
d. Find the winner using the Borda Count Method.
e. Find the winner using the Plurality with Elimination Method.
f. Find the winner using the Pairwise Comparisons Method.

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6. A local advocacy group asks members of the community to vote on which project
they want the group to put its efforts behind. The projects are green spaces (G),
city energy code (E), water conservation (W), and promoting local business (P).
The preference schedule for this vote is below.
Number of voters 12 57 23 34 13 18 22 39
st
1 choice W W G G E E P P
nd
2 choice G P W E G P W E
rd
3 choice E E E W P W G W
th
4 choice P G P P W G E G

a. How many voters voted in the election?

b. How many votes are needed for a majority?
c. Find the winner using the Plurality Method.
d. Find the winner using the Borda Count Method.
e. Find the winner using the Plurality with Elimination Method.
f. Find the winner using the Pairwise Comparisons Method.

7. An election is held and candidate A wins. A mistake was found that showed that
candidate C was not qualified to run in the election. The candidate was removed,
and the election office determined the winner with candidate C removed. Now
candidate D wins. What fairness criterion was violated?

8. An election is held and candidate C wins. Before the election is certified the
ballots are misplaced. Another election is held, and the only change in the ballots
was that more people put C as their first choice. When the winner is determined,
candidate A now wins. What fairness criterion was violated?

9. An election is held and candidate B has the majority of first-place votes.

However, candidate B does not win the election. What fairness criterion was
violated?

10. An election is held and candidate D is favored in a head-to-head comparison to

every other candidate. However, D does not win the election. What is D called,
and what fairness criterion was violated?

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11. Consider the weighted voting system [15 : 7,6,3,1] .

a. How many players are there?
b. List the weight of each player.
c. What is the quota?
d. Is this a valid system? Why or why not?

12. Consider the weighted voting system [ 23 :10,3, 2,1] .

a. How many players are there?
b. List the weight of each player.
c. What is the quota?
d. Is this a valid system? Why or why not?

13. Consider the weighted voting system [ 9 :10,3, 2,1] .

a. How many players are there?
b. List the weight of each player.
c. What is the quota?
d. Is this a valid system? Why or why not?

14. Consider the weighted voting system [16 : 9,6,3,1] .

a. How many players are there?
b. List the weight of each player.
c. What is the quota?
d. Is this a valid system? Why or why not?

15. Consider the weighted voting system [ q : 7, 6, 4,1] .

a. What is the minimum value of the quota q?
b. What is the maximum value of the quota q?
c. What is the quota q if a motion can only pass with 2/3’s of the vote?
d. What is the quota q if a motion can only pass with more than 2/3’s of the
vote?

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16. Consider the weighted voting system [ q : 25, 20,15,15, 6] .

a. What is the minimum value of the quota q?
b. What is the maximum value of the quota q?
c. What is the quota q if a motion can only pass with 2/3’s of the vote?
d. What is the quota q if a motion can only pass with more than 2/3’s of the
vote?

17. Consider the weighted voting system [12 :13,5, 4,1] . Are any players dictators?
Explain.

18. Consider the weighted voting system [16 :12, 2, 2,1] . Do any players have veto
power? Explain.

19. Consider the weighted voting system [ 24 :19,16,12] .

a. Find the Banzhaf power index for each player.
b. Find the Shapely-Shubik power index for each player.
c. Are any players a dummy?

20. Consider the weighted voting system [54 : 42,13,12] .

a. Find the Banzhaf power index for each player.
b. Find the Shapely-Shubik power index for each player.
c. Are any players a dummy?

21. Consider the weighted voting system .

a. Find the Banzhaf power index for each player.
b. Find the Shapely-Shubik power index for each player.
c. Are any players a dummy?

22. Consider the weighted voting system .

a. Find the Banzhaf power index for each player.
b. Find the Shapely-Shubik power index for each player.
c. Are any players a dummy?

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23. Consider the weighted voting system [16 :12, 2, 2,1] . Find the Banzhaf power
index for each player?

24. Consider the weighted voting system . Find the Banzhaf power
index for each player?

25. The United Nations (UN) Security Council consists of five permanent members
(United States, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, and China) and
10 non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly.
The five permanent members have veto power, and a resolution cannot pass
without nine members voting for it. Set up the weighted voting system for the
UN.

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