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FIRST DIVISION

STEELWELD CONSTRUCTION/ G.R. No. 200986

JOVEN STA. ANA AND
JOSEPHINE STA. ANA, Present:
Petitioners,
GESMUNDO, CJ,
Chairperson,
- versus - CAGUIOA,
LAZARO-IAVIER,
LOPEZ, M., and
SERAFIN H. ECHANO, RENATO LOPEZ, J., JJ.
L. SALAZAR, AND ROBERTO E.
COPILLO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
SEP 2 9 2021
x-------------------------------- ,.___x

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the following

dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122075:

a) Resolution2 dated November 29, 2011 dismissing petitioners' action

for certiorari for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the
National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC) impugned
Resolution in NLRC LAC No. 11-002695-10, NLRC RAB-IV-01-

1
Rollo, pp. 8-30.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas
Peralta and Jane Aurora C. Lantion, id. at 36-37.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 200986

00023-10 Rl, RAB IV-01-00137-10 RI and RAB IV-02-00362-10

RI; and

b) Resolution3 dated March 8, 2012, denying petitioners' motion for

reconsideration.

Antecedents

On February 16, 2010, respondents Serafin H. Echano (Echano),

Renato L. Salazar (Salazar), and Roberto E. Copillo (Copillo) sued petitioners
Steelweld Construction and its President Joven Sta. Ana, and Architect
Josephine Sta. Ana (petitioners),4 for illegal dismissal, underpayment and
non-payment of wages, separation pay, holiday pay, 13 th month pay, overtime
pay, and moral and exemplary damages. 5

Echano essentially alleged that sometime in 2006, petitioners hired

him as carpenter for its construction projects. He was also given additional
assignment as "bodegero" to safeguard the construction materials at
petitioners' jobsite in Floraville Subdivision, Mayamot, Antipolo City. He
was required to work from 8 o'clock in the morning until 2 o'clock in the
morning of the next day, Mondays to Sundays. Petitioners also required him
to report for work during holidays. 6

Sometime in January 2009, he was diagnosed with tuberculosis. On

February 7, 2009, petitioners ordered him to go on leave of absence, which he
heeded. After completing his three (3) months of treatment, he reported back
for work. But just after two (2) months, he was, this time, ordered to go on
"sick leave" for another three (3) months, which he again heeded. After
completing his second round of sick leave, he reported back for work on
November 13, 2009. The first thing he did was present his medical certificate
of fitness to work, but petitioners no longer took him back. 7

For his part, Salazar claimed that sometime in 2005, petitioners hired
him as a painter. His work schedule went from 8 o'clock in the morning until
5 o'clock in the afternoon, Mondays to Saturdays. From 2005 to December 4,
2009, petitioners asked him to work during the holidays, albeit without
holiday pay. Petitioners never paid him his 13 th month pay. 8 On June 28, 2009,
he and his co-workers wrote petitioners for their grievances. But petitioners
simply ignored them. Then, on December 4, 2009, petitioners illegally
terminated him. 9

As for Copillo, he averred that sometime in 2001, petitioners hired him

also as a painter. He worked from 8 o'clock in the morning until 5 o'clock in

3
Id. at 39-40.
4
Id. at 43.
5
Id. at 65; See also 108.
6
Id. at 65.
7
Id. at 66.
'Id. at 67.
9 Id. at 68.
 Decision 3 G.R. No. 200986

the afternoon, Mondays to Saturdays. Since he got hired in 2001, he reported

for work during holidays, sans any holiday pay. He wrote petitioners on June
28, 2009 to demand for better working conditions. 10 Thereafter, he received a
Notice to Explain dated November 12, 2009 why he should not be subjected
to disciplinary action for violating company rules and regulations. The notice
though failed to specify the alleged rules he violated. On December 12, 2009,
petitioners barred his entry into the company premises. 11

In response, petitioners countered that Steelweld 1s a corporation

engaged in the construction business and respondents were its project
employees. Respondents' employment got terminated because the projects
where they were respectively assigned already got completed. They submitted
in evidence the supposed employment contracts of Echano, Salazar, and
Copillo, albeit the same did not bear their signatures.

In the case ofEchano, he was advised to rest for six (6) months after he
contracted tuberculosis. But he never again reported back for work, thus, the
company was constrained to terminate him for abandonment of work. 12

With respect to Salazar, a notice of termination was sent to him on

December 4, 2009 because the project he was working on, the Patio Rosario
Townhomes, was already almost complete. 13

Finally, in the case of Copillo, he got terminated because of gross and

habitual neglect of duties. He was engaged to paint Unit 33 of the Patio
Rosario Townhomes. In October 2009, they received a letter from the unit
owner that Copillo used a wrong paint color on the living room. In his written
explanation, Copillo admitted the mistake claiming though that it was
unintentional. Copillo was served with another Notice to Explain dated
November 12, 2009 on account of the numerous complaints they received
regarding his poor performance. Eventually, the company decided to
terminate his services. 14

As for respondents' compensation and benefits, the same were paid in

accordance with law, albeit they (petitioners) could not produce their payrolls
and pay slips as these documents were washed out during typhoon Ondoy
which hit Manila and Rizal on September 26-27, 2009. 15

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

By Decision 16 dated July 22, 2010, the labor arbiter dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. The labor arbiter found that Echano's termination
was justified since he failed to report for work after the lapse of his six-month

10
Id
11 Id at 69.
12
Id at 84.
13
Id at 85.
14 Id
is Id
16 Penned by Labor Arbiter Enrico Angelo C. Portillo, id at 64-74.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 200986

medical leave. Salazar's termination was also valid since the last project
where he got assigned had already been completed. As for Copillo, he himself
admitted the infraction levelled against him, hence, he was terminated for
cause. 17

Finally, the labor arbiter ruled that respondents are not entitled to 13 th
month pay and holiday pay since they were all hired on a project basis.
Respondents' claim of underpayment and non-payment of wages, overtime
pay, holiday pay, separation pay, and damages was likewise denied for lack
ofbasis. 18

The Ruling of the NLRC

The NLRC initially denied respondents' appeal for failure to pay the
appeal bond. On motion for reconsideration, however, respondents clarified
they were indigents represented by the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). The
NLRC consequently took cognizance of the appeal and resolved it on the
merits.

It found that respondents were regular employees, not project

employees ofSteelweld. 19 The employment contracts presented by petitioners
had no evidentiary weight since they were not even signed by the respondents.
The absence of the employment contracts raised a serious question on whether
respondents were properly informed at the onset of their employment status
as project employees. 20

Too, respondents were illegally dismissed. Petitioners were unable to

prove that Echano abandoned his work. No proof was presented either that the
phase of the project where Salazar got assigned was already almost complete
as of December 4, 2009. Lastly, Copillo's mistake in using a wrong paint on
Unit 33 of Patio Rosario Townhomes did not amount to "gross" negligence
since it was not habitual but just an isolated incident. 21

On respondents' money claims, the NLRC ruled that they are entitled
to their unpaid 13 th month pay. All other money claims were denied for lack
of basis. Thus, by Resolution22 dated August 10, 2011, the NLRC ordained:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of complainants Echano,

Copillo, and Salazar is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the appealed
decision of the Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as
follows:

11 Id.
18 Id
19 Sometimes, Steelweld Construction Builders and Design on the records.
20 Rollo, pp. 88-89.
21
Id. at 90-91.
22 Penned by Commissioner Angelo Ang Palana, id at 81-95.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 200986

1. Declaring complainants Serafin Echano, Roberto Copillo,

and Renato Salazar as regular employees of respondent
STEELWELD Construction;

2. Declaring complainants Serafin Echano, Roberto Copillo,

and Renato Salazar to have been illegally dismissed from their
employment;

3. Directing respondent STEELWELD CONSTRUCTION

to reinstate complainants Serafin Echano, Roberto Copillo, and
Renato Salazar to their previous post and to pay their full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, computed
from the date of their illegal dismissal on 13 November 2009,
December 12, 2009, and December 4, 2009, respectively, until the
finality of the decision;

4. Directing respondent STEEL WELD CONSTRUCTION

to pay complainants Serafin Echano, Roberto Copillo, and Renato
Salazar their 13 th month [pay] for the period of 16 February 2007 up
to the date of their termination from the service on 13 November
2009, 12 December 2009, and 4 December 2009, respectively.

The computation made by the Computation and

Examination Unit of the Commission shall form an integral part of
this Decision.

SO ORDERED. 23

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners went straight to

the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. They manifested that it was
the negligence of their former lawyer which prevented them from seeking a
reconsideration of the assailed resolution from the NLRC. 24

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Under Resolution25 dated November 29, 2011, the Court of Appeals

dismissed the petition outright for petitioners' failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the questioned resolution before the NLRC.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied through

Resolution26 dated March 8, 2012.

The Present Petition

Petitioners now ask for affirmative relief against the dispositions of the
Court of Appeals, claiming that the same deprived them of their right to due
process and ignored the compelling reason that caused them not to file a

23 Id at 93-94.
24 Id. at 49.
25
Id. at 36-37.
26
Id. at 39-40.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 200986

motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution dated August 10, 2011.
They also ask that respondent employees be declared as project employees
whose services were validly terminated. 27

In their Comment, 28 respondents reiterate their submissions below

against petitioners' plea for the reinstatement of their petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners' Reply29 essentially repeats the same arguments presented

in the petition.

Ruling

A motion for reconsideration is

a condition sine qua non to the
filing of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is an extraordinary remedy which can only be availed of when there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy available in the ordinary
course of law. It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy which should be resorted to before one may avail of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. 30 In Audi AG v. Mejia, 31 the Court
stressed that it is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can
resort to a special civil action for certiorari. The purpose is to afford the
tribunal, board, or office an opportunity to ratify its own errors or mistakes
before the extraordinary remedy of certiorari comes into play through judicial
process. Thus, a party's omission or failure to file a motion for reconsideration
before the NLRC is a fatal infirmity which warrants the outright dismissal of
the special civil action for certiorari it may have prematurely filed. 32

The Court, nonetheless, has declined from applying the rule rigidly in
the following instances, viz.:

(a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;

(b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court;

27
Id. at 22-23.
28
Id at 266-283.
29 Id at 299-307.
30 Madarang v. Sps. Morales, 735 Phil. 632,646 (2014).
31
555 Phil. 348, 353 (2007).
32 Mandaue Dinghow Dimsum House, Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 571 Phil. 108, 119 (2008).
Decision 7 G.R. No. 200986

(c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
( e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief;
(f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;
(h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
(i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public inte.rest is
involved. 33 ( emphasis supplied)

As earlier stated, petitioners here fault their previous counsel who

allegedly neglected to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed NLRC
resolution.

We are not persuaded. It is hombook doctrine that the negligence of

counsel binds the client. 34 In Bejarasco, Jr. v. People, 35 the Court underscored
that even a counsel's mistake in the realm of procedural technique binds his
or her client. For a counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do
all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the management of the suit in behalf
of his or her client. As such, any act or omission by counsel within the scope
of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of
the client himself or herself 36 Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation
since every defeated party would just have to claim neglect or mistake of
counsel as ground to salvage his or her case. 37

As for the litigants themselves, they, too, have an obligation to

periodically keep in touch with their counsel, check with the court, and inquire
about the status of their case. "They should not expect that all they need to do
is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. " 38 In other words,
diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from the clients. 39 On this
score, petitioners had been remiss in discharging this duty. They utterly failed
to monitor their case and consequently failed to neutralize the negligence of
their chosen counsel pertaining to his omission or failure to file the required
motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution of the NLRC.

Even then, we can still excuse petitioners' failure to file its required
motion for reconsideration under the second exception (i.e., the questions
33 O/oresv. Manila Doctors College, 731 Phil. 45, 58-59 (2014).
34 Macondray & Co. Inc. v. Provident Insurance Corp., 487 Phil. 158, 161 (2004).
35 656 Phil. 337,340 (201 !).

36 Id.
37 Mendoza v. Court ofAppeals, 764 Phil. 53, 65 (2015).
38 Macondray & Co. Inc. v. Provident Insurance Corp., supra at 168.
39 Lumbre v. Court ofAppeals, 581 Phil. 390, 403 (2008).
Decision 8 G.R. No. 200986

raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court).

In Abraham v. NLRC, 40 petitioner Abraham sued respondent

Philippine Institute of Technical Education (PITE) for illegal dismissal and
money claims. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On
appeal, the NLRC reversed and ordered PITE to pay Abraham backwages,
separation pay, and her other money claims. On PITE's motion for
reconsideration, however, the NLRC reversed itself and reinstated the labor
arbiter's decision. Abraham, thereafter, directly filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The petition, though, was dismissed
outright for Abraham's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed NLRC resolution. But the Court reinstated the petition for certiorari
for the Court of Appeals to resolve on the merits. The Court noted that since
the issue pertaining to the employees' constructive dismissal and claim for
damages were already passed upon and resolved in full before the NLRC,
hence, it would be futile for petitioners to still file a motion for
reconsideration. 41

Here, the contractual relations between respondents and Steelweld, as

well as the validity of respondents' dismissal, had been the core issue in the
conflicting rulings of the two (2) labor tribunals. The NLRC itself had
exhaustively passed upon and resolved this issue in its assailed resolution.
Notably, petitioners reiterated the same issue and arguments before the Court
of Appeals, i.e.: (1) the NLRC erred in declaring respondents as regular
employees; (2) the NLRC erred in declaring that respondents were illegally
dismissed, thus, entitled to full backwages; and (3) the NLRC erred in
ordering the payment of 13 th month pay to Echano, Salazar, and Copillo from
February 16, 2007 up till their termination on November 13, 2009, December
4, 2009, and December 12, 2009, respectively. 42

Applying Abraham here, petitioners are excused from seeking a

reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution dated August 10, 2011, which
consequently results in the reinstatement of their Petition for Certiorari43
dated November 15, 2011.

In Abraham,44 we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for a

resolution on the merits. But here, we are not remanding the case. Instead, we
will resolve the case on the merits ourselves in order to stall any further delay
in the already delayed disposition of the case for the past eleven ( 11) years or
so since it first got filed on February 16, 2010. So must it be.

The nature of respondents' employment

40 406 Phil. 310,312 (2001).

41
Supra note 33 at 60.
42 Rollo, pp. 51-52.
43
Id. at 41-57.
44 Joto 's Kiddie Carts v. Cabal/a, 821 Phil. I IO I, I I 09 (2017).
Decision 9 G.R. No. 200986

A project employee is assigned to a project that starts and ends at a

determined or determinable time. 45 The principal test to determine if
employees are project employees is whether they have been assigned to carry
out a specific project or undertaking, the duration or scope of which was
specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project. 46 Article
295 of the Labor Code distinguishes a "project employee" from a "regular
employee," viz.:

ARTICLE 295. (formerly Article 280) Regular and Casual

Employment. - The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination
of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual ifit is not covered by
the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall
be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. 47

Here, petitioners claim that respondents were hired as project

employees only, not as regular employees. We are not convinced.

First. There is no showing that upon their engagement, respondents

were informed that they would be assigned to a specific project or
undertaking. Neither was it established that they were made aware of the
duration and scope of such project or undertaking. In Inocentes, Jr. v. R.
Syjuco Construction, lnc., 48 the Court stressed that to ascertain whether
employees were project employees, it is necessary to determine whether
notice was given them at the time of hiring that they were being engaged just
for a specific project.

Notably, the only "pieces of evidence" adduced by petitioners here

were the so-called employment contracts of respondents which incidentally
did not even bear the signatures of these employees. As aptly found by the
NLRC, these "unsigned employment contracts" cannot be given any probative
weight. 49 Mirandilla v. Jose Ca/ma Development Corp. 50 is apropos:

45 Inocentes, Jr. v. R Syjuco Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 240549, August 27, 2020.
46 See Gama v. Pamplona Plantation Inc., 579 Phil. 402,413 (2008).
47 Labor Code of the Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 442 (Amended & Renumbered), July 21, 2015.
48 Supra note 44.
49 Rollo, pp. 88-89.
50 G.R. No. 242834, June 26, 2019.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 200986

In this case, records fail to disclose that petitioners were engaged for
a specific project and that they were duly informed of its duration and scope
at the time that they were engaged.

As for Ramon, respondents submitted his WTRs as primary proof

of his alleged project employment status. While these WTRs do indicate
Ramon's particular assignments for certain weeks starting from November
8, 2013 to May 27, 2015, they do not, however, indicate that he was
particularly engaged by JCDC for each of the projects stated therein, and
that the duration and scope thereof were made known to him at the time his
services were engaged. At best, these records only show that he had worked
for such projects. By and of themselves, they do not show that Ramon was
made aware of his status as a project employee at the time of hiring, as well
as of the period of his employment for a specific project or undertaking.

xxxx

Likewise, same as in Ramon's case, Rani! and Edwin's project

employment contracts for their engagement were not even shown. These
contracts would have shed light to what projects or undertakings they were
engaged; but all the same, none were submitted. As case law holds, the
absence of the employment contracts puts into serious question the
issue of whether the employees were properly informed of their
employment status as project employees at the time of their
engagement, especially if there were no other evidence offered.
(emphasis in the original)

So must it be.

Second. Petitioners did not report the termination of the supposed

project employment (on account of project completion) to the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), in violation of Department Order No. 19.51
In Freyssinet Filipinas Corp. v. Lapuz, 52 the Court explained that the failure
on the part of the employer to file with the DOLE a termination report every
time a project or its phase is completed is an indication that the workers are
not project employees but regular ones. 53

Third. It is undisputed that Steelweld is engaged in the construction

business and respondents had been continuously employed with the company
for many years as construction workers in its various projects: Echano for
three (3) years, Salazar, four (4) years; and Copillo, eight (8) years. Their
employment had not been interrupted ever since they got hired. Too,
petitioners never required them to execute a new employment contract with
the company each time they got assigned to a new project.

Under Article 295 of the Labor Code, one is deemed a regular employee
ifhe or she: a) had been engaged to perform tasks which are usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, unless the
employment is one for a specific project or undertaking or where the work is

51
As well as the old Policy Instructions No. 20.
52
G.R. No. 226722, March 18, 2019.
53
Supra note 46 at 407.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 200986

seasonal and for the duration of a season; or b) has rendered at least one (1)
year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, with respect
to the activity for which he is employed and his employment continues as long
as such activity exists. 54

As discussed, respondents were continuously performing their

respective tasks as carpenter and painters in the construction business of the
company for more than one (1) year. Under the law, this is competent
evidence of necessity, if not indispensability, of such activities to Steelweld's
business. 55 The NLRC, therefore, properly found respondents to be regular
employees of Steelweld. Consequently, respondents may only be dismissed
for just or authorized cause and upon observance of due process oflaw. 56

In University of Santo Tomas v. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, 57

respondents Pontesor, et al. were engaged to perform all-around maintenance
services throughout the various facilities in UST's campus. For various
periods spanning the years 1990-1999, their respective employment contracts
show their positions as laborers, masons, painters, tinsmiths, electricians,
carpenters, and welders were merely re-shuffled to make it appear they were
engaged on a per-project basis only. Too, the cumulative period for which
they were hired under each contract exceeded one (1) year. The Court ruled
that since Pontesor, et al. were hired for more than one (1) year, by operation
of law, they are deemed regular employees who enjoy security of tenure. The
Court extends this protection to respondents here, as well.

Respondents were illegally dismissed

Petitioners assert that Echano was deemed to have abandoned his job
when he no longer reported for work ever after his sick leave for six (6)
months expired.

Abandonment requires the deliberate and unjustified refusal of the

employee to perform his employment responsibilities. Mere absence or failure
to work, even after notice to return, is not tantamount to abandonment. 58 To
justify the dismissal of an employee on this ground, two (2) elements must
concur, viz.: (a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (b) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship which is manifested through the employee's overt acts. 59 These
elements, however, are conspicuously absent here. For apart from petitioners'
self-serving allegation, there was no proof of any overt act on the part of
Echano showing his intention to abandon his work. On the contrary, records
reveal that Echano sought permission to return to work and even presented a

54 Pacific Metals Co., Ltd v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 226920, December 5, 2019.
55 Espina v. Highlands Camp/Rawlings Foundation, Inc., G.R. Nos. 220935 & 219868, July 28, 2020.
56 Supra note 45.
57 809 Phil. 212, 223 (2017).
58 Manarpiis v. Texan Philippines, Inc., 752 Phil. 305,321 (2015).

59 Demex Rattancraft, Inc. v. Leron, 820 Phil. 693, 702 (2017).

Decision 12 G.R. No. 200986

fit to work medical certificate, but the company simply informed him that he
should no longer report for work. 60

In any event, even if it were true that Echano failed to report for work
after his medical leave, there is no showing that petitioners sent the following
notices to Echano, viz.: (1) first notice asking him to explain why he should
not be declared to have abandoned his job; and (2) second notice to inform
him of the company's decision to dismiss him on ground of abandonment.

But the most telling of all is the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
Echano, et al. against petitioners. An employee who takes steps to protest his
or her dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned his work. 61

As for Salazar, petitioners simply aver that his services were terminated
since the project to which he got assigned was already nearing completion.
Again, however, we reckon with the abject paucity of evidence in this regard.
The inescapable conclusion is, like his co-respondents, Salazar was also
terminated without just cause.

Finally, we go to Copillo's termination. Petitioners point that he got·

dismissed on December 12, 2009 due to, first - his negligence in using a
wrong paint on Unit 33 of the Patio Rosario Townhomes; and second- there
were other complaints against his poor performance.

To warrant removal from employment on ground of negligence, the

negligence must not only be gross but habitual. 62 While Copillo admitted
that he used a wrong paint on Unit 33, he convincingly explained it was an
honest mistake. He said he was not instructed what specific color he should
use on Unit 33 .63 Petitioner have not refuted this.

In any case, the supposed infraction of Copillo was hardly gross, much
less, habitual. Petitioners do not dispute that it happened only once. On the
so-called other infractions or complaints against Copillo's poor performance,
there is no evidence at all that he was ever confronted with the same. What is
on record though is that for the past eight (8) years, he did not have a rating
of unsatisfactory in terms of his performance as a painter.

All told, the NLRC correctly found that respondents were illegally
dismissed. As such, they are entitled to the twin remedies of: (a) reinstatement
or separation pay equivalent to one ( 1) month salary for every year of service;
and (b) backwages. 64

Separation pay is granted when: a) the relationship between the

employer and the illegally dismissed employee is already strained; and b) a

60
Rollo, p. 67.
61 Supra note 58 at 322.
62 Kulas Ideas & Creations v. Alcoseba, 627 Phil. 22, 32 (20 I 0).
63
Rollo, p. 9 I.
64 Ador v. Jamila and Company Security Services, Inc., G.R. No. 245422, July 7, 2020.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 200986

considerable leni;:th of time had already passed rendering it impossible

for the employee to return to work. 65 A prayer for separation pay is an
indication of the strained relations between the parties. 66 Since respondents
here are opting for separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, and considering
the lapse of eleven (11) long years ever since they got illegally dismissed,
their reinstatement at this time may no longer be practicable. 67 The Court,
therefore, modifies the order of reinstatement of the NLRC, and in lieu
thereof, orders the payment of respondents' separation pay with backwages.

We affirm the award of 13 th month pay to respondents, there being no

proof that petitioners paid them. Applying the three-year prescriptive period,
however, the payment of 13 th month pay should be reckoned from February
16, 2007 (three years prior to the filing of the illegal dismissal complaint on
February 16, 2010) up to the date of the dismissal of Echano, Salazar, and
Copillo on November 13, 2009, December 4, 2009, and December 12, 2009,
respectively.

Finally, petitioners Joven Sta. Ana and Josephine Sta. Ana cannot be
held solidarily liable with the company on the payment of respondents'
monetary awards. 68 There was no indication that they acted in bad faith in
causing respondents' termination.

ACCORDINGLY, the Resolutions dated November 29, 2011 and

March 8, 2012 of the ColL.'i of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122075 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Resolution dated August 10, 2011 of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC LAC No. 11-002695-10, NLRC RAB-IV-01-00023-
10 Rl, RAB IV-01-00137-10 RI and RAB IV-02-00362-10 RI is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner STEELWELD
CONSTRUCTION is ORDERED to PAY respondents SERAFIN H.
ECHANO, RENATO L. SALAZAR, and ROBERTO E. COPILLO the
following:

a) SEPARATION PAY EQUIVALENT to one (1) month pay for every

year of service until the finality of this Decision;

b) FULL BACKWAGES computed from November 13, 2009,

December 4, 2009, and December 12, 2009, when their respective
employment got terminated, until the finality of this Decision;

c) THIRTEENTH MONTH PAY computed from February 16, 2007 up

to November 13, 2009, December 4, 2009, and December 12, 2009,
respectively; and

65 See Doctor v. NII Enterprise, 821 Phil. 251, 268-269 (2017).

66 Ador v. Jamila and Company Security Services, Inc., supra.
67 Id
68 See Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation v. Binamira, 639 Phil. 1, 8 (2010).
Decision 14 G.R. No. 200986
•

d) Six percent ( 6%) legal interest per annum on the total monetary award
computed from the fmality of this Decision until fully paid.

The labor arbiter is ORDERED to prepare a comprehensive

computation of the monetary award and cause its implementation, with utmost
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

AMhtLO~~~fER
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

.GESMUNDO

Chairperson
Decision 15 G.R. No. 200986

JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

G.GESMUNDO