The Druze (Arabic: ,derz or durz, plural ,durz, Hebrew: druzim) are an esoteric, monotheistic religious community, found

und primarily in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan, which emerged during the 11th century from Ismailism. The Druze have an eclectic set of beliefs that incorporate several elements from Abrahamic religions, Gnosticism, Neoplatonism and other philosophies. The Druze call themselves Ahl al-Tawhid (People of Unitarianism or Monotheism) or alMuwaidn (Unitarians, Monotheists) the official name of the sect is alMuwaidn al Dururz (The Unitarian Druze). Contents [hide]
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1 Location 2 History 2.1 Origin of the name 2.2 Early history 2.3 The closing of the faith 2.4 During the Crusades 2.5 Persecution during the Mamluk and Ottoman period 2.6 Ma'an dynasty 2.7 Shihab Dynasty 2.8 Qaysites and the Yemenites 2.9 Civil War of 1860 2.10 Rebellion in Hauran 3 Modern history 3.1 In Syria 3.2 In Lebanon 3.3 In Israel 4 Beliefs of the Druze 4.1 God in the Druze faith 4.2 Scriptures 4.3 Esotericism 4.4 Precepts of the Druze faith

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4.5 Religious Symbol 4.6 Uqql and Juhhl 5 Origins of the Druze people 5.1 Ethnic origins 5.2 Genetics 6 See also 7 Notes 8 Further reading 9 External links

[edit]Location The Druze people reside primarily in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel.[5] The Israeli Druze are mostly in Galilee (81%), around Haifa (19%), and in the Golan Heights,[6] which is home to about 20,000 Druze.[7] The Institute of Druze Studies estimates that 40%50% of Druze live in Syria, 30%40% in Lebanon, 6%7% in Israel, and 1%2% in Jordan.[8][9] Large communities of expatriate Druze also live outside the Middle East in Australia, Canada, Europe, Latin America, the United States, and West Africa. They use the Arabic language and follow a social pattern very similar to those of the other peoples of the eastern Mediterranean region.[10] The number of Druze people worldwide exceeds one million, with the vast majority residing in the Levant or East Mediterranean.[11] [edit]History [edit]Origin of the name The name Druze is derived from the name of Anushtakn adDaraz (from Persian, darzi, "seamster") who was an early preacher. Although the Druze consider ad-Daraz a heretic[12] the name had been used to identify them. Before becoming public, the movement was secretive and held closed meetings in what was known as Sessions of Wisdom. During this stage a dispute occurred between ad-Darazi and Hamza bin Ali mainly concerning ad-Darazi's ghuluww (Arabic, "exaggeration"), which refers to the belief that

God was incarnated in human beings, especially 'Ali and his descendants, including Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah who was the current Caliph, and adDarazi naming himself "The Sword of the Faith" which led Hamza to write an epistle refuting the need for the sword to spread the faith and several epistles refuting the beliefs of the ghulat. In 1016 ad-Darazi and his followers openly proclaimed their beliefs and called people to join them, causing riots in Cairo against the Unitarian movement including Hamza bin Ali and his followers which led to the suspension of the movement for one year and the expulsion of ad-Darazi and his supporters.[13] Although the Druze religious books describe ad-Darazi as the "insolent one" and as the "Calf" who is narrow minded and hasty, the name "Druze" is still used for identification and for historical reasons. In 1018 ad-Darazi was assassinated for his teachings, some sources claim to be executed by AlHakim bi-Amr Allah.[12][14] Some authorities see in the name "Druze" a descriptive epithet, derived from Arabic dresah ("those who study").[15] Others have speculated that the word comes from the Arabic-Persian word Darazo (" bliss") or from Shaykh Hussayn ad-Daraz, who was one of the early converts to the faith.[16] In the early stages of the movement, the word "Druze" is rarely mentioned by historians, and in Druze religious texts only the word Muwaidn("Unitarian") appears. The only early Arab historian who mentions the Druze is the 11th century Christian scholar Yahya of Antioch, who clearly refers to the heretical group created by ad-Daraz rather than the followers of Hamza ibn 'Al.[16] As for Western sources, Benjamin of Tudela, the Jewish traveler who passed through Lebanon in or about 1165, was one of the first European writers to refer to the Druzes by name. The word Dogziyin("Druzes") occurs in an early Hebrew edition of his travels, but it is clear that this is a scribal error. Be that as it may, he described the Druze as "mountain dwellers, monotheists, who believe in 'soul eternity' and reincarnation."[17] [edit]Early history

The Druze faith began as a movement in Ismailism, that was mainly influenced by Greek philosophy and gnosticism and opposed certain religious and philosophical ideologies that were present during that epoch. The faith was preached by Hamza ibn 'Al ibn Ahmad, a Persian Ismaili mystic and scholar. He came to Egypt in 1014 and assembled a group of scholars and leaders from across the world to establish the Unitarian movement. The order's meetings were held in the Raydan Mosque, near the Al-Hakim Mosque.[18] In 1017, Hamza officially revealed the Druze faith and began to preach the Unitarian doctrine. Hamza gained the support of the Ftimid Caliph alHakim, who issued a decree promoting religious freedom prior to the declaration of the divine call. Remove ye the causes of fear and estrangement from yourselves. Do away with the corruption of delusion and conformity. Be ye certain that the Prince of Believers hath given unto you free will, and hath spared you the trouble of disguising and concealing your true beliefs, so that when ye work ye may keep your deeds pure for God. He hath done thus so that when you relinquish your previous beliefs and doctrines ye shall not indeed lean on such causes of impediments and pretensions. By conveying to you the reality of his intention, the Prince of Believers hath spared you any excuse for doing so. He hath urged you to declare your belief openly. Ye are now safe from any hand which may bring harm unto you. Ye now may find rest in his assurance ye shall not be wronged. Let those who are present convey this message unto the absent so that it may be known by both the distinguished and the common people. It shall thus become a rule to mankind; and Divine Wisdom shall prevail for all the days to come.[19] Al-Hakim became a central figure in the Druze faith even though his own religious position was disputed among scholars. John Esposito states that alHakim believed that "he was not only the divinely appointed religio-political leader but also the cosmic intellect linking God with creation.",[20] while others like Nissim Dana and Mordechai Nisan state that he is perceived as the manifestation and the reincarnation of God or presumably the image of God.[21][22] Some Druze and non-Druze scholars like Samy Swayd and Sami Makarem state that this confusion is due to confusion about the role of the

early heretical preacher ad-Darazi, whose teachings the Druze rejected as heretical.[23] These sources assert that al-Hakim rejected ad-Darazi's claims of divinity,[14][24][25] and ordered the elimination of his movement while supporting that of Hamza ibn Ali.[26] Al-Hakim disappeared one night while out on his evening ride - presumably assassinated, perhaps at the behest of his formidable elder sister Sitt alMulk. The Druze believe he went intoOccultation with Hamza ibn Ali and three other prominent preachers, leaving the care of the "Unitarian missionary movement" to a new leader, Bah'u d-Dn. [edit]The closing of the faith Al-Hakim was replaced by his underage son, 'Al az-Zahir. The Unitarian Druze movement, which existed in the Fatimid Caliphate, acknowledged azZahir as the Caliph, but followed Hamzah as its Imam.[14] The young Caliph's regent, Sitt al-Mulk, ordered the army to destroy the movement in 1021.[12] At the same time, Bah'a ad-Dn as-Samuki was assigned the leadership of the Unitarian Movement by Hamza Bin Ali.[14] For the next seven years, the Druze faced extreme persecution by the new caliph, al-Zahir, who wanted to eradicate the faith.[27] This was the result of a power struggle inside of the Fatimid empire in which the Druze were viewed with suspicion because of their refusal to recognize the new Caliph, Ali azZahir, as their Imam. Many spies, mainly the followers of Ad-Darazi, joined the Unitarian movement in order to infiltrate the Druze community. The spies set about agitating trouble and soiling the reputation of the Druze. This resulted in friction with the new caliph who clashed militarily with the Druze community. The clashes ranged from Antioch to Alexandria, where tens of thousands of Druze were slaughtered by the Fatimid army.[12] The largest massacre was at Antioch, where 5000 Druze religious leaders were killed, followed by that of Aleppo.[12] . As a result, the faith went underground in hope of survival, as those captured were either forced to renounce their faith or killed. Druze survivors "were found principally in southern Lebanon and Syria."In 1038, two years after the death of al-Zahir, the Druze movement was able to resume because the new leadership that replaced him had friendly political ties with at least one prominent Druze leader.[27]

In 1043 Bah'a ad-Dn declared that the sect would no longer accept new pledges, and since that time proselytization has been prohibited.[14][27] [edit]During the Crusades It was during the period of Crusader rule in Syria (10991291) that the Druze first emerged into the full light of history in the Gharb region of the Chouf Mountains. As powerful warriors serving the Muslim rulers of Damascus against the Crusades, the Druze were given the task of keeping watch over the crusaders in the seaport of Beirut, with the aim of preventing them from making any encroachments inland. Subsequently, the Druze chiefs of the Gharb placed their considerable military experience at the disposal of the Mamluk rulers of Egypt (12501516); first, to assist them in putting an end to what remained of Crusader rule in coastal Syria, and later to help them safeguard the Syrian coast against Crusader retaliation by sea.
[28]

In the early period of the Crusader era, the Druze feudal power was in the hands of two families, the Tanukhs and the Arslans. From their fortresses in the Gharb district (modern AleyProvince) of southern Mount Lebanon, the Tanukhs led their incursions into the Phoenician coast and finally succeeded in holding Beirut and the marine plain against the Franks. Because of their fierce battles with the crusaders, the Druzes earned the respect of the Sunni Muslim Caliphs and thus gained important political powers. After the middle of the twelfth century, the Ma'an family superseded the Tanukhs in Druze leadership. The origin of the family goes back to a Prince Ma'an who made his appearance in the Lebanon in the days of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Mustarshid (1118 AD-1135 AD). The Ma'ans chose for their abode the Chouf district in the southern part of Western Lebanon, overlooking the maritime plain betweenBeirut and Sidon, and made their headquarters in Baaqlin, which is still a leading Druze village. They were invested with feudal authority by Sultan Nur-al-Dn and furnished respectable contingents to the Muslim ranks in their struggle against the Crusaders.[29] [edit]Persecution during the Mamluk and Ottoman period Having cleared Syria of the Franks, the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt turned their attention to the schismatic Muslims of Syria. In 1305, after the issuing

of a fatwa by the Hanbali Sunni scholar Ibn Taymiyyah calling for jihad against all non-Sunni Muslims like the Druze, Alawites, Ismaili, and twelver Shiites. al-Malik al-Nasir inflicted a disastrous defeat on the Druze atKeserwan and forced outward compliance on their part to orthodox Sunni Islam. Later, under the Ottoman Turks, they were severely attacked at Ayn-awfar in 1585 after the Ottomans claimed that they assaulted their caravans near Tripoli.[29] Consequently, the 16th and 17th centuries were to witness a succession of armed Druze rebellions against the Ottomans, countered by repeated Ottoman punitive expeditions against the Chouf, in which the Druze population of the area was severely depleted and many villages destroyed. These military measures, severe as they were, did not succeed in reducing the local Druze to the required degree of subordination. This led the Ottoman government to agree to an arrangement whereby the different nahiyes (districts) of the Chouf would be granted iniltizam ("fiscal concession") to one of the region's amirs, or leading chiefs, leaving the maintenance of law and order and the collection of its taxes in the area in the hands of the appointed amir. This arrangement was to provide the cornerstone for the privileged status which ultimately came to be enjoyed by the whole of Mount Lebanon in Ottoman Syria, Druze and Christian areas alike.[30] [edit]Ma'an dynasty Main article: Maan family

Fakhreddin castle in Palmyra

With the advent of the Ottoman Turks and the conquest of Syria by Sultan Selim I in 1516, the Ma'ans were acknowledged by the new rulers as the feudal lords of southern Lebanon. Druze villages spread and prospered in that region, which under Ma'an leadership so flourished that it acquired the generic term of Jabal Bayt-Ma'an (the mountain of the Ma'an family) or Jabal al-Druze. The latter title has since been usurped by the Hawran region, which since the middle of the 19th century has proven a haven of refuge to Druze emigrants from Lebanon and has become the headquarters of Druze power.[29] Under Fakhreddin II, the Druze dominion increased until it included almost all Syria, extending from the edge of the Antioch plain in the north to Safad in the south, with a part of the Syrian desert dominated by Fakhreddin's castle at Tadmur (Palmyra), the ancient capital of Zenobia. The ruins of this castle still stand on a steep hill overlooking the town. Fakhr-al-Dn became too strong for his Turkish sovereign in Constantinople. He went so far in 1608 as to sign a commercial treaty withDuke Ferdinand I of Tuscany containing secret military clauses. The Sultan then sent a force against him, and he was compelled to flee the land and seek refuge in the courts of Tuscany and Naples in 1614. In 1618 political changes in the Ottoman sultanate had resulted in the removal of many enemies of Fakhr-al-Din from power, signaling the prince's triumphant return to Lebanon soon afterwards. In 1632 Ahmad Koujak was named Lord of Damascus. Koujak was a rival of Fakhr-al-Din and a friend of the sultan Murad IV, who ordered Koujak and the sultanat navy to attack Lebanon and depose Fakhr-El-Din. This time the prince decided to remain in Lebanon and resist the offensive, but the death of his son Ali in Wadi el-Taym was the beginning of his defeat. He later took refuge in Jezzine's grotto, closely followed by Koujak who eventually caught up with him and his family. Fakhr-al-Din finally traveled to Turkey, appearing before the sultan, defending himself so skillfully that the sultan gave him permission to return to Lebanon. Later, however, the sultan changed his orders and had Fakhr-al-Din and his family killed on 13 April 1635 in Istanbul, the capital city of the Ottoman
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Empire, bringing an end to an era in the history of Lebanon, a country which would not regain its current boundaries, which Fakhr-al-Din once ruled, until Lebanon was proclaimed a republic in 1920. Fakhr-al-Din was the first ruler in modern Lebanon to open the doors of his country to foreign Western influences. Under his auspices the French established a khn (hostel) in Sidon, theFlorentines a consulate, and Christian missionaries were admitted into the country. Beirut and Sidon, which Fakhr-al-Dn beautified, still bear traces of his benign rule. [edit]Shihab Dynasty Main article: Shihab family

Druze woman wearing a tantour, Chouf, Lebanon 1870s As early as the days of Saladin, and while the Ma'ans were still in complete control over southern Lebanon, the Shihab tribe, originally HijazArabs but later settled in awran, advanced from awran, in 1172, and settled in Wadi-al-Taym at the foot of Mt. Hermon. They soon made an alliance with the Ma'ans and were acknowledged as the Druze chiefs in Wadi-alTaym. At the end of the 17th century (1697) the Shihabs succeeded the Ma'ans in the feudal leadership of Druze southern Lebanon, although they reportedly professed Sunni Islam, they showed sympathy with Druzism, the religion of the majority of their subjects.

The Shihab leadership continued until the middle of the 19th century and culminated in the illustrious governorship of Amir Bashir Shihab II(1788 1840) who, after Fakhr-al-Din, was the most powerful feudal lord Lebanon produced. Though governor of the Druze Mountain Bashir was a cryptoChristian, and it was he whose aid Napoleon solicited in 1799 during his campaign against Syria. Having consolidated his conquests in Syria (18311838), Ibrahim Pasha, son of the viceroy of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, made the fatal mistake of trying to disarm the Christians and Druzes of the Lebanon and to draft the latter into his army. This was contrary to the principles of the life of independence which these mountaineers had always lived, and resulted in a general uprising against Egyptian rule. The uprising was encouraged, for political reasons, by the British. The Druzes of Wadi-al-Taym and awran, under the leadership of Shibli al-Aryan, distinguished themselves in their stubborn resistance at their inaccessible headquarters, al-Laja, lying southeast of Damascus.[29] [edit]Qaysites and the Yemenites Main article: Battle of Ain Darra

Meeting of Druze and Ottoman leaders inDamascus, about the control of Jebel Druze The conquest of Syria by the Muslim Arabs in the middle of the seventh century introduced into the land two political factions later called the Qaysites and the Yemenites. The Qaysite party represented the ijaz and Bedouin Arabs who were regarded as inferior by the Yemenites who were earlier and more cultured emigrants into Syria from southern Arabia. Druzes and Christians grouped in political rather than religious parties so the party lines in Lebanon obliterated racial and religious lines and the people grouped themselves regardless of their religious affiliations, into one or the other of these two parties. The sanguinary feuds between these two factions depleted, in course of time, the manhood of the Lebanon and ended in the decisive battle of Ain Dara in 1711, which resulted in the utter defeat of the
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Yemenite party. Many Yemenite Druzes thereupon immigrated to the Hawran region and thus laid the foundation of Druze power there.[29] [edit]Civil War of 1860 Main article: 1860 Lebanon conflict The Druzes and their Christian Maronite neighbors, who had thus far lived as religious communities on friendly terms, entered a period of social disturbance in the year 1840, which culminated in the civil war of 1860.[29] After the Shehab dynasty converted to Christianity, the Druze community and feudal leaders came under attack from the regime with the collaboration of the Catholic Church, and the Druze lost most of their political and feudal powers. Also, the Druze formed an alliance with Britain and allowed Protestant missionaries to enter Mount Lebanon, creating tension between them and the Catholic Maronites, who were supported by the French. The Maronite-Druze conflict in 1840-60 was an outgrowth of the Maronite Christian independence movement directed against the Druze, Druze feudalism and the Ottoman-Turks. The civil war was not therefore a religious war, except in Damascus where it spread and where the vastly nondruze population was anti-Christian. The movement culminated with the 1859-60 massacre and defeat of the Christians by the Druzes. The civil war of 1860 cost the Christians some ten thousand lives in Damascus, Zahl, Deir al-Qamar, Hasbaya and other towns of Lebanon. The European powers then determined to intervene and authorized the landing in Beirut of a body of French troops under General Beaufort d'Hautpoul, whose inscription can still be seen on the historic rock at the mouth of Nahr al-Kalb. French intervention on behalf of the Maronites did not help the Maronite national movement since France was restricted in 1860 by Britain which did not want the Ottoman Empire dismembered. But European intervention pressured the Turks to treat the Maronites more justly.[31] Following the recommendations of the powers, the Ottoman Porte granted Lebanon local autonomy, guaranteed by the powers, under a Christian governor. This autonomy was maintained until World War I.[29][32] [edit]Rebellion in Hauran Main article: Hauran Druze Rebellion
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The Hauran rebellion was a violent Druze uprising against Ottoman authority in the Syrian province, which erupted in 1909. The rebellion was led by al-Atrash family in an aim to gain independence, but ended in brutal suppression of the Druze, significant depopulation of the Hauran region and execution of the Druze leaders in 1910. [edit]Modern history In Lebanon, Syria, and Israel, the Druze have official recognition as a separate religious community with its own religious court system. Druze are known for their loyalty to the countries they reside in,[33] though they have a strong community feeling, in which they identify themselves as related even across borders of countries.[34] Despite their practice of blending with dominant groups in order to avoid persecution and because the Druze religion doesn't endorse separatist sentiments, urging the Druze to blend with the communities they reside in, nevertheless the Druze have had a history of brave resistance to occupying powers, and they have at times enjoyed more freedom than most other groups living in the Levant.[34] [edit]In Syria

Druze warriors preparing to go to battle with Sultan Pasha al-Atrash in 1925 In Syria, most Druze live in the Jebel al-Druze, a rugged and mountainous region in the southwest of the country, which is more than 90 percent Druze inhabited; some 120 villages are exclusively so.[35]

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Flag of Jabal el Druze representing the five Druze principles; other variations of the flag exist The Druze always played a far more important role in Syrian politics than its comparatively small population would suggest. With a community of little more than 100,000 in 1949, or roughly three percent of the Syrian population, the Druze of Syria's southeastern mountains constituted a potent force in Syrian politics and played a leading role in the nationalist struggle against the French. Under the military leadership of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, the Druze provided much of the military force behind the Syrian Revolution of 1925-1927. In 1945, Amir Hasan al-Atrash, the paramount political leader of the Jebel al-Druze, led the Druze military units in a successful revolt against the French, making the Jebel al-Druze the first and only region in Syria to liberate itself from French rule without British assistance. At independence the Druze, made confident by their successes, expected that Damascus would reward them for their many sacrifices on the battlefield. They demanded to keep their autonomous administration and many political privileges accorded them by the French and sought generous economic assistance from the newly independent government.[35]

Druze leaders meeting in Jebel al-Druze,Syria, 1926

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Well-led by the Atrash household and jealous of their reputation as Arab nationalists and proud warriors, the Druze leaders refused to be beaten into submission by Damascus or cowed by threats. When a local paper in 1945 reported that President Shukri al-Quwatli (19431949) had called the Druzes a "dangerous minority", Sultan Pasha al-Atrash flew into a rage and demanded a public retraction. If it were not forthcoming, he announced, the Druzes would indeed become "dangerous" and a force of 4,000 Druze warriors would "occupy the city of Damascus." Quwwatli could not dismiss Sultan Pasha's threat. The military balance of power in Syria was tilted in favor of the Druzes, at least until the military build up during the 1948 War in Palestine. One advisor to the Syrian Defense Department warned in 1946 that the Syrian army was "useless", and that the Druzes could "take Damascus and capture the present leaders in a breeze."[35] During the four years of Adib Shishakli's rule in Syria (December 1949 to February 1954) (on August 25, 1952: Adib al-Shishakli created theArab Liberation Movement (ALM), a progressive party with pan[36] Arabist and socialist views), the Druze community was subjected to a heavy attack by the Syrian regime. Shishakli believed that among his many opponents in Syria, the Druzes were the most potentially dangerous, and he was determined to crush them. He frequently proclaimed: "My enemies are like a serpent: the head is the Jebel al-Druze, the stomachHoms, and the tail Aleppo. If I crush the head the serpent will die." Shishakli dispatched 10,000 regular troops to occupy the Jebel al-Druze. Several towns were bombarded with heavy weapons, killing scores of civilians and destroying many houses. According to Druze accounts, Shishakli encouraged neighboring bedouin tribes to plunder the defenseless population and allowed his own troops to run amok.[35] Shishakli launched a brutal campaign to defame the Druzes for their religion and politics. He accused the entire community of treason, at times claiming they were agents of the British and Hashimites, at others that they were fighting for Israel against the Arabs. He even produced a cache of Israeli weapons allegedly discovered in the Jabal. Even more painful for the Druze community was his publication of "falsified Druze religious texts" and false testimonials ascribed to leading Druze sheikhs designed to stir up sectarian hatred. This propaganda also was broadcast in the Arab world, mainly
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Egypt. Shishakli was assassinated in Brazil on September 27, 1964 by a Druze seeking revenge for Shishakli's bombardment of the Jebel al-Druze.[35] He forcibly integrated minorities into the national Syrian social structure, his "Syrianization" of Alawite and Druze territories had to be accomplished in part using violence, he declared: "My enemies are like serpent. The head is the Jabal Druze, If I crush the head the serpent will die" (Seale 1963:132). [35] To this end, al-Shishakli encouraged the stigmatization of minorities. He saw minority demands as tantamount to treason. His increasingly chauvinistic notions of Arab nationalism were predicated on the denial that "minorities" existed in Syria.[37] After the Shishakli's military campaign, the Druze community lost a lot of its political influence, but many Druze military officers played an important role when it comes to the Baathistregime currently ruling Syria.[35] [edit]In Lebanon

Prophet Job shrine in Lebanon the Choufregion The Druze community played an important role in the formation of the modern state of Lebanon, and even though they are a minority they played an important role in the Lebanese political scene. Before and during the Lebanese Civil War (19751990), the Druze were in favor ofPanArabism and Palestinian resistance represented by the PLO. Most of the community supported the Progressive Socialist Party formed by the Lebanese leader Kamal Jumblatt and they fought alongside other leftist and Palestinian parties against the Lebanese Front that was mainly constituted of Christians. After the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt on March 16, 1977, his son Walid Jumblatt took the leadership of the party and played an important role in preserving his father's legacy and sustained the existence of the Druze community during the sectarian bloodshed that lasted until 1990.

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In August 2001, Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir toured the predominantly Druze Chouf region of Mount Lebanon and visited Mukhtara, the ancestral stronghold of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. The tumultuous reception that Sfeir received not only signified a historic reconciliation between Maronites and Druze, who fought a bloody war in 1983-1984, but underscored the fact that the banner of Lebanese sovereignty had broad multi-confessional appeal[38] and was a cornerstone for the Cedar Revolution. The second largest political party supported by Druze is the Lebanese Democratic Party led by Prince Talal Arslan the son of Lebanese independence hero Prince Magid Arslan.Many Druze also support the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. [edit]In Israel Main article: Israeli Druze [edit]Beliefs of the Druze The Druze are considered to be a social group as well as a religion, but not a distinct ethnic group. Also complicating their identity is the custom of Taqiyaconcealing or disguising their beliefs when necessarythat they adopted from Shia Islam and the esoteric nature of the faith, in which many teachings are kept secretive. Druze in different states can have radically different lifestyles. Some claim to be Muslim, some do not. The Druze faith is said to abide by Islamic principles, but they tend to be separatist in their treatment of Druze-hood, and their religion differs from mainstream Islam on a number of fundamental points.[39] Druze does not allow conversion to the religion. Marriage between Druze and non-Druze is strongly discouraged for religious, political and historical reasons. [edit]God in the Druze faith The Druze conception of the deity is declared by them to be one of strict and uncompromising unity. The main Druze doctrine states that God is both transcendent and immanent, in which He is above all attributes but at the same time He is present.[40] In their desire to maintain a rigid confession of unity, they stripped from God all attributes (tanzh) which may lead to polytheism (shirk). In God, there are no attributes distinct from his essence. He is wise, mighty, and just,
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not by wisdom, might, and justice, but by his own essence. God is "the Whole of Existence", rather than "above existence" or on His throne, which would make Him "limited." There is neither "how", "when", nor "where" about him; he is incomprehensible.[41] In this dogma, they are similar to the semi-philosophical, semi-religious body which flourished under Al-Ma'mun and was known by the name of Mu'tazila and the fraternal order of theBrethren of Purity (Ikhwan alafa).[29] Unlike the Mu'tazilla, however, and similar to some branches of Sufism, the Druze believe in the concept of Tajalli (meaning "theophany").[41] Tajalli, which is more often misunderstood by scholars and writers and is usually confused with the concept of incarnation, ...is the core spiritual beliefs [sic] in the Druze and some other intellectual and spiritual traditions.... In a mystical sense, it refers to the light of God experienced by certain mystics who have reached a high level of purity in their spiritual journey. Thus, God is perceived as the Lahut [the divine] who manifests His Light in the Station (Maqaam) of the Nasut [material realm] without the Nasut becoming Lahut. This is like one's image in the mirror: one is in the mirror but does not become the mirror. The Druze manuscripts are emphatic and warn against the belief that the Nasut is God.... Neglecting this warning, individual seekers, scholars, and other spectators have considered al-Hakim and other figures divine. ...In the Druze scriptural view, Tajalli 'takes a central stage.' One author comments that Tajalli occurs when the seeker's humanity is annihilated so that divine attributes and light are experienced by the person."[41] The concept of God incarnating either as or in a human seems "to contradict with what the Druze scriptural view has to teach about the Oneness of God, while tajalli [sic] is at the center of the Druze and some other, often mystical, traditions."[41] [edit]Scriptures Druze Sacred texts include the Kitab Al Hikma (Epistles of Wisdom).[42] [edit]Esotericism

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The Druze believe that many teachings given by Prophets, religious leaders, and Holy Books, had esoteric meanings preserved for those of intellect, in which some teachings are mere symbols and allegoristic in nature and for that they divide the understanding of holy books and teachings into three layers. These layers according to the Druze are: The obvious or exoteric (Zahir), accessible to anyone who can read or hear; The hidden or esoteric (Batin), accessible to those who are willing to search and learn through the concept of (exegesis); and The hidden of the hidden, a concept known as Anagoge, inaccessible to all but a few really enlightened individuals who truly understand the nature of the universe.[43]

Unlike some Islamic esoteric movements known as the batinids at that time, the Druzes don't believe that the esoteric meaning abrogates or necessarily abolishes the exoteric one. For example, Hamza bin Ali, refutes such claims by stating that, if the esoteric interpretation of Taharah (purity), is the purity of the heart and soul, it doesn't mean that a person can discard his physical purity, as Salah (prayer) is useless if a person is untruthful in his speech and for that the esoteric and exoteric meanings complement each other.[44] [edit]Precepts of the Druze faith Main article: Seven pillars of Ismailism The Druze follow seven precepts that are considered the core of the faith, and are perceived by them as the essence of the pillars of Islam. The Seven Druze precepts are: 1. 2. Veracity in speech and the truthfulness of the tongue. Protection and mutual aid to the brethren in faith. 3. Renunciation of all forms of former worship (specifically, invalid creeds) and false belief. 4. Repudiation of the devil (Iblis), and all forces of evil (translated from Arabic Toghyan meaning "despotism"). 5. Confession of God's unity. 6. Acquiescence in God's acts no matter what they be.
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Absolute submission and resignation to God's divine will in both secret and public.[45]
7.

[edit]Religious Symbol Their symbol is an array of five colors: green, red, yellow, blue, and white. Each color pertains to a symbol defining its principles: green for Aql "the Universal Mind/Nous", red for Nafs "the Universal Soul/Anima mundi", yellow for Kalima "the Word/Logos", blue for Sabq "the Potentiality/Cause/Precedent", and white for Tal "the Actuality/Effect/Immanence".These principles are usually represented symbolically by a five-pointed star. [edit]Uqql and Juhhl

Druze Sheikh (Uqql) wearing religious dress The Druze are divided into two groups. The largely secular majority, called al-Juhhl ("( )the Ignorant") are not granted access to the Druze holy literature or allowed to attend the initiated Uqqal's religious meetings. They are around 80% of the Druze population and are not obliged to follow the ascetic traditions of the Uqqal. The initiated religious group, which includes both men and women (about 20% of the population), is called al-Uqql ("( ,)the Knowledgeable
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Initiates"). They have a special mode of dress designed to comply with Quranic traditions. Women can opt to wear al-mandl, a loose white veil, especially in the presence of other people. They wear al-mandl on their heads to cover their hair and wrap it around their mouths and sometimes over their noses as well. They wear black shirts and long skirts covering their legs to their ankles. Male uqql grow mustaches, and wear dark Levantine/Turkish traditional dresses, called the shirwal, with white turbans that vary according to the Uqqal's hierarchy. Al-uqql have equal rights to al-Juhhl, but establish a hierarchy of respect based on religious service.The most influential 5% of Aluqqlbecome Ajawd, recognized religious leaders, and from this group the spiritual leaders of the Druze are assigned. While the Shaykh al-Aql, which is an official position in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, is elected by the local community and serves as the head of the Druze religious council, judges from the Druze religious courts are usually elected for this position. Unlike the spiritual leaders, the Shaykh al-Aql's authority is local to the country he is elected in, though in some instances spiritual leaders are elected to this position. The Druze believe in the unity of God, and are often known as the "People of Monotheism" or simply "Monotheists". Their theology has a NeoPlatonic view about how God interacts with the world through emanations and is similar to some gnostic and other esoteric sects. Druze philosophy also shows Sufi influences. Druze principles focus on honesty, loyalty, filial piety, altruism, patriotic sacrifice, and monotheism. They reject tobacco smoking, alcohol, consumption of pork, and marriage to non-Druze. Also, in contrast to most Islamic sects, the Druze reject polygamy, believe in reincarnation, and are not obliged to observe most of the religious rituals. The Druze believe that rituals are symbolic and have an individualistic effect on the person, for which reason Druze are free to perform them, or not. The community does celebrate Eid al-Adha, however, considered their most significant holiday. [edit]Origins of the Druze people [edit]Ethnic origins

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The Druze faith extended to many areas in the Middle East, but most of the surviving modern Druze can trace their origin to the Wadi alTaymour in South Lebanon, which is named after an Arab tribe TaymourAllah (formerly Taymour-Allat) which, according to Islamic historian, alTabari, first came from Arabia into the valley of the Euphrates where they were Christianized prior to their migration into the Lebanon. Many of the Druze feudal families whose genealogies have been preserved by the two modern Syrian chroniclers Haydar al-Shihabi and al-Shidyaq seem also to point in the direction of this origin. Arabian tribes emigrated via the Persian Gulf and stopped in Iraq on the route that was later to lead them to Syria. The first feudal Druze family, the Tanukh family, which made for itself a name in fighting the Crusaders, was, according to Haydar al-Shihabi, an Arab tribe from Mesopotamia where it occupied the position of a ruling family and apparently was Christianized.[29] The Tanukhs must have left Arabia as early as the second or third century A.D. The Ma'an tribe, which superseded the Tanukhs and produced the greatest Druze hero in history, Fakhr-al-Din, had the same traditional origin. The Talhuq family and 'Abd-al-Malik, who supplied the later Druze leadership, have the same record as the Tanukhs. The Imad family is named foral-Imadiyyah--the Kurdish town of Amadiya, northeast of Mosul inside Kurdistan, and, like the Jumblatts, is thought to be of Kurdish origin. The Arsalan family claims descent from theHirah Arab kings, but the name Arsalan (Persian and Turkish for lion) suggests Persian influence, if not origin.[29] The most accepted theory is that the Druzes are "a mixture of refugee stocks, in which the Arab largely predominates, grafted on to an original mountain population of Aramaic blood."[46] Nevertheless, many scholars formed their own hypotheses: for example, Lamartine (1835) discovered in the modern Druzes the remnants of the Samaritans;[47] Earl of Carnarvon (1860), those of the Cuthites whom Esarhaddon transplanted into Palestine; [48] Professor Felix von Luschan (1911), according to his conclusions from anthropometric measurements, makes the Druze, Maronites, and Alawites of Syria, together with the Bektashis, 'Ali-Ilahis,

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and Yezidis of Asia Minor and Persia, the modern representatives of the ancient Hittites.[49] During the 18th century, there were two branches of Druze living in Lebanon: the Yemeni Druze, headed by the Hamdan and Al-Atrash families; and the Kaysi Druze, headed by theJumblat and Arsalan families. The Hamdan family was banished from Mount Lebanon following the battle of Ain Dara in 1711. This battle was fought between two Druze factions: the Yemeni and the Kaysi. Following their dramatic defeat, the Yemeni faction migrated to Syria in the Jebel-Druze region and its capital, Soueida. However, it has been argued that these two factions were of political nature rather than ethnic, and had both Christian and Druze supporters. [edit]Genetics In a 2005 study of ASPM gene variants, Mekel-Bobrov et al. found that the Israeli Druze people of the Carmel region have among the highest rate of the newly evolved ASPM haplogroup D, at 52.2% occurrence of the approximately 6,000-year-old allele.[50] While it is not yet known exactly what selective advantage is provided by this gene variant, the haplogroup D allele is thought to be positively selected in populations and to confer some substantial advantage that has caused its frequency to rapidly increase. According to DNA testing, Druze are remarkable for the high frequency (35%) of males who carry the Y-chromosomal haplogroup L, which is otherwise uncommon in the Mideast (Shen et al. 2004).[51] This haplogroup originates from prehistoric South Asia and has spread from Pakistan into southern Iran. Cruciani in 2007 found E1b1b1a2 (E-V13) [one from Sub Clades of E1b1b1a1 (E-V12)] in high levels (>10% of the male population) in Turkish Cypriot and Druze Arab lineages. Recent genetic clustering analyses of ethnic groups are consistent with the close ancestral relationship between the Druze and Cypriots, and also identified similarity to the general Syrian and Lebanese populations, as well as a variety of Jewish lineages (Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Iraqi, and Moroccan)(Behar et al 2010).[52] Also, a new study concluded that the Druze harbor a remarkable diversity of mitochondrial DNA lineages that appear to have separated from each

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other thousands of years ago. But instead of dispersing throughout the world after their separation, the full range of lineages can still be found within the Druze population.[53] The researchers noted that the Druze villages contained a striking range of high frequency and high diversity of the X haplogroup, suggesting that this population provides a glimpse into the past genetic landscape of the Near East at a time when the X haplogroup was more prevalent.[53] These findings are consistent with the Druze oral tradition, that claims that the adherents of the faith came from diverse ancestral lineages stretching back tens of thousands of years.[53] Israeli Knesset member Ayoob Kara, a Druze himslef, speculated that the Druze are descended from one of the Lost Tribes of Israel, probably Zebulun. Kara stated that the Druze share many of the same beliefs as Jews, and that he has genetic evidence to prove that the Druze were descended from Jews.[54] That was after the Israeli author Tsvi Misinai claimed that the cultural and genetic background of Arabs living west of the Jordan River, proved that the majority of them descended from the Jewish nation,and that the genetic cluster of Druze coincides closely with those of the Samaritans, and is very close to the genetic clusters of Ashkenazim, Sephardim, and Jews from the Caucasus, but he asserted that such findings do not prove Kara's conclusion since several Jewish villages in Palestine converted to Druze faith which means the samples can be linked to those lineages and not a broad Druze linkage.[54] [edit]See also

List of Druze Neoplatonism and Gnosticism Syncretism

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The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party (also spelled Ba'th or Baath which means "resurrection" or "renaissance" (reddyah); Arabic: ) is a political party, mixing Arab nationalist and Arab socialist interests, opposed to Western imperialism and calling for the renaissance or resurrection of the Arab World and its unity in one united state.[1] Its motto "Unity, Liberty, Socialism" (wahda, hurriya, ishtirakiya) refers to Arab unity, freedom from non-Arab control and interference. Its ideology of Arab socialism is notably separate in origins and practice from Marxism. The party was founded in Damascus in 1946 by the Syrian intellectuals Michel Aflaq, and Salah al-Bitar, and since its inception has established branches in different Arab countries, although the only countries it has ever held power in are Syria and Iraq. In Syria it has had a monopoly on political power since the party's 1963 coup. Ba'athists also seized power in Iraq in 1963, but were deposed some months later. They returned to power in a 1968 coup and remained the sole party of government until the 2003 Iraq invasion. Since then they have been banned in Iraq. In 1966 a coup d'tat by the military against the historical leadership of Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar led the Syrian and Iraqi parties to split into rival organizations the Qotri (or Regionalist) Syria-based party and the Qawmi (or Nationalist) Iraq-based party.[2] Both Ba'ath parties retained the same name and maintained parallel structures in the Arab World, but became so antagonistic that the Syrian Ba'ath regime became the only Arab government to support non-Arab Iran against Iraq during the bloody IranIraq War. ]Underlying political philosophy

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The motto of the Party"Unity, Liberty, Socialism" (Arabic )was inspired by the French Jacobin political doctrine linking national unity and social equity,[3] Unity refers to Arab unity, or PanArabism; liberty emphasizes being free from foreign control and interference (self-determination); and socialism refers to Arab socialism, rather than to European socialism or communism. The idea that the national freedom and glory of the Arab Nation had been destroyed by Ottoman and Western imperialism was expounded on in Michel Aflaqs works On the Way of Resurrection. Arab nationalism had been influenced by 19th Century mainland European thinkers, notably conservative German philosophers such asJohann Gottlieb Fichte of the Knigsberg University Kantian school[4] and French Positivists such as Auguste Comte and professor Ernest Renan of the Collge de France in Paris.[5] Tellingly, Ba'ath party co-founders Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar both studied at the Sorbonne in the early 1930s, at a time when Positivism was still the dominant ideology amongst Frances academic elite. The Kulturnation concept of Johann Gottfried Herder and the Grimm Brothers had a certain impact. Kulturnation defines a nationality more by a common cultural tradition and popular folklore than by national, political or religious boundaries and was considered by some as being more suitable for the German, Arab or Ottoman and Turkic countries. Germany was seen as an anti-colonial power and friend of the Arab world; cultural and economic exchange and infrastructure projects such as the Baghdad Railway supported that impression. According to Paul Berman, one of the early Arab nationalist thinkers Sati' al-Husri was influenced byFichte, a German philosopher famous for his conception of the nation state and his influence on the German unification movement. The Ba'ath party also had a significant number of Christian Arabs among its founding members. For them, most prominently Michel Aflaq, a resolutely nationalist and secular political framework was a suitable way to evade faith-based Islamic orientation and the minority status it would give nonMuslims and to get full acknowledgment as citizens. Also, during General Rashid Ali al-Gaylani's short-lived anti-British military coup in

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1941, Iraq-based Arab nationalists (Sunni Muslims as well as Chaldean Christians) asked the Nazi German government to support them against British colonial rule. [edit]Structure This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations toreliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2010) The Ba'ath Party was created as a cell-based organization, with an emphasis on withstanding government repression and infiltration. Hierarchical lines of command ran from top to bottom, and members were forbidden to initiate contacts between groups on the same level of organization; all contacts had to pass through a higher command level. This made the party somewhat unwieldy, but helped prevent the formation of factions and cordoned off members from each other, making the party very difficult to infiltrate, as even members would not know the identity of many other Ba'athists. As the U.S. and its allies discovered in Iraq in 2003, the cell structure has also made the Party highly resilient as an armed resistance organization. A peculiarity stemming from its Arab unity ideology is the fact that it has always been intended to operate on a pan-Arab level, joined together by a supreme National Command, which is to serve as a party leadership for branches throughout the Arab world. From its lowest organizational level, the cell, to the highest, the National Command, the party is structured as follows: The Party Cell or Circle, composed of three to seven members, constitutes the basic organisational unit of the Ba'ath Party. There are two sorts of Cells: Member Cells and Supporter Cells. The latter consist of candidate members, who are being gradually introduced into Party work without being allowed membership privileges or knowledge of the party apparatus; at the same time, they are expected to follow all orders passed down to them by the full member that acts as the contact for their Cell. This serves both to prevent infiltration and to train and screen Party cadres. Cells functioned at the neighborhood, workplace or village level,

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where members would meet to discuss and execute party directives introduced from above. A Party Division comprises two to seven Cells, controlled by a Division Commander. Such Ba'athist groups occur throughout the bureaucracy and the military, where they function as the Partys watchdog, an effective form of covert surveillance within a public administration.

A Party Section, which comprises two to five Divisions, functions at the level of a large city quarter, a town, or a rural district.

The Branch comes above the Sections; it comprises at least two sections, and operates at the provincial level and also, at least in Syria, with one Branch each in the country's four universities.

The Regional Congress, which combines all the branches, was set up to elect the Regional Command as the core of the Party leadership and top decision-making mechanism, even if this later changed to an appointive procedure in Syria. A "Region" (qur), in Ba'athist parlance, is an Arab state, such as Syria or Iraq or Lebanon, reflecting the Party's refusal to acknowledge them as nation-states.

The National Command of the Ba'ath Party ranked over the Regional Commands. Until the 1960s, it formed the highest policy-making and coordinating council for the Ba'ath movement throughout the Arab world at large in both theory and practice. However, from 1966, there has existed two rival National Commands for the Ba'ath Party, both largely ceremonial, after the Iraqi and Syrian Regional Commands entered into conflict and set up puppet National Commands in order to further their rival claims to represent the original party.

[edit]The Ba'ath in Syria, 19541963 This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2010)

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Syrian politics took a dramatic turn in 1954 when the military regime of Adib al-Shishakli was overthrown and a democratic system restored. The Ba'ath, now a large and popular organisation, gained representation in the parliamentary elections that year. Ideologically-based organisations appealing to the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeoisie and the working class were gaining ground in Syria, threatening to displace the old parties that represented the notables and bourgeoisie. The Ba'ath was one of these new formations, but faced considerable competition from ideological enemies, notably the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which was intrinsically opposed to Arab nationalism and was portrayed by the Ba'ath as proWestern, and the Syrian Communist Party (SCP), whose support for class struggle and internationalism was also anathema to the Ba'ath. In addition to the parliamentary level, all these parties as well as Islamists competed in street-level activity and sought to recruit support among the military. The assassination of Ba'athist colonel Adnan al-Malki by a member of the SSNP allowed the Ba'ath and its allies to launch a crackdown on that party, thus eliminating one rival, but by the late 1950s, the Ba'ath itself was facing considerable problems, riven by factionalism and faced with ideological confusion among its base. The growth of the Communist Party was also a major threat. These considerations undoubtedly contributed to the partys decision to support unification with Nassers Egypt in 1958, an extremely popular position in any case. In 1958, Syria merged with Egypt in the United Arab Republic. As political parties other than Nassers Arab Socialist Union were not permitted to operate, the Ba'th along with Syrias other parties faced the choice of dissolution or suppression. In August 1959, the Ba'ath Party held a congress which, in line with Aflaqs views, approved of its liquidation into the Arab Socialist Union. This decision was not universally accepted in party ranks, however many dissented and the following year a fourth party congress was convened which reversed it. Meanwhile, a small group of Syrian Ba'athist officers stationed in Egypt were observing with alarm the partys poor position and the increasing fragility of the union. They decided to form a secret military committee: its initial members were Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad 'Umran, majors Salah

28

Jadid and Ahmad al-Mir, and captains Hafiz al-Asad and 'Abd al-Karim alJundi. The merger was not a happy experience for Syria, and in 1961, a military coup in Damascus brought it to an end. Sixteen prominent politicians signed a statement supporting the coup, among them al-Hurani and al-Bitar (although the latter soon retracted his signature). The party was in crisis: the secession was extremely controversial among Syrians in general and most unpopular among the radical nationalists who formed the Ba'ath membership. A large section of the membership left in protest, setting up the Socialist Unity Vanguard and gaining considerable support. The leadership around Aflaq was bitterly contested for its timidity in opposing the separation. Al-Hawrani, now a determined opponent of reunification, left the Ba'ath and re-established his Arab Socialist Party. Aflaq sought to reactivate the splintered party by calling a Fifth National Congress held in Homs in May 1962, from which both al-Hawranis supporters and the Socialist Unity Vanguard were excluded. A compromise was reached between the pro-Nasser elements and the more cautious leadership. The leadership line was reflected in the position the congress adopted in favour of "considered unity" as opposed to the demands for "immediate unity" launched by the Socialist Unity Vanguard (later the Socialist Unity Movement), the Nasserists and the Arab Nationalist Movement. Meanwhile the Syrian partys secret Military Committee was also planning how to take power, having been granted considerable freedom of action by the civilian leadership in recognition of its need for secrecy. [edit]The Ba'ath takes power in Syria and Iraq, 1963 Main articles: 1963 Syrian coup d'tat and February 1963 Iraqi coup d'tat This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2010) In February 1963, the Iraqi Ba'ath took power after violently overthrowing Abd al-Karim Qasim and quashing communist-led resistance. That same year, the Syrian partys military committee succeeded in persuading Nasserist and independent officers to make common cause with

29

it, and they successfully carried out amilitary coup on 8 March. A National Revolutionary Command Council took control and assigned itself legislative power; it appointed Salah al-Din al-Bitar as head of a "national front" government. The Ba'ath participated in this government along with the Arab Nationalist Movement, the United Arab Front and the Socialist Unity Movement. As historian Hanna Batatu notes, this took place without the fundamental disagreement over immediate or "considered" reunification having been resolved. The Ba'ath moved to consolidate its power within the new regime, purging Nasserist officers in April. Subsequent disturbances led to the fall of the al-Bitar government, and in the aftermath of Jasim Alwans failed Nasserist coup in July, the Ba'ath monopolized power. [edit]Ideological transformation and division, 19631968 See also: 1966 Syrian coup d'tat This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2010) The challenges of building a Ba'athist state led to considerable ideological discussion and internal struggle in the party. The Iraqi party was increasingly dominated by Ali Salih al-Sa'di, an unsophisticated thinker according to Batatu, who took a hardline leftist approach, declaring himself a Marxist. He gained support in this from Syrian regional secretary Hamoud el Choufi and from Yasin al-Hafiz, one of the partys few ideological theorists. Some members of the secret military committee also sympathized with this line. The far-left tendency gained control at the partys Sixth National Congress of 1963, where hardliners from the dominant Syrian and Iraqi regional parties joined forces to impose a hard left line, calling for "socialist planning", "collective farms run by peasants", "workers' democratic control of the means of production", a party based on workers and peasants, and other demands reflecting a certain emulation of Soviet-style socialism. In a coded attack on Aflaq, the congress also condemned "ideological notability" within the party (Batatu, p. 1020). Aflaq, bitterly angry at this

30

transformation of his party, retained a nominal leadership role, but the National Command as a whole came under the control of the radicals. The volte-face was received with anger by elements in the Iraqi party, which suffered considerable internal division. The Nationalist Guard, a paramilitary unit which had been extremely effective, and extremely brutal, in suppressing opposition to the new regime, supported al-Sa'di, as did the Ba'athist Federation of Students, the Union of Workers, and most party members. Most of its members among the military officer corps was opposed, as was President Abd al-Salam 'Arif. Coup and counter-coup ensued within the party, whose factions did not shrink from employing the military in settling their internal differences. This eventually allowed 'Arif to take control and eliminate Ba'thist power in Iraq for the time being. After disposing of its Nasserist rivals in 1963, the Ba'ath functioned as the only officially recognized Syrian political party, but factionalism and splintering within the party led to a succession of governments and new constitutions. On 23 February 1966, a bloody coup d'tat led by left-wing extremists, a radical Ba'athist faction headed by Chief of Staff Salah Jadid, overthrew the Syrian Government. A late warning telegram of the coup d'tat was sent from President Gamal Abdel Nasser to Nasim Al Safarjalani (The General Secretary of Presidential Council), on the early morning of the coup d'tat. The coup sprung out of factional rivalry between Jadid's "regionalist" (qutri) camp of the Ba'ath Party, which promoted ambitions for a Greater Syria and the more traditionally pan-Arab, in power faction, called the "nationalist" (qawmi) faction. Jadid's supporters were also seen as more radically left-wing. Several Ba'ath leaders were sentenced to death in absentia by a special military court headed by later Syrian Defence Minister, Mustafa Tlass, and Interim Syrian President and Vice President of SyriaAbdul Halim Khaddam, as prosecutor. Many managed to make their escape and flee to Beirut. The Ba'ath wing led by Salah Jadid took power, and set the party out on a more radical line. Although they had not been supporters of the victorious far-left line at the Sixth Party Congress, they had now moved to adopt its positions and displaced the more moderate wing in power, purging from the party its original founders, Aflaq and al-Bitar. The Syrian Ba'ath and the Iraqi Ba'ath were by now two separate parties, each maintaining that it was the genuine party and electing a National
31

Command to take charge of the party across the Arab world. However, in Syria, the Regional Command was the real centre of party power, and the membership of the National Command was a largely honorary position, often the destination of figures being eased out of the leadership. At this juncture, the Syrian Ba'ath party split into two factions: the 'progressive' faction, led by President and Regional Secretary Nureddin alAtassi gave priority to the radical Marxist-influenced line the Ba'ath was pursuing, but was closely linked to the security forces of Deputy Secretary Salah Jadid, the country's strongman from 1966. This faction was strongly preoccupied with what it termed the "Socialist transformation" in Syria, ordering large-scale nationalization of economic assets and agrarian reform. It favored an equally radical approach in external affairs, and condemned "reactionary" Arab regimes while preaching "people's war" against Israel; this led to Syria's virtual isolation even within the Arab world. The other faction, which came to dominate the armed forces, was headed by Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad. He took a more pragmatic political line, viewing reconciliation with the conservative Arab states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as essential for Syrias strategic position regardless of their political color. He also called for reversing some of the socialist economic measures and for allowing a limited role for non-Ba'athist political parties in state and society. In early January 1965 the Syrian Ba'ath Party nationalized about a hundred companies, "many of them mere workshops, employing in all some 12,000 workers." Conservative Damascusmerchants closing their shops and "with the help of Muslim preachers, called out the populace" to protest against the expropriation. The regime fought back with the Ba'ath Party National Guard and "newly formed Workers' Militia." In retaliation for the uprising the state assumed new powers to appoint and dismiss Sunni Muslim Friday prayerleaders and took over the administration of religious foundations (awqaf), "the main source of funds of the Muslim establishment." [6] Despite constant maneuvering and government changes, the two factions remained in an uneasy coalition of power. After the 1967 Six-Day War, tensions increased, and Assad's faction strengthened its hold on the military; from late 1968, it began dismantling Salah Jadid's support networks, facing ineffectual resistance from the civilian branch of the party that remained
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under his control. This duality of power persisted until November 1970, when, in another coup, Assad succeeded in ousting Atassi as prime minister and imprisoned both him and Jadid. He then set upon a project of rapid institution-building, reopening parliament and adopting a permanent constitution for the country, which had been ruled by military fiat or provisional constitutional documents since 1963. The Ba'ath Party was turned into a patronage network closely intertwined with the bureaucracy, and soon became virtually indistinguishable from the state, while membership numbers were increased to well over one million (reflecting both a conscious desire to turn the previous vanguard party into a regimesupporting mass organization, and the fact that party membership was now vital to advancement in many sectors). The party simultaneously lost its independence from the state, and was turned into a tool of the Assad regime, which remained based essentially in the security forces. Other socialist parties that accepted the basic orientation of the regime were permitted to operate again, and in 1972 the National Progressive Front was established as a coalition of these legal parties; however, they were only permitted to act as junior partners to the Ba'ath, with very little room for independent organization. During the factional struggles of the 1960s, three breakout factions from the party had emerged. A pro-Nasser group split from the party at the breakup of union with Egypt in 1961, and later became the Socialist Unionists' party. This group later splintered several times, but one branch of the movement was coopted by the Ba'ath into the National Progressive Front, and remains in existence as a very minor pro-regime organization. The far-left line of Yasin al-Hafiz, which had impressed Marxist influences on the party in 1963, broke off the following year to form what later became the Revolutionary Workers' Party, while Jadid's and Atassi's wing of the organization reunited as the clandestine Arab Socialist Democratic Ba'ath Party. Both the latter organizations in 1979 joined an opposition coalition called the National Democratic Gathering. Hafez al-Assad, one of the longest-ruling leaders of the modern Arab world, remained as president of Syria until his death in 2000, when his son Bashar al Assad succeeded him as President and as Regional and National Secretary of the party. Since then, the party has experienced an important generational
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shift, and a discreet ideological reorientation decreasing the emphasis on socialist planning in the economy, but no significant changes have taken place in its relation to the state and state power. It remains essentially a patronage and supervisory tool of the regime elite. The Ba'ath today holds 134 of the 250 seats in the Syrian Parliament, a figure which is dictated by election regulations rather than by voting patterns, and the Syrian Constitutionstipulates that it is "the leading party of society and state", granting it a legally enforced monopoly on real political power. [edit]The party outside Syria This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (June 2010) Through its Damascus-based National Command, the Syrian Ba'th Party has branches in Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq (currently split into two factions),[citation needed] etc., although none of the non-Syrian branches have any major strength. Among the Palestinians, as-Sa'iqa, a member organization of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, is the Syrian Ba'ath party branch. [edit]The Iraq-based Ba'ath Party

Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party student cell, Cairo, in the period 195963. In Iraq, the Ba'ath party remained a civilian group and lacked strong support within the military. The party had little impact, and the movement split into several factions after 1958 and again in 1966. The movement was reported to have lacked strong popular support,[7] but through the construction of a strong party apparatus the party succeeded in gaining power. The Ba'athists first came to power in the coup of February 1963, when Abd al-Salam 'Arif became president. Interference from the historic leadership around Aflaq and disputes between the moderates and extremists, culminating in an attempted coup by the latter in November 1963, served to discredit the party. After Arifs takeover in November 1963, the moderate
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military Ba'athist officers initially retained some influence but were gradually eased out of power over the following months. In July 1968, a bloodless coup led by General Ahmad Hasan alBakr, Saddam Hussein and Salah Omar Al-Ali brought the Ba'ath Party back to power. In 1974 the Iraqi Ba'athists formed the National Progressive Front to broaden support for the government's initiatives. Wranglings within the party continued, and the government periodically purged its dissident members. Emerging as a party strongman, Hussein eventually used his growing power to push al-Bakr aside in 1979 and ruled Iraq until 2003. Under Saddam's tenure Iraq experienced its most dramatic and successful period of economic growth, with its citizens enjoying standards of health care, housing, instruction and salaries/stipends well comparable to those of European countries. Several major infrastructures were laid down to help with the country's growth, although many had to be scaled down or abandoned as the costs of the Iran-Iraq War became heavier and heavier. Author Fred Halliday writes about 1958-1979: Arab Nationalism confronting Imperial Iran, Ba'thist ideology, where, under the influence of al-Husri, Iran was presented as the age-old enemy of the Arabs. Al-Husri's impact on the Iraqi education system was made during the period of the monarchy, but it was the Ba'thists, trained in that period and destined to take power later, who brought his ideas to their full, official and racist, culmination. For the Ba'thists their pan-Arab ideology was laced with antiPersian racism, it rested on the pursuit of anti-Persian themes, over the decade and a half after coming to power, Baghdad organised the expulsion of Iraqis of Persian origin, beginning with 40,000 Fayli Kurds, but totalling up to 200,000 or more, by the early years of the war itself. Such racist policies were reinforced by ideology: in 1981, a year after the start of the Iran-Iraq war, Dar al-Hurriya, the government publishing house, issued "Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies". by the author, Khairallah Talfah (Tulfah), the foster-father and father-in-law of Saddam Hussein. Halliday says that it was the Ba'thists too who, claiming to be the defenders of 'Arabism' on the eastern frontiers, brought to the fore the chauvinist myth of Persian migrants and communities in the Gulf.[8] [edit]Post-Saddam

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See also: De-Ba'athification In June 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority banned the Ba'ath party. Some criticize the additional step the CPA tookof banning all members of the top four tiers of the Ba'ath Party from the new government, as well as from public schools and collegesas blocking too many experienced people from participation in the new government. Thousands were removed from their positions, including doctors, professors, school teachers, bureaucrats and more. Many teachers lost their jobs, causing protests and demonstrations at schools and universities. Under the previous rule of the Ba'ath party, one could not reach high positions in the government or in the schools without becoming a party member. In fact, party membership was a prerequisite for university admission. In other words, while many Ba'athists joined for ideological reasons, many more were members because it was a way to better their options. After much pressure by the US, the policy of deBa'athification was addressed by the Iraqi government in January, 2008 in the highly controversial "Accountability and Justice Act" which was supposed to ease the policy, but which many feared would actually lead to further dismissals.[9] The new Constitution of Iraq approved by a referendum on October 15, 2005, reaffirmed the Ba'ath party ban, stating that: "No entity or program, under any name, may adopt racism, terrorism, the calling of others infidels, ethnic cleansing, or incite, facilitate, glorify, promote, or justify thereto, especially the Saddamist Baath in Iraq and its symbols, regardless of the name that it adopts. This may not be part of the political pluralism in Iraq." On December 17, 2008, the New York Times reported that up to 35 officials in the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior ranking as high as general had been arrested over the three previous days accused of quietly working to reconstitute the Ba'ath Party.[10][11] [The Iraq-based Ba'ath Party had branches in various Arab countries, such as Lebanon, Mauritania and Jordan. After the fall of the Saddam government, some branches have distanced themselves from the central party, such as the branches in Yemen and Sudan.

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In Lebanon, the party is led by former Sunni MP for Tripoli, Abdul-Majeed Al-Rafei. In Yemen, the 'Qawmi'/pro-Saddam branch of the Ba'ath party is led by Dr. Qasim Sallam (former MP for the district of Ta'izz), a US-educated philosopher author of "The Baath and the Arab homeland" (1980). The party works amongst the Palestinians directly through the Arab Liberation Front (known as ALF or Jabhat al-Tahrir al-'Arabiyah) founded by Zeid Heidar, and indirectly through the relatively small pro-Iraqi wing of Fatah formerly led by Khaled Yashruti. ALF formed the major Palestinian political faction in Iraq during the Saddam years. It is numerically small, but gained some prominence due to the support given to it by the Iraqi government. It is a member organization of PLO. In Bahrain, Rasul al-Jeshy leads the local pro-Saddam faction of the Ba'ath Party, the secular Nationalist Democratic Rally Society (Jami'at alTajammu' al-Qawmi al-Dimuqrati), which in an alliance with Shiite Islamists opposes the Bahrain governments economic policies. An Iraq-oriented Ba'ath Party branch led by exiled Ba'ath party cofounder Salah ad-Din al-Bitar and Gen. Amin Hafiz formerly existed in Syria, which the Syrian government severely repressed. The Alawis, also known as Alawites, Nusayris and Ansaris (Alawyyah Arabic: ,Nuayr Arab ic: ,and al-Anriyyah) are a prominent mystical and syncretic[8] religious group centred in Syria |last=Kramer |first=Martin |quote=In their mountainous corner of Syria, the Alaw claim to represent the furthest extension of Twelver Shi'ism.}}</ref>[9]

Zulfiqar, a stylized representation of the sword of Ali, is an important symbol for Alawis

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The Alawis take their name from Al ibn Ab lib cousin and son-in-law of Muammad,[10]who was the first Shi'a Imam and the fourth and last "Rightly Guided Caliph" of Sunni Islam. Until fairly recently Alawis were referred to as "Nusairis", named after Abu Shu'ayb Muhammadibn Nusayr (d. ca 270 h, 863 AD) who is reported to have attended the circles of the last threeImams of the prophet Muhammad's line. This name is considered derogatory, and Alawis refer to themselves as Alawis.[page needed][11] Nusairis have allegedly "generally preferred" to be called 'Alawis, because of its association with 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, rather than Abu Shu'ayb Muhammad Ibn Nusayr.[12] In September 1920, French occupational forces instituted the policy of referring to them by the term "'Alawi". In older sources they are often referred to as Ansaris, as this is how they referred to themselves, according to the Reverend Samuel Lyde, who lived among Alawis in the mid-19th century. Another source states that "Ansari", as referring to Alawites, is simply a Western mistransliteration of Nosairi.
[page needed][13][14]

Alawis are distinct from the Turkish-based Alevi religious sect, although the terms share similar etymologies. [edit]History [hide] Part of a Shah Islam series on

Beliefs and practices Succession of Ali

Imamate of the Family Mourning of Muharram Intercession Ismah The Occultation Clergy Views The Qur'an Sahaba Mu'awiya I Abu Bakr Umar Ghulat Holy days Ashura Arba'een Mawlid Eid ul-Fitr Eid al-Adha Eid al-Ghadeer Eid al-Mubahila History Twelver Isml Zaidi The verse of purification Mubahala Two things Khumm Fatimah's house First Fitna Second Fitna The Battle of Karbala Persecution Ahl al-Kisa Muhammad Ali Fatimah Hasan Hussein Some companions Salman the Persian

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Miqdad ibn Aswad Abu Dharr al-Ghifari Ammar ibn Yasir Bilal ibn Rabah vde The origin of the Alawis is disputed. The Alawis themselves trace their origins to the followers of the eleventh Imm, Hassan al-'Askar (d. 873), and his pupil ibn Nuayr (d. 868). [15] The sect seems to have been organised by a follower of Muammad ibn Nuayr known as al-Khasibi, who died in Aleppo about 969. In 1032 AlKhab's grandson and pupil al-Tabarani moved to Latakia, which was then controlled by the Byzantine Empire. Al-Tabarani became the perfector of the Alawi faith through his numerous writings. He and his pupils converted the rural population of the Syrian Coastal Mountain Range and the plain of Cilicia to the Alawi faith.[16] Samuel Lyde believed the population was of ancient Canaanite origins, but that parts had come from where the sect originated.[page needed][17]Professor Felix von Luschan (1911), according to his conclusions from anthropometric measurements, makes the Druze, Maronites, and Alawites, together with the Armenians, Bektashis, Ali-Ilahis, and Yezidis of Asia Minor and Persia, the modern representatives of the ancient Hittites.[18] Under the Ottoman Empire they were ill treated,[19] and they resisted an attempt to convert them to Sunni Islam.[20] They revolted against the Ottomans on several occasions, and maintained virtual autonomy in their mountains.[21] T. E. Lawrence wrote of their isolationism: "The sect, vital in itself, was clannish in feeling and politics. One Nosairi would not betray another, and would hardly not betray an unbeliever."[22]

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Flag of the Alawi State After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Syria and Lebanon came under a French mandate. The French, when they occupied Syria in 1920, recognized the term "Alawi", gave autonomy to them and other minority groups, and accepted them into their colonial troops.[23] Under the mandate, many Alawi chieftains supported the notion of a separate Alawi nation and tried to convert their autonomy into independence. A territory of "Alaouites" was created in 1925. In May 1930, the Government of Latakia was created; it lasted until February 28, 1937, when it was incorporated into Syria.[24] In 1939 a portion of northwest Syria, the Sanjak of Alexandretta, now Hatay, that contained a large number of Alawis, was given to Turkey by the French following a plebiscite carried out in the province under the guidance of League of Nations which favored joining Turkey. However, this development greatly angered the Alawi community and Syrians in general. In 1938, the Turkish military had gone into Alexandretta and expelled most of its Arab and Armenian inhabitants[neutrality is disputed].[25] Before this, Alawi Arabs and Armenians were the majority of the province's population[neutrality is disputed][25] Zaki al-Arsuzi, the young Alawi leader from Iskandarun province in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, who led the resistance to the annexation of his province to the Turks, later became a founder of the Ba'ath Party along with the Eastern Orthodox Christian schoolteacher Michel Aflaq. After World War II, Salman Al Murshid played a major role in uniting the Alawi province with Syria. He was executed by the newly independent Syrian government in Damascus on December 12, 1946 only three days after a hasty political trial. Syria became independent on April 17, 1946. Following the 1948 ArabIsraeli War, Syria endured a succession of military coups in 1949, the rise of theBa'ath Party, and unification of the country with Egypt in the United
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Arab Republic in 1958. The UAR lasted for three years and broke apart in 1961, when a group of army officers seized power and declared Syria independent again. A further succession of coups ensued until a secretive military committee, which included a number of disgruntled Alawi officers, including Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jadid, helped the Ba'ath Party take power in 1963. In 1966, Alawi-oriented military officers successfully rebelled and expelled the old Ba'ath that had looked to the Christian Michel Aflaq and the Sunni Muslim Salah al-Din al-Bitar for leadership. They promoted Zaki al-Arsuzi as the "Socrates" of their reconstituted Ba'ath Party.

The Assad family In 1970, then-Air Force General Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite, took power and instigated a "Correctionist Movement" in the Ba'ath Party.[26] His coming to power has been compared to "an untouchable becoming maharajah in India or a Jew becoming tsar in Russiaan unprecedented development shocking to the majority population which had monopolized power for so many centuries."[23] In 1971 al-Assad became president of Syria, a function that the Constitution allows only a Sunni Muslim to hold. In 1973 a new constitution was published that omitted the old requirement that the religion of the state is Islam and replaced it with the statement that the religion of the republic's president is Islam. Protests erupted when the statement was altered,[27] and to satisfy this requirement in 1974, Musa Sadr, a leader of theTwelvers of Lebanon and founder of the Amal Movement who had earlier sought to unite Lebanese Alawis and Shias under the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council without success,[3] issued a fatwa stating that Alawis were a community of Twelver Shia Muslims.[28][29] Under the dictatorial

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but secular Assad regime, religious minorities were tolerated, political dissent was not. After the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000, his son Bashar alAssad maintained the outlines of his father's regime.[citation needed] Although the Alawis predominate among the top military and intelligence offices, the civilian government and national economy is largely led by Sunnis, who represent about 74% of Syria's population. The Assad regime is careful to allow all of the religious sects a share of power and influence in the government. Today the Alawis exist as a minority but politically powerful sect in Syria. [edit]Beliefs Alawis are self-described Shi'i Muslims, and have been called Shia by other sources[30][9] including the highly influential Lebanese Shia cleric Musa alSadr of Lebanon.[28] On the other hand, Sunni Muslims do not recognize Alawi as Muslims.[19] At least one source has compared them to Baha'is, Babis, Bektashis, Ahmadis, and "similar groups that have arisen within the Muslim community", and declared that "it has always been the consensus of the Muslim Ulama, both Sunni and Shi'i, that the Nusayri Alawi are kuffar (unbelievers) and mushrikun(polytheists)."[12] On the other hand, the prominent Sunni Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammad Amin alHusayni, issued a fatwah recognizing them as part of the Muslim community.[31] The Alawite sect initially resisted encouragement to be categorized as Shi'ite Muslims.[32] Alawites have had a mixed view of themselves propagated. Ali Sulayman al-Ahmad, chief judge of the Alawite state, replied We are Alawi Muslims. Our book is the Quran. Our prophet is Muhammad. The Ka`ba is our qibla, and our religion is Islam.[33] [edit]Heterodox

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Alawis celebrating a festival in Banyas, Syria, during World War II Many of the tenets of the faith are secret and known only to a select few Alawi.[19] In the 19th century, however, an Alawite named Sulaiman al-Adni converted to Christianity and in 1863, compiled a book called Al-Bakurah as-Suliamaniya fi Kashf Asrar ad-Diyanah an-Nusairiyah (The First Fruits of Sulaiman in Revealing the Secrets of the Nusairi Religion). Orientalists like Louis Massignon gained access to a number of Nusairi manuscripts.[12] According to some sources, Alawis have integrated doctrines from other religions (Syncretism), in particular from Ismaili Islam andChristianity.[8][19] [29] According to scholar Cyril Glasse, it is thought that "as a small, historically beleaguered ethnic group", the Alawi "absorbed elements" from the different religions that influenced their area from Hellenistic times onward,[29] while maintaining their own beliefs, and "pretended to adhere to the dominant religion of the age."[29] Alawites are reported to celebrate certain Christian festivals, "in their own way",[29] including Christmas, Easter, and Palm Sunday, and their religious ceremonies make use of bread and wine.[23] According to Matti Moosa, a "leading scholar of the Nusayris", The Christian elements in the Nusayri religion are unmistakable. They include the concept of trinity; the celebration of Christmas, the consecration of the Qurban, that is, the sacrament of the flesh and blood which Christ offered to his disciples, and, most important, the celebration of the Quddas (a lengthy prayer proclaiming the divine attributes of Ali and the personification of all the biblical patriarchs from Adam to Simon Peter, founder of the Church, who is seen, paradoxically, as the embodiment of true Islam).[34]

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Glasse writes that they also practice a religious feast called by the Persian name Naw Ruz.

Alawi man in Latakia, early 20th century Alawis have much in common with the Ismailis in terms of overall beliefs, and they are sometimes regarded as "an offshoot of this group."[12] According to scholar Umar F. Abd-Allah, who uses Sulaiman alAdni's book along with other sources, the Alawis, like the Ismailis and related groups, believe that the Shariah has both an esoteric, allegorical (Batini) meaning and an exoteric, literal (zahiri) meaning and that only the hidden meaning is intended. Alawis believe the esoteric meaning is known only to the Imams and later to the Bab and was hidden even to the Islamic prophet Muhammad himself. Only the Bab has access to this esoteric meaning in the absence of the Imam.[12] Alawis believe in a "trinity"[19] or "schema"[29] of `Ain-Mim-Sin, which stands for `Ali, Muhammad, and Salman al-Farsi, the Persian Companion of Muhammad. Muhammad is known as ism, or "name", Ali as bab, or "door", and Salman al-Farsi as ma'na, or "meaning", with both Muhammad and Ali considered to be emanations of Salman al-Farsi.[29] According to Abd-Allah, each of these three is said to have been an incarnation of God. Ali, however, constitutes the most important part of this trinity. The Alawi testimony of faith is: `I have borne witness that there is no God but He, the most High, the object of worship and that there is no concealing veil (hijab) except the lord Muhammad, the object of praise, (as-Sayyid Muhmmad al-Mahmud), and there is not Bab except the lord Salman al-Farisi` The Nusairis believe in the subsequent incarnation of God in other persons after the passing of `Ali, Muhammad, and Salman al-Farisi...[12] Some sources have suggested that the non-Muslim nature of many of the historical Alawi beliefs notwithstanding, Alawi beliefs may have changed in recent decades. In the early 1970s a booklet entitled al-`Alawiyyun Shi'atu Ahl al-Bait (The Alawis are Followers of the Household of the Prophet), was issued in which doctrines of the Imami Shi'ah were described as 'Alawi, and which was "signed by of numerous `Alawi` men of religion".[12] This book

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and Musa Sadr's proclamation have led one scholar to wonder whether "a mass conversion from Nusairism to Shi'ah Islam" has taken place. [12] Another scholar suggests that factors such as the high profile of Alawi in Syria, the strong aversion of the Muslim majority to apostasy, and the relative lack of importance of religious doctrine to Alawi identity may have induced Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad and his successor son to press their fellow Alawi "to behave like 'regular Muslims', shedding or at least concealing their distinctive aspects."[35] Alawis have their own scholars, referred to as shaikhs, although more recently there has been a movement to bring Alawism and the other branches of Twelver Islam together through educational exchange programs in Syria and Qumm.[36] Distinct Alawi beliefs include the belief that prayers are not necessary, they don't fast, nor perform pilgrimage, nor have specific places of worship.[37] [edit]Population [edit]Syria

Alawi women in Syria, early 20th century Traditionally Alawis have lived in the Alawite Mountains along the Mediterranean coast of Syria. Latakia and Tartous are the region's principal cities. Today Alawis are also concentrated in the plains around Hama and Homs. Alawis also live in all major cities of Syria. They have been estimated to constitute about 15% of Syria's population (which would be in 2011 about 3.5 million people of about 23.1 million people in Syria). There are four Alawi confederations Kalbiyah, Khaiyatin, Haddadin, and Matawirah each divided into tribes.[19] Alawis are concentrated in

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the Latakia region of Syria, extending north to Antioch (Antakya), Turkey, and in and around Homs and Hama.[38] Before 1953 they held reserved seats in the Syrian Parliament, like all other religious communities. After that, including for the 1960 census, there were only general Muslim and Christian categories, without mention of subgroups in order to reduce "communalism" (tafiyya). [edit]Lebanon There are an estimated 40.000 to 100,000[3][39] Alawis in Lebanon, where they are recognized as one of the 18 official Lebanese sects. Due to the efforts of their leader Ali Eid, the Taif Agreement of 1989 gave them two reserved seats in the Parliament. Lebanese Alawis live mostly in the Jabal Mohsen neighbourhood of Tripoliand Akkar, in 15 villages,[40][41][42] and are mainly represented by the Arab Democratic Party. [edit]Turkey In order to avoid confusion with Alevis, they prefer the selfappellation Arap Alevileri ("Arab Alevis") in Turkish. The term Nusayr, which used to exist in (often polemical) theological texts is also revived in recent studies. In ukurova, they are named as Fellah and Arabua, the latter considered highly offensive by Alawis, by the Sunni population. A quasi-official name used particularly in 1930s by Turkish authorities was Eti Trkleri ("Hittite Turks"), in order to conceal their Arab origins. Today, this term is almost obsolete but it is still used by some people of older generations as a euphemism. The exact number of Alaw in Turkey is unknown, but there were 185 000 Alawis in 1970[43] (this number suggest ca 400 000 in 2009). As Muslims, they are not recorded separately from Sunnis in ID registration. In the 1965 census (the last Turkish census where informants were asked their mother tongue), 180,000 people in the three provinces declared their mother tongue as Arabic. However, Arabic-speaking Sunni and Christian people are also included in this figure. Alawis traditionally speak the same dialect of Levantine Arabic with Syrian Alawis. Arabic is best preserved in rural communities and Samanda. Younger people in ukurova cities and (to a lesser extent) in skenderun tend to speak Turkish. Turkish spoken by Alaw is distinguished
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by Alaw and non-Alaw alike with its particular accents and vocabulary. Knowledge ofArabic alphabet is confined to religious leaders and men who had worked or studied in Arab countries. Alaw show a considerable pattern of social mobility. Until 1960s, they used to work bound to Sunni aghas around Antakya and they were among the poorest folk in ukurova. Today, Alaw are prominent in economic sectors such as transportation and commerce. A large professional middleclass had also emerged. In recent years, there has been a tendency of exogamy, particularly among males who had attended universities and/or had lived in other parts of Turkey. These marriages are highly tolerated but exogamy of women, as with other patrilineal groups, is usually disfavoured. Alaw , like Alevis, mainly have strong leftist political preferences. However, some people in rural areas (usually members of notable Alaw families) may be found supporting secularistconservative parties such as True Path Party. Most Alaw s feel discriminated by the policies of Diyanet leri Bakanl.[44][45] [edit]Golan Heights There are also about 2000 Alawis living in the village of Ghajar, split between Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.[46]

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Rumors in the Workplace Managing and Preventing Them

Gossiping: It's not nice and it's not professional! iStockphoto/phildate Rumors. If you haven't been a victim of one, you may have participated in one. The whispers when a colleague is fired. The looks of understanding when two co-workers routinely "stay late to catch up on paperwork" on the same evening. The emails back and forth guessing at which department will suffer the largest budget cuts.

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It's difficult not to become involved in gossip at work. After all, people like gossip and interesting bits of information: you only have to look at the number of celebrity-focused publications to realize that we have a huge appetite for discussing other people's lives. At work, however, this type of interaction is harmful and costly. It wastes time, damages reputations, promotes divisiveness, creates anxiety, and destroys morale. So why do people start and spread rumors? Much of it has to do with our need to make sense of what's happening around us. To understand what's going on, people talk to one-another. And, together, they fill in the holes in the story with a little bit of fact and a lot of guesswork. This new story spreads, with bits and pieces added along the way, until you have an out-ofcontrol rumor spreading throughout your company. Why Rumors Start Rumors often grow because people like to be "in the know." Knowledge is power, and that's why the people with the least amount of power in an organization can often be the ones to start and spread rumors. It can make them feel important if they're seen to know things that others don't. This knowledge is at the center of why and how rumors start and spread. Insufficient knowledge or incomplete information are often to blame. Consider these examples: People don't know why a colleague was fired, so they make up a reason based on some limited knowledge or insignificant fact. "I saw John override the cash register the other day without a supervisor present. Maybe he stole some money and that's why he went." People see a pattern of behavior between two individuals and they add their own explanation. "Joseph and Samantha spend a lot of time together after hours catching up on paperwork.' And just yesterday, they were sitting awfully close to each other in the meeting. I bet paperwork isn't all that's getting done after quitting time!" People know that budget meetings are being held, and they're all behind closed doors and kept very quiet. To help these people deal with the stress, they try to gain some control and predict the outcome. "When Steve came out of the budget meeting today, he looked really angry. The other day, he said how nervous he was about his presentation to the board. I bet he made mistakes and had his budget cut." Some rumors, like the one in the second example, take on a more personal tone. These are generally what we think of as gossip. Gossip tends to be

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related to interpersonal relationships, and is often malicious in nature. It can get out of control quickly, and should be addressed promptly before it leads to harassment or bullying. These rumors are typical of the things you'll face at work, and they spread because of a lack of accurate information. So, the best way to fight rumors is with good communication. When you communicate well, your team knows what's happening, and they trust that you'll keep them informed. Good communication within your team also means that you will become aware of any rumors that are starting, and you'll be able to address them quickly and effectively. Dealing with rumors requires a two-pronged attack. Firstly, you need to set up an environment where rumors are not as likely to start. And secondly, you need to establish a pattern of open communication that allows you to remain aware of what's being said. Preventing Rumors Keep workers informed When workers know what's going on within an organization, they don't need to guess as much. Use newsletters, weekly meetings, or regular updates via the intranet to let people know what's happening. Communicate When you face adversity in your business, keep the lines of communication open. This is when distrust and stress are likely to be highest. Whether it's communicating during a crisis, dealing with a shrinking team, ormanaging during a downturn, it's fundamentally important to communicate clearly. Be open and honest When you can't reveal ALL of the information about a certain situation or event, be up front about it. People know when they aren't being told the whole story. Cut off the rumors from the start by explaining that you'll provide more information after you have all the details. Establish transparency within your systems Develop a promotion process that's clear and fair. Hold meetings behind closed doors only when absolutely necessary. Share industry reports and company performance data. The more people understand, the more they trust. Practice Management By Wandering Around The closer you are to your team and to other workers, the easier it is to communicate information and the greater the sense of trust. This also gives you an opportunity to hear rumors when they start, instead of only after they're out of control.
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Let people know that rumors are unacceptable Establish a policy for dealing with rumors and gossip. Outline what you'll do to prevent rumors from starting, and address how you'll deal with the people who engage in this behavior. Talk about the effects of rumors in the workplace. The more that people understand why the behavior is damaging, the more likely they'll be to monitor their own participation. Build a culture that promotes cooperation rather than competition Putting people in direct competition with one another for reward and recognition creates an opportunity for conflict and resentment. This lays a foundation of distrust between people and departments, and it allows rumors to start and grow. It's a good idea to monitor the level of competitiveness within your organization on a regular basis, and then make adjustments as necessary. Managing Rumors Deal with rumors immediately Rumors can spread quickly, and they can often change and grow far beyond the small bit of truth that caused them to start. When you hear of a rumor, talk to the people involved. Where appropriate, hold a meeting to address the rumor, and then communicate the truth. Again, if you can't provide all of the details, be honest and restate your policy about rumor and gossip in the workplace. Set a good example When someone comes to you with an "interesting" or entertaining story, refuse to get involved. When you hear a story from someone other than a direct source, ask questions. Do what you can to find out the truth. Talk to your boss about what you heard. Again, this keeps the lines of communication open between different channels, and it helps stop rumors. Watch for patterns with rumors If a certain type of rumor continues to spread, this may mean that you need to provide more information or more regular updates. If a particular person seems to start or spread rumors often, address the situation directly. Rumors affect productivity, so you must deal with them directly as a performance issue. Regularly audit your rumor behavior Also, encourage your team to do the same. Think about what you might have done over the past month or two to spread rumors. Ask yourself why you participated. Prepare a plan of action so that you'll be less tempted to get involved in the future. If everyone holds themselves a bit more

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accountable for rumors in the workplace, their frequency and their negative consequences will drop. Key Points Rumors at work aren't likely to disappear. It's human nature to want to know what's happening around us, and when people don't have complete information, they may fill in the gaps with suppositions that may not be accurate. Fortunately, a little bit of accurate information goes a long way to stop the need to spread rumors. Focus on open, honest, and regular communication. It's also important to build a culture of mutual respect and integrity. Rumors are spread by people, so you can stop rumors at the source by talking about the negative effects of rumors and gossip, and by outlining your expectations. You probably won't ever stop rumors completely, however, you can use these strategies to create more harmony and trust within your work team. You can learn 600 similar skills elsewhere on this site. Click here to see our full toolkit. If you like our approach, you can subscribe to our free newsletter, orbecome a member for just US$1.

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