What Makes a Concept Good?

A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept

Formation in the Social Sciences
Author(s): John Gerring
Source: Polity , Spring, 1999, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Spring, 1999), pp. 357-393
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Northeastern Political
Science Association

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What Makes a Concept Good?
A Criterial Framework for Understanding
Concept Formation in the Social Sciences*

John Gerring
Boston University

Nowhere in the broad and heterogeneous work on concept formation has the
question of conceptual utility been satisfactorily addressed. Goodness in
concept formation, I argue, cannot be reduced to 'clarity,' to empirical or
theoretical relevance, to a set of rules, or to the methodology particular to a
given study. Rather, I argue that conceptual adequacy should be perceived
as an attempt to respond to a standard set of criteria, whose demands are
felt in the formation and use of all social science concepts: () familiarity,
(2) resonance, (3) parsimony, (4) coherence, (5) differentiation, (6) depth,
(7) theoretical utility, and (8)field utility. The significance of this study is to
be found not simply in answering this important question, but also in pro-
viding a complete and reasonably concise framework for explaining the
process of concept formation within the social sciences. Rather than con-
ceiving of concept formation as a method (with a fixed set of rules and a
definite outcome), I view it as a highly variable process involving trade-offs
among these eight demands.

John Gerring is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at

Boston University, 232 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215.

As we are ... prisoners of the words we pick, we had better pick them
well.
Giovanni Sartori'

"Concept formation" conventionally refers to three aspects of a conc

the events or phenomena to be defined (the extension, denotation, or de

*I thank Andrew Gould, Hanna Pitkin, Arun Swamy and Craig Thomas for their
comments and suggestions. I am particularly grateful to David Collier and David Wal
their work, their support, and their ongoing input to debate on matters methodological.
1. Giovanni Sartori, "Guidelines for Concept Analysis," Social Science Concepts:
tematic Analysis, ed. Giovanni Sartori (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), 60.

Polity Volume
Polity XXXI,
Volume Number
XXXI, Number 3 3 Spring 1999
Spring 1999

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358 What Makes a Concept Good?

dum), (b) the properties or attributes that define them (the intension, connota-
tion, definiens, or definition), and (c) a label covering both a and b (the term).
Concept formation is thus a triangular operation; good concepts attain a
proper alignment between a, b, and c.2
If this notion seems unfamiliar to readers it is doubtless because so little
attention has been devoted to the subject of concept formation within the
social sciences. To be sure, concepts are a central concern for philosophers,
political theorists, sociological theorists, intellectual historians, linguists, and
cognitive psychologists.3 However, these scholars are primarily interested in
concepts as they function in ordinary or philosophical contexts, not in the spe-
cialized realm of social science. I take as my point of departure the assump-

2. The tripartite analysis of concept formation is derived from C. K. Ogden and I. A.

Richards, The Meaning of Meaning [1923] (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1989) and, more directly,
from Sartori, "Guidelines...," 22.
3. On the phenomenon of contested concepts, see Barry Clarke, "Eccentrically Contested
Concepts," British Journal of Political Science 9 (January 1979), 122-28; William E. Connolly,
The Terms of Political Discourse, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); W. B.
Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," [1956], reprinted in The Importance of Language, ed.
Max Black (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 121-46; John N. Gray, "On the Con-
testability of Social and Political Concepts," Political Theory 5 (August 1977), 331-48. On con-
ceptual change through history, see Terence Ball, Transforming Political Discourse: Political
Theory and Critical Conceptual History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Political Innovation
and Conceptual Change, ed. Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989); Reinhart Kosselleck, "Linguistic Change and the History of
Events," Journal of Modern History 61 (December 1989), 649-66. On the differences between
researchers' and subjects' definitions of key concepts, see Steven R. Brown and Richard W.
Taylor, "Perspective in Concept Formation," Social Science Quarterly 52 (1972), 852-60. On
epistemological issues pertaining to concept formation, see J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); Virginia Held, "The Terms of Political Discourse: A Comment
on Oppenheim," Political Theory 1 (February 1973), 69-75; Arthur L. Kalleberg, "Concept For-
mation in Normative and Empirical Studies: Toward Reconciliation in Political Theory," Ameri-
can Political Science Review 63:1 (March 1969), 26-39; Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A
Reader, ed. Maurice Natanson (New York: Random House, 1963); Anthony Palmer, Concept and
Object: The Unity of the Proposition in Logic and Psychology (London: Routledge, 1988); Hanna
Fenichel Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice: On the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social
and Political Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). On the influence of cog-
nitive and linguistic behavior on concept formation, see Riley W. Gardner and Robert A. Schoen,
"Differentiation and Abstraction in Concept Formation," Psychological Monographs: General
and Applied 76 (1962), 1-21; George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Cate-
gories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Knowledge, Con-
cepts, and Categories, ed. Koen Lamberts and David Shanks (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997);
Eleanor Rosch, Carolyn Mervis, Wayne Gray, David Johnson, and Penny Boyes-Braem, "Basic
Objects in Natural Categories," Cognitive Psychology 8 (1976), 382-439; John Taylor, Linguistic
Categorization, 2d. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). On the definition of 'concept,' see
Robert Adcock, "What is a 'Concept,"' presented at the annual meetings of the American Politi-
cal Science Association, Boston, MA (September 1998).

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 John Gerring 359

tion that concepts function differently in political science, sociology, anthro-

pology, history, and psychology than they do in other language regions. To the
extent that this is true, we may justify the restricted ambit of the present paper.
In any case, concepts are critical to the functioning and evolution of social
science. Weber notes that the progress of the cultural sciences occurs through
conflicts over terms and definitions.

Its result is the perpetual reconstruction of those concepts through

which we seek to comprehend reality. The history of the social sciences
is and remains a continuous process passing from the attempt to order
reality analytically through the construction of concepts-the dissolu-
tion of the analytical constructs so constructed through the expansion
and shift of the scientific horizon-and the reformulation anew of con-
cepts on the foundations thus transformed.... The greatest advances in
the sphere of the social sciences are substantively tied up with the shift
in practical cultural problems and take the guise of a critique of concept-
construction.4

All authors make lexical and semantic choices as they write and thus partici-
pate, wittingly or unwittingly, in an ongoing interpretive battle. This is so
because language is the toolkit with which we conduct our work, as well as
the substance upon which we work. Indeed, concept formation lies at the heart
of all social science endeavor. It is impossible to conduct work without using
concepts. It is impossible even to conceptualize a topic, as the term suggests,
without putting a label on it. Any significant work on a subject will involve a
reconceptualization of that subject. Any work on the nation-state, for example
-if at all persuasive-alters our understanding of the nation-state. No use of
language is semantically neutral.
The importance of concept formation to the conduct of social science may
be glimpsed by the familiar observation that one's results are heavily colored
by one's definition of key terms. If I say "Somoza was a fascist," the hearer
is apt to respond, "Define 'fascist."' It is commonly said that one can prove
practically anything simply by defining terms in a convenient way. This is no
doubt what prompts certain commentators to say that we ought to pay less
attention to the terms we use, and more to the things out there (in the world)

4. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1949), 105-
06. Weber's remarks on social science are usefully contrasted with Wittgenstein's comments on
the practice of philosophy. "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language;
it can in the end only describe it... it leaves everything as it is" (Logical Investigations 41: para
124); quoted in Gordon Graham, Historical Explanation Reconsidered (Aberdeen: Aberdeen
University Press, 1983), 2. Some approaches to ordinarily language philosophy approach this
neutral ideal. Most, however, do not even pretend to.

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360 What Makes a Concept Good?

that we are talking about.5 Yet, it will become clear in the course of this dis-
cussion that we cannot dispense with high-order concepts like fascism, ideol-
ogy, democracy, justice, and so forth. If we conducted social science business
only with directly-observable or countable concepts (deaths, votes, and the
like) we would have very little of importance to say, and we would have no
way of putting these small-order concepts together into a coherent whole.
Knowledge would no longer cumulate. Indeed, social science would be
stopped in its tracks. If we cannot, then, get language out of the way, we had
best learn to deal more effectively with words. We had best learn, in other
words, what differentiates a good concept from one that is less good, or less
useful.
This brings us to a consideration of what, precisely, is the matter with the
way we use language (and in particular, key concepts) in social science. For
many years it has been a standard complaint that the terminology of social sci-
ence lacks the clarity and constancy of the natural science lexicon. 'Ideology,'
for example-a concept we shall employ repeatedly in the following discus-
sion-has been found to contain at least thirty-five possible attributes, form-
ing a conceptual apparatus with 235 definitional possibilities.6 Other concepts,
like justice, democracy, the state, and power, are similarly (though perhaps not
so extremely) fraught. Truly, it might be said, we do not know what it is we
are talking about when we use these terms: for when A says 'ideology' she
may mean something quite different than B. Concepts are employed differ-
ently in different fields and sub-fields, and within different intellectual tradi-
tions (e.g., marxist, weberian, behavioral, rational choice).
But the confusion does not end there, for even within single subfields or
intellectual traditions there is a good deal of ambiguity surrounding such
terms. Concepts are routinely stretched to cover instances that lie quite a bit
outside their normal range of use.7 Or they are scrunched to cover only a few
instances (ignoring others). Older concepts are redeployed, leaving etymo-

5. Popper, for example, writes "Never let yourself be goaded into taking seriously prob-
lems about words and their meanings. What must be taken seriously are questions of fact, and
assertions about facts, theories and hypotheses; the problems they solve; and the problems they
raise." Karl Popper, Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography (LaSalle, IL: Open Court,
1976), 19; quoted in David Collier, "Putting Concepts to Work: Toward a Framework for Ana-
lyzing Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," presented at the annual meetings of the
American Political Science Association, Boston, MA (September 1998).
6. See John Gerring, "Ideology: A Definitional Analysis," Political Research Quarterly 50
(December 1997): 957-94.
7. On conceptual stretching, see David Collier and James E. Mahon, Jr., "Conceptual
'Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis," American Political Sci-
ence Review 87 (December 1993), 845-55; Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Com-
parative Politics," American Political Science Review 64:4 (December 1970), 1033-46; Sartori,
"Guidelines."

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 John Gerring 361

logical trails that confuse the unwitting reader. New words are created to refer
to things that were perhaps poorly articulated through existing concepts, leav-
ing a highly complex lexical terrain (for the old concepts continue to circu-
late). Words with similar meanings crowd around each other, vying for atten-
tion and stealing each others' attributes (e.g., ideology, political culture,
belief-system, value-system). Thus we play "musical chairs with words," in
Sartori's memorable phrase.8
This sort of semantic confusion throws a wrench into the work of social
science. Arguments employing such terms have a tendency to fly past each
other; work on these subjects does not cumulate. Concepts seem to "get in the
way" of a clear understanding of things. Our conceptual apparatus seems
defective.

Approaches to the Problem

A variety of approaches (some more self-conscious than others) may be dis-

cerned on the vexed question of concept formation. Let us begin with the
familiar admonition to carefully define our terms and to maintain a reasonable
level of consistency in our use of those terms within a given work. This is cer-
tainly sound advice, and a good point of departure for this discussion.
The real problem arises when one considers the antecedent question:
which terms, and which definitions for those terms, should we choose? Purely
stipulative definitions (deriving solely from the authority of the author) can be
difficult to comprehend and-equally important-to remember. We are likely
to object to such definitions as arbitrary if they do not fit with our intuitive
understandings of the term or the subject matter. For these reasons, such def-
initions are less likely to permanently reshape scholarly understandings, or
even to make sense. If, as Galileo said, all definitions are arbitrary, then it
must be observed that some definitions are a great deal more arbitrary than
others.9 Humpty Dumpty's rules of concept formation will not do very well
for social science. It matters, in other words, how we define our terms, not
merely that we define them.

8. Giovanni Sartori, "The Tower of Babble," in Tower of Babel: On the Definition and
Analysis of Concepts in the Social Sciences, ed. Giovanni Sartori, Fred W. Riggs, and Henry
Teune (International Studies, occasional paper no. 6), 9. See also Sartori, "Guidelines," 38, 52-53.
9. Galileo is paraphrased in Richard Robinson, Definition (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1954), 63. Robinson discusses the problems caused for Locke by his arbitrary redefinition of
'idea.' "In common use in Locke's century the word 'idea' meant, as it does in ours, something
essentially part of the thinker or perceiver and not of the objects he surveys. To redefine it, there-
fore, as any object of thinking was either to make a most violent departure from usage or to imply
that no man can ever think about anything that is not a part of himself. The latter is what hap-
pened to Locke, without his intending it" (74).

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362 What Makes a Concept Good?

Perhaps the oldest solution to the age-old problem of concept formation is

to rely upon norms of established usage (as defined by dictionary lexicons or
more extended etymological study). This, broadly speaking, is the ordinary-
language approach to concept definition.'? Yet, as philosophers and linguists
are quick to point out, norms of ordinary usage generally provide a range of
terminological and definitional options, rather than a single definition; most
concepts, perhaps all key social science concepts, are multivalent. Semantic
complications multiply when a concept's meaning is considered historically,
in different languages, in different language regions of the same language, in
different grammatical forms (e.g., as noun, adjective, or verb), and in differ-
ent speech acts. Occasionally, we find ourselves constructing concepts that
are, for most intents and purposes, new. Thus, although ordinary usage may
be an appropriate place to begin, it is not usually an appropriate place to end
the task of concept formation. Given the diversity of meanings implied by
ordinary usage there is rarely a single definition one might appeal to in set-
tling semantic disputes.
Nor is there any good reason to suppose that social science should restrict
itself to ordinary meanings when defining terms for social-scientific use.
Social science concepts, as Durkheim pointed out, "do not always, or even
generally, tally with that of the layman."

It is not our aim simply to discover a method for identifying with suff-
icent accuracy the facts to which the words of ordinary language refer
and the ideas they convey. We need, rather, to formulate entirely new
concepts, appropriate to the requirements of science and expressed in an
appropriate terminology."

Social scientists, like all sub-communities-e.g., like doctors, lawyers, foot-

ball players-require a somewhat specialized vocabulary. This does not mean,
of course, that a premium should be placed on "scientific," as opposed to ordi-
nary, usage. Indeed, I shall argue that all departures from natural language
impose costs, and should not be adopted lightly. However, it seems virtually

10. For work in the ordinary-language tradition (I employ the term loosely), see John L.
Austin, Philosophical Papers; Philosophy and Ordinary Language, ed. Charles E. Caton
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963); Ordinary Language, ed. V.C. Chappell (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Pitkin, Wittgenstein; Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New
York: Barnes & Noble, 1949); Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1960). See also work by G.E.M. Anscombe, Stanley Cavell, Jerry Fodor, Jerrold Katz,
Norman Malcolm, and John Wisdom-all loosely inspired by Wittgenstein's later work.
11. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method [1895] (New York: The Free Press,
1964), 36-7.

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 John Gerring 363

indisputable that such departures must, and should, be taken on some occa-
sions.'2 Social science cannot accept words simply as they present themselves
in ordinary speech, or a natural-language dictionary. Some fiddling with
words and definitions is incumbent upon the researcher.
A second tradition in concept formation equates successful definition with
the identification of attributes that provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for locating examples of the term (i.e., the phenomenon itself). "In defining a
name," writes Mill, "it is not usual to specify its entire connotation, but so
much only as is sufficient to mark out the objects usually denoted by it from
all other known objects. And sometimes a merely accidental property, not
involved in the meaning of the name, answers this purpose equally well."'3
Following this general tack, a later logician writes: "A class must be defined
by the invariable presence of certain common properties. If we include an
individual in which one of these properties does not appear, we either fall into
a logical contradiction, or else we form a new class with a new definition.
Even a single exception constitutes a new class by itself."'4 To define human
as an animal that is (a) featherless and (b) bipedal, for example, is to offer a
definition that successfully picks out one species from other species. This
approach privileges one desideratum (which I call 'differentiation') over all
others. Like the approach of ordinary language, this approach is not so much
wrong as insufficient. Humans are indeed featherless and bipedal, but this is
not what we usually mean when we use the word 'human.' (Consider the qual-
ities that we consider distinctively 'human'; featherlessness and bipedality
would probably rank low on such lists.) Although definitions in social science
are called upon to perform a referential function, their purpose is not merely
referential (see below).
Moreover, even if we were to privilege differentiation over all other con-
ceptual desiderata, achieving the goal of the 'classical' concept (whose attrib-

12. Richardson, Definition (73) and Sartori, "Guidelines," offer further reflections on this
point.
13. John Stuart Mill, System of Logic [1843] 8th ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1872), 73.
14. W. Stanley Jevons, The Principles of Science (London: 1892), 723; quoted in Abraham
Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (San Francisco: Chandler
Publishing, 1964), 68. See also Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Concept Formation and Measurement in the
Behavioral Sciences: Some Historical Observations," in Concepts, Theory, and Explanation in
the Behavioral Sciences, ed. Gordon J. DiRenzo (New York: Random House, 1966), 144-204;
Felix E. Oppenheim, Political Concepts: A Reconstruction (Chicago: University of Chicago,
1981). Although Sartori's work is too wide-ranging to fit into any single model, his repeated
injunction to "seize the object" ("Guidelines," 26), to "identify the referent and establish its
boundaries" (33) puts him closer to the classical camp than to any other. "The defining proper-
ties are those that bound the concept extensionally.... Confine your defining to the necessary
properties," writes Sartori (55). For further discussion of the classical concept, see Adcock,
"What is a 'Concept,"' and Taylor, Linguistic Categorization.

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364 What Makes a Concept Good?

utes always identify its referents, and no others) might not be possible in
many instances. Consider the concept 'mother.' If defined as the person who
gives birth to a child we would appear to satisfy the always-and-only crite-
rion. But how are we to refer to foster mothers and adoptive mothers, or sur-
rogate mothers (who do not provide genetic material for the child)? Are these
not also, in some basic sense, 'mothers'? Even the "featherless and biped"
definition breaks down in the face of accident victims and birth defects. Prob-
lems multiply when one begins to consider social science concepts. Which
attributes of 'democracy,' for example, should be considered necessary and
sufficient to identify instances of democracy-contestation, participation,
accountability, protection of basic rights, or some combination thereof? The
classical notion of a concept is an ideal rarely satisfied in social science, as
many writers have pointed out.5
A third tradition argues that concept formation is rightfully subservient to
theory formation. Concepts are the hand-maidens of theories, and conse-
quently may be judged only so good as the theories they serve.'6 Indeed, con-
cepts are the building-blocks of all inferences, and the formation of many
concepts is clearly, and legitimately, theory-driven. "Theory formation and
concept formation go hand in hand," Hempel stresses; "neither can be carried
on successfully in isolation from the other."'7
My only dissent from this line of reasoning-and it is one with which
most scholars would probably concur-is to point out that concept formation
is not merely a matter of theory formation. This will become abundantly clear
as we progress. For the moment one might consider the fact that a concept's
utility in facilitating theory-formation is influenced by the degree to which it
can be differentiated from neighboring concepts. If, let us say, 'ideology' is
defined in such a way as to encroach upon what we normally think of as polit-
ical culture, then the theory within which this concept takes its place is seri-
ously impaired. A rose by another name-say, 'political culture'-may smell

15. See Collier and Mahon, "Conceptual 'Stretching' "; Kaplan, Logic of Inquiry (68);
Lakoff, Women, Fire.
16. See, e.g., Russell Faeges, "Theory-Driven Concept Definition and Classificatory Per-
versity," unpublished manuscript, n.d.; Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation: And
Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 139. A slightly dif-
ferent version of the theoretical approach is offered by Murray G. Murphey, Philosophical Foun-
dations of Historical Knowledge (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994). Rather than seeing concepts per-
forming functions within theories, Murphey proposes that "theories that explain the behavior and
properties of instances of the concept are the meanings of concepts" (23-24; emphasis added).
Thus, the best definition of gold is "the element whose atomic number is 79."
17. Hempel, Aspects, 113 (see also 139). Kaplan calls this the paradox of conceptualization:
"The proper concepts are needed to formulate a good theory, but we need a good theory to arrive
at the proper concepts" (Logic of Inquiry, 53).

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 John Gerring 365

more sweet. A great theory, with poorly crafted concepts is at best a great idea,
poorly implemented. Concept formation and theory formation are intimately
conjoined; the former is not reducible to the latter.
Other work on the subject of concept formation is more difficult to sum-
marize (mainly because the field of concept formation is so poorly defined).
A fourth approach suggests that concept formation is particular to the concept-
type-e.g., circular, classical, classificatory, comparative, connotative, con-
textual, core, deductive, denotative, disposition, empirical, essential, essen-
tially-contested, experiential, family-resemblance, functional, genus et
differentia, ideal-type, inductive, lexical, metrical, minimal, nominal, object,
observable, operational, ostensive, persuasive, polar, precising, property,
radial, real, residual, stipulative, technical, theoretical, and so forth.'8 Accord-
ing to this line of reasoning, different concept-types impose different defini-
tional demands on the conceptualizer. Each is appropriate for different
(largely context-driven) tasks.
Finally, as I have suggested, a good deal of work on concept formation in
the social sciences (including some of the work just cited) does not fall neatly

18. See, e.g., Kazimierz Adjdukiewicz, "Three Concepts of Definition," in Problems in the
Philosophy of Language, ed. Thomas M. Olshewsky (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1969); Peter A. Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1981), 56-58;
Robert Bierstedt, "Nominal and Real Definitions in Sociological Theory," in Symposium on Soci-
ological Theory, ed. Llewellyn Gross (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1959); Thomas Burger, Max
Weber's Theory of Concept Formation: History, Laws, and Ideal Types (Durham: Duke Univer-
sity, 1976); F. Stuart Chapin, "Definition of Definitions of Concepts" Social Forces 18 (Decem-
ber 1939), 153- 60; Bernard P. Cohen, Developing Sociological Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Chicago:
Nelson-Hall, Inc, 1989); Collier and Mahon, "Conceptual 'Stretching"'; Gordon J. DiRenzo,
"Conceptual Definition in the Behavioral Sciences," in Concepts, Theory, and Explanation in the
Behavioral Sciences, ed. Gordon J. DiRenzo (New York: Random House, 1966), 6-18; Richard
G. Dumont and William J. Wilson,"Aspects of Concept Formation, Explication, and Theory Con-
struction in Sociology," American Sociological Review 32 (December 1967), 985-95; George J.
Graham, Jr., Methodological Foundations for Political Analysis (Waltham, MA: Xerox College
Publishing, 1971); Carl G. Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science,"
Foundations of the Unity of Science 2 (1952); Kaplan, Logic of Inquiry; Lakoff, Women, Fire;
Leonard Linsky, "Reference and Referents," in Problems in the Philosophy of Language, ed.
Thomas M. Olshewsky (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969); John William Miller, The
Definition of a Thing, with Some Notes on Language (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980); Arthur
Pap, "Theory of Definition," in Problems in the Philosophy of Language, ed. Thomas M.
Olshewsky (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969); Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of
'Meaning'," in Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Volume 2 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1975), 215-71; Robinson, Definition; Bertrand Russell,"On Denoting,"
in Olshewsky, Problems in the Philosophy of Language; Sartori, "Tower of Babble," 28-30; Sar-
tori, "Guidelines," 72-85; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Har-
court, Brace, 1968); P.F. Strawson, "On Referring," in Olshewsky, Problems in the Philosophy of
Language.

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366 What Makes a Concept Good?

into any of the foregoing schools.'9 Indeed, social science is replete with folk
wisdom on the matter of concept formation. We applaud the virtues of clarity,
making sense, seizing the object, relevance, rigor, standardization, systemati-
cization, theoretical yield, utility, and parsimony, and decry the evils of ambi-
guity, vagueness, indefiniteness, triviality, and idiosyncrasy. Yet, these famil-
iar admonitions are themselves rather vague, and perhaps contradictory,
suggesting the need for further research.20 We should like very much to follow
Locke's advice to "strip all... terms of ambiguity and obscurity."2' The ques-
tion is, how shall we do so?

The Argument

Though concept formation is not reducible to any of the foregoing criteria,

that does not mean that we should toss up our hands and conclude that con-
cept formation is a matter of 'context,' or that it is infinite (or unspecifiable)
in its diversity.22 To be sure, it is a highly contextual process. But this opens

19. See, e.g., Martin Bulmer and Robert G. Burgess, "Do Concepts,Variables and Indicators
Interrelate?" in Key Variables in Social Investigation, ed. Robert G. Burgess (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1986); David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Con-
ceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," World Politics 49 (April 1997): 430-51; Carl G.
Hempel, "Typological Methods in the Social Sciences," in Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A
Reader, ed. Maurice Natanson (New York; Random House, 1963); Hempel, Philosophy of Nat-
ural Science (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966); Kaplan, Logic of Inquiry; John C.
McKinney, Constructive Typology and Social Theory (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966); Eugene
J. Meehan, The Foundations of Political Analysis: Empirical and Normative (Homewood, IL:
Dorsey Press, 1971); Mill, System of Logic; Tadeusz Pawlowski, Concept Formation in the
Humanities and the Social Sciences (Boston: D. Reidel, 1980). See also the extensive bibliogra-
phy in David Collier and Henry Brady, "Studies of Major Concepts in Political Analysis: An
Illustrative Inventory," unpublished manuscript (Berkeley: Department of Political Science, Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley).
20. Consider, for example, Sartori's ("Guidelines," 63) Rule 1: "Of any empirical concept
always, and separately, check 1) whether it is ambiguous, that is how the meaning relates to the
term; and 2) whether it is vague, that is how the meaning relates to the referent."
21. Quoted in Richardson, Definition, 70.
22. "Words," wrote Virginia Woolf, "are the wildest, freest, most irresponsible, most
unteachable of all things. Of course, you can catch them and sort them and place them in alpha-
betical order in dictionaries. But words do not live in dictionaries; they live in the mind.... Thus
to lay down any laws for such irreclaimable vagabonds is worse than useless. A few trifling rules
of grammar and spelling are all the constraint we can put on them. All we can say about them, as
we peer at them over the edge of that deep, dark and only fitfully illuminated cavern in which
they live - the mind - all we can say about them is that they seem to like people to think and
to feel before they use them, but to think and to feel not about them, but about something differ-
ent. They are highly sensitive, easily made self-conscious. They do not like to have their purity
or their impurity discussed.... Nor do they like being lifted out on the point of a pen and exam-
ined separately. They hang together, in sentences, in paragraphs, sometimes for whole pages at a

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 John Gerring 367

Table 1. Criteria of Conceptual Goodness

1. Familiarity How familiar is the concept (to a lay or academic audience)?

2. Resonance Does the chosen term ring (resonate)?
3. Parsimony How short is a) the term and b) its list of defining attributes (the
intension)?
4. Coherence How internally consistent (logically related) are the instances and
attributes?
5. Differentiation How differentiated are the instances and the attributes (from other
most-similar concepts)? How bounded, how operationalizable, is the
concept?
6. Depth How many accompanying properties are shared by the instances
under definition?
7. Theoretical Utility How useful is the concept within a wider field of inferences?
8. Field Utility How useful is the concept within a field of related instances and
attributes?

further questions: which contexts matter (or should matter), and under what
circumstances? Despite the complexities these questions introduce, I believe
that it is possible to arrive at a single account of concept formation within the
social sciences that is at once comprehensive and reasonably concise. Good-
ness in concept formation is most fruitfully understood as an attempt to medi-
ate among eight criteria: familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differ-
entiation, depth, theoretical utility, and field utility (see Table 1).
The common-sense conclusion from this eight-part list is to say that con-
cepts may be formed with a wide variety of purposes and may fulfill a wide
variety of attendant functions in social science research. I wish to carry the argu-
ment one step further. Of course differently constructed concepts will empha-
size and deemphasize different demands. In this sense, they each "do their own
thing" (as work on concept-types implies). But the suppression of one or more
demands does not go unnoticed by other social scientists. A concept with high
theoretical utility that offends norms of established usage (or vice-versa) is less
serviceable for this fact. Thus, although particular criterial demands are often
ignored, they are ignored at a cost. This points to the notion of concept forma-
tion as a set of tradeoffs-a tug of war among these eight desiderata. Concept
formation is a fraught exercise-a set of choices which may have no single
'best' solution, but rather a range of more-or-less acceptable alternatives. This
eight-part criterial framework provides a quick and ready schema by which the

time. They hate being useful; they hate making money; they hate being lectured about in public.
In short, they hate anything that stamps them with one meaning or confines them to one attitude,
for it is their nature to change" (The Death of the Moth, quoted in Richardson, Definition, 65).

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368 What Makes a Concept Good?

strengths and weaknesses of alternative conceptualizations can be assessed, and

the process of concept formation moved forward.
The argument of the paper proceeds in two stages. In the first section I set
forth the eight criterial demands, showing why each is important and, at the
same time, why concept formation is not reducible to that criterion alone. In
the following section, I discuss some broader implications of this framework
for the conduct of social science research. Specifically, I argue (a) that other
norms that might be supposed to guide the process of concept formation can
be subsumed within the foregoing criteria, or are not worth pursuing; (b) that
different sorts of social-science concepts (e.g., 'theoretical' and 'observa-
tional' terms) nonetheless respond to a common set of definitional demands;
(c) that the notion of tradeoffs, rather then specific rules (a la Sartori), best
guides and describes the complex process of concept formation; and (d) that
standards of conceptual adequacy are not entirely illusory, so long as they are
understood as relative-relative, that is, to alternative formulations that might
be constructed for any particular concept.

I. Criteria

Familiarity

The degree to which a new definition "makes sense," or is intuitively "clear,"

depends critically upon the degree to which it conforms, or clashes, with
established usage-within everyday language and within a specialized lan-
guage community. If a term is defined in a highly idiosyncratic way it is
unlikely to be understood, or retained. "The supreme rule of stipulation,"
writes Richard Robinson, "is surely to stipulate as little as possible. Do not
change received definitions when you have nothing to complain of in them."23
Thus, the criterion of familiarity must be understood, like other criteria, as a
matter of degrees. There should be, in any case, a demonstrable fit between
new and old meanings of a given term.
Familiarity in the definition of a given term is achieved by incorporating
as many of its standard meanings in the new definition as possible, or at least
by avoiding any glaring contradiction of those meanings. Here it is often help-
ful to distinguish between the 'core' features of a term-those which are gen-
erally agreed-upon and which have a secure etymological standing in the his-
tory of the term-and those which are peripheral. Dropping a peripheral
feature will impose a smaller loss in familiarity than the jettisoning of a core
feature.
Familiarity in the term is achieved by finding that word within the exist-

23. Robinson, Definition, 80.

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 John Gerring 369

ing lexicon which, as currently understood, most accurately describes the phe-
nomenon under definition. Where several existing terms capture the phenom-
ena in question with equal facility-as, for example, the near-synonyms
worldview and weltanschauung-achieving familiarity becomes a matter of
finding the term with the greatest common currency. Simple, everyday terms
of a researcher's native language are, by definition, more familiar than terms
drawn from languages which are dead, foreign, or highly specialized. Where
no terms within the existing general or social-science lexicon adequately
describe the phenomena in question the writer is pressed to invent a new term.
Yet, neologism is the greatest violation of the familiarity criterion, for it
involves the creation of an entirely new term with no meaning at all in normal
usage. All other things being equal, a writer should turn to this expedient only
when no other semantic options present themselves. "Let us not stipulate until
we have good reason to believe that there is no name for the thing we wish to
name," notes Robinson emphatically.4 Durkheim's comments on the matter
are also pertinent.

In actual practice, one always starts with the lay concept and the lay
term. One inquires whether, among the things which this word confus-
edly connotes, there are some which present common external charac-
teristics. If this is the case, and if the concept formed by the grouping of
the facts thus brought together coincides, if not totally (which is rare), at
least to a large extent, with the lay concept, it will be possible to continue
to designate the former by the same term as the latter, that is, to retain in
science the expression used in everyday language. But if the gap is too
considerable, if the common notion confuses a plurality of distinct ideas,
the creation of new and distinctive terms becomes necessary.2

At the same time, we ought not visualize the invention of new terms as
qualitatively removed from the redefinition of old terms. Neologisms, while
rejecting ordinary language, strive at the same time to re-enter the universe of
intelligibility. They are never simply nonsense words; they are, instead, new
combinations of existing words (e.g., bureaucratic-authoritarianism) or roots
(e.g., polyarchy, heresthetic), or terms borrowed from other time-periods (e.g.,
corporatism), other language communities (e.g., equilibrium), or other lan-
guages (e.g., laissezfaire). By far the most fertile grounds for neologism have

24. Robinson, Definition, 81.

25. Durkheim, Rules of Sociological Method, 37. Mill (System of Logic, 24) advises that
since "the introduction of a new technical language as the vehicle of speculations on subjects
belonging to the domain of daily discussion, is extremely difficult to effect, and would not be free
from inconvenience even if effected, the problem for the philosopher... is, in retaining the exist-
ing phraseology, how best to alleviate its imperfections."

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370 What Makes a Concept Good?

been Classical (e.g., Id, communitas, polis), religious (e.g., hermeneutics),

and personal (e.g., Marxism, Reaganism).26 In all these cases, words, or word-
roots, are imported from their normal contexts to a rather different context
where their definition takes on a new meaning, or additional senses. However
severe the semantic stretch, at least some of the original properties of such
terms remain intact.27

Resonance

Why do some terms stick while others, with virtually identical meanings, dis
appear? Why are some efforts successful at reformulating a field or a prob-
lem, and others (with the same general argument) often overlooked? One
factor in the knowledge game which relates directly to concept formation is
the "cognitive click" of a given term, which I shall call resonance.
"Makers, breakers, and takers," "exit, voice, and loyalty," and "civic cul-
ture" are all examples of resonance at work.28 As is apparent, the demand for
resonance is often fulfilled by reference to nearby terms, which may form par
of a larger typology. If two of three terms in a typology end in the same suffix
(-tion, -ity, . . .) it may be desirable to find a third with the same suffix.
Rhyming schemes are wonderful mnemonic devices.
To be sure, the search for resonance is often at odds with the satisfaction
of other criteria. The search for a catchy label tempts writers to violate the
familiarity criterion, making up new words to replace existing words or
choosing exotic options over plain ones. There are enough cases of abuse that
within social science circles snazzy labels are often regarded as terminologi

26. On polyarchy, see Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1971). On heresthetic, see William H. Riker, The Art of Politic
Manipulation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). On corporatism, see David Collier,
"Trajectory of a Concept: 'Corporatism' in the Study of Latin American Politics," in Latin Amer
ica in Comparative Perspective, ed. Peter Smith (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 135-62
Philippe Schmitter C., "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in The New Corporatism, ed. Freder
ick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974).
27. Robinson (Definition, 55) notes: "Men will always be finding themselves with a new
thing to express and no word for it, and usually they will meet the problem by applying whichever
old word seems nearest, and thus the old word will acquire another meaning or a stretched mean
ing. Very rarely will they do what A. E. Housman bade them do, invent a new noise to mean the
new thing."
28. See Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments
and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Albert O. Hirschman,
Exit, Voice, Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1970); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture: Political Atti-
tudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University, 1963). See also discus-
sion in Collier and Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives," 450.

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 John Gerring 371

cal tinsel-rhetorical covers for poor research. Yet, before we dismiss the cri-
terion of resonance as frivolously aesthetic and obfuscatory, we should con-
sider the reasons why scholars continue to search for words which are not
only clear, but also captivating.
Effective phrase-making can no more be separated from the task of con-
cept formation than good writing can be separated from the task of research.
It seems fairly obvious that 'ideology' resonates in a way that 'belief-system'
does not, which may explain something about the persistence of the former in
the face of a fairly concerted academic onslaught over the past several
decades. One might also consider Marx's choice of proletariat over 'working
classes.' Would his work have had the same impact had he stayed with the ter-
minological status quo?
If resonance is important in reconceptualizing old ideas, as well as in coin-
ing new terms, how does one achieve this quality? This is a very difficult ques-
tion to answer, or to predict, since there are so many nonsemantic (auditory,
visual, and perhaps even olfactory) cues to which readers commonly respond.
Resonance, for example, might be derived from a word's metaphoric, synech-
dotic, alliterative, or onomatopoetic value, its rhyming scheme or rhythm
(number of syllables, stress, . . .). These are matters that we need not pursue
here. The point is, concepts aspire not simply to clarity but also to power, and
power is carried by a term's resonance as well as its meaning.

Parsimony

Good concepts do not have endless definitions. It should be possible to say

what it is one is talking about without listing a half-dozen attributes. This goes
almost without saying.29 At the same time, it should be pointed out that the dis-
tinction between the formal 'definition'-the intension-and 'accompanying
properties' is rarely hard and fast. On this head, many hairs have been split.
About all that one can say in general about this problem is that the benefits a
prospective attribute may bring to a concept must be weighed against the
desideratum of parsimony. A long intension, even if composed of closely
related attributes, will create a cumbersome and unappealing semantic vehi-
cle. 'Ideology,' as we shall have occasion to observe, is so overloaded with
definitional baggage that it barely manages to shuffle across the page. All
reconceptualizations of the term jettison some of this baggage; indeed, the
term means almost nothing at all if all of its possible attributes are included.
Less often noted, the goal of parsimony also properly applies to the term
itself. Consider the options for ideology-like phenomena. One might call them

29. See, e.g., Sartori, "Guidelines," 40, 54-55; Fred W. Riggs, "The Definition of Concepts"
in Sartori et al., Tower of Babel, 39-76.

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372 What Makes a Concept Good?

'belief-system,' 'symbol-system,' or 'value-system,' but none of these possi-

ble replacements is as short and to-the-point as that old standby, ideology. If
qualified by the adjective 'political' (e.g., 'political belief-system'), these
alternate terms become clumsier still. Arguably, ideology's endurance-in the
face of repeated criticism from the academic establishment-is due to its
admirable compactness. I have argued, for example, that we should preserve
a broad definition for ideology-one encompassing all relatively coherent
sets of attitudes, values, and beliefs about politics-because we need a way to
talk about these phenomena and there is no other eligible (parsimonious and
reasonably familiar) alternative.30 If a more restrictive definition is adopted,
we lose the capacity to capture these phenomena in a single term, and must
forever say "relatively coherent sets of attitudes, values, and beliefs about pol-
itics" (instead of the more parsimonious 'ideology').
A concept is an abbreviation, just as sequences of words (sentences,
phrases, books) are abbreviations of things. "By the stipulative substitution of
a word for a phrase, language is abbreviated," notes Robinson.

What can now be said could also have been said previously, without
using the new rule or the new name; but it can now be said in fewer
words, because the thing can now be indicated by a single name,
whereas formerly a descriptive phrase was required. The value of such
timesaving does not lie merely or mainly in leaving more time for other
activities. Abbreviation not merely shortens discourse; it also increases
understanding. We grasp better what we can hold in one span of atten-
tion, and how much we can thus hold depends on the length of the sym-
bols we have to use in order to state it. Abbreviations often immensely
increase our ability to understand and deal with a subject.3'

The Chinese language takes this quest for abbreviation to what we in the west-
ern world would consider to be an extreme, substituting single characters for
whole English sentences. Logical and mathematical languages also prize
brevity. The point is, natural languages (of any sort) also seek to reduce
human experience. Reduction, of course, is not the only task of language, just
as it is not the only task of concepts in social science. But consider: key con-
cepts are likely to be employed repeatedly and insistently in a given work. To
say 'political belief-system' once in a paragraph is enough; to say it thrice in
a paragraph is awkward and tendentious. Single-word concepts, particularly
those that trip easily off the tongue, can be used unobtrusively. All other

30. Proposed substitutes violate the parsimony criterion (e.g., 'political belief-system'), or
the intelligibility/familiarity criterion (e.g., 'weltanschaaung'). See Gerring, "Ideology."
31. Robinson, Definition, 68.

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 John Gerring 373

things being equal, 'worldview' is preferable to 'weltanschaaung,' 'walking'

preferable to 'perambulation,' and concepts with fewer definitional predicates
preferable to those with a multitude (e.g., ideology).32
Bentham's words on this matter are amusing, and equally instructive:

Blessed be he forevermore, in whatever robe arrayed, to whose creative

genius we are indebted for the first conception of those too short-lived
vehicles which convey to us as in a nutshell the essential character of
those awful volumes which at the touch of the sceptre become the rules
of our conduct and the arbiters of our destiny: 'The Alien Act,' 'The
Turnpike Act,' 'The Middlesex Waterworks Bill,' and so on.

How much better they serve than those authoritative masses of words
called titles, by which so large a proportion of sound and so small a pro-
portion of instruction are at so large an expense of attention granted to
us, such as-'An Act to explain and amend an act entitled An Act to
explain and amend ...' Coinages of commodious titles are thus issued
day by day throughout the session from an invisible though not unli-
censed mint. But no sooner has the last newspaper of the last day of the
session made its way to the most distant of its readers, than all this
learning, all this circulating medium, is as completely buried in obliv-
ion as a French assignat. So many yearly strings of words, not one of
which is to be found in the works of Dryden, with whom the art of coin-
ing words fit to be used became numbered among the lost arts, and the
art of giving birth to new ideas among the prohibited ones!33

Coining words fit to be used entails finding words, or combinations of words,

that are parsimonious. 'An Act to explain and amend. . .' cannot be remem-
bered-nor, if it could, would it facilitate communication. A long neologism
is an unseemly neologism.

Coherence

Arguably, the most important criterion of a good concept is its internal coher-
ence-the sense in which the attributes that define the concept, as well as the
characteristics that actually characterize the phenomena in question, "belong"
to one another. There must be some sense of coherence to the grouping, rather

32. It may be observed that parsimony in a term occasionally conflicts with parsimony in a
definition. 'Ideology,' for example, scores well on the first and poorly on the second. 'Belief-
system' scores poorly on the first, but well on the second.
33. Jeremy Bentham, Bentham's Handbook of Political Fallacies [1834] ed. Harold A.
Larrabee (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1952), 10-11.

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374 What Makes a Concept Good?

than simply a coincidence in time and physical space.

Ideology provides a particularly glaring case of inconsistency, having
been defined by some authors as a system of ideas which "promote[s] social
change," and by others as a system of ideas which "prevent[s] change." It
"makes use of and seeks to base itself upon philosophical ideas, arguments
and theories," yet also "advocates action or impels to action." It "contains
statements of fact," yet also expresses "morals, values, etc." It is "associated
with the whole society or community," yet "places supreme significance upon
one particular class or group." It "promotes, serves or reflects interests," yet
is "unconsciously motivated."34 The coherence criterion calls for the analyst
to make choices among each of these contrdictory attributes, and-if possi-
ble-to consolidate those attributes around a single core principle.
The problem of coherence is usually more subtle, involving attributes
which are not mutually contradictory, but which bear no obvious relationship
to one another. Attributes may be logically or functionally related. The hypo-
thetical concept 'curly head-of-state' fails on both counts, since the two attrib-
utes curly-headed and head-of-state bear no apparent relationship to one
another. If the concept identifies phenomena whose shared properties are not
related in some manner-regardless of their level of differentiation-they are
not likely to make sense. More precisely, they will generate several senses. In
each case it is the degree of similarity (i.e., internal coherence) among the
items in the set that is at issue.
The most coherent definitions are those identifying a 'core' or 'essential'
meaning.35 Robert Dahl, in his first influential work on 'power,' sets out to dis-
cover "the central intuitively understood meaning of the word," "the primitive
notion [of power] that seems to lie behind all [previous] concepts."36 This
essentializing approach to definition is common (and, indeed, often justified).
The core meaning of democracy, for example, is often thought to be rule by
the people. This may be viewed as the single principle behind all other defi-
nitional characteristics, associated characteristics, and usages of the term.
When one says democracy, what one is really talking about is rule by the
people. To the extent that this reductionist view is successful-to the extent,

34. All these examples are drawn from Malcolm B. Hamilton, "The Elements of the Con-
cept of Ideology" Political Studies 35 (1987): 20-21.
35. An 'essential' or 'real' definition is defined as: "Giving the essence of a thing. From
among the characteristics possessed by a thing, one is unique and hierarchically superior in that
it states (a) the most important characteristic of the thing, and/or (b) that characteristic upon
which the others depend for their existence" (Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy, 57). See also
Mill, System of Logic, 71.
36. Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," [1957] in Political Power: A Reader in Theory
and Research, ed. Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, and R. Harrison Wagner (New York: Free
Press, 1969), 79-80.

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 John Gerring 375

that is, that a single principle is able to subsume various uses and instances of
the concept-the highest possible level of coherence has been achieved in that
concept. (It will be noted that 'core' conceptualizations are also, conveniently,
parsimonious ones.)
Each of the proposed core definitions for ideology is an attempt to restore
coherence to the tangled set of attributes associated with this concept by
pointing to a fundamental attribute that successfully explains, or resolves con-
tradictions among, other attributes.37 It should be obvious that coherence in a
term is usually fairly easy to achieve if one or more of the term's traditional
meanings are overlooked. Thus, one may specify a core attribute for ideology
and include in the concept only those peripheral characteristics that mesh
nicely with the chosen core meaning (ignoring all other attributes evoked by
ordinary usage of the term). Again, we have a situation in which concept for-
mation involves trade-offs between different criteria.

Differentiation

The flip side of internal coherence is external differentiation, or boundedness.

Indeed, it is hardly possible to have one without the other, as the carving-
nature-at-the-joints metaphor suggests. "We call a substance silver," writes
Norman Campbell, in his pathbreaking Foundations of Science,

so long as it is distinguished from other substances and we call all sub-

stances silver which are indistinguishable from each other. The test
whether a property is a defining or a non-defining property rests simply
on the distinction between those properties which serve to distinguish
the substance from others and those which it possesses in common with
others. Any set of properties which serve to distinguish silver from all
other substances will serve to define it.38

Similarly, with social-science concepts like 'state,' we want to be able to

distinguish it from state-like entities (tribes, provinces, empires, and so forth).39
What is at issue is the way in which a given concept relates to most-similar
concepts. A definition of 'car,' for instance, will probably not bother to tell us
that it is greasy-not because it isn't true, but because it does not help us in dif-
ferentiating car from 'truck' or 'bicycle.' A concept's differentiation derives

37. See Gerring, "Ideology."

38. Norman Robert Campbell, Physics: The Elements [1919]. Reprinted as Foundations of
Science (New York: Dover, 1957), 49.
39. The accuracy of a given attribute in distinguishing one concept from a field of related
concepts has been given the name 'cue validity' in Rosch, et al. "Basic Objects" (discussed in
Lakoff, Women, Fire, 52).

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376 What Makes a Concept Good?

from the clarity of its borders within a field of similar terms. A poorly bounded
concept has definitional borders which overlap neighboring concepts.
The importance of differentiation is brought out nicely in the OED's def-
inition of 'definition,' which (among other things) asserts that defining an
object is "the act or product of marking out, or delimiting, the outlines or char-
acteristics of any conception or thing."40 The two terms (definition and differ-
entiation) are very close in meaning. As Pitkin explains, "the meaning of an
expression is delimited by what might have been said instead, but wasn't.
Green leaves off where yellow and blue begin, so the meaning of 'green' is
delimited by the meanings of 'yellow' and 'blue."'4'
Ideology is an excellent example of a concept without clear borders. It is
difficult, one finds, to use the concept of ideology without tripping over the
neighboring concepts of belief-system, worldview, value-system, symbol-
system, myth, public philosophy, political philosophy, political culture, public
opinion, policy agenda, political rhetoric, and political discourse. If, however,
we can clarify, by adjusting the attributes of the intension, how ideology dif-
fers from these other terms then we have increased the differentiation of the
concept. For purposes of maximum differentiation (ignoring the demands of
other conceptual criteria), one might define ideology as: (a) composed of
values, beliefs, and attitudes, but not issue-positions and policy results (dif-
ferentiating it from programs, policies, agendas, and actions); (b) coherent,
but not rigorously and systematically so (differentiating it from philosophical
systems); (c) directly concerned with politics, and acting as a guide to politi-
cal action (in contrast with those many near-synonyms which imply only a
minimal connection to the real world of politics); (d) 'partisan' (oppositional,
engaged); (e) persistent through time (as distinguished from public opinion
and policy agendas); and (f) manifested in speech or in written form but not
reducible to language (as distinguished from forms of discourse). With these
defining characteristics, the concept of ideology comes about as close as one
can come, given the sheer number of its near-synonyms, to fulfilling the cri-
terion of differentiation. Without such differentiating characteristics, readers
are likely to wonder how-or whether-ideology differs from related con-

40. Reprinted in Chapin, "Definition of Definitions," 153. Angeles (Dictionary of Philoso-

phy, 56) finds the Latin origins of the term in the verb definire, which is translated as 'to limit,'
'to end,' 'to be concerned with the boundaries of something.' We can rightly substitute phenom-
ena for 'objects' and 'things' in the foregoing definitions, since for our purposes it matters little
whether the extension is composed of thing-like phenomena or not. Thus, my use of operational-
ization is not equivalent to operationism, by which "the meaning of every scientific term must be
specifiable by indicating a definite testing operation that provides a criterion for its application"
(Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, 88). See also P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern
Physics (New York: Macmillan, 1927).
41. Pitkin, Wittgenstein, 11.

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 John Gerring 377

cepts, and why none of these other terms were chosen to label the concept
under definition.
Some years ago, Hannah Arendt bemoaned the general lack of attention
paid by political scientists to distinctions between 'power,' 'force,' 'authority,'
and 'violence.'42 In the interim, this lack of attention has been followed by
what some might call a surfeit of attention.43 But Arendt's point is still good:
useful definitions define a term against related terms, telling us not only what
a concept is, but also what it is not.44 Internal coherence is inseparable from
external differentiation.
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that differentiation refers
not only to semantic space (the degree to which a concept's definitional bor-
ders are clear) but also to physical space (the degree to which a concept's bor-
ders in time and space are clearly demarcated).45 What we wish to know about
a social science concept is not merely what it is, but also where it is-which
is to say, where it isn't. In order to perform this task effectively a concept must
be sufficiently bounded.
Differentiation, like all criterial demands, is a matter of degrees. Contrary
to the classical view of concepts-where defining attributes are to be found
always-and-only in the extension-most social science concepts must take a
pragmatic approach to the goal of establishing differentiation (for the simple
reason that there are no always- and-only attributes). Table 2 lays out the pos-
sibilities. Where unique properties are present (category 1), all others are
superfluous (for purposes of establishing differentiation). It hardly matters
whether the property in question is invariably present, or invariably absent,
although in the latter case the definitional attribute will be residual. Where
unique properties do not exist, we are forced to rely on the less perfect expe-
dient of sometimes-differentiating attributes in order to establish the bound-
aries of a concept. In such cases-including the vast majority of abstract con-
cepts-the "minimal definition strategy" that Sartori advises simply makes no
sense.46 One is compelled in the case of ideology, for example, to place quite

42. Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1970), 43.
43. Steven Lukes, Power (New York: New York University Press, 1986) and Peter Morriss,
Power: A Philosophical Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1987) review this literature.
44. There may be circumstances when a scholar justifiably conflates the definitions of sev-
eral related terms, as Dahl and others appear to do with power, force, influence, et al. (see Dahl,
"Concept of Power"). Yet, as many writers have noticed, there is no such thing in ordinary usage
as a pure synonym-i.e., two words that may be exchanged for one another with absolutely no
change of meaning or import. Thus, the effort to combine the meanings of one or more words in
a single concept, while doubtless useful for certain purposes, always involves some loss of famil-
iarity in the resulting concept.
45. All key social science concepts, I argue (below), perform a referential function.
46. See Sartori, "Tower of Babble," 35.

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378 What Makes a Concept Good?

Table 2. Differentiation: A Relative Matter

ATTRIBUTES FOUND IN ATTRIBUTES FOUND NEAR

THE EXTENSION THE EXTENSION

1. Always differentiating Always Never

Never Always

2. Sometimes differentiating Always Sometimes

Sometimes Always
Sometimes Never
Never Sometimes

3. Non- differentiating Always Always

Sometimes Sometimes
Never Never

a multitude of properties into

from its many near-synonym
borders of most concepts are
erty X may
dis be invoked to
cept, and Property Y to dist
property resides exclusively w
An important distinction mu
operationalization. A differen
able-its referents can be locat
ationalization of a concept is a
formation refers to the choic
not to the indicators used to
happen that the so-called impo
most readily be observed." In
ever they may be-not the ob
object.47
Yet, to say that operationalizability is inseparable from differentiation is to
say a good deal about the sort of concepts we are likely to favor in social sci-
ence research. Alienation, anomie, charisma, collective conscience, dogma-
tism, equality, false consciousness, hegemony, ideology, legitimacy, margin-
alization, mass society, national character, pattern variables, petty bourgeois,
rationalization, sovereignty, status anxiety, and other fuzzy concepts have a
pox on them. It is the pox of insufficient differentiation (or, if you prefer, non-
operationalizability). If you don't know it when you see it, then you can't tell
it (the concept) from other things. Such a concept is (ceteris paribus) less

47. W. Stanley Jevons, The Principles of Science [1877] (New York: Dover, 1958), 708.

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 John Gerring 379

useful. Barbara Geddes notes that state autonomy is generally "inferred from
its effects rather than directly observed.

No one, it seems, is quite sure what 'it' actually consists of. State auton-
omy seems at times to refer to the independence of the state itself, the
regime, a particular government, some segments or agencies of the gov-
ernment, or even specific leaders. It seems the phrase can refer to any
independent force based in the central government.48

With respect to democracy-another poxed term-Dahl claims "The gap

between the concept and operational definition is generally very great, so
great, indeed, that it is not always possible to see what relation there is
between the operations and the abstract definition."49 This does not mean, of
course, that we should immediately jettison these fuzzy terms. (Indeed, jetti-
soning 'democracy' is likely to cause more problems than it solves.) It means,
very simply, that differentiation is a problem. Any study employing these cat-
egories will have to work hard to develop definitions that are sufficiently
bounded to do real work.5
Rather than viewing operationalization as simply an afterthought-tacked
on after the act of concept formation is already complete-I would argue that
it is integral to concept formation. Concepts that cannot be effectively opera-
tionalized, or can be operationalized in too many different ways, cannot be
differentiated.

Depth

The larger purpose of concept formation is not simply to enhance the clarity
of communication (by showing where, precisely, the borders between con-
cepts are located), but also the efficiency of communication. We are looking
for a way to group instances/characteristics that are commonly found together

48. Barbara Geddes, Politicians' Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 5.
49. Robert Dahl, "Power," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Science 12, ed. David
L. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 414. Quoted in Geoffrey Debnam, The Analysis of Power:
Core Elements and Structure (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 2.
50. Generally, the quest for bounded concepts leads one to concrete, 'observational' con-
cepts. This, it might be said, is the virtue of small concepts (their specificity, and hence clear bor-
ders). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a larger concept being more bounded than the smaller con-
cepts within its purview. 'State' is unlikely to be more bounded than 'executive,' 'parliament,' and
'bureaucracy.' However, this does not mean that all observational concepts are bounded, and all
'abstract' terms fuzzy. Consider the various terms used to describe parts of river-e.g., 'delta,'
'source,' 'beach,' and so forth. These, too, are shifty.

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380 What Makes a Concept Good?

so that we can use the concept's label as shorthand for those instances/char-
acteristics. The utility of a concept is enhanced by its ability to 'bundle' char-
acteristics. The greater the number of properties shared by the phenomena in
the extension, the greater the depth of a concept.5'
Within the U.S., the geographic concept of the West is vulnerable to the
charge that these states do not share many features in common; the concept,
in other words, is not meaning-full. Meaning, in this case, refers to the number
of shared attributes that the term calls forth. The deeper or richer a concept,
the more convincing the claim that it defines a class of common entities,
which are therefore deserving of being called by a single name. The term, in
this sense, carries more of a punch-it is, descriptively speaking, more pow-
erful, allowing us to infer many things-the common characteristics of the
concept-from one thing, the concept's label. The concept of the South, fol-
lowing the opinion of most historians, would have to be considered deeper
than the West, since a much longer list of accompanying attributes can be
constructed.
One of the rationales behind the familiar injunction not to define concepts
residually (by what they aren't) is rooted in the problem that in doing so we
violate the criterion of depth. Not-X attributes may be useful for establishing
differentiation, but they are not productive of depth. Residual concepts merit
the appellation 'shallow'; indeed, in the case of a purely residual concept
there is no water at all in the bathtub. Ceteris paribus, deep concepts are supe-
rior to shallow ones. While for the task of bounding a phenomenon a single
reliable trait may be sufficient, the task of describing it demands plenitude.
Good concepts identify fecund categories.
This is not to say, however, that parsimony and depth are directly at odds
with one another. Depth refers to properties that may be defining or accom-
panying (non-definitional). To define 'human' as a rational animal in no way
compromises the depth of this category. Indeed, if one considers the sheer
number of things that can be said to differentiate humans from other animals,
this must be considered an extraordinarily deep concept.

51. Although rarely acknowledged as a desideratum of concepts at-large (but see Arthur L.
Stinchcombe, Theoretical Methods in Social History, [New York: Academic Press, 1978], 21, 29),
the notion of depth is implicit in virtually all descriptions of classificatory methods of definition.
Mill (System of Logic, 460) defines a Kind, for example, as a class of things "distinguished from
all others not by one or a few definite properties, but by an unknown multitude of them; the com-
bination of properties on which the class is grounded being a mere index to an indefinite number
of other distinctive attributes." The argument here put forth may be viewed, therefore, as an
attempt to generalize from classificatory methods of concept formation to concept formation at
large. What is true for one, I would argue, is true for the other.

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 John Gerring 381

Theoretical Utility

The classic scientific goal of a social science concept is to aid in the formula-
tion of theories, as discussed above.5 Concepts are the building-blocks of all
theoretical structures and the formation of many concepts is legitimately
theory-driven. Anomie, libido, mode of production, and charisma owe their
endurance, at least in part, to the theories of Durkheim, Freud, Marx, and
Weber. Indeed, these terms have little meaning in the social sciences without
these broader theoretical frameworks.
Classificatory frameworks (which I shall consider a species of 'theory')
are particularly important since their effort is more explicitly conceptual than
other sorts of inferences. A classification aims to carve up the universe into
comprehensive, mutually exclusive, and hierarchical categories. Within such
a schema, a given concept derives much of its utility from its position within
this broader array of terms. Ideology, for example, within a general cognitivist
framework, has often been used to refer to the highest (i.e., most sophisti-
cated) level of political understanding.3 This brings with it an emphasis on
certain traits like abstraction, sophistication, and knowledge. Other commonly
understood features of the concept must be excluded or else the classificatory
schema will be violated. Although this involves some sacrifice of familiarity,
it may make more sense to appropriate the general term 'ideology,' with all its
complications, than to resort to neologism (which of course has its own con-
ceptual costs, as we have discussed). One can think of concepts whose exis-
tence is almost wholly dependent upon their classificatory utility. Thompson
et al.'s fatalism and Luebbert's traditional-authoritarianism have few exter-
nal referents.54 Indeed, they are virtually empty categories, failing the depth
criterion miserably. However, these concepts are redeemed to some degree by
their utility within broader typologies, which they help to define and delimit.
These are extreme cases but they illustrate the more general point that con-
cepts often categorize.55
But theoretical utility need not be so (shall we say) 'theoretical.' Consider,
once again, the concept of ideology. I have argued that we ought to define ide-
ology broadly-to refer to all minimally coherent political belief-systems-

52. See sources cited in note 16.

53. See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ide-
ology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 206-61.
54. See Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1990) and Gregory M. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy:
Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1991).
55. Indeed, these two terms-concept and category-are often used synonymously (Collier
and Mahon, "Conceptual 'Stretching,"' and Taylor, Linguistic Categorization).

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382 What Makes a Concept Good?

rather than to adopt a more narrow definition (including, perhaps, only those
values and beliefs that are dogmatic) because we need a way to talk about
these things, and 'political belief-system' is too long and awkward a term to
adequately perform this function. Ideology, broadly defined, has a theoretical
utility that ideology, narrowly defined, does not. Colloquially stated, "we
should possess a name wherever one is needed; wherever there is anything to
be designated by it, which it is of importance to express."56

Field Utility

To redefine a term, or to invent a new term, involves some resettling of the

semantic field in which the term is located. It is impossible, in other words, to
redefine one term without redefining others, for the task of definition consists
of establishing relationships with neighboring terms. Words are defined with
other words. Hence, any change in the original definition involves changes in
these relationships. Any redefinition of 'corporatism' necessarily changes our
understandings of 'pluralism,' as a redefinition of 'democracy' changes our
understandings of 'authoritarianism.' One might suppose that this only occurs
in semantically crowded fields, but not in those which are comparatively
devoid of competing terms. Not so. Even entirely new concepts-i.e., those
based upon discoveries of new entities-must be defined in terms of existing
concepts, and in that process must transform those original concepts. This
observation holds afortiori in the world of social science, where there is very
little that is truly new and where, consequently, conceptualization generally
takes the form of reconceptualizing what we already know.
Insofar as neighboring terms are affected by the reconceptualization of a
key term, it stands to reason that we should apply the same set of standards to
these peripheral, 'spillover' redefinitions as we have applied to the original con-
cept. Reconceptualizations which enhance-or do as little damage as possi-
ble-to the utility of neighboring concepts (their levels of familiarity, parsi-
mony, et al.) are, ceteris paribus, most desirable. I shall call this goalfield utility.
The general goal of concept formation at thefield-level is a semantic/phe-
nomenal field in which every distinct thing (referent) has a distinct name, and
every name a distinct referent-a one-to-one correspondence between words
and things. Of course, I am well aware that correspondences are rarely so per-
fect. Yet, all social science conceptualizations strive for this ideal-which, as
Sartori points out, maximizes the efficiency and clarity of language in
describing the world around us.57 One wishes, in other words, to avoid the

56. Mill, System of Logic, 436.

57. See Sartori, "Guidelines," 38-39. "So necessary is it that, when a thing is talked of, there
should be a name to call it by; so conducive, not to say necessary, to the prevalence of reason and

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 John Gerring 383

problem of the "homeless entity"-a phenomenon with all the extensional

characteristics of a good concept (coherence, differentiation, depth, theoreti-
cal utility), but no name.58 One wishes, at the same time, to avoid the problem
of the entity-less concept-a term without a corresponding referent.
The latter problem demands further commentary. In redefining concepts it
is easy to steal referents from neighboring terms, leaving these terms as empty
categories.59 Consider the question of American political culture. Perhaps the
easiest way to establish a name for oneself as a writer in this cramped field is
to select one word amongst the field of terms competing to describe Ameri-
can political norms and folkways-e.g., liberalism, republicanism, protes-
tantism, individualism, equal opportunity, pragmatism, libertarianism, demo-
cratic capitalism, freedom, Algerism, Americanism, the frontier spirit
-championing its merits against all the previous terms, or showing how it,
really, is the key term around which all the others revolve. To be sure, there is
nothing wrong with establishing coherence in a definition, but if all one is
doing is rearranging the same set of parts into (essentially) the same whole-
with a new label-then not much has been accomplished. Alternatively, one
may promote a fundamentally new term (e.g., 'American jeremiad' or 'Amer-
ican mission') to refer to the same tried and true referents. It all seems to make
sense; in fact, it makes sense much too easily. However, if one keeps in mind
the fact that one is reconceptualizing not simply a single term, but rather a
field of terms, then it becomes apparent why this sort of terminological leg-
erdemain is illegitimate (or at least less useful): because other, neighboring
terms have been deprived of their referents (and hence of their familiarity,
coherence, differentiation, depth, and theoretical utility).
The better we can "cover" a given phenomenal and terminological terrain
the better are the individual concepts that inhabit that terrain. It is here that the
criteria of concept formation, and of classificatory inference dovetail. "What
makes a concept significant," writes Abraham Kaplan,

is that the classification it institutes is one into which things fall, as it

were, of themselves. It carves at the joints, Plato said. Less metaphori-
cally, a significant concept so groups or divides its subject-matter that it
can enter into many and important true propositions about the subject-

common sense and moral honesty. ..," writes Bentham (Bentham's Handbook, 11). "Not only,"
writes his intellectual godchild, "should every word perfectly express its meaning, but there
should be no important meaning without its word" (Mill, System of Logic, 456).
58. Patrick Gardiner, from whom I steal this phrase, has a somewhat different point in mind.
See Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation [1952] (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1961), 55.
59. See Sartori, "Guidelines."

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384 What Makes a Concept Good?

matter other than those which state the classification itself. Tradition-
ally, such a concept was said to identify a 'natural' class rather than an
'artificial' one. Its naturalness consists in this, that the attributes it
chooses as the basis of classification are significantly related to the
attributes conceptualized elsewhere in our thinking. Things are grouped
together because they resemble one another. A natural grouping is one
which allows the discovery of many more, and more important, resem-
blances than those originally recognized. Every classification serves
some purpose or other...: it is artificial when we cannot do more with
it than we first intended.6

II. Explications and Implications

I have argued that concepts are liable to eight criteria of adequacy-familiar-

ity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, depth, theoretical utility,
and field utility. Readers may wonder whether these criteria truly exhaust the
norms governing concept formation in the social sciences. Specifically, how
are we to account for norms like 'clarity,' 'power,' 'adequacy,' 'value-neutral-
ity,' and other desiderata that do not appear in the eight-part framework?
Most of the aforementioned desiderata are, to be sure, beyond reproach.
(Who could argue with the notion that a definition "must not be ambigu-
ous"?6) Yet, these familiar admonitions are also highly ambiguous, referring
to several criterial demands at once. 'Clarity' and 'precision'-like their
antonyms, 'ambiguity,' 'vagueness,' and 'indefiniteness'-may refer to
coherence or differentiation. 'Power' may refer to coherence, differentiation,
depth, or theoretical utility. 'Adequacy' and 'utility' may refer to any or all cri-
teria.62 In short, it seems useful to disaggregate the project of concept forma-

60. Kaplan, Logic ofInquiry, 50-51. Hempel's observations are similar. "the familiar vague
distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' classifications may well be explicated as referring to
the difference between classifications that are scientifically fruitful and those that are not: in a
classification of the former kind, those characteristics of the elements which serve as criteria of
membership in a given class are associated ... with ... extensive clusters of other characteris-
tics. For example, the two sets of primary sex characteristics which determine the division of
humans into male and female are each associated ... with a large variety of concomitant physi-
cal, physiological, and psychological traits. It is understandable that a classification of this sort
should be viewed as somehow having objective existence in nature, as 'carving nature at the
joints,' in contradistinction to 'artificial' classifications, in which the defining characteristics have
few explanatory or predictive connections with other traits; as is the case, for example, in the divi-
sion of humans into those weighing less than one hundred pounds, and all others" (Aspects of Sci-
entific Explanation, 147) See also Jevons, Principles of Science, 679.
61. Angeles, Dictionary of Philosophy, 56.
62. I have therefore used these last two terms to refer to goodness in concept formation at-
large.

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 John Gerring 385

tion into narrower, more focused parts.

Some desiderata are simply not worth pursuing. The oft-expressed goal of
'value-neutrality,' for example, is plainly impossible to achieve in many con-
texts.63 Imagine trying to craft definitions of slavery, fascism, terrorism, or
genocide without recourse to 'pejorative' attributes, or human rights, democ-
racy, or peace without 'valorizing' attributes. These are stark examples, but
the same general problem confronts the choice of definitional attributes of all
social science concepts. Ideology, for example, has been defined as dogmatic
behavior and thought-patterns,64 a characteristic few would aspire to. Some-
times the most offensive word or definition is also the most appropriate, even
for social science purposes. At the same time, there is no reason to give pref-
erence to evaluative, over nonevaluative, connotations when defining a term,
or in choosing terms. Stripping notions of justice from 'democracy' may
indeed be preferable for some purposes-not because justice is an evaluative
term, but because it is so difficult to operationalize, and hence differentiate.
More importantly, in moving justice into democracy one collapses the bound-
aries separating these two terms, thus diminishing field utility. The point is,
the desirability of an attribute or term-label is irrelevant to its utility in social-
science research.

Arguably, breadth (scope or range) in a concept is a good thing.65 The

more instances a concept 'covers,' ceteris paribus, the more useful that con-
cept will be for social science purposes. However, I think it makes more sense
to view breadth as a criterion of inferences, rather than of concepts. Consider
'nuclear war.' There is only one case of this-or none (since the U.S. deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons effectively ended World War II). Does this make it
a poor concept? Should we broaden the range of cases by changing the defi-
nition of the concept? (It is not clear how one would do this without utterly
violating the normal meanings of 'war' and 'nuclear.') Similarly, one can
imagine many concepts with huge extensions-e.g., 'world,' 'person,' 'inci-
dent'-which are not terribly useful to us. The number of things a concept
refers to, by itself, says nothing about a concept's utility for social science
analysis.

63. See Connolly, Terms of Political Discourse; Lakoff, Women, Fire; Pitkin, Wittgenstein;
Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science,
ed. Michael Martin and Lee C. McIntyre (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994); Peter Winch, The Idea
of a Social Science, and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).
Finley's discussion of the word 'slave' is particularly apt (M. I. Finley, "Generalizations in
Ancient History," in Generalization in the Writing of History, ed. Louis Gottschalk [Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1963] 22-3).
64. See Sartori, "Concept Misformation."
65. This would appear to be the implication of Sartori's work on the tradeoffs between
extension and intension (see "Concept Misformation," and "Guidelines").

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386 What Makes a Concept Good?

If I were investigating Britain, France and Germany, but also wanted to

say something about Hungary and Poland, it would not make sense to broaden
the definition of "Western Europe" to include these two additional cases when
one has the handy moniker "Europe" to draw upon. This is a rather obvious
example, but it illustrates the absurdity of the assertion that broad definitions
are, ceteris paribus, better than narrow ones. The relevant question is where
the natural boundaries lie, not how large the resultant categories are.

Concept-Types versus Concept-Criteria

Another objection to the criterial framework might be that concepts are not
really, as claimed, part of a single enterprise. Rather, what we may have is a
set of widely-varying conceptual exercises, each responding to different cri-
teria of adequacy. Indeed, considering the number and diversity of concept-
types listed on page 365-ideal-typical, radial, classical, and so forth-my
claims for uniformity in concept formation within the social sciences may
appear to readers as an exemplary case of conceptual stretching (in the
derogatory sense of that term).
To be sure, concepts differ from one another. Yet I would argue that these
differences are better understood as differences of degree, rather than of kind.
Moreover, and more significantly, those differences that matter (to social sci-
ence work, that is) can be readily mapped across the eight dimensions of our
framework. Work on concept-types is subsumable within the criterial frame-
work. 'Classical' concepts, for example, privilege differentiation; 'ideal-type'
concepts emphasize coherence (generally at the expense of differentiation);
'radial' and 'family-resemblance' concepts emphasize coherence, depth, and
familiarity; 'polar' concepts emphasize coherence and theoretical utility; and
so forth. Each concept-type emphasizes a different conceptual task or tasks-
but not to the total exclusion of other tasks. Ideal-type concepts have not
renounced all claims to differentiation; classical concepts do not eschew all
ties to coherence, depth, or standard usage.66

66. Interestingly, the notion of an ideal-type is pre-figured in early work by Jevons (Princi-
ples of Science, 722-24). "Perplexed by the difficulties arising in natural history from the dis-
covery of intermediate forms, naturalists have resorted to what they call classification by types.
Instead of forming one distinct class defined by the invariable possession of certain assigned
properties, and rigidly including or excluding objects according as they do or do not possess all
these properties, naturalists select a typical specimen, and they group around it all other speci-
mens which resemble this type more than any other selected type. 'The type of each genus,' we
are told, 'should be that species in which the characters of its group are best exhibted and most
evenly balanced.' Yet Jevons promptly dismisses this pragmatic effort as "a certain laxity of log-
ical method."

Of the connection between ideal-types and empirical reality, Weber (Methodology of the
Social Sciences, 97) writes: "All expositions for example of the 'essence' of Christianity are ideal

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 John Gerring 387

Another division which has attracted great attention (from philosophers of

science as well as from linguists) is the distinction between observational
(concrete or referential) terms and nonobservational (theoretical or abstract)
terms. Useful though this distinction may be in other realms, I think it can be
shown that all key social science concepts (except, let us say, those which are
purely methodological) play a referential function. The reference may be
highly attenuated, but it is nonetheless always present.
Consider, as an example, the concept of 'justice.' If ever there was a social
science concept of high-order abstraction, this is surely it. Yet, even here, one
is at pains to find a social science discussion of the topic without an 'external'
(real-life, actual, physical, observational,....) referent. Contemporary philoso-
phers and political theorists are also concerned with questions of justice, and
routinely debate concrete instances and specific policies. John Rawls's Theory
of Justice, the primary fount of contemporary debate, is an excellent case in
point. Rawls and his challengers (e.g., Michael Walzer, Robert Nozick, and
Ronald Dworkin), wish to know not only what justice is "in the abstract" but
also how it might enter into questions of taxing and spending.67 What justice
means in the academy is not-or at least not rightly-separable from what it
means in the street.
In sum, although concept-types offer a useful shorthand way of talking
about certain issues in concept formation, they do not offer a comprehensive
explanation of that process. Particular concept-types are best understood as a
matter of prioritization, a sacrifice of certain conceptual virtues for the more
firm possession of others. There are, in short, no pure types.

types enjoying only a necessarily very relative and problematic validity when they are intended
to be regarded as the historical portrayal of empirically existing facts." However tenuous the con-
nection to reality, it seems clear from Weber's exposition that ideal-type concepts must bear some
relationship to empirically existing phenomena in order to be of use to social science. The rela-
tive nature of conceptual adequacy is also recognized (at least implicitly) in the following com-
ments by Hempel. "Cognitive significance in a system is a matter of degree: significant systems
range from those whose entire extralogical vocabulary consists of observation terms, through the-
ories whose formulation relies heavily on theoretical constructs, on to systems with hardly any
bearing on potential empirical findings." Carl Hempel, "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Signif-
icance: Problems and Changes," in The Philosophy of Science, ed. Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper,
and J.D. Trout (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 81.
67. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1977); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Michael Walzer,
Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983). For
explicitly empirical work on justice, see Justice: Views from the Social Sciences, ed. Ronald
Cohen (New York: Plenum Press, 1986); Norma Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, Choosing
Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Karol Edward Soltan,"Empirical Stud-
ies of Distributive Justice." Ethics 92 (1982): 673-91; Soltan, The Causal Theory of Justice
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

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388 What Makes a Concept Good?

Rules versus Tradeoffs

Sartori and colleagues offer the most impressive synthesis to date on the
vexed question of concept formation.6 The primary effort of their research has
been to uncover a set of rules-a method-by which to guide the process of
concept formation in the social sciences.69 Rules one and two in Sartori's
handbook, for example, read as follows:

Rule 1: Of any empirical concept always, and separately, check (a)

whether it is ambiguous, that is, how the meaning relates to the term;
and (b) whether it is vague, that is, how the meaning relates to the ref-
erent.

Rule 2a: Always check (a) whether the key terms (the designator of the
concept and the entailed terms) are defined; (b) whether the meaning
declared by their definition is unambiguous; and (c) whether the
declared meaning remains, throughout the argument, unchanged, (i.e.,
consistent).

Rule 2b: Always check whether the key terms are used univocally and
consistently in the declared meaning.70

This list extends to ten, and offers a convenient summary of what might be
called the "rulebook" approach to concept formation, an approach that
extends back to J. S. Mill.7'
The most obvious difficulty with this set of rules is that they are at pains
to rise above the commonsensical. (What allows us to determine whether
'ambiguity' or 'vagueness' is present in a definition?) More troubling is the
frequency of Sartori's caveats-"awaiting contrary proof," "all other things
being equal," and so forth.72 These difficulties suggest that concept formation
is a more dynamic and unpredictable process than can be managed within a
recipe-like approach. (As one wag has noted, when is ceteris ever really
paribus?)

68. See Riggs, "Definition of Concepts," Sartori, "Concept Misformation," "Tower of

Babble," "Guidelines"; Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis, ed. Giovanni Sartori
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984); Tower of Babel.
69. Reflecting upon the experiences of the Committee on Conceptual and Terminological
Analysis (COCTA), which he chaired, Sartori ("Guidelines," 11) writes: "We all came to share
the conviction that concept analysis required-in order to be of general and incremental value-
a method" (emphasis added).
70. Sartori, "Guidelines," 63.
71. See Mill, System of Logic; Jevons, Principles of Science.
72. See, e.g., Sartori, "Guidelines," 53.

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 John Gerring 389

As we have seen, satisfying one criterion of conceptual adequacy is likely

to have ramifications for other criteria. We can, for example, cleanse a term
of a property which overlaps inconveniently with the definition of neighbor-
ing terms, so as to increase its level of differentiation. However, the more
alterations we make within the ordinary understandings of a group of terms,
the more tenuous their connection to established usage becomes, compromis-
ing their familiarity. The oft-noted instability of terms like ideology arises
from the plural, and often contradictory, nature of the demands to which such
concepts are expected to respond.
Moreover, since each element of a concept-the term, the intension, and
the extension-is interdependent, there is no apparent place to begin (or end).
Consequently, we cannot discern a common sequence to the process of con-
cept formation. Some would begin with the word, some with the phenome-
non, some with a theory, and so forth. In any case, the process of definition
quickly becomes one of mutual adjustment. To achieve a higher degree of dif-
ferentiation in a concept one may do one or all of three things: (a) choose a
different term, (b) adjust the properties of the intension, or (c) adjust the mem-
bers of the extension. Concept formation thus offers an excellent illustration
of the so-called hermeneutic circle, since a change in any one aspect of a con-
cept will normally affect the other two. For this reason, concept formation
must be viewed holistically; there is no way to separate out tasks which per-
tain only to the 'phenomenal' realm from those that pertain only to 'linguis-
tic' or 'theoretical' realms, as some approaches to the problem imply.
Acknowledging the interdependent nature of concept formation leads us
away from the static, rule-bound model of concept formation. Forming con-
cepts in the social sciences (as elsewhere) is a dynamic process, as suggested
by the ubiquitous ceteris paribus clause. The best we can do in analyzing and
guiding conceptualization is to keep track of the parameters. Tradeoffs, rather
than rules, best make sense of this vexing enterprise. To be sure, the notion of
concept formation as a set of trade-offs is not new. Over a century ago, Jevons
pointed out that when the definitional attributes of a word are expanded (e.g.,
'war' becomes 'foreign war'), its breadth is generally narrowed. (Otherwise
put, more specific definitions generally refer to less phenomena.) Intension
and extension are thus inversely correlated.73 What has not been generally rec-
ognized is that the number of demands placed upon a single concept-and

73. See Jevons, Principles of Science, 26. This point was amplified by Sartori, "Concept
Misformation," 1041. For other work highlighting the role of tradeoffs and internal contradictions
in concept formation, see Cohen, Developing Sociological Knowledge, 131-45; Collier, "Putting
Concepts to Work," Collier and Mahon, "Conceptual 'Stretching,"' Collier and Levitsky,
"Democracy with Adjectives," and Andrew C. Gould, "Conflicting Imperatives and Concept For-
mation," unpublished manuscript (Notre Dame, IN: Department of Government, University of
Notre Dame, 1998).

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390 What Makes a Concept Good?

hence the number of possible trade-offs-reaches beyond two or three. A con-

cept that is difficult to distinguish from surrounding terms, cannot be easily
located in the physical world, shares few characteristics in common, is com-
posed of apparently heterogeneous elements, covers only a small number of
events, and does not build upon standard usage, is for any one of these sins
less useful in the world of social science. It will not make sense, or will make
less sense.
If concept formation is neither type-bound nor rule-bound, but is instead
responsive to a large number of criterial demands, I would argue that we are
better off thinking of social science concepts not as fixed entities in semantic
space but rather as pragmatic, and often temporary, expedients. The process
of concept formation owes more to art than to rote technique, involving one
in an ongoing set of choices. Definitive definitions, good for all times and all
situations, are rare. Recurring confusion in concept formation is not due to the
limited methodological skills of the conceptualizer, but rather to the trade-offs
entailed in conceptualization-a considerably more complex, multifaceted,
and just plain messy process than Sartori's work suggests.
A tradeoffs approach to concept formation amounts to placing the ceteris
paribus caveat at the center of our understanding. (To be sure, there are initial
steps one takes to achieve what one might call Pareto optimality-a recon-
ceptualization which enhances the performance of a concept on one dimen-
sion without impairing its performance on others. But once Pareto optimality
is achieved, all further changes are costly. Ceteris is no longer paribus.)
Consider Geddes's choices in working out a definition for her key con-
cept, "administrative reform." She defines this concept largely in terms of
merit-based hiring for civil servants, a definition which she defends in the fol-
lowing way.

This element of reform [merit-based hiring practices] was selected for

emphasis because the many administrative reform packages that have
been proposed during recent decades nearly always include it; rules for
merit-based hiring, unlike other kinds of reform, vary only moderately
from country to country; and the results of laws requiring recruitment
by exam are relatively easy to assess. Meritocratic recruitment may not
be the most important aspect of administrative reform, but it is always
at least moderately important, and it is the easiest element of reform to
'measure' accurately.74

The concept of administrative reform, so defined, is reasonably coherent (it

dovetails with connotations of 'reform,' for example) and differentiated (one

74. Geddes, Politicians' Dilemmas, 104.

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 John Gerring 391

would not mistake it for some other concept). It is familiar, and it seems suf-
ficiently parsimonious. Most important, Geddes manages to attain a high
degree of differentiation. She has some doubts, however, about its theoretical
utility (it "may not be the most important aspect of administrative reform").
No definitional choice, one imagines, would be perfect.

Towards a Relative Standard of Conceptual Adequacy

It would be easy to conclude from this example, and from the general discus-
sion that preceded, that concept formation is mostly a 'contextual' affair. Con-
texts differ, to be sure, and the task of concept formation will vary consider-
ably according to the specific real-world situation that one is attempting to
describe, specific semantic fields (fields of neighboring concepts), specific ety-
mological histories (the traditional social-scientific or ordinary-language
understandings of the term), and specific analytic tasks. At the same time, it
should be noted that in all contexts the conceptualizer will have to wrestle with
the same eight demands. Concept formation thus retains a certain uniformity
across the disciplines and subject matters that compose the social sciences.
Nor do we lack standards in differentiating good concepts from bad ones.
I would argue, instead, that standards are assessable in terms of the goals
achieved by a given concept relative to that which the concept might other-
wise attain with a different choice of words, properties, or phenomena. It
would be pointless, in other words, to complain that a certain definition of
'justice' was insufficiently differentiated because it was more difficult to
locate in the empirical universe than a certain definition of 'chair.' The rele-
vant standard of comparison here is other definitions of justice, or other
neighboring terms which might more adequately identify the instances in
question. As any new theory must prove itself superior to rival explanations,
any new definition must vie against rival definitions and terms that might be
employed in that particular empirical and theoretical context. Thus, in the case
of Geddes's concept of administrative reform, the test of adequacy may be
operationalized in the following question: is there a term, or another set of
attributes, which would better fulfill the eight tasks of concept formation in
this research design? If the answer is yes, then Geddes may be faulted; if no,
then her concept stands.
This process of concept evaluation would be aided if all writers were as
frank in setting forth the pros and cons of their own terms as Geddes has been.
Indeed, such transparency should be considered on par with norms of open-
ness in other facets of research-e.g., in making data available to other schol-
ars, in making clear possible biases in the data, and so forth. Writers have an
obligation to state explicitly why (on the basis of which criteria) certain prop-
erties and terms were chosen, or excluded. In the case of neologism, it should

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392 What Makes a Concept Good?

be incumbent upon the writer to demonstrate that no suitable terms can be

found in the existing lexicon, a much harder case. In this way, it would be
easier for readers to visualize alternative formulations of a given concept, and
thereby judge the adequacy of the writer's proffered solutions.
In any case-for the reader and the researcher-approaching the task of
concept formation in the social sciences from an integrated framework
reduces the uncertainty of this process, specifying the various demands that
must be taken into consideration and, in so doing, allows us to make better
choices. Where concepts remain flawed-as, in a certain sense, all social con-
cepts are-we may at least profit from this framework in better understanding
the nature of those flaws. "When it is impossible to obtain good tools," writes
Mill, "the next best thing is to understand thoroughly the defects of those we
have."75

Discussion

To many writers, the semantic confusion besetting the social sciences (as
described in the opening section of this paper) is not a signal to clean house,
but rather a signal that we ought to investigate the sources of these inner lin-
guistic tensions. Overlapping definitions, internal contradictions between def-
initional properties, and imprecise operationalizations (to name only a few of
the most common sins) are, in this view, (a) natural to ordinary language, (b)
ineradicable from social-science discourse, and perhaps (c) desirable. To such
writers the present study no doubt exudes a strong and unpleasant odor of
'positivism,' since I am proposing that there is a uniform set of criteria guid-
ing concept formation within the social sciences, and that among such crite-
ria are norms of operationalizability and classificatory utility. Indeed, even to
invoke the notion of social science is to suggest the applicability of a natural-
scientific model of endeavor. Since this is not really what I am proposing, it
seems worthwhile to explore some of the broader epistemological questions
that lie behind the claims of the present study.
With the first of the foregoing propositions (that many of our conceptual
failures are normal to ordinary language) I am in wholehearted agreement.
The second proposition, however, is more problematic. Before proceeding
further, I should emphasize what should already be apparent: I am not, in the
fashion of classical logic, proposing the creation of a taxonomic social science
language in which "the meaning of a term [is] fixed by laying down a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for its application," and in which each
term would be distinguished from neighboring terms by one defining attrib-

75. Mill, System of Logic, 31-32.

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 John Gerring 393

ute, such that all concepts could be arrayed on a single hierarchical grid.76 This
would require agreeing upon standard definitions and enforcing them-a for-
midable task, one imagines, and not one necessarily productive of good social
science work. Whether even the natural sciences actually operate in this fash-
ion may be debated.7 In any case, the objects of research in the social sciences
refuse to lie still in the manner of rocks, animals, cells, and atoms. If the social
sciences are scientific at all-and this, of course, hinges upon how one
chooses to define science-they are surely scientific in a very different way
than the natural sciences.
Yet, the unworkability of logical positivism should not obscure the fact
that there is still a great deal separating the language of social science from
natural language-as codified, let us say, in dictionaries of standard usage.
One may approach the specialness of social science as a matter of methods
and of objects of study; it is also, I would argue, a matter of concepts. Like
natural scientists, Mennonites, Republicans-like virtually any sub-group of
the general population-social scientists use specialized terms and definitions
(often specific to a field or subfield) and, conjointly, a specialized set of cri-
teria to guide the process of concept formation. We can debate the extent of
this specialness, asking to what degree a technical/professional vocabulary
may be justified. Indeed, from a broad epistemological angle, this is what the
present study seeks to establish: under what circumstances, and for what rea-
sons, social science should deviate from norms of ordinary usage.

76. Kaplan, Logic ofInquiry, 68. See also Jevons, Principles of Science, 73; Riggs, "Defin-
ition of Concepts."
77. See, e.g., Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of
Scientific Facts (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979).

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