The Aesthetic Theory of St.

Thomas Aquinas
Author(s): Charles Side Steinberg
Source: The Philosophical Review , Sep., 1941, Vol. 50, No. 5 (Sep., 1941), pp. 483-497
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review

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 THE AESTHETIC THEORY OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

T HE CONVICTION is rather widespread that the last place

to seek a theory of aesthetics is among the theological mys-
teries of Scholastic philosophy. While growing interest in the
culture of the Middle Ages is paralleled, in another context, by an
increasing concern with the problems of aesthetics, there has been
no attempt to correlate the artistic fertility of the Medieval period
with a theory of the beautiful. The paucity of written material on
the subject is revealing, and modern criticism has accepted this
dearth of material conclusively. Bosanquet, in his History of
Aesthetic, gives short shrift to the Middle Ages and this from the
viewpoint of his own idealistic bias; and contemporary Thomists,
with the exception of Maritain, find no basis for aesthetic theory
in Scholastic philosophy or in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas.
It should be pointed out, however, that the Catholic ritual was, and
is, an extraordinarily moving aesthetic experience, and that any
thinker who concerned himself with the questions of God and the
Angels, and man, and with grace and the beatific vision, might
conceivably give some thought to the nature of beauty, particu-
larly when beauty seems to be conjoined with the transcendental
attributes of unity, truth, and goodness. Nor is this conviction
without basis in fact. The Summa Theologica is not wanting in
references to the beautiful, and these passing notations, however
cursory, indicate the feasibility of a survey of the works of St.
Thomas Aquinas with the express intent of formulating a Scholas-
tic theory of aesthetics from the writings of the Saint. There is,
moreover, the significant factor of the Aristotelian influence on
Aquinas, and particularly the Aristotelian notion of formed matter.
The most complete and mature exposition of the thought of
Aquinas is found in the Summa Theologica.1 The didactic aim
of the Summa is stated in the prologue: "to treat of whatever
belongs to the Christian religion in such a way as may tend to
the instruction of beginners."2 The text is to be a summa in the
1Sumnma Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas. Literally trans. by Fathers of
the English Dominican Province. London and New York, i91i.
2Sujmma Theologica, Vol. I, p. Lxxxix (tr.).

483

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484 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. L.

truest sense, and, if the aesthetic experience belongs to the Chris-

tian religion, it will be treated along with other germane topics.
The reservation to be made, however, is, that, while philosophical
questions-and aesthetics among them-are dealt with in the
Summa, they are treated invariably from the standpoint of
Scholastic theology. The Summa Theologica is a religious work in
the most literal sense of the term, and while the Aristotelian ems
piricism, and the profound interest in philosophical questions, are
of seminal importance, the basic structure of the work is that of a
pious theology, an inherent and firmly rooted distinction between
nature and Grace. Thus the psychological empiricism is buttressed
from above and below by a frame of Christian mysticism, and
the Aristotelian element is frequently counterbalanced by the
thought of St. Augustine and the Fathers. Of chief interest to the
contemporary mind, particularly from the aesthetic point of view,
are the psychology and the epistemology-the former often di-
rectly empirical, and the latter strongly realistic. The aesthetic is
based essentially upon the broader theology and cosmology, but
specific reference is to be found in the psychology, the desire of
the mind for Being, and the emphasis upon the concrete, upon im-
mediate experience. It is in these sections that the psychological
aspects of the aesthetic experience are considered: the section on
love, desire, possession, and delight,3 and the exceedingly difficult
theory of the habits. Those sections in the Secunda Secundae
which have bearing on Thomistic aesthetic are to be found in the
explication of morals and virtues, and particularly in the parts on
the intellectual virtues: prudence and art. The question of art
and morality is discussed at this point. Love is again investigated,
this time with a mystic connotation, the love of God, including
intimate converse with God. The section on desire for knowledge
offers abundant material for constructing a Thomistic attitude
toward secular culture.
It remains, then, to consider each of the aforementioned sections
in some detail. In this way, a definitely marked out Thomistic
aesthetic should appear as a result of the consideration of the
psychology, along with the ontology and the theory of knowledge.
3Q. 8-I2.
4 Q. 49-54.

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No. 5.] AESTHETIC THEORY OF ST. THOMAS 485

II
While aesthetic theory does not constitute a distinct realm of
discourse in the writings of Thomas, there are nevertheless certain
root terms or key concepts in the metaphysics, psychology, and
the epistemology, which are applicable to a theory of the beautiful.
These include the Thomist connotation of the terms mind, being,
love, presence, habitus, concrete real, and joy. The mind seeks out
being, impelled by love and the activity of the will. It is confronted
by the presence of the concrete, and finds joy in the contemplation.
This, reduced to the barest essentials, is the mechanism of the
aesthetic experience, but the psychology may be considered more
profitably after certain general distinctions have been made clear,
among these the distinction between art and beauty, and between
art and fine art. There is a further distinction between art and
prudence, which is best considered in the discussion of art and
morality. Art, residing in the practical order, signifies work to be
done, a practical activity, a mode of doing. Beauty, conversely,
does not involve an activity but a contemplation, a satisfaction in
the mere knowing. Beauty is defined as "Id quod visum placet",
and resides primarily in the faculty of cognition.5 It is passive;
art is active. It is concerned with the joy of possession; art is
concerned with the practice of making. In general, the distinction
between art and the fine arts is not defined so clearly as that be-
tween art and beauty. Art (ars), for the ancients, indicated skill
in activity; and, while art tended to produce a work designated for
use, fine art aimed to produce a work which was essentially pleas-
ing to the sight, and therefore beautiful. But fine art and beauty
are not completely severed into practice and contemplation. For, if
art demands an action, it involves inherently the use of the fac-
ulties of the will and the appetite. And what is produced for the
appetite becomes an object of desire, and brings the subject into
closer proximity with being. The result of making, then, by bring-
ing being to the subject, brings beauty also; thus art and beauty
find common grounds for reconciliation.
The nature of beauty seems clearly defined: "Pulchra enim
dicuntur, quae visa placent", or, more succinctly, "Id quod visum

'I q. 5, a. 4, ad I.

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 486 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. L.

placet". "Let that be called beautiful which is pleasing to the

sight."6 There is a certain intuition of beauty, then, a characteristic
'via media' solution to the nature and locus of the beautiful. Pri-
marily, beauty is a result of the effective interaction of the quali-
ties of an object and the activity of the perceiving organism. Of
its qualitative nature there is no doubt.
The problem of the locus of the beautiful is resolved in a fashion
strikingly similar to Professor Dewey's interaction between organ-
ism and environment. For Thomas beauty remains an object of
desire, which is placated in the mere contemplation. The delight in
contemplation is to be defined in terms of a correspondence be-
tween the mind and the object, the intelligibility of the object being
appreciated by the intelligibility of the subject, with beauty a result
of the interaction. And although reality, qua reality, is, and must
remain, an unknowable, man strives to know, and what knowledge
he attains is through the medium of a sensible object. If the matter
and the form are peculiarly "adequate" in a given object, the
glimpse of the real is singularly lucid, and the object which is thus
made pellucid by form may be called beautiful. But, while the
normal mode of knowing occurs by abstraction, and formation of
judgments, the paramount question for aesthetic experience is the
possibility of a direct mode of knowledge, without the interference
of intermediate concepts. The Thomistic solution is essentially
affirmative, since the mind seeks out being in the concrete, and in-
timate union of this kind constitutes the experience. The mind
itself, however, does not know; but the creature, the substance
itself, knows through the medium of the mind. On this prosaic
level mind knows itself in action, but selfconsciousness is indis-
tinct, and selfvision is possible only in God and the angels.7 What
has occurred is nevertheless an experience, and this presents
fruitful basis for a consideration of aesthetic. The aesthetic ex-
perience in its fullest flower is definitely a species of knowledge,
but on a suprarational level. By analogy, it is comparable to self-
knowledge in God and the angels, neither sensuous nor rational,
but a synthesis and transcendence of both elements. Thus, like
other aspects of the synthesis, the aesthetic draws upon human
experiences, notes the instrumental character of the senses, but

6Ia, q. 5, art. 4, ad i. 7Ia: Lxxxvii: i, ad i.

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No. 5.] AESTHETIC THEORY OF ST. THOMAS 487

ultimately imparts Scholastic unity by having all elements reside

in God.
But there is another secondary aspect to the clause "quod visum
placet", which stands in need of interpretive analysis. Is the mean-
ing to be accepted as purely empirical, i.e., is beauty pleasing to
the senses, and nothing more? The references in Aquinas to the
limitations of sense and reason discuss this question, and the con-
clusion rests upon the ultimate efficacy of the intelligence, the
cognitive faculty. The aesthetic experience is ultimately the result
of the combined intellect and sense, and, while the perception and
joy of beauty is essentially an intellectual act, it is not conven-
tionally intellectual. It occurs without the usual abstraction and
formulation of concepts. The mind grasps the intelligible principle
without the intermediate concept, and the act is analogous to the
mystery of grace. But immediately, beauty is neither subjective,
nor objectively real, nor a Platonic form. It is the qualitative result
of an interplay of forces, and it is a relative concept, the outcome
of the coordinated activity of the senses, the emotions, and the
cognitive faculty. What occurs is at first purely perceptual, a
sensory impression. This psychological phenomenon becomes
transmuted, through the agency of intellectual contemplation, to
an ontological status, and the sensuous and intellectual are merged
by the brilliance of superimposed Form shining through.
The beautiful, then, is neither purely a phenomenon of the
senses nor of the mind, but involves both, with the intellect finally
transcendent over sense. In this balancing of sense and reason are
to be found both elements in Aquinas, the empiricism, which gives
his thought a singularly contemporary overtone, and the supra-
rationalism of Scholastic theology. On many points, but particu-
larly on the question of the aesthetic experience, Thomas recog-
nizes the importance of sense and the limitations of reason. Rea-
son is, at the outset, concerned with the general, while the aesthetic
phenomenon is concrete and specific. Reason is indirect in its ap-
proach; the experience is a direct union. In a broad way, reason
is conceptual, the experience is a perception of the concrete thing,
without the intervention of codification or concepts; for in the
experience itself representation and symbols are alien factors that
obstruct the purity of the union. The joy of the mind in beauty

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 488 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. L.

must be a spontaneous fact, and scientific abstraction proves a

stumbling block to this process. This bears a similarity to the
Kantian notion of beauty giving pleasure without a concept, but
Thomas does not relegate mind, for beauty pleases the mind
finally by means of the sensuous intuition. The order of abstraction
is, indeed, a kind of necessary evil, for the mind strives for Being
in things, in the concrete fact. In this way, the aesthetic experience
is spontaneous, while the conceptual activity of the reason is cir-
cuitous and, as a mode of knowing, secondary to the direct way
of the concrete. The scientific mode of thinking obscures direct
contact with the Real,8 dealing as it does in judgments; but the
mind strives for the intimate contact with the thing in itself, rather
than the idea of a thing.9
The limitations of the reason are not, however, an implied
vindication of the efficacy of sense. The distinction in Thomas is
a subtle one and involves not merely sense and reason, but sense,
reason, and intellect. By sense is meant, literally, the instruments
by which the immediate intuition occurs; reason signifies the for-
mation of concepts and judgments; intellect implies the striving
for and holding of the real, the concrete thing, by the mind through
the agency of the senses and the discipline of the reason. Ulti-
mately, mind and sense are conjoined in the joy of the experience
of the beautiful. At best, sense is the immediate fact, but it is not
the fully consummated experience. Thomas is not clear in the last
analysis whether beauty does or does not belong to the order of
abstraction. But if, ultimately, it does, the abstraction cannot take
place without the preparatory work of the senses. Nor can the act
itself occur without the work of the reason. If the experience
occurs independently of abstraction, the reason has its work to do.
It functions chiefly to prepare for the experience by means of
the previous formation of certain concepts regarding the nature
of art and beauty. The experience gains in stature because of the
preparatory discipline of the reason. The senses constitute the
first step in the process, for "Nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit
in sensu". But if the aesthetic experience is a cognitive fact sensu-
ous perception is insufficient, and beauty would not exist unless

' Cf. Ia: Lvi, 2; Ia Lvi, 3.

' Ia-2ae: xxvii: 2 ad 2.

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No. 5.] AESTHETIC THEORY OF ST. THOMAS 489

it appeared as an object of delight to the mind.10 B

considered finally in its cognitive aspect.
Our normal mode of knowing is achieved by the
activity of the senses and the elaboration of the rea
bility for aesthetic experience as a mode of knowled
the direct cognitive grasp of the thing in itself by
experience of the perception of the beautiful is co
knowledge-process in which the mind seeks out bein
tial simplicity. Aesthetic knowledge is intuitive, sponta
ing a union of mind and thing in one single act. F
experience, as we have seen, does not occur by the
elaboration. The mind, which is an emanation of n
its identity in the process. And while a union rem
for the experience, this union is complete only in the
of knowledge.1" "The known is joined to the know
nature or by likeness."'2 Aesthetic experience is
nature, i.e., direct physical union, non-symbolic or
Aesthetic knowledge, then, presupposes a union on
another. The most perfect union, that of substantia
take place only in God, while the principle of the
process in man is dependent to some degree on the
intimacy between the mind and the object known.
the lower status of man's mind in the scale of bein
develops a bifurcation into things in themselves an
presentations of them. And for this reason, if aesth
is to occur at all, it would seem to indicate the absol
of the human mind upon the higher principle. Thom
principle in the discussion of divine activity and g
finally draws into physical union with the object,
God's identity with Himself in knowledge. And this
to God's physical identity with Himself.'3 In the la
mind is able to move for a thing, rather than for a
knowledge at this level is suprarational, analogous t
knowledge of God's presence in the soul. The beaut
in knowledge because of this divine intervention.
It would seem that mysticism had usurped the plac
0 I-2 q. 27, art. I, ad 3. " Viii de Veritate, 6.
2 Ia Lvi: 3. 3 Ia xiv: 2; Ia xxvii, i ad 2.

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490 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. L.

ism at this point in the Thomistic system. But the abiding achieve-
ment of the philosophy of Thomas is the approach to a problem
by the empirical mode of analysis. Only at the conclusion is there
a rapprochement with mysticism in the interests of Scholastic
theology. Hence the act of knowing is an active and actual process.
What is known is a real thing, objectively verifiable, and known
as real by virtue of the formal element in the object. Only the
mind can seize upon being, however, and the experience is brought
to fruition primarily by the activity of the mind.14 The mind in-
herently strives for the very being of God, but has been consigned
to a mode of discursive and indirect knowledge. It is the faculty of
the will, operating through love, that forces the mind to seize
upon the presence of the concrete real.15 While the mode of analy-
sis and the general epistemology are of Aristotelian origin, there
is a curious overtone of the Platonic notion of knowledge as recol-
lection, derived from St. Augustine. Aesthetic experience brings
with it a sense of memory, a perception of that which the mind
recollects having known previously. Thus the empirical, Aris-
totelian approach to knowledge, with its emphasis upon the senses,
is juxtaposed with the notion of an innate knowledge in the in-
terests of Thomistic metaphysics. In this way Thomas is able to
retain the Aristotelian analysis, and at the same time introduce
the necessary appendage of the selfconsciousness of the soul and
the proximity of God.
Maritain has pointed to the intellectualist quality in Thomist
aesthetics, emphasizing the cognitive aspect of the experience. But,
if the cognitive side is fundamental, it is of equal significance to
note that the intellectual response is accompanied by a strong
emotional quickening. It is important to recall that beauty was
defined as Id quod visum placet; and, while this involves no mere
titillation of the senses, it indicates the presence of a pervading
sense of satisfaction, a feeling-tone of felt delight. The whole
process is a pleasurable one, but the aura of joy in the experience
of the beautiful is ultimately the satisfaction of the mind in con-
templation. What knows is mind, and mind alone has access to
the infinity of being. While beauty pleases the senses, it has not
flowered fully unless the senses are joined by the mind in the

14Cf. Ia 2ae xi: i. " Ia xx, I, ad 3.

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No. 5.] AESTHETIC THEORY OF ST. THOMAS 491

joyous perception.16 The very existence of beauty depends

pleasure of the intellect in the lustre of a form on ma
is a principle fundamental to Scholastic doctrine that "
principle of all human work is the reason".17 Mind rea
thing partially by interacting with the thing to conceive i
likeness. "We perceive that we are abstracting universal
The essential difficulty in a complete union of mind a
inheres in the order of knowledge. A created substan
dered intelligible by its being, but only God is pure B
only Divine activity can inform the mind directly an
complete union. This would seem to make a complete
act of union with the concrete-an active experience of
in itself-beyond the pale of the human intelligence. W
in the aesthetic experience, however, is a union of this
striving of the mind is satiated by the presence of the
and an experience occurs which is suprarational, an alm
union. The union is not fully perfect, for only knowle
vision of God can be perfect. What elevates the aesthe
ence to the level of union with Being, instead of remain
orgasm of sense, is the influence of the mind. In the la
mind and sense fuse in the delight of the beautiful, b
experience becomes complete-and postrational-Divine
tion must be suspected. The guiding spirit of God is fe
and beyond the experience.

III

The central tenet in the Thomistic metaphysics is that about

nature of being. Now there are predicated of being certain tr
cendental attributes. Unity, truth, and goodness, are specific
tributes, and each is analogous to being, each is being, parta
of the nature of being. The status of beauty, however, is ope
interpretation. Does it have an ontological status, i.e., does it belon
to the order of transcendental? Thomas is not so direct on t
point as on the nature of truth, unity, and goodness; but fr
the previous analysis it would seem that, if beauty is to find
place in the Thomistic synthesis, its locus must be among the
tributes of being. In the first place, the aesthetic experienc

16 1-2 q. 27, a. I, ad 3. 1 1-2 q. 58, a. 2. 18 Ia Lxxix: 4.

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492 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. L.

fundamentally the union of the mind with being, and, secondly,

the influence of God is to be discovered in any experience which
is full and complete, and, therefore, aesthetic. If the mind seeks
being in the concrete, and if the attainment of this end is beautiful,
-then beauty is an attribute of being. Thomas analyses this question
by discussing beauty in its relation to goodness, but the analysis
is not without contradictory statements. The conclusion, however,
bears sufficient evidence for a consideration of beauty as a "kind
of good", and a transcendental.
The Thomistic distinction between beauty and goodness is a
subtle one. It is immediately clear that they are not identified in
such a way as to lose their indigenous character in one another.
Beauty is an attribute of being, but its appearance is under the
guise of either unity or truth or goodness. When any of these
"primary" attributes are present in a specific way, beauty is pres-
ent, for beauty is a unity, a truth, a good. While things may be
good with reference to the will, and true with reference to the in-
tellectual faculty, beauty has no specific referent and must be
sought out in its relation to truth and to goodness. I believe that
Cardinal Mercier denied that beauty is of the order of trans-
cendentals on the grounds that, if it were, all being would be
beautiful. But the Thomistic mode of analysis would conclude that
all being is beautiful, under some aspect, and, therefore, beauty has
as valid a claim as the other attributes. Thomas reveals that beauty
is related to truth, in so far as the intelligible aspect of beauty is
related to the divine intelligibility which is the cause of all intel-
ligibility. But essentially, beauty is more closely related to good,
"The beautiful and the good are the same in regard to subject . . .
but differ in concept. The good . . . regards the appetite . . . that
being good which all things desire. The beautiful, however,
concerns knowledge, for things are called beautiful when they
give pleasure to the sight."'9 Thus beauty and goodness would
both seem to belong objectively to the order of transcendental,
the good being concerned with the object of desire, the beautiful
concerned with the cognitive faculty. Being is both good and
beautiful, satisfying the desire, pleasing the mind. "Pulchrum est
idem bono sola ratione differens."20 "Let that be termed good which

"9Iq.5a.4,ad I. ' I-2q.27a. I,ad3.

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 No. 5.] AESTHETIC THEORY OF ST. THOMAS 493

pleases the appetite; but let that be termed beautiful which in the
mere apprehension gives pleasure."2' The beautiful, however, has a
relation to the appetite, and this is shown clearly in the Thomistic
psychology. But the analyses of the attributes would seem to indi-
cate quite clearly that beauty does have an ontological status. If
it is not on absolute parity with unity, truth, and goodness, it is
analogously an attribute of being, at least, because it partakes of
the other attributes. In a metaphysical sense, beauty and goodness
are identical, for the desire of the good is also the desire of the
beautiful.22 Beauty, then, is an attribute of being, an aspect of be-
ing, and in one sense being itself. It is a transcendental.
The status of beauty is revealed most clearly in the Thomistic
psychology. The impulsion of the mind to seek out being stems
from the agencies of love and the will, and this association offers
still another basis for comparison between the good and the beauti-
ful. Now the mind desires the concrete thing spontaneously, and is
impelled by the effect of love on the concrete.23 Love reveals two
aspects-desire itself, natural desire, and will. The mind has a
desire for fusion with being, and that which satisfies the natural
desire of the mind may be called beautiful. The will, allied with
the knowledge-process, works posterior to desire, and accepts what
is presented to the mind through knowledge. But ultimately love
transcends cognition, for things are present in knowledge in a
representative way, but the objective of love is absolute union of
lover and beloved, mind and thing.24 When this is achieved the
desire of the will is also placated and an aesthetic experience has
taken place. Both the appetite and the faculty of desire have been
satisfied by the presence of the beautiful. The aesthetic experience,
considered as a psychological phenomenon, is engendered by love.
Love seeks a union with the object presented to sense, and this
union brings joy and satisfaction. But the satisfaction of the emo-
tions is not the fundamental fact. The act of the intellect is pre-
dominant. The truest comprehension of the beautiful is cognitive,
and, ultimately, mystic and suprarational.

21 "Ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitu; pulchrum

autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet" (ibid.).
22De Veritate, q. 22, art. I, ad 2.
23 By love is meant a psychological faculty in the soul.
4 I a-2ae, xxvii: 2, ad 2.

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494 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. L.

While the mind seeks out being as such and desires to unite with
the concrete, it has been relegated to a condition of rational elabora-
tion, rather than intuitive activity. The will functions to aid in
galvanizing the mind to the presence of the concrete. It may thus be
thought of as an efficient cause. The will in man forces the mind
to the concrete which God's will has created.25 When the mind
unites with the concrete, it enjoys a presence of the concrete, which
flows into the mind with pure intelligibility. But man is not capa-
ble, on his own level, of this experience, and again a divine activity
is adumbrated. For only divine essence can inform the mind with
pure intelligibility. At this point Thomistic ontology is superim-
posed on the psychology and the empirical analysis gives way to
the tenets of Scholastic theology. The influence of grace has been
all along a puissant factor in the experience of the concrete, and
the presence of God, the source of all being, is the cause of all
things beautiful to man. The aesthetic experience is intellectual
in character, but takes place without conceptual reasoning. It is
this immediate union with the intelligible real that is analogous to
the mystic grace. It is doubtful whether contemporary Thomist doc-
trine would admit the possibility of a "true" aesthetic experience,
i.e., an immediate intuition of the concrete, without the action of
grace. What may be admitted is the possibility of a union, but
perfect union, which is analogous to the beatific vision, can occur
only through the agency of grace. Thus mystical experience is
directly allied with aesthetic experience, and the Platonist theory
of reminiscence in Thomas has its own purpose; the mnemonic
element in knowledge and in experience is also a recognition of
the presence of God in the soul and a reminiscence of Him.26
When the mind fuses with the concrete in knowledge and in love,
the presence of God in the soul is illumined by grace. The aesthetic
experience, then, is a kind of mystic contemplation, and the paint-
ing of St. Theresa in Ecstasy would probably serve as a particu-
larly lucid example of a Thomistic aesthetic experience. A reason
beyond reason seems imminent in the aesthetic act. For God
Himself is beautiful, the most beautiful of all things, and the first
and final cause of all specific beauties. Man turns finally to God

2 Ila, 2ae, xlvii: i ad i. 26 I a xciii: 7 ad 3.

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No. 5.] AESTHETIC THEORY OF ST. THOMAS 495

as the source of all beauty. Not Euclid alone, but every man, can
look upon beauty bare through the intervention of grace. This
physical union of mind and object is analogous to God's identity
with Himself.27
IV
For a consideration of specific beauties Thomas turns again to
empirical analysis. The experience of beauty is not the experi-
ence of a Platonic archetype, but the completest union with a con-
crete thing. Certain conditions exist as prerequisites before an
object may be termed beautiful. Since beauty exists to satisfy the
desire of the mind, these conditions are: integrity, proportion, and
clarity. Beauty delights the mind by presenting the integrity, pro-
portion, and clarity, of concrete things to the mind. "For beauty
three things are necessary: Integrity . . . due Proportion . . . and
Clarity or brightness: thus bright colored things are termed beau-
tiful."28 The mind responds actively to the presence of integrity,
proportion, and clarity.
Integrity signifies a perfection in the object, but the notion of
integrity is relative to the aim and end of the artist's concept. Im-
plied in this notion is a Thomist acceptance of modern art, for
even a physically distorted figure may manifest integrity, if the
aim is realized. The mind and the senses find aesthetic gratification
also in "due proportion", the correct juxtaposition of part to part
and to the whole.29 But proportion, too, is not absolute, but acquires
meaning solely in the expressed aim and end of the work.
Neither proportion nor integrity, then, has significance apart
from the end of the work, which is to accommodate the brilliance
of form on matter. This is the third element, clarity, and the
notion of "claritas" involves the imposition of form on matter.
What is essential to the beauty of the work is a "splendor formae".
For matter is not accessible to the reason save by means of a form,
and the very possibility of interaction between perceiving subject
and object hinges upon the clarity of the object in perception. In
the perfection of a beautiful thing is reflected the mind's own perfec-
tion, and the predominant force present is that of "claritas", bright-
ness. And the greater the degree of clarity, the more luminous the

27Ia xiv: 2. 28I q. 39, a. 8. 291I q. 5, a. 4, ad i.

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496 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. L.

form, the more spontaneous the experience. This brilliance of form

constitutes the very essence of a beautiful thing, and, according to
Scholastic doctrine, is to be given an ontological meaning; for
brightness of form increases the intelligibility of the object to the
mind, and consequently its very proximity to being as such. The
object is of basic material elements, through which the "splendor
formae" radiates. Form is a spiritual essence illuminating, "in-
forming" matter.
The disquisition on form and matter offers a fruitful basis for
a discussion of the Thomistic philosophy of art; for, if there is
to be an experience of beauty, and if Thomistic aesthetic is to
acquire contemporary significance, beauty must be the beauty of
some concrete thing. The conventionally accepted objects or things
are works of fine art. The distinction between art, beauty, and fine
art, has already been noted. In artistic endeavor, the work to be
done (formed) constitutes the material of art. The imposition of
form involves the activity of the reason. But dexterity in the
manipulation of materials has, for the Thomist, no special signifi-
cance, art remaining an intellectual phenomenon. Even though the
work be imperfect to some degree, its truth and its essential virtue
remain flawless, and the artist remains free from taint, provided
that he has acquired the habit of art. For art is intellectual, and its
sole end is to impress a form on matter. Its concern is with the good
of the work, and the habit of art is directed to this end. Art is,
consequently, a virtue. But since the fine arts have as their ob-
jective the creation of beauty, similar conditions prevail for this
act as for the experience of beauty. The mind rejoices in the con-
templation of the object, and the artist seeks to form an object sig-
nificant to this end. No more than the mind can experience beauty
without the mystery of grace, can the artist create beauty without
the hand of God compelling his endeavors. In the creation as well
as in the apprehension of beauty, the influence of the divine is
paramount.
The creation of art, however, is not solely a phenomenon of
mystic grace. The sincere activity of the artist is important on its
own level, and artistic endeavor is subject to a discipline and
rigidity of its own. The Thomistic doctrine announces certain
rules for the creation of art, but these consist chiefly in allowing

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 No. 5.j AESTHETIC THEORY OF ST. THOMAS 497

the matter to be formed according to its own ligh

the question of art and prudence, and, implicitly, the
Thomistic moral philosophy of art. Prudence is bound up more or
less inextricably with the will. Its relation is to the artist as in-
dividual, but it has no concern with the work of art itself. It is
allied with moral problems as such and not with the creative ele-
ment in art.30 Its concern is with man as a moral being. Thus art
and beauty, having an ontological status, are superior to prudence.
But prudence has a human interest to serve and its intervention
is predicated on this interest. Consequently, art is subject to mor-
ality, but to a specifically Scholastic morality; the ultimate aim of
the artist is not the work qua work of art, but the proper attitude
toward the work, which is determined by the love of God, and the
notion of grace. Indeed, the very vindication of art is its participa-
tion by analogy in the beauty of being, and of God, the source of
being. If beauty is a "kind of good", the function of art is to
inculcate morality. In so far as art is an activity on the human
level, it is subject to the moral law. Its cause and its end arise in,
and are directed to, God.
For the Thomist, great art is possible only when the artist has
achieved the experience of grace. And the greatest beauty is, of
course, to be found in the liturgy. The aesthetic experience is
throughout pleasurable and becomes a sheer joy in the intuition
and contemplation of the beautiful by the mind as well as by the
senses. The final, consummatory phases of the experience reveal
a joy, a contemplation and an abiding ecstasy, analogous to the
beatific vision. In the aesthetic experience mind and thing, lover
and beloved, become one and indivisible. There is a sense of mystic
inspiration in this contact with the real that is beyond rational un-
derstanding. And, while the experience is a form of knowledge, on
this level it is neither sensuous nor rational, but mystical. It is a
sublimation in the most direct meaning of the term. The most
compelling aesthetic experience, then, can be realized only through
grace, in the beatific vision, and in the sense of proximity to God,
the source of all being.
CHARLES SIDE STEINBERG
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

80 Cf. II, JHae q. 47, a. 8.

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