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Lesson 8 Apportionment and Voting

The document discusses various methods for apportionment and voting, including: - The Hamilton and Jefferson methods for apportioning representatives among populations. - Concepts like average constituency, absolute/relative unfairness, and the Huntington-Hill method. - Voting methods like plurality, Borda count, and plurality with elimination. Examples are provided to illustrate how to use these various apportionment and voting methods.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
164 views53 pages

Lesson 8 Apportionment and Voting

The document discusses various methods for apportionment and voting, including: - The Hamilton and Jefferson methods for apportioning representatives among populations. - Concepts like average constituency, absolute/relative unfairness, and the Huntington-Hill method. - Voting methods like plurality, Borda count, and plurality with elimination. Examples are provided to illustrate how to use these various apportionment and voting methods.
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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APPORTIONMENT

AND VOTING
INTRODUCTION TO APPORTIONMENT
• Apportionment is a method of distributing a number of items
proportionally into several groups on the basis of the group
population sizes.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


Nation & Clegg
Hamilton Plan

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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EXAMPLE 1
• Use Hamilton plan to divide the total population of 20,000 of
Andromeda by the number of 25 representatives. The number of
representatives is to be apportioned according to the states’
respective populations.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,
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The Jefferson Plan
• This method uses a trial and error value for the standard divisor. This
value is chosen so that the sum of the standard quotas is equal to the
required number of allocations.

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Practice Problem 1
• Suppose the 18 members on the board of the Ruben County
environmental agency are selected according to the populations of
the five cities in the county, as shown in the table at the left. a. Use
the Hamilton method to determine the number of board members
each city should have. b. Use the Jefferson method to determine the
number of board members each city should have.

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Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,
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Fairness in Apportionment
• QUOTA RULE – The number of allocations to a subset of a population
is the standard quota or one more than the standard quota.
• Example: Appus violates this rule using Jefferson Plan

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Average Constituency

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Example
• Both states are equally represented

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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EXAMPLE
The idea of average constituency is an
essential aspect of democracy.
• Suppose state A has an average constituency of 1000
and state B has an average constituency of 10,000.
When a bill is voted on in the House of
Representatives, each vote has equal weight.
• Does not have equal representation.

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QUESTION
• Now suppose that one representative will be added to one of the
states. Which state is more deserving of the new representative? In
other words, to be fair, which state should receive the new
representative?

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Absolute Unfairness of an Apportionment
• The absolute unfairness of an apportionment is the positive
difference between the average constituency of a subset A and the
average constituency of subset B.

• The difference in the average constituencies between Hampton and


Shasta is 1668 -1455 = 213. This difference is the absolute unfairness
of the apportionment.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Relative Unfairness of an Apportionment
• The relative unfairness of an apportionment is the quotient of the
absolute unfairness of the apportionment and the average
constituency of the subset receiving an additional allocation.

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Apportionment Principle
• When adding an allocation to a subset of a population, the allocation
is assigned to the subset with the smallest relative unfairness of
apportionment.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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PRACTICE PROBLEM
• The table below shows the number of fi rst
and second grade teachers in a school
district and the number of students in each
of those grades. If a new teacher is hired,
use the apportionment principle to
determine to which grade the teacher
should be assigned.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Huntington-Hill Apportionment Method

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Huntington-Hill Apportionment Principle
• the additional allocation should be given to the subset with the
greatest Huntington-Hill number.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood, Nation & Clegg


EXAMPLE
• The table below shows the numbers of
lifeguards that are assigned to three
different beaches and the numbers of
rescues made by lifeguards at those
beaches. Use the Huntington-Hill
apportionment principle to determine to
which beach a new lifeguard should be
assigned.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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PRACTICE PROBLEM
• A university has a president’s council that is
composed of students from each of the
undergraduate classes. If a new student
representative is added to the council, use
the Huntington-Hill apportionment principle
to determine which class the new student
council member should represent.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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VOTING

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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The Plurality Method of Voting
• The candidate or issue gets one vote from each voter and the
candidate or the issue with the highest number of votes wins.
• The winner may not have the majority of votes
• Alternative choices are not considered.
• When an issue requires a majority vote, it means that more than 50%
of the people voting must vote for the issue. This is not the same as a
plurality, in which the person or issue with the most votes wins.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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EXAMPLE
Fifty people were asked to rank their preferences of
five varieties of chocolate candy, using 1 for their
favorite and 5 for their least favorite. This type of
ranking of choices is called a preference schedule. The
results are shown in the table below.

According to this table, which variety of candy would


win the taste test using the plural-ity voting system

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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PRACTICE PROBLEM
Cartoon Characters: A kindergarten class was surveyed to determine
the children’s favorite cartoon characters among Dora the Explorer,
SpongeBob SquarePants, and Buzz Lightyear. The students ranked the
characters in order of preference; the results are shown in the
preference schedule below. How many students are in the class? How
many votes are required for a majority? Using plurality voting, which
character is the children’s favorite?

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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The Borda Count Method of Voting
• If there are n candidates or issues in an election, each voter ranks the
candidates or issues by giving n points to the voter’s first choice, n-1
points to the voter’s second choice, and so on, with the voter’s least
favorite choice receiving 1 point.
• The candidate or issue that receives the most total points is the
winner.

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EXAMPLE
The members of a club are going to elect a
president from four nominees using the
Borda count method. If the 100 members of
the club mark their ballots as shown in the
table below, who will be elected president?

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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PRACTICE PROBLEM
Determine the taste test favorite using the Borda count method in the
previous example about the preference schedule of five varieties of
chocolate.

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Plurality with Elimination
• A variation of the plurality method
• Considers voter’s alternate choices
• The first to be eliminated is the alternative with the
fewest number of first-place votes.
• If two or more of these alternatives have the same
number of first-place votes, all are eliminated
• Voters do not change their preferences from round
to round. The second choice on those ballots
becomes the first, the third choice becomes the
second, and the fourth choice becomes the third.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Plurality with Elimination
• Plurality with elimination is used to choose
the city to host the Olympic games.
• A variation of this method is also used to
select the Academy Award nominees and,
since 2009, the winner for best picture.

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EXAMPLE
Suppose that 30 members of a regional
planning board must decide where to build a
new airport. The airport consultants to the
regional board have recommended four
different sites. The preference schedule for
the board members is shown in the following
table.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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EXAMPLE:Use the Plurality with Elimination
Voting Method
A university wants to add a new sport to its existing program. To
help ensure that the new sport will have student support, the
students of the university are asked to rank the four sports
under consideration. The results are shown in the table.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Pairwise Comparison Voting Method
• “head-to-head” method where each candidate is compared
one-on-one with each of the other candidates.
• A candidate receives 1 point for a win, 0.5 points for a tie, and 0
points for a loss.
• The candidate with the greatest number of points wins the election.
• Satisfies Condorcet criterion.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Condorcet Criterion
• A candidate who wins all possible head-to-head matchups should win
an election when all candidates appear on the ballot.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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EXAMPLE: Use the Pairwise Comparison
Voting Method
There are four proposals for the name of a new football stadium at a
college: Panther Stadium, after the team mascot; Sanchez Stadium,
after a large university contributor; Mosher Stadium, after a famous
alumnus known for humanitarian work; and Fritz Stadium, after the
college’s most winning football coach. The preference schedule cast by
alumni and students is shown the table. Use the pairwise comparison
voting method to determine the name of the stadium.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,
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Fairness Criterion
1. Majority criterion: The candidate who receives a majority of the
first-place votes is the winner.
2. Monotonicity criterion: If candidate A wins an election, then candidate A
will also win the election if the only change in the voters’ preferences is that
supporters of a different candidate change their votes to support candidate
A.
3. Condorcet criterion: A candidate who wins all possible head-to-head
matchups should win an election when all candidates appear on the ballot.
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: If a candidate wins an election,
the winner should remain the winner in any recount in which losing
candidates withdraw from the race.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
• There is no voting method involving three or more choices that
satisfies all four fairness criteria

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Weighted Voting Systems
• A weighted voting system is one in which some voters have more
weight on the outcome of an election.
• A few examples are the stockholders of a company and the United
Nations Security Council

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Weighted Voting System
• The number of votes that are required to pass a measure is called a
quota (q).
• The weight of a voter (w) is the number of votes controlled by the
voter.

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Various Voting Systems
One person, one vote:
For instance, {5: 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}. In this system,
each person has one vote and five votes, a majority, are required to
pass a measure.
Dictatorship:
For instance, {20: 21, 6, 5, 4, 3}. In this system, the person with 21
votes can pass any measure. Even if the remaining four people get
together, their votes do not total the quota of 20.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Various Voting Systems
Null system: For instance, {28: 6, 3, 5, 2} If all the members of this
system vote for a measure, the total number of votes is 16, which is
less than the quota. There-fore, no measure can be passed
Veto power system: For instance, {21: 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1}. In this case, the
sum of all the votes is 21, the quota. Therefore, if any one voter does
not vote for the measure, it will fail. Each voter is said to have veto
power. In this case, this means that even the voter with one vote can
veto a measure (cause the measure not to pass).

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Veto Power System
• A voter has veto power whenever a measure cannot be passed
without that voter's vote.
• If at least one voter in a voting system has veto power, the system is a
veto power system.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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The UN Security Council
..\United Nations Security Council _ Lex Animata _ Hesham Elrafei.mp4

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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The UN Security Council
• For a resolution to pass the Security Council,
• 1. Nine countries must vote for the resolution; and
q < 5x + 4.
• 2. If one of the five permanent members votes against the resolution, it
fails.
4x + 10 < q.
Combining, 4x + 10 < 5x + 4 🡪 x > 6.
The smallest whole number greater than 6 is 7. Therefore, the weight x of
each permanent member is 7 and q=39.
W= {39:7,7,7,7,7,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1)

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Weighted Voting System
• A coalition is a set of voters each of whom votes the same way, either
for or against a resolution.
• A winning coalition is a set of voters the sum of whose votes is
greater than or equal to the quota.
• A losing coalition is a set of voters the sum of whose votes is less than
the quota.
• A voter who leaves a winning coalition and thereby turns it into a
losing coalition is called a critical voter.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Number of Possible Coalitions of n Voters

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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EXAMPLE: Determine Winning Coalitions in a
Weighted Voting System
Suppose that the four owners of a company, Ang, Bonhomme, Carmel,
and Diaz, own, respectively, 500 shares, 375 shares, 225 shares, and
400 shares. There are a total of 1500 votes; half of this is 750, so the
quota is 751. The weighted voting system for this company is
{751: 500, 375, 225, 400}
a) Determine the winning coalitions.
b) For each winning coalition, determine the critical voter.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Banzhaf Power Index

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Example
• Suppose the stock in a company is held by fi ve people, A, B, C, D, and
E. The voting system for this company is {626: 350, 300, 250, 200,
150}. Determine the Banzhaf power index for A and E.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,
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Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,
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PRACTICE PROBLEM
• Suppose that a government is composed of four political parties, A, B,
C, and D. The voting system for this government is {26: 18, 16, 10, 6}.
a) Determine the winning coalitions.
b) For each winning coalition, determine the critical voter.
c) Determine the Banzhaf power index for A and D.

Mathematical Excursion, 3rd Ed, by Aufmann, Lockwood,


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