L/Epublic of Tbe Bilippines 6upreme Qcourt:Fflanila: First Division
L/Epublic of Tbe Bilippines 6upreme Qcourt:Fflanila: First Division
L/Epublic of Tbe Bilippines 6upreme Qcourt:Fflanila: First Division
6upreme QCourt
:fflanila
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
GESMUNDO, C.J.:
1 Also referred to as " Liliagail C. Al filer" in some pa1ts of the ro/lo (see rollo, pp. 36, 54, 58, 60 and 67).
Rollo, pp. 11 -35 . .
Id. at 69-72; penned by Associate Justic·e Victoria Isabel A. Paredes and concurred in by Associate
Justices Japar B. Dimaampao ( now a Membe r of this Court) and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez.
Id. at 74-76.
5 Id. at 60-66; pe nned by Judge Bernelito R. Fernnndez.
,_-I;,, 11-
Antecedents
1. That it is hereby agreed that the aforesaid property will be sold by the
owner to the respondents in the amount of !"550.00 per square meter
totalling to l"146,000.00.
2. That it shall be paid in cash by the respondents upon the delivery of the
certificate of Title and the final Deed of Sale by the complai1iant.
3. Thatthe respondents hereby agree that all fees and expenses incidental
to the transfer of ownership of the aforementioned property· including
but not limited to registration fees, revenues stamps, transfer tax, and
assurance fee, shall be for the account of the respondents, and that the
capital [gains] tax shall be shouldered by the_ complainant.
4. That the respondents shall put-up monthly deposit to a bank of their own
choice representing one fourth (1/4) of the total amount or about
'!'36,500.00, wherein which a xerox (copy] of their bank book shall be
shown to the Barangay Captain.
5. That the respondents shall purchase the said lot starting May up to
August 23, 1985. 9 ·
In their Complaint, respondents aIJeged that they are the owners of the
· subject property, having acquired the same under a Deed of Absolute Sale 15 .
(DOAS) dated August 20, 1997, which was purportedly executed by Quintin
through his attorney-in-fact, Norman Santiago (Norman). Respondents
further alleged that Garduce et al. have been in possession of the subject
property, illegally building their houses .without. paying rent since 1997. 16
Respondents issued a final demand Jetter dated May 8, 2009 to Garduce, et al.
to vacate the premises, but, despite such demand, Garduce, et al. continued to
refuse to vacate the property. 17 ·
In their Answer 18 and Position Paper, 19 petitioner and Meda raised the·
same principal defenses and arguments. Firstly, they denied respondents'
claim of ownership and possession over the subject property and argued that
the DOAS is null and void as Quintin did not truly execute a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Norman to sell the subject property to
respondents. Second, the DOAS is null and void because assuming that there
indeed was an SPA between Norman and Quintin, such contract of agency
was extinguished by the latter's death on March °12, 1997, or five months prior
to the execution of the DOAS. 20 Third, Garduce, et al. have a better right to
possess the subject property by virtue of the ai;nicable settlement entered into
between their predecessors-in-interest, Linglingay, et al., and Quintin which
embodied a contract· of sale. Fourth, the contract -of sale was already
to Id. at 79-83.
11 Id. at 100.
12 .Id. at 36:..43.
is Also referred to as "Medaliza C. Arrnarnento" in some parts of the ro/lo (see rollo, pp. 36;54, 58 60, 67
and 88). ·
1, Also referred to as "A.B. Amorato" in some parts of the rollo (see rolio, pp. 36, 44, 54, 58, 60, 67 and-
78).
1
' Rollo, pp. 97-99.
16
Id. at 38.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 44-53.
19
Id. at 88-96.
20 Id. at 45-46; 89-90.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 217111
SO ORDERED. 23
The MeTC ruled that Garduce, et. al. were not able to prove their right
. over the subject property, and thus, did not acquire a better right than that of
respondents. Further, Garduce, et. al. were not able to prove their claim that
the DOAS executed by Quintin and respondents was void, while respondents
were able to prove their ownership of the subject property by preponderance
of evidence. 24
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 25
The RTC ruled that petitioner and Meda must anchor the legality of
their material possession of the property on a claim of title in order for the
court to determine who has the better right of possession. However, petitioner
and Meda were only able to prove the occupation of the subject property as a
consequence of the amicable settlement's compromise instead of on a claim
of ownership. The RTC also agreed with the MeTC's findings that
respondents were able to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence,
. and thus, saw no reason to disturb the conclusions reached by the MeTC. 26
Petitioner and Meda filed a Motion fo~ Reconsideration but the same
was denied by the RTC in its Order2 7 dated October 17, 2013.
On November 22, 2013, only petitioner filed, before the CA, a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision and
Order of the RTC.
The CA Ruling
The CA held that the proper course of action for petitioner was to assaiL
the judgment of the RTC by appeal via a Petition for Review under Rule 42
of the Rules of Court. Since the remedy of appeal was available to petitioner,
25
Id at. 66.
26
Id. at 65-66.
17 Id. at 67-68.
J
Decision 6 G.R. No. 217111
the special civil action for certiorari could not be entertained - the aforesaid
remedies being mutually exclusive, and not alternative or successive. 28
Hence, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review .on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,raising the following issues: .
Petitioner argues that the DOAS dated August 20, 1997, upon which
respondents base their right over the subject property, is null and void and
could not confer any right or title in their favor as it was executed after the
death of Quintin. 31 Further, petitioner points out that no SPA was presented in
favor of Norman, even when such SPA was claimed to have been attached to
the DOAS. Even assuming arguendo that there existed an SPA, the death of ·
Quintin which occurred prior to the execution of the DOAS, extinguished the
SPA to Norman. 32 Finally, petitioner argues that the MeTC does not have
jurisdiction over the subject ejectment suit as it was filed after more than a
year from the dispossession of the realty. 33 .
28
Id. at 71.
29 Id. at 75-76.
30 . Id. at 21-22.
31 Id. at 24-25.
32 Id. at 25-27.
33 Id. at 28-29.
34 Id. at 118-120.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 217111
Procedural Matters
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation,
or who has acted beyond his powers,"shaffbe unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly Or impliedly,
by the person o.n whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the .other contracting P~-
40 Article 187 4. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through ~n agent, the authonty of
the Ja:tte~ shall be in writing; otl'ierwise, the sale shall be void.
41
Rollo, p. 124.
4~ Section 1. Petition for certiorari. ~ '},!'hen any tribu.nal, board or ·officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave_
abuse of discretion amounting to lack_ or eX.cess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or ai:1y plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that-judgment be
ren.dered annulJ-ing or·modifying the proceedings of such tribun·aJ, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as 'law and justice may-require. ·
Decision 8 G.R. No. 217111
However, instead of resorting .to a petition for review under Rule 42,
which should have been filed within 15 days from petitioner's receipt of the
order denying her 1notion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA ..
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari on November 22, 2013, 43 or 31 days
from the notice of the order · denying her motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, the period to file an appeal had already lapsed due to her
negligence.
power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or.
of law set out in the decision, order, or resolution. 49 . __
This Court finds that petitioner's case falls under the second and fourth
exceptions as patent errors on the assailed Decisions and Resolutions are
extant.
-In this case, the MeTC did not discuss said matters required in an
ejectment case_. The January 3, 2011 Decision merely stated the following:
49 Malayang Manggagcrwa ng Sta,1fast Phils,, Inc. v. National labor Relations Commission, supra at 512-
513. _
50 Bases Convers;on and Development Authority v. Callangan, Jr., G.R. No. 241168, August 22, 2022.
51 Barrientos v. Rapa!, 669 Phil. 438,444 (20 I I).
Decision 10 G.R. No. 217111
The Court finds that the [plaintiffs were] able to prove [their] .
ownership of the subject premises by preponderance of evidence it being
the owners thereof. As the lawful owners, plaintiffs are entitled to the use
and possession of the properties and have the right of action against a holder
and possessor in order to recover the same (Art. 428 of the New Ciyil
Code).
Basic is the rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proof.
The Court finds that defendants failed to present convincing proof showing
their lawful possession by ownership of the [property]. Neither was it
substantiated that the plaintiff did not present any documentary evidence to
support how it was able to secure the Deed of Absolute [Sale]. Allegations
must·be proven by sufficient evidence - mere allegation is not evidence. 52
(Emphasis in the 01iginal; citations omitted)
It can be gleaned from the decision that the supporting facts, discussion
on probative value of the evidence, and the legal basis of the MeTC's
conclusions above are clearly absent. The MeTC merely stated that
respondents were able to prove ownership, and hence, they are entitled to the
possession of the subject property, without substantially discussing the
rationale behind it. A discussion on the validity of the DOAS is particularly
important, even provisionally, given that respondents anchored their assertion
of ownership and possession upon the same. In fact, such issue was
particularly identified during the preliminary conference and mentioned by
the trial court in its decision, viz.:
xxxx
52
Rollo, p. 57.
Decision 1I G.R. No. 217111
xxxx
Worse, on appeal with the RTC, the issues raised by the parties
remained unsettled. In its January 9, 2013 Decision, the RTC merely
enumerated the evidence submitted by the parties and thereafter, concurred
with the findings of the Me TC, summarily concluding that respondents had
established their case by preponderance of evidence. The RTC also made a
rudimentary discussion on the nature of an action for forcible entry and
· unlawful detainer but failed to apply and discuss how it was applied to the
present case. Verily, there was no.discussion at all on the legality of the DOAS
and the SPA, even provisionally, which were so clearly brought forth by
defendants in their Answer· with ·Compulsory Counterclaim and Position
Paper. 54 In conclusion, the RTC summarized its decision by stating that
defendants failed to establish the legality of their material possession of the
subject property by not complying with the terms and conditions of the
amicable settlement; hence, respondents had a better right thereto. 55
53
Id. at 56.
54
Id. at 45-56; 55; 89-91.
55
Id. at 63-66.
56
398 Phil. 86 (2000). .
" Id. at I 05; cited in Gov. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corporation, 824 Phil. l, 6 (2018).
58 South Cotabato Communicatfon'.s· Corporation· v.· Sta. Tomas, 787 Phil. 494, 514 (20 I 6).
59 NJCOS Industrial Corporation v. Court qf Appeals, 283 Phil. 12, l 8 (J 992).
Decision 12 G.R. No. 217111
As stressed in San Jose v. NLRC, 61 this Court has previously held that
judges and arbiters should draw up their decisions and resolutions with due
care and make certain that -they truly and accurately reflect·
their conclusions and their final dispositions. 62 Accordingly, this Court will
not hesitate to strike down decisions rendered not hewing to this
. Constitutional directive 63 when it is clearly shown that they were arrived at
arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record or when there is showing
of fraud or en-or of law. 64 Thus, this Court cannot agree with the CA on the
_outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari. To do so would, in effect,
sanction the otherwise defective decisions of the MeTC and the RTC.
There are two entirely distinct and ·different causes of action under.
the aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action
to recover possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation
thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy Or stealth; and (2) a case for unlav..ful detainer, ·
which is an action for recovery of possession from the defendant whose
possession of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract
(express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when ·he continued
his possession despite the tennination of his right thereunder.
I.
Decision 15 G.R. No. 217111
and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving
title to the property. 74
xxxx
xxxx
Verily, not only was the seller, Quintin, already deceased at the time of
the sale on August 20, 1997, respondents also could not produce the
mandatory requirement of a written SP A that would have authorized Norman
· to sell the land of Quintin. These are significant defects in the sale that renders
the claim of ownership, including de facto possession, of respondents highly
doubtful.
Respondents are then mistaken in their belief that the DOAS would
confer to them any right whatsoever to the subject property. Settled is the rule
that an agency is extinguished by the death of the principal. 84 It is by reason
of the very nature of the relationship between a principal and an agent that any
act of an agent after the death of his principal is void ab initio, except as
explicitly provided for in the New Civil Code: (1) Art. 1930 85 when the agency
J
Decision 17 G.R. No. 217111
is coupled with an interest, and (2) Art. 1931 86 when the agent performed an
act for the principal without knowledge of the principal's death and the third
person who contracted with him acted in good faith. 87 Neither of'which are
alleged or applicable in this case. Additionally, it is not enough that th~
existence of an SP A be rnerely referred to in a deed of sale. It must be offered
in evidence. If no evidence is offered, it only gives rise to the presumption
that no such written authority exists. 88
Thus, absent a written SP A and for want of authority, as the seller was
already deceased at the time of sale, 89 the DOAS is void ab initio. 90
Respondents do not have any· interest, rights, or claim over the subject
property. Accordingly, they have not established their de facto right of
possession because there is no right of ownership to speak of, even in the
provisional sense. ·
The cause of action for an action for unlawful detainer is the act or
omission by which a party violates the legal right of the other. 91 Meanwhile,
the real party in interest as a. complainant thereto is the landlord, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land. or building
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied. 92 In other words; the.
plaintiff should have a right of possession over the property.
Not having acquired any right over the property in question, no right of ·
respondents' could have been violated. Thus, respondents' evidence failed to
prove their cause of action alleged in their pleadings. Due to the insufficiency
of factual or legal basis.to grant the complaint and the failure to establish their
burden of proof, respondents' complaint should be dismissed.
86 Article 1931: Anything done by the agent, without knowledge of the death of the principal or of any
other cause which extinguishes .the agency, is valid and shall be fully ~ffective with respect to third
person·s who may have contracted with him in_ good faith.
87 Ra/los v. Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation, 171 Phil. 222,229 (1978).
88 Spouses Alcantara v. Nido, 632 Phil. 343, 351 (20 I 0).
89 Article 1318. Ther.e is no contract unless the following requisites conc'ur:
(I) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject !natter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. Civil Code ofthe Philippines, Republic Act No.
386, June 18, 1949.
90
Spouses Delos Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 522,538 (1999).
91 Agustin v. Spouses Delos Santos, 596 Phil. 630, 644 (2009).
92 RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Sec. I.
J
Decision 18 G.R. No. 217111
SO ORDERED."
G.GESMUNDO
WE CONCUR:
RICA
-
As ociate Justice
'~
J ~ A S P.'Mr_A_R_Q.JUEZ .
'Associate Justice·
CERTIFICATION
AT~ G. GESMUNDO
r 7 ~ i e f Justice