Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-25707&25753-25754 May 14, 1981

ANTONIO MARINAS, ANTONIO MONTANO and GREGORIO RUPISAN petitioners,

vs.
HON. ANDRES S. SIOCHI, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, VICTORIA
LASIN VDA. DE ATIENZA and ROSARIO L. ATIENZA, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: 1äwphï1.ñët

Before us is a Petition for certiorari with Preliminary injunction seeking to annul the proceedings held
in Criminal Cases Nos. 12943 and 12945 for Theft, and Criminal Case No. 12944 for Grave
Coercion, before the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal; to annul the warrants of arrest issued in the
said cases; and to declare as unconstitutional and void Section 5, Rule l l2 of the Rules of Court in
so far as it denies the accused the right of notice and opportunity to be heard in the preliminary
examination.

The present controversy arose out of the issuance by the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, of a Writ of
Execution in Civil Case No. 938 for Ejectment, entitled Jose C. Zulueta vs. Gregorio Atienza. On
December 13, 1965, petitioner Antonio Marinas, Deputy Sheriff of Rizal, with his co-petitioners
Antonio Montano and Gregorio Rupisan enforced said Writ of Execution by levying upon the
personal properties and chattels of private respondents Victoria Lasin Vda. de Atienza and] Rosario
L. Atienza, and taking out said properties from their (respondents') rented house at #23 General
Malvar St., Antonio Village, Pasig, Rizal. Respondents were also ejected from said house. On the
same date, respondent Victoria Lasin Vda, de Atienza reported to the police authorities of Pasig that
her jewelry worth P590.00 had been taken by petitioners without issuing any receipt therefor,   and in
1

connection therewith, she executed a written Statement which was sworn to before Special Counsel
Lucila P. Alcoba. 2

On January 28, 1966, respondents re-entered the house they had been ejected from after securing a
Court Order for that purpose. Respondent Rosario L. Atienza then discovered that several pieces of
her jewelry and other personal items, with a total value of P1,018.00, were missing. She reported the
loss to the authorities on February 2, 1966, and her Statement was taken. She subscribed and
swore to the same before respondent Municipal Judge Andres S. Siochi.  3

On February 3, 1966, respondents, armed with a Court Order authorizing them to enter the premises
of the said house, did so again to get their remaining unlevied properties. They claimed, however,
that on the said date petitioners and their companions forcibly compelled them to deliver the
unlevied personal properties found therein, hauled said articles into a truck and left. Private
respondents reported the incident to the police authorities at Pasig.   Victoria Lasin executed a
4

Statement   alleging that the personal properties forcibly taken from them by petitioners, amounting
5

to P2,645.00, were not included in the levy. Her son, Tranquilino Atienza, also executed an Affidavit
corroborating her declaration.   Both Statements were subscribed and sworn to before respondent
6

Judge.
On February 7, 1966, two separate charges for Theft, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 12943 and
12945, were filed against petitioners and Carlos Quintana before the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal,
respondent Judge, presiding.   A Complaint for Grave Coercion Crime Case No. 12944) was also
7

lodged against petitioners and three Does on the same date.  The three Complaints were filed by Lt.
8

Jose S. Lontoc, Chief of the Criminal Investigation Section of the Police Department of Pasig, Rizal,
for and on behalf of the Chief of Police. These Complaints contained an annotation on the lower left
hand corner reading: "APPROVED AFTER PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION: (SGD) Lucila P. Alcoba,
Special Counsel." The Complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 12943 and 12944 for Theft and Grave
Coercion, respectively, were subscribed and sworn to by Lt. Jose S. Lontoc before respondent
Judge. The Complaint in Criminal Case No. 12945 for Theft does not show the jurat on its face, but
respondents state that it was also attested to by Lt. Lontoc before respondent Judge and that this
appears on the dorsal side of the Complaint. On February 8, 1966, warrants for the arrest of
petitioners were issued by respondent Judge in all three cases   after preliminary examination
9

conducted by him in Criminal Cases Nos. 12943 and 12944, and by Special Counsel Lucila P.
Alcoba in Criminal Case No. 12945.

Petitioners took exception to the issuance of the warrants of arrest against them and instituted the
present Petition raising the following issues:  1äwphï1.ñët

1. When Section 87, Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828,
provides that when the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional,
then the Municipal Judge in the capitals of the provinces shall have "like jurisdiction
as the Court of First Instance" to try the offense, does the Municipal Court in such
cases follow the procedure for Municipal Courts or that for Courts of First Instance?

2. Is preliminary investigation a part of due process?

3. Can there be due process without the presence of the accused during the
preliminary investigation.  10

On February 23, 1966, we required respondents to file an Answer, and ordered the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary injunction restraining respondent Judge from enforcing the warrants of arrest
issued in Criminal Cases Nos. 12943, 12944 and 12945.

Section 87, paragraph 4 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296), as amended by Republic Acts Nos.
2613 and 3828, provides.  1äwphï1.ñët

Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and judges of city courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to. try parties charged with an offense
committed within their respective jurisdiction, in which the penalty provided by law
does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or
fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both, and in the absence of the district
judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the province as the Court of First Instance to
hear application for bail.

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, both Criminal Cases Nos. 12943 and 12945, for Theft of
P590.00 and P1,018.00, respectively, fall under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of
Pasig and the Court of First Instance of Rizal, as the penalty provided for said crimes, pursuant to
Article 309 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods.
Criminal Case No. 12944 for Grave Coercion, with a penalty, under Article 286 of the Revised Penal
Code, of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500.00, also falls under the concurrent jurisdiction
of the Municipal Court of Pasig and the Court of First Instance of Rizal.  11

It is petitioners' submission that because of this concurrent jurisdiction, a Municipal Court acts in
reality as a Court of First Instance and, consequently, it cannot issue warrants of arrest without first
giving the accused a chance to be heard; and that the Information filed should carry a certification
under oath that defendant was given a chance to appear in person at said examination and
investigation. Continuing, petitioners argue that since Special Counsel Lucila P. Alcoba of the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, in Criminal Cases Nos. 12943 and 12945, merely signed the
Complaints for these two cases below the notation, "Approved after preliminary examination", her
failure to make the certification under oath to the effect that the accused were given a chance to
appear in person or by counsel at said examination and investigation, was violative of the due
process clause, and, therefore, the warrants of arrest issued thereafter should be quashed.

Section 14, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, relied upon by petitioners, provides:  1äwphï1.ñët

Section 14. Preliminary examination and investigation by provincial or city fiscal or by

state attorney in cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance. -Except when an
investigation has been conducted by a judge of first instance, justice of the peace or
other officer in accordance with the provisions of the preceding sections, no
information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by
the provincial or city fiscal, or state attorney, without first giving the accused a chance
to be heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him or by his assistant by
issuing a corresponding subpoena. lf the accused appears, the investigation shall be
conducted in his presence and he shall have the right to be heard, and to cross-
examine the complainant and his witnesses. and to adduce evidence in his favor. If
he cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed he does not appear before the fiscal,
the investigation shall proceed without him.

The fiscal or state attorney shall certify under oath in the information to be filed by
him that the defendant was given a chance to appear in person or by counsel at said
investigation and examination.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the governing proviso is the second paragraph of
Section 10, Rule 112, referring to the right of an accused to preliminary. investigation after arrest,
reading: "in cases triable in the municipal or city courts. the accused shall not be entitled as a matter
of right to a preliminary investigation in accordance with this section" and that this rule applies
whether the case is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court or within its
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance.

The issue of whether or not an accused is entitled to appear and present evidence in a preliminary
investigation in cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal Court and the Court of
First Instance has been squarely resolved in the negative by this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Claudio Teehankee, in the cases of People vs. Abejuela and People vs. Endan,   reiterated in the
12

case of Banzon vs. Cabato, 64 SCRA 419 (1975), which decisively held, that even though the
offense be one falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the City Courts and Courts of First
Instance, the accused is not entitled as a matter of right to be heard in a preliminary investigation
under section 10, Rule 112. The reason is because the case goes to trial already after the arrest of
the accused and his delivery to the Court.   "The ensuing trial on the merits takes the place of
13

preliminary investigation, without needless waste or duplication of time and effort, and a final verdict
on the innocence (or guilt) of the accused is thereupon rendered, rather than an inconclusive
dismissal of the charge by the fiscal in a preliminary investigation which would not constitute
jeopardy."   To reiterate and to re-state the rule, therefore, there is no right of preliminary
14

investigation in cases triable by inferior Courts, without distinction as to whether such case be of

their exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.  15

What was conducted by the respondent Judge in these cases is the preliminary examination before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest pursuant to section 1, Rule 112. The 1935 Constitution, in section
l (3), Article III provides that no warrant shall be issued but upon probable cause to be determined by
the Judge after examination of witnesses under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the
witnesses he may produce. Conformably thereto, Section 87, paragraph 3, of the Judiciary Act, as
amended by Republic Act No. 3828, provides that: before a Municipal Judge may issue a warrant of
arrest, the following conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the witness or witnesses
personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions and answers.

These requirements have been met in the three criminal cases involved herein. As explained by
respondent Judge in his Answer:  1äwphï1.ñët

Before the warrants of arrest were issued by the respondent Judge in Criminal Cases
Nos. 12944 and 12945 (actually 12943 and 12944), he first conducted, on February
8, 1966, the necessary preliminary examination required by Section l of Rule 112 by
adopting, as his own questions, and by asking the complainants and their witnesses,
the same or Identical questions asked of them by the Investigating Police Officer in
their written statements before the said Police Investigator, Annexes "4", "5", and '7'
hereof, and thereafter the respondent Judge required them (the complainants and
their witnesses) to subscribe before and make oath to him as to the truth of the
answers given by them to the Police Investigator as shown by the fact that in said
Annexes "4", "5", and "7", the deponents signed their respective names twice, once
before the Investigating Police Officer and the second time before the respondent
Judge who also required them to take the jurat to the oath, thereby complying to the
requirements of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, providing
therein that 'no warrant of arrest shall be issued by any justice of the peace in any
criminal case filed with him unless he first examines the witness or witnesses
personally, and the examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the
form of searching questions and answers.  16

By "searching questions and answers" is meant:  1äwphï1.ñët

the term "searching questions and answers" means only, taking into consideration
the purpose of the preliminary examination which is to determine 'whether there is a
reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused
held for trial', such questions as have tendency to show the commission of a crime
and the perpetrator thereof. What would be searching questions would depend on
what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense, the date, time,
and place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission the subject, his
age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, his attitude toward the
investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age,
status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc.
The points that are the subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. The
questions, therefore, must to a great degree depend upon the Judge making the
investigation. At any rate, the court a quo found that respondent Judge was satisfied
 that the questions and answers contained in the sworn statements taken by T-Sgt.
Patosa partake of the nature of his searching questions and answers as required by
law,' so the respondent Judge adopted them.  17

In the language of this Court in De Mulata vs. Irizari, 61 SCRA 210, 213 (1974):  1äwphï1.ñët

The requirement that the investigating judge must examine the witnesses personally,
which examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers, is fulfilled where the municipal judge examined
under oath the witnesses by asking questions that were adopted from a previous
investigation and considered by him as sufficiently searching and, which questions
and the answers thereto, were in writing and sworn to before him prior to his
issuance of the order of arrest.

In regards Criminal Case No. 12945 for Theft, respondent Judge had this to say:  1äwphï1.ñët

As regards Criminal Case No. 12943 (actually 12945), although, the respondent
Judge did not take the oath of the complainant and her witness on the statement
given by them to the Police investigator, Annexes "I" and "2" hereof, Special Counsel
Lucile P. Alcoba of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal conducted the
necessary preliminary examination required by Section l of Rule l l 2 in that, as can
be seen from said Annexes 'I' and '2', she asked the same or Identical questions
appearing in said annexes to the deponents and adopted the questioning of the
Police Investigator as her own interrogations of the complainant and her witness, and
thereafter she required them to subscribe their respective names and to swear
before her as to the truth of the answers given by them to each and every question
appearing in said Annexes '1' and '2' and, although there was no certification, in the
exact form required by law, by Special Counsel Lucile P. Alcoba that she conducted
the required preliminary examination of the complainant and her witness, it is
admitted that her certification in the body of the complaint stating "Approved after
preliminary examination", accompanied by the oath taken by her before the
respondent Judge after making such certification, is a substantial compliance to the
requirements of the law although it can be said that the same is somewhat defective
in form. (pp. 46-47, Rollo)

xxx xxx xxx

From the foregoing explanation, lt may be deduced that respondent Judge was satisfied that the
questions and answers in a previous investigation by Special Counsel Alcoba partook of the nature
of his searching questions and answers and made them his own. As held in Luna vs. Plaza, supra,
the Judiciary Act as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, does not prohibit the Municipal Judge from
adopting the questions asked by a previous investigator. For, in the final analysis, whether or not
probable cause exists or not depends upon the judgment and discretion of the Judge issuing the
warrant of arrest (De Mulata vs. Irizari, supra). In Criminal Case No. 12945 below, respondent Judge
had convinced himself that probable cause existed before he issued the warrant of arrest. Under the
attendant circumstances, respondent Judge may not be said to have acted arbitrarily.

We reiterate, however, the reminder in the Luna case (supra), reading: 1äwphï1.ñët

We wish to stress, however, that what has been stated in this opinion is certainly not
intended to sanction the return to the former practice of municipal judges of simply
relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that are made to accompany the
 complaints that are filed before them, in determining whether there is a probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. That practice is precisely what is
sought to be voided by the amendment of Section 87 (c) of Republic Act. 296
(Judiciary Act of 1948) which requires that before a municipal judge issues a warrant
of arrest he should first satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by examining
the witnesses personally, and that the examination must be under oath and reduced
to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. It is obvious that the
purpose of this amendment is to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a
person based simply upon affidavits of witnesses who made, and swore to, their
statements before a person or persons other than the judge before whom the
criminal complaint is filed. We wish to emphasize strict compliance by municipal or
city judges of the provision of Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended
by Republic Act 3828, in order to avoid malicious and/or unfounded criminal
prosecution of persons. (Luna vs. Plaza, supra p. 323)

Petitioners further maintain that Section 5 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, in so far as it authorizes
the Municipal Court to conduct a preliminary examination before the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
without previous notice to the accused, is unconstitutional as it violates the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws, and Section l (15), Art. III of the 1935 Constitution which states, "No person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law." Section 5, Rule l l 2
provides:  1äwphï1.ñët

The municipal, the city judge, the fiscal or the municipal mayor who conducts the
preliminary examination as provided in these rules must take under oath, either in the
presence or in the absence of the accused, the testimony of the complainant and his
witnesses. The testimony of the complainant and his witnesses shall be reduced to
writing and signed by them.

The preliminary examination referred to is defined, under Section l of Rule 112, as a previous inquiry
or examination made before the arrest of the accused by a Judge or officer authorized to conduct
the same, with whom a Complaint or Information has been filed imputing the commission of an
offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance, for the purpose of determining whether there is a
reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial. This section does
not refer to the preliminary investigation proper provided for under Section 10, Rule 112, in which the
accused is given access to the testimony and evidence presented against him at the preliminary
examination, and to present evidence if he so desires.

From Section 5 of Rule 112, supra, it is clear that, unlike in the preliminary investigation proper, an

accused is not entitled as a matter of right to be present, during the preliminary examination nor to
cross-examine the witnesses presented against him before his arrest, the purpose of said
examination being merely to determine whether or not there is sufficient reason to issue a warrant of
arrest.   Section l (3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution commanding the determination of probable
18

cause prior to issuance of a warrant arrest, requires no notice to an accused. A preliminary

examination is generally a proceeding ex-parte in which the person charged has no right to
participate or be present. The right to confrontation of witnesses neither applies to a preliminary
hearing. The reason therefor has been explained thus:  1äwphï1.ñët

... It can not be seriously contended that an accused person has a right to be present
during this stage of the proceedings. To hold that he had such a right and to reverse
a judgment of conviction on this ground would have the effect of destroying the very
purpose of that part of the criminal law. lt would be against public policy. lt is
 frequently essential that such investigations be kept secret and that the accused
should have no suspicion of any complaint against him, otherwise he might avoid
punishment for his crime by escaping before arrest. (U.S. vs. Grant, et al., 18 Phil.
122, 147)

... it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may reasonably be
charged with the crime so as to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information, ... (People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 719, 731)

While section l (3) Art. III of the 1935 Constitution does require, before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the determination of probable cause by the Judge after examination of witnesses he may
produce, the curtailment of the presence of an accused during that preliminary examination entails
no infringement of the constitutional right to due process of law nor to equal protection of the laws.
Thus, in Manzano vs. Villa,   this Court categorically held: 
19
1äwphï1.ñët

The preliminary examination conducted by the municipal judge was essentially a

procedural matter and no substantial rights of the accused were violated just
because he had not been given an opportunity to examine the witnesses against
him. The first stage of the preliminary investigation is 'not the occasion for full and
exhaustive presentation of parties' evidence but only such as may engender well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof' The proceeding is usually held ex-parte, for under section 5
of Rule 112 all that is required is for the judge conducting such examination to 'take
under oath, either in the presence or absence of the accused, the testimony of the
complainant and his witnesses,' said testimony to be reduced to writing and signed
by them. Hence, the absence of the accused during the preliminary examination was
not a denial of due process of law.

Neither can the withholding of the right of preliminary investigation from the accused in cases triable
by inferior Courts be termed ' an unjust or unfair distinction, as explained in People vs.
Abejuela, supra:  1äwphï1.ñët

... The loss of time entailed in the conduct of preliminary investigations, with the
consequent extension of deprivation of the accused's liberty, in case he fails to post
bail, which at times out- lasts the period of the penalty provided by law for the
offense, besides the mental anguish suffered in protracted litigations, are eliminated
with the assurance of a speedy and expeditious trial for the accused, upon his
arraignment (without having to undergo the second stage of the preliminary
investigation), and of a prompt verdict on his guilt or innocence. On the other hand,
the so-called first stage of preliminary investigation or the preliminary examination,
conducted by the duly authorized officer, as borne out by the examination and sworn
written statements of the complainants and their witnesses, generally offices to
establish the existence of reasonable ground to charge the accused with having
committed the offense complained of.

Attention should also be called to the fact that neither the 1935 nor the 1973 Constitution requires
the holding of a preliminary investigation. lt is settled doctrine that the right hereto is of statutory
character and may be invoked only when specifically created by statute.   lt is not a fundamental
20

right and may be waived expressly or by silence.  21

In a nutshell, the proceedings in these three criminal cases conformed to law and jurisprudence. But
even conceding that petitioners were entitled to a preliminary investigation, the proper forum before
which absence thereof should have been raised and ventilated was in the trial Court, not in an
appellate Court because the absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of
the Court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings, and bearing in mind that preliminary
investigation can be waived, as in fact, it is frequently waived. 
22

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby denied and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction heretofore issued
is hereby lifted. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985

JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch
XVIII (Quezon City), HON. JUDGE RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon City) CITY FISCAL SERGIO APOSTOL of Quezon
City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN MADELLA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due
process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks this Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of
the democratic opposition in the Philippines.

The background of this case is a matter of public knowledge.

A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and
October of 1980. On September 6, 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American
citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo,
as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found
in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in
May, 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a
Los Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses
appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely.

As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to
the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention of Col.
Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National
Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers,
Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and
damage to property.

On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted
in the death of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others
which caused injuries to a number of persons.

On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was
broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. In
his interview, Romeo stated that he had driven his elder brother, Victor, to the petitioner's house in
Greenhills on two occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980. Romeo stated that Victor did
not bring any bag with him on that day when he went to the petitioner's residence and did not carry a
bag when he left. The second time was in the afternoon of August 31, 1980 when he brought Victor
only to the gate of the petitioner's house. Romeo did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did
he return that day to pick up his brother.

The next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner
had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.

Meanwhile, on September 25, 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and
transferred to the office of Col. Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time.

On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at three big hotels in
Metro Manila, namely: Philippine Plaza, Century Park Sheraton and Manila Peninsula. The bombs
injured nine people. A meeting of the General Military Council was called for October 6, 1980.

On October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the
International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International
Convention Center, a small bomb exploded. Within the next twenty-four hours, arrest, search, and
seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons who were apparently implicated by Victor
Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. One of them was herein petitioner. Victor Lovely
offered himself to be a "state witness" and in his letter to the President, he stated that he will reveal
everything he knows about the bombings.

On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the
Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial
asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed the petitioner the ASSO form
which however did not specify the charge or charges against him. For some time, the petitioner's
lawyers were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until this Court in the case of Ordoñez v.
Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., (G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980) issued an order directing that the
petitioner's right to be visited by counsel be respected.

On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest
to an isolation room without windows in an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The
petitioner states that he was not informed why he was transferred and detained, nor was he ever
investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority.

Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from
military custody and placed "under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without
the benefit of any investigation or charges.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice of Preliminary
Investigation" in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused),
stating that "the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m.
on December 12, 1980" and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet
and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to
the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has
not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.

On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's
Office to the Ministry of Justice.
On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner, among
others of having violated Republic Act No. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and Batas Pambansa Blg.
31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The inquest court set the preliminary
investigation for March 17, 1981.

On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church
conferences and undergo comprehensive medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and
ear including a possible removal of his left eye to save his right eye. Petitioner Salonga almost died
as one of the principal victims of the dastardly bombing of a Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda on
August 20, 1971. Since then, he has suffered serious disabilities. The petitioner was riddled with
shrapnel and pieces still remain in various parts of his body. He has an AV fistula caused by a piece
of shrapnel lodged one millimeter from his aorta. The petitioner has limited use of his one remaining
hand and arms, is completely blind and physical in the left eye, and has scar like formations in the
remaining right eye. He is totally deaf in the right ear and partially deaf in the left ear. The petitioner's
physical ailments led him to seek treatment abroad.

On or around March 26, 1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a copy of an amended
complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated March 12, 1981, charging the petitioner, along with
39 other accused with the violation of R.A. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885, Batas Pambansa Blg. 31
and P.D. 1736. Hearings for preliminary investigation were conducted. The prosecution presented as
its witnesses Ambassador Armando Fernandez, the Consul General of the Philippines in Los
Angeles, California, Col. Balbino Diego, PSC/NISA Chief, Investigation and Legal Panel of the
Presidential Security Command and Victor Lovely himself.

On October 15, 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against
petitioner for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him.

On December 2, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion. On January 4, 1982, he issued a
resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as
amended, against forty (40) people, including herein petitioner.

The resolutions of the respondent judge dated December 2, 1981 and January 4, 1982 are now the
subject of the petition. It is the contention of the petitioner that no prima facie case has been
established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to
sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no
rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution
utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. We grant the petition.

However, before going into the merits of the case, we shall pass upon a procedural issue raised by
the respondents.

The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash or to
dismiss, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari; that since the question
of dismissal will again be considered by the court when it decides the case, the movant has a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that public interest dictates that
criminal prosecutions should not be enjoined.

The general rule is correctly stated. However, the respondents fail to appreciate or take into account
certain exceptions when a petition for certiorari is clearly warranted. The case at bar is one such
exception.
In the case of Mead v. Angel (115 SCRA 256) the same contentions were advanced by the
respondents to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

... Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in
a criminal case shall be denied, the remedy of the accused-movant is not to file a
petition for certiorari or mandamus or prohibition, the proper recourse being to go to
trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to
quash if an adverse judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may
take therefrom in the manner authorized by law. (Mill v. People, et al., 101 Phil.
599; Echarol v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309.)

On this argument, we ruled:

There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents.
However, it is also recognized that, under certain situations, recourse to the
extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to question the
denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the interest of "more enlightened
and substantial justice", as was so declared in "Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669,
April 30, 1969."

Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is
respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person
is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record no
evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a victim of
the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at the Manila Medical
Center while hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of
the charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened
through the issuance of an order directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him (Ordonez v. Gen.
Fabian Ver, et al., G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980). Only after four months of detention was the
petitioner informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary
investigation, the petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently,
the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information after finding that a
prima facie case had been established against an of the forty persons accused.

In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to
commit the crime, the initial disregard of petitioner's constitutional rights together with the massive
and damaging publicity made against him, justifies the favorable consideration of this petition by this
Court. With former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. now deceased, there are at least 38 other co-
accused to be tried with the petitioner. The prosecution must present proof beyond reasonable doubt
against each and every one of the 39 accused, most of whom have varying participations in the
charge for subversion. The prosecution's star witness Victor Lovely and the only source of
information with regard to the alleged link between the petitioner and the series of terrorist bombings
is now in the United States. There is reason to believe the petitioner's citation of international news
dispatches * that the prosecution may find it difficult if not infeasible to bring him back to the Philippines to testify against the petitioner. If
Lovely refused to testify before an American federal grand jury how could he possibly be made to testify when the charges against the
respondent come up in the course of the trial against the 39 accused. Considering the foregoing, we find it in the interest of justice to resolve
at this stage the issue of whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the questioned resolutions.

The respondents contend that the prosecution will introduce additional evidence during the trial and
if the evidence, by then, is not sufficient to prove the petitioner's guilt, he would anyway be acquitted.
Yes, but under the circumstances of this case, at what cost not only to the petitioner but to the basic
fabric of our criminal justice system?

The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is
sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the
presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction. The question raised before us now is: Were the
evidences against the petitioner uncontradicted and if they were unexplained or uncontradicted,
would they, standing alone, sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence and warrant his
conviction?

We do not think so.

The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on
the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when
called upon to testify on subversive organizations in the United States nowhere mentioned the
petitioner as an organizer, officer or member of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP), or any of
the organizations mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on the other hand, when asked what
evidence he was able to gather against the petitioner depended only on the statement of Lovely "that
it was the residence of ex-Senator Salonga where they met together with Renato Tañada, one of the
brains of the bombing conspiracy ... and the fact that Sen. Salonga has been meeting with several
subversive personnel based in the U.S.A. was also revealed to me by Victor Burns Lovely; 11 and
on the group pictures taken at former Congressman Raul Daza's birthday party. In concluding that a
conspiracy exists to overthrow by violent means the government of the Philippines in the United
States, his only bases were "documentary as well as physical and sworn statements that were
referred to me or taken by me personally," which of course negate personal knowledge on his part.
When asked by the court how he would categorize petitioner in any of the subversive organizations,
whether petitioner was an organizer, officer or a member, the witness replied:

A. To categorize former Senator Salonga if he were an organizer, he is an officer or

he is a member, your Honor, please, we have to consider the surrounding
circumstances and on his involvement: first, Senator Salonga wanted always to
travel to the United States at least once a year or more often under the pretext of to
undergo some sort of operation and participate in some sort of seminar. (t.s.n., April
21, 1981, pp- 14-15)

Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as
prima facie evidence of subversion. It should not have been given credence by the court in the first
place. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, -has no probative value as the affiant could not
have been cross-examined on the facts stated therein. (See People v. Labinia, 115 SCRA 223;
People v. Valero, 112 SCRA 661). Moreover, as Victor Lovely, himself, was personally examined by
the court, there was no need for the testimony of Col. Diego. Thus, the inquest judge should have
confined his investigation to Victor Burns Lovely, the sole witness whose testimony had apparently
implicated petitioner in the bombings which eventually led to the filing of the information.

Lovely's account of the petitioner's involvement with the former's bombing mission is found in his
sworn statement made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella and taken on October 17, 1980 at the
AFP Medical Center. Lovely was not presented as a prosecution or state witness but only as
a defense witness for his two younger brothers, Romeo and Baltazar, who were both included in the
complaint but who were later dropped from the information. Victor Lovely was examined by his
counsel and cross-examined by the fiscal. In the process, he Identified the statement which he made
before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella. After Lovely's testimony, the prosecution made a
manifestation before the court that it was adopting Lovely as a prosecution witness.
According to Lovely's statement, the following events took place:

36. Q. Did Psinakis tell you where to stay?

A. Yes, at first he told me to check-in at Manila Hotel or the Plaza

Hotel where somebody would come to contact me and give the
materials needed in the execution of my mission. I thought this was
not safe so I disagreed with him. Mr. Psinakis changed the plan and
instead told me to visit the residence of Ex-Sen. Jovito Salonga as
often as I can and someone will meet me there to give the materials I
needed to accomplish my mission

37. Q. Did you comply as instructed?

A. Yes, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980 and stayed at the

residence of Mr. Johnny Chua, husband of my business partner, then
I went to the Hospital where I visited my mother and checked-in at
Room 303 of the YMCA at Concepcion Street, Manila.

38. Q. Did you visit the residence of former Senator Jovito Salonga
as directed by Psinakis?

A. I visited Sen. Salonga's place three (3) times, the first visit was
August 20 or 21, and the last was 4:00 P.M. of August 31, 1980. In
addition to these visits, I TALKED to him on the phone about three or
four times. On my first visit, I told him "I am expecting an attache
case from somebody which will be delivered to your house," for which
Sen. Salonga replied "Wala namang nagpunta dito at wala namang
attache case para sa iyo." However, if your attache case arrives, I'll
just call you." I gave him my number. On my second visit, Salonga
said, "I'll be very busy so just come back on the 31st of August at 4
P.M." On that date, I was with friends at Batulao Resort and had to
hurry back to be at Salonga's place for the appointment. I arrived at
Salonga's place at exactly 4 P.M.

39. Q. What happened then?

A. I was ushered to the sala by Mrs. Salonga and after five minutes,
Sen. Salonga joined me in the sala. Sen. Salonga informed me that
somebody will be coming to give me the attache case but did not tell
me the name.

40. Q. Are there any subject matters you discuss while waiting for
that somebody to deliver your materials?

A. Yes, Salonga asked if Sen. Aquino and I have met, I explained to

him the efforts of Raul Daza in setting up that meeting but I have
previous business commitments at Norfolk, Virginia. I told him,
however, that through the efforts of Raul Daza, I was able to talk with
Ninoy Aquino in the airport telephone booth in San Francisco. He
 also asked about Raul Daza, Steve Psinakis and the latest opposition
group activities but it seems he is well informed.

41. Q. How long did you wait until that somebody arrived?

A. About thirty (30) minutes.

41. Q. What happened when the man arrived?

A. This man arrived and I was greatly surprised to see Atty. Renato
Tañada Jovy Salonga was the one who met him and as I observed
parang nasa sariling bahay si Tañada nung dumating. They talked for
five (5) minutes in very low tones so I did not hear what they talked
about. After their whispering conversations, Sen. Salonga left and at
this time Atty. "Nits" Tañada told me "Nasa akin ang kailangan mo,
nasa kotse."

43. Q. Were the materials given to you?

A. When Sen. Salonga came back, we asked to be permitted to leave

and I rode in Atty. "Nits" Tañadas old Pontiac car colored dirty brown
and proceeded to Broadway Centrum where before I alighted, Atty.
Tañada handed me a "Puma" bag containing all the materials I
needed.

xxx xxx xxx

45. Q. What were the contents of the Puma bag?

A. Ten (10) pieces of Westclox pocket watch with screw and wirings,
ten (10) pieces electrical blasting caps 4" length, ten (10) pieces non-
electrical blasting caps 1 " length, nine (9) pieces volts dry cell
battery, two (2) improvised electrical testers. ten (10) plastic packs of
high explosive about 1 pound weight each.

However, in his interview with Mr. Ronnie Nathanielz which was aired on Channel 4 on November 8,
1980 and which was also offered as evidence by the accused, Lovely gave a different story which
negates the above testimony insofar as the petitioner's participation was concerned:

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Who were the people that you contacted in Manila and for what
purpose?

A. Before I left for the Philippines, Mr. Psinakis told me to check in at

the Manila Hotel or the Plaza Hotel, and somebody would just deliver
the materials I would need. I disapproved of this, and I told him I
would prefer a place that is familiar to me or who is close to me. Mr.
Psinakis suggested the residence of Sen. Salonga.
 And so, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980, 1 made a call to Sen.
Salonga, but he was out. The next day I made a call again. I was able
to contact him. I made an appointment t see him. I went to Sen.
Salonga's house the following day. I asked Sen. Salonga if someone
had given him an attache case for me. He said nobody. Afterwards, I
made three calls to Sen. Salonga. Sen. Salonga told me "call me
again on the 31st of August. I did not call him, I just went to his house
on the 31st of August at 4 P.M. A few minutes after my arrival Atty.
Renato Tañada arrived. When he had a chance to be near me, he
(Atty. Tanada) whispered to me that he had the attache case and the
materials I needed in his car. These materials were given to me by
Atty. Tanada When I alighted at the Broadway Centrum. (Emphasis
supplied)

During the cross-examination, counsel for petitioner asked Lovely about the so-called destabilization
plan which the latter mentioned in his sworn statement:

Q. You mentioned in your statement taken on October 17, 1980,

marked Exhibit "G" about the so-called destabilization plan of Aquino.
When you attended the birthday party of Raul Daza wherein Jovito
Salonga was also present, was this destabilization plan as alleged by
you already formulated?

WITNESS:

A. Not to my knowledge.

COURT TO WITNESS:

Q. Mr. Witness, who invited you to the party?

A. Raul Daza, your Honor.

Q. Were you told that Mr. Salonga would be present in the party.

A. I am really not quite sure, your Honor.

Q. Alright. You said initially it was social but then it became political.
Was there any political action taken as a result of the party?

A. Only political discussion, your Honor. (TSN, July 8, 1981, pp. 69-
84).

Counsel for petitioner also asked Lovely whether in view of the latter's awareness of the physical
condition of petitioner, he really implicated petitioner in any of the bombings that occurred in Metro
Manila. The fiscal objected without stating any ground. In sustaining the objection, the Court said:

Sustained . . . The use of the word 'implicate' might expand the role of Mr. Salonga.
In other words, you are widening the avenue of Mr. Salonga's role beyond the
participation stated in the testimony of this witness about Mr. Salonga, at least, as far
as the evidence is concerned, I supposed, is only being in the house of Mr. Salonga
 which was used as the contact point. He never mentions Mr. Salonga about the
bombings. Now these words had to be put in the mouth of this witness. That would
be unfair to Mr. Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, p. 67)

Respondent judge further said:

COURT:

As the Court said earlier, the parts or portions affecting Salonga only
refers to the witness coming to Manila already then the matter of . . . I
have gone over the statement and there is no mention of Salonga
insofar as activities in the United States is concerned. I don't know
why it concerns this cross-examination.

ATTY. YAP:

Because according to him, it was in pursuance of the plan that he

came to Manila.

COURT:

According to him it was Aquino, Daza, and Psinakis who asked him to
come here, but Salonga was introduced only when he (Lovely) came
here. Now, the tendency of the question is also to connect Salonga to
the activities in the United States. It seems to be the thrust of the
questions.

COURT:

In other words, the point of the Court as of the time when you asked
him question, the focus on Salonga was only from the time when he
met Salonga at Greenhills. It was the first time that the name of
Salonga came up. There was no mention of Salonga in the
formulation of the destabilization plan as affirmed by him. But you are
bringing this up although you are only cross-examining for Salonga
as if his (Lovely's) activities in the United States affected Salonga.
(TSN. July 8, 1981, pp. 73-74).

Apparently, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by limiting the
petitioner's alleged "participation" in the bombing mission only to the fact that petitioner's house was
used as a "contact point" between Lovely and Tañada, which was all that Lovely really stated in his
testimony.

However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent judge suddenly
included the "activities" of petitioner in the United States as his basis for denying the motion to
dismiss:

On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness, Lovely, in one of his
statements declared: 'To the best of my recollection he mentioned of some kind of
violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted
by President Marcos immediately.
 It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has established facts and
circumstances sufficient for a finding that excludes a Motion to Dismiss by
respondent Salonga. The Movement for Free Philippines is undoubtedly a force born
on foreign soil it appears to rely on the resources of foreign entities, and is being (sic)
on gaining ascendancy in the Philippines with the use of force and for that purpose it
has linked itself with even communist organizations to achieve its end. It appears to
rely on aliens for its supporters and financiers.

The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in subversive activities in
the United States is not only inexplicable but without foundation.

The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to actual
acts of violence or terrorism. There is no proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of
subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of subversive organizations for two reasons-

(1) Because his house was used as a "contactpoint"; and

(2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should
reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately."

The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by association" theory
is too tenuous a basis to conclude that Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing
incidents. To indict a person simply because some plotters, masquerading as visitors, have
somehow met in his house or office would be to establish a dangerous precedent. The right of
citizens to be secure against abuse of governmental processes in criminal prosecutions would be
seriously undermined.

The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of inconsistencies. Senator Salonga
and Atty. Renato Tañada could not have whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost
totally deaf. Lovely could not have met Senator Salonga at a Manglapus party in Washington, D.C.
in 1977 because the petitioner left for the United States only on November, 1978. Senator Salonga
denies having known Mr. Lovely in the United States or in the Philippines. He states that he has
hundred of visitors from week to week in his residence but cannot recall any Victor Lovely.

The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in Los Angeles
where Senator Salonga was a guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated by the petitioner, in his
many years in the turbulent world of politics, he has posed with all kinds of people in various groups
and various places and could not possibly vouch for their conduct. Commenting on the matter,
newspaper columnist Teodoro Valencia stated that Filipinos love to pose with important visitors and
the picture proves nothing.

It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's stature can
expect guests and visitors of all kinds to be visiting his home or office. If a rebel or subversive
happens to pose with the petitioner for a group picture at a birthday party abroad, or even visit him
with others in his home, the petitioner does not thereby become a rebel or subversive, much less a
leader of a subversive group. More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for an indictment.
Nonetheless, even if we discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and dismiss the refutations and
arguments of the petitioner, the prosecution evidence is still inadequate to establish a prima facie
finding.

The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the
petitioner to any proscribed activities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive
organization mentioned in the complaint. Lovely had already testified that during the party of former
Congressman Raul Daza which was alleged to have been attended by a number of members of the
MFP, no political action was taken but only political discussion. Furthermore, the alleged opinion of
the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not
instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of
thought and expression. No man deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam memo
meretur. And as the late Justice Oliver W. Holmes stated in the case of U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S.
644, " ... if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than
any other it is the principle of free thought not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom
for the thought that we hate."

We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands
on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded
freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko v.
Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal,
illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other
form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly
concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of
government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth.
It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments.

The United States Supreme Court in Noto v. United States (367 U.S. 290) distinguished between
the abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence
and speech which would prepare a group for violent action and steel it to such action. In Watts v.
United States (394 U.S. 705), the American court distinguished between criminal threats and
constitutionally protected speech.

It stated:

We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits
within that statutory term. For we must interpret the language Congress chose
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254). The
language of the political arena, like the language used in labor disputed is often
vituperative abusive, and inexact. We agree with petitioner that his only offense was
a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the
President.

In the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to violence, much less
an advocacy of force or a conspiracy to organize the use of force against the duly constituted
authorities. The alleged remark about the likelihood of violent struggle unless reforms are instituted
is not a threat against the government. Nor is it even the uninhibited, robust, caustic, or unpleasantly
sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech. Parenthetically, the American case
of Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action. The words which petitioner allegedly used according to the best
recollections of Mr. Lovely are light years away from such type of proscribed advocacy.
Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective
clause of freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities
per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive organization. Under Presidential Decree No.
885, Section 3, paragraph 6, political discussion will only constitute, prima facie evidence of
membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to:

(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in

furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof.

As stated earlier, the prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would establish any link
between petitioner and any subversive organization. Even if we lend credence to Lovely's testimony
that a political discussion took place at Daza's birthday party, no proof whatsoever was adduced that
such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegal means.
The alleged opinion that violent struggle is likely unless reforms are instituted by no means shows
either advocacy of or incitement to violence or furtherance of the objectives of a subversive
organization.

Lovely also declared that he had nothing to do with the bombing on August 22, 1980, which was the
only bombing incident that occurred after his arrival in Manila on August 20, and before the YMCA
explosion on September 6, 1980. (See TSN, pp. 63-63, July 8, 1981). He further testified that:

WITNESS:

Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing against

the government. My bombing mission was directed against the
particular family (referring to the Cabarrus family [TSN, p. 11, July 9,
1981] [Rollo, p. 10].

Such a statement wholly negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment which Lovely
was supposed to have been commissioned to perform upon the orders of his co- accused and which
was the very reason why they answer charged in the first place. The respondent judge also asked
Lovely about the possible relation between Cabarrus and petitioner:

COURT:

Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito

Salonga, why did you implicate Jovito Salonga?

A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga.

It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony, the prosecution manifested to the court that it was
adopting him as a prosecution witness. Therefore, the prosecution became irreversively bound by
Lovely's disclaimers on the witness stand, that it was not his intention "to do some kind of bombing
against the government" and that he "did not try to implicate Salonga", especially since Lovely is the
sole witness adopted by the prosecution who could supposedly establish the link between the
petitioner and the bombing incidents.

The respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a
prima facie case exists against the petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People v. Dayad, 56 SCRA 439). In the
case at bar, the prosecution cannot even present a credible version of the petitioner's role in the
bombings even if it ignores the subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and without relying on mere
affidavits including those made by Lovely during his detention.

The resolution dated January 4, 1982 suffers from the same defect. In this resolution, Lovely's
previous declarations about the bombings as part of the alleged destabilization plan and the people
behind the same were accorded such credibility by the respondent judge as if they had already been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and
expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right
to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the
due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of
making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves
not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair
play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or
the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause
exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or
fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the
conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding
or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts
before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v.
Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in
the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant
violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary
lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It
should continue to be so. Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93).

The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been
arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when
on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal
Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the
Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of
petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned
resolution.

We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the
draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the
Court's crowded agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is
concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, however, that he is not precluded from filing
new charges for the same acts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double jeopardy
does not apply. in that sense, the case is not completely academic.
Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the
Supreme Court's functions.

The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas
reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the
awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as
excessive and, therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was
pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision
and stated:

The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from
setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part
of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive
bail shall not be required.

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could
validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the
Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Stan, this
Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture
for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case,
26 petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining
petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that
the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function
from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.

In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution evidence miserably
fails to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a
destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive
organization. They have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. We
reiterate the rule, however, that this Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the
kind of evidence against the petitioner found in the records.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6791             March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.

Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.
dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the
Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as
required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No.,
638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order
or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said
circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the
circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said
two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette,
presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the
Bureau of Printing.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of
the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
(See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule,
circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the
general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws,
(Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that
their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of
the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws"
include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:

El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de

Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.
Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que
muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia
de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de
aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol. I. p.
52).

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was
not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its
violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and
bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words,
appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to
have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.

But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being
raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one
may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is
within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court).
But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20
had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was
no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or
committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question
may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.

In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with
costs de oficio.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision.   Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws
of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and
that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.  2

In the Comment   required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
3

request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be
made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by
three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply   refuting these arguments. Came
4

next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in
view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he
submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for
particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and
in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding
because it was not supported by eight members of this Court.  5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision,   is the Civil Code which did not
6

become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at
all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as
a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required
of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details"
of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare
on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably
of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration.   The evident
7

purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication
in the Official Gazette   and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as
8

the people were sufficiently informed.   One reserved his vote   and another merely acknowledged
9 10

the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made.   It is therefore necessary
11
for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay
down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble,
though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as
we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not
pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet
been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if
we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that
we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory
opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of
their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression
and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 1044. May 15, 1903. ]

PEDRO JULIA, Complainant-Appellee, v. VICENTE SOTTO, Defendant-Appellant.

Felipe G. Calderon for Appellant.

Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT; PLEA IN BAR. — Where a demurrer to a

criminal complaint is sustained on grounds other than a lack of jurisdiction and the
court does not expressly order the filing of a new complaint, a further complaint
charging the same offense must be dismissed.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — Sustaining a demurrer to a criminal complaint on the ground that
neither time nor place of the crime is alleged, is not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
within the meaning of section 23, General Orders, No 58.

3. ID; JEOPARDY DEFINED. — Jeopardy may result only after arraignment upon a
complaint sufficient both in form and substance; the absolute dismissal of an
insufficient complaint is a bar to further prosecution of the crime named therein, but
may not be referred to as jeopardy.

DECISION

MAPA, J. :

The accused is charged with the offense of libel, committed, according to the complaint,
by means of a publication on the 12th of September, 1901, in issue No. 209 of "El
Pueblo," a newspaper edited and published in the city of Cebu, and of which the
defendant was editor and proprietor, of an article entitled "Miracles of Father Julia; the
bitter truth," in which article are contained libelous phrases tending to dishonor and
discredit the complaining witness and to bring him into contempt. In the complaint
those parts of the article which are necessary for the purposes of the accusation are
copied literally, hence it is not necessary to transcribe them here.
The case having been prosecuted to a termination, the defendant was convicted in the
court below and sentenced to four years’ banishment at a distance of 50 kilometers
from the town lines of the municipality of Cebu, and to the payment of a fine of 625
pesetas and to the costs of the suit. From this judgment he appeals to this court.

One of the errors assigned by the appellant in this appeal is the infraction of the
provisions of section 23 of General Orders, No. 58, which he alleges was committed by
the court below in the prosecution of this case against him. This allegation affects the
validity of the trial, and is, therefore, by reason of its importance, worthy of a careful
consideration. Upon being arraigned on the charge the accused set tip the plea of
jeopardy, and asked that the complaint be dismissed. This plea was overruled by the
court. Thereupon the application for the allowance of an appeal against the order
disposing of the plea of jeopardy having been denied, the plea of jeopardy was again
advanced at the time the accused pleaded not guilty.

It is alleged that the prosecuting witness, on the 16th of September, 1901, filed against
the defendant a .complaint, amended on the 4th of November following, charging him
with the same offense of which he is accused in the present trial — that is, the
publication of libelous matter in the issue of the 12th of September, 1901, of the
newspaper "El Pueblo," of which the defendant was editor; that the court sustained a
demurrer to this complaint; that in sustaining the demurrer the court did not base its
ruling upon a lack of jurisdiction, nor did it order the filing of a new complaint or
information. In support of his contention the appellant cites section 23 of General
Orders, No. 58, which he alleges prohibits a second trial for the same offense in such
cases.

The court below in overruling the said exception of jeopardy did not do so on the
ground of the inaccuracy of the facts alleged by the accused as the ground of his
motion, but upon the ground that they are not, in his opinion, sufficient to constitute
jeopardy, or any other defense.

On his part the complaining witness in a written argument on page 27 of the record
admits the truth of the allegations; that a complaint, amended on the 4th of November,
1901, was presented against the accused, and that this complaint was dismissed by the
court. He alleges that the ruling is based upon the following grounds: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Because the said complaint was not drawn in the form required by General Order,
No. 58;

(2) Because in the said complaint no allegation was made as to the time or place of the
commission of the alleged offense;

(3) Because the alleged libelous words had not been copied therein, but merely the
conclusions drawn by the complainant therefrom.

This does not disprove nor is it in conflict with the allegation of the accused that the
court below, when dismissing the complaint of November 4, did not order the filing of a
new complaint or information, and consequently the truth of this assertion is impliedly
admitted. Among the grounds upon which, according to the complaining witness
himself, the judge dismissed said complaint, we do not find included a finding that the
court was without jurisdiction over the offense charged. The fact that the place in which
the offense was committed was not stated in the complaint does not support the
deduction which the complainant apparently seeks to draw — that the court dismissed
the complaint by reason of lack of jurisdiction — because the only effect produced by
such omission is to make the complaint insufficient or defective, but by no means does
it deprive the court of the jurisdiction which the law confers upon it, and which it might
have exercised bad the complaint been properly drawn. The proof of this is that the
complainant subsequently presented the complaint upon which this trial is based,
correcting the defects in the complaint of the 4th of November, and presented this new
complaint to the same court which had dismissed the preceding one.

Upon the comparison of one complaint with the other, it will readily be seen that the
accused is charged therein with the same offense, inasmuch as both refer to the alleged
libelous matter published-in the article entitled "Miracles of Fattier Julia" in the issue of
"El Pueblo," of which the defendant was editor, c or responding to the 12th of
September, 1901. It is true that in the complaint of November 4 the words contained in
the article are not transcribed verbatim, but this circumstance is merely accidental, and
by no means necessary for the identification of the offense. It is sufficiently identified
by the citation of the article upon which the complaint is based, its heading, the name
of the paper in which it was published, the date of its publication, and by the offense
which the complainant considers to have been committed by its publication. These are
the circumstances which identify the offense with precision and exactness, malting it
impossible to confound it with any other; and it appears that in both complaints the
same offense is referred to. All this, in connection with the statements alleged in the
complaint of the 4th of November to be libelous, all of which are taken from the article
referred to and are actually found therein and which, by the way, are the most libelous
ones it contained, leaves no ground for the slightest doubt that in the said complaint
the accused was charged with the publication against the complainant of the libelous
matter contained in the article referred to. This libelous matter is precisely the same as
that upon which the complaint in this case is based, and therefore the offense charged
in both complaints is one and the same, notwithstanding the fact that the complaint of
November 4 was dismissed, because in the opinion of the court below it lacked the
elements necessary under the law to the existence of a valid complaint.

The allegation made by the private prosecutor, that the complaint of the 4th of
November did not charge the accused with any offense, inasmuch as the judge
considered that this allegation was insufficient to charge the offense of libel because it
did not contain verbatim the alleged libelous matter, but only conclusions of the
complaining witness himself, is wholly without foundation and can not merit our
approval. It is sufficient to read the complaint in order to see that the clergy of libel was
clearly and distinctly made, and that the libel was alleged to consist precisely in the
article already mentioned. The dismissal of the complaint by reason of its formal defects
could not in any degree affect or alter the reality of this fact, whether the conclusions of
law of the Court below in its order dismissing it are correct or not, nor can it be at
present considered, because of the plaintiff’s admission. Furthermore, the libelous
matter, the publication of which is denounced in the complaint, is defamatory in so high
a degree that it would be difficult for us to imagine a publication which could possibly
be more injurious in the eyes of the public.
We consider, therefore that the record discloses sufficiently —

(1) That the defendant had been accused by the complaining witness in his complaint of
November 4, 1901, of the same offense with which he is charged in the present case;

(2) That the said complaint was dismissed by an order sustaining the demurrer of the
accused, based, among other grounds, upon the failure to draw the said complaint
whitewall the essential requisites prescribed by the law;

(3) That in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the complaint the court did not find
that it was without jurisdiction to try the offense charged, nor did it order the
presentation of a new complaint or information

This being so, the case falls fully within the provisions of section 23 of G.O., No. 58,
which is literally as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"If the demurrer is sustained, the judgment shall be final on the complaint or
information demurred to, and it shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense, unless the court delivering judgment was without jurisdiction, or unless the
court, being of opinion that the objection may be avoided, directs a new complaint or
information to be filed. If the court does not direct that the accused be remanded to a
court of proper jurisdiction for trial or that a new information be filed, the defendant
must be discharged or his bail be exonerated." cralaw virtua1aw library

The grounds upon which the demurrer referred to in this section may be made are
enumerated in section 21, of which section 23 is the complement, and among them is
included (No. 2) the objection to the complaint by reason of its failure to conform to the
essential requisites prescribed by the law, which was one of the objections advanced by
the accused and sustained by the court in dismissing the complaint of November 4,
1901. The court, then, not having declared itself to be without jurisdiction and not
having ordered the presentation of a new complaint or information, the order sustaining
the plea is a bar to further prosecution of the accused for the same offense charged in
the first complaint, in accordance with the provisions of section 23.

The principle established by this section is clear and explicit. If a demurrer by the
accused is sustained, in order that he may be prosecuted again for the same offense, it
is necessary that the ruling on the demurrer rests upon .the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, or the court must have expressly directed the presentation of a new
complaint or information. Outside of these two excepted cases, it would be unlawful and
unjust to submit the accused to a subsequent prosecution, and to do so would be error.
And this is certainly a logical result, in view of the principles of a system of procedure
both just and equitable, and neither the spirit nor the law of section 23 are susceptible
of any other interpretation.

Without the safeguard this article establishes in favor of the accused, his fortune,
safety, and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness,
who might repeat his accusation as often as dismissed by the court and whenever he
might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than his own will and pleasure.
The accused would never be free from the cruel and constant menace of a never-ending
charge, which the malice of the complaining witness might hold indefinitely suspended
over his head, were it not that the judiciary is exclusively empowered to authorize, by
an express order to that effect, the repetition of a complaint or information once
dismissed in the cases in which the law requires that this be done. Such is, in our
opinion, the fundamental reason of the article of the law to which we refer. Thanks to
this article, the accused, after being notified of the order dismissing the complaint may,
as the case may be, either rest assured that he will not be further molested, or prepare
himself for the presentation of a new complaint. In either case, the order gives him full
information as to what he may hope or fear, and prevents his reasonable hopes from
being dissipated as the result of an equivocal and indefinite legal situation. To this
much, at least, one who has been molested, possibly unjustly, by a prosecution on a
criminal charge, is entitled.

The objection sustained by the judge in this case solely affected the form of the
complaint, and without self-contradiction he might well have ordered the filing of a new
complaint or information. Even more, we believe it was his duty to have done so. Our
understanding of the spirit of section 23 is that it makes it the duty of the judge to
enter such an order whenever he considers that the defect may be cured — i. e.,
whenever the nature of the defect is such as not to be incompatible with the filing of a
new complaint or information. The judge not having done this, the private prosecutor
should have appealed if he desired to preserve his right to file a new complaint for the
same offense. Far from doing so, he consented to the order by which the demurrer was
sustained, without reservation or restriction of any kind, and he must suffer the legal
consequence of his own negligence.

The accused calls the defense or exception of which he avails himself under section 23,
jeopardy. We are of the opinion that this is a misnomer. Jeopardy can only result after
arraignment upon a complaint sufficient both in farm and substance. (Section 28). In
the present case the complaint of November 4 was dismissed precisely because it
lacked the essential requisites necessary to its validity and sufficient as a matter of law.
For the very reason that the complaint was dismissed upon the demurrer of the accused
there was no arraignments as this would only have taken place had the demurrer been
overruled (section 24) . It is therefore evident that this is not a case of jeopardy,
notwithstanding the exception or defense set up by the accused is complete and is
sufficient to offset the accusation brought by the complaining witness in this case.
Section 23 establishes a special defense which, without constituting jeopardy, produces,
nevertheless, the same effect as a matter of law, inasmuch as it is a bar to further
prosecution for the same offense. But the judge violated the legal principle contained in
tilts section, and therefore committed an error of law in overruling the plea and in
directing the continuance of the prosecution of the cause against the accused.

For these reasons we set aside the judgment of the court below, together with all the
proceedings in the trial, with the costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-42925 January 31, 1977

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RICARDO D. GALANO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII,
and GREGORIO SANTOS, respondents.

Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Hugo Nathanael P. de
Pano, Jr. and Trial Attorney Blesila O. Quintillan for petitioner.

Juanito M. Romano for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J:

The Court sets aside the respondent judge's orders dismissing the information for estafa against
respondent accused, since the offense charged clearly has not prescribed. The complaint filed with
the Batangas court which expressly alleged commission of the offense within the municipality and
which pended for twelve years (the accused having jumped bail and evaded rearrest for nine years)
and which was eventually dismissed by said court for lack of territorial jurisdiction as a result of the
proof adduced before it properly interrupted and tolled the prescription period. Respondent judge
failed, in ruling otherwise, to apply the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in
criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof. The
case is ordered remanded for determination with the utmost dispatch, since this case has already
been pending for fifteen years owing to respondent accused's deplorable tactics. The undisputed
factual background of the case is succinctly stated by then Acting Solicitor General, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., thus:

1. On October 2,1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court

of Batangas, Batangas (now City Court of Batangas City) against the accused-
respondent Gregorio Santos by complainant, Juanito Limbo, ...

2. Gregorio Santos was arrested to answer for the above charge, and upon his
arrest, posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused was thereafter
arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Then, the case was heard on its
 merits. However, on September 16, 1964, the accused jumped bail. As a result, his
bail bond was forfeited and the case against him archived by the municipal court of
Batangas, Batangas.

3. It was not until September 14, 1973, about nine years later, when the accused was
re-arrested, and the trial of the said case resumed.

4. On October 21, 1974, while the said case was pending trial, private respondent
Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Batangas
court did not have territorial jurisdiction over the case, the evidence showing that the
crime was committed in Manila.

5. Finding the motion meritorious, the Batangas City Court issued an order dated
November 5, 1974, dismissing the case against Gregorio Santos for lack of territorial
jurisdiction over the crime charged ...

6. On November 14, 1974, the complainant Juanito B. Limbo refiled the same case
against Gregorio Santos in the Fiscal's Office of Manila. A preliminary investigation
was conducted. On July 29, 1975, the corresponding information was filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 22397, ...

7. On November 12, 1975 the accused Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss
criminal Case No. 22397 on the grounds of prescription and double jeopardy.

8. The prosecuting fiscal filed his opposition to said motion on December 2, 1975, to
which the accused filed a rejoinder on December 5, 1975.

9. On December 8, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, presided
over by the Honorable Ricardo D. Galano, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case
No. 22397 on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed, ... The
prosecution moved for the reconsideration of said order but this was denied by the
lower court by order of January 7, 1976. ...

10. From the said Order of dismissal, the City Fiscal of Manila offenses provides:
interposed an appeal by certiorari to this Honorable Court on January 24, 1976. On
March 3, 1976, this honorable Court issued the Resolution of March 3, 1976
requiring the Solicitor General to file the petition for review within fifteen days from
receipt thereof ...

The People avers in the petition 1 that respondent judge "dismissing criminal Case No. 22397 despite
the provisions of Article l of the Revised Penal Code, which clearly indicate that the offense charged has
not prescribed" and "in not considering the prevailing jurisprudence indicating non-prescription of the
offense charged, and in holding that the case of People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, does not apply to the
case at bar."

The petition is patently meritorious and must be granted.

I. The offense of estafa for which respondent accused stands charged clearly has not prescribed.

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.— The period of prescription shall

commence to run from the day on which the discovered by the offended party, the
 authorities, or by their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint
or information and shall commence to run again when the proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him. ...

The offense was committed on or about September 16, 1962 when respondent failed to account for
and instead misappropriated to his own use the sum of P8,704.00 representing the net proceeds
(minus his commission) of 272 booklets of sweepstakes tickets that had been entrusted to him be
the complainant, who promptly filed on October 2, 1962 plainly within the ten-year prescriptive period
the criminal complaint against respondent accused in the Municipal Court of Batangas, Batangas.
The prescriptive period was thereupon interrupted.

After his plea of not guilty and during the trial, respondent accused jumped bail in September, 1964
and evaded rearrest for nine years until September, 1973 and the trial was resumed. When the
Batangas court in its Order of November 5, 1974 upon respondent's motion dismissed the complaint
"for lack of jurisdiction" since the evidence (of both prosecution and accused) showed that all
elements of the crime were committed in Manila (and not in Batangas), 2 the proceedings therein
terminated without conviction or acquittal of respondent accused and it was only then that the prescriptive
period (which was interrupted during the pendency of the case in the Batangas court) commenced to run
again.

When the City Fiscal of Manila upon complainant's instance refiled on July 29, 1975 the same case
against respondent accused in the Manila court of first instance, (after having conducted a
preliminary investigation), it is clear that not even a year of the ten-year prescriptive period had been
consumed.

Respondent accused intent on thwarting his prosecution filed anew a motion to dismiss the
information on grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. There is manifestly no jeopardy,
because he was not acquitted by the Batangas court which on the basis of the evidence could
neither convict him because it was thereby shown to have no jurisdiction over the offense.

But respondent judge gravely erred in sustaining the ground of prescription, ruling that there was no
interruption of the prescriptive period during the pendency of the case in the Batangas court because
"(T)he proceedings contemplated by Article 91 are proceedings which are valid and before a
competent court. If they are void from the beginning because the court has no territorial jurisdiction
of the offense charged, it is as if no proceedings were held thereat. If this is so, then the warrant or
order of arrest as well as the bail given by the accused for his provisional liberty is of no effect.
Inevitably, there can be no jumping bail to speak of and there are no proceedings to be interrupted."

This is plain error for "Settled is the rule ... that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal
cases by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof." 4

It follows clearly that the Batangas court was vested with lawful jurisdiction over the criminal
complaint filed with it which expressly alleged that the offense was committed "in the Municipality of
Batangas, province of Batangas" and that the proceedings therein were valid and before a
competent court, (including the arrest warrant, the grant of bail and forfeiture thereof upon the
accused's jumping of bail), until the same court issued its November. 1974 order dismissing the
Case and declaring itself without territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the evidence presented to it by
both prosecution and the accused.
It follows just as clearly that the prescriptive period was interrupted and tolled during the 12-year
pendency of the proceedings before the Batangas Court (for nine years of which respondent
accused had jumped bail and evaded re-arrest).

II. Respondent judge gravely erred in dismissing the information on the ground of prescription and
disregarding the controlling case of People vs. Olarte. 5

In the second People vs. Olarte case, 6 the Court clarified precisely for the guidance of bench and bar
that the true doctrine is that the filing of the compliant in the municipal court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary investigation (where the offense charged is beyond its jurisdiction to try the case
on the merits) should, and does interrupt the period of prescription, as follows:

Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two
lines of decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of
crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the
complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course
of the prescriptive term: (People vs. Olarte, L-131027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited
therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil.
588, 590.) Another series of decisions declares that to produce interruption the
complaint or information must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction
to try the case on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29,
1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench
and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and after mature consideration has
arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established
by the decision holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if
it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should and
does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.
Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information' without distinguishing whether the complaint is
filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on
the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may
only proceed to investigate the case, its actuation already represents the initial step
of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party
of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file
the requisite complaint. 7

Respondent judge in his dismissal order correctly cited the rationale for statutory prescriptions, inter
alia, that "the delay in instituting the proceedings not only causes expenses to the State, but exposes
public justice to peril, for it weakens oral evidence due to the lapse of the natural period of duration
of memory if not to anything, else. And it is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt
and that statutes enforcing that promptitude should be maintained, they being not merely acts of
grace, but checks imposed by the State upon its subalterns, to exact vigilant activity and to secure
for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained. 8

But respondent judge fell into grave error in not applying the controlling case of Olarte on his
misconception that there had been no valid complaint filed with a competent court in Batangas
contrary to what has already been held hereinabove that the express allegations of the complaint
that the offense was committed in Batangas vested the Batangas court with lawful
jurisdiction until its dismissal order twelve years later for lack of jurisdiction as a result of
the proof presented before it during the tiral (and in not taking into account that the delay was not at
all due to the State but to respondent accused himself who jumped bail and escaped tile law for nine
[9] years and who apparently has made no effort all this time to make good the amount the to
complainant or any part thereof).

Since the record with transcript of the testimonial evidence in the Batangas court is complete (and
shows that the trial was continued on August 2, 1974 to September 10, 1974 while respondent
accused was testifying on the witness stand but that he instead filed his motion to dismiss of October
14, 1974 which granted by the Batangas court for lack of territorial jurisdiction) and this case had
already been pending for almost 15 years, all the evidence already taken by the Batangas court as
recorded in the minutes and transcript shall be deemed reproduced upon remand of the case to the
Manila court which is hereby ordered to receive only the remaining evidence of the respondent
accused and such rebuttal evidence as the parties may have and thereafter resolve the case with
the utmost dispatch.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge's dismissal orders of December 8, 1975 and January 7, 1976 are
hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to respondent judge or whoever presides Branch XIII of
the Manila court of first instance for continuation of the trial (with reproduction of the evidence in the
Batangas city court in Criminal Case No. 532 thereof, entitled "People vs. Gregorio Santos") in line
with the directives in the preceding paragraph. Respondent judge or the judge presiding his court is
further ordered to report to this Court the action taken hereon within a period of ninety (90) days from
promulgation of this decision. In view of the many years that the criminal case has been pending,
this decision is declared immediately executory upon promulgation.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 9632. September 23, 1914. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO REGALA, Defendant-Appellant.

Ceferino Hilario, for Appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE; JIJRISDICTION IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS. — The jurisdiction of a justice’s

court in criminal actions is determined by the penalty which may be imposed; and where, in a given
case, the penalty which .may be imposed is more than six months imprisonment and P200 fine, the
justice’s court has no jurisdiction over the action.

2. ID.; ID. — Therefore, where the penalty which may be imposed is six months imprisonment and
P200 fine and, in addition, temporary special disqualification in its maximum degree to perpetual
special disqualification, the penalty exceeds that which a justice’s court may impose and, for that
reason, it has no jurisdiction of the action. (U. S. v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. Rep., 265.)

3. MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY PUBLIC OFFICIAL. — In order that a public official may be
guilty of malversation of public funds or property, he must, at the time of the conversion, be acting as
a public official and must be dealing with public money or property, or with money or property which
has become impressed with public attributes or character.

4. CRIMINAL LAW; FORMER JEOPARDY. — Where an information has been filed in the Court of First
Instance charging estafa and the accused is duly tried for that crime, and the court determines
erroneously that it has no jurisdiction of the action, dismisses the same, and discharges the prisoner,
the plea of double jeopardy is sustainable in a subsequent action in the same court against the same
accused charging him with malversation of public funds arising out of exactly the same acts, it
appearing in the second action that the facts alleged and proved did not constitute malversation of
public funds but estafa, for which the accused had been already tried and acquitted by a court of
competent jurisdiction.

5. ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL. — An acquittal of an accused on a trial upon an information charging estafa is
a bar to a subsequent action for malversation of public funds based upon exactly the same facts,
although the court acquitted the accused in the first action upon jurisdictional grounds, but
erroneously.

DECISION
 MORELAND, J.:

On the 1st day of February, 1912, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga presented an
information against the appellant Lorenzo Regala for estafa, alleging: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That the said Lorenzo Regala on one of the days of the month of October, 1911, in the municipality of
Floridablanca, Pampanga, P. I., being then and there a public official, namely, justice of the peace of
Floridablanca, Pampanga, P. I., in abuse of his office and authority, voluntarily, illegally, intentionally,
and criminally, making use of deceit, that is to say, pretending that there had been presented to his
court by Luisa Garcia a claim against Juan Montemayor for the sum of P12, took and received from
said Juan Montemayor the said sum of P12 for delivery to Luisa Garcia, but said accused then and
there delivered to the said Luisa Garcia the sum of P6 only, which was the sum actually claimed by
her, and appropriated then and there to his own use the said sum of P6, to the injury and detriment of
the said Juan Montemayor, thereafter denying having received said sum from him and refusing to
return it." cralaw virtua1aw library

On the 13th day of March, 1912, the accused appeared before the court for trial. The cause was duly
opened and the trial proceeded with, the Government presenting as witnesses Luisa Garcia, Juan
Montemayor, Juan Manlulu, and Gervasio Lalic. These witnesses having testified, the court came to
the conclusion that it was without jurisdiction, dismissed the case and ordered the prosecuting
attorney to present an information to the justice of the peace.

On the 9th of August of the same year the prosecuting attroney, instead of presenting an information
for estafa to the justice;s court, as ordered, filed an information against said accused in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga charging him with malversation of public funds. The information
alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That the said accused on one of the days of the month of October, 1911, in the municipality of
Floridablanca, Pampanga, P.I.,voluntarily, illegally, and criminally, being, as he was, a public official,
namely, justice of the peace of the aforesaid municipality of Floridablanca, and charged for that reason
with the care and custody of public funds, collected from Juan Montemayor the sum of P12 which,
according to the representations of the accused, Luisa Garcia had claimed before him as such justice
of the peace was due her from said Juan Montemayor, obtaining andrecieving thereby from the said
Luisa Garcia; but the said accused delivered to said Luisa Garcia the sum of P6 only, which was, as a
matter of fact, the only sum claimed from the beggining, neglecting and refusing to deposit the
remaining P6 in the municipal treasury and refusing to give an account of the same, thereby
embezzling the same and converting the same to his own use." cralaw virtua1aw library

On the 5th of November, 1912, the accused, by his attorneys, demurred to the complaint on the
ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute malversation of public funds. This demurrer
was overruled and the accused was ordered to plead. On the 2d of April, 1913, the accused excepted
to the order overruling the demurrer, pleaded not guilty and at the same time entered a plea of
former jeopardy and one of autre fois acquit. The latter pleas were based upon the fact that he had
been tried once for the crime of estafa upon precisely the same facts alleged in the information in the
present case and acquitted thereof.

The cause went to trial and the accused was found guilty and sentenced to two months’ imprisonment,
to indemnify Juan Montemayor in the sum of P6, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. The judgment also perpetually disqualified the accused from holding public office
within the Philippine Islands.

The judgment must be reversed.

The acts alleged to have been committed by the first information constitute the crime of estafa against
the com- plaining witness. As a necessary result those alleged in the second information do not
constitute the crime of malversation of public funds. The money paid by the debtor to the accused and
herein complained of was paid involuntarily and under false representations and pretense made by the
accused for the purpose. The accused represented to the complainant that he was authorized and
required to collect P6, the amount of the claim against him, and P6 damages. The debtor paid upon
that representation and the accused received in accordance therewith. This representation was false.
The creditor neither required nor authorized such a collection. Wherever false representations are
knowingly and intentionally made and money obtained by virtue thereof which is subsequently
converted to the use of the person making the false replesentations or of some person other than the
one from whom it was obtained, a criminal action lies.

The charge of malversation of public funds has no foundation. The funds were not public funds.
Section 790 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides what fees or sums a justice of the peace is
authorized to collect in civil and criminal actions and the disposition which must be made thereof. It
provides that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The following are the legal fees which a justice of the peace shall collect: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x          x          x

"For each civil action, three pesos.

x          x          x

"For taking affidavitm fifty centavos.

x          x          x

"For writing and certifying depositions, including oath per one hundred words, or fractional part
thereof, twenty centavos.

x          x          x

"For certified copies of any record, per one hundred words, or fractional part thereof, twenty
centavos." cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 73 of Act No. 136 provides: "No justice of the peace, clerk, or amanuensis thereof shall collect
or receive any fee, except such as are prescribed in the fee bill embraced in the Code of Civil
Procedure." cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 71 of Act No. 136, as amended, provids in part as follows: "Except whn th justic of th peace
acts as judge of the Court of First Instance, all fines imposed by a justice of the peace in criminal
prosecutions and all fees charged in civil suits or for any other service and collected shall be paid
without delay to the municipal treasurer, or in the city of Manila to the Collector of Internal Revenue,
to whom on the first day of each month the justice shall present a detailed statement of the amounts
thus collected by him since his last previous report and of the amounts which the municipal treasurer
should pay for fees in criminal proceedings during the preceding month. His ac- count shall forthwith b
audited by the municipal treasurer and president, or in Manila by the Insular Auditor, by examining
the records of the justice of the peace and any other papers or persons deemed necessary, and all
mutilated or spoiled receipts must be accounted for and turned in by said justice. But it shall not be
necessary for the justice to prove the insolvency of parties who have failed to pay costs taxed against
them." cralaw virtua1aw library

It has not been contended that the P6 collected by the accused constitued in any sense any of the fees
enumerated in the sections just quoted. No civil action was begun. No witnesses were sworn or oaths
taken; no record was made and no expenses incurred. There arose no occasion for the collection of
any of the fees specified in the Code of Civil Procedure. As a necessary result, no part of the money
collected was public money and the accused was under no duty to the public in relation thereto.

We are also of the opinion that the plea of former Jeopardy was well founded and that the present
action should be dismissed for that reason alone.

The ground for the dismissal of the action for estafa after the prosecution had presented its case was
that the sum involved being only P6, the penalty imposed under subdivision 1 of article 534 would be
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degrees, — that is, the maximum punishment would not
be more than six months’ imprisonment and P200 fine; that, this being true, the case fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of justice courts and the Court of First Instance accordingly had no jurisdiction.

In this reasoning the trial court overlooked the fact that in addition to the penalty imposed by article
534 of the Penal Code, article 399 of the same code provides that under certain circumstances there
shall be imposed, in addition to arresto mayor, temporary special disqualification in its maximum
degree to perpetual special disqualification. The latter is a penalty which justices of the peace have no
jurisdiction to impose. (U. S. v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. Rep., 265.) As a necessary result the crime of
estafa as charged in the information in the case before us is not one over which a justice of the peace
has jurisdiction. (U. S. v. Ang Suyco, 17 Phil. Rep., 92.) Accordingly, the action was one within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was erroneous.

As will be seen from reading the informations above set out the two charges are made upon precisely
the same facts. While in one case the fact that the justice of the peace was a public functionary is
emphasized more than in the other and stress is laid in one information more that in the other upon
his failure to account for the sum he received, nevertheless, essentially the facts are the same. It is
not a case where the acts complained of constitute two or more separate and distinct offenses for
which he can be separately tried.

The accused having already been put in jeopardy for his acts under one charge, cannot now be tried
for the commission of the same acts under another charge.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellant acquitted; costs de officio.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43790 December 9, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE CITY COURT OF SILAY, ERNESTO DE LA PAZ, PACIFICO SENECIO, JR. y SEBUSA,
ROMEO MILLAN y DELEJERO and WILFREDO JOCHICO y MAGALONA, respondents.

Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and
Solicitor Enrique M. Reyes for petitioner.

Hilado, Hagad & Hilado as private prosecutors.

Benjamin Z. Yelo, Sr. for private respondent Romeo Millan.

Ciceron Severino and Emeterio Molato for other private respondents.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review jointly filed by the City Fiscal of Silay City, Marcelino M. Paviera, and
the Law Offices of Hilado, Hagad & Hilado, the latter as private prosecutors, praying that an order of
the City Court of Silay dated December 19, 1975, issued by Judge Reynaldo M. Alon, dismissing
Criminal Case No. 7124-C entitled "People vs. Ernesto de la Paz, et al." be set aside and that
respondent court be directed to continue with the trial of the aforementioned case. *

In compliance with Our Resolution of July 21, J976, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
comment on October 13, 1974, joining the Petitioner's prayer that the order of respondent court of
December 19, 1975, be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
The record shows that private respondent herein, Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico Senecio, Jr. y Sebusa
Romeo Millan y Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y Magalona, were charged with "falsification by
private individuals and use of falsified document" under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code, alleged to have been committed as follows.

That sometime on January 4, 1974, at Hawaiian-Philippine Company, Silay City,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Ernesto
de la Paz, overseer of Hda. Malisbog belonging to Deogracias de la Paz, and the
other three accused, scalers of Hawaiian-Philippine Company, with intent of gain and
to cause damage by conniving, cooperating and mutually helping one another did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously alter or falsify the sugar cane
weight report card or "tarjeta", a private document showing the weight of sugarcane
belonging to Deogracias de la Paz, particularly those loaded in cane cars Nos. 1686,
1743 and 1022 by increasing the total actual weight of 22.005 tons to 27.160 tons for
said three cane cars, thereby causing damage to the central and other cane planters
of about 8.68 piculs of sugar valued in the total amount of P618.19, to the damage
and prejudice of Hawaiian Central and other sugarcane planters adhered thereto in
the aforestated amount of P618.19.

IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 2, ART. 172, R.P.C. (p. 14, rollo) Evidence was
presented by the prosecution showing that:

On January 4, 1974, accused Pacifico Senecio, Jr. Romeo Millan and Wilfredo
Jochico who were then scalers on duty that day at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company,
weighed cane cars Nos. 1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes belonging to
Deogracias de la Paz. The weight of the sugar canes were reflected on the weight
report cards (H.P. Co. Lab. Form No. 1) or "tarjetas" showing that for car No. 1743 —
8.920 tons (Exhibit "B-1"), for Car No. 1686 — 8.970 tons (Exhibit "C-1") for car No.
1022 — 8.875 tons or a total weight of 26.765 tons. However, they did not submit
said "tarjetas" to the laboratory section, instead, they substituted "tarjetas" showing a
heavier weight for car No. 1743 — 10.515 tons (Exhibit "B"), car No. 1686 — 10.525
tons (Exhibit "C") and car No. 1022 — 10.880 tons (Exhibit "D") with a total of 27.160
tons or an additional of 5.155 tons. These were the "tarjetas" submitted to the
laboratory section. Exhibits "B-1", "C-1" and "D-1" were taken later by the
prosecution witness PC Sgt. Rogelio Sevilla from the wife of Pacifico Senecio, Jr.
(pp. 15-16, rollo, Order of December 19, 1975).

After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved to
dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion, respondent court issued its
order of December 19, 1975, dismissing the case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that
the acts committed by the accused as narrated above do not constitute the crime of falsification as
charged. Reasoning out his order, Judge Alon said:

To be convicted under paragraph 2, Article 172, an accused should have committed

one of the eight acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171, R.P.C. Is the act
of substituting the "tarjetas" with higher cane weight for the ones with lower cane
weight fall under one of the acts enumerated. After going over the acts of falsification
one by one and trying to correlate the act of the accused with each of them, the
Court finds that the said act could not possibly be placed under any of them. Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius, the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other.
Following this maxim, we cannot just include the act of substitution as among those
 acts enumerated under Article 171. And, under the rule of statutory construction,
penal laws should be liberally construed in favor of the accused. This Court,
therefore, is of the opinion that the accused have not committed the act of
falsification with which they are charmed. Obviously, it follows that there could be no
use of falsified document since there is no falsified document.

The imputed acts of the accused in making the substitution, if true, is repugnant to
the human sense of right and wrong. But, however reprehensible the act may be, it is
not punishable unless there is a showing that there is a law which defines and
penalizes it as a crime. Unless there be a particular provision in the Penal Code or
Special Law that punishes the act, even if it be socially or morally wrong, no criminal
liability is incurred by its commission. (U.S. vs. Taylor, 28 Phil. 599)

xxx xxx xxx

Wherefore, the motion is hereby granted and the case dismissed with costs de
oficio ... (pp. 17-18, rollo)

In their comment on this Petition, private respondents claim that there was no error committed by
respondent court in dismissing the case against them for insufficiency of evidence and that for this
Court to grant the present petition would place said respondents in double jeopardy.

On the other hand, the People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable inasmuch as
the case was dismissed upon motion of the accused, and the dismissal having been made with their
consent, they waived their defense of double jeopardy, citing various cases in support thereof. (pp.
58-59, rollo, Comment of the Solicitor General)

We disagree with the position taken by the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. that the
plea of double jeopardy is not available in the instant situation.

It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this
was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the
evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in
a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.

Thus, in People vs. Acosta, L-23657, October 29, 1968, this Court dismissed an appeal taken by
the People against an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing a criminal case
upon motion of the accused after the presentation of evidence by the prosecution as such appeal if
allowed would place the accused in double jeopardy. There the accused was charged with estafa by
obtaining from Pedro Miguel a ring valued at P16,500.00 and issuing a check for $5,000.00 in
Payment thereof which turned out later to be counterfeit to the damage and prejudice of said Pedro
Miguel in the aforementioned amount of P16,500.00. After the presentation of the evidence of the
prosecution, the accused moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the evidence showed that
the ring belonged to somebody else, Banang Jaramillo, and not to Pedro Miguel as alleged in the
information and that the element of damage was absent. This motion was opposed by the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal but notwithstanding said opposition, the trial court dismissed the case on the
ground that Pedro Miguel was a mere agent of the true owner of the ring and therefore not the real
offended party. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal appealed to this Court, but the Solicitor General
moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it would place the accused in double
jeopardy, and the Court agreed with the Solicitor General, stating that it cannot be seriously
questioned that the trial court had grievously erred in his conclusion and application of the law, and
in dismissing outright the case; however, the error cannot now be remedied by an appeal because it
would place the accused in double jeopardy. (per Eugenio Angeles, J., 25 SCRA 823,826)

In the earlier case of Catilo vs. Hon. Abaya, May 14, 1954, petitioner Catilo was charged with murder
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas presided by respondent Judge. Petitioner was
arraigned and after the prosecution had rested its case petitioner moved for the dismissal of the
charge for insufficiency of evidence. This motion was granted by the Judge and his order was
promulgated in open court to the accused. Later in the day, Judge Abaya set aside his order of
dismissal motu proprio and scheduled the case for continuation of the trial on specific dates. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the defense counsel but because respondent Judge failed to
take action, the accused filed an original action for certiorari with this Court. In granting relief to
petitioner Catilo, the Court, through Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, held:

From whatever angle we may view the order of dismissal Annex "A", the only
conclusion possible is that it amounted to an acquittal. Whether said acquittal was
due to some "misrepresentation of facts" as stated in the order of reconsideration,
which alleged misrepresentation is vigorously denied by the defendant-petitioner, or
to a misapprehension of the law or of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the
fact is that it was a valid order or judgment of acquittal, and thereafter the respondent
Judge himself advised the accused in open court that he was a free man and could
not again be prosecuted for the same offense.

The inherent powers of a court to modify its order or decision, under section 5, Rule
124 of the Rules of Court claimed for the respondent to set aside his order of
dismissal, does not extend to an order of dismissal which amounts to a judgment of
acquittal in a criminal case; and the power of a court to modify a judgment or set it
aside before it has become final or an appeal has been perfected, under section 7,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, refers to a judgment of conviction and does not and
cannot include a judgment of acquittal.

In conclusion, we hold that to continue the criminal case against the petitioner after
he had already been acquitted would be putting him twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. ... (94 Phil. 1017)

The cases cited by the Acting Solicitor General are not applicable to the situation now before Us
because the facts are different. In Co Te Hue vs. Judge Encarnacion , 94 Phil. 258, the case was
dismissed provisionally with the express consent of the accused. The same occurred in People vs.
Togle, 105 Phil. 126 there was a provisional dismissal upon express request of the counsel for the
accused, In Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299, it was the accused who asked for the dismissal of the
case because the private prosecutor was not in court to present the prosecution's evidence and the
Municipal Court of the City of Iloilo dismissed the case without prejudice to the refiling of the charge
against the accused.   In People vs. Romero, 89 Phil. 672, the dismissal was made at the instance of
1

the accused because the prosecution was also not ready with its evidence. The case of People vs.
Belosillo, 9 SCRA 836, is not applicable either, because the order of dismissal of the Information
was made before arraignment, hence, the accused was not yet placed in jeopardy of punishment for
the offense charged.

In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against them was one
on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from other dismissals at the instance of the
accused. All the elements of double jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution had
rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being one on the merits,
the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot be invoked.

It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents was
erroneous.

As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were not charged
with substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false ones. The basis for the accusation was that the
accused entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar cane loaded in certain cane cars in
"tarjetas" which were submitted to the laboratory section of the company. The act of making a false
entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document, the accused having
made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they were under obligation to accomplish as
part of their duties- Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda. Malisbog, and the other accused as
scalers of the offended party, the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby causing damage to the
latter.

However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted
from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People vs. Nieto, 103 Phil, 1133, such error
cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.

In Nieto, the background of the case is as follows: On September 21, 1956, an Information for
homicide was filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against Gloria Nieto who, upon
arraignment pleaded guilty to the charge but -notwithstanding that plea, the trial judge acquitted her
on the Page 254 ground that although the accused was a minor "over 9 and under 15 years old" the
Information failed to allege that she acted with discernment. Thereafter the prosecution filed another
Information for the same offense stating therein that the accused Gloria Nieto was "a child between
9 and 15 years" and alleging in express terms that she acted with discernment. The defense filed a
motion to quash this second Information on grounds of double jeopardy, and the trial court already
presided by another Judge, Hon. Felix V. Makasiar, now Justice of this Court, granted the motion.
The prosecution appealed to this Court from said order. In its Decision, the Court dismissed the
appeal and sustained the order of then Judge Makasiar, deploring that as a result of a mistaken view
taken by the trial judge who acquitted the accused Gloria Nieto despite her plea of guilty there was a
miscarriage of justice which cannot be righted and which leaves the Court no choice bat to affirm the
dismissal of the second Information for reasons of double jeopardy. 2

We cannot but express Our strong disapproval of the precipitate action taken by Judge Alon in
dismissing the criminal case against the private respondents at that stage of the trial. A thorough and
searching study of the law, the allegations in the Information, and the evidence adduced plus a more
circumspect and reflective exercise of judgment, would have prevented a failure of justice in the
instant case. We exhort Judge Alon to take into serious consideration what We have stated so as to
avoid another miscarriage of justice.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We are constrained to DISMISS this Petition of the People. Without
pronouncement as to costs. Let copy of this Decision be entered in the personal file of Judge
Reynaldo Alon.

So Ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-41863 April 22, 1977

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and ASST. PROV'L FISCAL F. VISITACION, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch
II, and MARGARITO FAMA, JR., respondents.

Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and
Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for petitioners.

Fama & Jimenea for private respondent.

BARREDO, J:

Petition for certiorari; to set aside the orders of respondent judge dated September 22, 1975 and
October 14, 1975 dismissing Criminal Case No. 5241 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against
private respondent Margarito Fama, Jr., said dismissal being predicated on the ground of double
jeopardy, in view of the dismissal of a previous charge of slight physical injuries against the same
respondent for the same incident by the Municipal Court of Janiuay, Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 3335,
notwithstanding that in the information in the first-mentioned case, it was alleged that the injuries
sustained by the offended party, aside from possibly requiring medical attendance from 6 to 9 days
barring complications", as was alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 3335, had left "a
permanent sear and deform(ed) — the right face of (said offended party) Miguel Viajar."

The first criminal complaint filed against respondent Fama Jr. on April 15, 1975 (Case No. 3335) was
as follows:
 That at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 12, 1975, at Aquino Nobleza St.,
Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court the above-named accused, while armed with a piece of stone,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and use
personal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone,
hitting said Miguel Viajar on the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which
would have required and will require medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9
days barring complication as per medical certificate of the physician hereto attached.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 93-94, Record)

Arraigned on July 7, 1975, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.

Meanwhile, on June 8, 1975, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal of
Iloilo charging Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and herein respondent Margarito Fama, Jr. with
serious physical injuries arising from the same incident alleged in above Criminal Case No. 3335.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, under date of July 28, 1975, the Fiscal filed in the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo an information, but only against respondent Fama Jr., (Case No. 5241) for
serious physical injuries as follows:

That on or about April 12, 1975, in the Municipality of January, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent, and without any justifiable motive, armed with pieces of stone did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and throw pieces of stone at
Miguel Viajar, hitting him on the lower right eye which would heal from five (5) to nine
(9) days barring complications but leaving a permanent scar and deforming on the
right face of said Miguel Viajar.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Pp. 94-95, Record)

On August 1, 1975, Fama Jr. filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5241,
claiming that since he was already charged and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 3335, he
would be in double jeopardy, if Case No. 5241 were to be prosecuted. This motion was opposed by
the Fiscal and the Court required both parties to file their respective memorandum on the issue of
double jeopardy.

In the meantime, the Fiscal after filing Case No. 5241, sought the dismissal of Case No. 3335, but
the Municipal Court did not act on said motion. Instead, the case was set for hearing, and in view of
the postponements asked by the Fiscal in order to await the resolution of the issue of double
jeopardy in Case No. 5241, on September 11, 1975, the following order was entered:

Under our democratic and constituted system of government litigants before our
courts of justice, plaintiffs and defendants, complainants and accused are entitled to
the equal protection of our laws. More is an accused, the trial of his case has been
repeatedly postponed for several times by this Court in the exercise of its sound
discretion at the instance of the prosecution. So, when this case was called for
hearing on the afternoon of September 1, 1975 the accused through counsel
vigorously objected to another postponement and moved for the dismissal of the
case against him. To grant another postponement as sought by the Fiscal against
the vehement, strong and vigorous objection of the accused is to the mind of the
Court, no longer an exercise of sound discretion consistent with justice and fairness
but a clear and palpable abuse of discretion amounting to a serious denial to, and a
 grave violation of, the right of the accused to a speedy trial to which he is rightfully
entitled to under Section 16 of Article IV, (Bill of Rights) of the Philippine Constitution.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered

dismissed. The Cash Bond posted by the accused is hereby ordered cancelled and
released (Pp. 96-97, Record.)

Whereupon, on even date, Fama Jr. filed an addendum to his memorandum in Case No. 5241
inviting attention to the above dismissal order and reiterating his theory of double jeopardy. On
September 22, 1975, respondent court issued the impugned order sustaining the contention of
double jeopardy and dismissing Case No. 5241. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was
denied in the other assailed order of October 14, 1975, respondent judge relying on the ruling laid
down in Peo. vs. Silva, 4 SCRA 95.

In brief, what happened here was that when Case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court of January,
the charge against Fama Jr. had to be for slight physical injuries only, because according to the
certification of the attending physician, the injuries suffered by the offended party Viajar, would
require medical attendance from 5 to 9 days only "baring complications." Indeed, when the complaint
was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries were
sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be
suffered by said offended party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already been
filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity became
apparent.

Now, expert evidence is not needed for anyone to understand that the scar or deformity that would
be left by a wound on the face of a person cannot be pre-determined. On the other hand, whether or
not there is actually a deformity on the face of Viajar is a question of fact that has to be determined
by the trial court. The only issue We are to resolve here is whether or not the additional allegation of
deformity in the information in Case No. 5241 constitutes a supervening element which should take
this case out of the ruling in People vs. Silva cited by respondent court.

In Silva, there was no question that the extent of the damage to property and physical injuries
suffered by the offended parties therein were already existing and known when the prior minor case
was prosecuted, What is controlling then in the instant case is Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766, in
which it was held:

This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in
existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case
there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for
an offense that was then inexistent Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of homicide against
the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

So also is People vs. Yorac, 42 SCRA, 230, to the following effect:

Stated differently, if after the first. prosecution 'a new fact supervenes on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and
giving rise to a new and distinct offense, 'the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

In People vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 112, We explained how a deformity may be considered as a
supervening fact. Referring to the decision in People vs. Manolong, 85 Phil. 829, We held:
 No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had caused deformity
and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing was mentioned in the first
medical certificate about the deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we
presumed that such fact was not apparent or could have been discernible at the time
the first examination was made. The course (not the length) of the healing of an
injury may not be determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after the
period of healing has ended. That is the reason why the court considered that there
was a supervening fact occuring since the filing of the original information.

In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private
respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for
respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.

ACCORDINGLY, the orders of September 22, 1975 and October 14, 1975 herein complained of are
hereby set aside and respondent court is ordered to proceed with the trial and judgment thereof
according to law. Costs against private respondent Fama Jr.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 150135             October 30, 2006

SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA, petitioners,

vs.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL TEOXON, ENGR.
LEON PALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN NAVARRO, SR., respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Anyone who has ever struggled with poverty

knows how extremely expensive it is to be poor.
–– James Baldwin

The Constitution affords litigants—moneyed or poor—equal access to the courts; moreover, it

specifically provides that poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the
courts.1 Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and implemented pursuant to
the intent and spirit of this constitutional provision. As such, filing fees, though one of the essential
elements in court procedures, should not be an obstacle to poor litigants' opportunity to seek redress
for their grievances before the courts.

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the annulment of the September 11, 2001 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 27, in Civil Case No. 99-4403 entitled Spouses
Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, et al.,
dismissing the case for failure of petitioners Algura spouses to pay the required filing fees. 2 Since the
instant petition involves only a question of law based on facts established from the pleadings and
documents submitted by the parties,3 the Court gives due course to the instant petition sanctioned
under Section 2(c) of Rule 41 on Appeal from the RTCs, and governed by Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.

The Facts

On September 1, 1999, spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified
Complaint dated August 30, 19994 for damages against the Naga City Government and its officers,
arising from the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house and for payment of
lost income derived from fees paid by their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly.

Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants,5 to which

petitioner Antonio Algura's Pay Slip No. 2457360 (Annex "A" of motion) was appended, showing a
gross monthly income of Ten Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Four Pesos (PhP 10,474.00) and a
net pay of Three Thousand Six Hundred Sixteen Pesos and Ninety Nine Centavos (PhP 3,616.99)
for [the month of] July 1999.6 Also attached as Annex "B" to the motion was a July 14, 1999
Certification7 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, which stated that petitioners had
no property declared in their name for taxation purposes.

Finding that petitioners' motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious, Executive Judge Jose
T. Atienza of the Naga City RTC, in the September 1, 1999 Order, 8 granted petitioners' plea for
exemption from filing fees.

Meanwhile, as a result of respondent Naga City Government's demolition of a portion of petitioners'

house, the Alguras allegedly lost a monthly income of PhP 7,000.00 from their boarders' rentals.
With the loss of the rentals, the meager income from Lorencita Algura's sari-sari store and Antonio
Algura's small take home pay became insufficient for the expenses of the Algura spouses and their
six (6) children for their basic needs including food, bills, clothes, and schooling, among others.

On October 13, 1999, respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim dated October 10,
1999,9 arguing that the defenses of the petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the
spouses' boarding house blocked the road right of way, and said structure was a nuisance per se.

Praying that the counterclaim of defendants (respondents) be dismissed, petitioners then filed their
Reply with Ex-Parte Request for a Pre-Trial Setting10 before the Naga City RTC on October 19,
1999. On February 3, 2000, a pre-trial was held wherein respondents asked for five (5) days within
which to file a Motion to Disqualify Petitioners as Indigent Litigants.

On March 13, 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing
Fees dated March 10, 2000.11 They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00 net
income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of the Philippine National Police, spouse
Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence
along Bayawas St., Sta. Cruz, Naga City. Also, respondents claimed that petitioners' second floor
was used as their residence and as a boarding house, from which they earned more than PhP
3,000.00 a month. In addition, it was claimed that petitioners derived additional income from their
computer shop patronized by students and from several boarders who paid rentals to them. Hence,
respondents concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants.

On March 28, 2000, petitioners subsequently interposed their Opposition to the Motion 12 to
respondents' motion to disqualify them for non-payment of filing fees.
On April 14, 2000, the Naga City RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants
on the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees
and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Court—
directing them to pay the requisite filing fees.13

On April 28, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000 Order. On May
8, 2000, respondents then filed their Comment/Objections to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

On May 5, 2000, the trial court issued an Order14 giving petitioners the opportunity to comply with the
requisites laid down in Section 18, Rule 141, for them to qualify as indigent litigants.

On May 13, 2000, petitioners submitted their Compliance 15 attaching the affidavits of petitioner
Lorencita Algura16 and Erlinda Bangate,17 to comply with the requirements of then Rule 141, Section
18 of the Rules of Court and in support of their claim to be declared as indigent litigants.

In her May 13, 2000 Affidavit, petitioner Lorencita Algura claimed that the demolition of their small
dwelling deprived her of a monthly income amounting to PhP 7,000.00. She, her husband, and their
six (6) minor children had to rely mainly on her husband's salary as a policeman which provided
them a monthly amount of PhP 3,500.00, more or less. Also, they did not own any real property as
certified by the assessor's office of Naga City. More so, according to her, the meager net income
from her small sari-sari store and the rentals of some boarders, plus the salary of her husband, were
not enough to pay the family's basic necessities.

To buttress their position as qualified indigent litigants, petitioners also submitted the affidavit of
Erlinda Bangate, who attested under oath, that she personally knew spouses Antonio Algura and
Lorencita Algura, who were her neighbors; that they derived substantial income from their boarders;
that they lost said income from their boarders' rentals when the Local Government Unit of the City of
Naga, through its officers, demolished part of their house because from that time, only a few
boarders could be accommodated; that the income from the small store, the boarders, and the
meager salary of Antonio Algura were insufficient for their basic necessities like food and clothing,
considering that the Algura spouses had six (6) children; and that she knew that petitioners did not
own any real property.

Thereafter, Naga City RTC Acting Presiding Judge Andres B. Barsaga, Jr. issued his July 17,
200018 Order denying the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

Judge Barsaga ratiocinated that the pay slip of Antonio F. Algura showed that the "GROSS INCOME
or TOTAL EARNINGS of plaintiff Algura [was] ₧10,474.00 which amount [was] over and above the
amount mentioned in the first paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 for pauper litigants residing outside
Metro Manila."19 Said rule provides that the gross income of the litigant should not exceed PhP
3,000.00 a month and shall not own real estate with an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00. The trial
court found that, in Lorencita S.J. Algura's May 13, 2000 Affidavit, nowhere was it stated that she
and her immediate family did not earn a gross income of PhP 3,000.00.

The Issue

Unconvinced of the said ruling, the Alguras instituted the instant petition raising a solitary issue for
the consideration of the Court: whether petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who
qualify for exemption from paying filing fees.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

A review of the history of the Rules of Court on suits in forma pauperis (pauper litigant) is necessary
before the Court rules on the issue of the Algura spouses' claim to exemption from paying filing fees.

When the Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, the rule on pauper litigants was found in
Rule 3, Section 22 which provided that:

Section 22. Pauper litigant.—Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or
defense as a pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means to that effect by affidavits,
certificate of the corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or otherwise. Such
authority[,] once given[,] shall include an exemption from payment of legal fees and from
filing appeal bond, printed record and printed brief. The legal fees shall be a lien to any
judgment rendered in the case [favorable] to the pauper, unless the court otherwise
provides.

From the same Rules of Court, Rule 141 on Legal Fees, on the other hand, did not contain any
provision on pauper litigants.

On July 19, 1984, the Court, in Administrative Matter No. 83-6-389-0 (formerly G.R. No. 64274),
approved the recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of Rates and Charges of Court
Fees, through its Chairman, then Justice Felix V. Makasiar, to revise the fees in Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court to generate funds to effectively cover administrative costs for services rendered by
the courts.20 A provision on pauper litigants was inserted which reads:

Section 16. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of court fees.—Pauper-litigants include

wage earners whose gross income do not exceed P2,000.00 a month or P24,000.00 a year
for those residing in Metro Manila, and P1,500.00 a month or P18,000.00 a year for those
residing outside Metro Manila, or those who do not own real property with an assessed value
of not more than P24,000.00, or not more than P18,000.00 as the case may be.

Such exemption shall include exemption from payment of fees for filing appeal bond, printed
record and printed brief.

The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment rendered in favor of the
pauper-litigant.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the pauper-litigant shall execute an affidavit
that he does not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor own any real property with the
assessed value afore-mentioned [sic], supported by a certification to that effect by the
provincial, city or town assessor or treasurer.

When the Rules of Court on Civil Procedure were amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
(inclusive of Rules 1 to 71) in Supreme Court Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8, 1997,
which became effective on July 1, 1997, Rule 3, Section 22 of the Revised Rules of Court was
superseded by Rule 3, Section 21 of said 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:

Section 21. Indigent party.—A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that
the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and
basic necessities for himself and his family.
 Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and
of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The
amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying
shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the
court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is
rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared
as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and
other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not
made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof,
without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

At the time the Rules on Civil Procedure were amended by the Court in Bar Matter No. 803,
however, there was no amendment made on Rule 141, Section 16 on pauper litigants.

On March 1, 2000, Rule 141 on Legal Fees was amended by the Court in A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC,
whereby certain fees were increased or adjusted. In this Resolution, the Court amended Section 16
of Rule 141, making it Section 18, which now reads:

Section 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.—Pauper litigants (a) whose
gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed four thousand (P4,000.00)
pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if
residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own real property with an assessed value
of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal
fees.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the pauper
litigant, unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he
and his immediate family do not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor do they own
any real property with the assessed value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a
disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to
strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have
been incurred.

It can be readily seen that the rule on pauper litigants was inserted in Rule 141 without revoking or
amending Section 21 of Rule 3, which provides for the exemption of pauper litigants from payment
of filing fees. Thus, on March 1, 2000, there were two existing rules on pauper litigants;
namely, Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 18.

On August 16, 2004, Section 18 of Rule 141 was further amended in Administrative Matter No. 04-2-
04-SC, which became effective on the same date. It then became Section 19 of Rule 141, to wit:

Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.– INDIGENT LITIGANTS
(A) WHOSE GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT
EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE OF AN
EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH A FAIR MARKET
 VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT OF
LEGAL FEES.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent
litigant unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit
that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and
they do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an
affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit. The
current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant's affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to
dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to
whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. (Emphasis supplied.)

Amendments to Rule 141 (including the amendment to Rule 141, Section 18) were made to
implement RA 9227 which brought about new increases in filing fees. Specifically, in the August 16,
2004 amendment, the ceiling for the gross income of litigants applying for exemption and that of their
immediate family was increased from PhP 4,000.00 a month in Metro Manila and PhP 3,000.00 a
month outside Metro Manila, to double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the
maximum value of the property owned by the applicant was increased from an assessed value of
PhP 50,000.00 to a maximum market value of PhP 300,000.00, to be able to accommodate more
indigent litigants and promote easier access to justice by the poor and the marginalized in the wake
of these new increases in filing fees.

Even if there was an amendment to Rule 141 on August 16, 2004, there was still no amendment or
recall of Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigants.

With this historical backdrop, let us now move on to the sole issue—whether petitioners are exempt
from the payment of filing fees.

It is undisputed that the Complaint (Civil Case No. 99-4403) was filed on September 1, 1999.
However, the Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and July 17, 2000 Orders, incorrectly applied
Rule 141, Section 18 on Legal Fees when the applicable rules at that time were Rule 3, Section
21 on Indigent Party which took effect on July 1, 1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper
Litigants which became effective on July 19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000.

The old Section 16, Rule 141 requires applicants to file an ex-parte motion to litigate as a pauper
litigant by submitting an affidavit that they do not have a gross income of PhP 2,000.00 a month or
PhP 24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro Manila and PhP 1,500.00 a month or PhP
18,000.00 a year for those residing outside Metro Manila or those who do not own real property with
an assessed value of not more than PhP 24,000.00 or not more than PhP 18,000.00 as the case
may be. Thus, there are two requirements: a) income requirement—the applicants should not have a
gross monthly income of more than PhP 1,500.00, and b) property requirement––they should not
own property with an assessed value of not more than PhP 18,000.00.

In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura and
neighbor Erlinda Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner Antonio F. Algura showing a gross monthly
income of PhP 10,474.00,21 and a Certification of the Naga City assessor stating that petitioners do
not have property declared in their names for taxation. 22 Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real
property as shown by the Certification of the Naga City assessor and so the property requirement is
met. However with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of
PhP 10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura
when combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule
141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement was not satisfied. The trial court was
therefore correct in disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants although the court should
have applied Rule 141, Section 16 which was in effect at the time of the filing of the application on
September 1, 1999. Even if Rule 141, Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141, Section 16 on March
1, 2000) were applied, still the application could not have been granted as the combined PhP
13,474.00 income of petitioners was beyond the PhP 3,000.00 monthly income threshold.

Unrelenting, petitioners however argue in their Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000
Order disqualifying them as indigent litigants 23 that the rules have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3,
Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure which authorizes parties to litigate their action as
indigents if the court is satisfied that the party is "one who has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family." The trial court did not
give credence to this view of petitioners and simply applied Rule 141 but ignored Rule 3, Section 21
on Indigent Party.

The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate as
indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to apply both Rule 141,
Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such applications or should the court apply only Rule 141,
Section 16 and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded by Rule 141, Section 16 on
Legal Fees.

The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141,
Section 18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16,
2003, which is now the present rule) are still valid and enforceable rules on indigent litigants.

For one, the history of the two seemingly conflicting rules readily reveals that it was not the intent of
the Court to consider the old Section 22 of Rule 3, which took effect on January 1, 1994 to have
been amended and superseded by Rule 141, Section 16, which took effect on July 19, 1984 through
A.M. No. 83-6-389-0. If that is the case, then the Supreme Court, upon the recommendation of the
Committee on the Revision on Rules, could have already deleted Section 22 from Rule 3 when it
amended Rules 1 to 71 and approved the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1,
1997. The fact that Section 22 which became Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigant was retained in
the rules of procedure, even elaborating on the meaning of an indigent party, and was also
strengthened by the addition of a third paragraph on the right to contest the grant of authority to
litigate only goes to show that there was no intent at all to consider said rule as expunged from the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent litigants was amended twice: first on March 1, 2000 and the
second on August 16, 2004; and yet, despite these two amendments, there was no attempt to delete
Section 21 from said Rule 3. This clearly evinces the desire of the Court to maintain the two (2) rules
on indigent litigants to cover applications to litigate as an indigent litigant.

It may be argued that Rule 3, Section 21 has been impliedly repealed by the recent 2000 and 2004
amendments to Rule 141 on legal fees. This position is bereft of merit. Implied repeals are frowned
upon unless the intent of the framers of the rules is unequivocal. It has been consistently ruled that:

(r)epeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that the
legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full
 knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing
a statute[,] it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to same
matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully
embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond
peradventure removed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if,
by any reasonable construction they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a
repeal of the earlier.24 (Emphasis supplied).

Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly amended by Section
18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can and should be
harmonized.

The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled
principle that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize
them. Hence, "every statute [or rule] must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes [or
rules] as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence." 25

In Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enunciated that in the interpretation of
seemingly conflicting laws, efforts must be made to first harmonize them. This Court thus ruled:

Consequently, every statute should be construed in such a way that will harmonize it with
existing laws. This principle is expressed in the legal maxim 'interpretare et concordare leges
legibus est optimus interpretandi,' that is, to interpret and to do it in such a way as to
harmonize laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. 26

In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together and are
compatible with each other. When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court
shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if
the applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19
of Rule 141—that is, the applicant's gross income and that of the applicant's immediate family do not
exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not
own real property with a fair market value of more than Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP
300,000.00). If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements,
the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.

However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a
hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has "no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family." In that hearing, the
adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the
applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced.
In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant
of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly
discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after
hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property,
the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If
payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of
prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule 3, Section 21
does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption. Knowing that the litigants may
abuse the grant of authority, the trial court must use sound discretion and scrutinize evidence strictly
in granting exemptions, aware that the applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under Rule
141. The trial court must also guard against abuse and misuse of the privilege to litigate as an
indigent litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which would otherwise be regulated by a
legal fee requirement.

Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after
their affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin
requirements on gross monthly income and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of
disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing as required
by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that they didn't have
property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and
their family.27 In that hearing, the respondents would have had the right to also present evidence to
refute the allegations and evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to litigate as
indigent litigants. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial
court to determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards
set in Rule 3, Section 21.

Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the
salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is
mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then
the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the "indigency test"
under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for
exemption.

Access to justice by the impoverished is held sacrosanct under Article III, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. The Action Program for Judicial Reforms (APJR) itself, initiated by former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., placed prime importance on 'easy access to justice by the poor' as one of its
six major components. Likewise, the judicial philosophy of Liberty and Prosperity of Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban makes it imperative that the courts shall not only safeguard but also enhance
the rights of individuals—which are considered sacred under the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt,
one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to
the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged, and the marginalized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the April 14, 2000 Order granting the disqualification
of petitioners, the July 17, 2000 Order denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, and the
September 11, 2001 Order dismissing the case in Civil Case No. RTC-99-4403 before the Naga City
RTC, Branch 27 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the Naga City RTC is ordered to
set the "Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants" for hearing and apply Rule 3, Section 21 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether petitioners can qualify as indigent litigants.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.