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OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs or Judge Jurado, that the respondents were absent or

MALLARE, et.al. were not in their posts on several occasions.


A.M. No. P-01-1521 November 11, 2003
Justice Callejo, Sr. However, we agree that the respondents are guilty of
misconduct. The fact that their presiding judge was
FACTS: out of the country and there were no scheduled
On October 19, 2000, the Supreme Court Committee on hearings at that time is no excuse for them to absent
the Halls of Justice with Assistant Court Administrator from duty. It bears stressing that judicial officials and
Antonio H. Dujua, conducted an ocular inspection to employees must devote their official time to government
different Regional Trial Courts in Malolos, Bulacan. In service. They must exercise at all times a high degree of
Branch 76 of the RTC, the presiding judge, Judge professionalism and responsibility which includes
Jurado, was on leave. When the committee inquired optimum performance of duties even in the absence of
upon said RTC Branch, several court personnel reported the presiding judge.
for work, but were not present at their work posts.

The Assistant Court Administrator reported such finding


to then Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, who
required said court personnel to file their respective
comments.

The Supreme Court issued a resolution, referring the


matter to the Executive Judge of RTC, Malolos for
investigation, report and recommendation. Judge Oscar
Herrera, Jr. said in his recommendations that Mallare,
Buencamino, Galvez and Bartolome be severly
reprimanded; and that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty.
Barranta to be admonished for negligence and failure to
maintain discipline among his subordinates.

The OCA agreed in part with the findings of Judge


Herrera; however, the OCA believed that the court
employees were guilty not only of misconduct, but
of "loafing," which is considered a grave offense and
a clear violation of Administrative Code of 1987.
Thus, the OCA recommended for their suspension
without pay for loafing during regular office hours.

ISSUE:
WON the said court employees can be said to have
committed “loafing” as defined under the Administrative
Code?

HELD:
The Court agreed with the recommended sanction made
by Judge Herrera, but found that the recommendation for
“loafing” to be quite harsh.

The CSC rules define "loafing" as "frequent


unauthorized absences from duty during office
hours." The word "frequent" connotes that the
employees absent themselves from duty more than
once. Apparently, this case was the first time that a
random check was conducted by the members of the SC
Committee on HOJ, and was likewise the first time that
the respondents were caught outside their respective
posts during office hours. There is no evidence on record
that the respondents had been absent from duty on prior
occasions.

The Investigating Judge did not find them to be absent


on other occasions during office hours as well. Nor were
there any complaints from their superiors, Atty. Barranta
DANILO RIMONTE vs CSC, OMBUDSMAN, and engage in a review of facts found or even of law as
HENRIETTA ROQUE interpreted by the agency concerned unless the
G.R. No. 112045 29 May 1995 supposed errors of fact or law are so serious and
Justice Bellosillo prejudicial as to amount to a grave abuse of
discretion. Moreover, erroneous findings and
FACTS: conclusions do not render the respondent Commission
Petitioner Danilo Rimonte assails the appointment of vulnerable to the corrective writ of certiorari, for where
respondent Henrietta Roque as Records Officer V of the Commission has jurisdiction over the case, even if its
Central Records of the Office of the Ombudsman. findings are not correct, they would at most constitute
errors of law and not an abuse of discretion correctible
Petitioner Rimonte was then the incumbent Planning by certiorari.
Officer III in the Office of the Ombudsman. He then
applied for any of the position of Records Officer V or Respondent Civil Service Commission found from the
Administrative Officer V. However, petitioner Rimonte records that respondent Roque possessed the minimum
was appointed to the position of Associate Graft qualifications required for the position of Records Officer
Investigation Officer III while respondent Henrietta F. V to which she was appointed. She graduated with a
Roque was appointed Records Officer V or Chief of the degree of Bachelor of Business Administration. She has
Central Records Division. the General Clerical, Stenographer and Career Service
Professional eligibilities. Her work experience also
Rimonte filed an appeal and protest against the shows she is qualified for the position.
appointment of Roque. Ombudsman Vasquez denied the
appeal, stating that as appointing authority, he has Since there is no doubt that Roque possesses the
ample discretion to appoint any person who possesses minimum qualifications for the position, respondent Civil
at least the minimum qualifications; and that Rimonte Service Commission acted well within its discretion in the
failed to show that Roque is not qualified to hold such exercise of its jurisdiction in attesting to the appointment
position. of Roque. As long as the appointee is qualified the
Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest
Rimonte then filed an appeal before the Civil Service to and respect the appointment even if it be proved
Commission. CSC dismissed the appeal, on the ground that there are others with superior credentials. The
that an appointment is essentially discretionary on the law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or
part of the appointing authority provided the appointee is not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and
qualified. The Commission also found that petitioner did the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. If
not dispute the qualification of respondent Roque to the they do then the appointments are approved because
contested position. the Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting
its will for that of the appointing authority.
Upon denial of Rimonte’s MR, he filed the petition before
the Court.

ISSUE:
WON the CSC erred when it affirmed the appointment of
Roque.

HELD: Petition is DISMISSED.

Petitioner contends that there were flagrant violations of


the reorganization law and rules attendant to the
appointment of respondent Roque; and that he is more
qualified than Roque in terms of performance which is
one of the criteria provided by the reorganization law,
and that while the appointing authority has discretion in
the appointment of its personnel such discretion is not
absolute but must yield to the intent and criteria laid
down by law.

The Court did not sustain Rimonte’s arguments.

The Civil Service Commission is the single arbiter of all


contests relating to civil service; as such its judgments
are unappealable and subject only to the certiorari
jurisdiction of this Court, at least until 1 June 1995
when Rev. Adm. Circ. No. 1-95, amending Rev. Circ. No.
1-91, shall take effect. In view thereof this Court cannot
involving public officers or employees is concurrent with
GREGORIO HONASAN vs DOJ PANEL OF other government investigating agencies such as
INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS and OMBUDSMAN provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the
G.R. No. 159747 April 13 2004 Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
Justice Austria-Martinez over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take
over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.
FACTS:
CIDG-PNP Director Eduardo Matillano filed an affidavit-
complaint with the Department of Justice stating that
Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan and a number of
military occupying Oakwood, committed the crime of
coup d’etat. Petitioner Honasan appeared at the DOJ,
questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting
that since the imputed acts were committed in relation to
his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not
the DOJ.

The DOJ Panel issued an Order, stating that the motion


filed by Honasan shall be passed upon the resolution of
the case.

Thus, Honasan filed this present petition for certiorari


under Rule 65, attributing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted
Order on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to
conduct the preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
WON the preliminary investigation for the present case
should be under the jurisdiction of Ombudsman and not
of the DOJ Panel.

HELD: Petition is without merit.

Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution


does not exclude other government agencies tasked by
law to investigate and prosecute cases involving public
officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, they would have expressly declared the
exclusive conferment of the power to the Ombudsman.

That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate


offenses involving public officers or employees is not
exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government such as the provincial, city
and state prosecutors has long been settled in several
decisions of the Court. In Cojuangco, Jr. vs PCGG, the
Court said that the authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the government, with the
only qualification that the Ombudsman may take over at
any stage of such investigation in the exercise of his
primary jurisdiction.

In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the


Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
offenses committed by public officers or employees. The
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses

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