(CRIMREV) March 15

MARCH 15
DEADLINE: MARCH 14
# Case Title & G.R. No. SURNAME
TOPIC:
DOCTRINE:
CHARGE/INFORMATION:
FACTS:
Note:
1. If material sa case, be specific with the dates
2. Show the transition of the case (from commission to ruling)
MTC/RTC DECISION:
CA DECISION:
ISSUE:
SC RULING: (State if Acquitted or Convicted)
(State if the ruling affirmed/modified/reversed the RTC/CA Decision)
(Body of the Ruling relevant to the discussion)
Art. 247
1. People vs. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735 (SOMERA)
Art. 252, 256-258 and 263-266, RPC

2. Ruego vs. People, G.R. No. 226745, 03 May 2021 (CAMUNGAO)
Arts. 267-270; 124; 125, 145, 342, and 343, RPC

3. Duropan vs. People, G.R. No. 230825, 10 June 2020 (PARALEJAS) [DELA PAZ]
4. Osorio vs. Navera, G.R. No. 223272, 26 Feb. 2018 (AGUINALDO)
5. People vs. Damayo, G.R. No. 232361, 26 Sept. 2018 (DELA CRUZ)
6. People vs. Avanceña, 826 SCRA 414 (PAQUINTO)
7. People vs. Trestiza, 660 SCRA 407 (SOMERA)
8. People vs. Santiano, 299 SCRA 583 (GONZALES)
9. People vs. Roxas, 629 SCRA 745 (MAGCAMIT)
10. Cayao vs. del Mundo, 226 SCRA 492 (MANSILLA)
Art. 282-287, 298, and 312 RPC

11. Garma vs. People, G.R. No. 248317, 16 March 2022 (ERIPOL)
12. Barbasa vs. Tuquero, 575 SCRA 102 (TEÑIDO)
13. People vs. Villamar, 298 SCRA 398 (CAMUNGAO)
14. Timoner vs. People, 125 SCRA 830 (AGUINALDO)
15. Ong Chiu Kwan vs. CA, 345 SCRA 586 (DELA CRUZ)
16. Baleros vs. People, 483 SCRA 10 (GREFAL)
17. People vs. Alfeche, 211 SCRA 770 (PAQUINTO)
1 People v. Abarca Somera
TOPIC: Art. 247 - Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances
DOCTRINE: Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2)
that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.
The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . .
. immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should
commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate
result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest
act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse,
and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product
of the accused's rage. (HERE, 1 HOUR INTERVAL)
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Murder with Double Frustrated Murder
FACTS: Khingsley Koh and Jenny (wife of accused Abarca) had an illicit relationship, which
began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was
left behind in their residence in Tacloban, Leyte.
Sometime in 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning of that
date he went to the bus station to go to Eastern Samar to fetch his daughter. However, he was
not able to catch the first trip (morning). He went back to the station to take the 2 p.m. trip but
the bus had engine trouble and could not leave. The accused then proceeded to the residence
of his father and after which, he went home.
He arrived at his residence at around 6 p.m. The accused found his wife and Koh in the act of
sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour
who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their
room jumped and ran away.
The accused went to look for a firearm. He went to the house of a PC soldier, C2C Talbo,
arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his
house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session"
as it was the "hangout" of Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Koh three
times with his rifle. Koh was hit.
The Amparado spouses who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was
playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Koh died instantaneously of
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds
on the head, trunk and abdomen. Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the
kidney to remove a bullet; his wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was
hit by bullet fragments.
MTC/RTC DECISION: Guilty of complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder
CA DECISION: -
ISSUES:
1. WON Art. 247 of the RPC applies. (YES)
2. WON the accused-appellant is liable for the physical injuries suffered by Amparado
spouses. (YES, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence)
SC RULING:
1. Article 247 reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person who,
having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or
both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the
penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under
eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to
the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this
case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit
of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.
These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of
murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the
accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time
the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the
pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the
accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in
the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only
requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing
should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been
influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247 does not define an offense. In People v. Araque,
we said:
The above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or
benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to a legally
married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death or
serious physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and his righteous indignation,
the accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide,
murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only with destierro. This
penalty is mere banishment and is intended more for the protection of the accused than a
punishment. And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is
exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances
mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious
physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all.
A different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the
exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral
elements of the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally,
admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a
mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the crime
charged. Only "acts or omissons . . . constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint
or information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused
therefrom, not being an essential element of the offense charged-but a matter of defense that
must be proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded.
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide
for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or
the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances therein mentioned.
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is
intended for his protection.
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a
punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
2. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a
rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule
presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony.
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing
murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder
for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility.
Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he
cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he
uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") that is not enough a precaution to absolve
him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part.
Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is,
less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence.
Physical injuries
2 Ruego vs. People, G.R. No. 226745, 03 May 202 CAMUNGAO
TOPIC: ARTICLE 263. Serious Physical Injuries
DOCTRINE: Serious physical injuries contemplate physical deformity or the loss of a body part
resulting in the alteration of one's physical appearance. The loss of a tooth, may, in most cases,
be later repaired or replaced with an artificial tooth by a competent dentist. Thus, for the loss of
a tooth to be considered within the scope of serious physical injuries, the circumstances
surrounding its loss and whether it caused a physical deformity or permanent alteration of one's
physical appearance must be examined on a case-to-case basis.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Serious physical injuries
FACTS: On September 5, 2005, June Alfred Altura (Altura), Anthony M. Calubiran (Calubiran),
Raden Selguerra (Selguerra), and Selguerra's father were waiting for a jeepney along Paho
Road, Barangay South Fundidor, Molo, Iloilo City when Ruego's group passed by. Ruego said
to Calubiran, "[guina] kursunadahan mo kami?" (You took interest in us?) and suddenly
punched him.
Altura introduced himself as a Sangguniang Kabataan Chair and tried to stop the altercation by
blocking Ruego. Ruego, however, ignored him and faced off against Calubiran. Altura then
asked a passing pedicab driver to call some barangay officials for assistance.
Thereafter, Police Officer 1 Ritchie Altura (PO1 Altura) and Barangay Kagawad Jonathan Altura
(Barangay Kagawad Altura) arrived on a motorcycle and tried to talk to Ruego. In response,
Ruego pushed their motorcycle away.
Calubiran and Barangay Kagawad Altura then reported the incident to the Philippine National
Police of Molo, Iloilo City, per police blotter dated September 5, 2005. When the police arrived
at the place of the incident, Ruego's group was already gone.
Per medical examination of Dr. Owen Jaen Libaquin (Dr. Libaquin), the medico-legal officer of
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Iloilo City, Calubiran sustained injuries in the
head region and a fractured upper right central incisor, causing permanent deformity. Calubiran
presented his fractured tooth in trial but it had "already been repaired by means of a modern
dental technological procedure that has not been revealed in the evidence."
In his defense, Ruego presented himself and his friend Leomar Tondo, otherwise known as
"Ok-Ok," as witnesses. They testified that on September 5, 2009, at around 10:30 p.m., Ruego
accompanied Ok-Ok in sending their friend Norberto Ong's son home. On the way to the
jeepney waiting area, he observed Calubiran staring at him. He asked, "[a]no tulok mo?" (What
are you looking/staring at?) when Calubiran suddenly punched him. Ruego alleged that
Calubiran was drunk so he was unable to land the first punch. Ruego then punched him back
and hit him. They were, however, pacified by Altura and Ok-Ok.
MTC/RTC DECISION: MTC: Found Ruego guilty of serious physical injuries under Article 263
of the Revised Penal Code.
RTC: Affirmed the conviction
CA DECISION: Affirming the conviction. It found that there was no clear evidence that
Calubiran instigated the fight and that it was Ruego who started the fight when he told
Calubiran, "ano tulok mo?"
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming petitioner's conviction for serious physical injuries
under Article 263 of the RPC, for causing respondent Calubiran's fractured front tooth.
SC RULING: GUILTY of slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code.
Article 263 (3) of the Revised Penal Code makes it unlawful for any person to wound, beat, or
assault another in a manner that would cause the person injured to suffer a deformity or lose
any other part of his body.
ARTICLE 263. Serious Physical Injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or
assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in

consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have
become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost
the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the
work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days.
Under this provision, the prosecution must prove the following elements:first, that the
perpetrator wounds, beats, or assaults another; and second, that the person injured shall have
gone through any of the following circumstances: (1) become deformed; (2) lost any other part
of their body; (3) lost that body part's use; or (4) been ill or incapacitated for the work
performance in which they were habitually engaged for a period of more than 90 days.
In determining whether or not the loss of a tooth could be considered a serious physical injury
under Article 263, there must first be a factual determination during trial that the loss of the tooth
resulted in a visible deformity. Where deformity is not apparent at trial, whether as a result of a
lesser injurious act or through medical intervention, a lesser penalty should be imposed.
Deformity or the loss of any other part of the body under Article 263 (3), therefore, should be
properly interpreted to mean the loss of an eye, an ear, or any of the limbs — all of which would
visibly alter one's physical appearance and body functions.
The loss of an eye results in blindness that artificial eyes cannot restore. The loss of an ear will
alter one's head shape and may result in deafness. Persons with artificial limbs will have
different postures and gaits. Osseointegration, or "a direct structural and functional connection
between ordered living bone and the surface of a load-carrying implant," has been used for
prosthetic limbs by integrating "titanium implants into the medullary cavity of the bone [where]
the implants extend from the bone, emerging through the skin to create an anchor for the
prosthetic limb." 62 This process can lead to infection and metal corrosion.
Moreover, modern prosthetics also involve the connection of a socket to the residual limb, which
can sometimes lead to instability, tissue damage, and pain. The socket's structural design must
take into account "ratio of muscle, the movement of the femur, and movement of the residual
limb, all of which would affect gait and other gross functional movements."
In contrast, artificial teeth are so common that they are known to the general public by its
colloquial term:pustiso (dentures). In some cases, they are even used to beautify one's
appearance. As far back as 1934, it has already been observed that the loss of a tooth is not a
serious affair, considering "the ease with which an injury of this nature could be remedied by
any reputable dentist."
It is conceded that there may be cases where the loss of teeth would cause a physical deformity
that can no longer be remedied by science. In those instances, it should be the duty of courts to
impose the proper, and graver, penalties required by the law. Trial courts should consider all the
factual circumstances surrounding the injury and the resulting consequences. They should not
equate, for example, the loss of a fingernail with the loss of a hand.
Thus, it is inequitable for this Court to arbitrarily apply theBalubar doctrine in all cases where a
tooth has been chipped or fractured and then later medically repaired in a manner where no
visible deformity could be seen. Article 263 itself provides for a gradation of penalties according
to the factual circumstances surrounding the injury, from the extent of the injury to the
consequences suffered by the offended party. There is no reason for this Court to stubbornly
declare that the loss of a tooth is immediately classified as a serious physical injury, without
taking into account all the circumstances that may affect the nature and consequences of the
injury.
In this case, Dr. Owen Jaen Lebaquin opined that respondent Calubiran's tooth fracture had
caused a permanent deformity and that the tooth had to be extracted. Respondent Calubiran
was asked to show to the trial court his tooth, to which the trial court noted that it was already
an artificial tooth. More accurately, the trial court observed that his tooth had "already [been]
repaired by means of a modern dental technological procedure that has not been revealed in
the evidence[.]" In other words, respondent Calubiran's face had no visible disfigurement that
would warrant petitioner's conviction of serious physical injuries under Article 263 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Thus, the CA decision is MODIFIED. Petitioner Elpedio Ruego is found GUILTY of slight
physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
3 Duropan vs. People, G.R. No. 230825 DELA PAZ
TOPIC: Arts. 267-270; 124; 125, 145, 342, and 343, RPC
DOCTRINE:
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Unlawful arrest
On or about the evening of March 7, 2009, in Barangay Lincod, Municipality of Maribojoc,

Province of Bohol, Pacasio Duropan and Raymond Nixer Coloma, conspiring and
confederating, and mutually helping each other, arrest a certain William Pacis without
reasonable ground, for the purpose of delivering him to the proper authority.
Acts committed contrary to the provision of Art. 269, RPC
FACTS: Duropan and Coloma were Barangay Kagawad and Barangay Tanod, respectively, of
Lincod, Maribojoc, Bohol.
The Abatan Lincod Mangroves Nipa Growers Organization (ALIMANGO) is a cooperative duly
registered with the Cooperative Development authority. It was authorized to develop, utilize, and
protect the Mangrove-Nipa Area in Maribojoc. Its members cut, gather, and weave nipa palms.
March 7, 2009 at 11:30AM: Duropan, Coloma, and another barangay official saw Pacis,
Baldoza, Moquila, Magbanua, and Zambra harvesting nipa palm in a plantation. Coloma
approached them and asked who gave them authority to harvest. Pacis replied that they were
ALIMANGO members.
Doubting Pacis, Duropan and Coloma pushed Pacis and his companions on board 2 paddle
boats. Pacis protested and inquired whether Duropan and Coloma can arrest them without a
warrant, but to no avail, the group was brought to the Police Station of Maribojoc.
Upon investigation, Pacis and his companions were released. The Maribojoc Chief of Police
determined that the barangay officials had no legal basis to arrest Pacis.
In their affidavits, Duropan and Coloma claimed that:

1. The arrest was pursuant to Barangay Resolution No. 2, which was enacted the day
prior to the incident. It ordered the barangay officials to conduct “surveillance on the
mangrove/nipa area due to several complaints of illegal cutting of mangroves and
nipa leaves.
2. That Duropa and Coloma believed that Pacis was committing theft because he
knew that the nipa plantation belonged to Calvin Cabalit. Futher, Pacis as a member
of “ALIMGANO Association” was doubtful as the latter is an organization, not an
association While questioning the group, Pacis allegedly lost his temper and
punched Duropan’s shoulder. In light of his violent outburst, they brought him to the
police station.
In their Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC
Petitioners posit that not all the elements of the crime were present. They argue that
complainant Pacis was not arrested, but was merely invited to the police station. They contend
that it was their duty to investigate whether he was authorized to harvest the nipa leaves. They
argue that they had reasons to doubt his claim, considering that he referred to ALIMANGO
Organization as "ALIMANGO Association." Moreover, they believed in good faith that the land
he was harvesting from belonged to Cabalit.
Respondent argument: Petitioners’ guilt was sufficiently proved. Despite reports of rampant
illegal cutting of mangrove and nipa, petitioners ought to be diligent in verifying reports rather
than surreptitiously arresting a private person.
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Unlawful
Arrest. (Art. 269)
It found that all the essential elements of the crime were present and noted that both accused
admitted to knowing Pacis prior to the arrest. It reasoned that instead of immediately arresting
them, Duropan and Coloma should have given them time to prove their claim. It noted that this
is relevant since the accused themselves had no proof that a certain Calvin Cabanlit owns the
area where Pacis and his group cut nipas.
RTC DECISION: Affirmed the MCTC (modified the imposed penalty).
CA DECISION: Affirmed the RTC decision
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners Duropan and Coloma arrested William Pacis. (YES)
2. Whether or not there was reasonable ground to arrest Pacis, which warrants petitioners’
acquittal from the charge of unlawful arrest. (NONE)
SC RULING: DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF CA ARE AFFIRMED
THE SC AFFIRMED THE PETITIONERS’ CONVICTION
The MCTC charged and convicted petitioners with the crime of unlawful arrest penalized under
Art. 269 of the RPC.
ISSUE #1: However petitioners opt to call it, it was evident that Pacis was taken into the
barangay officials’ custody based on their belief that he committed a crime, either
because he was allegedly committing theft, or because he became violent. Their intent to
arrest Pacis was clearly established.
The crime of unlawful arrest punishes an offender's act of arresting or detaining another to
deliver him or her to the proper authorities, when the arrest or detention is not authorized, or
that there is no reasonable ground to arrest or detain the other. Any person may be indicted for
the crime of unlawful arrest.
People vs. Malasugui: A public officer may be exculpated from the crime of unlawful arrest
under specific circumstances:
1. Under the law, members of the Insular Police or Constabulary as well as those of the
municipal police and of chartered cities, and even townships
2. May make arrests without judicial warrant, not only when a crime is committed or about
to be committed in their presence
3. But also when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect that one has
been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested by them.
A public officer who does not have the authority to arrest shall be criminally liable. Even when a
public officer is authorized to arrest, he or she must have a judicial warrant. However, when the
enumerated circumstances exist, the absence of a judicial warrant justified and does not
expose the public officer to criminal liability.
CRIMES IN THE RPC PERTAINING TO THE CURLTAILMENT OF A PERSON’S LIBERTY

Art. 125: Failure to judicially charge within the prescribed period renders the public officer
effecting the arrest liable for the crime of delay in the delivery of detained persons.
Art. 124: If the warrantless arrest was without any legal ground, the arresting officers become
liable for arbitrary detention.
Arts. 267 and 268: If the arresting officers are not among those whose official duty gives them
the authority to arrest, they become liable for illegal detention.
Art. 269: If the arrest is for the purpose of delivering the person arrested to the proper
authorities, but it is done without any reasonable ground or any of the circumstances for a valid
warrantless arrest, the arresting persons become liable for unlawful arrest
ART. 267 & 268

Illegal detention defined under Arts. 267 and 268 penalizes “any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him or her of his or her liberty.
A public officer who has no duty to arrest or detain a person is deemed a private individual, in
contemplation of Articles 267 and 268 of the Revised Penal Code. Even when a public officer
has the legal duty to arrest or detain another, but he or she fails to show legal grounds for
detention, "the public officer is deemed to have acted in a private capacity and is considered a
'private individual."
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL ARREST

To prosecute accused of the crime of unlawful arrest successfully, the following elements must
be proved:
1. That the offender arrests or detains another person;
2. That the arrest or detention is to deliver the person to the proper authorities; and
3. That the arrest or detention is not authorized by law or that there is no reasonable
ground to.
Inquiry is incumbent on whether the person implementing the arrest has the official duty to
arrest or detain, and whether he or she had reasonable ground to effect the apprehension in
that instance.
In the crime of unlawful arrest, the offender who arrested or detained another intended to
deliver the apprehended person to the proper authorities, considering he or she does not have
the authority. This act of conducting the apprehended persons to the proper authorities takes
the offense out of the crime of illegal detention.
Arrest is defined by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as “the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is an
actual restraint of a person to be arrested or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.
However, jurisprudence instructs that there need not be an actual restraint for curtailment of
liberty to be characterized as an “arrest”:
1. (INVITATION) Babst vs. National Intelligence Board: An invitation to attend a hearing

and answer some questions which the person invited may heed or refuse at his
pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances,
however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. – Authoritative
commands which may not be reasonably expected to be defied.
2. (INTENT) Sanchez vs. Demetriou: Application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that
there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent on
the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary. – Intent to arrest must be clearly established.
Hence, arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there
be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
ISSUE #2: Pacis’ apprehension was not pursuant to an arrest warrant.
Duropan – Barangay Kagawad: A barangay kagawad is a member of the legislative council of

the sangguniang barangay, which enacts laws of local application. He or she is a person in
authority, per Section 388 of the Local Government Code.
Coloma – Barangay Tanod: A barangay tanod is deemed as an agent of persons in authority

whose duties are described in Section 388.
While deemed as persons in authority and agents of persons in authority, respectively,

the barangay kagawad and barangay tanod are not the public officers whose official duty
is to arrest or detain persons contemplated within the purview of Article 269.
Pacis' apprehension was not pursuant to an arrest warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates instances when warrantless arrests are lawful:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the arresting officer must have
personal knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under Section 5(a), the arresting
officer must have personally witnessed the crime; meanwhile, under Section 5(b), the arresting
officer must have had probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed an
offense. Nonetheless, whether under Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest generally precedes,
or is substantially contemporaneous, with the search.
In direct contrast with warrantless searches incidental to a lawful arrest, stop and frisk searches
are conducted to deter crime.
For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer must have had personal knowledge of
facts, which would engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit act. Cogaed
emphasized that anything less than the arresting officer's personal observation of a suspicious
circumstance as basis for the search is an infringement of the "basic right to security of one's
person and effects."
For purposes of a valid Terry stop-and-frisk search, the test for the existence of reasonable
suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal activity is the totality of the circumstances,
viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, prudent police officer.
Accordingly, to sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should have
personally observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would then
create a reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting officer to investigate
further.
APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR:

Even granting that petitioners may have had the authority to inquire into the surrounding
circumstances, and that what transpired was a stop and frisk search, petitioners failed to cite
any suspicious circumstance that warranted Pacis' immediate arrest. The argument as to the
reports of stealing nipa leaves falls short of three things:
1. They were aware that ALIMANGO existed, whose members were authorized to harvest
nipa;
2. They personally knew Pacis; and
3. They were uncertain that Cabalit owns the land where they found Pacis and his group.
Petitioners had no reason to suspect any wrongdoing.
Petitioners invoke paragraph (a) to justify their warrantless arrest – The argument is
invalid.
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, two elements must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Here, there was no overt act within petitioners' plain view which hinted that Pacis was
committing a crime. During his apprehension, Pacis has not committed, was not committing, nor
was he about to commit a crime. The warrantless arrest in this case was unlawful.
4 Osorio vs. Navera, G.R. No. 223272, 26 Feb. 2018 Aguinaldo
TOPIC: Kidnapping
DOCTRINE:
Kidnapping is not part of the functions of a soldier. Even if a public officer has the legal duty to
detain a person, the public officer must be able to show the existence of legal grounds for the
detention. Without these legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have acted in a private
capacity and is considered a "private individual." The public officer becomes liable for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention punishable by reclusion perpetua, not with arbitrary
detention punished with significantly lower penalties.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Kidnapping and serious illegal detention
FACTS:
Together with his superior officer, Major General Jovito Palparan (Major General Palparan),
SSgt. Osorio was charged in two (2) Informations before Branch 14, Regional Trial Court,
Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping University of the Philippines students Karen E. Empeño
(Empeño) and Sherlyn T. Cadapan (Cadapan).
The next day, at about 3:00 p.m., SSgt. Osorio was arrested by Colonel Herbert Yambing, the
Provost Marshall General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. SSgt. Osorio was turned over
to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Unit Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City and was
detained in Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to the Philippine Army Custodial
Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is currently detained.
Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals on July 21, 2015.
SSgt. Osorio mainly argued that courts-martial, not a civil court such as the Regional Trial
Court, had jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active duty
and that the offense charged was allegedly "service-connected." In the alternative, SSgt. Osorio
argued that the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case because among his coaccused was Major
General Palparan, a public officer with salary grade higher than 28.
4 Osorio vs. Navera, G.R. No. 223272, 26 Feb. 2018 Aguinaldo
SSgt. Osorio added that he could not be charged with the felony of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention because under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony may only be
committed by a private individual, not a ranking officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Lastly, he claimed deprivation of due process because he was allegedly charged without
undergoing proper preliminary investigation.
MTC/RTC DECISION: kidnapping and serious illegal detention
CA DECISION: Court of Appeals denied SSgt. Osorio's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer may be charged with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that the provision speaks of
"any private individual." (YES)
SC RULING: (DENIED- Certiorari on denied Petition for Habeas Corpus by lower courts)
Republic Act No. 7055, 51 Section 1 provides that if the accused is a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the crime involved is one punished under the Revised Penal
Code, civil courts shall have the authority to hear, try, and decide the case.
Under Section 1 of RA 7055, the only time courts-martial may assume jurisdiction is if, before
arraignment, the civil court determines that the offense is "service-connected." These
service-connected offenses are found in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to
97 of the Articles of War.
SSgt. Osorio was charged with kidnapping, a crime punishable under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code. Applying Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1, the case shall be tried by a civil court,
specifically by the Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over the crime of kidnapping. The
processes which the trial court issued, therefore, were valid.
Contrary to SSgt. Osorio's claim, the offense he committed was not service-connected. The
case filed against him is none of those enumerated under Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92,
and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War.
Further, kidnapping is not part of the functions of a soldier. Even if a public officer has the legal
duty to detain a person, the public officer must be able to show the existence of legal grounds
for the detention. Without these legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have acted in a
private capacity and is considered a "private individual." The public officer becomes liable for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention punishable by reclusion perpetua, not with arbitrary
detention punished with significantly lower penalties.
All told, the arrest warrants against SSgt. Osorio were issued by the court that has jurisdiction
over the offense charged. SSgt. Osorio's restraint has become legal; hence, the remedy of
habeas corpus is already moot and academic. 58 SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy is to pursue the
orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies, the first of which would be a motion to
quash, filed before arraignment, on the following grounds: the facts charged do not constitute
an offense; the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and the officer
who filed the information had no authority to do so.
5 People v. Damayo, G.R. No. 232361 DELA CRUZ
TOPIC: Kidnapping for Ransom
DOCTRINE:
In order that the accused can be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime,
namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in
any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must
be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is
present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is
committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. Also, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the
purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. It is settled that
the curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the
latter's person and it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or
treated him harshly. The crime of serious illegal detention is committed by detaining a
person or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. Its essence is the actual deprivation
of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof the intent of the accused to effect
such deprivation.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Damayo was indicted for Kidnapping for Ransom under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
On August 7, 2008, at 12:00 noon, Jerome Rosario, then eleven (11) years old, was outside his
school at Sucat Elementary School, Brgy. Sucat, Muntinlupa City when Damayo, known to him
as Kuya Frank, approached and told him that he was there to fetch him as they were going
somewhere. Since Jerome was familiar with Damayo, he went with him and both boarded a
jeep bound for Pasay. Upon arriving at Pasay, they boarded a bus. Jerome did not know where
they were going.
Worried that Jerome had not returned from school, his parents Edna Rosario and Jerry Rosario
started to look for Jerome. When they chanced upon Daryll, a classmate of Jerome, and asked
him on his whereabouts, Daryll informed them that an unknown man had taken Jerome during
dismissal time. Edna and Jerry then reported the incident to the barangay, where it was
blottered.
The next day, August 8, 2008, Edna received a call on her daughter's cellphone from a person
who introduced himself as Jerome's classmate. The man, whom Edna recognized to be
Damayo, stated that Jerome was with him and will be let go, provided that he will be given
P150,000.00 and Edna will be unaccompanied when they meet. He directed her to meet him at
a terminal in Dau, Pampanga.
The following day, August 9, 2008, Edna and Jerry went to the Muntinlupa City Police Station to
report the matter. An operation was planned to retrieve Jerome, where it was agreed that upon
meeting Damayo at the designated meet-up point, Edna would touch Damayo's arm, signaling
to the police his identity.
At 2:00 P.M. of the same date, Edna, Jerry, and the police officers, namely, Senior Police Officer
4 (SPO4) Elias Nero, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Rudolph Delmendo, PO3 Roberto Lanting and
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Julkabra Sulaiman, proceeded to the Dau terminal in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Upon seeing Damayo, Edna touched his arm which prompted the police to arrest
him. After handcuffing him, informing him of his arrest and reading him his constitutional rights,
the police asked Damayo where Jerome was being kept. Damayo told them that Jerome was at
his house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San Fernando, Pampanga. They proceeded to the area and
were able to safely recover Jerome.
MTC/RTC DECISION: After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated July 29, 2015, finding
Damayo guilty beyond reasonable of the crime charged. the Court finds accused Francisco
Damayo y Jaime guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
under the first (the private complainant is a minor) and second (for the purpose of extorting
ransom) paragraphs of Article 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua without possibility of parole.
The RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence which established that on August 7, 2006,
Damayo took Jerome Rosario y Sampaga (Jerome),who was then eleven years of age, from his
school and brought the latter to his house in Pampanga where he deprived the said victim of his
personal liberty for three (3) days and that Damayo demanded ransom of P150,000.00 from
Edna, Jerome's mother, for the release of her son from captivity. According to the RTC, Jerome
convincingly testified on the events that transpired during the kidnapping incident from August 7
to 9, 2006 and positively identified Damayo as his abductor. The RTC rejected the defense of
denial interposed by Damayo because it was not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.
CA DECISION:On January 30, 2017, the CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming Damayo's
conviction with modification as to the award of damages
ISSUE: Whether the conviction of Damayo must stand. - Yes.
SC RULING: The appeal is DISMISSED.The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January
30, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07683 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Francisco
Damayo y Jaime is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for
parole.
The elements of kidnapping as embodied in Article 267 of RPC have been sufficiently
proven in the case at bench. It is undisputed that Damayo is a private individual, and that he
took Jerome from his school at Sucat Elementary School, Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City on
August 7, 2008 at 12:00 noon, brought said victim to his house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San
Fernando, Pampanga, and kept him there until he was safely recovered by his parents and the
police officers on August 9, 2008. That Damayo had no justification whatsoever to detain
Jerome is undeniable.
Although it was not established that Jerome was placed inside an enclosure or was locked up,
he was nonetheless deprived of his liberty because he cannot leave the place where Damayo
brought him as the latter remained outside and kept watch of him. This only goes to show that
Jerome was constantly guarded by Damayo during the period of his captivity. Also, let it be
underscored that leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if
he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of
liberty inasmuch as under this situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and control of
the abductor
Here, bringing minor Jerome to a house located somewhere in Pampanga, a place which is
totally unfamiliar to him and very far from his residence at Sucat, Muntinlupa City, would
constitute denial of the said victim's liberty. Even if Jerome had the freedom of locomotion
inside the house of Damayo, he did not have the freedom to leave the same at will or escape
therefrom because he did not know where to go and could not possibly go back home to his
mother Edna as he didn't know how to do so. Jerome was merely waiting and hoping that he
would be brought home or that his parents would fetch him. Verily, the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt that Damayo intended to deprive Jerome of his liberty,
and his parents, with the custody of their minor son.
Jerome's testimony prevails over the statement he gave in the affidavit which he previously
executed. It is settled that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that
affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.
At any rate, the inconsistency adverted to by Damayo is negligible and merely refers to a minor
detail that does not bear relevance on the material and significant fact that Damayo kidnapped
Jerome. It does not pertain to the why's and wherefore's of the crime, as to adversely affect the
reliability of the People's evidence as a whole. An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with
the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction.
Thus, whether Jerome was taken by force or not is of no moment. What is controlling is the
act of the accused in detaining the victim against his will after the offender is able to take
the victim in his custody. Besides, it is settled that the carrying away of the victim can either
be made forcibly or fraudulently, as in this case. Anent the inconsistencies in the testimony of
witness Edna cited by Damayo, suffice it to say that they are mere trifles which could not
discredit her testimony nor diminish her credibility.
In a crude effort to muddle the case for the prosecution, Damayo asserts that he and Edna were
lovers and that he took Jerome from his school and brought him to Pampanga upon Edna's
request. Damayo explains that he and Edna had considered transferring Jerome to a school in
Pampanga. He claims that it had been the practice for Edna and Jerome to spend their
weekends with him at their rented home in Pampanga.
What destroys the veracity of Damayo's claims is the categorical and credible
declaration of Jerome that he and his mother have never stayed in Pampanga with
Damayo at any given time, and that he has never been in Pampanga before the kidnapping
incident. Case law has it that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit,
and that the testimony of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful
than that of older persons.
Edna, on the other hand, vehemently denied that she and Damayo were lovers and that she
gave him an instruction to bring Jerome to Pampanga. We agree with the courts a quo that
Edna has not given her consent for Damayo to take and keep her son. This is evident from the
fact that Edna, together with her husband, wasted no time and went through the trouble of going
to Jerome's school to look for their son when the latter failed to go home at around 4 o'clock in
the afternoon on August 7, 2008 and in having the incident of the taking of Jerome by a male
person to be blottered before the Barangay Office of the Sucat, Muntinlupa City. This is,
likewise, clear from the plea of Edna, via cellular phone, for Damayo to bring home her son.
Apart from Damayo's bare assertion, no other evidence was adduced by the defense to
substantiate his claim that he and Edna were lovers. Lastly, the Court determines that the
qualifying circumstance of extortion of ransom being the purpose of Damayo in
kidnapping Jerome was duly alleged in the Information and has been sufficiently
established by the prosecution. Edna clearly testified that on August 8, 2008 at around 8
o'clock in the morning, she received a call from Damayo who demanded that he be given
P150,000.00 in exchange for the safe release of Jerome and that the ransom payout shall be
held at the Dau Terminal, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Damayo never rebutted this particular
testimony of Edna. The fact that he did not receive the ransom payment is of no consequence.
Actual payment of ransom is not necessary for the crime to be committed. It is enough that the
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.
6 People v. Avanceña, 826 SCRA 414,GR 200512, June 17, 2017 Paquinto
TOPIC: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 247)
DOCTRINE:
CHARGE/INFORMATION: 2 Informations were filed charging AVANCENA, POPIOCO, TAYTAY,

JAYMALIN, NAZARENO, AND GREFALDEO, with the crimes of Kidnapping for Ranson and
Robbery/Extortion. Jaymalin and Grefaldeo were excluded in the amended information.
Crim. Case No. 04-2817

That on or about August 1, 2004 in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then private individuals and armed with
handguns, conspiring, confederating. and mutually helping one another, did then and there, with
the use of force, threat, violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
kidnap and deprive Rizaldo Policarpio y Legaspi of his liberty against his will for purposes of
extorting money in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (₱l50,000.00) as a condition for
his release; That said Rizaldo Policarpio y Legaspi was in fact only released after he was
illegally detained for almost seven hours and after his father had paid the amount of Four
Thousand Pesos (₱4,000.00) to the accused to the damage and prejudice of Rizaldo Policarpio
y Legaspi in whatever amounts that may be awarded him under the provisions of the New Civil
Code.
Crim Case No. 04-2818
That on or about August 9. 2004 along Evangelista St., Barangay Bangkal, Makati City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then armed with
handguns, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, did
then and there, by means of threat and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
from Alfonso Policarpio the amount of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (₱6,000.00) against his will
and to the damage and prejudice of said Alfonso Policarpio in whatever amounts that may be
awarded him under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
FACTS: On April 26, 2005, Avancena, Popioco, Nazareno, and Taytay were arraigned where
they entered a plea of not guilty.
Rizaldo (kidnapping victim) testified that at around 12:30AM of August 1, 2004, he went to 7/11
located in the corner of Evangelista st., Pasay City to buy a sandwich. He boarded his
Tamaraw FX and as he drove, he noticed a Gray Isuzu Crosswind vehicle, with no headlight
and plate number, following him. Rizaldo then decided to head to the nearest police precinct
on Evangelista Street. Upon alighting his vehicle, he heard a man calling him (which he later
found out to be Avancena). Avancena alighted from their gray vehicle across the street. Rizaldo
knew him because they live in the same barangay. Avancena told Rizaldo that one of his
companions in the vehicle noticed Rizaldo received illegal drugs. Rizaldo denied. Avancena
instructed him that they should board Rizaldo’s vehicle because Avancena was going to
introduce him to the group’s team leader, Abalo.
While they were boarding Rizaldo’s vehicle, Rizaldo noticed Avancena calling out his
companions from the gray vehicle, to which they alighted their vehicle and approached them.
Abalo boarded the backseat of Rizaldo’s vehicle. Upon Avancena’s request, they distanced the
vehicle 50 meters away from the police precinct and went to the corner of Kaiga street where
Avancena asked Rizaldo again about a certain person which the latter does not know.
Avancena then suggested that they should talk 5 blocks away from the precinct.
At the corner of Lacuna and Evangelista Street, Avancena alighted and talked to his
companions in the gray vehicle. He boarded Rizaldo’s vehicle again and told Rizaldo to move to
the passenger’s side. He followed since Avancena had a gun. When he was moving to the
passenger’s side, he was surprised that Taytay opened the passenger’s door, boarded the
vehicle, and handcuffed him. When he asked Avancena why this was happening, the latter did
not respond.
Avancena drove to the PDEA parking lot at Adriatico St., Malate. Upon arriving, the
handcuffs were removed and Rizaldo was boarded to the gray vehicle. He was handcuffed
again by Taytay whom he asked for an explanation, but did not respond. Avancena, Taytay,
Abalo, together with the rest, boarded the Gray vehicle and drove through Taft, Libertad and
went around going to Makati. Abalo alighted when they reached Roxas Boulevard and
Tambo road. Then, they drove through EDSA on the way to Makati. Once parked along
Makati Ave in front of the Landmark Dept Store, Avancena and 1 of his companions alighted
from the vehicle. After 30 mins, they came back to the vehicle and drove to Pasay road again
to return to the PDEA parking lot. While onboard, Rizaldo was asked again about people he
didn’t knew, and the group started hurting him. Taytay was strangling him on his left side,
Nazareno was holding him on his right side, and Popioco was punching him. Rizaldo pleaded
but to no avail.
Upon arriving at PDEA Parking, avancena told Rizaldo that they would release him if his father
would pay them P150,000. Rizaldo said his father does not have enough money. Avancena
removed his handcuffs and they alighted him from the vehicle to have coffee on the sidewalk.
After having coffee, Avancena commanded Rizaldo to call his father. He spoke to his father and
told him to come to PDEA Parking since they were demanding P150,000 for his release.
Avancena grabbed the phone and talked to the father. Rizaldo did not hear the convo. They
boarded the gray vehicle again and waited 1 and ½ hr for Rizaldo’s father to arrive.
At around 5-5:30AM, Alfonso, Rizaldo’s father, arrived. He boarded the gray vehicle on the
passenger’s side. Rizaldo recalled that Alfonso was very angry and told the group that he did
not have that kind of money. Alfonso invited Avancena to have breakfast at Jollibee at the
corner of Vito Cruz and taft so they could talk. At Jollibee, everyone except Rizaldo alighted.
The group invited him but Rizaldo said no as his body was aching. He waited for them for 30-45
mins.
After breakfast, the group came back and 1 of them took the handcuffs of Rizaldo off. Alfonso
followed the group and approached Avancena to hand him the money, saying, “Pare, this is the
only money i have, just call me by phone and I will give the remaining balance later.” They
returned to the PDEA parking lot to get Rizaldo’s vehicle. Then Rizaldo drove home with
Alfonso following him.
At around 1PM, Avancena called Rizoldo on his phone to ask for the balance but Rizaldo told
him to just ask his father. He turned off the phone. He claimed that he was traumatized by the
incident.
In Alfonso’s account, he said that he had borrowed P5,000 and brought it to PDEA. He was
instructed by Avancena to sit in the passenger’s seat and talk to Rizaldo. He did and the group
alighted from the vehicle.Rizaldo told him that Avancena’s group was linking him to drug-related
cases. Alfonso then said that Avancena’s group was no longer connected with PDEA and that
they were asking P150,000 for his release.
In Jollibee, Alfonso recalled that when asked if he was able to bring the P150k,he said he didn't
have enough and only brought P4,000 with him. Avancena then said that he could bring his son
home but he must remember that he still has a balance. He needs to settle it otherwise they
would abduct Rizaldo again. When they were already at home, Avancena called Alfonso twice.
On August 2, 2004, at around 10AM, Rizaldo and Alfonso went to the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Force at Camp Crame to report the incident. While Rizaldo was talking to a
certain Colonel Aguilar, Avancena called on his phone. He answered and pointed to it to inform
Colonel that Avancena was on the phone. Avancena asked him about the balance of P150,000.
Alfonso told him that he could not afford that amount and asked if he could give P40,000.
Avancena countered P50,000, but eventually agreed to P40,000.
In coordination with the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF), Colonel told Alfonso to
bring whatever cash he has to be marked. He was able to produce P6,000. The pay-off was
scheduled on August 6, but did not push through. Alfonso received a call on Aug 7 from Abalo,
saying to deliver the money Aug 9 in the afternoon. Alfonso called NAKTAF to disclose the
agreement.
At 11AM, Aug 9, NAKTAF deployed 20 operatives to Alfonso’s place. At 12nn, Alfonso was
directed by NAKTAF to go to Evangelista Street and advised him of the operatives present in
the vicinity. He went in front of the INC church. At past noon, Avancena’s group arrived in a
white Revo. the operations ensued, and Alfonso heard gunshots and a commotion followed.
MTC/RTC DECISION: Avancena, Popioco, and Taytay were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention and Robbery.
CA DECISION: Affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of Kidnapping
with Serious Illegal Detention under Art. 247 and Robbery, under Art. 294(5). YES
SC RULING: Convicted.
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused
is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of
the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish the following elements:
1. the accused was a private person;

2. he [or she] kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty;
3. the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and
4. The victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.
The prosecution was able to prove that the accused were not agents of PDEA.
The prosecution was able to present Police Inspector Nabor of Human Resource Service of
PDEA,who testified that the accused were not in any manner connected with PDEA.
Nonetheless, assuming they were agents of PDEA, detaining any private person for the purpose
of extorting any amount of money could not, in any way, be construed as within their official
functions. If proven, they can be guilty of serious illegal detention. Their badges or shields do
not give them immunity for any criminal act.
The prosecution was also able to prove that Rizaldo was illegally deprived of his liberty.
In order to prove kidnapping, the prosecution must establish that the victim was "forcefully
transported, locked up or restrained." It must be proven that the accused intended "to deprive
the victim of his liberty." The act of handcuffing Rizaldo and physically harming him to prevent
escape falls under this definition.
Accused-appellants, however, claim that Rizaldo was not kidnapped because he voluntarily
went with the accused-appellants. The Court held that the fact that the victim voluntarily went
with the accused [does] not remove the element of deprivation of liberty [if] the victim went with
the accused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done so." Rizaldo
would not have gone with the accused-appellants had they not misrepresented themselves as
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency agents who allegedly caught him selling illegal drugs.
Accused-appellants also told Rizaldo that he would only be released if Alfonso paid them
₱150,000.00. "The act of holding a person for a proscribed purpose necessarily implies an
unlawful physical or mental restraint against the person's will, and with a willful intent to so
confine the victim." If Rizaldo was indeed free to leave, there would have been no reason for
Alfonso to come rushing to his son's aid. Rizaldo was also able to come home only after Alfonso
negotiated his release.
Taken together, the prosecution was able to establish the elements of kidnapping for ransom,
which is punishable under the Revised Penal Code with death. Considering the suspension of
the death penalty, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
7 People vs. Trestiza Somera
TOPIC: Art. 267 - Kidnapping
DOCTRINE:
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Kidnapping for Ransom

FACTS: [Summary: Irma at Lawrence were kidnapped by Pineda (private), Manrique and
Trestiza (policemen). They were released after Lawrence’s friends gave 180k. Irma’s parents
later on learned about the incident and reported it to the CIDG. Pineda kept calling for the
balance of the ransom. Entrapment operation. Pineda was arrested. Manrique was arrested
when complainants were giving statements at the CIDG office and recognized him. Trestiza was
arrested as he was identified by Pineda.]
On November 7, 2002 at about 1AM, Irma Navarro and her boyfriend Lawrence Yu were at the
"Where Else Disco" in Makati attending a party. They stayed thereat for around 30 minutes only.
Irma however, went out ahead of Lawrence. When she was about to proceed to where
Lawrence’s car was parked, she noticed that the said car was blocked by a van. 3 armed men
later on emerged from the said van. As she was about to open the door of the car, somebody hit
her on the nape. When she turned her back, she saw the 3 men in the company of Pineda. She
knew Pineda because the latter was her sister Cynthia’s kumpare. Furthermore, she saw
Pineda in their residence the night of November 6, 2002 as he visited her sister. She asked
Pineda what was happening but the latter replied "pasensya na, mare, trabaho lang"
She was told that the three (3) whose identities she later on learned as Capt. Manrique, PO2
Jose and PO1 Trestiza, were policemen. She asked why she was being accosted but she was
handcuffed by Manrique. She was ushered inside the car. Pineda asked her where Lawrence
was but she was left inside the car with Jose while Pineda, Trestiza and Manrique on the other
hand went away apparently to look for Lawrence. Pineda and Manrique later on went back
inside the car. They drove later with Jose behind the wheel while Pineda occupied the
passenger seat. They followed the van which was then driven by Trestiza. Unknown to Irma,
Lawrence was already inside the van at the time. They just drove and drove around, passing
through small alleys as they avoided major routes. She was asked later by Pineda to remove
her jewelry. She was able to remove only her earrings as she was in handcuffs. Pineda himself
removed her watch and bracelet. Her necklace and ring followed. All these were later on turned
over by Pineda to Manrique. Her bag where her wallet containing 120k was likewise taken. Her
2 cellphones were likewise taken by Pineda.
Later on, Irma and Lawrence were brought together inside the van. It was there that they were
told that they will not be released if they will not be able to produce 1M pesos. These were all
uttered by Jose and Manrique.
Irma later on felt the call of nature, prompting her to ask permission if she could possibly relieve
herself. She was accompanied by Pineda to a nearby gas station. When they returned to where
they stopped, she was asked as to whom she could possibly call so that the money that the
accused were asking would be produced. The accused later on asked Lawrence to make a call
using his cellphone with speaker phone. Lawrence was able to get in touch with his friends
Suguitan and Gonzales. The latter was told that Lawrence figured in an accident and that he
needs money badly. Lawrence and his friends agreed that the money the two will produce will
be brought to the gas station in Greenhills. They proceeded to the said place later where they
waited for the friends of Lawrence.
Suguitan and Gonzales, later on arrived at the gas station. Lawrence took from them what
appears to be a package and handed the same to Pineda. Manrique thereafter called Pineda
asking "positive na ba?" to which Pineda replied "yes." The amount raised by the friends of
Lawrence was 180k. Irma and Lawrence were later brought to the Star Mall along Edsa. Their
captors warned them not to report the matter to the authorities otherwise they will face dire
consequences. Irma was told that the men knew her address, the members of her family and
that they have the picture of her child. She was likewise warned not to report the matter to her
father, Rod Navarro, who was an actor and a policeman, otherwise her daughter with Lawrence
will be the one to bear the consequences. They were released after 30 minutes.
Pineda in the meanwhile kept on calling them Irma and Lawrence demanding for their "balance"
of 1M. Irma’s mother and father learned of the incident because of a newspaper item and
immediately contacted the authorities from the CIDG. Irma and Lawrence were later
investigated by the CIDG people to whom they gave their sworn statements. As Pineda
continued to call them for the alleged balance, an entrapment operation was planned on that
date. On the same date, Pineda called Lawrence for purposes of meeting him that night in order
to get the remaining money. The entrapment operation was successful as Pineda was arrested.
The following day at the CIDG, Manrique went to the said office looking for his co-accused
Trestiza. Manrique was arrested thereat when the private complainants who happened to be
there as they were giving additional statements identified him through a one-way mirror.
Trestiza was likewise arrested later as he was identified by his co-accused Pineda.
MTC/RTC DECISION: Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom.
CA DECISION: Affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE: WON public officers can be guilty of kidnapping with ransom. (YES)
SC RULING: Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. ‒ Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill
him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a
public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Before the present case was tried by the trial court, there was a significant amount of time spent
in determining whether kidnapping for ransom was the proper crime charged against the
accused, especially since Trestiza and Manrique were both police officers. Article 267 of the
RPC specifically stated that the crime should be committed by a private individual. The trial
court settled the matter by citing our ruling in People v. Santiano, thus:
The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is an organic member of the NARCOM and appellant
Sandigan a member of the PNP would not exempt them from the criminal liability of kidnapping.
It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so neither in
furtherance of official functions nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in
relation to their office, but in purely private capacity that they have acted in concert with their
co-appellant Santiano and Chanco.
In the same order, the trial court asked for further evidence which support the defense’s claim of
holding a legitimate police operation. However, the trial court found as unreliable the
Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet presented by the defense. The sheet was not authenticated,
and the signatories were not presented to attest to its existence and authenticity.
The second to the last paragraph of Article 267 prescribes the penalty of death when the
extortion of ransom was the purpose of the kidnapping. Irma and Lawrence were released only
after they were able to give various personal effects as well as cash amounting to ₱300,000,
with the promise to give the balance of ₱1,000,000 at a later date.
Trestiza insists that his participation is limited to being a driver of the van. Lawrence testified
otherwise. Trestiza’s acts were far from just being a mere driver. The series of events that
transpired before, during, and after the kidnapping incident more than shows that Trestiza acted
in concert with his co-accused in committing the crime.
8 People vs. Santiano, 299 SCRA 583 GONZALES
TOPIC: Kidnapping
DOCTRINE: The elements of the offense, here adequately shown, are (a) that the offender is a
private individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (c) that the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) that, in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present, i.e., (i) that the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 5 days, or (ii) that it is committed simulating public
authority, or (iii) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made, or (iv) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Accused-appellants Alipio Santiano, Jose Sandigan, Armenia

Pillueta and Jose Vicente (Jovy) Chanco were indicted for the kidnapping with murder of
Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr., a detention prisoner at the Naga City Jail, in an amended Information,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Pili, Branch 32, Camarines Sur.
FACTS: Accused-appellants Alipio Santiano, Jose Sandigan, Armenia Pillueta and Jose
Vicente (Jovy) Chanco were indicted for the kidnapping with murder of Ramon John Dy Kow,
Jr., a detention prisoner at the Naga City Jail, in an amended Information, docketed Criminal
Case No. P-2319, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Branch 32, Camarines Sur.
On May 13, 1993, the kidnap victim, Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. and his live-in partner, Loida
Navidad, were arrested by appellants Jose Sandigan and Armenia Pillueta and several other
NARCOM agents for alleged illegal possession of marijuana . After the arrest, they were
brought to the NARCOM Office situated at the compound of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Headquarters, Naga City.
Thereafter, a certain Alipio Santiano, also a detainee, was mauled inside the jail and pointed Dy
Kow Jr. as the one who mastermind his mauling.
On December 27, 1993, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, the victim asked permission from a
jail trustee to allow him to buy viand outside the jail. When he left, the victim was wearing a
fatigue jacket and short pants.
As the victim emerged from the PNP store, he was accosted by appellants Sandigan and
Santiano. The two (2) appellants held the victim between them and thereafter hurriedly
proceeded towards the NARCOM Office Situated at a distance of about twenty-five (25) meters
away. Upon reaching the door of the NARCOM office, the victim was pushed inside. Once the
victim was already inside the NARCOM Office, appellant Sandigan proceeded to and took his
place at Plaza Barlin facing the PNP Police Station. The victim was made to sit and thereafter
mauled by appellant Santiano. Santiano got hold of a handkerchief, rolled it around his fists and
continued to punch the victim for almost fifteen (15) minutes. As the victim was being mauled,
appellant Pillueta stood by the door of the Narcom office, her both hands inside her pockets
while looking to her right and left, acting as a lookout.
At this time, appellant Chanco who owned and drove his trimobile, parked it in front of the door
of the NARCOM Office. Thereafter, he proceeded inside the NARCOM Office.
After a few minutes, appellant Chanco went out of the NARCOM Office and started the
trimobile. His co-appellant Santiano and Pillueta followed him. Inside the trimobile, appellant
Pillueta occupied the back seat. Santiano occupied the reversed seat in front of the passenger
seat which was occupied by the victim.
The trimobile proceeded towards the direction of San Francisco Church. When it passed the
Panganiban Drive, Naga City, on its way towards the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur,
the victim was still aboard the trimobile at the passenger seat nearest the driver.
When prosecution witness Raola heard over the radio that a person was found dead at the
canal in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, he lost no time in informing a policeman Prila of the Pili
Police Department that the descriptions of the dead person he heard over the radio fit not only
the person he saw being hauled to and thereafter mauled at the NARCOM Office but likewise
the same person who was on board the trimobile driven by the appellant Chanco.
Robert Dy Kow identified the man found dead in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, as his brother
Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr.
Appellant Jovy Chanco had this further statement in his supplemental appeal brief; thus:
On December 28, 1993, a cadaver of an unknown person was discovered somewhere in the
vicinity of Barangay Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines, by Danilo Camba, the
Barangay Captain of said locality. The corpse was later on identified by Robert Dy Kow as that
one of his brother, Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr.
Dr. Thomas S. Gonzales performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. His findings
revealed that Dy Kow, Jr.,
CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND.
MTC/RTC DECISION: Evaluating the evidence before it, the trial court found all four accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code
CA DECISION: n/a
ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention (Yes)
SC RULING: Convicted. RTC ruling affirmed.
When a complex crime has been charged in an information and the evidence fails to support
the charge on one of the component offenses, can the defendant still be separately convicted of
the other offense? The question has long been answered in the affirmative. In United States vs.
Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, the Court has ruled to be legally feasible the conviction of an
accused on one of the offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly
established, despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused guilty of the other charge.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Section 8 of Republic Act
7659,11 reads:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.- Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or a public officer.
The elements of the offense, here adequately shown, are (a) that the offender is a private
individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of
his liberty; (c) that the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) that, in the commission of
the offense, any of the following circumstances is present, i.e., (i) that the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more then 5 days, or (ii) that it is committed simulating public authority, or (iii)
that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats
to kill him are made, or (iv) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer.
Prosecution witness William Raola testified that he had seen the victim being accosted, held
and thereafter dragged to the NARCOM office by appellants Santiago and Sandigan. Inside the
NARCOM office, the victim was mauled by Santiano. For several minutes, Santiano continued
to batter him with punches while Pillueta stood by the door and so acted as the "lookout. The
appellants then took the victim away on a trimobile owned and driven by Chanco. Raola
positively identified the fatigue jacket worn by the victim on the evening of his abduction on 27
December 1993 and when his lifeless body was found in the morning of 28 December 1993.
Don Gumba corroborated Raolas testimony. Gumba was positive that he had seen the victim at
around eight oclock in the evening of 27 December 1993 with appellants Santiano and Pillueta
on Board the trimobile driven by appellant Chanco on its way towards the direction of Palestina,
Pili, Camarines Sur, where, the following morning, the victim was found evidently after
succumbing to several gunshot wounds.
Appellants have not shown any nefarious motive on the part of the witnesses that might have
influenced them to declare falsely against appellants, the Court sees no justification to thereby
deny faith and credit to their testimony. The Court likewise shares the view of the Solicitor
General in pointing out that
1. There is no question that the victim, who was on the date in question detained at the
Naga City Jail, asked permission from the jail trustee in order to buy viand outside. It
was while he was emerging from the PNP store that he was accosted by appellants
Santiano and Sandigan
2. From the moment that the victim was accosted in Naga City, he was at first dragged
to the NARCOM Office where he was mauled. This circumstance indicated the intention
to deprive him of his liberty for sometime, an essential element of the crime of
kidnapping.
3. The victim did not only sustain serious physical injuries but likewise died as indicated
in the autopsy report, thus, belying appellants claim that none of the circumstances in
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was present.
4. Witness Don Gumba was positive when he declared that he saw the victim at about
8:00 oclock in the evening of December 27, 1993 with appellants Santiano and Pillueta
on board the trimobile driven by appellant Chanco on its way towards the direction of
Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur where the victim was found dead.
The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is an organic member of the NARCOM and appellant
Sandigan a regular member of the PNP would not exempt them from the criminal liability for
kidnapping.] It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so
neither in furtherance of official function nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in
fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity, that they have acted in concert with
their co-appellants Santiano and Chanco.
The crime of kidnapping cannot be here absorbed by the charge of murder since the detention
of the victim is not shown to have been for the purpose of liquidating him. Appellants
themselves, in fact, all deny having killed the victim. And while the evidence may have thus
been found to be wanting by the trial court so as to equally hold appellants responsible for the
death of the victim, the Court is convinced that the court a quo did not err in making them
account for kidnapping. The circumstances heretofore recited indicate the attendance of
conspiracy among the appellants thereby making them each liable for the offense.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

9 People vs. Roxas, 628 SCRA 378 Magcamit
TOPIC: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
DOCTRINE:
The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention has been correctly complexed by the
RTC with frustrated murder. A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two
or more, grave or less grave, felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder,

Violation of R.A. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, and Robbery (3 separate
information)
FACTS:
On January 12, 1994, around 3:00 p.m., Agnes Guirindola (Agnes), while cruising along
Panay Avenue, Quezon City, on board a red 1993 model Nissan Sentra sedan with plate
number TKR-837, was suddenly flagged down by a man wearing a PNP reflectorized vest.
The man signaled her to make a U-turn. The man, identified by Agnes as appellant Vanancio
Roxas (Roxas) walked in front of her car and proceeded to the right side of the car.
Agnes asked Roxas, "Ano ang problema?" Roxas replied, "Miss, one way street po ito."
Agnes explained to the man that she usually passed by the same street and it was only that
day that she had been caught. Roxas told her that the street had been made a one-way street
because a girl figured in an accident in the same street two days ago.
After taking Agnes’ driver’s license, Roxas handed her a piece of paper which she was asked
to sign. Agnes noticed that it was not the usual traffic citation ticket but, nevertheless, she
pretended to sign the same by making a check thereon.
When Agnes handed back the paper to Roxas, the latter asked her to open the door of the car
so that he could show her the one-way sign and the other traffic aide at the corner of the
street. Agnes let Roxas enter the car. Roxas then instructed Agnes to drive to the corner of
the street, and upon reaching the corner, Roxas pointed to her the one-way sign and looked
for the traffic aide he had told Agnes about. The traffic aide was not there. Agnes asked
Roxas where she could drop him. Roxas told Agnes to make a left turn from the corner of the
street and that he will alight somewhere in Mother Ignacia. Agnes obliged and made a left turn
and stopped the car. Thinking that Roxas was waiting for a bribe, Agnes took out her wallet,
pulled a ₱50.00 bill and gave it to Roxas. After receiving the money, Roxas returned to Agnes
her driver’s license.
Upon returning the driver’s license to Agnes, Roxas immediately switched off the engine of
the car and poked a gun at her saying "Miss, kailangan ko ang kotse mo." Agnes, terrified and
shocked by Roxas’ actions, cried and pleaded with him to let her go and just take the car.
Roxas continued to poke a gun at her, unmindful of what Agnes was telling him.
After a while, Agnes heard a knock from outside the car. Roxas opened the rear door and
then someone boarded the car, occupying the back seat. The second passenger immediately
reclined the driver’s seat and pulled Agnes towards the back seat. Agnes identified this man
as Roberto Gungon (Gungon). Subsequently, Roxas took the driver’s seat and drove the car
while Gungon held Agnes on the shoulder with one hand, and her leg with the other.
After crossing Mother Ignacia Street, Gungon got his beeper and told Roxas: "Boss, dalhin na
natin siya sa dati, doon na natin siya i-s." [Referring to somewhere in Batangas] Agnes
became more frightened as she understood "s" to mean "salvage," a lingo for summary
execution.
When Agnes woke up, around 9:30 or 10:00 p.m, after she was forcefully fed some tablets,
she noticed that there was already a third man sitting in front of the car beside Roxas who
was still driving. She then asked them if she could relieve herself. Gungon asked Roxas if
Agnes would be allowed to relieve herself to which Roxas answered in the affirmative. Roxas
alighted from the car and opened the rear door. Gungon alighted first from the car followed by
Agnes. Gungon then led Agnes to a nearby grassy area and told her, "O, dyan ka na lang
umihi." After Agnes relieved herself, and as she was about to get up and return to the car, she
saw white sparks at her right side and then she fell down. When she opened her eyes, she
saw Roxas walking back towards the car with a gun in his hand. She did not see Gungon at
that particular time. Then she lost consciousness.
When Agnes regained consciousness, she was all alone. Roxas, Gungon and the third man,
as well as the car, were no longer there. It was very dark. She followed a "sparkling light" that
led her to a small house. Upon reaching the house, she opened the door and saw two (2)
children and a teenager singing. She asked for their help but upon seeing her, they ran away.
She then saw a lady standing at the stairs of the house carrying a baby. Agnes asked for her
help but the lady went upstairs and locked herself inside the room. Agnes followed her and
knocked at the door of the room asking for help, but still the lady did not come out of the
room. She then went downstairs and lied down on the sofa. Only then did she notice that
blood was profusely oozing from her face and there were "holes" in the left side of her neck
and her right cheek.
After a while, Agnes heard a vehicle arrive and also heard voices saying: "May taong duguan
sa loob ng bahay, tulungan natin siya!" Agnes was then carried to a Fiera motor vehicle and
brought to the Batangas Regional Hospital, where she was treated for her wounds and given
first aid.
The NBI conducted a manhunt for Roxas. On September 11, 1995, Roxas was arrested by
elements of the NBI inside the municipal hall of Taysan, Batangas, where he was working
under the Office of the Mayor using the aliases "Joe Villamor" and "Marianito Villamor."
MTC/RTC DECISION: Guilty of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with frustrated
murder, carnapping and theft
CA DECISION: Affirmed in toto
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of the crimes charged against him
SC RULING:
No.
We have ruled that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of
the case. The trial court is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having seen
and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying.
Agnes not only positively identified her abductors, she also graphically narrated what
happened on January 12, 1994. Actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident in the
instant case from the moment Agnes was taken from Panay Avenue to a remote place in
Batangas.
Based on the foregoing testimony of Agnes, the trial court did not err in convicting appellant of
the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the crime, thus:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap
or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death;
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by
Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 7659.
The evidence likewise reveal, undoubtedly, the commission of frustrated murder as qualified
by the circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. The medical findings show that
had it not been due to the timely and proper medical attention given to the victim, the gunshot
wound sustained by the victim would have been fatal.
The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention has been correctly complexed by the
RTC with frustrated murder. A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two
or more, grave or less grave, felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other.
In a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. Since the kidnapping and serious illegal detention is the more
serious crime, the proper penalty under Article 26750 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, should be applied in its maximum period; thus, the penalty should be
death. However, in light of R.A. 9346, or the Anti-Death Penalty Law, which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of
death is, thus, proper and ineligible for parole.
People vs. Ty (1996)
Charge: Kidnapping and failure to return a minor
Facts: (1987) Complainant Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter Arabella, then only
seven (7) months old, for treatment to the Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic, which was
owned and operated by the accused-appellants. Arabella was diagnosed to be suffering
bronchitis and diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to confine the child at the clinic for
speedy recovery.
About 3 days later, Arabella was well and was ready to be discharged but complainant was not
around to take her home. A week later, complainant came back but did not have enough money
to pay the hospital bill (P300). Complainant likewise confided to accused-appellant Dr. Carmen
Ty that no one would take care of the child at home as she was working. She then inquired
about the rate of the nursery and upon being told that the same was P50 per day, she decided
to leave her child to the care of the clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella was transferred from
the ward to the nursery.
Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and accumulate. It was at this time that
accused-appellant Dr. Ty suggested to the complainant that she hire a "yaya" for P400 instead
of the daily nursery fee of P50. Complainant agreed, hence, a "yaya" was hired. Arabella was
then again transferred from the nursery to the extension of the clinic which served as residence
for the hospital staff.
From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She neither visited her child nor called to
inquire about her whereabouts. Her estranged husband came to the clinic once but did not get
the child. Efforts to get in touch with the complainant were unsuccessful as she left no address
or telephone number where she can be reached. This development prompted Dr. Ty to notify
the barangay captain of the child's abandonment. Eventually, the hospital staff took turns in
taking care of Arabella.
(1989) 2 years after Arabella was abandoned by complainant, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the
clinic, suggested during a hospital staff conference that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian who
could give the child the love and affection, personal attention and caring she badly needed as
she was thin and sickly. The suggestion was favorably considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave
the child to her aunt, Lilibeth Neri.
(1992) 3 years after, complainant came back to claim the daughter she abandoned some 5
years back. The instant criminal case was filed against accused-appellants.
[another case-Sombong vs. CA] Complainant filed a petition for habeas corpus with the RTC.
RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. SC affirmed CA decision.
Issue: WON accused are guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor. (NO)
Ruling: Under the facts and ruling in Sombong vs. CA, as well as the evidence adduced in this
case accused-appellants must perforce be acquitted of the crime charged, there being no
reason to hold them liable for failing to return one Cristina Grace Neri, a child not conclusively
shown and established to be complainant's daughter, Arabella.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to consider Cristina Grace Neri and Arabella
Sombong as one and the same person, still, the instant criminal case against the
accused-appellants must fall.
Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has
been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore
said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is
entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the kidnapping
of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or
refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Said
failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige
the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.
The key word therefore of this element is deliberate. Essentially, the word deliberate as used in
the article must imply something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated,
obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the
accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainant's child to her. When the
accused-appellants learned that complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years
of apparent wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein complainant find the child as the
latter was no longer under the clinic's care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address
of Arabella's guardians but as soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga who was already
working abroad, she personally went to the guardians' residence and informed them that herein
complainant wanted her daughter back.
10 Cayao v. Del Mundo; A.M. MTJ-93-813; September 15, 1993 Mansilla
TOPIC: Article 124 - Arbitrary Detention
DOCTRINE: Respondent judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public
officer, ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal grounds.
The idea of confinement is not synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough
to qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his personal
liberty.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: administrative case abuse of authority pero may maikling

explanation lang about art 124
FACTS:
Complainant Fernando Cayao drives a bus along Indang, Cavite where it overtook another bus,
as a consequence, the bus driven by the complainant almost collided with an oncoming
Jeepney. The jeepney was registered in the name of respondent Judge Justiniano Del
Mundo who at the time of the incident, was one of the passengers along with his sons.
At 3:30pm the same day, before the complainant could park the bus, he was picked up by
policemen of PNP Indang and was immediately brought to the sala of respondent judge. There,
the complainant was confronted by respondent judge and accused by the latter of nearly
causing an accident that morning. Without given the opportunity to explain, respondent judge
insisted that complainant be punished and made to choose between the three:
1. To face a charge of multiple attempted homicide
2. Revocation of his driver’s license
3. To be put in jail for 3 days
Complainant chose the third and was made to sign a “waiver of detention” by the respondent
judge. Thereafter, complainant was immediately escorted by policemen to the municipal jail.
Though not actually incarcerated, complainant remained in the premises of the municipal jail for
three (3) days, from October 22 up to October 25, 1992, by way of serving his "sentence". On
the third day, complainant was released by SPO1 Manolo Dilig to the custody of Geronimo
Cayao, complainant's co-driver and cousin.
MTC/RTC DECISION: wala

10 Cayao v. Del Mundo; A.M. MTJ-93-813; September 15, 1993 Mansilla
CA DECISION: wala din
ISSUE: whether there was illegal detention even though complainant chose to be
detained?
SC RULING: Dismissed Judge Del Mundo
While it is true that complainant was not put behind bars as respondent had intended, however,
complainant was not allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of
confinement is not synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to qualify
as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his personal
liberty. Under the circumstances, respondent judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention
when he, as a public officer, ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal
grounds. In overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not
actually committed a crime in the presence of respondent judge. Such being the case, the
warrantless arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. In the case at bar, no
less than the testimony of the jail warden herself confirmed that complainant was indeed
deprived of his liberty for three (3) days
Q So, summarily speaking, you feel that you were detained in the municipal jail of the
station of Indang, Cavite?
A (complainant: Yes, your Honor, because I was not able to get out from the police
station from the time that I was detained.
It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the misconduct of respondent is
not alone centered on his order for the detention of complainant. Rather, it is ingrained in the
fact that complainant was so detained without affording him his constitutional rights.
11 Pedrito Garma v. People of the Philippines ERIPOL
TOPIC: Art. 282 (2)
I am sorry ang haba. Sinama ko kasi ang layo ng version ng parties involved.
DOCTRINE:
Grave threats must have an actus reus and mens rea. The actus reus is the actual speaking or
uttering of the threats of, say, death or serious bodily harm. The mens rea is that the accused
intends that the recipient of their words to feel intimidated by their words or that the accused
intended the words to be taken seriously. The words must be meant by the accused to convey a
threat; in other words, the utterance is meant to intimidate or to be taken seriously. It is not
necessary that the recipient themself actually feels intimidated or actually takes the words
seriously. To repeat, all that needs to be proven is that they were intended by the accused to
have that effect.
In this case, the petitioner was charged with grave threat WITHOUT A condition falling under
Art. 282(2)
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Grave Threats
FACTS:
PROSECUTION'S VERSION:
On February 11, 2010, around 9:30 in the morning, three (3) farmers working for Barangay
Captain Ballon, went to Sitio Rissik, Barangay Mabuno, Gattaran, Cagayan to pick up the water
pump of Barangay Captain Ballon from a rice field. While they were loading the water pump,
they saw the Garma twins, herein petitioner, and the now deceased Reynaldo, chasing a group
of people illegally fishing from their fishpond. Curiously, for some inexplicable reason, the
Garma twins stopped chasing after the alleged thieves when they saw the three (3) farmers.
They inquired from the farmers if Barangay Captain Ballon was with them. Gammuac replied
that Barangay Captain Ballon was in his residence. To this, again for some unknown reason,
petitioner supposedly uttered: "Patayen mi koman" (We should have killed him). The Garma
twins then went back to chasing the group that went fishing, but the Garma twins failed to catch
up with them. When the Garma twins went back to the three (3) farmers, this time, they asked
for the whereabouts of barangay tanod Carmelo Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz). The farmers replied
that they did not know where Dela Cruz was.
The three (3) farmers went straight to the house of Barangay Captain Ballon and told him about
their encounter with the Garma twins. Upon hearing their narrative, for inexplicable reasons,
Barangay Captain Ballon allegedly got so terrified he instantly called the police for assistance
and protection. He speculated that the Garma twins were mad at him purportedly because of
the proposed construction of a water impounding project in Barangay Mabuno that would affect
the Garma twins' fishpond. As Barangay Captain of Mabuno, Ballon was in charge of the
implementation and facilitation of this project. The Garma twins allegedly strongly opposed the
project.
DEFENSE'S VERSION:
Petitioner testified that on February 9, 2010, a group led by Dela Cruz barged into his fenced
property in Barangay Mabuno, Gattaran, Cagayan, and demanded that he show proof of the
boundaries of their property. He readily complied by presenting the survey document of their
property but the group sharply retorted that the document was "useless". He consequently
commented, "if this is useless, then let's just see each other in court." Dela Cruz violently
reacted by suddenly hitting him in the face. A few minutes later, a police officer arrived and
asked the group to leave. Meanwhile, he was brought to the hospital for treatment.
On February 10, 2010, following their release from the hospital, he and his twin brother
Reynaldo visited their fishpond where they caught a group of persons illegally fishing. Upon
seeing them, the group scampered away. They later on discovered that the gate valve and
shafting of the water impounding project got destroyed. A portion of the fence was also cut and
two (2) of the posts got damaged.
He and Reynaldo then planned to seek the assistance of Barangay Captain Ballon regarding
the problems they just encountered. On their way to see the barangay captain, they chanced
upon the three (3) farmers then loading a water pump nearby. They asked them if they knew
where they could find the barangay captain so they could report to him their problems. The
farmers replied that Barangay Captain Ballon was in his residence. But instead of going to
Ballon's house, petitioner and his brother decided to go straight to the Philippine National
Police-Gattaran where they reported the incidents. The PNP-Gattaran, however, did not
respond at all to their report.
Petitioner claimed that the present case was nothing but a harassment suit since Barangay
Captain Ballon wanted them evicted from their land so the construction of the water impounding
project could smoothly proceed.
MTC/RTC DECISION:
MTC: found the petitioner guilty of grave threats under Art. 282 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
Pedrito Garma is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of grave threat and there being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
RTC: Affirmed the decision of the MTC
CA DECISION:
The CA has denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. But modified the penalty
with imprisonment of four (4) months and [one] (1) day as minimum to six (6) months as
maximum, pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos and to pay costs of suit.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the lower court.
SC RULING:
Petitioner is acquitted.
The CA erred when it affirmed the decision of the lower courts.
Under the RPC, grave threats must have an actus reus and mens rea. The actus reus is the
actual speaking or uttering of the threats of, say, death or serious bodily harm. The mens rea is
that the accused intends that the recipient of their words to feel intimidated by their words or
that the accused intended the words to be taken seriously. The words must be meant by the
accused to convey a threat; in other words, the utterance is meant to intimidate or to be taken
seriously. It is not necessary that the recipient themself actually feels intimidated or actually
takes the words seriously. To repeat, all that needs to be proven is that they were intended by
the accused to have that effect.
The following requisites must be present to be convicted for grave threats.
Here, Barangay Captain Ballon admitted that there was no other instance when petitioner or his
brother threatened his person other than the alleged incident on February 9, 2010. Thus,
assuming petitioner indeed uttered such words, Ballon himself was not even sure if he was
threatened at all much less if petitioner intended, by the words he had spoken, to really
intimidate him. He was not sure and showed no circumstances that petitioner would have
intended to carry into effect his words since, by his own admission, petitioner uttered these
words only once. Clearly, not only is the story of the prosecution witness highly incredible, the
prosecution's own version, even if believed, does not show circumstances probative of the
mens rea of grave threats, which was to intimidate Ballon.
In this light, it became incumbent upon Barangay Captain Ballon to prove the fact that there was
a past and deep-seated altercation between him and the twins. The prosecution, however, did
not present any evidence other than his bare allegation that such feud had existed. If indeed
there was a previous altercation, he, being the barangay captain, could have easily summoned
petitioner in the barangay hall, settled the dispute, and recorded it in the barangay blotter. But
there is none presented here. Bare allegations that could have easily been substantiated by
independent evidence are not equivalent to proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders; it is
for the prosecution to demonstrate guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. The
prosecution here evidently failed to overcome the onus probandi of establishing petitioner's guilt
to a moral certainty. It failed to rise on its own merits just as the Court of Appeals erred in
rendering its verdict of conviction based on the weakness of the defense.
In sum, since both the actus reus and the mens rea of grave threats that petitioner threatened
Barangay Captain Ballon with the infliction upon his person of any wrong by uttering "Patayen
mi koman" is wanting, reasonable doubt persists. It is settled that where the basis of conviction
is flawed, this Court must acquit.
12 Barbasa v. Tuquero Teñido
TOPIC: Grave Coercion (Art. 268)
DOCTRINE:
The crime of grave coercion has three elements:
(a) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong;
(b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a
display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the
offended party; and
(c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Grave coercion filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila
FACTS:
Barbasa is the president of Push-Thru Marketing Inc. which leases commercial stalls
in Tutuban Center owned by Tutuban Properties Inc (TPI). Petitioners received a notice of
disconnection utilities from private respondent Grace Guarin, Credit and Collection Manager of
TPI, for failure of Push-Thru Marketing to settle its outstanding obligations for Common Usage
and Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities, electricity and rentals.
Barbasa settled the charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity, but failed to pay
back rentals. Thus, Guarin, Sangalang (engineer manager of TPI), and Callueng (TPI head of
security), together with several armed guards, disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied
by Push-Thru Marketing.
Barbasa filed a criminal complaint against TPI and its officers David Go, Robert
Castanares, Buddy Mariano, Guarin, Dangalang, and Callueng before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila alleging that TPI and its officers cut off the electricity in Barbasa’s stalls “in
a violent and intimidating manner” and by unnecessary employing several armed guards to
intimidate and frighten him and his employees.
Respondents filed their separate counter-affidavits, alleging that the cutting off of
electrical supply was done peacefully; Barbasa was given demand letters/notices in writing at
least three times where it was stated that if he does not settle his arrears, electricity will be cut;
they only cut off the power after sending a Notice of Disconnection of Utilities; and Barbasa had
outstanding + accumulated unpaid rentals, billings and accountabilities. There is also a penalty
in their contract of lease which expressly provides that failure to pay at any time of the lease,
rentals, and premiums corresponding to a total of three (3) months, grants the LESSOR the
option to cut off power and other utility services to the LESSEE.
Barbasa filed his Reply admitting that none of the armed personnel drew his gun, nor
aimed or fired, but insisted that he was unduly prevented from using electricity to the detriment
of his business and person. He also claimed that TPI failed to show the amount of his unpaid
obligations.
Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila: Dismissed the complaint against David Go, Roberto
Castanares, Buddy Mariano and Art Brondia (TPI Officers) but found probable cause against
respondents Grace Guarin, Nestor Sangalang and Victor Calueng.
Information was filed in court but proceedings were deferred when private respondents filed an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice/
Secretary of Justice: Reversed the City Prosecutor’s Resolution
Barbasa filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied, so he elevated it to the CA through
a petition for certiorari, which was dismissed for lack of merit. CA also denied his MR. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Guarin, Sangalang, and Callueng’s act of disconnecting the electricity supply
in Barbasa’s stalls and the manner by which it was carried out constitute grave coercion - NO
SC RULING: *See doctrine for elements of grave coercion
The records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would
produce intimidation upon Barbasa’s employees when the cutting off of his electricity was
effected. It was found to be done peacefully and after a written notice to Barbasa was sent.
We do not subscribe to Barbasa’s claim that the presence of armed guards were
calculated to intimidate him or his employees. Rather, we are more inclined to believe that the
guards were there to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of
TPI’s rights under the lease agreements.
If respondents desired a violent result, they would have gone there unannounced or
cut Barbasa’s electricity through less desirable and conspicuous means. There is also a clear
stipulation under the Penalty Clause. Hence there could be grave coercion in respondent’s act
under the covenants of a contract to which Barbasa had agreed and signed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Resolution of the CA are
hereby AFFIRMED.
13 People vs. Villamar, G.R. No. 121175. November 4, 1998 CAMUNGAO
TOPIC: Grave Coercion
DOCTRINE: The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented
by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against
his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence,
either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently,
control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and
liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under
authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
The offense of grave coercion is necessarily included in illegal detention; as such, an
information for illegal detention will not bar the accused from being convicted of grave coercion,
instead of the original charge
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Illegal detention and frustrated murder
FACTS: On February 11, 1993, Villamar went to the house of the private offended party Cortez
and inquired if the latter was interested in adopting her daughter, explaining that her offer was
due her husband's hasty departure. Unable to refuse, Cortez accepted the offer and
immediately prepared a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to formalize the adoption. Unfortunately, on
June 5, 1993, Villamar, apparently regretting her decision, went to the house of Cortez and
decided to take her daughter back. This sudden reversal was, of course, not taken lightly by
Cortez, who vehemently refused to relinquish custody of the girl to Villamar.
Thereupon, a scuffle ensued between the two, during which Villamar managed to hit Cortez with
a chisel on the head rendering the latter weak and immobilized, after which she threatened her
with a pair of scissors. Villamar was demanding that Cortez reveal where the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" was located. Meanwhile, attracted by the commotion, a curious crowd was already
gathering outside the Cortez residence. Sensing imminent danger, Villamar demanded money
and a get-away vehicle to extricate herself from her predicament. However, on her way to the
car, a melee ensued resulting in her immediate arrest by the responding policemen.
On the defense: Villamar admits that a struggle did occur between her and Cortez, after the
latter refused her request for the return of her child. However, while she acknowledged that she
brandished a pair of scissors before Cortez, this was motivated more out of fear of the crowd
assembled outside the house which might harm her. In other words, in order to protect herself,
she had to use Cortez as a "human shield" to keep the crowd at bay.
MTC/RTC DECISION: The trial court convicted Villamar for serious illegal detention and less
serious physical injuries, but at the same time acquitted her on the charge of frustrated murder.
CA DECISION: n/a
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in convicting Villamar with serious illegal detention
and less serious physical injuries.
SC RULING: Villamar convicted only of grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6)
months of arresto mayor.
The Court ruled that the actuations of Villamar appear to be more of a product of a mother's
desperation and distraught mind when her pleas for the return of her child was refused by
Cortez, unmindful of the consequences which her reckless outburst would cause to the latter.
Thus, the Court rejected the kidnapping charge where there was not the slightest hint of a
motive for the crime. Likewise, the Court rejected the prosecution contention that Villamars
demand for money in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) from Cortez constitutes
a ransom within the contemplation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
But the Court only convicted Villamar of grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months
of arresto mayor. The Court found that when accused-appellant coerced Cortez to reveal the
whereabouts of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" for the purpose of destroying the same, the act
merely constituted grave coercion, as provided in Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. The
crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be
it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material
force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the
will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another
has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in
the exercise of any lawful right.
While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something against the latter's will, it must be stressed
that the same cannot be categorized as an act of illegal detention. Still, when Villamar was
erroneously charged for illegal detention, such oversight will not preclude a guilty verdict for the
crime of grave coercion.
In the previous decided cases, the Court ruled that the offense of grave coercion is necessarily
included in illegal detention; as such, an information for illegal detention will not bar the accused
from being convicted of grave coercion, instead of the original charge. Regarding the imposable
penalty, while we are aware that on February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7890 was passed
increasing the penalty for crimes involving grave coercion from arresto mayor to prision
correccional, such amendatory law will not be applicable in the instant case, for the simple
reason that the offense was committed on June 5, 1993 two years before the said law was
enacted. Villamar should not, therefore, be unduly prejudiced by the imposition of a more
severe penalty than that provided in the law then in force.
Hence, the penalty ofarresto mayor, which is from one month and one day to six months, is the
proper penalty imposable for the offense of grave coercion.
14 Timoner vs. People, 125 SCRA 830 Aguinaldo
TOPIC: Grave Coercions (Art. 286)
DOCTRINE: Grave coercion is committed when “a person who, without authority of law, shall by
means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do
something against his will, either it be right or wrong.”
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Grave Coercion
FACTS:
At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines
Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six
laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main thoroughfare of the
same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber
slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among
the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining
witness, and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia Rebustillos. These establishments had
been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for noncompliance
with certain health and sanitation requirements.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte
against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2257, alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well
as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.
Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were charged with the
offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet. As already noted, the said court
exonerated the two policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime charged as principal by
inducement.
Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon’s barbershop was done in
abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.
MTC/RTC DECISION: found petitioner guilty of the crime of grave coercion
CA DECISION: affirmed the decision of the trial court
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of grave coercion (NO)

14 Timoner vs. People, 125 SCRA 830 Aguinaldo
SC RULING: (Acquitted)
In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid
recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the
performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability.
Grave coercion is committed when “a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of
violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do
something against his will, either it be right or wrong.”1 The three elements of grave coercion
are: [1] that any person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the prevention or
compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would
produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and [3] that the person who
restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the
restraint was not made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right.
The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave
coercion.
15 Ong Chiu Kwan v. CA, 345 SCRA 586 DELA CRUZ
TOPIC: Art. 287 - Unjust vexation
DOCTRINE:
CHARGE/INFORMATION: On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. Bayona

of Bacolod filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bacolod City an information charging petitioner
with unjust vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of “Crazy
Feet,” a business establishment owned and operated by Mildred Ong.
FACTS:
On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to
“relocate” the telephone, electric and water lines of “Crazy Feet,” because said lines posed as a
disturbance. However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit from appropriate authorities
allowing him to cut the electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the business
establishment.
MTC/RTC DECISION:
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of
unjust vexation, and sentenced him to “imprisonment for twenty days.” The court also ordered
him to pay moral damages,finding that the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water
pipe and telephone lines of “Crazy Feet” caused the interruption of its business operations
15 Ong Chiu Kwan v. CA, 345 SCRA 586 DELA CRUZ
during peak hours, to the detriment of its owner, Mildred Ong. The trial court also awarded
exemplary damages to complainant “as a deterrent to the accused not to follow similar act in
the future and to pay attorney’s fees.”
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the latter court in a decision dated
December 8, 1992, simplistically adopted the decision of the lower court in toto, without stating
the reasons for doing so.
CA DECISION: On April 22, 1993, by petition for review, Ong Chiu Kwan elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals. On August 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
dismissing the appeal, agreeing with the lower court’s finding that petitioner was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of unjust vexation.
ISSUE: Whether Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation. Yes.
SC RULING: WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, accused Ong Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00,
and the costs. The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is hereby
deleted. (WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In
lieu thereof, accused Ong Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, and the
costs. The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is hereby deleted.
(CONVICTED)
Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of
complainant’s business establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He failed,
however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permits or authorization to relocate the
lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone services during peak
hours of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioner’s act unjustly
annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for
unjust vexation.
16 Baleros, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 138033 GREFAL
TOPIC: Unjust vexation/Light Coercion
DOCTRINE: There is no need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for

unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or
compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an
innocent person. The paramount question is whether the offender's act causes annoyance,
irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Attempted Rape
FACTS: Malou with her Maid, Marvilou, occupied Room 307. In the evening of December 12,
inside Unit 307, Malou retired around 10:30. Outside, right in front of her bedroom door,
Marvilou slept on a folding bed. Early morning of the following day, Malou was awakened by the
smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. Somebody was pinning her down on
the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth
with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight. Malou continued fighting off her attacker by
kicking him until at last her right hand got free. She was able to grab hold of his sex organ which
she then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. Over
the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako.”
She did not know who it was. Malou proceeded to seek help from her classmates in Room 310.
Malou saw her bed, topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue. Aside from the window
with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom was now
open. Her attacker had fled from her room going through the left bedroom window.
According to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building at 1:30 in the
early morning of December 13, 1991, and requested permission to to Room 306. This Unit was
being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was asking permission to enter, only
Joseph Bernard Africa was in the room. He asked CHITO to produce the required written
authorization and when CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused, but later, relented.
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to talk to
Chito. He mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that they were not being
allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.
Christian and his roommates, Bernard and Lutgardo were called to the building and were asked
by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging to their unit. Loyloy, another roommate,
went inside to search the Unit and found a gray “Khumbella” bag cloth type from inside their unit
which they did not know was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When he saw
the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to Chito as he had seen the latter
usually bringing it to school inside the classroom. The CIS opened the bag and pulled out its
contents, among others, a white t-shirt with a Tau Sigma Phi sign a Black Adidas short pants, a
handkerchief, 3 white T-shirts, an underwear, and socks. The forensic Chemist conducted a
laboratory examination and found the night dress and the handkerchief testing positive for
chloroform, a volatile poison.
MTC/RTC DECISION: Convicted petitioner of Attempted Rape.
CA DECISION: Affirmed RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the accused may be held liable for attempted rape (NO)
SC RULING: Convicted of Unjust Vexation/Light Coercion instead of Attempted Rape.

It would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the
mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and
necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of
any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that
petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let
alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if
that was really his immediate intention, is anybody's guess.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises,
of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation
that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during
the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and
having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down.
Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted
rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion
under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the context of the
constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation, it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the
inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the information against
petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to make his defense.
There is no need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation.
As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the
reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent
person. The paramount question is whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation,
torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. That Malou,
after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a
sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she
was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
17 People v. Alfeche Paquinto
TOPIC: Article 312 - Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Propery
DOCTRINE:
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Grave Threats and Usurpation
FACTS: A complaint for Grave Threats and Usurpation of Real Property was filed against
Dimalata and Fuentes, and after the appropriate preliminary investigation wherein Dimalanta
presented evidence showing that (1) he is the real successor-in-interest of the alleged owner of
the land; and (2) that the threat was established to have been directed against the
complainants’ tenant-encargado (overseer), Azzaraga (Assistant Provincial Prosec) issued a
Resolution, finding prima facie evidence of guilt of the crime charged. The complainants are
co-owners of the property allegedly usurped.
Azzaraga filed Information for “Usurpation of Real rights in Property defined and penalized
under Art. 312 in re Art. 282, RPC'' with the RTC of Capiz, docketed and raffled to Branch 15.
Judge Alfeche of Branch 15 dismissed the case motu proprio on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction considering that “the crime committed by the accused falls under Article 312 of the
RPC and the violence or intimidation by the accused is a means to commit it or a mere incident
in its commission, hence, the threat is absorbed by the crime charged,” and considering that
“the imposable fine is from P200-P500” because the value of the gain cannot be ascertained.
Azzaraga filed MR alleging that it is true that the crime charged is not a complex crime and if
mention is made of Art 282, that is because “the penalty under Art. 312 is dependent on Art
282. Art. 312 borrows the pertinent provision on penalty from Article 282, because Article 312
does not provide a penalty" as "Article 312 expressly provides that the penalty for the violence
shall likewise be imposed in addition to the fine." In the instant case, the intimidation consists of
the threat to kill the encargado, penalized under Article 282; considering that the accused
attained their purpose, the penalty imposable thereunder is that which is one degree lower than
that prescribed by law for the crime they had threatened to commit — homicide.” This MR was
denied by Judge Alfeche.
MTC/RTC DECISION:
CA DECISION:
ISSUE:
(a) Whether the penalty prescribed under Art. 282 is the basis for the imposable penalty in
the crime defined in Art. 312
(b) Whether the crime charged in the information is not complexed with Art. 282 by the
mere allegation in the caption of the information that it is a prosecution under Art. 312 in
re Art. 282.
SC RULING: The orders of Judge Alfeche are SET ASIDE. Either the Information be amended
or be dismissed on the ground that it does not charge an offense.
Article 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. -

Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take
possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to
another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him,
shall be punished by a fine from 50 to 100 per centum of the gain which he shall have
obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine of from 200 to 500 pesos shall be
imposed.
The offense defined here is one of the crimes against property found under Title 10 of the RPC,
and is committed in the same manner as the crime of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons defined under Art. 294. The main difference is that the former involves
real property or real rights in property, while the latter involves personal property. In other words,
Art. 312 would have been denominated as robbery if the object taken is personal property.
The phrase “by means of violence against or intimidation of persons” in Art 312 refers tot he
same phrase provided in Art. 294.
There are 5 classes of robbery under Art. 294, namely:

(a) Robbery with homicide (par. 1)
(b) Robbery with rape, intentional mutilation, or the physical injuries penalized under Art.
263 (par. 2).
(c) Robbery with the physical injuries under Sub 2, Art. 268. (par 3)
(d) Robbery committed with unnecessary violence or with physical injuries covered under
Sub 3-4, Art. 263 (par. 4); and
(e) Robbery in other cases, or simple robbery (par. 5) where the violence agasint or
intimidation of persons cannot be subsumed by, or where it is not sufficiently specified
so as to fall under, the first 4 pars.
Paragraphs one to four of Article 294 indisputably involve the use of violence against persons.
The actual physical force inflicted results in death, rape, mutilation or the physical injuries
therein enumerated. The simple robbery under paragraph five may cover physical injuries not
included in paragraphs two to four. Thus, when less serious physical injuries or slight physical
injuries are inflicted upon the offended party on the occasion of a robbery, the accused may be
prosecuted for and convicted of robbery under paragraph five.
“Intimidation” means “unlawful coercion, extortion, duress, putting in fear”. To take or in attempt
to take, “by intimidation” means “willfully to take, or attempt to take, by putting in fear of bodily
harm.”
Pars. 1-5 of Art. 294 are single, special, and indivisible felonies, not complex crimes as defined
under Art. 48. The penalties imposed do not take into account the value of the personal
property taken, but the gravity of the effect or consequence of the violence or intimidation.
Art. 312 may also be considered to be defining the single, special, and indivisible crime of
occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property by means of violence against
or in intimidation of persons. It is not a complex crime. However, while Article 294 provides a
single penalty for each class of crime therein defined, Article 312 provides a single, albeit
two-tiered, penalty consisting of a principal penalty, which is that incurred for the acts of
violence, and an additional penalty of fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the
accused. For want of a better term, the additional penalty may be designated as an incremental
penalty.
What Article 312 means then is that when the occupation of real property is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, the accused may be prosecuted under an
information for the violation thereof, and not for a separate crime involving violence or
intimidation. But, whenever, appropriate, he may be sentenced to suffer the penalty for the acts
of violence and to pay a fine based on the value of the gain obtained.
Thus, if by reason or on the occasion of such occupation or usurpation, the crime of homicide,
or any of the physical injuries penalized in either subdivisions 1 or 2 of Article 263 is committed;
OR when accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation; OR when, in the course of its
execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission
any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263; OR when it is
committed through intimidation or through the infliction of physical injuries not covered by
subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263, i.e., physical injuries penalized under Articles 265 and 266,
the accused may be convicted for the violation of Article 312.
However, he shall be sentenced: (a) to suffer the penalty for homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation and physical injuries provided under subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263, other physical
injuries 18 or for the intimidation, which may fall under Article 282 (Grave Threats) or Article 286
(Grave Coercion) of the Revised Penal Code, as the case may be, AND (b) to pay a fine based
on the value of the gain obtained by him, which shall be an amount equivalent to 50 to 100% of
such gain, but in no case less than P75 pesos, provided, however, that if such value cannot be
ascertained, the fine shall be from 200 to 500 (P200.00 to P500.00) pesos.
In the case at bar, Judge Alfeche erred.

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MARCH 15

# Case Title & G.R. No. SURNAME

SC RULING: (State if Acquitted or Convicted)

(State if the ruling affirmed/modified/reversed the RTC/CA Decision)

(Body of the Ruling relevant to the discussion)

Art. 252, 256-258 and 263-266, RPC

Arts. 267-270; 124; 125, 145, 342, and 343, RPC

Art. 282-287, 298, and 312 RPC

CHARGE/INFORMATION: Murder with Double Frustrated Murder

1. Article 247 reads in full:

TOPIC: ARTICLE 263. Serious Physical Injuries

CHARGE/INFORMATION: Serious physical injuries

RTC: Affirmed the conviction

3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in

3 Duropan vs. People, G.R. No. 230825 DELA PAZ

CHARGE/INFORMATION: Unlawful arrest

On or about the evening of March 7, 2009, in Barangay Lincod, Municipality of Maribojoc,

Acts committed contrary to the provision of Art. 269, RPC

In their affidavits, Duropan and Coloma claimed that:

In their Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC

RTC DECISION: Affirmed the MCTC (modified the imposed penalty).

CA DECISION: Affirmed the RTC decision

SC RULING: DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF CA ARE AFFIRMED

THE SC AFFIRMED THE PETITIONERS’ CONVICTION

CRIMES IN THE RPC PERTAINING TO THE CURLTAILMENT OF A PERSON’S LIBERTY

ART. 267 & 268

ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL ARREST

making the arrest.

1. (INVITATION) Babst vs. National Intelligence Board: An invitation to attend a hearing

ISSUE #2: Pacis’ apprehension was not pursuant to an arrest warrant.

Duropan – Barangay Kagawad: A barangay kagawad is a member of the legislative council of

Coloma – Barangay Tanod: A barangay tanod is deemed as an agent of persons in authority

While deemed as persons in authority and agents of persons in authority, respectively,

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private

APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR:

4 Osorio vs. Navera, G.R. No. 223272, 26 Feb. 2018 Aguinaldo

CHARGE/INFORMATION: Kidnapping and serious illegal detention

MTC/RTC DECISION: kidnapping and serious illegal detention

TOPIC: Kidnapping for Ransom

ISSUE: Whether the conviction of Damayo must stand. - Yes.

TOPIC: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 247)

CHARGE/INFORMATION: 2 Informations were filed charging AVANCENA, POPIOCO, TAYTAY,

Crim. Case No. 04-2817

Crim Case No. 04-2818

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

1. the accused was a private person;

7 People vs. Trestiza Somera

TOPIC: Art. 267 - Kidnapping

CHARGE/INFORMATION: Kidnapping for Ransom

CA DECISION: Affirmed the trial court’s decision.

SC RULING: Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

8 People vs. Santiano, 299 SCRA 583 GONZALES

CHARGE/INFORMATION: Accused-appellants Alipio Santiano, Jose Sandigan, Armenia

CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND.

SC RULING: Convicted. RTC ruling affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

TOPIC: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

CHARGE/INFORMATION: Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder,