(CRIMREV) March 22
(CRIMREV) March 22
(CRIMREV) March 22
DEADLINE: MARCH 21
TOPIC:
DOCTRINE:
CHARGE/INFORMATION:
FACTS:
Note:
1. If material sa case, be specific with the dates
2. Show the transition of the case (from commission to ruling)
MTC/RTC DECISION:
CA DECISION:
ISSUE:
TOPIC: Arts. 267-270; 124; 125, 145, 342, and 343, RPC
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: Duropan and Coloma were Barangay Kagawad and Barangay Tanod, respectively, of
Lincod, Maribojoc, Bohol.
The Abatan Lincod Mangroves Nipa Growers Organization (ALIMANGO) is a cooperative duly
registered with the Cooperative Development authority. It was authorized to develop, utilize, and
protect the Mangrove-Nipa Area in Maribojoc. Its members cut, gather, and weave nipa palms.
March 7, 2009 at 11:30AM: Duropan, Coloma, and another barangay official saw Pacis,
Baldoza, Moquila, Magbanua, and Zambra harvesting nipa palm in a plantation. Coloma
approached them and asked who gave them authority to harvest. Pacis replied that they were
ALIMANGO members.
Doubting Pacis, Duropan and Coloma pushed Pacis and his companions on board 2 paddle
boats. Pacis protested and inquired whether Duropan and Coloma can arrest them without a
warrant, but to no avail, the group was brought to the Police Station of Maribojoc.
Upon investigation, Pacis and his companions were released. The Maribojoc Chief of Police
determined that the barangay officials had no legal basis to arrest Pacis.
Petitioners posit that not all the elements of the crime were present. They argue that
complainant Pacis was not arrested, but was merely invited to the police station. They contend
that it was their duty to investigate whether he was authorized to harvest the nipa leaves. They
argue that they had reasons to doubt his claim, considering that he referred to ALIMANGO
Organization as "ALIMANGO Association." Moreover, they believed in good faith that the land
he was harvesting from belonged to Cabalit.
Respondent argument: Petitioners’ guilt was sufficiently proved. Despite reports of rampant
illegal cutting of mangrove and nipa, petitioners ought to be diligent in verifying reports rather
than surreptitiously arresting a private person.
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Unlawful
Arrest. (Art. 269)
It found that all the essential elements of the crime were present and noted that both accused
admitted to knowing Pacis prior to the arrest. It reasoned that instead of immediately arresting
them, Duropan and Coloma should have given them time to prove their claim. It noted that this
is relevant since the accused themselves had no proof that a certain Calvin Cabanlit owns the
area where Pacis and his group cut nipas.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners Duropan and Coloma arrested William Pacis. (YES)
2. Whether or not there was reasonable ground to arrest Pacis, which warrants petitioners’
acquittal from the charge of unlawful arrest. (NONE)
The MCTC charged and convicted petitioners with the crime of unlawful arrest penalized under
Art. 269 of the RPC.
ISSUE #1: However petitioners opt to call it, it was evident that Pacis was taken into the
barangay officials’ custody based on their belief that he committed a crime, either
because he was allegedly committing theft, or because he became violent. Their intent to
arrest Pacis was clearly established.
The crime of unlawful arrest punishes an offender's act of arresting or detaining another to
deliver him or her to the proper authorities, when the arrest or detention is not authorized, or
that there is no reasonable ground to arrest or detain the other. Any person may be indicted for
the crime of unlawful arrest.
Duropan vs. People, G.R. No. 230825 DELA PAZ
People vs. Malasugui: A public officer may be exculpated from the crime of unlawful arrest
under specific circumstances:
1. Under the law, members of the Insular Police or Constabulary as well as those of the
municipal police and of chartered cities, and even townships
2. May make arrests without judicial warrant, not only when a crime is committed or about
to be committed in their presence
3. But also when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect that one has
been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested by them.
A public officer who does not have the authority to arrest shall be criminally liable. Even when a
public officer is authorized to arrest, he or she must have a judicial warrant. However, when the
enumerated circumstances exist, the absence of a judicial warrant justified and does not
expose the public officer to criminal liability.
A public officer who has no duty to arrest or detain a person is deemed a private individual, in
contemplation of Articles 267 and 268 of the Revised Penal Code. Even when a public officer
has the legal duty to arrest or detain another, but he or she fails to show legal grounds for
detention, "the public officer is deemed to have acted in a private capacity and is considered a
'private individual."
Inquiry is incumbent on whether the person implementing the arrest has the official duty to
arrest or detain, and whether he or she had reasonable ground to effect the apprehension in
that instance.
In the crime of unlawful arrest, the offender who arrested or detained another intended to
Duropan vs. People, G.R. No. 230825 DELA PAZ
deliver the apprehended person to the proper authorities, considering he or she does not have
the authority. This act of conducting the apprehended persons to the proper authorities takes
the offense out of the crime of illegal detention.
Arrest is defined by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as “the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is an
actual restraint of a person to be arrested or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.
However, jurisprudence instructs that there need not be an actual restraint for curtailment of
liberty to be characterized as an “arrest”:
Hence, arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there
be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
Pacis' apprehension was not pursuant to an arrest warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised
Duropan vs. People, G.R. No. 230825 DELA PAZ
Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates instances when warrantless arrests are lawful:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the arresting officer must have
personal knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under Section 5(a), the arresting
officer must have personally witnessed the crime; meanwhile, under Section 5(b), the arresting
officer must have had probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed an
offense. Nonetheless, whether under Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest generally precedes,
or is substantially contemporaneous, with the search.
In direct contrast with warrantless searches incidental to a lawful arrest, stop and frisk searches
are conducted to deter crime.
For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer must have had personal knowledge of
facts, which would engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit act. Cogaed
emphasized that anything less than the arresting officer's personal observation of a suspicious
circumstance as basis for the search is an infringement of the "basic right to security of one's
person and effects."
For purposes of a valid Terry stop-and-frisk search, the test for the existence of reasonable
suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal activity is the totality of the circumstances,
viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, prudent police officer.
Accordingly, to sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should have
personally observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would then
create a reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting officer to investigate
further.
nipa;
2. They personally knew Pacis; and
3. They were uncertain that Cabalit owns the land where they found Pacis and his group.
Petitioners had no reason to suspect any wrongdoing.
Petitioners invoke paragraph (a) to justify their warrantless arrest – The argument is
invalid.
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, two elements must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Here, there was no overt act within petitioners' plain view which hinted that Pacis was
committing a crime. During his apprehension, Pacis has not committed, was not committing, nor
was he about to commit a crime. The warrantless arrest in this case was unlawful.
TOPIC: Kidnapping
DOCTRINE:
Kidnapping is not part of the functions of a soldier. Even if a public officer has the legal duty to
detain a person, the public officer must be able to show the existence of legal grounds for the
detention. Without these legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have acted in a private
capacity and is considered a "private individual." The public officer becomes liable for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention punishable by reclusion perpetua, not with arbitrary
detention punished with significantly lower penalties.
FACTS:
Together with his superior officer, Major General Jovito Palparan (Major General Palparan),
SSgt. Osorio was charged in two (2) Informations before Branch 14, Regional Trial Court,
Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping University of the Philippines students Karen E. Empeño
(Empeño) and Sherlyn T. Cadapan (Cadapan).
The next day, at about 3:00 p.m., SSgt. Osorio was arrested by Colonel Herbert Yambing, the
Provost Marshall General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. SSgt. Osorio was turned over
to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Unit Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City and was
detained in Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to the Philippine Army Custodial
Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is currently detained.
Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals on July 21, 2015.
Osorio vs. Navera, G.R. No. 223272, 26 Feb. 2018 Aguinaldo
SSgt. Osorio mainly argued that courts-martial, not a civil court such as the Regional Trial
Court, had jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active duty
and that the offense charged was allegedly "service-connected." In the alternative, SSgt. Osorio
argued that the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case because among his coaccused was Major
General Palparan, a public officer with salary grade higher than 28.
SSgt. Osorio added that he could not be charged with the felony of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention because under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony may only be
committed by a private individual, not a ranking officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Lastly, he claimed deprivation of due process because he was allegedly charged without
undergoing proper preliminary investigation.
CA DECISION: Court of Appeals denied SSgt. Osorio's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer may be charged with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that the provision speaks of
"any private individual." (YES)
SC RULING: (DENIED- Certiorari on denied Petition for Habeas Corpus by lower courts)
Republic Act No. 7055, 51 Section 1 provides that if the accused is a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the crime involved is one punished under the Revised Penal
Code, civil courts shall have the authority to hear, try, and decide the case.
Under Section 1 of RA 7055, the only time courts-martial may assume jurisdiction is if, before
arraignment, the civil court determines that the offense is "service-connected." These
service-connected offenses are found in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to
97 of the Articles of War.
SSgt. Osorio was charged with kidnapping, a crime punishable under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code. Applying Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1, the case shall be tried by a civil court,
specifically by the Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over the crime of kidnapping. The
processes which the trial court issued, therefore, were valid.
Contrary to SSgt. Osorio's claim, the offense he committed was not service-connected. The
case filed against him is none of those enumerated under Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92,
and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War.
Further, kidnapping is not part of the functions of a soldier. Even if a public officer has the legal
duty to detain a person, the public officer must be able to show the existence of legal grounds
for the detention. Without these legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have acted in a
private capacity and is considered a "private individual." The public officer becomes liable for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention punishable by reclusion perpetua, not with arbitrary
detention punished with significantly lower penalties.
Osorio vs. Navera, G.R. No. 223272, 26 Feb. 2018 Aguinaldo
All told, the arrest warrants against SSgt. Osorio were issued by the court that has jurisdiction
over the offense charged. SSgt. Osorio's restraint has become legal; hence, the remedy of
habeas corpus is already moot and academic. 58 SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy is to pursue the
orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies, the first of which would be a motion to
quash, filed before arraignment, on the following grounds: the facts charged do not constitute
an offense; the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and the officer
who filed the information had no authority to do so.
DOCTRINE:
In order that the accused can be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (a) the
offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3)
any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. Also, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting
ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. It is settled that the curtailment of the
victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the latter's person and it is not
necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. The crime of
serious illegal detention is committed by detaining a person or depriving him in any manner of
his liberty. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable
proof the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Damayo was indicted for Kidnapping for Ransom under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
On August 7, 2008, at 12:00 noon, Jerome Rosario, then eleven (11) years old, was outside his
school at Sucat Elementary School, Brgy. Sucat, Muntinlupa City when Damayo, known to him
as Kuya Frank, approached and told him that he was there to fetch him as they were going
somewhere. Since Jerome was familiar with Damayo, he went with him and both boarded a
jeep bound for Pasay. Upon arriving at Pasay, they boarded a bus. Jerome did not know where
People v. Damayo, G.R. No. 232361 DELA CRUZ
Worried that Jerome had not returned from school, his parents Edna Rosario and Jerry Rosario
started to look for Jerome. When they chanced upon Daryll, a classmate of Jerome, and asked
him on his whereabouts, Daryll informed them that an unknown man had taken Jerome during
dismissal time. Edna and Jerry then reported the incident to the barangay, where it was
blottered.
The next day, August 8, 2008, Edna received a call on her daughter's cellphone from a person
who introduced himself as Jerome's classmate. The man, whom Edna recognized to be
Damayo, stated that Jerome was with him and will be let go, provided that he will be given
P150,000.00 and Edna will be unaccompanied when they meet. He directed her to meet him at
a terminal in Dau, Pampanga.
The following day, August 9, 2008, Edna and Jerry went to the Muntinlupa City Police Station to
report the matter. An operation was planned to retrieve Jerome, where it was agreed that upon
meeting Damayo at the designated meet-up point, Edna would touch Damayo's arm, signaling
to the police his identity.
At 2:00 P.M. of the same date, Edna, Jerry, and the police officers, namely, Senior Police Officer
4 (SPO4) Elias Nero, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Rudolph Delmendo, PO3 Roberto Lanting and
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Julkabra Sulaiman, proceeded to the Dau terminal in Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Upon seeing Damayo, Edna touched his arm which prompted the police to arrest
him. After handcuffing him, informing him of his arrest and reading him his constitutional rights,
the police asked Damayo where Jerome was being kept. Damayo told them that Jerome was at
his house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San Fernando, Pampanga. They proceeded to the area and
were able to safely recover Jerome.
MTC/RTC DECISION: After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated July 29, 2015, finding
Damayo guilty beyond reasonable of the crime charged. the Court finds accused Francisco
Damayo y Jaime guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
under the first (the private complainant is a minor) and second (for the purpose of extorting
ransom) paragraphs of Article 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua without possibility of parole.
The RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence which established that on August 7, 2006,
Damayo took Jerome Rosario y Sampaga (Jerome),who was then eleven years of age, from his
school and brought the latter to his house in Pampanga where he deprived the said victim of his
personal liberty for three (3) days and that Damayo demanded ransom of P150,000.00 from
Edna, Jerome's mother, for the release of her son from captivity. According to the RTC, Jerome
convincingly testified on the events that transpired during the kidnapping incident from August 7
to 9, 2006 and positively identified Damayo as his abductor. The RTC rejected the defense of
denial interposed by Damayo because it was not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.
CA DECISION:On January 30, 2017, the CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming Damayo's
conviction with modification as to the award of damages
People v. Damayo, G.R. No. 232361 DELA CRUZ
SC RULING: The appeal is DISMISSED.The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January
30, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07683 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Francisco
Damayo y Jaime is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for
parole.
The elements of kidnapping as embodied in Article 267 of RPC have been sufficiently
proven in the case at bench. It is undisputed that Damayo is a private individual, and that he
took Jerome from his school at Sucat Elementary School, Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City on
August 7, 2008 at 12:00 noon, brought said victim to his house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San
Fernando, Pampanga, and kept him there until he was safely recovered by his parents and the
police officers on August 9, 2008. That Damayo had no justification whatsoever to detain
Jerome is undeniable.
Although it was not established that Jerome was placed inside an enclosure or was locked up,
he was nonetheless deprived of his liberty because he cannot leave the place where Damayo
brought him as the latter remained outside and kept watch of him. This only goes to show that
Jerome was constantly guarded by Damayo during the period of his captivity. Also, let it be
underscored that leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if
he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of
liberty inasmuch as under this situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and control of
the abductor
Here, bringing minor Jerome to a house located somewhere in Pampanga, a place which is
totally unfamiliar to him and very far from his residence at Sucat, Muntinlupa City, would
constitute denial of the said victim's liberty. Even if Jerome had the freedom of locomotion
inside the house of Damayo, he did not have the freedom to leave the same at will or escape
therefrom because he did not know where to go and could not possibly go back home to his
mother Edna as he didn't know how to do so. Jerome was merely waiting and hoping that he
would be brought home or that his parents would fetch him. Verily, the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt that Damayo intended to deprive Jerome of his liberty,
and his parents, with the custody of their minor son.
Jerome's testimony prevails over the statement he gave in the affidavit which he previously
executed. It is settled that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that
affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.
At any rate, the inconsistency adverted to by Damayo is negligible and merely refers to a minor
detail that does not bear relevance on the material and significant fact that Damayo kidnapped
Jerome. It does not pertain to the why's and wherefore's of the crime, as to adversely affect the
reliability of the People's evidence as a whole. An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with
the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction.
People v. Damayo, G.R. No. 232361 DELA CRUZ
Thus, whether Jerome was taken by force or not is of no moment. What is controlling is the
act of the accused in detaining the victim against his will after the offender is able to take
the victim in his custody. Besides, it is settled that the carrying away of the victim can either
be made forcibly or fraudulently, as in this case. Anent the inconsistencies in the testimony of
witness Edna cited by Damayo, suffice it to say that they are mere trifles which could not
discredit her testimony nor diminish her credibility.
In a crude effort to muddle the case for the prosecution, Damayo asserts that he and Edna were
lovers and that he took Jerome from his school and brought him to Pampanga upon Edna's
request. Damayo explains that he and Edna had considered transferring Jerome to a school in
Pampanga. He claims that it had been the practice for Edna and Jerome to spend their
weekends with him at their rented home in Pampanga.
What destroys the veracity of Damayo's claims is the categorical and credible
declaration of Jerome that he and his mother have never stayed in Pampanga with
Damayo at any given time, and that he has never been in Pampanga before the kidnapping
incident. Case law has it that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit,
and that the testimony of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful
than that of older persons.
Edna, on the other hand, vehemently denied that she and Damayo were lovers and that she
gave him an instruction to bring Jerome to Pampanga. We agree with the courts a quo that
Edna has not given her consent for Damayo to take and keep her son. This is evident from the
fact that Edna, together with her husband, wasted no time and went through the trouble of going
to Jerome's school to look for their son when the latter failed to go home at around 4 o'clock in
the afternoon on August 7, 2008 and in having the incident of the taking of Jerome by a male
person to be blottered before the Barangay Office of the Sucat, Muntinlupa City. This is,
likewise, clear from the plea of Edna, via cellular phone, for Damayo to bring home her son.
Apart from Damayo's bare assertion, no other evidence was adduced by the defense to
substantiate his claim that he and Edna were lovers. Lastly, the Court determines that the
qualifying circumstance of extortion of ransom being the purpose of Damayo in
kidnapping Jerome was duly alleged in the Information and has been sufficiently
established by the prosecution. Edna clearly testified that on August 8, 2008 at around 8
o'clock in the morning, she received a call from Damayo who demanded that he be given
P150,000.00 in exchange for the safe release of Jerome and that the ransom payout shall be
held at the Dau Terminal, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Damayo never rebutted this particular
testimony of Edna. The fact that he did not receive the ransom payment is of no consequence.
Actual payment of ransom is not necessary for the crime to be committed. It is enough that the
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.
People v. Avanceña, 826 SCRA 414,GR 200512, June 17, 2017 Paquinto
DOCTRINE:
That on or about August 1, 2004 in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then private individuals and armed with
handguns, conspiring, confederating. and mutually helping one another, did then and there, with
the use of force, threat, violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
kidnap and deprive Rizaldo Policarpio y Legaspi of his liberty against his will for purposes of
extorting money in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (₱l50,000.00) as a condition for
his release; That said Rizaldo Policarpio y Legaspi was in fact only released after he was
illegally detained for almost seven hours and after his father had paid the amount of Four
Thousand Pesos (₱4,000.00) to the accused to the damage and prejudice of Rizaldo Policarpio
y Legaspi in whatever amounts that may be awarded him under the provisions of the New Civil
Code.
That on or about August 9. 2004 along Evangelista St., Barangay Bangkal, Makati City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then armed with
handguns, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, did
then and there, by means of threat and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
from Alfonso Policarpio the amount of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (₱6,000.00) against his will
and to the damage and prejudice of said Alfonso Policarpio in whatever amounts that may be
awarded him under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
FACTS: On April 26, 2005, Avancena, Popioco, Nazareno, and Taytay were arraigned where
they entered a plea of not guilty.
Rizaldo (kidnapping victim) testified that at around 12:30AM of August 1, 2004, he went to 7/11
located in the corner of Evangelista st., Pasay City to buy a sandwich. He boarded his
Tamaraw FX and as he drove, he noticed a Gray Isuzu Crosswind vehicle, with no headlight
and plate number, following him. Rizaldo then decided to head to the nearest police precinct
on Evangelista Street. Upon alighting his vehicle, he heard a man calling him (which he later
found out to be Avancena). Avancena alighted from their gray vehicle across the street. Rizaldo
knew him because they live in the same barangay. Avancena told Rizaldo that one of his
companions in the vehicle noticed Rizaldo received illegal drugs. Rizaldo denied. Avancena
instructed him that they should board Rizaldo’s vehicle because Avancena was going to
introduce him to the group’s team leader, Abalo.
While they were boarding Rizaldo’s vehicle, Rizaldo noticed Avancena calling out his
companions from the gray vehicle, to which they alighted their vehicle and approached them.
Abalo boarded the backseat of Rizaldo’s vehicle. Upon Avancena’s request, they distanced the
vehicle 50 meters away from the police precinct and went to the corner of Kaiga street where
Avancena asked Rizaldo again about a certain person which the latter does not know.
People v. Avanceña, 826 SCRA 414,GR 200512, June 17, 2017 Paquinto
Avancena then suggested that they should talk 5 blocks away from the precinct.
At the corner of Lacuna and Evangelista Street, Avancena alighted and talked to his
companions in the gray vehicle. He boarded Rizaldo’s vehicle again and told Rizaldo to move to
the passenger’s side. He followed since Avancena had a gun. When he was moving to the
passenger’s side, he was surprised that Taytay opened the passenger’s door, boarded the
vehicle, and handcuffed him. When he asked Avancena why this was happening, the latter did
not respond.
Avancena drove to the PDEA parking lot at Adriatico St., Malate. Upon arriving, the
handcuffs were removed and Rizaldo was boarded to the gray vehicle. He was handcuffed
again by Taytay whom he asked for an explanation, but did not respond. Avancena, Taytay,
Abalo, together with the rest, boarded the Gray vehicle and drove through Taft, Libertad and
went around going to Makati. Abalo alighted when they reached Roxas Boulevard and
Tambo road. Then, they drove through EDSA on the way to Makati. Once parked along
Makati Ave in front of the Landmark Dept Store, Avancena and 1 of his companions alighted
from the vehicle. After 30 mins, they came back to the vehicle and drove to Pasay road again
to return to the PDEA parking lot. While onboard, Rizaldo was asked again about people he
didn’t knew, and the group started hurting him. Taytay was strangling him on his left side,
Nazareno was holding him on his right side, and Popioco was punching him. Rizaldo pleaded
but to no avail.
Upon arriving at PDEA Parking, avancena told Rizaldo that they would release him if his father
would pay them P150,000. Rizaldo said his father does not have enough money. Avancena
removed his handcuffs and they alighted him from the vehicle to have coffee on the sidewalk.
After having coffee, Avancena commanded Rizaldo to call his father. He spoke to his father and
told him to come to PDEA Parking since they were demanding P150,000 for his release.
Avancena grabbed the phone and talked to the father. Rizaldo did not hear the convo. They
boarded the gray vehicle again and waited 1 and ½ hr for Rizaldo’s father to arrive.
At around 5-5:30AM, Alfonso, Rizaldo’s father, arrived. He boarded the gray vehicle on the
passenger’s side. Rizaldo recalled that Alfonso was very angry and told the group that he did
not have that kind of money. Alfonso invited Avancena to have breakfast at Jollibee at the
corner of Vito Cruz and taft so they could talk. At Jollibee, everyone except Rizaldo alighted.
The group invited him but Rizaldo said no as his body was aching. He waited for them for 30-45
mins.
After breakfast, the group came back and 1 of them took the handcuffs of Rizaldo off. Alfonso
followed the group and approached Avancena to hand him the money, saying, “Pare, this is the
only money i have, just call me by phone and I will give the remaining balance later.” They
returned to the PDEA parking lot to get Rizaldo’s vehicle. Then Rizaldo drove home with
Alfonso following him.
At around 1PM, Avancena called Rizoldo on his phone to ask for the balance but Rizaldo told
him to just ask his father. He turned off the phone. He claimed that he was traumatized by the
incident.
In Alfonso’s account, he said that he had borrowed P5,000 and brought it to PDEA. He was
People v. Avanceña, 826 SCRA 414,GR 200512, June 17, 2017 Paquinto
instructed by Avancena to sit in the passenger’s seat and talk to Rizaldo. He did and the group
alighted from the vehicle.Rizaldo told him that Avancena’s group was linking him to drug-related
cases. Alfonso then said that Avancena’s group was no longer connected with PDEA and that
they were asking P150,000 for his release.
In Jollibee, Alfonso recalled that when asked if he was able to bring the P150k,he said he didn't
have enough and only brought P4,000 with him. Avancena then said that he could bring his son
home but he must remember that he still has a balance. He needs to settle it otherwise they
would abduct Rizaldo again. When they were already at home, Avancena called Alfonso twice.
On August 2, 2004, at around 10AM, Rizaldo and Alfonso went to the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Force at Camp Crame to report the incident. While Rizaldo was talking to a
certain Colonel Aguilar, Avancena called on his phone. He answered and pointed to it to inform
Colonel that Avancena was on the phone. Avancena asked him about the balance of P150,000.
Alfonso told him that he could not afford that amount and asked if he could give P40,000.
Avancena countered P50,000, but eventually agreed to P40,000.
In coordination with the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF), Colonel told Alfonso to
bring whatever cash he has to be marked. He was able to produce P6,000. The pay-off was
scheduled on August 6, but did not push through. Alfonso received a call on Aug 7 from Abalo,
saying to deliver the money Aug 9 in the afternoon. Alfonso called NAKTAF to disclose the
agreement.
At 11AM, Aug 9, NAKTAF deployed 20 operatives to Alfonso’s place. At 12nn, Alfonso was
directed by NAKTAF to go to Evangelista Street and advised him of the operatives present in
the vicinity. He went in front of the INC church. At past noon, Avancena’s group arrived in a
white Revo. the operations ensued, and Alfonso heard gunshots and a commotion followed.
MTC/RTC DECISION: Avancena, Popioco, and Taytay were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention and Robbery.
CA DECISION: Affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of Kidnapping
with Serious Illegal Detention under Art. 247 and Robbery, under Art. 294(5). YES
SC RULING: Convicted.
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused
is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
People v. Avanceña, 826 SCRA 414,GR 200512, June 17, 2017 Paquinto
The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of
the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish the following elements:
1. the accused was a private person;
2. he [or she] kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty;
3. the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and
4. The victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.
The prosecution was able to prove that the accused were not agents of PDEA.
The prosecution was able to present Police Inspector Nabor of Human Resource Service of
PDEA,who testified that the accused were not in any manner connected with PDEA.
Nonetheless, assuming they were agents of PDEA, detaining any private person for the purpose
of extorting any amount of money could not, in any way, be construed as within their official
functions. If proven, they can be guilty of serious illegal detention. Their badges or shields do
not give them immunity for any criminal act.
The prosecution was also able to prove that Rizaldo was illegally deprived of his liberty.
In order to prove kidnapping, the prosecution must establish that the victim was "forcefully
transported, locked up or restrained." It must be proven that the accused intended "to deprive
the victim of his liberty." The act of handcuffing Rizaldo and physically harming him to prevent
escape falls under this definition.
Accused-appellants, however, claim that Rizaldo was not kidnapped because he voluntarily
went with the accused-appellants. The Court held that the fact that the victim voluntarily went
with the accused [does] not remove the element of deprivation of liberty [if] the victim went with
the accused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done so." Rizaldo
would not have gone with the accused-appellants had they not misrepresented themselves as
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency agents who allegedly caught him selling illegal drugs.
Accused-appellants also told Rizaldo that he would only be released if Alfonso paid them
₱150,000.00. "The act of holding a person for a proscribed purpose necessarily implies an
unlawful physical or mental restraint against the person's will, and with a willful intent to so
confine the victim." If Rizaldo was indeed free to leave, there would have been no reason for
Alfonso to come rushing to his son's aid. Rizaldo was also able to come home only after Alfonso
negotiated his release.
Taken together, the prosecution was able to establish the elements of kidnapping for ransom,
which is punishable under the Revised Penal Code with death. Considering the suspension of
the death penalty, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
People vs. Trestiza Somera
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: [Summary: Irma at Lawrence were kidnapped by Pineda (private), Manrique and
Trestiza (policemen). They were released after Lawrence’s friends gave 180k. Irma’s parents
later on learned about the incident and reported it to the CIDG. Pineda kept calling for the
balance of the ransom. Entrapment operation. Pineda was arrested. Manrique was arrested
when complainants were giving statements at the CIDG office and recognized him. Trestiza was
arrested as he was identified by Pineda.]
On November 7, 2002 at about 1AM, Irma Navarro and her boyfriend Lawrence Yu were at the
"Where Else Disco" in Makati attending a party. They stayed thereat for around 30 minutes only.
Irma however, went out ahead of Lawrence. When she was about to proceed to where
Lawrence’s car was parked, she noticed that the said car was blocked by a van. 3 armed men
later on emerged from the said van. As she was about to open the door of the car, somebody hit
her on the nape. When she turned her back, she saw the 3 men in the company of Pineda. She
knew Pineda because the latter was her sister Cynthia’s kumpare. Furthermore, she saw
Pineda in their residence the night of November 6, 2002 as he visited her sister. She asked
Pineda what was happening but the latter replied "pasensya na, mare, trabaho lang"
She was told that the three (3) whose identities she later on learned as Capt. Manrique, PO2
Jose and PO1 Trestiza, were policemen. She asked why she was being accosted but she was
handcuffed by Manrique. She was ushered inside the car. Pineda asked her where Lawrence
was but she was left inside the car with Jose while Pineda, Trestiza and Manrique on the other
hand went away apparently to look for Lawrence. Pineda and Manrique later on went back
inside the car. They drove later with Jose behind the wheel while Pineda occupied the
passenger seat. They followed the van which was then driven by Trestiza. Unknown to Irma,
Lawrence was already inside the van at the time. They just drove and drove around, passing
through small alleys as they avoided major routes. She was asked later by Pineda to remove
her jewelry. She was able to remove only her earrings as she was in handcuffs. Pineda himself
removed her watch and bracelet. Her necklace and ring followed. All these were later on turned
over by Pineda to Manrique. Her bag where her wallet containing 120k was likewise taken. Her
2 cellphones were likewise taken by Pineda.
Later on, Irma and Lawrence were brought together inside the van. It was there that they were
told that they will not be released if they will not be able to produce 1M pesos. These were all
uttered by Jose and Manrique.
Irma later on felt the call of nature, prompting her to ask permission if she could possibly relieve
herself. She was accompanied by Pineda to a nearby gas station. When they returned to where
they stopped, she was asked as to whom she could possibly call so that the money that the
accused were asking would be produced. The accused later on asked Lawrence to make a call
using his cellphone with speaker phone. Lawrence was able to get in touch with his friends
Suguitan and Gonzales. The latter was told that Lawrence figured in an accident and that he
needs money badly. Lawrence and his friends agreed that the money the two will produce will
People vs. Trestiza Somera
be brought to the gas station in Greenhills. They proceeded to the said place later where they
waited for the friends of Lawrence.
Suguitan and Gonzales, later on arrived at the gas station. Lawrence took from them what
appears to be a package and handed the same to Pineda. Manrique thereafter called Pineda
asking "positive na ba?" to which Pineda replied "yes." The amount raised by the friends of
Lawrence was 180k. Irma and Lawrence were later brought to the Star Mall along Edsa. Their
captors warned them not to report the matter to the authorities otherwise they will face dire
consequences. Irma was told that the men knew her address, the members of her family and
that they have the picture of her child. She was likewise warned not to report the matter to her
father, Rod Navarro, who was an actor and a policeman, otherwise her daughter with Lawrence
will be the one to bear the consequences. They were released after 30 minutes.
Pineda in the meanwhile kept on calling them Irma and Lawrence demanding for their "balance"
of 1M. Irma’s mother and father learned of the incident because of a newspaper item and
immediately contacted the authorities from the CIDG. Irma and Lawrence were later
investigated by the CIDG people to whom they gave their sworn statements. As Pineda
continued to call them for the alleged balance, an entrapment operation was planned on that
date. On the same date, Pineda called Lawrence for purposes of meeting him that night in order
to get the remaining money. The entrapment operation was successful as Pineda was arrested.
The following day at the CIDG, Manrique went to the said office looking for his co-accused
Trestiza. Manrique was arrested thereat when the private complainants who happened to be
there as they were giving additional statements identified him through a one-way mirror.
Trestiza was likewise arrested later as he was identified by his co-accused Pineda.
MTC/RTC DECISION: Trestiza, Manrique, and Pineda guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom.
ISSUE: WON public officers can be guilty of kidnapping with ransom. (YES)
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. ‒ Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in
any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill
him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a
public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
People vs. Trestiza Somera
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
Before the present case was tried by the trial court, there was a significant amount of time spent
in determining whether kidnapping for ransom was the proper crime charged against the
accused, especially since Trestiza and Manrique were both police officers. Article 267 of the
RPC specifically stated that the crime should be committed by a private individual. The trial
court settled the matter by citing our ruling in People v. Santiano, thus:
The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is an organic member of the NARCOM and appellant
Sandigan a member of the PNP would not exempt them from the criminal liability of kidnapping.
It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so neither in
furtherance of official functions nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in
relation to their office, but in purely private capacity that they have acted in concert with their
co-appellant Santiano and Chanco.
In the same order, the trial court asked for further evidence which support the defense’s claim of
holding a legitimate police operation. However, the trial court found as unreliable the
Pre-Operation/Coordination Sheet presented by the defense. The sheet was not authenticated,
and the signatories were not presented to attest to its existence and authenticity.
The second to the last paragraph of Article 267 prescribes the penalty of death when the
extortion of ransom was the purpose of the kidnapping. Irma and Lawrence were released only
after they were able to give various personal effects as well as cash amounting to ₱300,000,
with the promise to give the balance of ₱1,000,000 at a later date.
Trestiza insists that his participation is limited to being a driver of the van. Lawrence testified
otherwise. Trestiza’s acts were far from just being a mere driver. The series of events that
transpired before, during, and after the kidnapping incident more than shows that Trestiza acted
in concert with his co-accused in committing the crime.
TOPIC: Kidnapping
DOCTRINE: The elements of the offense, here adequately shown, are (a) that the offender is a
private individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (c) that the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) that, in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present, i.e., (i) that the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 5 days, or (ii) that it is committed simulating public
authority, or (iii) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made, or (iv) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.
filed with the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Pili, Branch 32, Camarines Sur.
FACTS: Accused-appellants Alipio Santiano, Jose Sandigan, Armenia Pillueta and Jose
Vicente (Jovy) Chanco were indicted for the kidnapping with murder of Ramon John Dy Kow,
Jr., a detention prisoner at the Naga City Jail, in an amended Information, docketed Criminal
Case No. P-2319, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Branch 32, Camarines Sur.
On May 13, 1993, the kidnap victim, Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. and his live-in partner, Loida
Navidad, were arrested by appellants Jose Sandigan and Armenia Pillueta and several other
NARCOM agents for alleged illegal possession of marijuana . After the arrest, they were
brought to the NARCOM Office situated at the compound of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Headquarters, Naga City.
Thereafter, a certain Alipio Santiano, also a detainee, was mauled inside the jail and pointed Dy
Kow Jr. as the one who mastermind his mauling.
On December 27, 1993, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, the victim asked permission from a
jail trustee to allow him to buy viand outside the jail. When he left, the victim was wearing a
fatigue jacket and short pants.
As the victim emerged from the PNP store, he was accosted by appellants Sandigan and
Santiano. The two (2) appellants held the victim between them and thereafter hurriedly
proceeded towards the NARCOM Office Situated at a distance of about twenty-five (25) meters
away. Upon reaching the door of the NARCOM office, the victim was pushed inside. Once the
victim was already inside the NARCOM Office, appellant Sandigan proceeded to and took his
place at Plaza Barlin facing the PNP Police Station. The victim was made to sit and thereafter
mauled by appellant Santiano. Santiano got hold of a handkerchief, rolled it around his fists and
continued to punch the victim for almost fifteen (15) minutes. As the victim was being mauled,
appellant Pillueta stood by the door of the Narcom office, her both hands inside her pockets
while looking to her right and left, acting as a lookout.
At this time, appellant Chanco who owned and drove his trimobile, parked it in front of the door
of the NARCOM Office. Thereafter, he proceeded inside the NARCOM Office.
After a few minutes, appellant Chanco went out of the NARCOM Office and started the
trimobile. His co-appellant Santiano and Pillueta followed him. Inside the trimobile, appellant
Pillueta occupied the back seat. Santiano occupied the reversed seat in front of the passenger
seat which was occupied by the victim.
The trimobile proceeded towards the direction of San Francisco Church. When it passed the
Panganiban Drive, Naga City, on its way towards the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur,
the victim was still aboard the trimobile at the passenger seat nearest the driver.
When prosecution witness Raola heard over the radio that a person was found dead at the
canal in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, he lost no time in informing a policeman Prila of the Pili
Police Department that the descriptions of the dead person he heard over the radio fit not only
the person he saw being hauled to and thereafter mauled at the NARCOM Office but likewise
the same person who was on board the trimobile driven by the appellant Chanco.
People vs. Santiano, 299 SCRA 583 GONZALES
Robert Dy Kow identified the man found dead in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, as his brother
Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr.
Appellant Jovy Chanco had this further statement in his supplemental appeal brief; thus:
On December 28, 1993, a cadaver of an unknown person was discovered somewhere in the
vicinity of Barangay Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines, by Danilo Camba, the
Barangay Captain of said locality. The corpse was later on identified by Robert Dy Kow as that
one of his brother, Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr.
Dr. Thomas S. Gonzales performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. His findings
revealed that Dy Kow, Jr.,
MTC/RTC DECISION: Evaluating the evidence before it, the trial court found all four accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code
CA DECISION: n/a
ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention (Yes)
When a complex crime has been charged in an information and the evidence fails to support
the charge on one of the component offenses, can the defendant still be separately convicted of
the other offense? The question has long been answered in the affirmative. In United States vs.
Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, the Court has ruled to be legally feasible the conviction of an
accused on one of the offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly
established, despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused guilty of the other charge.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Section 8 of Republic Act
7659,11 reads:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.- Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or a public officer.
The elements of the offense, here adequately shown, are (a) that the offender is a private
individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of
his liberty; (c) that the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) that, in the commission of
the offense, any of the following circumstances is present, i.e., (i) that the kidnapping or
People vs. Santiano, 299 SCRA 583 GONZALES
detention lasts for more then 5 days, or (ii) that it is committed simulating public authority, or (iii)
that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats
to kill him are made, or (iv) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer.
Prosecution witness William Raola testified that he had seen the victim being accosted, held
and thereafter dragged to the NARCOM office by appellants Santiago and Sandigan. Inside the
NARCOM office, the victim was mauled by Santiano. For several minutes, Santiano continued
to batter him with punches while Pillueta stood by the door and so acted as the "lookout. The
appellants then took the victim away on a trimobile owned and driven by Chanco. Raola
positively identified the fatigue jacket worn by the victim on the evening of his abduction on 27
December 1993 and when his lifeless body was found in the morning of 28 December 1993.
Don Gumba corroborated Raolas testimony. Gumba was positive that he had seen the victim at
around eight oclock in the evening of 27 December 1993 with appellants Santiano and Pillueta
on Board the trimobile driven by appellant Chanco on its way towards the direction of Palestina,
Pili, Camarines Sur, where, the following morning, the victim was found evidently after
succumbing to several gunshot wounds.
Appellants have not shown any nefarious motive on the part of the witnesses that might have
influenced them to declare falsely against appellants, the Court sees no justification to thereby
deny faith and credit to their testimony. The Court likewise shares the view of the Solicitor
General in pointing out that
1. There is no question that the victim, who was on the date in question detained at the
Naga City Jail, asked permission from the jail trustee in order to buy viand outside. It
was while he was emerging from the PNP store that he was accosted by appellants
Santiano and Sandigan
2. From the moment that the victim was accosted in Naga City, he was at first dragged
to the NARCOM Office where he was mauled. This circumstance indicated the intention
to deprive him of his liberty for sometime, an essential element of the crime of
kidnapping.
3. The victim did not only sustain serious physical injuries but likewise died as indicated
in the autopsy report, thus, belying appellants claim that none of the circumstances in
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was present.
4. Witness Don Gumba was positive when he declared that he saw the victim at about
8:00 oclock in the evening of December 27, 1993 with appellants Santiano and Pillueta
on board the trimobile driven by appellant Chanco on its way towards the direction of
Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur where the victim was found dead.
The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is an organic member of the NARCOM and appellant
Sandigan a regular member of the PNP would not exempt them from the criminal liability for
kidnapping.] It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so
neither in furtherance of official function nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in
fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity, that they have acted in concert with
their co-appellants Santiano and Chanco.
The crime of kidnapping cannot be here absorbed by the charge of murder since the detention
of the victim is not shown to have been for the purpose of liquidating him. Appellants
themselves, in fact, all deny having killed the victim. And while the evidence may have thus
People vs. Santiano, 299 SCRA 583 GONZALES
been found to be wanting by the trial court so as to equally hold appellants responsible for the
death of the victim, the Court is convinced that the court a quo did not err in making them
account for kidnapping. The circumstances heretofore recited indicate the attendance of
conspiracy among the appellants thereby making them each liable for the offense.
DOCTRINE:
The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention has been correctly complexed by the
RTC with frustrated murder. A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two
or more, grave or less grave, felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other.
On January 12, 1994, around 3:00 p.m., Agnes Guirindola (Agnes), while cruising along
Panay Avenue, Quezon City, on board a red 1993 model Nissan Sentra sedan with plate
number TKR-837, was suddenly flagged down by a man wearing a PNP reflectorized vest.
The man signaled her to make a U-turn. The man, identified by Agnes as appellant Vanancio
Roxas (Roxas) walked in front of her car and proceeded to the right side of the car.
Agnes asked Roxas, "Ano ang problema?" Roxas replied, "Miss, one way street po ito."
Agnes explained to the man that she usually passed by the same street and it was only that
day that she had been caught. Roxas told her that the street had been made a one-way street
because a girl figured in an accident in the same street two days ago.
After taking Agnes’ driver’s license, Roxas handed her a piece of paper which she was asked
to sign. Agnes noticed that it was not the usual traffic citation ticket but, nevertheless, she
pretended to sign the same by making a check thereon.
When Agnes handed back the paper to Roxas, the latter asked her to open the door of the car
so that he could show her the one-way sign and the other traffic aide at the corner of the
street. Agnes let Roxas enter the car. Roxas then instructed Agnes to drive to the corner of
the street, and upon reaching the corner, Roxas pointed to her the one-way sign and looked
for the traffic aide he had told Agnes about. The traffic aide was not there. Agnes asked
Roxas where she could drop him. Roxas told Agnes to make a left turn from the corner of the
street and that he will alight somewhere in Mother Ignacia. Agnes obliged and made a left turn
and stopped the car. Thinking that Roxas was waiting for a bribe, Agnes took out her wallet,
pulled a ₱50.00 bill and gave it to Roxas. After receiving the money, Roxas returned to Agnes
her driver’s license.
Upon returning the driver’s license to Agnes, Roxas immediately switched off the engine of
the car and poked a gun at her saying "Miss, kailangan ko ang kotse mo." Agnes, terrified and
shocked by Roxas’ actions, cried and pleaded with him to let her go and just take the car.
Roxas continued to poke a gun at her, unmindful of what Agnes was telling him.
After a while, Agnes heard a knock from outside the car. Roxas opened the rear door and
then someone boarded the car, occupying the back seat. The second passenger immediately
reclined the driver’s seat and pulled Agnes towards the back seat. Agnes identified this man
as Roberto Gungon (Gungon). Subsequently, Roxas took the driver’s seat and drove the car
while Gungon held Agnes on the shoulder with one hand, and her leg with the other.
After crossing Mother Ignacia Street, Gungon got his beeper and told Roxas: "Boss, dalhin na
natin siya sa dati, doon na natin siya i-s." [Referring to somewhere in Batangas] Agnes
became more frightened as she understood "s" to mean "salvage," a lingo for summary
execution.
When Agnes woke up, around 9:30 or 10:00 p.m, after she was forcefully fed some tablets,
she noticed that there was already a third man sitting in front of the car beside Roxas who
was still driving. She then asked them if she could relieve herself. Gungon asked Roxas if
Agnes would be allowed to relieve herself to which Roxas answered in the affirmative. Roxas
alighted from the car and opened the rear door. Gungon alighted first from the car followed by
Agnes. Gungon then led Agnes to a nearby grassy area and told her, "O, dyan ka na lang
umihi." After Agnes relieved herself, and as she was about to get up and return to the car, she
saw white sparks at her right side and then she fell down. When she opened her eyes, she
saw Roxas walking back towards the car with a gun in his hand. She did not see Gungon at
that particular time. Then she lost consciousness.
When Agnes regained consciousness, she was all alone. Roxas, Gungon and the third man,
as well as the car, were no longer there. It was very dark. She followed a "sparkling light" that
led her to a small house. Upon reaching the house, she opened the door and saw two (2)
children and a teenager singing. She asked for their help but upon seeing her, they ran away.
She then saw a lady standing at the stairs of the house carrying a baby. Agnes asked for her
help but the lady went upstairs and locked herself inside the room. Agnes followed her and
knocked at the door of the room asking for help, but still the lady did not come out of the
room. She then went downstairs and lied down on the sofa. Only then did she notice that
blood was profusely oozing from her face and there were "holes" in the left side of her neck
and her right cheek.
After a while, Agnes heard a vehicle arrive and also heard voices saying: "May taong duguan
sa loob ng bahay, tulungan natin siya!" Agnes was then carried to a Fiera motor vehicle and
brought to the Batangas Regional Hospital, where she was treated for her wounds and given
first aid.
The NBI conducted a manhunt for Roxas. On September 11, 1995, Roxas was arrested by
elements of the NBI inside the municipal hall of Taysan, Batangas, where he was working
under the Office of the Mayor using the aliases "Joe Villamor" and "Marianito Villamor."
MTC/RTC DECISION: Guilty of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with frustrated
murder, carnapping and theft
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of the crimes charged against him
SC RULING:
No.
We have ruled that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of
the case. The trial court is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having seen
and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying.
Agnes not only positively identified her abductors, she also graphically narrated what
happened on January 12, 1994. Actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident in the
instant case from the moment Agnes was taken from Panay Avenue to a remote place in
Batangas.
Based on the foregoing testimony of Agnes, the trial court did not err in convicting appellant of
the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the crime, thus:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap
or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by
Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 7659.
The evidence likewise reveal, undoubtedly, the commission of frustrated murder as qualified
by the circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. The medical findings show that
had it not been due to the timely and proper medical attention given to the victim, the gunshot
wound sustained by the victim would have been fatal.
The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention has been correctly complexed by the
RTC with frustrated murder. A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two
or more, grave or less grave, felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other.
In a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. Since the kidnapping and serious illegal detention is the more
serious crime, the proper penalty under Article 26750 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, should be applied in its maximum period; thus, the penalty should be
death. However, in light of R.A. 9346, or the Anti-Death Penalty Law, which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of
death is, thus, proper and ineligible for parole.
Facts: (1987) Complainant Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter Arabella, then only
seven (7) months old, for treatment to the Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic, which was
owned and operated by the accused-appellants. Arabella was diagnosed to be suffering
bronchitis and diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to confine the child at the clinic for
speedy recovery.
About 3 days later, Arabella was well and was ready to be discharged but complainant was not
around to take her home. A week later, complainant came back but did not have enough money
to pay the hospital bill (P300). Complainant likewise confided to accused-appellant Dr. Carmen
Ty that no one would take care of the child at home as she was working. She then inquired
about the rate of the nursery and upon being told that the same was P50 per day, she decided
to leave her child to the care of the clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella was transferred from
the ward to the nursery.
Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and accumulate. It was at this time that
accused-appellant Dr. Ty suggested to the complainant that she hire a "yaya" for P400 instead
of the daily nursery fee of P50. Complainant agreed, hence, a "yaya" was hired. Arabella was
then again transferred from the nursery to the extension of the clinic which served as residence
for the hospital staff.
From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She neither visited her child nor called to
inquire about her whereabouts. Her estranged husband came to the clinic once but did not get
the child. Efforts to get in touch with the complainant were unsuccessful as she left no address
or telephone number where she can be reached. This development prompted Dr. Ty to notify
the barangay captain of the child's abandonment. Eventually, the hospital staff took turns in
taking care of Arabella.
(1989) 2 years after Arabella was abandoned by complainant, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the
clinic, suggested during a hospital staff conference that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian who
could give the child the love and affection, personal attention and caring she badly needed as
she was thin and sickly. The suggestion was favorably considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave
the child to her aunt, Lilibeth Neri.
(1992) 3 years after, complainant came back to claim the daughter she abandoned some 5
years back. The instant criminal case was filed against accused-appellants.
[another case-Sombong vs. CA] Complainant filed a petition for habeas corpus with the RTC.
RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. SC affirmed CA decision.
Issue: WON accused are guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor. (NO)
Ruling: Under the facts and ruling in Sombong vs. CA, as well as the evidence adduced in this
case accused-appellants must perforce be acquitted of the crime charged, there being no
reason to hold them liable for failing to return one Cristina Grace Neri, a child not conclusively
shown and established to be complainant's daughter, Arabella.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to consider Cristina Grace Neri and Arabella
Sombong as one and the same person, still, the instant criminal case against the
accused-appellants must fall.
Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has
been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore
said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is
entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the kidnapping
of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or
refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Said
failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige
the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.
The key word therefore of this element is deliberate. Essentially, the word deliberate as used in
the article must imply something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated,
obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the
accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainant's child to her. When the
accused-appellants learned that complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years
of apparent wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein complainant find the child as the
latter was no longer under the clinic's care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address
of Arabella's guardians but as soon as she obtained it from Dr. Mallonga who was already
working abroad, she personally went to the guardians' residence and informed them that herein
complainant wanted her daughter back.
DOCTRINE: Respondent judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public
officer, ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal grounds.
The idea of confinement is not synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough
to qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his personal
liberty.
FACTS:
Complainant Fernando Cayao drives a bus along Indang, Cavite where it overtook another bus,
as a consequence, the bus driven by the complainant almost collided with an oncoming
Jeepney. The jeepney was registered in the name of respondent Judge Justiniano Del
Mundo who at the time of the incident, was one of the passengers along with his sons.
At 3:30pm the same day, before the complainant could park the bus, he was picked up by
policemen of PNP Indang and was immediately brought to the sala of respondent judge. There,
the complainant was confronted by respondent judge and accused by the latter of nearly
causing an accident that morning. Without given the opportunity to explain, respondent judge
insisted that complainant be punished and made to choose between the three:
1. To face a charge of multiple attempted homicide
2. Revocation of his driver’s license
3. To be put in jail for 3 days
Complainant chose the third and was made to sign a “waiver of detention” by the respondent
judge. Thereafter, complainant was immediately escorted by policemen to the municipal jail.
Though not actually incarcerated, complainant remained in the premises of the municipal jail for
three (3) days, from October 22 up to October 25, 1992, by way of serving his "sentence". On
the third day, complainant was released by SPO1 Manolo Dilig to the custody of Geronimo
Cayao, complainant's co-driver and cousin.
ISSUE: whether there was illegal detention even though complainant chose to be
detained?
While it is true that complainant was not put behind bars as respondent had intended, however,
complainant was not allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of
confinement is not synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to qualify
as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his personal
liberty. Under the circumstances, respondent judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention
when he, as a public officer, ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal
grounds. In overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not
actually committed a crime in the presence of respondent judge. Such being the case, the
warrantless arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. In the case at bar, no
less than the testimony of the jail warden herself confirmed that complainant was indeed
deprived of his liberty for three (3) days
Q So, summarily speaking, you feel that you were detained in the municipal jail of the
station of Indang, Cavite?
A (complainant: Yes, your Honor, because I was not able to get out from the police
station from the time that I was detained.
It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the misconduct of respondent is
not alone centered on his order for the detention of complainant. Rather, it is ingrained in the
fact that complainant was so detained without affording him his constitutional rights.
I am sorry ang haba. Sinama ko kasi ang layo ng version ng parties involved.
DOCTRINE:
Grave threats must have an actus reus and mens rea. The actus reus is the actual speaking or
uttering of the threats of, say, death or serious bodily harm. The mens rea is that the accused
intends that the recipient of their words to feel intimidated by their words or that the accused
intended the words to be taken seriously. The words must be meant by the accused to convey a
threat; in other words, the utterance is meant to intimidate or to be taken seriously. It is not
necessary that the recipient themself actually feels intimidated or actually takes the words
seriously. To repeat, all that needs to be proven is that they were intended by the accused to
Pedrito Garma v. People of the Philippines ERIPOL
In this case, the petitioner was charged with grave threat WITHOUT A condition falling under
Art. 282(2)
FACTS:
PROSECUTION'S VERSION:
On February 11, 2010, around 9:30 in the morning, three (3) farmers working for Barangay
Captain Ballon, went to Sitio Rissik, Barangay Mabuno, Gattaran, Cagayan to pick up the water
pump of Barangay Captain Ballon from a rice field. While they were loading the water pump,
they saw the Garma twins, herein petitioner, and the now deceased Reynaldo, chasing a group
of people illegally fishing from their fishpond. Curiously, for some inexplicable reason, the
Garma twins stopped chasing after the alleged thieves when they saw the three (3) farmers.
They inquired from the farmers if Barangay Captain Ballon was with them. Gammuac replied
that Barangay Captain Ballon was in his residence. To this, again for some unknown reason,
petitioner supposedly uttered: "Patayen mi koman" (We should have killed him). The Garma
twins then went back to chasing the group that went fishing, but the Garma twins failed to catch
up with them. When the Garma twins went back to the three (3) farmers, this time, they asked
for the whereabouts of barangay tanod Carmelo Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz). The farmers replied
that they did not know where Dela Cruz was.
The three (3) farmers went straight to the house of Barangay Captain Ballon and told him about
their encounter with the Garma twins. Upon hearing their narrative, for inexplicable reasons,
Barangay Captain Ballon allegedly got so terrified he instantly called the police for assistance
and protection. He speculated that the Garma twins were mad at him purportedly because of
the proposed construction of a water impounding project in Barangay Mabuno that would affect
the Garma twins' fishpond. As Barangay Captain of Mabuno, Ballon was in charge of the
implementation and facilitation of this project. The Garma twins allegedly strongly opposed the
project.
DEFENSE'S VERSION:
Petitioner testified that on February 9, 2010, a group led by Dela Cruz barged into his fenced
property in Barangay Mabuno, Gattaran, Cagayan, and demanded that he show proof of the
boundaries of their property. He readily complied by presenting the survey document of their
property but the group sharply retorted that the document was "useless". He consequently
commented, "if this is useless, then let's just see each other in court." Dela Cruz violently
reacted by suddenly hitting him in the face. A few minutes later, a police officer arrived and
asked the group to leave. Meanwhile, he was brought to the hospital for treatment.
On February 10, 2010, following their release from the hospital, he and his twin brother
Reynaldo visited their fishpond where they caught a group of persons illegally fishing. Upon
seeing them, the group scampered away. They later on discovered that the gate valve and
shafting of the water impounding project got destroyed. A portion of the fence was also cut and
two (2) of the posts got damaged.
He and Reynaldo then planned to seek the assistance of Barangay Captain Ballon regarding
Pedrito Garma v. People of the Philippines ERIPOL
the problems they just encountered. On their way to see the barangay captain, they chanced
upon the three (3) farmers then loading a water pump nearby. They asked them if they knew
where they could find the barangay captain so they could report to him their problems. The
farmers replied that Barangay Captain Ballon was in his residence. But instead of going to
Ballon's house, petitioner and his brother decided to go straight to the Philippine National
Police-Gattaran where they reported the incidents. The PNP-Gattaran, however, did not
respond at all to their report.
Petitioner claimed that the present case was nothing but a harassment suit since Barangay
Captain Ballon wanted them evicted from their land so the construction of the water impounding
project could smoothly proceed.
MTC/RTC DECISION:
MTC: found the petitioner guilty of grave threats under Art. 282 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
Pedrito Garma is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of grave threat and there being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
CA DECISION:
The CA has denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. But modified the penalty
with imprisonment of four (4) months and [one] (1) day as minimum to six (6) months as
maximum, pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos and to pay costs of suit.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of the lower court.
SC RULING:
Petitioner is acquitted.
Under the RPC, grave threats must have an actus reus and mens rea. The actus reus is the
actual speaking or uttering of the threats of, say, death or serious bodily harm. The mens rea is
that the accused intends that the recipient of their words to feel intimidated by their words or
that the accused intended the words to be taken seriously. The words must be meant by the
accused to convey a threat; in other words, the utterance is meant to intimidate or to be taken
seriously. It is not necessary that the recipient themself actually feels intimidated or actually
takes the words seriously. To repeat, all that needs to be proven is that they were intended by
the accused to have that effect.
Here, Barangay Captain Ballon admitted that there was no other instance when petitioner or his
brother threatened his person other than the alleged incident on February 9, 2010. Thus,
assuming petitioner indeed uttered such words, Ballon himself was not even sure if he was
threatened at all much less if petitioner intended, by the words he had spoken, to really
Pedrito Garma v. People of the Philippines ERIPOL
intimidate him. He was not sure and showed no circumstances that petitioner would have
intended to carry into effect his words since, by his own admission, petitioner uttered these
words only once. Clearly, not only is the story of the prosecution witness highly incredible, the
prosecution's own version, even if believed, does not show circumstances probative of the
mens rea of grave threats, which was to intimidate Ballon.
In this light, it became incumbent upon Barangay Captain Ballon to prove the fact that there was
a past and deep-seated altercation between him and the twins. The prosecution, however, did
not present any evidence other than his bare allegation that such feud had existed. If indeed
there was a previous altercation, he, being the barangay captain, could have easily summoned
petitioner in the barangay hall, settled the dispute, and recorded it in the barangay blotter. But
there is none presented here. Bare allegations that could have easily been substantiated by
independent evidence are not equivalent to proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders; it is
for the prosecution to demonstrate guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. The
prosecution here evidently failed to overcome the onus probandi of establishing petitioner's guilt
to a moral certainty. It failed to rise on its own merits just as the Court of Appeals erred in
rendering its verdict of conviction based on the weakness of the defense.
In sum, since both the actus reus and the mens rea of grave threats that petitioner threatened
Barangay Captain Ballon with the infliction upon his person of any wrong by uttering "Patayen
mi koman" is wanting, reasonable doubt persists. It is settled that where the basis of conviction
is flawed, this Court must acquit.
DOCTRINE:
The crime of grave coercion has three elements:
(a) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong;
(b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a
display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the
offended party; and
(c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Grave coercion filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila
FACTS:
Barbasa is the president of Push-Thru Marketing Inc. which leases commercial stalls
in Tutuban Center owned by Tutuban Properties Inc (TPI). Petitioners received a notice of
Barbasa v. Tuquero Teñido
disconnection utilities from private respondent Grace Guarin, Credit and Collection Manager of
TPI, for failure of Push-Thru Marketing to settle its outstanding obligations for Common Usage
and Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities, electricity and rentals.
Barbasa settled the charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity, but failed to pay
back rentals. Thus, Guarin, Sangalang (engineer manager of TPI), and Callueng (TPI head of
security), together with several armed guards, disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied
by Push-Thru Marketing.
Barbasa filed a criminal complaint against TPI and its officers David Go, Robert
Castanares, Buddy Mariano, Guarin, Dangalang, and Callueng before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila alleging that TPI and its officers cut off the electricity in Barbasa’s stalls “in
a violent and intimidating manner” and by unnecessary employing several armed guards to
intimidate and frighten him and his employees.
Respondents filed their separate counter-affidavits, alleging that the cutting off of
electrical supply was done peacefully; Barbasa was given demand letters/notices in writing at
least three times where it was stated that if he does not settle his arrears, electricity will be cut;
they only cut off the power after sending a Notice of Disconnection of Utilities; and Barbasa had
outstanding + accumulated unpaid rentals, billings and accountabilities. There is also a penalty
in their contract of lease which expressly provides that failure to pay at any time of the lease,
rentals, and premiums corresponding to a total of three (3) months, grants the LESSOR the
option to cut off power and other utility services to the LESSEE.
Barbasa filed his Reply admitting that none of the armed personnel drew his gun, nor
aimed or fired, but insisted that he was unduly prevented from using electricity to the detriment
of his business and person. He also claimed that TPI failed to show the amount of his unpaid
obligations.
Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila: Dismissed the complaint against David Go, Roberto
Castanares, Buddy Mariano and Art Brondia (TPI Officers) but found probable cause against
respondents Grace Guarin, Nestor Sangalang and Victor Calueng.
Information was filed in court but proceedings were deferred when private respondents filed an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice/
Barbasa filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied, so he elevated it to the CA through
a petition for certiorari, which was dismissed for lack of merit. CA also denied his MR. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Guarin, Sangalang, and Callueng’s act of disconnecting the electricity supply
in Barbasa’s stalls and the manner by which it was carried out constitute grave coercion - NO
The records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would
Barbasa v. Tuquero Teñido
produce intimidation upon Barbasa’s employees when the cutting off of his electricity was
effected. It was found to be done peacefully and after a written notice to Barbasa was sent.
We do not subscribe to Barbasa’s claim that the presence of armed guards were
calculated to intimidate him or his employees. Rather, we are more inclined to believe that the
guards were there to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the exercise of
TPI’s rights under the lease agreements.
If respondents desired a violent result, they would have gone there unannounced or
cut Barbasa’s electricity through less desirable and conspicuous means. There is also a clear
stipulation under the Penalty Clause. Hence there could be grave coercion in respondent’s act
under the covenants of a contract to which Barbasa had agreed and signed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Resolution of the CA are
hereby AFFIRMED.
DOCTRINE: The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented
by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against
his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence,
either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently,
control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and
liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under
authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
The offense of grave coercion is necessarily included in illegal detention; as such, an
information for illegal detention will not bar the accused from being convicted of grave coercion,
instead of the original charge
FACTS: On February 11, 1993, Villamar went to the house of the private offended party Cortez
and inquired if the latter was interested in adopting her daughter, explaining that her offer was
due her husband's hasty departure. Unable to refuse, Cortez accepted the offer and
immediately prepared a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to formalize the adoption. Unfortunately, on
June 5, 1993, Villamar, apparently regretting her decision, went to the house of Cortez and
decided to take her daughter back. This sudden reversal was, of course, not taken lightly by
Cortez, who vehemently refused to relinquish custody of the girl to Villamar.
Thereupon, a scuffle ensued between the two, during which Villamar managed to hit Cortez with
a chisel on the head rendering the latter weak and immobilized, after which she threatened her
with a pair of scissors. Villamar was demanding that Cortez reveal where the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" was located. Meanwhile, attracted by the commotion, a curious crowd was already
gathering outside the Cortez residence. Sensing imminent danger, Villamar demanded money
People vs. Villamar, G.R. No. 121175. November 4, 1998 CAMUNGAO
and a get-away vehicle to extricate herself from her predicament. However, on her way to the
car, a melee ensued resulting in her immediate arrest by the responding policemen.
On the defense: Villamar admits that a struggle did occur between her and Cortez, after the
latter refused her request for the return of her child. However, while she acknowledged that she
brandished a pair of scissors before Cortez, this was motivated more out of fear of the crowd
assembled outside the house which might harm her. In other words, in order to protect herself,
she had to use Cortez as a "human shield" to keep the crowd at bay.
MTC/RTC DECISION: The trial court convicted Villamar for serious illegal detention and less
serious physical injuries, but at the same time acquitted her on the charge of frustrated murder.
CA DECISION: n/a
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in convicting Villamar with serious illegal detention
and less serious physical injuries.
SC RULING: Villamar convicted only of grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6)
months of arresto mayor.
The Court ruled that the actuations of Villamar appear to be more of a product of a mother's
desperation and distraught mind when her pleas for the return of her child was refused by
Cortez, unmindful of the consequences which her reckless outburst would cause to the latter.
Thus, the Court rejected the kidnapping charge where there was not the slightest hint of a
motive for the crime. Likewise, the Court rejected the prosecution contention that Villamars
demand for money in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) from Cortez constitutes
a ransom within the contemplation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
But the Court only convicted Villamar of grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months
of arresto mayor. The Court found that when accused-appellant coerced Cortez to reveal the
whereabouts of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" for the purpose of destroying the same, the act
merely constituted grave coercion, as provided in Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. The
crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be
it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material
force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the
will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another
has no right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in
the exercise of any lawful right.
While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something against the latter's will, it must be stressed
that the same cannot be categorized as an act of illegal detention. Still, when Villamar was
erroneously charged for illegal detention, such oversight will not preclude a guilty verdict for the
crime of grave coercion.
In the previous decided cases, the Court ruled that the offense of grave coercion is necessarily
included in illegal detention; as such, an information for illegal detention will not bar the accused
People vs. Villamar, G.R. No. 121175. November 4, 1998 CAMUNGAO
from being convicted of grave coercion, instead of the original charge. Regarding the imposable
penalty, while we are aware that on February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7890 was passed
increasing the penalty for crimes involving grave coercion from arresto mayor to prision
correccional, such amendatory law will not be applicable in the instant case, for the simple
reason that the offense was committed on June 5, 1993 two years before the said law was
enacted. Villamar should not, therefore, be unduly prejudiced by the imposition of a more
severe penalty than that provided in the law then in force.
Hence, the penalty ofarresto mayor, which is from one month and one day to six months, is the
proper penalty imposable for the offense of grave coercion.
DOCTRINE: Grave coercion is committed when “a person who, without authority of law, shall by
means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do
something against his will, either it be right or wrong.”
FACTS:
At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines
Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six
laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main thoroughfare of the
same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber
slabs to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among
the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining
witness, and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia Rebustillos. These establishments had
been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for noncompliance
with certain health and sanitation requirements.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte
against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2257, alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well
as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.
Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were charged with the
offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet. As already noted, the said court
exonerated the two policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime charged as principal by
inducement.
Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon’s barbershop was done in
abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.
Timoner vs. People, 125 SCRA 830 Aguinaldo
SC RULING: (Acquitted)
In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid
recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the
performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal liability.
Grave coercion is committed when “a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of
violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do
something against his will, either it be right or wrong.”1 The three elements of grave coercion
are: [1] that any person be prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the prevention or
compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would
produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and [3] that the person who
restrained the will and liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the
restraint was not made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right.
The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave
coercion.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to
“relocate” the telephone, electric and water lines of “Crazy Feet,” because said lines posed as a
disturbance. However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit from appropriate authorities
allowing him to cut the electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the business
establishment.
Ong Chiu Kwan v. CA, 345 SCRA 586 DELA CRUZ
MTC/RTC DECISION:
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of
unjust vexation, and sentenced him to “imprisonment for twenty days.” The court also ordered
him to pay moral damages,finding that the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water
pipe and telephone lines of “Crazy Feet” caused the interruption of its business operations
during peak hours, to the detriment of its owner, Mildred Ong. The trial court also awarded
exemplary damages to complainant “as a deterrent to the accused not to follow similar act in
the future and to pay attorney’s fees.”
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the latter court in a decision dated
December 8, 1992, simplistically adopted the decision of the lower court in toto, without stating
the reasons for doing so.
CA DECISION: On April 22, 1993, by petition for review, Ong Chiu Kwan elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals. On August 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
dismissing the appeal, agreeing with the lower court’s finding that petitioner was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of unjust vexation.
ISSUE: Whether Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation. Yes.
SC RULING: WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, accused Ong Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00,
and the costs. The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is hereby
deleted. (WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In
lieu thereof, accused Ong Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00, and the
costs. The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is hereby deleted.
(CONVICTED)
Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of
complainant’s business establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He failed,
however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permits or authorization to relocate the
lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone services during peak
hours of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioner’s act unjustly
annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for
unjust vexation.
unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or
compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an
innocent person. The paramount question is whether the offender's act causes annoyance,
irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.
FACTS: Malou with her Maid, Marvilou, occupied Room 307. In the evening of December 12,
inside Unit 307, Malou retired around 10:30. Outside, right in front of her bedroom door,
Marvilou slept on a folding bed. Early morning of the following day, Malou was awakened by the
smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. Somebody was pinning her down on
the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth
with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight. Malou continued fighting off her attacker by
kicking him until at last her right hand got free. She was able to grab hold of his sex organ which
she then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. Over
the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako.”
She did not know who it was. Malou proceeded to seek help from her classmates in Room 310.
Malou saw her bed, topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue. Aside from the window
with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom was now
open. Her attacker had fled from her room going through the left bedroom window.
According to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building at 1:30 in the
early morning of December 13, 1991, and requested permission to to Room 306. This Unit was
being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was asking permission to enter, only
Joseph Bernard Africa was in the room. He asked CHITO to produce the required written
authorization and when CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused, but later, relented.
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to talk to
Chito. He mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that they were not being
allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.
Christian and his roommates, Bernard and Lutgardo were called to the building and were asked
by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging to their unit. Loyloy, another roommate,
went inside to search the Unit and found a gray “Khumbella” bag cloth type from inside their unit
which they did not know was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When he saw
the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to Chito as he had seen the latter
usually bringing it to school inside the classroom. The CIS opened the bag and pulled out its
contents, among others, a white t-shirt with a Tau Sigma Phi sign a Black Adidas short pants, a
handkerchief, 3 white T-shirts, an underwear, and socks. The forensic Chemist conducted a
laboratory examination and found the night dress and the handkerchief testing positive for
chloroform, a volatile poison.
ISSUE: Whether the accused may be held liable for attempted rape (NO)
It would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the
mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and
necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of
any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that
petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let
alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if
that was really his immediate intention, is anybody's guess.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises,
of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation
that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during
the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and
having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down.
Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted
rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion
under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the context of the
constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation, it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the
inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the information against
petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to make his defense.
There is no need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation.
As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the
reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent
person. The paramount question is whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation,
torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. That Malou,
after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a
sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she
was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
TOPIC: Article 312 - Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Propery
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: A complaint for Grave Threats and Usurpation of Real Property was filed against
Dimalata and Fuentes, and after the appropriate preliminary investigation wherein Dimalanta
presented evidence showing that (1) he is the real successor-in-interest of the alleged owner of
the land; and (2) that the threat was established to have been directed against the
complainants’ tenant-encargado (overseer), Azzaraga (Assistant Provincial Prosec) issued a
Resolution, finding prima facie evidence of guilt of the crime charged. The complainants are
co-owners of the property allegedly usurped.
Azzaraga filed Information for “Usurpation of Real rights in Property defined and penalized
under Art. 312 in re Art. 282, RPC'' with the RTC of Capiz, docketed and raffled to Branch 15.
Judge Alfeche of Branch 15 dismissed the case motu proprio on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction considering that “the crime committed by the accused falls under Article 312 of the
RPC and the violence or intimidation by the accused is a means to commit it or a mere incident
in its commission, hence, the threat is absorbed by the crime charged,” and considering that
“the imposable fine is from P200-P500” because the value of the gain cannot be ascertained.
Azzaraga filed MR alleging that it is true that the crime charged is not a complex crime and if
mention is made of Art 282, that is because “the penalty under Art. 312 is dependent on Art
282. Art. 312 borrows the pertinent provision on penalty from Article 282, because Article 312
does not provide a penalty" as "Article 312 expressly provides that the penalty for the violence
shall likewise be imposed in addition to the fine." In the instant case, the intimidation consists of
the threat to kill the encargado, penalized under Article 282; considering that the accused
attained their purpose, the penalty imposable thereunder is that which is one degree lower than
that prescribed by law for the crime they had threatened to commit — homicide.” This MR was
denied by Judge Alfeche.
MTC/RTC DECISION:
CA DECISION:
ISSUE:
(a) Whether the penalty prescribed under Art. 282 is the basis for the imposable penalty in
the crime defined in Art. 312
(b) Whether the crime charged in the information is not complexed with Art. 282 by the
mere allegation in the caption of the information that it is a prosecution under Art. 312 in
re Art. 282.
SC RULING: The orders of Judge Alfeche are SET ASIDE. Either the Information be amended
or be dismissed on the ground that it does not charge an offense.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine of from 200 to 500 pesos shall be
imposed.
The offense defined here is one of the crimes against property found under Title 10 of the RPC,
and is committed in the same manner as the crime of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons defined under Art. 294. The main difference is that the former involves
real property or real rights in property, while the latter involves personal property. In other words,
Art. 312 would have been denominated as robbery if the object taken is personal property.
The phrase “by means of violence against or intimidation of persons” in Art 312 refers tot he
same phrase provided in Art. 294.
Paragraphs one to four of Article 294 indisputably involve the use of violence against persons.
The actual physical force inflicted results in death, rape, mutilation or the physical injuries
therein enumerated. The simple robbery under paragraph five may cover physical injuries not
included in paragraphs two to four. Thus, when less serious physical injuries or slight physical
injuries are inflicted upon the offended party on the occasion of a robbery, the accused may be
prosecuted for and convicted of robbery under paragraph five.
“Intimidation” means “unlawful coercion, extortion, duress, putting in fear”. To take or in attempt
to take, “by intimidation” means “willfully to take, or attempt to take, by putting in fear of bodily
harm.”
Pars. 1-5 of Art. 294 are single, special, and indivisible felonies, not complex crimes as defined
under Art. 48. The penalties imposed do not take into account the value of the personal
property taken, but the gravity of the effect or consequence of the violence or intimidation.
Art. 312 may also be considered to be defining the single, special, and indivisible crime of
occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property by means of violence against
or in intimidation of persons. It is not a complex crime. However, while Article 294 provides a
single penalty for each class of crime therein defined, Article 312 provides a single, albeit
two-tiered, penalty consisting of a principal penalty, which is that incurred for the acts of
violence, and an additional penalty of fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the
accused. For want of a better term, the additional penalty may be designated as an incremental
penalty.
What Article 312 means then is that when the occupation of real property is committed by
People v. Alfeche Paquinto
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, the accused may be prosecuted under an
information for the violation thereof, and not for a separate crime involving violence or
intimidation. But, whenever, appropriate, he may be sentenced to suffer the penalty for the acts
of violence and to pay a fine based on the value of the gain obtained.
Thus, if by reason or on the occasion of such occupation or usurpation, the crime of homicide,
or any of the physical injuries penalized in either subdivisions 1 or 2 of Article 263 is committed;
OR when accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation; OR when, in the course of its
execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission
any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263; OR when it is
committed through intimidation or through the infliction of physical injuries not covered by
subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263, i.e., physical injuries penalized under Articles 265 and 266,
the accused may be convicted for the violation of Article 312.
However, he shall be sentenced: (a) to suffer the penalty for homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation and physical injuries provided under subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263, other physical
injuries 18 or for the intimidation, which may fall under Article 282 (Grave Threats) or Article 286
(Grave Coercion) of the Revised Penal Code, as the case may be, AND (b) to pay a fine based
on the value of the gain obtained by him, which shall be an amount equivalent to 50 to 100% of
such gain, but in no case less than P75 pesos, provided, however, that if such value cannot be
ascertained, the fine shall be from 200 to 500 (P200.00 to P500.00) pesos.
TOPIC: Arson
DOCTRINE:
The applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 3 of PD 1613 and not Article 320 par. 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. The elements of Arson under the PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling, and these
elements concur in this case. On the other hand, the acts committed under Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes “for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.”
Acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of
perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security
implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances
present.
CHARGE/INFORMATION:
Information showed the following accusations:
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of
ADELINA
FACTS:
It was on January 1, 1994 at around 3AM, Adelina Borbe was in her house located in Hacienda
San Miguel Tabaco Albay. She was watching over her sick child when she heard some noise
around the house. She got up and looked through the window and saw Rolando Buela,
Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos, and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut.
Adelina went out and saw that the roof of her hut was on fire and she shouted for help.
Unfortunately, Rolando, Sarmelito, Dante and Antonio fled.
Olipiano who was drinking from a distance heard the scream and ran to the place, he focused
his flashlight and saw the accused which he was able to identify.
MTC/RTC DECISION:
RTC found Dante and Sarmelito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson.
Each of the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay the cost.
CA DECISION:
The decision is affirmed with modification on the penalty. The CA ruling relied on the fact that
the accused could only be convicted of simple arson, punishable by prision mayor, and not for
burning of an inhabited house, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate court, the information failed to allege
with specificity the actual crime committed.
Each of the accused are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as
maximum.
ISSUE:
Whether the herein accused-appellants are liable for simple arson as ruled by the CA (YES)
SC RULING: The petitioners are convicted of simple arson and SC affirmed the ruling of the
CA.
The applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 3 of PD 1613 and not Article 320 par. 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. The elements of Arson under the PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling, and these
elements concur in this case. As distinguished from the acts committed under Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson, that are characterized as heinous crimes
“for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.”
On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a
lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other
words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and
national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson
may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying
circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those acts
punishable under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was
established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance
that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the
property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting
more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him
to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate
father under the prevailing circumstances that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house.
Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of
PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.
The court highlighted the case of People v. Soriano wherein the accused was found guilty of
destructive arson then a capital offense however on review the court held that he should be
held liable for simple arson only.
Having similarities in the present case, the court relied on People v. Soriano
The accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular house. Unfortunately, the
blaze spread and gutted down five (5) neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused
guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however,
declared that:
"x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties
burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited
houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second
Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or
edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320,
par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that
such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the
accused.
TOPIC: Arson
DOCTRINE:
If the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main
objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of
arson.
FACTS:
It was at around 4:45am on January 2, 2001 when Bernardo and his tanods saw Edna
Malngan, housemaid of Roberto Separa with her head turning in different directions, hurriedly
leaving the house of his employer. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven
by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have
instructed that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she changed her mind
and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan Street where she finally alighted, after paying
for her fare.
Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardo's group later discovered
that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo
and his tanods responded to the fire upon hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter.
The Barangay Tanods apprehended Edna and brought her to the barangay hall for
investigation. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside the bag. Thereafter, Edna
confessed to the barangay chairman that she set her employer’s house on fire because she had
not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to her province but
her employer told her “Sumakay ka na lang sa walis. Pagbalik mo dito maputi ka na”. When
asked how she burned the house, she replied “Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan
ko ng disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay"
The fire resulted in the destruction of the house of Roberto Separa, Sr. and other adjoining
houses and the death of Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa together with their four
children, namely: Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.
At trial, prosecution presented testimony of police, Separa’s neighbors and the pedicab driver.
When it came time for the defense to present evidence, accused filed a motion to admit
demurrer to evidence which asserts that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the following reasons: (a) that she is charged with crime
not defined and penalized by law; (b) that circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (c) that the testimonies given by the witnesses of the
prosecution were hearsay, thus, inadmissible in evidence against her.
MTC/RTC DECISION: Found Edna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arson with multiple
homicide. And imposed death penalty and ordered to pay damages
CA DECISION: affirmed with modification (death penalty affirmed but reduced damages)
ISSUE: Whether Malngan was correctly convicted of the complex crime of arson with
multiple homicide? (no)
Whether the accused is guilty of simple arson or destructive arson? (simple arson)
Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the provisions of PD
No. 1613 respecting other cases of arson provide only one penalty for the commission of
arson, whether considered destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom. The raison
d'être is that arson is itself the end and death is simply the consequence.
Groizard says that when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be
in a house and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only.
When the Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it
intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no
murder without a design to take life. In other words, if the main object of the offender
is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the
burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of
arson.
xxxx
If the house was set on fire after the victims therein were killed, fire would not be a
qualifying circumstance. The accused would be liable for the separate offenses of
murder or homicide, as the case may be, and arson.
Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is
de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the
burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the
crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main
objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to
as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the
objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but
fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct
crimes committed - homicide/murder and arson.
Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances
present.
As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having
intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa.Said conflagration
likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was
proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple
arson.
3 Taguinod v. People Paraleajs
DOCTRINE: What really governs this particular case is that the prosecution was able to prove
the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the crime of malicious
mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
(2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction;
(3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging
it
FACTS:
This case started with a single incident on May 26, 2002 at the parking area of the Rockwell
Powerplant Mall. Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his Honda CRV (CRV) from the
3rd basement parking, while Robert Taguinod (petitioner) was driving his Suzuki Vitara (Vitara)
from the 2nd basement parking. When they were about to queue at the corner to pay the
parking fees, the respective vehicles were edging each other. The CRV was ahead of the
queue, but the Vitara tried to overtake, which resulted the touching of their side view mirrors.
The side view mirror of the Vitara was pushed backward and naturally, the side view mirror of
the CRV was pushed forward. This prompted the private complainant's wife and daughter,
namely, Susan and Mary Ann, respectively, to alight from the CRV and confront the petitioner.
Petitioner appeared to be hostile, hence, the private complainant instructed his wife and
daughter to go back to the CRV. While they were returning to the car, petitioner accelerated the
Vitara and moved backward as if to hit them. The CRV, having been overtaken by the Vitara,
took another lane. Private complainant was able to pay the parking fee at the booth ahead of
petitioner. When the CRV was at the upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the
CRV's rear portion and pushed the CRV until it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit
portion of the ramp.
As a result of the collision, the CRV sustained damage at the back bumper spare tires and the
front bumper, the repair of which amounted to P57,464.66. The insurance company shouldered
the said amount, but the private complainant paid P18,191.66 as his participation. On the other
hand, the Vitara sustained damage on the right side of its bumper.
CA DECISION: Affirmed
ISSUE: Whether Taguinod is guilty of the offense (YES)
SC RULING:
Accused is convicted
What really governs this particular case is that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
(2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction;
(3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging
it.
In finding that all the above elements are present, the MeTC rightly ruled that:
The following were not disputed: that there was a collision between the side view mirrors of the
two (2) vehicles; that immediately thereafter, the wife and the daughter of the complainant
alighted from the CRV and confronted the accused; and, the complainant, in view of the hostile
attitude of the accused, summoned his wife and daughter to enter the CRV and while they were
in the process of doing so, the accused moved and accelerated his Vitara backward as if to hit
them.
The incident involving the collision of the two side view mirrors is proof enough to establish the
existence of the element of "hate, revenge and other evil motive." Here, the accused
entertained hate, revenge and other evil motive because to his mind, he was wronged by the
complainant when the CRV overtook his Vitara while proceeding toward the booth to pay their
parking fee, as a consequence of which, their side view mirrors collided.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution had proven beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing elements. First, the hitting of the back portion
of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The
version of the private complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the
CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the petitioner's version that it
was private complainant's CRV which moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara
considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky
and dangerous for the private complainant and his family to move the CRV backward when it
would be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of the
gravitational pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute
arson or other crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the
petitioner was just giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between
him and the private complainant.
DOCTRINE:
The issue of whether the amount of P5,000.00 was offered or demanded by petitioner is
irrelevant in the prosecution against him for the crime of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons. It
does not change the fact that unlawful taking occurred as a result of petitioner's use of
intimidation on private complainant.
FACTS:
On December 23, 2010, petitioner Journey Kenneth Asa, using the Facebook account name
Indho Than, sent Alyanna Cassandra a private message by way of Facebook Messenger,
threatening to post provocative photos of her friend, private complainant Joyce Erica Varias.
Alyanna immediately contacted private complainant. Using Alyanna's Facebook account,
private complainant sent a private message to petitioner, asking him to take down the fake
Facebook account with her photo as profile. Instead of doing what private complainant
requested, petitioner threatened private complainant that he would make a public post on
Facebook of her private and post-coital photos with her partner.
From December 24 to 27, 2010, private complainant and petitioner exchanged a series of
private messages, where the former begged the latter not to release her photos because a lot of
people would be affected. In desperation, private complainant told petitioner that she would do
anything to get back her photos. Petitioner then told her that he would delete all the photos in
his possession and take down her fake Facebook account if she would agree to have sex with
him. Private complainant replied that she would not have sex with petitioner but she could give
him P5,000.00. Petitioner agreed but told her that he wanted to meet her in an apartelle. They
agreed to meet at McDonald's in Walter Mart, Dasmarifias City on December 30, 2010, where
private complainant would hand to petitioner P5,000.00 in exchange for the memory card
containing the private photos and that they would then go to Quatro Pasos Apartelle together.
On December 28, 20l0, private complainant told her mother that someone was blackmailing her
on Facebook. The two went to Dasmariñas City Police Station to ask for assistance. The police
4 Asa vs. People, G.R. No. 236290, 20 Jan. 2021 Magcamit
In the morning of December 30, 2010, as agreed with petitioner, private complainant went to
McDonald's. Petitioner approached her and introduced himself as the one private complainant
was exchanging private messages with. He brought out his cellular phone and showed private
complainant the contents of the memory card inserted therein. After verifying that the memory
card indeed contained her private photos, private complainant handed to petitioner an envelope
containing the marked money amounting to P5,000.00. Petitioner counted the money in front of
private complainant before removing his phone's memory card and giving it to the latter. Private
complainant then removed her glasses to alert the entrapment team, who then rushed to the
scene and immediately arrested petitioner. Afterwards, the entrapment team brought petitioner
to Dasmarifias City Police Station.
For his part, petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed that he went to
McDonald's to buy food. He saw private complainant thereat whom he recognized as a
schoolmate in high school. He then approached private complainant and told her, "Your face
looks familiar." He left her alone and sat on a table near hers. While eating, petitioner felt the
urge to urinate so he went to the toilet and left his bag on the table. When he returned,
petitioner noticed that his bag was open. He looked inside his bag and saw an envelope. He
examined the contents of his bag, which included two (2) or three (3) memory cards containing
his family photos. Without any warning, a man handcuffed him and that man introduced himself
as a police officer. Afraid of the police officer, petitioner followed whatever they asked him to do.
He was then brought to Dasmarifias City Police Station.
SC RULING:
Yes.
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts when it found that petitioner demanded money from private complainant in
exchange for the memory card containing the latter's private photos, which made him liable for
Robbery with Intimidation of Persons. It may be recalled that petitioner originally demanded for
private complainant to have sex with him in exchange for the return of the private photos.
Private complainant refused and offered P5,000.00 instead. It must be stressed, however, that
private complainant's counter-offer does not make it "with her consent," as the same was made
as a result of petitioner's existing and continuing threat of posting the private photos on
Facebook. It is worthy to note that petitioner did not offer to voluntarily and unconditionally
return the photos of private complainant but instead asked for something in exchange for him
not to post the same on Facebook. In effect, when petitioner accepted private complainant's
counter-offer of P5,000.00 instead of sex, his demand was merely amended or changed from
sexual into a monetary one. Accordingly, it is not entirely wrong for the RTC and the CA to
4 Asa vs. People, G.R. No. 236290, 20 Jan. 2021 Magcamit
conclude that, in the end, petitioner demanded money in the amount of P5,000.00 from private
complainant, which he took at McDonald's against private complainant's consent. Concurrently,
the second element in the crime of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons is present in this case
-that there is unlawful taking of property belonging to another. So is the fourth element of the
crime charged anent the presence of intimidation of persons, as petitioner's threat to post the
subject private photos on Facebook if his demand is not met produced fear in the mind of his
victim, private complainant, so that the latter was forced to give to petitioner the amount of
P5,000.00, against or without her consent.
TOPIC: Theft
DOCTRINE: Under Article 308, par. 2 (1) of the RPC, Theft is also committed by one's failure to
deliver lost property to its owner or local authorities. In this kind of Theft, it is essential to prove:
1) the finding of lost property; 2) the failure of the finder to deliver the same to the local
authorities or its owner.
In fine, a "finder" under Article 308, par. 2(1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual finder of
the lost property since the gist of the offense is the furtive taking and misappropriation of the
property found. . . Otherwise stated, petitioner was a "finder in law," if not in fact; and his act in
appropriating the money was of precisely of the same character as if it had been originally
found by him.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Theft
FACTS:
On December 10, 2004, Dawson Word (Word) dropped by the People's Mart in Naga City,
Camarines Sur with his househelper, Angie Beroño (Beroño), to buy fish. He was carrying
US$4,550.00 and P27,000.00 bundled together in a rubber band placed on his lap. Word gave
Beroño P1,000.00 to buy fish and arranged his remaining money while waiting inside the car.
When Beroño returned, Word placed the bundle of money on his lap between his legs and
drove back to his apartment. He parked his car in front of his residence and forgot the money
that he placed on his lap. Apparently, upon alighting from the car, the bundled money fell on the
road near his vehicle. At about 5:30 a.m. the following morning, a bakery worker noticed a
bundle of money lying on the ground near Word's car. Meanwhile, one of Pante's co-accused,
who was riding his bike outside, also noticed the bundle of money and picked it up before going
inside his house. At around 8:00 a.m. Word realized that the money that he had placed on his
lap was missing. He began searching for it in his car but could no longer find it. With the help of
his landlord, Word learned that Pante's minor co-accused picked up the bundled money near
his car. On December 21, 2004, Word sought the help of the police in the recovery of his
money. Upon investigation, it was found that Pante's minor co-accused was indeed the finder of
the money. The police headed to the minor's residence where accused-minor admitted that he
found the bundle of money under Word's car. He also averred that the money was shared
among his other co-accused, who is a cousin and also a minor, Pante, and himself.
MTC/RTC DECISION: "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft under
Article 308, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from 2 years 4 months and 1 day of prision correctional as minimum to 9 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.
ISSUE:
SC RULING:
Under Article 308, par. 2 (1) of the RPC, Theft is also committed by one's failure to deliver lost
property to its owner or local authorities. In this kind of Theft, it is essential to prove: 1) the
finding of lost property; 2) the failure of the finder to deliver the same to the local authorities or
its owner.
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court found that the prosecution
witnesses were able to prove that Word lost his bundled money after alighting from his car in
front of his residence and forgetting that he had placed them in between his legs. Such fact was
corroborated by the prosecution witness who testified that he positively saw the accused-minor
pick up the bundle of money under Word's car. In the same vein, all three accused admitted that
it was the accused-minor who found the bundle of money in front of the bakery, which they later
divided among themselves in the following manner: US$1,700.00 for Pante; and US$500.00
and US$2,350.00 for each of the two accused-minor. Despite knowing that the money did not
rightfully belong to them, Pante encouraged the two minor accused to keep the money for
themselves. He also appropriated the money for himself by buying various items such as a JVC
component, gas tank, and construction materials. He only returned the remainder of the money
to Word when police authorities showed up in his house.
Anent Pante's argument that he cannot be convicted for Theft because he is not the finder of
the lost property, we are not persuaded.
In fine, a "finder" under Article 308, par. 2(1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual finder of
the lost property since the gist of the offense is the furtive taking and misappropriation of the
property found Though not the actual finder, there is no dispute that Pante knew for a fact that
his two co-accused minor did not own the subject money. He knew for a fact that his
co-accused minor merely found the money along the road while the latter was delivering
bread.Instead of returning the money, Pante convinced his co-accused minors not to return the
money and to divide it among themselves. At that moment, Pante placed himself precisely in
the situation as if he was the actual finder. Otherwise stated, petitioner was a "finder in law," if
not in fact; and his act in appropriating the money was of precisely of the same character as if it
had been originally found by him.
6 People v. Sanota (ASUS LAPTOP) Paralejas
DOCTRINE: For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to
prove the confluence of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of
the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and (4) by
reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
FACTS:
According to Santiago Abion, Jr. (Abion), on March 31, 2011, around 4:00 p.m., he was
feeding his ducks at the back of his house when he saw appellants having a drinking spree at
a hut located five (5) meters away from his house. From a distance of three (3) meters, he
overheard the three (3) appellants planning to raid a house in Hacienda 8. Abion also heard the
same appellants saying that anyone who blocks their path will be killed. Thereafter, Abion
entered his house and cooked food for dinner. Later, in the evening of the same day, appellant
Espineli arrived at Abion's house and invited the latter to a birthday party in Don Jose, Santa
Rosa, Laguna. After Abion asked permission from his wife, he and appellant Espineli
boarded a motorcycle owned and driven by the same appellant. Instead of going to Don Jose,
Santa Rosa, Laguna, the motorcycle headed towards Hacienda 8, and after five (5) minutes of
travelling, appellant Espineli parked the motorcycle beside the road and in front of the house
of Don Alfonso Quiros (Quiros). Appellant Espineli told Abion to stay put as he had to talk to his
fellow security guard inside the house of Quiros. After a few seconds, appellants Sanota and
Dayto arrived and the two asked Abion where appellant Espineli was. Abion told them that
appellant Espineli went inside the house of Quiros and, thereafter, appellants Sanota and Dayto
went inside the same house. Abion followed appellants Sanota and Dayto, and when he was
twenty (20) meters away from the house of Quiros, he saw appellant Espineli handing a gun to
appellant Dayto, and the latter, with a gun in his possession, climbed the window of the same
house. After five (5) minutes, Abion heard a gunshot and saw appellant Dayto come out of the
window of the house of Quiros with a gun on his right hand and a "black thing" on his left.
Appellants Sanota and Dayto then fled to the forest, while appellant Espineli proceeded to
where the motorcycle was parked. Abion also went back to the motorcycle and pretended that
he didn't witness the incident. Appellant Espineli drove the motorcycle and Abion alighted in
Barangay Hernandez where the latter was told by the former to keep quiet. The following day,
Abion heard from his neighbors that Quiros' house has been robbed and that the latter's son,
Jose Miguel Quiros (Jose Miguel) was killed.
MTC/RTC DECISION: GUILTY
CA DECISION: AFFIRMED
SC RULING:
SC Affirmed.
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
confluence of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of
the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has
to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through
reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery and homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide
is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on
the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one
of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is
committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with
homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is
used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of
personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable
doubt, conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not
presented in court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away
and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner. The prosecution is not burdened to
prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether
the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment
because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the
killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the
robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire
to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all
profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has
materialized.
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to
preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the
commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As
long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be
committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.
7 People v. Labuguen G.R. No. 223103 24 Feb. 2020 Camungao
DOCTRINE: Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or
on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution
must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another(2)
with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was
committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and objective of
the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
FACTS: On January 3, 2002, while spouses Manuel Padre and Nenita Padre and their two
daughters, Rhoda and Rachel, were having dinner at their home, five men suddenly barged in.
Accused Florentino Labuguen entered first and pulled Rachel into the comfort room together
with her mother Nenita and sister Rhoda, who in turn were pulled by accused Rodrigo
Macalinao and by an unidentified man respectively.
Manuel, on the other hand, was brought to the store by an unidentified man. Nenita was then
brought to Padre's store while Rhoda and Rachel were left in the comfort room. Subsequently,
Labuguen brought Rachel out of the comfort room and she saw accused Romeo Zuniga,
standing by the door of the store and Macalinao, standing guard at the CR door and holding a
gun.
Upon reaching the dining area, Labuguen stabbed Rachel with a small knife on the left breast
and then Macalinao hit her on the forehead with the butt of a gun, causing her to fall down.
Then Labuguen strangled her and as she could not remove his hands off her neck, she played
dead. As soon as Labuguen stood up and left, together with the other perpetrators, she
immediately ran for help to their neighbor.
Meanwhile, after Manuel closed the store and returned to the house, Zuniga, upon the
instruction of Joel Albano (Albano), hit [Manuel hard] on the forehead, causing the latter to fall.
Eric Madday, one of the five men and who also used to work for Manuel Padre, boxed Nenita
on the abdomen and when Zuniga saw the chopping knife, he stabbed her at the back. On the
other hand, Rudy Macalinao shot Rhoda when she tried to run away. On the belief that all
members of the Padre family were dead, the group proceeded to Albano's house, where Zuniga
learned that they got the money from the Padre family.
MTC/RTC DECISION: The court finds accused, Romeo Zuniga and Florentino "Tinong"
Labuguen "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The Court ruled that all the elements of the crime of Robbery with Homicide were proved by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion,
of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove
the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another(2) with intent to
gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed. A
conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the
taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
As to the crime charged in the information, the Court reiterated its ruling in People vs. Tidong
that there is no special complex crime of robbery with homicide and double frustrated homicide.
The offense should have been designated as robbery with homicide alone, regardless of the
number of homicides or injuries committed. These other felonies have, at the most and under
appropriate circumstances, been considered merely as generic aggravating circumstances
which can be offset by mitigating circumstances. The term "homicide" in paragraph 1 of Article
294 is used in its generic sense, that is, any act that results in death. Any other act producing
injuries short of death is integrated in the "homicide" committed by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery, assuming, of course, that the homicide is consummated. If no death supervenes,
the accused should be held liable for separate crimes of robbery and frustrated or attempted
homicide or murder (provided that there was intent to kill) if the latter offenses were not
necessary for the commission of the robbery, or for a complex crime of robbery and frustrated
or attempted homicide or murder under Article 48 of the Code if the latter offenses were the
necessary means for the commission of robbery.
8 People v. Barrera, G.R. No. 230549 Teñido
TOPIC: Art. 299 RPC; Robbery by the use of force upon things
DOCTRINE:
● There can be no charge of Robbery with Rape if Rape is through Sexual Assault. The
crimes should be separate because there is a legislative intent which distinguishes Rape
through Sexual Intercourse and Rape through Sexual Assault.
Four elements constituting the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things
(1) intent to gain
(2) taking of personal property
(3) the items are personal property
(4) use of force upon things - destruction of the window jalousies
FACTS:
Prosecution’s version:
In the early morning of Feb. 2, 2013, Glenn Barrera broke into the house occupied by
BBB, his wife CCC, and their seven-year old daughter AAA. Barrera gained entry by
removing one of the jalousies of a window, through which he was able to turn the
doorknob and enter the house. He took a DVD player and television set, and went to the
second floor where AAA was sleeping. He took off AAA’s shorts and licked and inserted his
tongue in her vagina. This awakened AAA who shouted to CCC, “Mommy hinubadan po ako ng
short at dinilaan ang pepe ko.” CCC, upon hearing the noise, got up and started to wake BBB.
BBB saw Barrera still inside the house and carrying the DVD player. Barrera tried to escape as
he was being chased by BBB and CCC with the help of their relatives as they were on the same
compound. In the process he dropped the DVD player. Barrera was apprehended with the help
of the barangay tanod and was turned over to the police.
Defense’ version:
Defense presented accused appellant and his neighbor/sister-in-law Rachelle Magsino.
He offered the defense of denial claiming that on Feb. 3 he was on his way to the seashore to
hep his father when he was approached by barangay officials who brought him to the Municipal
Hall where he was informed of being charged with robbery and rape.
Rachelle testified that on 5am of the day of the incident, accused was having breakfast
in his house and she saw him headed to the sea where his father was waiting. She also saw the
accused being arrested by the barangay tanods.
RTC DECISION: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape under
Art. 293 in relation to Art. 294 of the RPC
There is an undeniable positive identification of the accused as the person who entered BBB;s
house and took their television and DVD player.
RTC found AAA’s testimony credible and sufficient to establish that she was sexually assaulted.
Accused appellant assails the judgment on the ground that the testimonies upon which they are
based are incongruent and improbable and should not be given weight and credence.
SC RULING: Affirmed the ruling of the CA but with modifications of the crime charged
(Guilty of robbery by the use of force upon things; Guilty of sexual assault)
The accused should not be punished of the special complex crime of robbery with rape
but that of two special distinct crimes. The legislature intended to maintain the dichotomy
between rape through carnal knowledge and rape through sexual assault.
The crime of robbery with rape is a special complex crime; for prosecution of said crime,
the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt:
In robbery with rape, the intent of the accused must be taken with intent to gain the
property of another; rape must be committed only as an accompanying crime. Article 294 does
not distinguish when rape must be committed, for as long as it is contemporaneous with the
commission of robbery.
The Anti-Rape Law expanded the definition of rape to include acts of sexual assault.
Hence, the two modes in which rape may be committed (through carnal knowledge and sexual
assault). There is a legislative intent that distinguishes between rape through sexual intercourse
and sexual assault as seen on the penalties imposed to them, the more severe penalty is
imposed through sexual intercourse warranting a more severe punishment.
The Court cannot simply presume that with the passage of R.A. No. 8353, rape as a
component of the special crime of robbery with rape includes sexual assault. Whatever is not
plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment.
Furthermore, the fundamental rule in criminal law that any ambiguity shall be construed strictly
against the State and in favor of the accused.
The more reasonable interpretation is that when Sexual Assault under Art. 266-A(2) of
the RPC accompanied the robbery, the accused should not be punished of the special complex
crime of robbery with rape but that of two separate and distinct crimes, as it would be more
favorable to the accused.
ART. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice to worship. - Any
armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or
edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the value
of the property taken shall exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) and if -
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was
committed, by and of the following means:
(2) by breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking of any door or window.
Here, the information alleged that the accused-appellant took one portable DVD worth
P2,500.00 and one TCL 21 inches television. The court finds such allegations insufficient to
prove the amount of the property taken. An uncorroborated estimate is not enough. The Court
hereby imposes the minimum penalty under Art. 299 of the RPC.
In the crime of robbery by the use of force upon things, the breaking of the jalousies in BBB’s
house is a means of committing the crime and as such can no longer be considered to increase
the penalty. With the separation of crimes committed and the crime of robbery established with
the use of force upon things, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling can no longer be
considered as it is inherent in the offense.
DOCTRINE:
That on or about September 2, 2007, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, with intent to gain
and to kill, armed with bladed weapons, with force and violence, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously grabbed the neck and dragged Peter Ray Garcia Enriquez who was then
seventeen (17) years old, and then took away the latter's Nokia 6630 cellular phone,
silver bracelet, necklace, wallet containing cash of undetermined amount. Without the
said victim's consent and on occasion of the said robbery stabbed the aforementioned
victim, thereby inflicting upon him fatal wounds which caused his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the said victim's legal heirs.
FACTS:
Manuel Bernido, Jr. testified that on September 2, 2007, around 3:30 in the
morning, he was in front of Toto's Eatery along Quirino Avenue, Davao City.
About ten meters away, he saw Peter Enriquez texting while waiting fora jeepney
ride. Appellant suddenly approached Enriquez from behind and stabbed the
latter in the neck. Appellant then dragged the victim toward an alley in Barangay
9. Shocked by what he saw, he ran home.
Later, he saw appellant pass his house, running. Then, appellant passed his
house again, this time carrying a dipper with water. He used the water to wash
away blood stains off the crime scene and the alley where he dragged the
lifeless body of his victim. He called appellant and asked why he was not
wearing slippers and why he was covered with blood. Appellant responded he
came from the Bankerohan Public Market. Few hours later, he saw appellant's
brother Wangyu. Mancao flag down a taxicab and board the same together with
appellant.
SPO2 Kelvin Magno testified that on September 3, 2007, around 6 o'clock in the
morning, the San Pedro Police Station received a report that a dead body was
found in Barangay 9. He and SPO2 Nelson Galban proceeded to the area to
investigate. There, they found the lifeless body of Enriquez. His cellphone, silver
necklace, silver bracelet, and wallet containing cash were missing.
They followed a trail of blood near the body which led to the boarding house of
the Mancao brothers. After asking around, they went to the eatery where
Wangyu worked. Wangyu was there. Upon seeing the police officers, he cried
and confessed that appellant was involved in the robbery and that he assisted
his brother in fleeing to Maco, Davao del Norte. The next day, SPO2 Magno and
other police officers proceeded to Maco in search for appellant. 12 When they
finally found him, he tried to escape but they were able to capture and arrest him.
13 They found in his possession a silver necklace and a pair of blood-stained
pants. 14
Pedro Enriquez, the victim's father, identified the necklace in open court. He
recognized it because it was his gift to his son. He remembered the pendant
bearing the letter "T".
Evidence for the Defense: Appellant denied the charge. He averred that he had
been in Barangay Libay-libay, Compostela Valley since September 1, 2007 to
tend the land of his mother. On September 4, 2007, more than ten people
arrested him without a warrant. He was brought to the police station where he
was forced to wear a silver necklace. He discovered later on that he was already
being charged with murder for the death of victim Peter Enriquez.
MTC/RTC DECISION: finding accused Jay Godoy Mancao GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
ISSUE: Whether the CA err in affirming appellant’s conviction for robbery with homicide
SC RULING: the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated September 27, 2016 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01258-MIN, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
The appeal utterly lacks merit. Robbery with homicide is defined and penalized
under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. — Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
A conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the
main purpose and objective of the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental
to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the
killing may occur before, during or after the robbery
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses to be clear, straightforward and consistent. They gave full
credence to Bernido, Jr.'s eyewitness account of the victim's killing and SPO2
Magno and Pedro Enriquez's identification of the object of the crimei.e., the
victim's necklace found in appellant's possession. In any event, the courts below
ruled that there is no showing that the witnesses were impelled by any improper
motive to falsely testify against appellant.
TOPIC: Robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons
DOCTRINE: The complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons was committed when the accused, who
held firearms, entered the residential house of the victims and inflicted injury upon the victims in
the process of committing the robbery. Hence, the penalty is that imposed for the robbery in an
inhabited house, the more serious crime. All the accused are liable because the act of one is
the act of all.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Robbery
FACTS: At the private complainant’s residence at No. 24, Mabait St., Teachers Village, Quezon
city, private complainant Lalaine Yreverre saw appellant Aurora Engson in front of their gate.
Upon noticing Aurora, Lalaine went to the gate and asked Aurora what is their purpose, as there
were 4 of them. Aurora then inquired about Cynthia Yreverre, Lalaine's sister. The latter replied
that Cynthia was in the Japanese Embassy and asked Aurora if there was any other person
whom she wanted to talk to. Aurora told Lalaine that she was from the POEA. Upon said
pretension, Lalaine offered herself instead to talk to her and allowed her to enter their house.
Aurora asked Lalaine if she could use the telephone, which the latter acceded to and handed
her a cordless telephone. Lalaine noticed that Aurora seemed to keep on dialing the telephone
and even said that the person she was calling did not know how to use the telephone. But still,
Aurora kept on dialing the telephone.
Thereafter, appellant Aurora asked for a cigarette. After Lalaine gave Aurora the cigarette, the 4
other men outside the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly came inside the house. When
Aurora told that she could not contact the person she was calling, she asked Lalaine if she
could use the comfort room, which the latter again permitted. Aurora stood up, put down the
telephone, got her bag and went to the comfort room. When Aurora came back, she sat down
again but in crossed-legs as she said she was having a menstrual period. Upon saying that,
Lalaine's attention was focused on her. Accused Edgardo Cacal poked a gun at Lalaine's neck
and announced that it was a hold-up. While appellant Edgardo Cacal was poking a gun at
Lalaine's neck, accused Danilo Cuanang and the 2 other men proceeded to the kitchen. In the
kitchen, Danilo and his 2 other companions herded their maids, private complainant's niece and
cousin inside the bodega.
Accused Cacal who was still poking the gun at Lalaine's neck pulled Lalaine's hair and dragged
her upstairs and brought her inside Cynthia's room. The gun still being poked at Lalaine, Cacal
looked around the room and when he spotted upon the vault he dropped Lalaine, opened
the door and called for his companions to come along. Accused Cuanang came up and
the two (Cacal and Cuanang) carried the vault and brought it downstairs. But before they
went downstairs, they threatened Lalaine not to follow them and to just stay in the room, but
Lalaine opened the door and followed them.
When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused Cacal turned his back and saw her. Accused
Cacal then brought her inside her room. Inside the room, Cacal pushed her towards her bed
and she fell. Cacal told her to just stay, and then he searched the room. Lalaine managed to
stand up but Cacal slapped her. While sitting, accused Cuanang came and tied her arms behind
her back. While she was being tied, appellant Aurora Fransdilla peeped inside the room. It was
also at the time that accused Cacal and Cuanang searched the entire room and took all the
jewelry and things they saw.
When Cuanang and Cacal left the room, Lalaine followed them. While in the middle downstairs,
she saw Cacal, Cuanang and their two other companions tucking their guns around their waists.
Appellants and their co-accused then left the house on board 2 cars that were waiting for them.
MTC/RTC DECISION: Robbery under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.
CA DECISION: Affirmed.
ISSUE: (1) Whether conspiracy of Fransdilla with her co-accused was established beyond
reasonable doubt (YES)
(2) What crime was committed? (Complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed
men under Art. 299 of the RPC and robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
under Art. 294 of the RPC).
In the eyes of the law, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. For an accused to be validly
held to have conspired with her co-accused in committing the crime, her overt acts must evince
her active part in the execution of the crime agreed to be committed. The overt acts of each of
the conspirators must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive
conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such
conspirator is the mastermind. Here, Fransdilla was satisfactorily shown not to have been a
mere passive co-conspirator, but an active one who had facilitated the access into the house by
representing herself as an employee of the POEA. In that respect, it is not always required to
establish that two or more persons met and explicitly entered into the agreement to commit the
crime by laying down the details of how their unlawful scheme or objective would be carried out.
Conspiracy can also be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense is
perpetrated, or can be inferred from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or
common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Once conspiracy is
established, the act of each conspirator is the act of all.
Crime committed was the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
Citing Napolis v. Court of Appeals, the CA ruled that all the accused, including Fransdilla,
were guilty of committing the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299,
Revised Penal Code, and robbery with intimidation or violence under Article 294, Revised Penal
Code. Thus, it held that the penalty for the complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code was that for the more serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period. Taking into
consideration that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances were present, it set the
indeterminate sentence of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In Napolis v. Court of Appeals, the Court abandoned the doctrine adopted in United States v.
De los Santos that when the felonies of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299 of the
Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against or intimidation of a person under Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code are committed, the penalty for the latter crime (although the
lighter one) should be imposed because the violence against or intimidation of a person was the
"controlling qualification," on the theory that "robbery which is characterized by violence or
intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force
upon things, because where violence or intimidation against the person is present there is
greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual."
Napolis v. Court of Appeals is controlling in this case. To start with, the information fully
alleged the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal
Code, and robbery with intimidation or violence under Article 294, Revised Penal Code by
averring that "the above- named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain,
and by means of violence and intimidation upon person rob the residence…" And, secondly, the
Prosecution competently proved the commission of the complex crime by showing during the
trial that the accused, after entering the residential house of the complainants at No. 24-B
Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, took away valuables, including the vault containing
Cynthia's US dollar currencies, and in the process committed acts of violence against and
intimidation of persons during the robbery by slapping and threatening Lalaine and tying her up,
and herding the other members of the household inside the bodega of the house.
Art. 294 par. 5 is the relevant provision, under which the penalty is prison correccional in its
maximum period to prison mayor in its medium period:
“Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. — Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
xxx 5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
period in other cases. (As amended by R.A. 18).”
On the other hand, relevant are Art. 299 par. (a) 4 (because Fransdilla pretended to be from the
POEA) and paragraph(b) 2 (because the accused brought the vault down from Cynthia's
upstairs bedroom and forced it open outside the place where the robbery was committed),
supra. The penalty for the crime is reclusion temporal:
Or if –
(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:
xxx 2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open outside the place of the
robbery.”
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the complex crime is that for the
more serious felony, which, in this case, was the robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
punishable by reclusion temporal, to be imposed in the maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four
months and one day to 20 years). Hence, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence of 12
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal, must be
corrected to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal.
11 People v. Bacyaan, GR 238457, September 18, 2019 Paquinto
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Testimony of Cuadro: On May 31, 2017, he boarded the JMK bus along Ayala Avenue,
Makati. When the bus reached EDSA-Ayala Flyover, 6 men, armed with guns and grenades,
declared a hold-up. He identified Bacyaan as the one who announced the hold-up, while
Guevarra and Fernandez were the ones who divested himself and other passengers of their
personal belongings including money. Meanwhile, policemen started pursuing the bus. When it
reached Muñoz market in Caloocan, the policemen flagged it down. As the passengers tried to
jump off the bus, Bacyaan shot passenger Renato Veloso in the back which resulted in his
death. Bacyaan also shot Lauro Santos, the bus driver, in the head, causing his immediate
death.
Thereafter, the appellants grabbed a passenger to be used as a shield. They also grabbed
Cuadro and 2 other female passengers outside the bus as they looked for a vehicle to
commandeer. They saw a Mitsubishi Adventure van with the driver inside, boarded it, pointed a
gun at the driver, and ordered him to take the vehicle to NLEX and look for an exit route.
Appellants continued to exchange gunshots with the pursuing policemen until the vehicle finally
ditched into a gutter and became immobile because of blown tires, just inside the Lawang Bato
exit. According to Cuadro, he escaped through a broken windshield and saw appellants
commandeering a dump truck to escape.
Testimony of PO1 Baluya: a concerned citizen approached him and reported that appellants
had boarded a dump truck with Plate No. PDL 127. Together with his team, they pursued
appellants and another exchange of gunshots ensued until the driver of the dump truck jumped
out causing the vehicle to stop. 3 male persons, later identified as appellants, also jumped out
and surrendered. The police officers searched the dump truck and recovered a bag containing
several amounts of money, cellphones, and guns.
Defense: Denied that they were participants in the robbery incidents. Guevarra averred that he
was an innocent passenger of the bus and was on his way home. He was wrongfully arrested
and charged with the crime. Meanwhile, Fernandez claimed that at the time of the incident, he
was in the Balintawak Market waiting for a ride on his way home to Bulacan when he heard
gunshots being fired. He ran towards a street corner and dropped to the ground. After the
commotion subsided, he returned to where he was previously waiting for a ride to gather his
things but a policeman grabbed him and implicated him as one of the hold-uppers. Lastly,
Bacyaan narrated that on the day of the incident, at around 11:00 a.m., he was selling fruits in
front of the Balintawak Market when policemen in civilian clothes approached and invited him
for questioning at the Valenzuela Police Station. When they reached the station, they had his
picture and fingerprints taken. He was then brought to Camp Karingal, where he was detained
and informed that he was a suspect in the robbery incident.
CA DECISION: Affirmed the conviction for the crime of Robbery with homicide, but dismissed
the criminal case for serious illegal detention.
ISSUE: Whether Bacyaan, Guevarra, and Fernandez are guilty of Robbery with Homicide. YES
There is robbery with homicide under Art. 294, par. 1, RPC, as amended by RA 7659, when a
homicide is committed by reason of or on occasion of a robbery.
In order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the following elements must be
proven by the prosecution:
(1) the taking of personal property belonging to another;
(2) with intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
(3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic
sense, was committed.
"A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the
malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery." Thus, it follows that "the intent
to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or
after the robbery.”
In the case at bar, all the elements are present. Their main intention was to rob the passengers
of JMK Bus and that on the occasion of the robbery, a homicide was committed. Personal
properties belonging to the passengers were taken by means of force and with obvious intent to
gain. During the robbery, Renato Veloso and Lauro Santos were both mercilessly gunned down
by Bacyaan.
DOCTRINE:
CHARGE/INFORMATION: Four informations for Robbery with Homicide were filed against
appellant, Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy
Servantes, and alias “Rey”, an alias “Jonard”, an alias “Precie”, and an alias “Renato” whose
true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, and
conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed
firearms and acting as a band, with intent of gain with aggravating circumstances of treachery,
abuse of superior strength and using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime,
and by means of motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and intimidation:
1. (ROBBERY) Employed upon ENERGEX GASOLINE STATION, owned by Regino C.
Natividad, and represented by Macario C. Natividad, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away its cash earnings worth
P3,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of said Energex Gasoline Station and there
willfully, unlawfully; and
(HOMICIDE) Feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard
of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which
directly caused his death.
FACTS: In the early morning, around 2AM of January 7, 2000, employees of Energex Gasoline
Station (San Mateo, Rizal): Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato Lacambra III, both gasoline boys;
Juliet Amistoso, cashier; and Edraline Macahis, security guard; were on duty when a mint
green-colored Tamaraw FX arrived for service at the said gasoline station.
Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle, according to him when he went to the
driver’s side, he saw through the lowered window shield that there were about six to seven
persons aboard. He proceeded to fill up P50 worth of diesel in the has tank and returned the
key to the driver. While returning the key, the driver told him that the engine of the vehicle won’t
start. Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a push together with Lacambra.
When Zulueta and Lacambra were at the back of the vehicle and ready to push, all six male
passengers (except the driver) alighted and announced a hold-up. They were armed with a
shotgun and .38 caliber pistol. Lacambra was ordered to lie down and Zulueta was directed to
go near the Car Wash Section. All throughout the encounter, guns were poked at them.
Appellant De Leon guarded Zulueta, he poked a gun at the latter and took his wallet
containing a pawnshop ticket and P50.
Four members of the group went to the cashier’s office and took money worth P3000.
They also shot Macahis in the stomach and thereafter took the latter’s firearm.
Thereafter, the robbers boarded the same vehicle and proceeded towards San Mateo, Rizal.
Zulueta found Amistoso who told him that the robbers took her bag and jewelry. He also saw
Macahis and his gunshot wound and took him to the hospital. Macahis died at the hospital due
to the gunshot wound.
The following day, Zulueta identified the appellant De Leon as one of the robbers who poked a
gun at him.
DEFENDANT’S VERSION
De Leon stayed at the house of his Tita Emma from January 4 to 6 at Binangonan, Rizal,
helping her in her canteen. On the evening of Jan. 6, at approximately 9PM, he asked
permission to go to Antipolo and he was accompanied by Catherine Homo and her younger
brother. While waiting for a ride, the Tamaraw FC of a certain Christian Gersalia, his relative
passed by. Catherine asked Gersalia if he would allow De Leon to hitch a ride on his vehicle, to
which the former agreed. There were other passengers in the vehicle.
De Leon was supposed to alight at Masinag but he was not allowed to do so. Instead, he was
asked by the other passengers to join them in their destination. While on the road, he fell
asleep. When he woke up, they were in a gasoline station and saw Gersalia and the others
conducting a hold-up. He never left the vehicle because he was overwhelmed with fear.
After the holdup, they proceeded towards Marikina. On their way, they were followed by
policemen who fired at them. The other passengers fired back. It was then that the vehicle hit a
wall prompting the other passengers to scamper in different directions leaving him behind. De
Leon was immediately arrested.
Upon arraignment on March 23, 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty on all charges
CA DECISION: (This case was appealed first to the SC, originally. But because of the
modifications in the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an intermediate
review by the CA before elevated to the SC was allowed. The case was transferred to CA for
appropriate action and disposition)
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Commuted the case to reclusion perpetua – De Leon is
guilty of only 1 count.
SC RULING:
People vs. De Jesus: For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements:
1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and
4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The
intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction
as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the
crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime,
namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
HAPPENING OF DEATH
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide
is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on
the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of
the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or
on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide. The word “homicide” is used in its generic sense. Homicide,
thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
INTENT/ASPORTATION
Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of
personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt,
conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented
in court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed
by the robber or recovered by the owner. The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual
value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the
actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment, because the motive for robbery
can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he
is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit
robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited
and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has
materialized.
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to
preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of
the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a
nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place
other than the situs of the robbery.
The witnesses were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the robbery and positively identified De Leon as one of the robbers. Therefore, it
can be inferred that a conspiracy existed and that De Leon was part of it. To be a conspirator,
one need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed
by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.
For De Leon’s defense denying his participation in the robbery: Granting that he was merely
present, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a
conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the
conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof. – There are no evidence
presented that De Leon performed an overt act neither to escape from the company of the
robbers nor to prevent the robbery from taking place. His denial is of no value.
DOCTRINE: It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim
of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that
aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide
is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with
homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used
in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
FACTS: [SUMMARY: De Jesus, Manansala and Del Rosario agreed to stage a robbery against
Ybasco. During the commission, Manansala told him that he had a warrant of arrest,
handcuffed him and dragged him to a car. Acosta (security guard) saw the incident and sped
towards the scene. De Jesus shot Acosta (died). Manansala looked inside Ybasco’s bag and
found that it only contained ₱5,000 instead of the expected US$250,000. Ybasco was
transported to a sugar farm, where he would be freed. However, De Jesus suddenly shot
Ybasco (died).]
Ybasco (victim) was a policeman assigned to the Makati Police Station. After his tour of duty,
he worked for a money changer in the vicinity of the Intercontinental Hotel and the Rustan’s
Supermarket in Makati City. He delivered money for his employer every afternoon. The money
was placed in a plastic bag and he used a bicycle for this extra job.
Sometime in February 1994, Manansala, De Jesus (appellant), and Del Rosario, the
appellant’s brother-in-law, agreed to stage a robbery on March 7, 1994. The appellant told Del
Rosario of the planned robbery. Del Rosario was told that the financier for the heist was Nash,
a British national residing in the Philippines. The appellant knew that Ybasco was to deposit
US$250,000 in the bank every afternoon for his employer. They decided to waylay Ybasco on
his way to the bank.
On March 7, 1994 (8AM), upon Nash’s instructions, Del Rosario and the appellant took a car in
Batangas. The car was owned by Nash. The group arrived in the vicinity of the parking lot at the
Ayala Center near the Rustan’s Supermarket and the Kimpura Restaurant on board the same
car. The appellant was armed with a caliber .45 handgun. Manansala, the appellant and Del
Rosario alighted, and conducted a surveillance of the area. Tonton remained in the car.
Manansala instructed Del Rosario to position himself as a lookout at the corner of the Rustan’s
Supermarket, and for the appellant to position himself within the vicinity. Manansala waited for
Ybasco near the office of the money changer. Dela Rapa, who was then vending cigarettes,
was about five arm’s length away from the car.
[MAIN FACTS] (6:30PM) Ybasco emerged from the office of his employer holding a plastic bag.
Manansala contacted Del Rosario and told him that Ybasco was on his way out. He reminded
Del Rosario to be on the lookout for anybody who might rush to the succor of Ybasco, while the
appellant would take care of Ybasco. Momentarily, Manansala and the appellant confronted
Ybasco and told him, "May warrant of arrest ka." They grabbed Ybasco, handcuffed him and
dragged him to the car. Manansala and the appellant had a scuffle with Ybasco when they
grabbed the plastic bag from him. Acosta (victim), a roving security guard, saw the incident
and pulled out his gun. On board his motorbike, he sped towards the scene to investigate the
incident. Del Rosario confronted Acosta and grappled with him for the possession of the gun.
As Del Rosario managed to wrest possession of the gun from Acosta, Manansala ordered Del
Rosario to shoot. Del Rosario shot Acosta in the mouth. They boarded the car, and sped
towards EDSA. Another security guard at the Ayala Center rushed to Acosta’s aid and brought
him to the Makati Medical Center. Acosta expired.
The car sped towards Laguna. When Manansala he looked inside Ybasco’s bag and found
that it only contained ₱5,000 instead of the expected US$250,000, he was enraged.
Manansala hit Ybasco on the nape and uttered invectives at the latter. Ybasco explained, "Eh
wala naman akong idinedeliber mga anak na ganyan kalaking pera." Manansala took the
₱5,000 from Ybasco.
Ybasco was transported to a sugar farm in Laguna. Manansala and the appellant took him out
of the car and told him that he would be allowed to board a tricycle. The appellant warned
Ybasco not to follow them. Believing that Ybasco would be freed, Del Rosario took ₱80 from the
latter’s wallet, but returned ₱50 to him for his fare.
The appellant suddenly shot Ybasco on the head. The latter fell to the ground with his hands
still handcuffed. Manansala, the appellant and Del Rosario proceeded to Calamba, where Del
Rosario alighted after receiving ₱100 from the appellant for his fare. The appellant explained
that the remaining ₱4,900 would be used for the repair of the car.
After investigation, police operatives arrested Del Rosario and Manansala. Manansala executed
an extrajudicial confession in which he narrated how he, the appellant, Del Rosario and Nash,
planned to rob Ybasco of the cash he was carrying, including the details of the abduction and
the killing. Eventually, the appellant was also arrested.
CA DECISION: -
ISSUE: WON THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED. (YES)
SC RULING: GUILTY of robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the RPC
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the
use of violence against or any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson.
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
confluence of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during
or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has
to be taken into consideration.
There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple
negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be
consummated.
It is immaterial (1) that the death would supervene by mere accident; or (2) that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or (3) that two or more persons are killed or (4) that
aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact (5) that the victim of
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a
homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is
robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
"homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of
personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt,
conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented
in court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed
by the robber or recovered by the owner. The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual
value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the
actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the motive for robbery
can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.106
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part
as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it
clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he
is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit
robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained
from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his
co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to
preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of
the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a
nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place
other than the situs of the robbery.
In this case, appellant Del Rosario and Manansala, intended to abduct Ybasco and divest him
of money, which they thought Ybasco was about to deposit in the bank. Each of them had
specific tasks to perform: the appellant and Manansala were tasked to abduct Ybasco, handcuff
him and board him in their car, while Del Rosario acted as a lookout who would prevent anyone
from interfering with Ybasco’s abduction and the consummation of the robbery. The trio
performed their tasks with precision. In the process, Del Rosario shot and killed Acosta who
was on patrol within the vicinity and had rushed to the scene to investigate the incident. The
appellant and Manansala abducted Ybasco, handcuffed him and boarded him in the car. Del
Rosario took Acosta’s service gun after killing the victim.
TOPIC: Rape with Homicide when accompanied with rape or intentional mutilation
DOCTRINE: Parenthetically, we note that the trial court inaccurately designated the crime
committed as "robbery with homicide and rape. When the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide is accompanied by another offense like rape or intentional mutilation, such additional
offense is treated as an aggravating circumstance which would result in the imposition of the
maximum penalty of death.
FACTS:
On 23 April 1995, at around five o'clock in the morning, witness Benjamin Milano (nephew and
neighbor of the accused) was awakened by his mother to fetch water for their morning meal.
Bringing along a container, he then proceeded to the water pump of Bonifacia Lasquite, located
at the back of the latter's house After filling up his container, he then went on his way home.6
However, while still near the house of Bonifacia Lasquite, he noticed that someone was coming
from the fence of Bonifacia Lasquite's house. Although it was still a little dark, he recognized it to
be his uncle, accused-appellant.9 While standing only five (5) meters way, accused-appellant
asked him: "Toy, is there somebody fetching water?" 11 He responded in the negative. He notice
that the forehead, t-shirt and hair of accused-appellant were stained with blood. He also noticed
that accused-appellant was carrying a plastic bag. and had a bolo tucked in his pants.
Accused-appellant then walked away in a hurried manner while repeatedly looking over his
shoulders. Later on in the day, he was informed by a certain Emma about the death of their
neighbor, Bonifacia Lasquite. Because of this, he informed Roberto Lasquite, the son of
Bonifacia Lasquite, of his encounter with accused-appellant in the early morning of the ill-fated
day.
Mario Vinculado - He testified that he has been a resident of Brgy. Santa Cruz, Hilongos, Leyte,
since his birth and, as such, he knows both accused-appellant and the victim. Sometime in the
second week of August of 1995, he went to Ampayon, Butuan City together with a police officer
named Lumayno from the Hilongos Police Station. He went to the said town because he was
requested by Roberto Lasquite to accompany police officer Lumayno in ascertaining whether
accused-appellant was indeed in Ampayon pursuant to an information sent by the Butuan
Police Station to the Hilongos Police Station. When they arrived in Ampayon, they went to the
municipal jail where they found accused-appellant being investigated by the police. After the
investigation, accused-appellant asked Vinculado if they could have a talk. During their
conversation, accused-appellant informed Mario Vinculado that he had a companion when he
assaulted Bonifacia Lasquite and that he was only able to stab the victim twice in the breast.
Upon Mario Vinculado's return to his hometown, he informed the Hilongos police and Roberto
Lasquite of the admission made to him by accused-appellant.
Roberto Laquiste (son of the victim) – He was informed by Benjamin of his encounter with
accused-appellant while he was fetching water. Because of this, he and the barangay tanods
looked for accused-appellant. They searched for accused-appellant for more than a month but
could not find him. He only learned about the whereabouts of his mother's assailant when he
was informed by police officer Lumayno that accused-appellant had been arrested in Butuan
City. Roberto Lasquite than went to their councilor, Mario Vinculado, to request the latter to go
to Butuan City and confirm, if accused-appellant indeed killed his mother.
CA DECISION:
ISSUE: Whether the rape committed by the accused should be considered a different
offense (NO)
SC RULING:
SC affirmed.
Parenthetically, we note that the trial court inaccurately designated the crime committed as
"robbery with homicide and rape. When the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is
accompanied by another offense like rape or intentional mutilation, such additional offense is
treated as an aggravating circumstance which would result in the imposition of the maximum
penalty of death.
SC: We agree with the Solicitor General's observation that the crime committed was
erroneously designated as robbery with homicide, rape and physical injuries. The proper
designation is robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. When rape and homicide co-exist
in the commission of robbery, it is the first paragraph of Article 244 of the Revised Penal
Code which applies, the rape to be considered as an aggravating circumstance
[CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE]
The core issue the instant case is whether the circumstantial evidence on record forms an
unbroken chain which leads to the conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime for
which he is being made accountable for, to the exclusion of all others. Circumstantial evidence
is defined as that which indirectly proves a fact in issue. Under Section 4 of Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict an accused if the
following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
n the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly establishes
the guilt of accused-appellant and overpowers his defense of denial and alibi. Aside from the
fact that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses, accused-appellant's alibi of being in his
house at 5:30 in the morning does not preclude his physical presence in the house of the victim
considering that their respective residences are only 380 meters apart. Moreover, the proven
circumstances in the instant case, when viewed in their entirety, are as convincing as direct
evidence and, as such, negate the innocence of accused-appellant, to wit: (1)
accused-appellant was present at the scene of the crime; (2) he had blood stains on his body
and clothes, had a bolo tucked in his waist and was carrying a plastic bag when he was seen
leaving the scene of the crime; (3) he left Brgy. Sta. Cruz for Butuan City on the same day when
the victim was killed; (4) he admitted to Mario Vinculado that he killed the victim; (5) he did not
even bother to inform Roberto Lasquite of his alleged innocence despite having learned that he
was being made accountable for the death of Bonifacia Lasquite; (6) he could not think of any
reason as to why Benjamin Milano, his nephew, would lie in testifying against him; and (7) he
escaped from incarceration during the pendency of this case before the lower court. Clearly, the
foregoing evidence is consistent with the culpability of the accused and inconsistent with his
defense of denial and alibi. Not the least worthy of notice is the fact that accused-appellant
twice sought to escape liability: first, on the day that the victim was killed and second, while he
was incarcerated in prison. As has often been repeated, flight is a strong indication of guilt.
DOCTRINE: Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or
on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution
must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is
animo lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed. A conviction needs certainty
that the robbery is the central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely
incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing
may occur before, during or after the robbery.
FACTS:
Herein private complainants, the spouses Henry and Violeta Acob (Spouses Acob), were
owners of a market stall at the public market of Sta. Rosa Aurora, Isabela. Around 6 o'clock in
the evening of February 7, 2010, the Spouses Acob, together with their son, Homer, closed their
stall and proceeded home by riding together on their motorcycle. Homer was the driver, Violeta
sat at the middle, while Henry sat behind her. They were approaching the entrance to their
barangay around 6:30 p.m. when they noticed two persons, whom they later identified as
herein accused- appellants, near a motorcycle. When they passed, accused-appellants rode the
motorcycle and tailed them. Accused-appellants eventually caught up with them, whereupon,
accused Dillatan forced them to stop and immediately declared a holdup. Violeta embraced
Homer, while Dillatan grabbed her belt bag which contained P70,000.00 cash. Thereafter,
Dillatan uttered, "barilin mo na." Garcia then fired at the victims hitting, first, the left hand of
Violeta. The bullet went through the left hand of Violeta and pierced Homer's chest causing the
latter to fall down together with the motorcycle. Henry, on the other hand, was able to get off the
motorcycle and tried to escape but Garcia also fired at him thereby hitting his right knee.
Accused- appellants, thereafter, fled through their motorcycle. Several people then came to the
aid of the private complainants and brought them to the hospital where Homer later expired by
reason of his gunshot wound. Violeta and Henry were treated for their wounds.
Accused-appellants were apprehended by police authorities later at night where they were
subsequently identified by Violeta at the police station as the ones who grabbed her belt bag
and shot them. A criminal complaint was subsequently filed against accused-appellants.
In their Brief, accused-appellants mainly contend that the RTC erred in convicting them of the
crime charged, and the CA, in affirming their conviction, despite the incredibility of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and the failure of the prosecution to establish the
identity of the assailants.
MTC/RTC DECISION: The RTC held that: all the elements of the crime of robbery are present
in the instant case; robbery was the main purpose of accused-appellants; the killing of Homer
and the infliction of injuries upon Violeta and Henry are only committed on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery; hence, these crimes are merged into a special complex crime of robbery
with homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The RTC further held that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that the
accused-appellants are the perpetrators of the crime when they were positively identified by
Violeta.
CA DECISION: The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the prosecution was able to
establish the presence of all the elements of robbery with homicide by proving that Dillatan
declared a holdup and grabbed Violeta's belt bag, while Garcia fired at the private complainants
in order to facilitate the taking of the bag and their escape from the crime scene.
ISSUE: Whether or not the identity of the accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime of
robbery with homicide was duly proven (YES)
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion,
of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove
the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo
lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed. A conviction needs certainty that the
robbery is the central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental
to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery.
Under the given facts, the Court finds no error in the findings of both the RTC and the CA that
the prosecution was able to clearly establish that: (1) accused-appellants forced Homer, Henry
and Violeta to stop their motorcycle; (2) Dillatan declared the holdup and grabbed the belt bag
in Violeta's possession; and (3) thereafter, Garcia fired at the victims in order to preserve their
possession of the stolen item and to facilitate their escape.
The Court, likewise, finds no cogent reason to disturb the rulings of both the RTC and the CA in
giving credence to the testimonies of Henry and Violeta, especially, their positive and
categorical identification of accused- appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
Thus, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to
remember the faces of the assailants, this Court sees no reason how both parents, who
witnessed the violence inflicted, not only upon themselves, but especially upon their son, who
eventually died by reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed that Henry and
Violeta were seated together atop their motorcycle when Dillatan grabbed her bag and Garcia
fired at them. In fact, Violeta was embracing her son, Homer, when a single bullet struck them.
Both accused-appellants, at that time, were both less than a meter away from the victims.
Hence, despite the swiftness of the assault upon them, Henry and Violeta could not have
mistaken the identity of accused-appellants as the persons responsible for the attack.
Moreover, Violeta's testimony disproves the poor illumination claim of accused-appellants when
she testified that "it was still bright" at the time of the commission of the crime. It is settled
that when the conditions of visibility are favorable, as in this case, the eyewitness identification
of accused-appellants as the malefactors and the specific acts constituting the crime should be
accepted. Add the fact that Violeta and Henry had an unhindered view of the faces of
accused-appellants during the whole time that the crime was being committed. Thus,
accused-appellants' attack on the positive identification by Violeta and Henry must, therefore,
fail.
FACTS: Cahilig worked as a cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan
Association Inc. (WPESLAI) from Dec 1992 until Nov 2001. She was tasked with handling,
managing, receiving and disbursing the funds of WPESLAI.
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the
funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare
disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in
order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its
other bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her
capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferring funds from one bank account to
another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually
transfer the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit
was made into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal
of said amount from her capital contribution.
There were 30 cases of qualified theft filed against Cahilig, to which the parties agreed in the
stipulation of facts that only 3 of the 30 cases will be tried and heard, and that the remaining 27
counts will adopt the results of the 3 cases. The same being similar transactions with the same
modus operandi and involving the same accused and the offended party.
MTC/RTC DECISION: RTC found Cahilig guilty to the crimes charged. The RTC held that
Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key officers of the
association. The RTC noted that Cahilig “enjoyed access to the funds and financial records of
the association, a circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy withdrawal of funds
which she converted to her personal use in the manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly, she
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer.”
Second, the property belongs to another, since the funds undisputably belong to WPESLAI.
Third, the taking was done without the consent of the owner, which is obvious because
accused-appellant created a ruse showing that the funds were credited to another account but
were actually withdrawn from her own personal account.
Fourth, the taking was done with intent to gain, as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit,
took the funds by means of a modus operandi that made it appear through the entries in the
ledgers that all withdrawals and deposits were made in the normal course of business and with
the approval of WPESLAI.
Fifth, the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person [or] force
upon things. And finally, the acts were committed with grave abuse of confidence considering
that her position as cashier permeates trust and confidence.
SC RULING: CONVICTED.
The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by the trial court in six of the 30
cases are incorrect and, therefore, must be modified.
The elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows:
It is clear that all the elements of Qualified Theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her
intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to
commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, “must be the result of the relation
by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended
party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused.”
Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves
“handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing” money from WPESLAI’s depositors and other
funds of the association. Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and
vigilance over the money entrusted into her care.
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into
authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact
that Cahilig did not deny.
Proper Penalty
The trial court, however, erred in the penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191,
03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206.
To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases are P20,000.00, P46,300.00,
P25,000.00, P30,000.00, P40,000.00, and P35,000.00, respectively.
Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft “shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article.”
In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below P12,000.00. Hence, if the
crime charged had been simple theft, the penalty in any of these six cases would have been, at
least, prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since it was established that the crime
was qualified by grave abuse of confidence, Article 310 provides that the penalty to be imposed
shall be the one “next higher by two degrees,” which in this case is reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, the penalty in these six cases should be reclusion perpetua.
DOCTRINE: When the elements of both provisions are present, that the crime is a complex
one, calling for the imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the penalty for the most
serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period.
CHARGE/INFORMATION: A criminal complaint for robbery in band was filed with the
Justice of the Peace Court of Hermosa, Bataan. Named as defendants in the complaint,
as subsequently amended, were Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana, Ben de la Cruz,
Mauricio Anila, alias Mori, Jose Escabel, alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John
Doe, alias Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Paul Doe, et al. Napolis, Malana, Anila
and Casimiro having waived their right to a preliminary investigation, the case, insofar as
they are concerned, was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Bataan, where the
corresponding information was filed
FACTS:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peñaflor ,
47-year old wife of Ignacio Peñaflor , the owner of a store located at the new highway,
Hermosa, Bataan, after answering a minor call of nature, heard the barkings of the dog nearby
indicating the presence of strangers around the vicinity. Acting on instinct, she woke up
husband Ignacio Peñaflor who, after getting his flashlight and .38 caliber revolver, went down
the store to take a look. As he approached the door of the store, it suddenly gave way having
been forcibly pushed and opened by 4 men, one of them holding and pointing a machinegun.
Confronted by this peril, Ignacio Peñaflor fired his revolver but missed. Upon receiving from
someone a stunning blow on the head, Ignacio fell down but he pretended to be dead. He was
hogtied by the men.
The fact, however, was that he did not lose consciousness (tsn. 5, I). The men then went up the
house. One of the robbers asked Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor for money saying that they are
people from the mountain. Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor , realizing the danger, took from under the
mat the bag containing P2,000.00 in cash and two rings worth P350.00 and delivered them to
the robber. Thereupon, that robber opened and ransacked the wardrobe. Then they tied the
hands of Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and those of her two sons. After telling them to lie down, the
robbers covered them with blankets and left. The revolver of Ignacio, valued at P150.00, was
taken by the robbers. The spouses thereafter called for help and Councilor Almario, a neighbor,
came and untied Ignacio Peñaflor . The robbery was reported to the Chief of Police of Hermosa
and to the Philippine Constabulary.
MTC/RTC DECISION:
Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance of Bataan dismissed the case as
against defendants Flores, Anila, Casimiro and De la Cruz.
In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana and Apolinario
Satimbre, as above indicated.
CA DECISION: Affirmed
ISSUE: Whether the appellants are guilty of robbery with violence against persons under
Article 294 or robbery with use of force upon things under Article 299 (a) – It must be
complexed
SC RULING:
The fourth assignment of error refers to the characterization of the crime committed and the
proper penalty therefor. It should be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court convicting Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of the crime of robbery committed by armed
persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been made by breaking a wall, as provided
in Article 299 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and, accordingly, sentencing Napolis and
Satimbre to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, which is in accordance with said legal provision.
In addition, however, to performing said acts, the malefactors had, also, used violence against
Ignacio Peñaflor , and intimidation against his wife, thereby infringing Article 294 of the same
Code, under conditions falling under sub-paragraph (5) of said article, which prescribes the
penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period,
which is lighter than that prescribed in said Article 299, although, factually, the crime committed
is more serious than that covered by the latter provision.
Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view. Indeed, one
who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals therefrom
valuable effects, without violence against or intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art.
299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal.
Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in previous decision, if, aside from performing said acts,
the thief lays hand upon any person, without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the
injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of the same Code, the imposable
penalty -- under paragraph (5) thereof -- shall be much lighter. To our mind, this result and the
process of reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic and reason.
The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies the
"controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to justify said result. We agree with the
proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than
ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but, precisely, for this reason, We cannot
accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above cited — reduction of the penalty
for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of violence or intimidation which made it a more
serious one. It is, to our mind, more plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery
with violence against or intimidation of person takes place without entering an inhabited house,
under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements of both
provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition -- as provided
in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum period,
which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This penalty should, in
turn, be imposed in its maximum period -- from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven
(11) days to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal — owing to the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime.