1.

Rules on Succession

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall
become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according
to their ranking as defined herein.

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking
sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by
the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills
a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in the Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.

Section 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. -

(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic succession provided above do
not apply shall be filled by appointment in the following manner:

(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities;

(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities
and the sangguniang bayan;

(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, upon
recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned.

(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which
the sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the position
next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the
manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same political party as
that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term
of the vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of
 membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are
conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without such nomination and certification shall
be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official
responsible therefore.

(c) In case or permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong
to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian
concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.

(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the
sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the
organization concerned.

Section 46. Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive. -

(a) When the governor, city or municipal mayor, or punong barangay is temporarily
incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited to,
leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office, the vice-governor, city or
municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall
automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the local chief
executive concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees which
can only be exercised if the period of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working days.

(b) Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate
sanggunian of a written declaration by the local chief executive concerned that he has
reported back to office. In cases where the temporary incapacity is due to legal causes, the
local chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary documents showing that said
legal causes no longer exist.

(c) When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside his
territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3) consecutive days, he may
designate in writing the officer-in-charge of the said office. Such authorization shall specify
the powers and functions that the local official concerned shall exercise in the absence of the
local chief executive except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees.

(d) In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or refuses to issue
such authorization, the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking
sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be, shall have the right to assume the
powers, duties, and functions of the said office on the fourth (4th) day of absence of the said
local chief executive, subject to the limitations provided in subsection (c) hereof.

(e) Except as provided above, the local chief executive shall in no case authorize any local
official to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the office, other than the vice-
governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay
member, as the case may be.

Talaga v. Comelec (G.R. No.196804, 09 October 2012)

TALAGA vs COMELEC
GR. NO. 197015
In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was
proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the office
following the substitute’s disqualification.

FACTS:

Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy
(CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national
and local elections. Ramon declared that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to.

Four days later, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon as Mayor for Having Already Served
Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena. He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing
that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his
CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the upcoming elections.

Ramon countered that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second
and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing
jurisprudence to the effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of
continuity of service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule.

In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections, holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid
ground for avoiding the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a
Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, acknowledging that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position
of Mayor of Lucena City; yet did not withdraw his CoC.

Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration, however, he later on filed for its withdrawal.
On the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon,
her husband.

On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast
in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby
being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.

Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC, alleging that Barbara Ruby
could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara
Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her
substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.

Thereafter, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene,
positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s substitution had been invalid
and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.

ISSUES:

1. WON Barbara Ruby’s substitution was valid

2. Who among the contending parties should assume the position

HELD:

1.
 Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be
considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code, to wit:

Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he
files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through
a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid
substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that
a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a
valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is
not at all a candidate.

 Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not a valid
candidate to be properly substituted.

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only
that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false. The false
representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be
made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public
office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous
mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no
deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows
from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of
the election laws.

To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the
Constitution and statutory law. The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of
a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a
prolonged stay in the same office."

To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from
asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC
was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of
his eligibility to run.

Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve
on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all
intents and purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that
he was no candidate at all.

We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute.

2. Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to a permanent
vacancy in the office
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification
becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The
second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the
second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first
situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for,
and votes cast for him shall not be counted. Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second
placer. On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the
position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to
Ramon’s ineligibility.

A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be
filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.
– If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x

Gamboa v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 134213, 20 July 1999)

Gamboa vs Aguirre and Araneta (members of SP)

Facts:

In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr.,
and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members,
respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the governor designated petitioner as Acting Governor for the duration of
the former’s official trip abroad until his return.  When the Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its regular session,
respondents questioned the authority of petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor
and asked him to vacate the Chair.  The latter, however, refused to do so.  In another session, 7 members of the SP
voted to allow petitioner to continue presiding while 4 others voted against with 1 abstention.  Respondents filed
before the lower court a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition.  In the meantime, the Governor re-assumed his
office. 

Later, the trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as “temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over
the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor.” Petitioner filed a petition for review raising
the issue earlier mentioned.  Although this case is dismissible for having become moot and academic considering the
expiration in 1998 of the terms of office of the local officials involved herein, the Court nonetheless proceeds to
resolve this common controversy but novel issue under the existing laws on local government.

Issue:

WON Gamboa, while serving as the Acting Governor, temporarily relinquished the powers, functions, duties and
responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to preside over the sessions of the SP
Held:

YES

Ratio Decidendi:

What the LGC provides:

The LGC provides that the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to such function, he
becomes the Governor and assumes the higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of
“permanent vacancy” therein. When the vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the Vice-Governor “shall
automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties and functions” of the
Governor. But, no such contingency is provided in case of temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor.

Vice-Governor as Acting Governor:

When the Vice-Governor exercises the “powers and duties” of the Governor, he does not assume the latter office. 
He only “acts” as the Governor but does not “become” the Governor.  His assumption of the powers, duties and
functions of the provincial Chief Executive does not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as the
Vice-Governor.  Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as Vice-Governor by merely
becoming an Acting Governor or by merely exercising the powers and duties of the higher office. 
A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-Governor.  This means, that for purposes
of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. 
By tradition, the offices of the provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas
plain members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character.  This is because the
authority vested by law in the provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some legislative powers of
Congress. This is clear from the law, when it provides that “local legislative power shall be vested in the SP,” which is
“the legislative body of the province,” and enumerates therein its membership consisting of the:

1) Vice Governor as presiding officer

2) regular elective SP members
3) 3 elective sectoral representatives
4) ex-officio members namely:
a) president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay
b) president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan
c) president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of municipalities and component cities

Not being included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded and thus, local executive power in the
province is vested alone in the Governor. Consequently, the union of legislative-executive powers in the office of the
local chief executive under the former Code has been disbanded.

Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter
office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.

Conclusion:
To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding temporary
vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary
vacancy.  This event constitutes an “inability” on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside
during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government
Code – concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer.  The continuity of the Acting Governor’s (Vice-
Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity.  Under Section
49(b), “(i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the
members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.”

2. Recall

Section 69. By Whom Exercised. - The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by
the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such
recall belongs.
Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. -

(a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the
local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.

(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and
municipality which shall be composed of the following:

(1) Provincial level. - All mayors, vice-mayors, and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities;

(2) City level. - All punong barangay and sanggunian barangay members in the city;

(3) Legislative District level. - In case where sangguniang panlalawigan members are
elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; and in cases where
sangguniang panlungsod members are elected by district, all elective barangay
officials in the district; and

(4) Municipal level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in
the municipality.

(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a
public place and initiate a recall proceedings against any elective official in the local
government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be validly
initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the preparatory
recall assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose.

(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be validly
initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered
voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official
sought to be recalled was elected.

(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his
representative, and in the presence of a representative of the petitioner and a
representative of the official sought to be recalled and, and in a public place in the
province, city, municipality, or barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the
COMELEC through its office in the local government unit concerned. The COMELEC
or its duly authorized representative shall cause the publication of the petition in a
public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more
than twenty (20) days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness
of the petition and the required percentage of voters.

(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized
representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and
thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official
sought to be recalled.

Section 71. Election on Recall. - Upon the filing of a valid resolution or petition for recall with the
appropriate local office of the COMELEC, the Commission or its duly authorized representative shall
set the date of the election on recall, which shall not be later than thirty (30) days after the filing of
the resolution or petition for recall in the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials. and forty-
five (45) days in the case of provincial officials. The official or officials sought to be recalled shall
automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions
and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.

Section 72. Effectivity of Recall. - The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon
the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive
the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.

Section 73. Prohibition from Resignation. - The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not
be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress.

Section 74. Limitations on Recall. -

(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term
of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

Section 75. Expenses Incident to Recall Elections. - All expenses incident to recall elections shall be
borne by the COMELEC. For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act a contingency fund at the disposal of the COMELEC for the conduct of recall
elections.

3. Resignation

The act of giving up or the act of a public officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to
use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender,
renounce and relinquish the office and the acceptance thereof by competent lawful authority [Ortiz v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 78957 (1988)].

Requisites:
a. Intention to relinquish a part of the term
b. Act of relinquishment
c. Acceptance by the proper authority, either expressly or implied

Art. 238 of the RPC makes it an offense for any public officer who, before acceptance of his resignation, abandons
his office to the detriment of the public service.

Forms of resignation

1. Where a law requires that resignation is to be made in any particular form, that form must be
substantially complied with.

2. Where no such form is prescribed, no particular mode is required, but the resignation may be
made by any method indicative of the purpose. It need not be in writing, unless so required by
law. A written resignation, delivered to the board or officer authorized to receive it and fill the
vacancy thereby created, is prima facie, but not conclusive evidence of the intention to
relinquish the office. [DE LEON]
N.B. Courtesy resignation cannot properly be interpreted as a resignation in the legal sense for it is not necessarily
a reflection of a public official’s intention to surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of
the political authority and the appointing power [Ortiz v. COMELEC, supra]

When resignation is effective

1. Date specified in the tender

2. If no such date is specified, resignation shall be effective when the public officer receives notice of the
acceptance of his resignation, NOT the date of the letter or notice of acceptance [Gamboa v. CA, G.R. No. L-38068
(1981)]

Revocation of Resignation:
A resignation can be validly withdrawn before the public official is notified of its acceptance [Republic v. Singun,
supra].

Acceptance of resignation
1. As provided by law
2. If the law is silent on who shall accept and the public officer is an appointive officer, tender to the appointing
authority. If elective, tender to those authorized by law

Section 82. Resignation of Elective Local Officials. -

(a) Resignations by elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance
by the following authorities:

(1) The President, in the case of governors, vice-governors, and mayors and vice-
mayors of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities;

(2) The governor, in the case of municipal mayors, municipal vice-mayors, city
mayors and city vice-mayors of component cities;

(3) The sanggunian concerned, in the case of sanggunian members; and

(4) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of barangay officials.

(b) Copies of the resignation letters of elective local officials, together with the action taken
by the aforesaid authorities, shall be furnished the Department of the Interior and Local
Government.

(c) The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned
within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

(d) Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon

presentation before an open session of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its
records: Provided, however, that this subsection does not apply to sanggunian members
who are subject to recall elections or to cases where existing laws prescribed the manner of
acting upon such resignations.
 4. Discipline
(a) Grounds
Grounds For Disciplinary Action
1. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
2. Culpable violation of the Constitution;
3. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
4. Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision
mayor;
5. Abuse of authority;
6. Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days ○ Except in the case of
members of the local legislative bodies.
7. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant
of another country; and

(b) Jurisdiction
Administrative Complaints under the LGC [Sec. 61]
Elective Local Official of: Complaint filed at
Province, Highly urbanized city, independent Office of the President
component city, or component city
Municipality Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Barangay Sangguniang Panglungsod or Bayan

No investigation may be held within 90 days immediately prior to any local election [Sec. 62, LGC]

Ombudsman Jurisdiction
Primary Jurisdiction [Sec. 15, R.A. 6770] Acts or omissions of a public officer or
employee in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan (i.e. salary grade of 27 or
higher)
Concurrent Jurisdiction [Sec. 61, LGC] Cases cognizable by regular courts and other
investigative agencies of the government

In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities,
the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case,
acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction [Office of
the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 172700 (2010)].

Who are salary grade 27 and above? [Secs. 443-486, LGC]

Municipalities Municipal Mayor

Cities City mayor; Vice mayor; and (for highly-urbanized
cities) Sanggunian Panglungsod members
Provinces Governor; Vice governor; And Sanggunian
Panlalawigan members.

The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. Under R.A. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official
other than members of Congress and the Judiciary [COA, Regional Office No. 13 v. Hinampas, G.R. No. 158672
(2007)].
 (c) Preventive suspension

UNDER THE LGC

Elective Local Official of: Suspension imposed by:
Province, highly urbanized city, or President
independent component city
Component city, or municipality Governor
Component city, or municipality Mayor

When Imposed
Any time (1) the issues are joined, (2) when the evidence of the guilt is strong and (3) given the gravity of the
offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or
threaten the safety/integrity of the records or evidence [Sec. 63(b), LGC].

A preventive suspension is merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation, and can be decreed on an
official under investigation after the charges are brought and even before the charges are heard [Castillo-Co v.
Barbers, G.R. No. 129952 (1998)].

Rules on Length of Preventive Suspension

a. Any single preventive suspension cannot exceed 60 days;
b. Cannot be imposed within 90 days immediately prior to any local election; if imposed before said period but
extends to such, automatically lifted upon start of the 90-day period;
c. If there are several administrative cases against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for
more than 90 days within a single year on the same ground/s existing and known at the time of the first
suspension;
d. Once lifted, official is deemed reinstated without prejudice to the continuance of the proceedings against him
[Sec. 62-63, LGC].

The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of 6 months for every
administrative offense. It shall not be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended [Sec. 66(b), LGC].

Rights of Respondent Pending Preventive Suspension

a. No salary paid during period of suspension, but if subsequently exonerated and reinstated, he shall be paid full
salary that accrued during such suspension;

b. Accorded full opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, and require attendance of witnesses and production of evidence through compulsory process of
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum [Sec. 64-65, LGC].

UNDER THE OMBUDSMAN ACT [SEC. 24, R.A. 6770]

Who may impose

Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman - The Ombudsman’s power of preventive suspension is governed by R.A. 6770
(The Ombudsman Act of 1989) [Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 154098 (2005)].

Requisites for Preventive Suspension:

a. The evidence of guilt is strong; and

b. Any of the following is present:
 i. The charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty;
ii. The charges would warrant removal from the service; or
iii. The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

Length of Preventive Suspension

General Rule
Until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months without pay.

Exception
When the delay in the disposition of the case by the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension.

N.B. The shorter period of suspension under the LGC is intended to limit the period of suspension that may be
imposed by a mayor, governor or the President, who may be motivated by partisan political considerations. In
contrast, the Ombudsman is not likely to be similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body [Garcia v.
Mojica, G.R. No. 139043 (1999)].

Preventive suspension pursuant to an Information on charges under R.A. 3019

Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under R.A. 3019 or
under Title 7, Book II of the RPC or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is
pending in court shall be suspended from office [Sec. 13, R.A. 3019].

The suspension pendente lite under Sec. 13, R.A. 3019 is mandatory upon the filing of a valid information against
the erring official. This is based on the presumption that unless the public officer is suspended, he may frustrate his
prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or both.

The suspension is not automatic, but requires the determination of the presence of a valid information Upon
determination of validity, it is the court's ministerial duty to issue an order of preventive suspension [Segovia v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124067 (1998)].

The term “office” in Sec. 13, R.A. 3019 applies to any office which the officer might currently be holding and not
necessarily the particular office in relation to which he is charged [Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, supra].

Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction
Exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the
RPC (Bribery) and other offenses or felonies in relation to public office where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher.

Where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, exclusive original
jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper RTC or first level court as the case may be. The Sandiganbayan in such
case shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments or orders of RTCs in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction [Sec. 4, P.D. 1606 as amended].

(d) Removal

An elective local official may be removed from office by order of the proper court [Sec. 60, LGC].

The penalty of removal from office as a result of administrative investigation shall be considered a bar to the
candidacy of the respondent for any elective position [Sec. 66(c), LGC].

A suspension for multiple offenses does not amount to a removal if each suspension corresponding to each offense
does not exceed 6 months [Salalima v. Guingona, G.R. No. 117589 (1996)].
Proper Court Order
Local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President cannot validly impose the penalty of dismissal or removal
from service on erring local elective officials. It is clear from Sec. 60 of LGC that an elective local official may be
removed from office on the grounds enumerated only by order of the proper court.

Art. 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC, which states that “an elective local
official may be removed from office by order of the proper court or the Disciplining Authority whichever first
acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other” is void for being repugnant to Sec. 60, LGC.

But if the official concerned is an appointive official, the Office of the President may remove him [Pablico v.
Villapando, G.R. No. 147870 (2002)].

(e) Administrative appeal

Period for appeal under the LGC: 30 days from receipt of the decision

To whom appealable

Decision of: Appeal to:

Sangguniang Panglungsod of component cities; and Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Sangguniang Bayan
Sangguniang Panglalawigan; Sangguniang Panglungsod Office of the President
of HUCs/ICCs
Office of the President N/A (decision is final and executory)

Decisions are immediately executory:

Appeals shall not prevent a decision from being final and executory.

The phrase “decision shall be final and executory” simply means that the administrative appeal shall not prevent
the enforcement of the Sanggunian decision.

The decision is immediately executory but the respondent may appeal to the Office of the President or the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as the case may be [Don v. Lacsa, G.R. No. 170810 (2007)].

Sec. 6, Admin. Order No. 18 which authorizes the President to stay the execution of the decision pending appeal
remains valid despite the enactment of the LGC. The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in
the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of
execution, such authority can be provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in
administrative cases [Berces, Sr. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 112099 (1995)].

The decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. No motion for reconsideration is allowed by
law but the parties may appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the
execution of the decision. Thus, the DILG Secretary may validly move for its immediate execution [Calingin v. CA,
G.R. No. 154616 (2004)].

Decisions of the Ombudsman

General Rule: A decision of the Ombudsman is not immediately executory.
Exception: The decision is final, immediately executory, and unappealable in the following cases:
1. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge;
2. Where the penalty imposed is:
a. Public censure;
 b. Reprimand;
c. Suspension of not more than one month; or
d. Fine not equivalent to one month's salary.

In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of 10 days from receipt thereof by the
respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or an appeal is filed by him to the Court of Appeals [Sec. 7, Rule
III, Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman].

Disciplinary Actions
A. Elective Local Officials (Secs. 60-68)

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. - An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:

(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;

(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;

(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;

(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least
prision mayor;

(e) Abuse of authority;

(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan,
and sangguniang barangay;

(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant of another country; and

(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of
the proper court.

Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. - A verified complaint against any erring
local elective official shall be prepared as follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the
President;

(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the
sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President;
and

(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.
Section 62. Notice of hearing. -

(a) Within seven (7) days after the administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to
submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, and commence the
investigation of the case within ten (10) days after receipt of such answer of the respondent.

(b) When the respondent is an elective official of a province or highly urbanized city, such
hearing and investigation shall be conducted in the place where he renders or holds office.
For all other local elective officials, the venue shall be the place where the sanggunian
concerned is located.

(c) However, no investigation shall be held within ninety (90) days immediately prior to any
local election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If
preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the 90-day period immediately preceding
local election, it shall be deemed automatically lifted upon the start of aforesaid period.

Section 63. Preventive Suspension. -

(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:

(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly

urbanized or an independent component city;

(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or

municipality; or

(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.

(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the
evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that
the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single
preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days:
Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an
elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a
single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.

(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official shall be
deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against
him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time he was
formally notified of the case against him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case
is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such
delay shall not be counted in computing the time of termination of the case.

(d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be penalized as
abuse of authority.

Section 64. Salary of Respondent Pending Suspension. - The respondent official preventively

suspended from office shall receive no salary or compensation during such suspension; but upon
subsequent exoneration and reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or compensation including
such emoluments accruing during such suspension.

Section 65. Rights of Respondent. - The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to appear
and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary process of
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.

Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. -

(a) The investigation of the case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from the start
thereof. Within thirty (30) days after the end of the investigation, the Office of the President or
the sanggunian concerned shall render a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the reasons for such decision. Copies of said decision shall immediately be
furnished the respondent and all interested parties.

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a
period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to
the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications
required for the office.

(c) The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation shall be
considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position.

Section 67. Administrative Appeals. - Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:

(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlungsod
of component cities and the sangguniang bayan; and

(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan
and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component
cities.

Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.

Section 68. Execution Pending Appeal. - An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final
or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive
suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the
appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the
pendency of the appeal.

Cases: Ganzon v. Court of Appeals (200 SCRA 271)

Rodolfo Ganzon vs Court of Appeals

200 SCRA 271 – Political Law – Control Power – Local Government

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed
against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary
of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based
on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing
about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the
CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the
1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to
suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution
supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the
present Constitution was mere supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s

alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the
power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein
it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two
different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. “In
administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail
or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.”
But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power
of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include
the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in

suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by
imposing a 600 day suspension.

Joson v. Torres (290 SCRA 279)

JOSON vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

290 SCRA 279
Distribution of Powers of Government
Traditional Branches
FACTS:
Respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint dated September 13,
1997charging petitioner with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Respondents alleged
that in the morning they were at the session hall of the provincial capital for a scheduled session
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall; Angrily
entered the Hall and uttered threatening words at them accompanied by men with long and
short firearms who encircled the area. Respondents claim that this incident was due to their
resistance to a pending legislative measure that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of
P150 million from the Philippine National Bank and their acts were intended to harass them into
approving this loan; that fortunately, no session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held that
day for lack of quorum and the proposed legislative measure was not considered; that private
respondents opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated
obligation of more than P70 million incurred without prior authorization from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. The petitioner's act of barging in and intimidating respondents was a serious
insult to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that the presence of his private army posed grave
danger to private respondents' lives and safety. Private respondents prayed for the suspension
or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and
for the review of the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the province.

President Ramos noted that the situation of the refusal of the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to approve the proposed loan, did not appear to justify "the use of force,
intimidation or armed followers." He thus instructed the then Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments (SILG)Robert Barbers to "take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions,"
but to "break not the peace."

Acting upon the instructions of the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case
against him and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its annexes. In the same
notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit his verified/sworn answer thereto, not a
motion to dismiss, The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private
respondents reiterated their letter- complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer to
the letter-complaint within fifteen days from receipt. Petitioner submitted requests for extension
to submit his answer and was each request was granted each time. The DILG however,
informed him that his "failure to submit answer will be considered a waiver and that the plaintiff
shall be allowed to present his evidence ex parte."

Three months later Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued
an order declaring petitioner in default and to have waived his right to present evidence. Private
respondents were ordered to present their evidence ex-parte. Respondent was hereby declared
in default. Petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss." Petitioner alleged that the
letter- complaint was not verified on the day it was filed with the Office of the President; and that
the DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him, to answer the
complaint.

On July 4, 1997, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of
June 23,1997 reinstating the order of default. Petitioner also prayed that the hearing on the
merits of the case be held in abeyance until after the "Motion to Dismiss" shall have been
resolved. On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive
suspension for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him. Secretary
Barbers directed the Philippine National Police to assist in the implementation of the order of
preventive suspension. In petitioner's stead, Secretary Barbers
designated Vice-Governor Oscar Tinio as Acting Governor until such time as petitioner's
temporary legal incapacity shall have ceased to exist. Forthwith, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive
suspension and the order of default.

In the meantime, on October 24, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition.

A few days after filing the petition before this Court, petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Here in Incorporated Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction." Petitioner alleged that subsequent to the institution of this
petition, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments rendered a resolution on the case
finding him guilty of the offenses charged. His finding was based on the position papers and
affidavits of witnesses submitted by the parties. The DILG Secretary found the affidavits of
complainants' witnesses to be "more natural, reasonable and probable" than those of herein
petitioner Joson's.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DILG Secretary was exercising the powers of the President which
are clearlyvested by law only upon the President or the Executive Secretary, and thus his action
is contrary to law?

RULING: No,

Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in
two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. Pursuant to these
provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by
himself or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government
is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee.
The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the
DILG Secretary, the Disciplinary Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee.

The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials
is derived from his power of general supervision over local governments. The power to
discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President
has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local
government officials. A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a
Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not
undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.

Salalima v. Guingona (257 SCRA 55)

Salalima v. Guingona
GR No. 117589-92, May 22 1996
FACTS:
This Supreme Court case involves four administrative complaints filed against Albay Governor Salalima
and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay. The complaints seek to hold the petitioners liable for
a) wanton disregard of law amounting to abuse of authority in OP case 5470; b) grave abuse of authority under
Section 60 (e) of the Local Government Code in OP cae 5649; c) oppression and abuse of authority under Section
60 (c) and (e) of the Local Government Code in OP case 5471 and d) abuse of authority and negligence in OP case
5450. Relevant to our discussion on whether or not LGUs can hire private lawyers in cases filed against it is OP case
5469.

The Province of Albay imposed real property tax against the National Power Corporation. The latter,
claiming that it is tax exempt, refused to pay the said tax liability. Due to its refusal to pay, the Province of Albay
took over the properties of NPC and sold them in an auction sale. The Province was the sole bidder. Upon the
failure of NPC to redeem the property, the Province sought the issuance of a writ of possession from the Regional
Trial Court. The NPC challenged this in a petition filed with the Supreme Court. The Province, through its legal
office Atty. Ricaforte, filed its comment on the said petition on May 17, 1989.

On June 2, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 129-89, authorizing Salalima to
engage the services of a Manila-based law firm to handle the case. As such, on August 25, 1989, Atty. Jesus
Carnago entered his appearance with the SC as a collaborating counsel. On November 14, 1989, Atty. Antonio Jose
Cortes of Cortes and Reyna Law Firm sent a letter to Salalima, informing him that Atty. Carnago had filed a
memorandum in the SC. He then proposed that his law firm and that of Atty. Carnago enter into a retainer
agreement with the Province in connection with the case. He charged 50, 000 as acceptance fee and a contingency
fee of 18%. In response to this, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 01-90 authorizing Salalima to
sign a retainer contract with Cortes and Reyna Law Firm.

On June 4, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Province. The latter then paid the lawyers
amounting to around 7 million. However, on May 31, 1993, the Provincial Auditor informed the Province that COA
had disallowed the payments for lack of prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and a written concurrence
of COA. An administrative complaint was later on filed against the petitioners with the Office of the President.

The OP found that the petitioners incurred administrative liability in hiring private lawyers to defend it in
the NPC case.

OP’s RATIO
1. Section 481 of the LGC states that the legal officer of the province has the duty to represent the
LGU in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the LGU or any official thereof, in his
official capacity, is a party.
2. In the case Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, the Supreme Court ruled that the LGU cannot be
represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial legal officer or provincial fiscal who
can represent it. A private lawyer has no standing in such a case.
3. Sec. 481 and Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok are applicable in this case. In hiring the private
lawyers, the petitioners violated the LGC and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme court.
4. Moreover, the transaction was also full of irregularities.
a. The disbursement of 7M as payment was disallowed by COA for failure to comply with the
prerequisite conformity from the SolGen and the COA.
b. Resolution 01-90 authorized Salalima to contract with Cortes and Reyna Law Firm and NOT
with Atty. Carnago. Salalima exceeded the authority given to him in doing so.
c. Only Atty. Carnago appeared as counsel in the NPC case. It appears that Cortes and Reyna
did not render any form of legal service in relation thereto.
d. The provincial legal officer had already filed a comment in the SC. What Carnago filed was
merely a memorandum. The total attorney’s fees of 38 Million is clearly unconscionable.
 Because of these findings, the OP imposed the penalty of suspension for 6 months against
Gov. Salalima and Vice governor Azana, while the members of the SP were suspended for 4
months. The petitioners appealed the case to the SC. In the meantime, the 1992 elections
took place wherein the petitioners were reelected.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners incurred administrative liabilities in hiring private lawyers to represent the Province

HELD: Whether or not they incurred liabilities, they can no longer be held to answer for these in view of the fact
that they have already been reelected. Their reelection operates as condonation of any misconduct committed in
their prior term.

RATIO
In Pascual v. Pascual, the SC ruled those offenses committed or acts done in a previous term are generally
held not to furnish a cause for removal in the current term of office. This is because each term is separate from
other terms and that the reelection operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefore. Such a rule is founded on the theory that an official’s reelection
expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for
administrative discipline which was committed during the previous term. Also, sound policy dictates such a rule. A
contrary rule would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between reelected officials and
their political enemies who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for
acts alleged to have been committed during his previous term.

RULING: OP Decision imposing penalties is reversed and set aside.

Berces v. Executive Secretary (241 SCRA 539)

Malinao v. Reyes (256 SCRA 616)

Sanggunian Baranggay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez (G.R. No.
170626, March 03, 2008)
Lingating v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 153478, November 13, 2002)

B. Secs. 13, 21 and 24, R.A. 6770

Cases: Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole ( G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995)
Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez (G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010)

C. Sec. 13, R.A. 3019

Case: Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 169888, November 11, 2008)

D. Secs. 51 and 52, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or the
Administrative Code of 1987

(f) Doctrine of condonation

Aguinaldo v. Santos (G.R. No. 94115,21 August 1992)

Salumbines, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman (G.R. No. 180917, 23 April 2010)
Ombudsman Carpio- Morales v. CA and Binay (G.R. Nos. 217126-27, 10 November
2015)

C. Appointive Local Officials

 1. Responsibility for Human Resources and Development
2. Discipline (Secs. 84 – 88,LGC)

Cases:
De Rama v. CA (G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001)
Plaza v. CA (G.R. No. 138464, January 18, 2008)

Atienza v. Villarosa (G.R. No. 161081, 10 May 2005) People

v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 164185, 23 July 2008) Sales v.
Carreon (G.R. No. 160791, 13 February 2007) Quirog v.
Aumentado (G.R. No. 163443, 11 November 2008)
Montuerto v. Ty (G.R. No. 177736, 06 October 2008)

V. Intergovernmental Relations

A. With the National Government and its agencies (read Sec. 11, Art. X, Constitution)

Cases:
MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc. (G.R. No. 170656, 15 August 2007)
MMDA v. Garin (G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005)
Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 129546, 13 December 2005)

B. With other LGUs