Republic of the Philippines vs Merlyn Mercadera

GR 186027 December 08, 2010

FACTS: Merlyn Mercadera sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of
Live Birth - from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the LCR of Dipolog City
pursuant to R.A. No. 9048, as she never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private
transactions. However, it refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained because the
Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on
petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by RA 9048.

Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the
Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the RTC of Dipolog City.

The OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous
error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in
substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure
under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition correctly falls under Rule 108

RULING: Yes. The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply
sought a correction of a misspelled given name.
RULE 103 vs RULE 108
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant
to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in
court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or
with regard to, the rest of the community. In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to
alter the "designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known." When granted, a person’s identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or
appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with
him." Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the
change by virtue of a court decree. The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which
requires publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to
oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole
world.

Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries
in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to "acts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons,” also as enumerated in Article 408 of
the same law.

The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article
412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by
law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for
the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To
assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes
of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all
alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set
right under Rule 108.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." In
this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what appears
as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled.
Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 216425)
November 11, 2020

FACTS: Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III was born to Mario Cimafranca Alanis (father) and Jarmila Imelda Al-
Raschid Ballaho (mother). His parents separated when he was 5 years old. As such, he and his siblings
were raised alone by his mother.

Subsequently, he filed a petition before the RTC of Zamboanga City to change his name to Abdulhamid
Ballaho, for two reasons: (a) he wanted to remove the name of his father; and (b) he has always been
known as Abdulhamid Ballaho, as evidenced by his yearbook, campus newspaper, non-professional
driver's license, and community tax certificate, among others.

RTC: Denied petition on the ground that petitioner failed to prove any of the grounds to warrant a change
of name. The RTC also held that to allow him to drop his last name was to disregard the surname of his
natural and legitimate father, in violation of the Family Code and Civil Code, which provide that legitimate
children shall principally use their fathers' surnames.

CA denied petitioner's Petition for Certiorari based on procedural lapses.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not legitimate children have the right to use their mothers' surnames as their
surnames. -- YES.

RULING:
On using the last name of the mother by a legitimate child:
The RTC's application of Article 364 of the Civil Code is incorrect. Indeed, the provision states that
legitimate children shall "principally" use the surname of the father, but "principally" does not mean
"exclusively." This gives ample room to incorporate into Article 364 the State policy of ensuring the
fundamental equality of women and men before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it. This Court
has explicitly recognized such interpretation in Alfon v. Republic.

The fundamental equality of women and men before the law shall be ensured by the State. This is
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, Republic Act No. 7192, or the Women in Development and
Nation Building Act, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
to which the Philippines is a party.

Reading Article 364 of the Civil Code together with the State's declared policy to ensure the fundamental
equality of women and men before the law, a legitimate child is entitled to use the surname of either
parent as a last name.
On the change of name to avoid confusion:

Further, the SC granted petitioner's request to change name in order to avoid confusion.

Whether people inquire deeper into petitioner's parentage or paternity because of a name is
inconsequential here, and seems to be more a matter of intrigue and gossip than an issue for courts to
consider. Regardless of which name petitioner uses, his father's identity still appears in his birth
certificate, where it will always be written, and which can be referred to in cases where paternity is
relevant.

Aside from being unduly restrictive and highly speculative, the trial court's reasoning is also contrary to
the spirit and mandate of the Convention, the Constitution, and Republic Act No. 7192, which all require
that the State take the appropriate measures to ensure the fundamental equality of women and men
before the law.

Patriarchy becomes encoded in our culture when it is normalized. The more it pervades our culture, the
more its chances to infect this and future generations.

The trial court's reasoning further encoded patriarchy into our system. If a surname is significant for
identifying a person's ancestry, interpreting the laws to mean that a marital child's surname must identify
only the paternal line renders the mother and her family invisible. This, in turn, entrenches the patriarchy
and with it, antiquated gender roles: the father, as dominant, in public; and the mother, as a supporter, in
private.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY
OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN
WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG v. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR,
duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO [G.R. NO. 159966. March 30, 2005 SECOND DIVISION]

FACTS: petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition... for
change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Petitioner... sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed... to Julian Lin Wang

The petition was... raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born... to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to
each other

When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of... legitimation of their son so
that the child's name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there

Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not... carried in a person's name , they anticipate
that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle
name.

the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition.

The trial court found that the reason given for the change of name... did not fall within the grounds recognized by law.

The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child.

Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of... the bearers.

Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a... minor.

Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari

The OSG filed its Comment[11] positing that the trial court correctly denied the petition for change of name.

ISSUE: whether or not dropping the middle name of a... minor child is contrary to Article 174[7] of the Family Code.--- YES

RULING: We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.

the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of
name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name... given him either in his
certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify
such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.

Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal... consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage,... all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that
the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek to change the name of the
minor petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether.

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who
may... have the same given name and surname as he has.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how
such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use... of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable
cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is
based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of
majority.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.

PRINCIPLES:

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives and is best known.

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the surname or family name.

A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused
with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the... start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the
commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.
GRACE M. GRANDE vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO (G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014 EN BANC)
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two
sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The children were not
expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry.

The parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in May
2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.

On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ruling that “[t]he evidence at
hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and
physical custody of [respondent Antonio].” The court ordered the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause
the entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and
causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande
to Antonio

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA) attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate
children. In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the RTC. The appellate court, however,
maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors,
taken in conjunction with the universally protected “best-interest-of-the-child” clause, compels the use by the children of the
surname “ANTONIO.”

Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing
the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors’ surname to “Antonio.” When her motion was denied,
petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code––as amended by
Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by
his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.

ISSUE: Whether or not the father has a right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation

RULING: Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime
of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall
remain in force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255, which now reads:

Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her
mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the
prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of
his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of
his children’s surname as Antonio.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring.
Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit.

Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order
the change of the surname to that of respondent?

Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father
(herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it
must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation. Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to
use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be measured is their best
interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s
surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic, for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate
child to continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and
there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v.
Republic, this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the
surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to the rule
requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA
BRINGAS BOLANTE (G.R. No. 160597, July 20, 2006, SECOND DIVISION)
PONENTE: GARCIA, J.:

FACTS: In her petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC,) respondent alleged, among other things,
the following:

Roselie Eloisa Bolante is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses Floriano B. Bolante and Paula
B. Bringas and a resident since birth of Bangued, Abra;

That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her registered name is
Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolantewhich name, as far as she can remember, she did not use but instead the
name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;

That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private records;
and
That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.
Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to the
name she has always carried and used.

On January 23, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment granting the basic petition. In time, the Republic,
through the OSG, went to the Court of Appeals (CA) whereat its appellate recourse was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 74398. In the herein assailed Decision of October 21, 2003, the appellate court affirmed in
toto that of the trial court.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT’S NAME SHALL BE CHANGED

RULING: On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by decisional law on
the matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of
identification, and that changing one’s name is a privilege and not a right. Accordingly, a person can be
authorized to change his name appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not
only of reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying
grounds to warrant a change of name. Among these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (d) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest.

The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of what is a proper
and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need
only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence available. What is involved in special
proceedings for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals, “not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and
with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.”

With the view we take of the case, respondent’s submission for a change of name is with proper and
reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she started schooling, used the given name and has been
known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her scholastic
records, as well as records in government offices, including that of her driver’s license, professional
license as a certified public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, and the
“Quick Count” document of the COMELEC, all attest to her having used practically all her life the name
Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.

The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted. But beyond practicalities,
simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of any opportunity to improve his
social standing, provided he does so without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of
other people.

As the CA correctly ratiocinated:

In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her registered name in order to avoid confusion
having used a different name all her life. This is a valid ground under the afore-mentioned enumeration not to mention
that the instant remedy presents the less cumbersome and most convenient way to set her records straight.

Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to prove that the petition is not resorted to for an
illegal purpose due to her inability to present NBI as well as police clearance to the effect that she has no derogatory
records, due perusal of the requirements of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of proof to
establish the fact that a petitioner has no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon the declaration
and affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further fraud but for a legitimate purpose,
coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in a
petition for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to prove that the said petition is not resorted to for
purpose of fraud. Until such time, we see no urgency to impose the requirements espoused by oppositor-appellant.

FACTS: On Oct. 18, 2000, respondent Bolante filed with RTC a petition for a change of name. among her allegations
were:
That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses Floriano B. Bolante and Paula B. Bringas and a resident
since birth of Bangued, Abra;
That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her registered name is Roselie Eloisa
Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa
Bringas Bolante;
That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private records; and
That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante- Marbella.
Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to the name she has
always carried and used.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered respondent to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication, and set the hearing on February 20, 2001. Thereafter, at said
date of hearing, court issued an order giving Bolante 5 days to file written formal offer of evidence to establish
jurisdictional facts and set presentation of evidence proper on March 26. But Bolante filed her “Offer of Evidence for
Marking and Identification Purposes to Prove Jurisdictional Facts” on the afternoon of Feb. 20.Then, series of
rescheduling of hearing… actually held on Sep. 25.
Bolante presented her evidence without objections of petitioner (OSG thru duly deputized provincial prosecutor).
Among the documents presented were:
Exh. A — The Petition

Exh. B — The Notice of Initial Hearing

Exh. C — The Certificate of Posting

Exh. D — The Appearance of the Solicitor General

Exh. E — The Authority given to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor

Exh. F — The Affidavit of Publication —The Newspaper Clippings

Exh. G — The Norluzonian Courier

Exh. H — Another copy of Norluzonian Courier

On cross she stated that the purpose of filing the petition is that, she wanted to secure a passport and wanted that
the same be issued in her correct name and that she would not have filed the petition was (sic) it not for the passport.
On clarificatory question by the Court she said that her reason in filing the petition is her realization that there will be a
complication upon her retirement.

Ruling of Lower Courts:

RTC granted the petition

Change the name from Roselie to Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante
CA affirmed in toto

Contentions of the PETITIONER

On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of name cannot be set within 4 months from the last
publication of the notice of such hearing, petitioner submits at the threshold that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case for want or defective publication.
The fact that the hearing took place on September 25, 2001, beyond the four-month prohibited period, did not cure
the jurisdictional defect since notice of the September 25, 2001 setting went unpublished (court has no jurisdiction
because of in rem nature of proceeding – need for republication for the date Sep. 25)

ISSUE: Whether there was substantial compliance with Sec 3. Rule 103 of Rules of Court.– YES.

RULING:

JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME (NONCOMPLIANCE = FATAL)

Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural and jurisdictional requirements for a
change of name. Noncompliance with these requirements would be fatal to the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear
and determine a petition for change of name. The provisions adverted to are pertinently quoted hereunder:
“SEC. 2. Contents of petition.—A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his
name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3)
years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner’s name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing.—If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the
purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, . . . . The date set for the hearing shall not bewithin thirty (30) days prior to an
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.

HEARING WAS SET WITHIN THE 4-MONTH PROHIBITED PERIOD (1STALLEGATION)

As gleaned from the records:

Petition: filed on October 18, 2000
Hearing: set on February 20, 2001 via an Order issued on November 13, 2000
Publication of Notice: done on the November 23, and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000 issues of the Norluzonian
Courier.
Counted from the last day (December 7, 2000) of publication of the Order, the initial hearing scheduled on February
20, 2001 is indeed within the four-month prohibited period prescribed under Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules. The
Court, as did the CA, must emphasize, however, that the trial court, evidently upon realizing the error committed
respecting the 4-month limitation, lost no time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due notice to all
concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling for September 25, 2001.

REQUISITES FOR A VALID PUBLICATION

The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication serves as notice to the whole world that the
proceeding in question has for its object to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any and
against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party
in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the following requisites concur:
the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and place for the hearing must be published;
the publication must beat least once a week for three successive weeks; and
the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem
best.
Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the petitionbeing heard within 30 days prior to an election
or within 4 months after the last publicationof the notice of the hearing.

NO ACTUAL NEED FOR REPUBLICATION (2ND ALLEGATION)

It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any interested person may appear at the hearing
and oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy shall appear on behalf of the Government. The
government, as an agency of the people, represents the public and, therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on
behalf of the government, effectively represents the public.
In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of appearing in the trial
on his behalf. As it were, the provincial prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing.
Accordingly, there was no actual need for a republication of the initial notice of the hearing.
Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001 initial hearing which, to reiterate is already
outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules, the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection as to
the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional
requirementsexacted by the Rules. In a very real sense, therefore, the petitionerfully and knowingly acquiesced in the
jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case and the requirements of fair dealing
demand that we accord validity to the proceedings a quo.

CHANGING OF NAME IS A PRIVILEGE WHICH MAY BE GRANTED ONLY FOR REASONABLE CAUSE OR ANY
COMPELLING REASON

On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by decisional law on the matter. As we
have held, the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification, and that
changing one’s name is a privilegeand not a right.
Accordingly, a person can be authorized to change his name appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil registry
upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. Among these are:
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorableor extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
when the change will avoid confusion;
when one has been continuously used and been known since childhoodby a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage;
when the surname causes embarrassmentand there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purposeorthat the change of name will prejudice public interest.

ONLY SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE ISREQUIRED (NOT BEST EVID AVAILABLE)

The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause
therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the
best evidence available. What is involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals,
“not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for
making such determination being lodged in the courts.”
With the view we take of the case, respondent’s submission for a change of name is with proper and reasonable reason.
She has, since she started schooling, usedthe given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is
written on her birth record.
Her scholastic records, as well as records in government offices, including that of her driver’s license, professional license as a
certified public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, and the “Quick Count” document of the COMELEC,
all attest to her having used practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted. But beyond practicalities, simple justice dictates
that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of any opportunity to improve his social standing, provided he does so without
causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.
At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance of the basic petition is whimsical or based on a
consideration other than to avoid confusion. The trial court appears to have exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the
petition. Like the CA, the Court loathes to disturb the action thus taken.

[G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001.]

MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K.
LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and HON.
LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG in their personal capacities and ROSA
K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY
K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE,
represented by RITA K. LEE, Respondents.

FACTS: Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent
records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their
mother, and by substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is... allegedly the petitioners' true
birth mother.

The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate
children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in
1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China,... private respondents herein were all
born and raised in the Philippines.

Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young
girl named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but
far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee

Tek Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.

Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the
petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners
by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.

Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners.
They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was
well, therefore, before private respondents' discovery of... the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their
father, Lee Tek Sheng.

The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the
names of all his children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok
Cheng's death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this... seemingly irrational act that
piqued private respondents' curiosity, if not suspicion.[7]

It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction
of entries in petitioners' records of birth with the lower courts.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions - SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-
1674 - on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the
legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is... essentially an action to impugn legitimacy
was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.[9]

ISSUES: In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following arguments: (1)
Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges
are sanctioning a collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of... children; (3) Respondents
judges are allowing private respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the
fact that their undisputed common father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are entertaining petitions
which are already time-barred; and

(5) The petitions below are part of a forum-shopping spree.[13]

RULING:

`Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children
from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x x.'

`Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Article 412
of the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil status from married to
single and of their three children from legitimate to... illegitimate. x x x'
"Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a person from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate," as in Sarah Zita's case, the same cannot be granted in summary
proceedings."[39]

We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the
interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively
excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule,... substantial changes that may affect
nationality, status, filiation and the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin
does not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412
is summary... in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent
cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without, however, shedding light on the matter.

The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.

First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:

"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order."

It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or
changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure
contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in... nature.

Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and "changed". In its
ordinary sense, to correct means "to make or set right"; "to remove the faults or errors from"[44] while to
change means "to replace something with... something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute".[45] The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or
corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have.

Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under
Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of
the same title to find the answer.

"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register."

"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of... citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name."

It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status
but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate
matters that may affect civil status, nationality or... citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the
effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear
contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole...
such that the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and
the nature of the subject treated.[46]

Thirdly, Republic Act No. 9048[47] which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially
amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or... nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations."

The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be
corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general. The obvious effect is to remove from... the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such
errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are
substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is precisely the opposite of what

Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound
doctrine after all.

. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases below
as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy
of his children only after his death.[48]

Article 171 provides:

"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:

"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;

"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or

"(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."

III. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of action had already prescribed as more than five
(5) years had lapsed between the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the
filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of

1993.[54]

We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically
prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the
New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil Code that applies:

"Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought
within five years from the time the right of action accrues."

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements,
namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such... right; and c) an act or omission on
the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or
takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.[55]

It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of action,
that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners' birth records, occurred more than thirty
(30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was... upon this occurrence that private respondents' right of action or
right to sue accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that
private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who... continue
to use said falsified birth records.

Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to
establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners' true mother, and their real status, simply because
they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by... their common father at a much later date.
This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their father's legitimate children, did not
have any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their
sole right to inherit... from their mother's (Keh Shiok Cheng's) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that
private respondents' suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From that time until 1992 and 1993, less
than five (5) years had lapsed.

Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of the
last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents had
discovered the false entries in petitioners' birth records in 1989.

Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth records are public documents, hence, the period of
prescription for the right of action available to the private respondents started to run from the time of the
registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.

We cannot agree with petitioners' thinking on that point.

It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.[56] Petitioners liken their
birth records to land titles, public... documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for
the petitioners, this analogy does not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person's parentage
cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born of a particular mother or... not. It is that simple.
ROICE ANNE F. FOX v. PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY, GR No. 233520, 2019-03-06

FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Roice
Anne F. Fox (petitioner), assailing the Orders dated March 24, 2017[1] and July 24, 2017[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54 of Davao City, which dismissed outright her petition for correction
of entry on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

On October 29, 2012 Roice Anne F. Fox (Petitioner)... married Thomas Kenneth K. Fox (Thomas)... in
Davao City

Right after their union... they flew to Canada where they have decided to settle and raise a family.

Not long thereafter, the petitioner conceived and gave birth to a baby girl, whom they named Zion Pearl
Fox (Zion), on June 27, 2015.

The fact of birth of the petitioner's daughter was duly registered at the Registrar's Office in Regina
Saskatchewan, Canada, which issued the corresponding birth certificate.

On June 7, 2016,... the Philippine Consulate Office (PCO) in Calgary, Alberta submitted a Report of
Birth[4] of the child to the national office of the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) in Manila.

Unfortunately,... PCO erroneously indicated the child's birthdate as June 27, 2016, instead of June 27,
2015, in the said Report of Birth.

petitioner brought the said discrepancy to the attention of the concerned officials of the PCO which...
advised her to file a petition before the proper court in the Philippines for the correction of entry in the
Report of Birth of her daughter.[5]

On January 17, 2017, the petitioner filed before the RTC of Davao City, where she was a resident

March 24, 2017, however, the RTC motu proprio dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

court cites Section 1 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

"Any person interested in any act, event, order, or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the [Regional Trial Court] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located."

Regional Trial Court in Davao City has no jurisdiction over the instant petition which seeks to direct the
Philippine Statistics Authority in Manila to make the correction of entry in the report of birth of Zion Pearl F.
Fox made by the Philippine Consulate Office of Calgary, Alberta, Canada to the said office in Manila.

July 24, 2017

In the instant petition, the fact of birth of petitioner’s daughter Zion Pearl F. Fox was reported by petitioner
to the Philippine Consulate in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, which in turn caused to be recorded directly said
fact of birth before the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) in Manila and not to any local civil registrar.

Regional Trial Court in Davao City is NOT the proper venue of the instant petition for correction of entry in
the report of birth of the minor daughter of the petitioner.

ISSUE: whether the RTC was correct in motu proprio dismissing her petition for correction of entry on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

RULING: The petition lacks merit.

Based on the above-mentioned rule, a petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register may be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

Given that Rule 108 pertains to a special proceeding, the specific provisions stated thereunder,
particularly on venue, must be observed in order to vest the court with jurisdiction. Apart from the
foregoing, the petition likewise failed to comply with other jurisdictional requirements such as impleading
the civil registrar and all persons who may have a claim or interest in the correction sought.
The local civil registrar is an indispensable party for which no final determination of the case can be
reached.

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to
give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of
jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.

dismissal is without prejudice to the refilling of the petition in the proper court, with full compliance to the
specific requirements of Rule 108.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR (G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
THIRD DIVISION)
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on
June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied
having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not
appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries
in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her
alleged husband, as parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before
Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly
celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She
completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named
witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel
agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. Respondent
also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed
that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife
who appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged.

The RTC granted the petition. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was
not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and
rectify the terrible mistake.

Petitioner OSG, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1)
there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to
fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the
entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab
initio. The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WHETHER RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE
ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED. Petition DENIED

RULING: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then
the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that “even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true
facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding.” An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in
interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not
the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such
marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be
recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was
married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the
marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties–respondents. It is likewise undisputed
that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor
General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner,
testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was
different from respondent’s signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.
The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was
not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no
such marriage was celebrated.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and
that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly
established that the only “evidence” of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already
been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was
no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth
by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.

CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR. G.R. No. 189538;
February 10, 2014.

FACTS: Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. She
denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; She,
thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife
portion thereof.

During trial, She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a
receptionist in Tadel's Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh,
who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a
passport. A document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
The RTC decided in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar.

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there
was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall
within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries
in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used by an
unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to
institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under
Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: May the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage, be
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding?

RULING: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then
the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true
facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in
interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related
laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention
of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. Minoru Fujiki v.
Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office G.R.No. 196049, June 26, 2013.

While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot
nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties
had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as
set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage
by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of. DENIED.
GLENN M. MILLER v. JOAN MILLER Y ESPENIDA, GR No. 200344, 2019-08-28

FACTS: John Miller (John) and Beatriz Marcaida were legally married. They bore four (4) children, namely: (1) Glenn M.
Miller (Glenn); (2) Charles Miller; (3) Betty Miller (Betty); and (4) and John Miller, Jr.[

After John's death, Joan Miller (Joan), through her mother Lennie Espenida (Lennie), filed before the Regional Trial Court a
Petition for Partition and Accounting of John's estate with a prayer for preliminary attachment, receivership, support, and
damages. Alleging that she is John's illegitimate child with Lennie, Joan presented her Certificate of Live Birth which showed
John to be her registered father.[6

Glenn filed a separate Petition praying that Joan's Certificate of Live Birth be canceled. With it, he also prayed that the Local
Civil Registrar of Gubat, Sorsogon be directed to replace Joan's surname, Miller, with Espenida, and that Joan use Espenida
instead of Miller in all official documents.

Glenn claimed that John did not acknowledge Joan as a natural child,[7] pointing out that John's signature was not in her
birth certificate. It was also not shown that John knew and consented that his name would be indicated in the certificate.[

Joan countered that from 1978 until John's death in 1990, her mother Lennie and John had an amorous relationship,[9] out
of which she was born on June 25, 1982. While she admitted that John did not sign her birth certificate,[10] he "openly and
continuously recognized [her] as [his] child during his lifetim

She narrated that she grew up in his ranch and went to John Miller Primary School with John financing her studies. John
also mentioned her name in his July 5, 1984 letter to Lennie. Moreover, in his holographic will, he gave Joan a 1/8 share of
his estate. Further, in a February 14, 1987 document, he assigned Betty to act as Joan's guardian and her inheritance's
administrator until she attains the age of majority. Also, by his bidding, Betty obtained an educational plan for her

Glenn, however, countered that the authenticity of the July 5, 1984 and February 14, 1987 documents and the July 1985
holographic will was not proven. Since Joan failed to prove that John wrote and signed these documents, Glenn claimed that
they failed to establish Joan's filiation

Before the trial court, Glenn presented Apulio Ferreras[15] who brought Joan's birth record. It was revealed that Joan had
two (2) existing birth certificates. The first, dated June 30, 1982 and registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 760,[16] indicated
Johnlyn Espenida Miller as the child and John Manares Miller as the father.[17] The second, dated July 20, 1982 and
registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 825,[18] pertained to Joan Espenida Miller as the child and John (Manyares) Miller as
the father.[19] Neither certificate bore a name or signature on the space provided for the parent's Affidavit of
Acknowledgment. Further, the July 20, 1982 birth certificate was the document submitted to the then National Census and
Statistics Office.

He later found out the existence of her two (2) birth certificates, none of which bore his father's signature acknowledging
Joan as his child. Hence, he wanted Joan to stop using the surname Miller.

They alleged that, despite John's failure to acknowledge Joan in the birth certificate, their evidence-the letters, the
holographic will, and the document assigning Betty as Joan's guardian-preponderantly prove that he acknowledged Joan as
his illegitimate child

Regional Trial Court issued a Judgment[23] in favor of Joan

Glenn appealed the case before the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision,[29] denying Glenn's appea

Evelyn L. Miller, Jennifer Ann L. Miller, Leslie Ann L. Miller, Rachel Ann L. Miller, and Valerie Ann L. Miller, who substituted
Glenn as his surviving legal heirs, filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court Judgment allowing private respondent
Joan Miller y Espenida to continue using the surname Miller

RULING: This Court stresses that Glenn's initiatory pleading before the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City is a Petition for
Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller y Espenida.[58] This type of petition is governed by Rule
108 of the Rules of Court

Here, petitioners sought the correction of private respondent's surname in her birth certificate registered as Local Civil
Registrar No. 825. They want her to use her mother's surname, Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an
acknowledged illegitimate child of John

What petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a simple matter of correcting a single letter in private
respondent's surname due to a misspelling. Rather, private respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her
surname from Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her identity, but her successional rights
as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,[61]
this Court emphasized that "legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through collateral attack[.]"[62] Moreover, impugning the legitimacy of a child is governed by Article 171 of the
Family Code, not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' June 30, 2011
Decision and February 3, 2012 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 84826 are AFFIRMED

However, the declarations of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court as to the legitimacy and filiation of private
respondent Joan Miller y Espenida are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court's other pronouncements in its
November 26, 2004 Judgment are also NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE

Principles:

The legitimacy and filiation of children cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for correction of entries in the certificate of
live birth.

JONNA KARLA BAGUIO BARCELOTE, Petitioner v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RICKY 0.

TINITIGAN, and LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, DAVAO CITY, Respondents

GR No. 222095 August 7, 2017

TOPIC: birth certificate of illegitimate child without signature of mother

PONENTE: Carpio

FACTS: On 24 June 2008, she bore a child out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky 0. Tinitigan
in her relative’s residence in Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to register the birth of
their child, whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a hospital.

To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while Tinitigan lived
with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her. On 24 August 2011, she bore another
child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not register his birth to
avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and
she returned to Davao City.

When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote finally decided to
register the births of both children. She, then, returned to Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur to register their
births. The Local Civil Registrar of Santa Cruz approved the late registration of the births of Yohan Grace
Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote, with Registry Nos. 2012-1344 and 2012-1335, respectively, after
submitting proof that the National Statistics Office (NSO) has no record of both births on file.

However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the NSO, Barcelote was
informed that there were two certificates of live birth (subject birth certificates) with the same name of the
mother and the years of birth of the children in their office.

The subject birth certificates registered by the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City state the names “Avee
Kyna Noelle Barcelote Tinitigan” and “Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan”. Ricky Tinitigan was the listed
Informant in both birth certificates.

Thus, petitioner Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth certificates
registered by Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for containing erroneous entries.

RTC granted the cancellation of birth certificates. CA, however, reversed and set aside the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the certificates of live birth of the two illegitimate children registered by their father
Tinitigan, which were not duly signed by their mother Barcelote, were void.

RULING: YES

The Court held that since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside a valid marriage
after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011, respectively, then they are the illegitimate
children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The
entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname
should have been “Barcelote” and not “Tinitigan.”

The Court did not agree with the CA that the subject birth certificates were the express recognition of the
children’s filiation by Tinitigan, because they were not duly registered in accordance with law i.e. the
subject birth certificates of the illegitimate children were not signed by their mother.

Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, 16 states:

Section 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. -The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be
sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth,
by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child. (first
paragraph)

xxx

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. (fourth paragraph)

The first paragraph of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 assumes that the newborn child is legitimate since our
law accords a strong presumption in favor of legitimacy of children. On the other hand, the fourth
paragraph of Section 5 specifically provides that in case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall
be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. The
fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically applies to an illegitimate child and likewise underscores its
mandatory character with the use of the word “shall.”

Mother must sign the birth certificate of her illegitimate child; otherwise, the same is void

Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in all
cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not. The only legally known parent
of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the
blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents. The
mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth certificate because she has the
parental authority and custody of the illegitimate child.

Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did not sign the documents,
the local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth certificates.

Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of the law
respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the fact that the entry in the subject
birth certificates as to the surname of the children is incorrect since it should have been that of the
mother, the subject birth certificates are also incomplete as they lacked the signature of the mother.

Accordingly, the Court declared the subject birth certificates void and order their cancellation for being
registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code requiring the use of the mother’s
surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of the mother in her
children’s birth certificates.

FACTS: On 24 June 2008, she bore a child out of wedlock with a married man named Ricky O. Tinitigan
(Tinitigan) in her relative's residence in Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She was not able to register
the birth of their child, whom she named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in a
hospital. To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while Tinitigan
lived with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit her. On 24 August 2011, she bore
another child with Tinitigan, whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did not register his
birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with
Tinitigan and she returned to Davao City.When her first child needed a certificate of live birth for school
admission, Barcelote finally decided to register the births of both children. She, then, returned to Santa
Cruz, Davao del Sur to register their births. The Local Civil Registrar of Santa Cruz approved the late
registration of the births of Yohan Grace Barcelote and Joshua Miguel Barcelote, with Registry Nos. 2012-
1344 and 2012-1335, respectively, after submitting proof that the National Statistics Office (NSO) has no
record of both births on file.

However, upon submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to the NSO, Barcelote was
informed that there were two certificates of live birth (subject birth certificates) with the same name of the
mother and the years of birth of the children in their office.

Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth certificates registered by
Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for containing erroneous entries.

After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, Barcelote was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
In her testimony, Barcelote reiterated her allegations in the petition and emphasized that the subject birth
certificates were registered by her children's biological father, Tinitigan, without her knowledge. She also
testified that the subject birth certificates reflected wrong entries, but she did not present any other
evidence.

RTC ruled in favor of Barcelote and ordered the cancellation of the subject birth certificates

The RTC ruled that the subject birth certificates are legally infirm, because they were registered
unilaterally by Tinitigan without the knowledge and signature of Barcelote in violation of Section 5, Act No.
3753. The RTC also held that the subject birth certificates contain void and illegal entries, because the
children use the surname of Tinitigan, contrary to the mandate of Article 176 of the Family Code stating
that illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother.

the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC

The CA ruled that the registrations of the children's births, caused by Tinitigan and certified by a
registered midwife, Erlinda Padilla, were valid under Act No. 3753, and such registrations did not require
the consent of Barcelote.

CA further ruled that... children can legally and validly use the surname of Tinitigan,... since Republic Act
No. (RA) 9255, amending Article 176 of the Family Code, allows illegitimate children to use the surname
of their father if the latter had expressly recognized them through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register,... such as in this case where Barcelote admitted that Tinitigan personally registered the children's
births and affixed his surname on the subject birth certificates.

Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: CA erred in not cancelling the certificates of live birth for YUHARES JAN BARCELOTE
TINITIGAN and AVEE KYNNA BARCELOTE TINITIGAN.

Under the Family Code, illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. Being the mother with parental authority, [Barcelote]'s choice of names for her
children upon birth should prevail.

RULING: We grant the petition.Prior to its amendment, Article 176 of the Family Code[11]
reads:Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.

The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitirae of a legitimate child. Except
for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force

Upon the effectivity of RA 9255,[13] the provision that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother was retained, with an added provision that they may use
the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father. Thus, Article 176
of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-
half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

We do not agree with the CA that the subject birth certificates are the express recognition of the children's
filiation by Tinitigan, because they were not duly registered in accordance with the law.

ct No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law,[16] states:Section 5. Registration and
Certification of Birth. - The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a
birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be
sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth,... ys after the birth, by the physician,
or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of
the infant or only the mother if the father refuses.

it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in all cases,
irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of an
illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the blood of
the mother.[21] Thus, this provision ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents.

The mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth certificate because she has the
parental authority and custody of the illegitimate child.

guel,[23] we

Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did not sign the documents,
the local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth certificates.

Accordingly, we declare the subject birth certificates void and order their cancellation for being registered
against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code requiring the use of the mother's surname for her
illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of the mother in her children's birth
certificates.In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be the primary consideration.[30]WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the 5 March 2015 Decision and the 3 December 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 03223-MIN. We REINSTATE the 28 February 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 15, in SPC. PROC. No. 12,007-12. The Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil
Registry of Davao City is ordered to CANCEL: (1) the Certificate of Live Birth of Avee Kynna Noelle
Barcelote Tinitigan under Registry No. 2008-21709 and (2) the Certificate of Live Birth of Yuhares Jan
Barcelote Tinitigan under Registry No. 2011-28329.

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC, GR NO. 174689, 2007-10-19

FACTS: petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex
in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.

Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in... the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery[2] in
Bangkok, Thailand.

He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his
sex from "male" to "female."

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.[6] It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
sex... alteration.

the Court of Appeals[7] rendered a decision[8] in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for. NO

RULING: Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery.

RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.[19] In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name.[20] In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's first name was not
within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an... improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit... since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For
all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner's petition in so far as the change of
his first name was concerned.

The birth certificate of petitioner... contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to
his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts... and judicial decrees

These acts, events and judicial decrees produce... legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor
even mentioned by... any law, expressly or impliedly.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error,[30] is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the... correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.

Principles:

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.[11]
A change of name is a privilege, not a right.[12] Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.
[13] In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or... nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.[14] It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions
for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications... for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103... and 108... f the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:[24]

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the
civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of... citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.[25] However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the ground... of sex reassignment.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term... status… include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.[28] (emphasis
supplied)

A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person's legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance
at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient
for the registration of a birth in the... civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary
stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by... examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error,[30] is immutable.

MAIN FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born
in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered
as “male.”

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female”
and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted
several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a “woman” culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent
sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a
plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in
his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Firstly, the court is of the opinion that
granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual re-
assignment, petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a
female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken
against him. Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community
in granting the petition.

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It
alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. The CA
rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis.

ISSUE: Whether the changes in the petitioner’s entry shall be allowed?

COURT’S RULING: Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of
first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that
court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it
could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and
deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages,
adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and
changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil
status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that: “all other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws.” But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention
of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is
no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Petitioner pleads that “the unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and the realization of their
dreams.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do
not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed
an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.

Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines

Respondent: Jennifer B. Cagandahan
565 SCRA 72
G.R. No. 166676
September 12, 2008
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

FACTS: Jennifer B. Cagandahan was registered at birth as a female but developed secondary male characteristics
while growing up. She was later diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where afflicted
persons possess both male and female characteristics. She was further diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy and at
the age of six underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. Alleging that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion she has become a male
person, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and
her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

PROCEDURAL FLOW:
Respondent thus filed before the RTC a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from
“Jennifer” to “Jeff” and her gender from female to male, on the ground that she is suffering from a rare medical
condition therefore possessing both male and female characteristics. In the trial, she presented her medical certificate
issued by her doctor evidencing that she is suffering from such condition to prove her claim. The RTC granted the
respondent’s petition and ordered the Civil Register to make the specified changes. However, the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed to the Supreme Court for a reversal of the ruling, invoking that respondent’s petition was
fatally defective for non-compliance with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 because it did not implead the local
civil registrar.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not respondent’s petition failed to comply with the requirements under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court for not impleading the local civil registrar to the proceeding;

2.) Whether or not the court a quo erred in ordering the correction of entry in respondent’s birth certificate to change
her gender from female to male on the ground of her medical condition;

3.) Whether or not the court a quo erred in ordering the respondent’s change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.

RULING:
No, the Court ruled in the negative on all issues.

1.) Although Rule 108 requires that the local civil registrar be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name
in the civil registry, the Court agrees with respondent that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.

2.) The Court, in deciding the case, considered the “compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” It is of the opinion that sexual development in
cases of intersex person makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive; it is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like the respondent, is fixed.

Further, the Court ruled that in the absence of a law on the matter, it will not dictate on the respondent concerning a
matter as innately private as one’s sexuality. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy, thus, to
him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s
position and his personal judgment of being a male.

3.) The Court has held that a change of name under Rule 103 is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. In the instant case, considering
the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, the Court finds merit in
such change of name.
FACTS: A hermaphrodite is a person who was born with two (2) sexual organs: one male and the other, female. This
is usually considered as an error.

Here comes Jennifer who is a hermaphrodite. Invoking Rule 108 and Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, she petitions the
court to correct entries in her birth certificate. She wants to change "female" to "male" and "Jennifer" to "Jeff."

ISSUE: Should the petition be allowed?

RULING: Yes, the petition should be allowed. It is nature that reorganized the structure of her body and the law of
nature is above the law of men. The Supreme Court said, "In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the
diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person.
We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering
the unique circumstances in this case."

Marc O Ali suggests that the turning point in this case is that there was, between the two sexes, a "dominant sex."

MAIN FACTS: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate
of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and
at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries.

At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no
breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her
gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating
that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her
body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs – female and
male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of
female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent
and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as
male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent’s petition. Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a
reversal of the abovementioned ruling.

The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s
claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.

ISSUE: whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to
change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name
from “Jennifer” to “Jeff,” under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

COURT’S RULING: Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or “inappropriate” appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has
XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia
often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus
and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and
failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial. “It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a `no-man’s
land’ for those individuals who are neither truly `male’ nor truly `female'” The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels
that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than
female, then a change in the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.

Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of
a male.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes
the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born
with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken
steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so.
Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s
sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to
CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as
a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as
society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex
anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice
of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s
position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life
easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of
respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

FRANCLER P. ONDE v. OFFICE OF LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, GR No. 197174, 2014-09-10

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition[2] for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the RTC and named respondent
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City as sole respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate... child of his
parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married . His birth
certificate also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler.

RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the
proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in nature and would affect... petitioner's status as a
legitimate child.

correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048

ISSUE: NO... whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries

RULING: CHANGE OF NAME... the first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by
the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048.

The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name... from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the... proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors.

MARRIAGE... petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must implead as parties to the proceedings not
only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or...
claim any interest which would be affected by the correction.

when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations,
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy... of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated.

PRINCIPLE/S:
Special Proceedings
a) RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172, allows administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first
name
Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of
first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order.

Effect on change of first name:

- Jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers.
- Exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court

Effect on correction of clerical or typographical errors:

- The correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order.
- The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or typographical errors

b) Substantial correction requires adversarial proceedings (Rule 108 of the Rules of Court)
- Corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, involve substantial alterations.
- Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceedings.

c) Parties to implead under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:

- Local civil registrar
- All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the correction.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the RTC and named Office of the Local
Civil Registrar. He prayed that the following entries on his birth certificate be corrected as follows:

ISSUE/S:
(1) WON the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No.
9048.
(2) WON the correcting of entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married to "not married" is substantial in
nature requiring adversarial proceedings,

RULING:
1) YES. Section 1 of R.A. No. 9048 provides that clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected
and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order. R.A. No. 9048
provides that jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers.
Hence, the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order.

2) YES. Corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial alterations. These substantial alterations can be corrected through appropriate
adversary proceedings. Hence, correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married to "not
married" is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings since it will affect his legitimacy. It will convert him from
a legitimate child to an illegitimate one.

.
[ G.R. No. 239011, June 17, 2019 ]
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. PACOL DISUMIMBA RASUMAN, RESPONDENT.

FACTS: Pacol, an employee of the Bureau of Customs, filed before the RTC of Lanao del Sur a petition
for correction of his birth date from February 12, 1952 to February 12, 1956. After notice and hearing, the
RTC granted the petition and ordered the local civil registrar of Marantao, Lanao del Sur, to change
Pacol’s birth date from February 12, 1956 to February 12, 1956.

Pacol thereafter filed before the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region a request for
correction of his birthdate to reflect the RTC decision granting his petition for change of birthdate, in his
service records. The CSC-NCR, however, denied the request, noting that if his corrected birthdate is true,
it would appear that he attended elementary school when he was only one year, when his service records
indicated that he attended elementary school from 1957 to 1962.

On petition for review before the CSC proper, the latter denied his petition for review. It held that it is not
bound by the July 23, 2015 RTC decision in the correction of Pacol’s birthdate because it was not
impleaded therein, although it was an indispensable party; that the RTC decision would have no effect
insofar as the CSC is concerned, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Police Senior Superintendent
Macawadib v. The Philippine National Police Directorate for Personnel and Records Management.

The CA, however, reversed the CSC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC should be imploded in petitions for correction of civil registry records
involving government employees.

RULING: We find merit in the petition.

Petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court which provides, among others:

SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

The essential requirement for allowing substantial correction of entries in the civil registry is that the true
facts be established in an appropriate adversarial proceeding.Section 3 requires that all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 provide for two sets of notices to two different potential oppositors, i.e., (1)
notice to the persons named in the petition; and (2) notice to other persons who are not named in the
petition, but, nonetheless, may be considered interested or affected parties.The two sets of notices are
mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 and are validated by Section 5, also above-quoted, which
provides for two periods (for the two types of “potential oppositors”) within which to file an opposition (15
days from notice or from the last date of publication). Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due
process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.

Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of the type of action – whether the action is in
personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.

In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly. Jurisdiction over the parties is
required in actions in personam because they seek to impose personal responsibility or liability upon a
person.

Courts need not acquire jurisdiction over parties on this basis in in rem and quasi in rem actions. Actions
in rem or quasi in rem are not directed against the person based on his or her personal liability.

Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the whole world. Quasi in rem
actions are actions involving the status of a property over which a patty has interest. Quasi in rem actions
are not binding upon the whole world. They affect only the interests of the particular parties.

However, to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the parties in in rem and quasi in
rem actions is required.

The phrase, “against the thing,” to describe in rem actions is a metaphor. It is not the “thing” that is the
party to an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may be parties even in in rem actions. “Against the
thing” means that resolution of the case affects interests of others whether direct or indirect. It also
assumes that the interests – in the form of rights or duties – attach to the thing which is the subject matter
of litigation. In actions in rem, our procedure assumes an active vinculum over those with interests to the
thing subject of litigation.

Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an opportunity
to defend those interests. Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be expected to deny
persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction.
(Citations omitted.)

In Police Senior Superintendent Macawadib v. The Philippine National Police Directorate for Personnel
and Records Management, we already held that there is a necessity to implead the CSC in petitions for
correction of entries that would affect a government employee’s service records. In that case, petitioner
therein, Police Senior Superintendent Dimapinto Macawadib, filed with the RTC of Marawi City a Petition
for Correction of Entry in his birth certificate which the RTC granted; and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), the National Police Commission, and the CSC were ordered to make the necessary correction in
their records of Macawadib’s date of birth. The RTC decision had become final and executory. The PNP
filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA on the ground that the RTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over it, an unimpleaded indispensable party. The CA nullified and set aside the RTC decision
and barred Macawadib from continuing and prolonging his tenure with the PNP beyond the mandatory
retirement age of fifty-six (56) years. We affirmed the CA decision and held:

[I]t is the integrity and correctness of the public records in the custody of the PNP, National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) which are involved and which would be
affected by any decision rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner. The
aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties to the proceeding. They are
indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. An indispensable
party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In the fairly recent
case of Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc., the Court had the occasion to
reiterate the principle that:

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, “parties in interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.” If there is a failure to implead an
indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It is “precisely ‘when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed.’ The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even to those present.” The purpose of the rules on joinder of
indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves,
but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face
cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.

xxxx

In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand to
be adversely affected by petitioner’s petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations in
petitioner’s service records.(Citations omitted.)

In this case, respondent sought from the RTC the correction of his birthdate from February 12, 1952 to
February 12, 1956. He impleaded in his petition for correction the BOC, the agency where he was
working at so as to update his service records, but did not implead the CSC. It bears stressing that one of
the CSC’s mandated functions under Executive Order No. 292 is to keep and maintain personnel records
of all officials and employees in the civil service. Therefore, the CSC has an interest in the petition for
correction of respondent’s birth certificate since the correction entails a substantial change in its public
record, i.e., he would have an additional four years before reaching his compulsory retirement age. To
reiterate, Section 3 of Rule 108 mandatorily requires that the civil registrar and the interested parties who
would be affected by the grant of a petition for correction should be made parties. Considering that the
CSC is an indispensable party, it should have been impleaded in respondent’s petition, and sent a
personal notice to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process, before it could be affected
by the decision granting the correction of his date of birth. The CSC should have been afforded due
process before its interest be affected, no matter how the proceeding was classified. Thus, the CSC
correctly denied respondent’s request for correction of his date of birth on the basis of the RTC decision
granting the correction.

The CA’s reliance on our decision in Civil Service Commission v. Magoyag[ – that since the petition for
correction of entry filed in the RTC was a proceeding in rem, the decision therein binds not only the
parties thereto but the whole world and that an in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication – is misplaced.

In Magoyag, the respondent therein, Madlawi Magoyag, then Deputy Collector of the BOC in Cagayan de
Oro City, filed with the RTC of Lanao del Sur, Marawi City, a petition for correction of his birthdate from
July 22, 1947 to July 22, 1954 which was granted. The RTC then ordered the Government Service
Insurance System, and the BOC to effect a correction in his date of birth. The RTC subsequently issued
an amended decision by further directing the Local Civil Registrar and the CSC to immediately effect a
correction of the entry of Magoyag’s date of birth. Magoyag requested the CSC to correct his date of birth
appearing in his employment records. The CSC denied Magoyag’s request since based on the official
transcript of records issued by Liceo de Cagayan University, he graduated from college in November
1967, which was highly improbable if he was born on July 22, 1954 as it would mean that he graduated
from college at the age of thirteen (13), from high school at the age of nine (9), and from elementary at
the age of five (5). Respondent then filed a petition for review with the CA which granted the petition and
ordered the CSC to comply with the RTC decision. The CSC filed a petition for review with us which we
denied. We found, among others, that the CSC’s concern should have been brought up in the RTC
proceedings.

Notably, the CSC, in the Magoyag case, had been particularly directed by the RTC to immediately effect a
correction of the entry of respondent’s birth certificate in their records. In effect, the CSC had knowledge
of the RTC decision, and could have raised its opposition thereto. In this case, the CSC was not
impleaded at all in respondent’s petition for correction of his date of birth filed with the RTC, and it was
never specifically ordered to make the correction in respondent’s records, as his amended petition only
prayed for the BOC to effect correction on his employment records to reflect his true and correct date of
birth. The CSC was not at all apprised of the proceedings in the RTC and not bound by such decision.

The CA found that the CSC was only inadvertently left out since respondent even amended his petition for
correction of entries by impleading the BOC which indicated his earnest efforts to comply with the
requirement of the rules, thus the failure to implead the CSC was cured by the publication of the notice of
hearing, and it is legally bound to give effect to the RTC decision granting the correction of his date of
birth.

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, such as earnest efforts were
made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties, the interested parties themselves
initiated the correction proceedings, there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the
interested parties, or when a party is inadvertently left out, none of them applies in respondent’s case.

In this case, while respondent impleaded the BOC when he amended his petition for correction of entry,
he did not implead the CSC. To stress, the CSC is the central personnel agency of the government and,
as such, keeps and maintains the personal records of all officials and employees in the civil service.
Notwithstanding that respondent knew that the correction of his date of birth would have an effect on the
condition of his employment, he still did not exert earnest efforts in bringing to court the CSC, and there is
no showing that the CSC was only inadvertently left out. We, therefore, find no basis for the CA’s ruling
that respondent’s case falls under the exceptional circumstances where the failure to implead
indispensable parties was excused.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 25, 2017
and the Resolution dated April 26, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 151017 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 13, 2017 Decision No. 170058 and May 8, 2017 Resolution
No. 1700847 of the Civil Service Commission in NDC-2016-07025 are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.G.R. No. 186571, [11 August 2010]

PRINCIPLE/S:
Special Proceedings
a) Jurisdictional and procedural requirements before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry (Rule 108 of the Rules of Court)
- Verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;
- Civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings
- Time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.

Conflict of Laws
a) Rule on recognition of a foreign divorce judgment
- Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws

b) How foreign divorce judgment is recognized in the Philippines

- Foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with
the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
(Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.)
- Foreign judgment must be ALLEGED and PROVED

c) How to ALLEGE and PROVE foreign judgment (Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court)
Proof either by:
(1) official publications OR
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents.

If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept AND
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

d) Registration of the foreign divorce decree should be done with judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment
Article 407 of the Civil Code requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status. But while the law requires the entry of
the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not
ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.

Persons and Family Relations

a) Second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code cam only be claimed by a Filipino citizen
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

b) Two types of defective marriages recognized under the Family Code

- void marriages
- voidable marriages

c) Void and voidable marriages vs. Divorce

Void and voidable marriages - Dissolution of the lawful union is based on a cause existing before or at the
time of the marriage
Divorce- Dissolution of the lawful union is based on a cause arising after the marriage

d) Philippines does not recognize absolute divorce; exception

GR: Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country.
Exception: Second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code recognizes the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

e) Effect of 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family Code

- Recognition of the foreign divorce decree
- Declare that the Filipino spouse is capacitated to contract another marriage if the court finds that the
foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry.

f) Intent for enactment of 2nd par. of Article 26 of the Family Code

"to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."

FACTS: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt
and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that
the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition
to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

Petitioner Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
He married a Filipina. He later filed a petition for divorce for his first wife since he discovered that she was
having an affair. This was granted. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. He
desired to marry her. So he registered the Canadian divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office. But he
was informed that despite the registration of the divorce decree the marriage between him and his first
wife still subsists under Philippine law and for the divorce decree to be enforceable, it must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.

Petitioner then filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with
the RTC. The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, petitioner
directly appeals to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE/S:
1) WON the 2nd paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
2) WON Civil Registry Office acted out of line in registering the foreign decree of divorce.

RULING:
1) NO. Only a Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse. Hence, only the
Filipino spouse can invoke the 2nd paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code.

However, the unavailability of the 2nd paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence
of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to alien’s national law.

2) YES. Article 407 of the Civil Code requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status. But while the law requires the
entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do
not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement
of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.

In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree.
Hence, the Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the foreign decree of divorce on the
petitioner and respondent’s marriage certificate without judicial order recognizing the said decree. The
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect.

MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, GR No. 196049, 2013-06-26

FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to

Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from

Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.[4] On

14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and

Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;[5]
and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of

Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition

The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.

The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.[12]

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the... foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court.[49] Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an
official... publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment.
If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service... in Japan and authenticated by the
seal of office.[50]

ISSUE: Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

RULING: A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment
is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are... binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as
a fact according to... the rules of evidence.

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully... consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.

Principles:

Civil Law

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity
of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction
relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as
a fact according to... the rules of evidence.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in
a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to
rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act
No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has
an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared
that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the
civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule
108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of
the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises
the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his
property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between
Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify"
the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or
the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question
the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states
that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage
are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil
aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime.
Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution
and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of
a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and
preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and
is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly
the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a
real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For
this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there
should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a
direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition
of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related
laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on
the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89
under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-
MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.

FACTS: Respondent Julian Edward Emerson was born in Makati City to Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna
Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted
marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent
filed before RTC of Quezon City a petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim
Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the NSO stating that his
mother Anna Dominique does not appear in its National Indices of Marriage. Respondent also submitted
his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng,"
and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. Respondent ran and was
elected as Quezon City’s Councilor using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."

The RTC granted the petition and ordered the Civil Registrar to:

1. Delete the entry “date and place of marriage” (of parents) in respondent’s live birth certificate
2. Change entry of “Last name” from Magpayo to Coseteng
3. Delete entry of Coseteng from “Middle name”
4. Delete entry of Fulvio Miranda Magpayo Jr in the entry for "Father".

Republic appealed contending that deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of respondents
parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary
proceeding.

ISSUES:

1. Was there a valid ground for changing respondent's name?

2. Did respondent file the proper remedy?

RULING:
1. The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE
OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody;
and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized
grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court
allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in
order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the
surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that
she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.

2. No. Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings. Since
respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies and
not Rule 103. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in
the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected, that of Makati in the present
case, and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made
parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate
was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent
before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties
thereto.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies,
respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside
from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as
respondents in the case.

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated
(Republic vs. Coseteng-Magpayo, G.R. No. 174689, October 22 2007)