PADILLA VS. CA G.R. No.

121917, March 12, 1997 FACTS: Manarang, a witness, noticed a vehicle running fast down the highway. Later, Manarang and the other witness heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something. Manarang decided to report the incident to the PNP. By the time he completed the call, the vehicle had started to leave the place. He went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle had hit somebody. Manarang rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle. During the chase, he was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle and immediately called the police to report that a vehicle was involved in a hit and run accident. Policemen were immediately mobilized to intercept the vehicle. The responding officers forced the car of the accused to stop. When Padilla, the accused, alighted with both his hands raised, since he was wearing a short leather jacket, a gun tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed. While denying the accusation regarding the hit and run, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in his back right pocket. Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle, a police prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of Padilla's vehicle. The police saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. He asked Padilla for the papers covering the rifle and the latter answered angrily that they were at his home. The police officers brought Padilla to the Traffic Division where he voluntarily surrendered another firearm and a magazine loaded with live bullets. He also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine. Padilla was correspondingly charged and convicted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866. ISSUES: 1. WAS THE ARREST LEGAL? Yes. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances: "Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. The policemen's warrantless arrest of Padilla could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Further, the report received by the police regarding the plate number and description of Padillas vehicle, formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.

2.

ARE THE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITIONS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE? Yes. The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid are as follows: 1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence, 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are: (a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 3. search of a moving vehicle. 4. consented warrantless search, and 5. customs search.

The authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search. The seizure of some of the firearms and magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which wasimmediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. With respect to the other firearms, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest is effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle. In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe that the accused was involved in the hit and run. 3. CAN PADILLA BE CONVICTED OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS? Yes. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, witnesses have been presented in court to testify that, with respect to some of the firearms confiscated, they never have issued any license in favor of Padilla. The Court has ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. InPeople vs. Tobias, the SC held that such certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. 4. DOES THE PENALTY FOR SIMPLE ILLEGAL POSSESSION CONSTITUTE EXCESSIVE AND CRUEL PUNISHMENT PROSCRIBED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION? No. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. To come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive', 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community' ". It is not so much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 5. DOES THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW APPLY? Yes. In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v. Simon, although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied.

PADILLA VS. CA G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997

Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help of a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession: 1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition 2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo 3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo 4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for acquittal. Issues/Ruling: 1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule

No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible. Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid: Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant) Search of moving vehicle. Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest. Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. 2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms.

No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian. 3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment prescribed by the 1987 Constitution.

No. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. To come under the ban, the punishment must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive', 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community' ". It is not so much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW APPLIES. In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws explained in People v. Simon, although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper period should be applied. Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining the proper period should be applied. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum.