NOTABLE JURISPRUDENCE

ON SUCCESSION

In a petition for probate of a will, oppositor A moved for the dismissal of the petition alleging that
the will is void for non-compliance with the formalities required by the law, particularly, the last
page of the will which contained only the Acknowledgment that was not signed by any of the
instrumental witnesses and by the testator. He also alleges that the attestation clause did not state
the number of pages in the will, although admittedly it is in the acknowledgment. Are the grounds
for dismissal tenable?

ANS: No, the grounds for dismissal are not tenable. The signature on the last page which does not contain
testamentary disposition is not essential for the validity of the will. When Art. 805 of the Civil Code requires the
testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last
testamentary disposition ends. In this case, the last page of the will contained only the Acknowledgment. Hence,
the last page of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the
Acknowledgment.

Also, in Taboada v. Rosal, the probate of a will was allowed notwithstanding that the number of pages was
stated not in the attestation clause, but in the Acknowledgment. What is imperative for the allowance of a will
despite the existence of omissions is that such omissions must be supplied by an examination of the will itself,
without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
Consequently, the motion for dismissal must be denied (Mitra v. Sablan-Guevarra, G.R. No. 213994, April 18,
2018).

 II

In a petition for probate of a will led by M, the testator named and appointed M as his sole and
only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to W
by whom he had two legitimate children, A and B, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his
lawfully wedded wife and had been living with M as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5,
1952, the testator and M married. The testator devised some properties to his forced heirs, his
legal wife and his children. While his entire estate and the free portion thereof to M. The RTC,
while declaring the will validly drawn as to formalities, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision in favor of M and invalidated it. Did the court act in excess
of its jurisdiction?

No, in this case, the court can pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will. As a general rule, the testator’s
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only
questions that should be presented for the resolution of the court for probate proceedings. However, when on the
face of the will, it is invalid as when separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions would be super uous, then it could pass upon that issue. Here, the very wordings of the will
invalidate the provisions because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he
had been living in concubinage (Nepomuceno v. CA, G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985).

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 III

Is a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate special

No. No judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property
of the deceased. Unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent’s estate or for the
determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare the
nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their
ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration
of their status as such (Treyes v. Larlar, G.R. No. 232579, September 8, 2020, Caguioa Case).

 IV

P and D had four (4) children: A, E (married to L), O and V. A1 and A2 are children of A while V1
and V2 are children of V. After the death of P and D, their three (3) parcels of land were
adjudicated to E. After the death of E, the properties passed to his surviving spouse L, and
daughter G. After L’s death, her share went to G. Thereafter, G died intestate without any issue.
After G’s death, J (L’s sister), adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving
heir of L and G. Hence, the children of A and V claim that the properties should have been
reserved by J in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Art. 891 of the Civil
Code on reserva troncal. Decide.

There is no reserva troncal in this case. Art. 891 of the Civil Code provides that the ascendant who inherits from
his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the bene t of
relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came. Properties in
dispute were owned by E (ascendant). After his death, G (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as
inheritance. The person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/
reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. J, however, is not G’s ascendant; rather, she is G’s collateral relative.
Further, the children of A and V cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the
third degree of G from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the
property last revolved by descent. It is G in this case. The children of A and V are G’s fourth degree relatives, being
her rst cousins, and are not reservees or reservatarios. Therefore, while it may appear that the properties are
reservable in character, the children of A and V cannot bene t from reserva troncal. First, because J, who now
holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Art. 891 of and second, because
the children of A and V are not G’s relatives within the third degree (Mendoza v. Delos Santos, G.R. No.
176422, March 20, 2013).

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 V

A, B, and C were the surviving heirs of the late P who died intestate. Before his death, P had
properties in Rizal which was almost 50 hectares, part of which was developed for residential and
agricultural purposes, and another property in Romblon. A allegedly discovered that through
manipulation and misrepresentation, respondents D (son of deceased C) and C were able to
secure two (2) free patents over two lots in Romblon. As a consequence, A instituted a petition for
Cancellation and Recall of the Free Patent Applications and Reconveyance. She claimed that there
was preterition by virtue of the Con rmation Af davit of Distribution of Real Estate con rming
partition executed by P years prior to his death, and that the disputed two lots pertained to P’s
inheritance, he had only three legal heirs and he left A with no share in the two lots. Was A
preterited?

No. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of a compulsory heir in the direct line or anyone of
them either because they are not mentioned therein or although mentioned they are neither instituted as heir nor
expressly disinherited. In order that there be preterition, it is essential that the heir must be totally omitted. Perfecto
left no will. Under Article 854, the presence of a will is necessary. A could not have been totally excluded in the
inheritance of P even if she was not allegedly given any share in the disputed two lots. If Araceli’s share in the
inheritance of P as claimed by her was indeed impaired, she could have instituted an action for partition or a
settlement of estate proceedings instead of her complaint for cancellation of free patent and reconveyance
(Mayuga v. Atienza, G.R. No. 208197; January 10, 2018, Caguioa Case).

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 VI

GT and RT died testate. They were survived by their children namely: A, B, C, D, E, and his four
grandchildren from F. F died after his mother’s death but before his father’s death and was
survived by his four children from his marriage with X, namely GA, GB, GC, and GD. At the time
of his death, F’s marriage with his wife had been annulled. Thereafter, F allegedly married Y. Is Y
entitled to a share in GT and RT’s respective estates?

Yes, but only with respect to GT’s estate. Y would inherit from F pursuant to Article 887(3) and part of his estate
would be his share in the estate of her mother, GT. On the other hand, Y could not inherit from the estate of RT
because F, predeceased RT, his father, and the children of F would succeed by right of representation from their
grandfather pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Y is not related by blood, but only by af nity, to
RT (Tirol v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020, Caguioa Case).

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 VII

Decedent A died on April 26, 1997, leaving a will dated February 8, 1997. The will was admitted to
probate. In the will, a three-door apartment, which includes two apartment units, were devised to
A’s four grandchildren. Prior to his death, on November 15, 1996, A executed a Real Estate
Mortgage covering the apartment Unit 1 in favor of Spouses E, and on February 21, 1997, and A
executed a deed of Sale of Real Estate on Installment (SREI) covering the other apartment Unit 2
also in favor of Spouses E. However, the SREI never attained obligatory force or did not become
binding by virtue of the non-payment of the purchase price as stipulated. Determine the
provisional effects of the transactions made by A.

The provisional effects would be that: A’s estate is obliged to pay the debt in connection with the mortgage of Unit
1, while SREI revoked de facto the devise of Unit. Under Article 934 of the Civil Code, if the testator should
bequeath or devise something pledged or mortgaged to secure a recoverable debt before the execution of the will,
the estate is obliged to pay the debt, unless the contrary intention appears. Hence, Since A devised in his will Unit
1, which had been mortgaged prior to the execution of his will, his estate is obliged to pay the debt. Pursuant to
Article 957, one of the instances of revocation de facto of a legacy or devise is the alienation by the testator by any
title of the thing bequeathed subsequent to the execution of the will. There might be here an intention on the part
of A to alienate through the SREI Unit 2 subsequent to the execution of his will although it subsequently became
inef cacious, or without obligatory force, by reason of the nonful llment of the positive suspensive condition of full
payment of the purchase price (Estipona v. Estate of Aquino, G.R. No. 207407 (Resolution), September
29, 2021, Caguioa Case)

Note: The probate court may pass upon the title and ownership thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the nal decision in a separate action to resolve title and ownership (Estipona v.
Estate of Aquino, G.R. No. 207407 (Resolution), September 29, 2021, Caguioa Case)
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 VIII

V had two (2) legitimate children— R and D. D has three (3) children. Meanwhile, R had a
relationship with L, who was also single and had the legal capacity to marry. L became pregnant
and gave birth to JR. After the birth of JR, his father, R, died. Later, V died without a will. JR led
a motion to be declared an heir of the deceased, but D opposed on the ground that JR is an
illegitimate child. JR countered that Article 992 of the Civil Code is unconstitutional for violation
of the equal protection of the laws. He argued that Article 992 created an absurdity and
committed an injustice because while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child can
represent, the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child cannot. Decide the case and explain.

I will deny the motion of JR to be declared as an heir of the deceased, JR, being an illegitimate child of the
deceased legitimate son, R, cannot inherit intestate from the deceased, V, because of the iron curtain rule under
Article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. JR cannot argue that Article 992 is violative of the equal protection clause
because equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed (Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 101 Phil. 1155).
The clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What
it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classi cation.

Note: In Aquino v. Aquino (G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018, December 7, 2021), the SC ruled that when a
nonmarital child seeks to represent their deceased parent to succeed in their grandparent’s estate, Article 982 of the
Civil Code shall apply. Article 982 does not make any distinctions or quali cations as to the birth status of the
“grandchildren and other descendants” granted the right of representation. The SC abandoned the presumption
that nonmarital children are products of illicit relationships or that they are automatically placed in a hostile

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 environment perpetrated by the marital family. This will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of
representation to their parent’s share in her grandparent’s legitime.
IX

A was previously married to B in 1990. They begot 2 children: C and D. In 2010, B died.
Subsequently, A married X and they also begot 2 children: Y and Z. A died in 2018. C and D then
executed an extrajudicial settlement on the properties of A. Is the extrajudicial settlement valid?

No, the extrajudicial settlement is not valid. Art 879 of the Civil Code provides that legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages. Art. 980 provides that the children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance into equal shares. Upon the death of A, her children and second husband
acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate. In the
execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, all the heirs of A should have participated. Considering
that Y and Z were admittedly excluded, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a
total nullity (Neri v. Heirs of Uy, G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012).

A Filipino couple, Mr. and Mrs. BM Jr., decided to adopt YV, an orphan from St. Claire’s
orphanage in New York City. They loved and treated her like a legitimate child for they have none
of their very own. However, BM, Jr., died in an accident at sea, followed to the grave a year later
by his sick father, BM, Sr. Each left a sizable estate consisting of bank deposits, lands and
buildings in Manila.

a. May the adopted child, YV, inherit from BM, Jr.?

As to BM, Jr., YV can inherit. According to Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, capacity to succeed is governed by the law
of the nation of the decedent. Our domestic law, particularly the Domestic Adoption Act (RA 8552) provides that
in legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without
distinction from legitimate liation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law
on testamentary succession shall govern. Hence, by express provision of the law, YV can inherit.

b. May the adopted child, YV, inherit from BM, Sr.?

As to BM, Sr. however, there is a difference since RA 8552 states that there are only reciprocal rights of succession.
Under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does
not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by
law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a
consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter (Teotico v. Del Val, G.R.
No. L-18753, March 26, 1965). Hence, YV cannot inherit from BM, Sr.

Note: Sec. 41 of RA 11642, otherwise known as the Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child
Care Act, provides that the legitimate liation that is created between the adopter and adoptee shall be extended to
the adopter’s parents, adopter’s legitimate siblings, and legitimate descendants.
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 XI

Can a testator institute a stranger as heir through a partition inter vivos without a will?

No. If there is no will of the testator, the designation in the partition inter vivos shall be in accordance with the laws
of intestacy. Said partition shall be valid so long as it does not impair the legitime of the co-heirs. Thus, should the
testator institute a stranger as heir, he cannot make a partition inter vivos without making a designation by a valid
will because the stranger cannot inherit by the laws of intestacy (Mayuga v. Atienza, G.R. No. 208197;
January 10, 2018, Caguioa Case).

XII

A, B and C are the legitimate children of X. Unknown to them, X had an illegitimate child D. A, B
and C obtained a partition of the estate of X. Are A, B and C obliged to pay D for his share?

Yes. Under Art. 1104 of the Civil Code, a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not
be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the other persons interested; but
the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him. In this case,
A, B, and C did not know the existence of D, hence there is no fraud or bad faith on their part, but still, they are
obliged to pay for D’s share in the partition.

If a partition included an illegitimate child of the deceased who turned out to be not as such, will
the entire partition be void?

No. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to
such person (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1105).