February 3, 2020 G.R. No.: Click or Tap Here To Enter Ponente

SPOUSES PRUDENTE D.
SOLLER
vs.
HON. ROGELIO SINGSON
February 3, 2020
G.R. No. Click or tap here to enter GR
N/A
Click or tap here to enter Ponente
Doctrines:
Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8975 was explicit in excluding other courts in the
issuance of injunctive writs. A perusal of these provisions readily reveals that all courts,
except this Court, are proscribed from issuing TROs and writs of preliminary injunction
against the implementation or execution of specified government projects. Thus, the ambit
of the prohibition covers only temporary or preliminary restraining orders or writs but
NOT decisions on the merits granting permanent injunctions. Considering that these laws
trench on judicial power, they should be strictly construed. Therefore, while courts below this
Court are prohibited by these laws from issuing temporary or preliminary restraining orders
pending the adjudication of the case, said statutes however do not explicitly proscribe the
issuance of a permanent injunction granted by a court of law arising from an adjudication of
a case on the merits.
Facts:
An elevation project of the National Highway near the Bansud River Bridge was commenced
by King’s Builder. Sps. Soller averred that they are the owners of parcels of land located near
the Strong Republic Nautical Highway, and their safety is placed in imminent danger. Sps.
Further alleged that King’s Builder initiated the elevation of the national highway thereby
blocking and retaining floodwaters naturally coming from the nearby Bansud River and
farmlands, thus submerging houses and lands on the left side of the road including their
properties thus warranting the Sps. to file a Permanent Injunction and damages. Sec. Singson
and Engr. Roldan did not file an answer, instead they filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that
issuance of injunctive writs are prohibited by P.D. 1818, and that State’s immunity from suit
applies. The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss. In compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8975 Sec. 3 Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary
Mandatory Injunctions.—No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government,or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or
private acting under the government direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following
acts. Sps. Soller filed a MR but denied.
Issues:
Substantive: Whether the grant of the ‘motion to dismiss’ is proper; the RTC having no
jurisdiction in cases where the law expressly vests its jurisdiction to the Supreme Court?
ALT: Whether the principal action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary
remedy of preliminary injunction? (YES)
Procedural:
Whether the motion to dismiss filed by the Sec, Singson et al. is a prohibited motion
under Rule 15 Sec.12?
Whether the dismissal of the complaint was with prejudice and precludes the right to
appeal?
Held:
No, while Section 3 of R.A. No. 8975 was explicit in excluding other courts in the issuance of
injunctive writs, the ambit of the prohibition covers only temporary or preliminary restraining
orders or writs but NOT decisions on the merits granting permanent injunctions. Considering
that these laws trench on judicial power, they should be strictly construed. In this case, the
allegations and the reliefs prayed for in the complaint reveal that Sps. Soller, as landowners
of the surrounding estate of the highway elevation project, sought to enjoin such construction;
or if completed, to restore the affected portion thereof, to their original state. Thus, principal
action is one for injunction, which is within the jurisdiction of the RTC since it is a well-
settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought. In determining the
jurisdiction of the RTC, what is controlling is the principal action, and not the ancillary
remedy which is merely any incident thereto.
No, Sec. 12 (a) 1) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim. The dismissal sought was due to the substantive law prohibitions, see above.
No, None of the instances under Sec. 13 are present in the case at bar. An order
granting a motion to dismiss or an affirmative defense that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; that the claim or demand
set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; or that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under
the provisions of the statute of frauds, shall bar the refiling of the same action or
claim. In this case, it is a dismissal granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Digest by Milton Ma. Jose N. Pates

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SPOUSES PRUDENTE D.

Digest by Milton Ma. Jose N. Pates

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