Bangladesh-India Water Negotiations: Challenges and Way Forward

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/336553743
Bangladesh-India Water Negotiations: Challenges and Way Forward

Article · October 2019
CITATION
READS
1,071
2 authors:
Syeda Tanzia Sultana
Bangladesh HYPERLINK"https://www.researchgate.net/institution/Bangladesh_Institute_of_International_and_Strategic_Studies?enrichId=rgreq-953f6d71747274ba6c455dd72b11c538-
XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzMzNjU1Mzc0MztBUzo4MTQ5MTIzMTgyMjIzMzlAMTU3MTMwMTY0NTk0MQ%3D%3D&el=1_x_6&_esc=publicationCoverPdf" HYPERLINK
"https://www.researchgate.net/institution/Bangladesh_Institute_of_International_and_Strategic_Studies?enrichId=rgreq-
953f6d71747274ba6c455dd72b11c538-
XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzMzNjU1Mzc0MztBUzo4MTQ5MTIzMTgyMjIzMzlAMTU3MTMwMTY0NTk0MQ%3D
%3D&el=1_x_6&_esc=publicationCoverPdf"Institute HYPERLINK"https://www.researchgate.net/institution/Bangladesh_Institute_of_International_and_Strategic_Studies?enrichId=rgreq-
953f6d71747274ba6c455dd72b11c538-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzMzNjU1Mzc0MztBUzo4MTQ5MTIzMTgyMjIzMzlAMTU3MTMwMTY0NTk0MQ%3D
%3D&el=1_x_6&_esc=publicationCoverPdf" HYPERLINK
953f6d71747274ba6c455dd72b11c538-
%3D&el=1_x_6&_esc=publicationCoverPdf"of HYPERLINK "https://www.researchgate.net/institution/Bangladesh_Institute_of_International_and_Strategic_Studies?enrichId=rgreq-
953f6d71747274ba6c455dd72b11c538-
%3D&el=1_x_6&_esc=publicationCoverPdf"International HYPERLINK"https://www.researchgate.net/institution/Bangladesh_Institute_of_International_and_Strategic_Studies?
enrichId=rgreq-953f6d71747274ba6c455dd72b11c538-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzMzNjU1Mzc0MztBUzo4MTQ5MTIzMTgyMjIzMzlAMTU3MTMwMTY0NTk0MQ%3D
953f6d71747274ba6c455dd72b11c538-
%3D&el=1_x_6&_esc=publicationCoverPdf"and HYPERLINK "https://www.researchgate.net/institution/Bangladesh_Institute_of_International_and_Strategic_Studies?enrichId=rgreq-
953f6d71747274ba6c455dd72b11c538-
%3D&el=1_x_6&_esc=publicationCoverPdf"Strategic HYPERLINK "https://www.researchgate.net/institution/Bangladesh_Institute_of_International_and_Strategic_Studies?enrichId=rgreq-
953f6d71747274ba6c455dd72b11c538-
%3D&el=1_x_6&_esc=publicationCoverPdf"Studies
6 PUBLICATIONS 1 CITATION
Shanjida Shahab Uddin
Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies
3 PUBLICATIONS 1 CITATION
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
Revisiting Migration-Development Nexus: A Micro-Level Study in Dhaka City of Bangladesh View project
BRI and the Geopolitics of Energy View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Shanjida Shahab Uddin on 17 October 2019.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
Shanj
ida
Shah
ab
Uddi
n
Syed
a
Tanzi
a
Sulta
na
BANGLADESH-INDIA WATER
NEGOTIATIONS: CHALLENGES AND WAY
FORWARD
A
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
Sharing river water between neighbours is a

complicated task as it creates upstream-downstream
supply disputes. Having the highest number of common
rivers with its biggest neighbour – India, Bangladesh
has to face common water sharing disputes with that
country. To resolve disputes over water sharing,
Bangladesh started negotiations with India after its
independence, but the country has been facing
challenges in reaching a consensus on a formula and
mechanism to share the common water. Given this
backdrop, the present paper argues that the water
negotiations between Bangladesh and India are being
affected due to significant negotiation challenges which
make the water negotiations a zero-sum game. With
this argument, the paper endeavours to examine the
challenges of Bangladesh-India water negotiations. To
understand these challenges, this paper evaluates
historical fact, past and ongoing water negotiations
between Bangladesh and India. Some possible
solutions are also suggested in the paper to overcome
these challenges.
• Introduction
South Asian countries are increasingly facing acute water

shortfall due to growing population, industrialisation and the
absence of proper water sharing management. Bangladesh is a
riverine country of South Asia. It is a great delta formed by the
three mighty Rivers – the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the
Meghna.1 There are 405 rivers in Bangladesh. Out of 405 rivers, 57
are transboundary rivers. Of the 57 transboundary rivers, 54 are
entering from India and 3 from Myanmar.2 China, India, Nepal and
Bhutan are the co-riparian countries of Bangladesh. Among these
countries, India and Bangladesh depend largely on the waters
from the common rivers. The inadequate supply of water in the dry
season is the central point of dispute between these two countries.
The situation is particularly critical for Bangladesh since
Shanjida Shahab Uddin and Syeda Tanzia Sultana are Research

Officers at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies
(BIISS). The authors' e-mail addresses are:
[email protected] and [email protected]
HYPERLINK "mailto:[email protected]" respectively.
© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2017.
1 Q. K. Ahmed, Asit K. Biswas, R. Rangachari and M. M. Sainju (eds.), Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna Region: A Framework for Sustainable Development, Dhaka,
Bangladesh: University Press Ltd, 2001, p. 15.

2 “Bangladesh Transboundary Rivers”, available at http://jrcb.gov.bd/bangla/, accessed on 11 February 2017.
its fresh water comes mostly (92.5 per cent) from its
transboundary rivers from India. 3 In this respect, Bangladesh
largely depends on India. This dependency causes both the
scarcity and flooding situation in Bangladesh. It also creates
disputes over the rights of a fair share of water between the
two countries.
To resolve disputes over water sharing, Bangladesh

started negotiations with India on the Ganges and the Teesta
instantaneously after its independence. Though the neighbours
managed to set Ganges water sharing treaty, both the nations
have been facing challenges in reaching a consensus over the
water sharing of other common rivers. The uncertainty over the
proposed Teesta River agreement is now a burning issue. The
Tipaimukh dam dispute is also on the negotiation table. Water
shortage during the dry season makes the situation particularly
critical. Therefore, proactive negotiations for successful water
sharing agreements on the common rivers between the two
countries are essential for Bangladesh. However, past water
negotiations between them were mostly zero-sum game. Both the
countries depend on the riverine ecosystem. To protect the
ecosystem, it is important to act sensibly on the issue of common
water sharing. But in asymmetrical situations, it is difficult to reach
satisfactory solutions for all parties involved in the negotiation.
Power in a transboundary context refers to the riparian’s

geographic position, size, military might, economic strength and
structural capacity. Power determines the hegemon in international
river basins. The fundamental power structure in the basin is
dictated by the relative power of the parties. In international river
basins, power asymmetry explains how conflict occurs in relation to
allocation and exploitation of a water resource and how consent
may be established through agreements and institutions.4 States’
position in a negotiation depends on its geographical positioning
e.g., whether it is an upstream state or a downstream state. While
upstream states hold a powerful position as they can control the
water resources, downstream states have no reciprocal power.5 But
this situation may differ in the other cases such as the Nile basin
dispute and India’s water arrangement with Bhutan. In these cases,
Egypt and India being the lowest riparian country had the greatest
power. Still, Egypt and India are practicing power in their
negotiations with Sudan and Bhutan respectively, due to their
military and political prowess. 6 It is usually cited that India and
Egypt act as benevolent hegemons with respect to their upstream
basin states (Bhutan and Sudan), offering economic incentives
designed to foster cooperation.7
3 Brahma Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground, Washington

DC, USA: Georgetown University Press, 2011, p. 40.
4 Anamika Barua, Sumit Vij and Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman, “Powering or
Sharing Water in the Brahmaputra River Basin”, International Journal of
Water Resources Development, 2017, pp. 1-15. 5 Jack Di Nanzio, “Conflict
on the Nile: The Future of Transboundary Water Disputes over the World’s
Longest River” in Strategic Analyses Paper, Dalkeith, Australia: Future
Directions International, 2013.
6 Ibid.
7 Shlomi Dinar, “Power Asymmetry and Negotiations in International
River Basins”, International Negotiation, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2009, pp. 329-
360.
Zeitoun and Warner introduced “Hydro -hegemony” – a

framework for analysing transboundary water conflicts. The
framework posits that relative power differences can cause various
forms of hydro-hegemony. According to their framework, power
may either encourage or discourage effective transboundary water
cooperation. Consequently, either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’
transboundary arrangements may take place. If the basin hegemon
considers the needs of the basin riparians and uses its power to
lead the way to cooperation, then such power can help to achieve
effective transboundary management. However, if the basin
hegemon uses its position and power in a negative way and
behaves as a basin bully rather than a basin leader, it will lead to a
negative transboundary outcome or arrangement. For example,
South Africa as a hegemon in the Orange-Senqu River basin plays
a leading and enabling role that has brought about an effective
transboundary water management regime between Lesotho,
Botswana and Namibia.8 So, the absence of symmetry in power
between riparian countries may result in asymmetric negotiations
and treaties. In fact, the greater the symmetry in power, the better
will be the outcome (equitable, sustainable and non-zero sum) of
transboundary negotiations and vice versa.9 It is therefore important
to recognise and analyse this power asymmetry and how it may
influence basin-level negotiation or cooperation. In Bangladesh-
India water negotiations, state’s geographic position and position in
power structure matter the most. India as an upstream as well as
politically, militarily and economically more powerful state holds the
strongest position. In contrast, Bangladesh as a downstream as
well as politically, militarily and economically less powerful state
holds the weakest position. Thus, an asymmetric situation is
prevailing in Bangladesh-India water negotiations. This situation
results a zero-sum outcome. And this zero-sum outcome of
Bangladesh-India water negotiations demonstrate significant
challenges in resolving the water sharing disputes.
Given this backdrop, the present paper argues that the

water negotiations between Bangladesh and India are being
affected due to significant negotiation challenges which has turned
the water negotiations a zero-sum game. With this argument, the
paper endeavours to understand the challenges. The paper, then,
attempts to suggest relevant policy recommendations to address
these challenges. The paper is qualitative in nature. In the
literature review, publications on water negotiation, water
diplomacy, Bangladesh-India water relations, etc. have been drawn
upon. For data collection, in-depth interviews of experts have been
conducted along with the literature review comprised of books,
journal articles, newspaper articles, reports and government
documents. There are five sections in the paper. After the
introduction, the second section discusses the past and present
progress of water negotiations between Bangladesh and India.
Third section analyses the challenges that disrupt the negotiation
process. In the fourth section, it suggests relevant policy
recommendations to address the challenges. The final section
concludes the paper.
8 Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, “Hydro-hegemony – A

Framework for Analysis of Trans- boundary Water Conflicts”, Water
Policy, Vol. 8, No. 5, 2006, pp. 435-460.
9 Ibid.
• Bangladesh-India Water Negotiations: Past and Present Progress
Although Bangladesh shares transboundary rivers with

two of its neighbouring countries, its water negotiation effort only
focuses on India. The water negotiations with India have been
limited to the Ganges, the Teesta and the Feni. The main bone of
contention between the two countries is to share water in the
common rivers during the dry season. Since, most of the common
rivers originate from India, Bangladesh faces severe problems of
unilateral water withdrawal in the upper stream.
On the other hand, India has water deals with almost

all of the South Asian countries. Of all the South Asian
neighbours, India has a very well functioning water relation with
Bhutan. In contrast, Bangladesh finds itself at the weakest
negotiating position with India. Being a lower riparian country,
Bangladesh has to suffer the disastrous consequences of
upstream river diversions and mismanagement of
transboundary water flows.10 India is mostly blamed for doing
such mismanagement of water bodies, which results in a
perilous situation for Bangladesh. To understand the water
relations between India and Bangladesh, the background and
the latest development of the water negotiations between them
have been discussed in this section. A map is also given in the
annex to exhibit the geographical setting of the international
rivers between Bangladesh, India and Myanmar.
• Negotiations on the Establishment of the Joint Rivers Commission
Early on, both India and Bangladesh recognised the

importance of water relations and started bilateral
negotiations immediately after the independence of
Bangladesh. The establishment of the Joint Rivers
Commission (JRC) in 1972 was the instant outcome of the
very first phase of the negotiations. The statute of JRC was
initialed on 24 November 1972.
According to the statute, the JRC is supposed to meet at

least four times a year. 11 Its main objective is to discuss the
common water issues and identify applicable solutions. The
functions of the JRC as mentioned in its statute are summarised
below:
• Ensuring most effective joint efforts in

maximising the benefits from common rivers.
• Formulating flood control works and

recommend implementations of joint projects.
10 Bhim Subba and Kishor Pradhan (eds.), Disputes Over the Ganga,
Patan, Nepal: Jagadamba Press, 2004, pp. 104-105.
11 Ainun Nishat and Faisal Islam, “An Assessment of the Institutional Mechanisms
for Water Negotiations in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna System”, International
Negotiation, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2000, pp. 292-295.
• Formulating detailed proposals on flood and

cyclone warning and flood forecasting.
• Studying flood control and irrigation projects to

ascertain equitable sharing of water resources
for mutual benefit of the peoples of the two
countries.
• Formulating proposals for carrying joint

research on the problem of flood control
affecting both the countries.12
Although JRC has a very small list of successes, but it

has been dealing with common water related disputes for the
last 45 years as an important platform. The contributions of
JRC in terms of Bangladesh-India water negotiations include
efforts of both nations to resolve the dispute over the Ganges
water sharing and facilitating bilateral agreements in 1975,
1978 and 1996.13
• Ganges Water Sharing Negotiations
The Ganges (or Ganga) is a major river in South

Asia, flowing eastwards through the plains of northern India
into Bangladesh and discharging into the Bay of Bengal. It
originates from the Gangotri glacier in the Indian state of
Uttarakhand in the central Himalayas and travels south and
southeastwards in India for about 1,400 miles (about 2253
km).14 The river forms a common boundary between
Bangladesh and India around 11 miles (about 18 km)
downstream from the Farakka Barrage in India, and
continues about 63 miles (about 101 km) before finally
entering Bangladesh near Rajshahi.15
Ganges water sharing negotiations started with India when

Bangladesh was known as the East Pakistan. The then Pakistan
started that negotiations with India from the 1950s and failed to
reach to any settlement till the independence of Bangladesh. After
the independence, Bangladesh officially started the water
negotiations with the issue of the sharing of Ganges water. The
central point of the Ganges water sharing negotiations stands on
the allocation of water and augmentation of flows in the dry season.
In 1972, both the countries signed a Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Peace for the promotion of goodwill between the
countries.16
12 Ibid.
13 Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Rethinking Water-
Climate Cooperation in South Asia, New Delhi, India: Observer
Research Foundation, 2016.
14 M. Rafiqul Islam, The Ganges Water Dispute: International Legal
Aspects, Dhaka, Bangladesh: University Press Limited, 1987, p. 50.
15 Ashild Kola, Katherine Edelen, Farzana Jahan and Line Barkved, “Water
Scarcity in Bangladesh: Transboundary Rivers, Conflict and Cooperation”,
available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/172868/ PRIO%20Report%20-
%20Water%20Scarcity%20in%20Bangladesh.pdf, accessed on 09 January
2017. 16 Graham P. Chapman and Michael Thompson (eds.), Water and the Quest
for Sustainable Development in the
Source: Available at https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2017/01/17/even-

states-in-the-same-country- fight-over-a-river/, accessed on 09 January
2017.
Article VI of the treaty provides, “both the nations agree to
take joint action in the field of flood control, river basin
development and development of hydroelectric power and
irrigation”.17 In 1974, the Prime Ministers of the two countries met
and made a joint declaration on the augmentation of the Ganges
river. But the situation was not in favour of a peaceful settlement
as India unilaterally built the Farakka Bridge. India, from the very
beginning of this negotiation with the then Pakistan, wanted to
build a bridge at Farakka. However, Pakistan opposed the
construction of the Farakka Barrage in 1951. Between 1960 and
1970, several meetings were held where two countries shared
substantial amount of data. In 1970, India for the first time
acknowledged Ganges as an international river.18
Despite the resistance of Pakistan, India completed

building the Farakka Barrage in 1971. The Farakka Barrage
became operational in 1975. Early in 1975, an interim agreement
was signed to operate a test withdrawal of water, allowing India to
operate the feeder canals of the Barrage experimentally for 41
days from April 21 to May 31. 19 However, Indian unilateral
withdrawal of water started to cause severe water crisis in the
southwest region of Bangladesh. Bangladesh tried to settle this
Ganges Valley, New York, USA : Mensell, 1995, p. 95.

17 Mazharul Islam, “Revisiting the 1996 Ganges Treaty”, The Daily Star, 26 July 2016.
18 Mohammad Abul Kawser and Md. Abdus Samad, “Political History of
Farakka Barrage and Its Effects on Environment in Bangladesh”, Bandung:
Journal of the Global South, Vol. 3, No. 16, 2016, p. 455.
19 “Ganges Water Sharing”, Banglapedia, available at
http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Ganges_ Water_Sharing,
accessed on 09 January 2017.
contention through bilateral negotiations, but the efforts broke

down in September 1976. After that, Bangladesh decided to
internationalise the issue. It was first raised at the Islamic Foreign
Ministers’ Conference in Istambul in May 1976, and then at the
summit of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Colombo in August of
the same year. Bangladesh’s decision to raise the issue at the 31 st
session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1976,
led to a flurry of diplomatic activities. At the request of Senegal,
Australia and Sri Lanka, the Political Committee of UNGA urged
upon India and Bangladesh to settle the issue amicably. At the
initiative of Syria, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Algeria and Guyana, both
Bangladesh and India agreed to sit at Dhaka for talks.20
Afterward, a bilateral discussion between Bangladesh and
India resulted in the formation of the first water sharing agreement
on 05 November 1977. The agreement was valid for five years. A
significant feature of the treaty was the Article 2 that provided a
‘guarantee clause’ for Bangladesh by assuring a minimum of 80
per cent of its share during the lean period, and it was further
reinforced in the Article
• Bangladesh’s share of water cannot be reduced under any
circumstances till the duration of the treaty. This treaty expired
in 1982. After that, the two countries signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) on 04 October 1982 for two years. The
second MoU was signed in November 1985 for a 3-year period.
However, the ‘guarantee clause’ was not included in the two
MoUs. After the expiry of these MoUs, a vacuum remained till
the water sharing treaty in 1996 was signed.21
Finally, the two countries signed the Ganges Water Sharing

Treaty in 1996, which will remain valid for 30 years. This treaty has
resolved the sharing of Ganges water between the two countries.
However, there are still concerns regarding the guarantee of minimum
water flow for Bangladesh. According to the 1996 Water Sharing
Treaty, Bangladesh and India are each to receive Ganges water as per
the following distribution policy:
• If water availability is less than or equal to 70,000

cusecs at Farakka, then Bangladesh and India
will share the water equally (50 per cent).22
• If the water availability is above 70,000 but less than
75,000 cusecs at Farakka, then Bangladesh will get
35,000 cusecs and India may withdraw the rest.
• If water availability is more than 75,000

cusecs, then India may withdraw 40,000
cusecs and Bangladesh will get the rest.23
20 Punam Pandey, India Bangladesh Domestic Politics: The River Ganges Water Issues,
Singapore: Springer, 2016.
21 Ibid.
22 1 Cusec = 28.32 litres per second.
23 Ainun Nishat and Faisal Islam, op. cit.
The Ganges treaty has been criticised due to less

effectiveness during the lean period. It performs poorly in the most
critical periods of March and April.24 The lack of the arbitration
clause and the lack of any guarantee clause made the treaty less
effective.25 The dispute resolution mechanism of the Ganges treaty
has been widely condemned. Quite the opposite, the “Mahakali
Treaty 1996” signed between India and Nepal, and the “Indus
Water Treaty 1960” signed between India and Pakistan have the
arbitration mechanism for dispute settlement.26 In the case of Indus
Water Treaty, Pakistan remained able to include arbitration clause
because of the involvement of third party e.g., World Bank during
the negotiations of the treaty. Additionally, India was increasingly
eager to resolve the dispute, as many of its development projects
were being delayed because of lack of a resolution.27 Prior to
Mahakali Treaty, Nepal and India signed Kosi Agreement (1954)
and Gandaki Treaty (1959) which created mutual trust and
confidence between them. Consequently, this mutual trust and
confidence pushed India to keep arbitration clause in Mahakali
Treaty.
With regard to Ganges Treaty, no third party was involved and

there was no urgent development project that needed to be
undertaken immediately by India. Additionally, certain activities like
India’s unilateral withdrwal of water from Farakka Barrage and
Bangladesh’s decision to raise the issue at the UNGA created trust
deficit and diffidence. As a result, Ganges Treaty lacks arbitration and
guarantee clause. But the Article 9 of the Ganges Treaty specifies that
the “principle of equality, fairness and no harm to either party” shall
guide the future action of both nations. This is the reflection of
“equitable utilisation theory”, based on the Roman maxim “sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas”, which means “you use your own so as not to
injure another”. Articles 5-7 of UN Watercourses Convention 1997 and
Articles 4-8 of Helsinki Rules, 1966 are also based on the “equitable
utilisation theory”. But India and Bangladesh are not the signatories of
the UN Watercourse Convention 1997. As such, they cannot claim any
legally binding effects for dispute settlement. 28 The Ganges Treaty is
supposed to be reviewed every five years, but it has never happened
though it is renewable without any condition. Experts are of the opinion
that whatever existing loopholes are there, these can be addressed.29
• Teesta Water Sharing Negotiations
The Teesta River originates from the Pahunri glacier

above 7,068 metres (23,189 ft), and flows southward through
valleys and falls in the Sikkim Himalaya. It runs through Sikkim,
West Bengal and Bangladesh, where after streaming through
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Mazharul Islam, op. cit.
27 “Water Scarcity in Bangladesh Transboundary Rivers, Conflict and
Cooperation”, available at https://www. files.ethz.ch/isn/172868/PRIO Report -
Water Scarcity in Bangladesh, accessed on 01 March 2017.

28 Ibid.
29 Authors’ interview with Professor Dr. Ainun Nishat on 03 March 2017.
about 45 km of irrigable land, joins with the Brahmaputra

River.30 It is the fourth largest transboundary river between
Bangladesh and India.
Source: Strategic Foresight Group, Rivers of Peace – Restructuring India Bangladesh Relations, Mumbai, India:
Strategic Foresight Group, 2013.
The Teesta water negotiation was started in 1951. At

that time, Bangladesh was part of Pakistan. After the
independence of Bangladesh, the negotiation with India on
Teesta water sharing officially began with the ad hoc
agreement in July 1983. According to the ad hoc agreement,
Bangladesh was supposed to receive 36 per cent whereas
India was supposed to get 39 per cent of water. But the
agreement was not implemented. After a long period of
disagreement, an interim water sharing agreement has been
drafted in 2010 during the 37 th meeting of the JRC. The draft
specifies that Bangladesh and India would each get 40 per cent
of the actual flow available at Gazaldoba Barrage in West
Bengal, while 20 per cent of the actual flow available at
Gazaldoba would be reserved as environmental flow.31
30 Kumar Harshvardhan, “Teesta River Conflict”, available at

https://www.quora.com/What-are-the- disputes-over-India-Bangladesh-
Teesta-deal, accessed on 11 January 2017.
31 Strategic Foresight Group, Rivers of Peace – Restructuring India
Bangladesh Relations, Mumbai, India: Strategic Foresight Group, 2013.
Source: Strategic Foresight Group, Rivers of Peace – Restructuring India Bangladesh Relations, Mumbai, India:
Strategic Foresight Group, 2013.
During former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit
to Bangladesh in September 2011, the signing of the agreement on
Teesta waters was one of the main objectives. But the Chief Minister of
West Bengal opposed the agreement. She stated that water was a
state subject under the Indian Constitution, and the state needed to
give its consent to the central government prior to any agreement with
Bangladesh. Thus, the draft Teesta treaty remained unsigned during
that time.32 Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s latest visit to India in April
2017 renewed the hope of signing the agreed Teesta agreement. But
this time, again, India refused to sign it. The Chief Minister Mamata
Banerjee proposed that Bangladesh should look for alternative sources
of water other than the Teesta. However, Dhaka rejected such
inappropriate proposal of Mamata Banerjee.33
Teesta’s dry period starts in October and monsoon

starts in April-May. The crucial period in the Teesta is
September-October when supplementary irrigation is
32 Strategic Foresight Group, op. cit. p. 10.

33 Humayun Kabir Bhuiya, “Dhaka Wants Signing of Agreed Draft”, The Independent, 19 April 2017.
needed in some areas of the river basin for agriculture. During the
dry season, the Teesta gets around 6,000 cusecs of water. But
Bangladesh needs 8,000 cusecs and India needs 16,000 cusecs.
So it is a difficult task to meet these demands. On the other hand,
the Teesta overflows during monsoon. Its water flow typically
exceeds 300,000 cusecs to 450,000 cusecs. If governments come
forward to develop an effective water management mechanism like
building a reservoir in the upstream, then the excess monsoon
water can be shared during the dry period. So, according to the
experts, Teesta treaty should have two mechanisms: ensuring
water flow during the dry period and managing water for the rest of
the year in the entire river basin. In addition, it should ensure
prevention of flood and river erosion during the monsoon period.34
• Feni Water Sharing Negotiations
Feni River originates from the hill ranges of the Indian

state of Tripura. It flows southwest marking the boundary with the
Chattogram Hill Tracts, then flows west, separating Tripura from
Chattogram up to Aliganj and then emerges out of the hills and
passes through the plains dividing Chattogram from Noakhali,
flows down the frontier town of Sabroom before falling into the Bay
of Bengal.35 The river flows through the highlands and passes
down Feni district where it acquires its name on the Bangladesh
side. Feni river is a transboundary river between Bangladesh and
India.
The question of sharing of the waters of the Feni river

between India and Pakistan was first discussed in 1958. After the
independence of Bangladesh, a negotiation with India was going
on Feni river. The issue of water sharing in the Feni river has been
added to the mandate in the 36 th JRC meeting held in September
2005. At that meeting, a decision was taken to inspect the site. The
Ministers of Water Resources of both countries would visit the sites
where developmental works had been held up. This joint inspection
took place in September 2006.36
During the dry season, the Feni river is hardly navigable up to
Ramgarh, about 80 km upstream. Members of the JRC of Bangladesh and
India have prepared a draft agreement to equally share the Feni river
waters. However, the agreement was not signed yet.37
• Negotiations on India’s River Linking Project
The river linking project of India is designed to reduce

water scarcity in the east and south parts and protect the north and
west parts from flooding. This proposed linking project has three
parts: Northern Himalayan component, Southern peninsular
34 Authors’ interview with Professor Dr. Ainun Nishat, op. cit.

35 Available at http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Feni_River, accessed on 19 February 2017.
36 Authors’ interview with an official from Joint Rivers Commission, Bangladesh on 22 February 2017.
37 “Vast Tracts of Land to Go Barren”, Dhaka Mirror, 14 September 2011.
MECHI
TISTA
component and an Intra-state rivers linking component.38 Under the

Himalayan river linking component, the Ganges and the
Brahmaputra rivers are included for diverting water from these two
rivers to create a canal. This canal will link the Ken and Batwa
rivers in central India and Damanganga-Pinjal in the west. 39 This
situation raises concern in Bangladesh as Himalayan component
is linked with Bangladesh. However, India did not take any such
initiative till now, which affects Bangladesh. There are also internal
contentions related to river-linking project in India. Of the many
proposed projects under India’s river-linking project, Ken Betwa
linking project got the final permission.40 But according to JRC
Bangladesh and other Bangladeshi experts, this river linking
project of Ken Batwa will not affect Bangladesh.41
KALISINDH
PARBATI
14
• Kosi- Mechi 8. Chunar-Sone Barrage

• Kosi Ghagra 9. Sone Dam - Southern Tributaries of Ganga
• Gandak Gonga 11. Manas - Sankosh -Tista - Ganga
• Ghagra - Yamuna* 12. Farakka - Sunderbans
• Sarda - Yamuna* 13. Ganga (Farakka) - Damodar - Subernarekha
• Yamuna - Rajasthan 14. Subernarekha -Mahanadi
• Rajasthan Sabarmati * FR Completed
Source: National Water Development Agency (NWDA), India.
38 Available at www.nwda.gov.in/ HYPERLINK "http://www.nwda.gov.in/", accessed on 10 April 2017.

39 “India Set to Start Massive Project to Divert Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers”, The Guardian, 18 May 2016.
40 Ibid.
41 Authors’ interview with an official from Joint Rivers Commission, Bangladesh, op. cit.
1
0
4
• Negotiations on Tipaimukh Dam
Tipaimukh Dam is a proposed hydroelectric project, which is

to be built on the Barak river in Manipur, India. The 164 metre high and
390 metre long dam has a capacity to generate around 1,500
megawatts of power for the Indian national grid. The dam is within 100
km of the Bangladeshi border town of Sylhet. 42 The Tipaimukh dam
entered on the agenda of the JRC in 1978. It was then decided that
superintending engineers of the two countries should jointly examine
the scope of the Indian scheme of the storage dam on Barak river at
Tipaimukh. The examination did not take place as the issue of
Tipaimukh has been protested both in India and Bangladesh because
of its adverse environmental impact. In spite of enormous
demonstration, on 22 October 2011 Indian government unilaterally
signed an agreement with the Indian national hydroelectric companies
NHPC (National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Limited), and SJVNL
(Satlujjal Vidyut Nigam Limited) and the Manipur state government for
the construction of the project.43
As a result, in 2012, a sub-group was formed under the

JRC for joint surveys to assess the impacts of proposed 1500 MW
Tipaimukh dam over Barak river. The first meeting of the sub-group
took place in 2012 where the terms of references for the surveys
were finalised. Under the terms of references, both countries can
undertake surveys in their own sides to assess the environmental
impacts.44 But there was no such joint study that took place.45 In
sub-group’s second meeting in 2013, Dhaka asked Delhi to
provide more information and data on the water flow of the Barak
river to assess the possible negative impacts of the planned dam
on the common river in Bangladesh. Later on, the governments of
India and Bangladesh announced further delays.46 Till now, this
proposed dam has not been built yet. According to the experts, the
proposed Tipaimukh dam is likely to affect two major rivers of
Bangladesh, namely the Surma and the Kushiara and another
60,000 Manipuri people of India who depend on the river for
livelihood and other activities.47
• Challenges
South Asia provides two excellent, but contrasting

examples on water relations between the co-riparian countries.
Bhutan and India have shown a successful example of water
relations that are based on goodwill and trust.48 In contrast, water
42 Rashid Askar, “Tipaimukh Dam and Indian Hydropolitics”, The Daily Star, 01 January 2012.
43 Harunur Rashid, “Tipaimukh Dam: What is the Current Position?”, Dhaka Courier, 01 February 2015.
44 “High Tipaimukh Dam Negotiations Sans Peoples”, The Sangai Express, 06 September 2012.
46 Harunur Rashid, op. cit.
47 M. Asaduzzaman and Md. Moshiur Rahman, “Impacts of Tipaimukh Dam on
the Down-stream Region in Bangladesh: A Study on Probable EIA”, Journal of
Science Foundation, Vol. 13, No.1, 2015, p. 6.
48 Asit K. Biswas, “Cooperation or Conflict in Transboundary Water
Management: Case Study of South Asia”, Hydrological Sciences
Journal, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2011, pp. 662-670.
relations between Bangladesh and India have proved a

missed opportunity. Regarding Bangladesh-India water
negotiations, it is understood that the water negotiations
between them have faced major challenges. In this section,
these challenges are discussed to understand why most of
the negotiations have failed to produce good results. These
challenges are discussed subsequently.
Lack of Accurate and Up-to-Date Data. One of the basic

problems that states face during water-related negotiations is the
lack of adequate and reliable data on the flow of the shared
rivers.49 On the one hand, it prevents those at the negotiating table
from arriving at a common ground. On the other hand, it fosters
power and information asymmetries between countries, which
restricts a plurality of views and participation. 50 Bangladesh Foreign
Office lacks proper logistical and technical mechanisms to update
on relevant data on the common rivers.51 Transboundary rivers'
data and information are not properly being collected, maintained
and published by governments in a systematic manner.52 Unlike
India, Bangladesh does not have sophisticated telemetry and
remote- sensing technologies and satellite-based water resources
information system. Bangladesh uses survey vessels, telemetering
and wireless system, calibrating tank and field installations in order
to collect data for flood forecasting purpose.53 Even the data
collection is only limited to irrigation, water quantity and diversion.54
This data gap holds up the progress of the water sharing
negotiation.55
Sharing of hydrological data is widely considered a

fundamental component of transboundary cooperative history as it is
extremely important to support decision making and planning among
riparians.56 Data are usually collected within the limits of the territory of
a country. This makes it an instrument of power interplay in terms of
sharing information, fully or partially, or keeping it under wraps
entirely.57 Data sharing is seen as closely related to national security,
foreign policy, strategic relations and territorial sovereignty which
makes it a prime marker of power interplay. It is a ready instrument in
the hands of riparian countries to extract concessions or stall
negotiations over transboundary rivers. Therefore, sharing of data may
be considered to imply a loss of

50 Sagar Prasai and Mandakini Surie, Strengthening Transparency and
Access to Information on Transboundary Rivers in South Asia, New
Delhi, India: Asia Foundation, 2015, pp. 25-30.
52 Ibid.
53 Bangladesh Water Development Board, available at
http://www.hydrology.bwdb.gov.bd/index. php?
pagetitle=pffc,_hydrology&sub2=161&_subid=79&id=159, accessed on
28 February 2017. 54 Authors’ interview with an official from Joint River
Commission, Bangladesh, op. cit.
56 Jonathon Lautze and Mark Giordarno, “Water Resources Data and
Information Exchange in Transboundary Water Treaties”, International
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Vol. 11, No. 10,
2011, pp. 179‐199.
57 Hang NgoThu and Uta Wehn, “Data Sharing in International
Transboundary Contexts: The Vietnamese Perspective on Data Sharing in
the Lower Mekong Basin”, Journal of Hydrology, Vol. 536, No. 10, 2016,
pp. 351‐364.
control over data, information or ideas. 58 Data sharing on common

water has long been a controversial issue between Bangladesh and
India. India does not provide all the data that Bangladesh needs,
particularly data on dry season flow. It is not technically difficult to gain
flood season data from satellite information. The difficulty lies in
obtaining dry season data, as this needs to be measured on the
ground and is not available from satellite data. For this reason,
obtaining dry season data from upstream countries is critical for
Bangladesh. Negotiations, however, for water sharing in this region,
are mostly based on anecdotal rather than scientific evidences. Both
Bangladesh and India classify river flow data as secret and use the
lack of mutually acceptable data as a tactic to promote their own
national interests. Thus, lack of accurate data and sharing of data by
creating power and information asymmetry significantly hamper the
negotiation process.
Lack of Consistency in Negotiation Process. According

to the statute of the JRC, the ministerial level meetings are
supposed to hold four times in a year. But there are only 37
meetings since the inception of the JRC in 1972. The 37th meeting
was held in 2010. After that, there was no ministerial level meeting
that took place to settle issues relating to common rivers.59 It
demonstrates the lack of consistency in negotiations. Selective
foreign policy or regime based shifts in the foreign policy are found
in the Bangladesh-India water negotiations. In Bangladesh’s
context, there are political quarters that bear an anti-India posture.
It is seen that when Awami League comes in power, it follows the
policy of engaging with India, whereas the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party follows a policy of sidestepping India.60 This policy difference
hampers the regular talks on water sharing issue.
Similarly, it is seen that Indian foreign policy with

Bangladesh seems more engaging when Awami League
government stays in power. Additionally, one more issue
that hampers the negotiation process is once there is a
change in the pannel of diplomatic negotiators to discuss
the issue.61 If the “right” people are not involved in
negotiations, the process is not likely to succeed. This
situation happens in both sides of the two countries.62
Indolence in Negotiation Process. Bangladesh and

India are not fully successful in regularising talks on water
sharing. Both countries' diplomats get involved with the water
talks when the issue appears intermittently. Due to this
indolence, despite sharing the highest number of
transboundary rivers with India, Bangladesh has only one
water sharing treaty with it, on the River Ganges,
58 Anamika Barua, Sumit Vij and Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman, op. cit.
59 Ibid.
60 Shaukat Hassan “The India Factor in the Foreign Policy of Bangladesh”,
in M. G. Kabir and Shaukat Hassan, (eds.), Issues and Challenges Facing
Bangladesh Foreign Policy, Dhaka, Bangladesh: Bangladesh Society of
International Studies, 1989, pp. 44-61.
61 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Perceptions
from Bangladesh”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2011, pp. 71-87.
62 Authors’ interview with Ambassador Humayun Kabir, on 05 March, 2012.
which was signed in 1996. The Ganges Water Treaty was a

product of 25 years of negotiations that finally recognised
Bangladesh’s rights as a lower riparian state. But
Bangladesh remains unable to include guarantee and
arbitration clauses in the treaty. The Teesta water sharing
agreement has been waiting to be signed since 2011. The
Teesta water negotiations have been started since 1983.
Even after long 28 years, the Teesta water sharing
agreement remained unsigned. Apart from Bangladesh,
India shares a number of transboundary rivers with
countries like Pakistan, China, Nepal and Bhutan. There are
mainly three rivers flowing from China to India 63 , six rivers
from India to Pakistan64, five rivers from Nepal to India65 and
four rivers from Bhutan to India 66 . Excluding the Ganges
Water Treaty with Bangladesh, India has the Indus Treaty
with Pakistan, Mahakali Water Treaty with Nepal and an
MoU with China on the water sharing of Brahmaputra. This
reflects the indolence of India to negotiate water sharing
issue with its neighbouring countries also.
Lack of political vision plays a role in creating indolence in

the negotiation process. The political vision determines whether
the negotiation will be a success or a failure. In 1996, two
governments were cooperative in making the Ganges Treaty into
reality. That time, “Gujral Doctrine” became popular. The doctrine
spelt out by I.K. Gujral, first as India’s foreign minister and later as
the prime minister.67 The five-point roadmap of doctrine set the then
Indian government’s political will to build trust between India and
its neighbours for solving bilateral issues through bilateral talks.
The Ganges Treaty with Bangladesh was the result of this Gujral
Doctrine-led Indian foreign policy. On the other side, during the
Ganges Water Treaty, Awami League government was also willing
to settle the Ganges water sharing dispute with India. This both-
way political willingness helped to settle the dispute. But after that,
negotiations on the rest of the common rivers became deadlocked.
So this negotiation inertia due to the changed regime with the
different foreign policy and lack of political determination is have
been major challenges of the water negotiations.
Lack of Coordination with the JRC. The Bangladesh

part of the JRC is working alone with some engineers and
members from the Ministry of Water Resources. There is also a
lack of coordination between the JRC and the Foreign Office to
carry out regular ministerial level meeting on water sharing.
Moreover, by the statute, the organisation should be one body with
members from both the countries. But in reality, there are two
separate bodies that are working in the two countries. And
63 Available at https://www.quora.com/How-many-rivers-flow-from-China-to-India,
accessed on 17 January 2017. 64 Available at https://www.quora.com/How-
many-rivers-flow-from-India-to-Pakistan, accessed on 17 January 2017.
65 “Flood Threat from Rivers Flowing through Nepal to India”, available at
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/mbErel. aspx?relid=169814, accessed on 17 January 2017.
66 “River Systems”, available at http://countrystudies.us/bhutan/16.htm,
accessed on 17 January 2017. 67 Padmaja Murthy, “The Gujral Doctrine
and Beyond,” available at https://www.idsa-india.org/an- jul9-8. html,
accessed on 10 January 2017.
there is a lack in research and workshop by the JRC and
the MoFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) on water sharing
issues.68
Although Bangladesh has a structure and an

Organogram of Bangladesh’s JRC but India does not have any
established body called JRC. The Ministry of Water Resources,
River Development and Ganges Rejuvenation of India basically
runs Indian part of JRC.69 So, the JRC actually does not work
jointly. On top of that, Bangladesh remains unable to compel India
to work jointly under the JRC.
Lack of Research and Monitoring in the Negotiation

Process. Research has always played a key role in
transboundary water-related cooperation, and in particular in
bringing forward the negotiation processes. At the beginning,
research and measurements are needed to know and to
understand what is happening with a water basin. Very often it
is the scientists who ring the alarm bells first and thus force the
policy makers to sit around the negotiating table.70 But
Bangladesh government’s preference of other sectors over
water suggests, compared to other countries, that the water
sector receives small funding for conducting quality research.
There are a good number of government organisations such as
River Research Institute, Water Resources Planning
Organisation, Bangladesh Water Development Board,
Bangladesh Haor and Wetland Development Board, Flood
Forecasting and Warning Centre, and JRC. These
oraganisations only deal with technical aspects. Even there is
no research team in the Bangladesh part of JRC. 71 On the other
hand, water related departments and research institutes in
public and private universities do not get enough funding for
conducting research on transboundary water negotiations.
Hence, compared to India, Bangladeshi researchers have a
lack of contribution in shaping Bangladesh’s water diplomacy.
On the other hand, India needs to build its own

understanding of water. In contrast with Bangladesh, India is
in an advantageous position in terms of research over water
negotiations. But the scientific knowledge on water
management in India is not adequate in comparison with
China. The Central Water Commission is not in a state to
perform any kind of extensive research and development as
there is no investment in this area.72
69 “Indo-Bangladesh Cooperation”, available at
http://wrmin.nic.in/forms/list.aspx?lid=348, HYPERLINK
"http://wrmin.nic.in/forms/list.aspx?lid=348" accessed on 17 June 2017.
70 Branko Bosnjakovic, op. cit.
71 Author’s interview with an official from Joint Rivers Commission, Bangladesh op. cit
72 Uttam Kumar Sinha, “India-China Riparian Relations: Towards
Rationality”, paper presented at the Fellow’s Seminar on India-China
Riparian Relations: Towards Rationality, organised by Institute of Defense
Studies and Analyses, India on 16 January 2015.
Distributive Approach to Negotiation. Both the

countries are following distributive approach 73 to water
negotiation, which results in zero sum achievement. This
approach is also known as positional bargaining. Distributive
approach or positional bargaining in water negotiation emerges
when parties to the negotiation conceive water as a fixed
resource – one provided by nature in a given quantity that is
either static or diminishing.74 Based on this assumption,
diplomats of both parties try to divide the assets or resources
under dispute that means diplomats often focus on what share
of the existing water will be given to each entity often in the
face of ever-increasing demand and uncertain variability. 75 The
Ganges treaty and even the ad hoc agreement and draft
agreement regarding Teesta river gave greater focus on the
distributive policy. According to the ad hoc agreement,
Bangladesh was supposed to get 36 per cent whereas India
was supposed to get 39 per cent of water. The draft specifies
that Bangladesh and India would each get 40 per cent of the
actual flow available at Gazaldoba Barrage. 76 According to the
report of Brahmaputra dialogue initiated by the South Asia
Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies,
Bangladesh undertakes positional bargaining approach. Thus,
it is seen that both the countries are more inclined to positional
bargaining or distributive approach of negotiation.
Technical Knowledge Gap. Having a pool of water

experts is important to give support to the diplomats at the
negotiation table. But in reality, Bangladesh lacks in water
expertise. The issue of water negotiation requires technical data,
which can be dealt only by the water experts.77 The inadequate
academic contribution is also evident. Even lack of cooperation is
seen between the scientists and the policy makers in Bangladesh.
In contrast, Indian government fosters a close relationship with
academic institutions and has sound scientific information on
water.
Absence of Water Expert Negotiator. In Bangladesh,

water experts remain frequently absent at the negotiation table.
This is also a barrier because carrier diplomats are mostly
unknown about the technical part of the water sharing process.
Indian diplomats have more updated data, but still their water
experts cannot take part in government-to-government
negotiations on water sharing issues.
73 Distributive approach to negotiation is a competitive negotiation strategy in

which one party gains only if the other party loses something. It is used as a
negotiation strategy to distribute fixed resources such as money, resources,
assets, etc. between both the parties. It is also referred to as ‘Win‐Lose’, or
‘Fixed‐Pie’ negotiation because one party generally gains at the expense of
another party. See Definitions, available at
https://www.negotiations.com/definition/, accessed on 16 January 2017.
74 Lawrence Susskind and Shafiqul Islam, “Water Diplomacy: Creating Value and Building Trust in
Transboundary Water Negotiations”, Journal Science and Diplomacy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2012, pp. 1-7.
75 Ibid.
76 Strategic Foresight Group, op. cit.
77 Authors’ interview with Ambassador Humayun Kabir, op. cit.
The challenges discussed above are substantial and

important. These require effective policy intervention.
Bangladesh and India need to address the challenges
appropriately to achieve a fair share of transboundary rivers.
• Way Forward
Bitterness between states over water can lead to souring

relations and tension. If not managed well, this bitterness can
worsen relations and even lead to a large-scale conflict. As
discussed above, water negotiations between Bangladesh and
India are facing major challenges such as lack of accurate data,
exchange of data, inconsistency and indolence in negotiation,
technical knowledge gap, lack of research for negotiation, lack of
coordination with the JRC, applying the distributive approach in
negotiation, etc. To address these challenges, the present paper
makes an effort to suggest some policy recommendations. These
are discussed subsequently.
In light of the observations, Bangladesh needs to apply

track II diplomacy in negotiating water sharing issue. Currently,
Bangladesh water negotiation is based on applying track I
diplomacy78. Besides applying track I diplomacy, the application
of track II diplomacy might be a good option for a proactive
water negotiation. Track II diplomacy is the practice of non-
governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities
between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes
called ‘non-state actors’. Intellectuals, water experts, academics
from both the countries can be involved in informal meetings to
seek sustainable and amicable solution. Therefore, it is prudent
to undertake joint informal meetings in order to create a
conducive environment in favour of track I level negotiation.
Track one and half diplomacy might be useful in

promoting proactive negotiations. Track one and half diplomacy
refers to the application of both track I and track II diplomacy
within a strategic framework. A conglomeration of experts,
professionals, officials and analysts from Bangladesh and India
might play significant role in identifying sustainable solutions.
This type of conglomeration can turn into a proper institution
which can be used as a knowledge hub. Regular monitoring
might also be possible under this type of institution.
Application of paradiplomacy might be a good option for

resolving water dispute between Bangladesh and India. In India,
power equilibrium is evident in the state-centre relations. Since the
independence of India, it has been following the federal state
system. Thus, Delhi-centred negotiation process of Bangladesh
may not be able to produce the desired result. In 2011, both the
countries were agreed with Track I diplomacy is the practice of
governmental, formal and official contacts between or among the states.
See Jeffrey Mapendere, “Track One and a Half Diplomacy and
Complementarity of Tracks”, Culture of Peace Online Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1,
2005, pp. 66-81.
52:48 water sharing ratio of Teesta river. But Mamata Banerjee

remained unconvinced regarding the ratio of the water sharing.
She believed that agreeing on 48 per cent water share to
Bangladesh would affect the agriculture of West Bengal. Thus,
while formulating water diplomacy strategy with India,
Bangladesh needs long term strategy to be engaged with West
Bengal and other important states of India that are involved
with Bangladesh-India water sharing issue. To do this, the
government of Bangladesh may promote closer relations with
the relevant states of India using social and cultural ties for
working on the water related disagreements.79
Instead of distributive approach, Bangladesh may

focus on integrative approach80 to water negotiation. The
Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace 81 serves as an excellent
example of integrative approach to water negotiation which
Bangladesh may follow. Integrative approach in water
negotiation emerges when parties recognising that water
are not a fixed resource. Based on this assumption, policy
makers and diplomats think about improving the overall
efficiency of water use which, in effect, can “create” more
water.82 This approach embeds the concept of sharing
benefits of water rather than water itself. This allows riparian
to focus firstly on generating basin-wide benefits and
secondly on sharing those benefits in a manner that is
agreed as fair. In fact, focusing on the benefits derived from
the use of water in a transboundary river system rather than
the physical water itself provides many opportunities to
undertake mutually beneficial cooperative actions for water
resources development and management that are
acceptable to all parties.83 Such an approach to water
negotiation not only encourages either side to look for
creative ways of increasing or reusing available supplies but
also helps either party to deal with flood, drought, or
decreasing environmental quality.84 Examples of the 'sharing
of benefit' embedded in the integrative approach date back
to the transboundary waters agreement, Columbia River
Treaty, between United States and Canada. Besides, this
approach is at the root of the some of the world’s most
successful water agreements.
The Indus Treaty of 1961 was possible because both India

and Pakistan could perceive the huge advantage of the
development of the waters of Indus system.
79 Ibid.
80 Integrative approach to negotiation is often referred to as ‘win-win’ and
typically entails two or more issues to be negotiated. It often involves an
agreement process that better integrates the aims and goals of all the involved
negotiating parties through creative and collaborative problem solving.
Relationship is usually more important, with more complex issues being
negotiated than with the distributive approach. See Definitions, available at
https://www.negotiations.com/definition/, accessed on 16 January 2017.
81 Lawrence Susskind and Shafiqul Islam, op. cit.
82 Ibid.
83 Aaron T. Wolf (ed.), Sharing Water, Sharing Benefits: Working Towards
Effective Transboundary Water Resources Development, Paris, France:
UNESCO, 2010, pp. 52-54.
84 Ibid.
The Mekong River Agreement 1995 was possible because of

the four countries saw a common interest in jointly managing
their shared water resources. The Nile basin initiative of 1999 is
another example of sustainable development of water
resources through equitable 'sharing of benefit' which focus not
on water but on a win-win situation of regional development. 85
The Nile Basin Initiatives, Mekong River Commission and Indus
River Treaty serve as excellent examples of an integrative
approach to successful water negotiation which Bangladesh
and India may follow. In integrative approach, parties in the
negotiation also consider multiple issues simultaneously as
they can try to create value and maximise benefits by tradeoffs
between them.86 In this respect, both countries can consider
multiple issues like transit issue, trafficking, terrorism
simultaneously with water negotiation.
There is a new kind of approach which is gaining attention

to deal with water sharing problems. This approach is known as
multi-track water diplomacy. Multi-track water diplomacy refers to
effective water cooperation as a collaboration in which two or more
parties identify a negotiated compromise on maximising mutual
gains and achieving joint wins for all parties involved, resulting in
the availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for
health, livelihoods, ecosystems and production, coupled with an
acceptable level of water-related risks to people, environments and
economies. Multi-track water diplomacy framework consists of five
analytical components: the assessment of a river basin and the
contextual factors related to an action situation; the institutions
structuring action; the actors and their agency; the action situation
– the interface between structure-agency; and finally the different
outputs, outcomes and impacts as a result of the interaction. By
analysing each component and their relationships, involved in a
transboundary river, it helps to diagnose water problems across
sectors and administrative boundaries, and at different levels of
governance. Consequently, it identifies intervention points, and
proposes sustainable solutions or a ZOPEC (Zone of Possible
Effective Cooperation) which is sensitive to diverse views and
values. Additionally, it can also accommodate ambiguity and
uncertainty as well as changing and competing needs. This
framework has great potential to build a sound bridge from actual
or potential conflict to effective cooperation and practical
solutions.87 Thus, both Bangladesh and India may consider this
approach to solve the water sharing problem.
85 M. A. Abedin, Umma Habiba, Rajib Shaw (eds.), Water Insecurity: A

Social Dilemma, Binglay, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, 2013, pp.134-
136.
86 Yona Shamir, “Alternative Dispute Resolution Approaches and their Application
in Water Management: A Focus on Negotiation, Mediation and Consensus
Building”, UNESCO-HP, available at http://www.un.org/
waterforlifedecade/water_cooperation_2013/pdf/adr_background_paper.pdf,
accessed on 10 December 2017.
87 “The Multi-track Water Diplomacy Framework: A Legal and Political
Economy Analysis for Advancing Cooperation over Shared Waters”, Hague
Institute for Global Justice, available at http://
internationalwatercooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/THIGJ_The
-Multi-track-Water- Diplomacy-Framework_Webversion-1.pdf, accessed on
28 February 2017.
It is important to strengthen the JRC. It was established

with a view to maintaining liaison to ensure effective joint efforts
in maximising benefits from the common river system. But
unfortunately, it is not so active. Since JRC’s establishment, it
did not contribute much to resolve the transboundary water
dispute between India and Bangladesh. So, there is a need to
strengthen JRC as it provides a very good platform to discuss
water sharing. In order to strengthen JRC, several initiatives
need to be undertaken. Firstly, JRC should concentrate on
developing a robust mechanism to collect hydrological data as
hydrological data is important to manage the tranboundary
river. The JRC should engage in regular collection and sharing
of data on the quantity and quality of common rivers. The
satellite based real time telemetry system installation might be
useful to remove the existing mistrust on data exchange.
Secondly, according to the charter of JRC, it is supposed to
meet four times in a year. Sometimes it fails to meet even once
in a year. So, JRC needs to meet from time to time for following
up the progress in water negotiations. Thirdly, JRC needs to
develop itself as an autonomous body so that regime change
does not affect its activity. Fourthly, there is a need to shift from
JRC’s focus from supply side cooperation to demand side
cooperation. Rather than simply focusing on volumes of water
(demand side cooperation) and cross border discussion, JRC
needs to focus on uses of water (supply side cooperation).
Fifth, JRC needs to strengthen its organisational structures to
create a set of strict norms and guideline to regulate the use of
not just the Teesta, Feni and Ganges but all transboundary
rivers shared with Bangladesh and to promote sustainable
conservation, develop better ways to combat pollution and
manage existing water supply and resources in order to avoid
future dispute.
In comparsion with India, Bangladesh has a little

expertise regarding water negotiations. As a result,
Bangladesh is lagging behind in negotiation with India. In
India, there are enough funds for water research. There is a
specialised training institute for water research. Currently
private sectors are also involved in water research in India.
Even scholarships are available for water research. In
Bangladesh, there is no such institutional arrangement to
support this type of research. It creates a lack of capability
over water issues. So, there is a need to establish a pool of
experts by creating different forums, research and training
institutes. In this regard, Bangladesh government should
allocate enough funds for public and private research
bodies.
Both countries may develop a shared platform for

water experts to take part in the negotiation process. In this
regard, water experts from both countries can be trained so
that they can contribute in the negotiation process. In this
regard, the Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International
Relations sets an example. They started a training course with
the collaboration of UNESCO-IHE where they train water
experts in negotiations. So these trained water experts can
take part in any water negotiation and aid the career diplomats
in dealing with
technical problems. Even if they are not present at the

negotiation table, they can influence the process of
negotiations.88
Collection of accurate data and sharing those data of

transboundary rivers are important to resolve the
transboundary water dispute. In this regard, Bangladesh can
think about four possible solutions. Firstly, Bangladesh can
discuss with India to determine sharing of minimum level of
data under the JRC. Secondly, Bangladesh can also discuss
with India to delegate the task of data- gathering to a third party
which may speed the pace of negotiations. Thirdly, Bangladesh
can upgrade its own instruments to collect common rivers,
water related data e.g. sophisticated telemetry and remote-
sensing technologies and satellite-based water resources
information system. Fourthly, Bangladesh and India can
generate scientific or technical information collaboratively.
By maintaining reciprocity in bilateral relations with India,

Bangladesh can mitigate the challenges of water negotiations. In
two ways, Bangladesh can maintain reciprocity with India. On the
one hand, currently bilateral relations between Bangladesh and
India are getting warmer. Cooperation in several spheres like
political, economic, social, cultural and security is evident.
Bangladesh needs to maintain reciprocity in bilateral relations with
India in these spheres. Because, by maintaining the existing warm
relations Bangladesh can create a compulsion over India to
negotiate water dispute. On the other hand, through dialogue and
engagement both countries can share best practices and ease
overall water demand. As a result, they can easily come to an
agreement over transboundary rivers. Reciprocal sharing of best
practices over the uses of water is much effective in a range of
fields. They include: irrigation; hydro-power generation and
distribution; navigation; fisheries management; water quality and
pollution; industrial water usage; erosion control on shared rivers;
urban water management; eco-system; watershed and forest
management.
Multilateral diplomacy might be another suitable option for

resolving water sharing tribulations. As the middle riparian in the
basin, India faces threats from upper riparian China and poses
challenges to lower riparian Bangladesh. Among the world’s major
international rivers, the Brahmaputra ranks low in terms of
institutionalised management. Countries along the Nile, for
instance, have formed the Nile Basin Initiative to encourage peace
and security. The states, in the lower Mekong region, have formed
the Mekong River Commission. On the contrary, there is no
institution capable of promoting cooperation between the
Brahmaputra’s three major riparian states – China, India and
Bangladesh. The three riparians have taken modest steps at the
bilateral level to cooperate in the Brahmaputra basin, such as
limited water data-sharing and government dialogues between
technical experts. Although Bangladesh
88 Mariska Heijs, “Water Negotiations: Sharing A Resource Without

Borders”, available at https://www.
clingendael.org/publication/water-negotiations-sharing-
resource-without-borders, accessed on 12 January 2017.
is most favourably disposed to multilateral cooperation, China

and India are cautious and selective. They have shown marginal
interest in addressing water resource management at the
multilateral level. They are supporting bilateralism to address
water sharing problems. Bangladesh, on the other hand, is the
strongest advocate for basin-wide management of the
Brahmaputra. Thus, there is still precedents and space for New
Delhi and Beijing to experiment with pursuing innovative
approaches with its neighbours by applying multilateral
diplomacy. Opportunities at the multilateral level include 1)
technical exchanges on the development of hydrological tools,
disaster management, and pollution control and 2) confidence-
building activities through official and unofficial dialogues,
especially by international organisations and extra-regional
governments. Additionally, through multilateral diplomacy,
countries can develop collaborative water management projects
by taking financial aid from multinational institutions such as the
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank and so forth .
One would not be wrong in saying that the most critical

part of the water negotiation is to define and balance the rights
of upstream and downstream states. All the above discussed
recommendations are doable if both the countries agree upon
the same policy of negotiation. In Bangladesh-India case, India
is following its latest National Water Policy (2012). According to
this policy, India is inclined to bilateral cooperation to address
the transboundary water issues. In contrast, National Water
Policy of Bangladesh (1999) is disposed to multilateral
cooperation and basin-wide management to address the
transboundary water issues. In summary, a successful
negotiation requires an agreed platform. Once this situation
developed, both parties can settle down all the existing water
sharing disputes.
• Conclusion
River basins in South Asia are not only the greatest

sources of drinking water, irrigation and hydropower but also
important for social, economic and environmental development.
This condition is a burning issue for Bangladesh and India. These
two countries mostly depend on the waters from the common
rivers. The inadequate supply of water in the dry season is the
central point of dispute between these two countries. Although
from the very beginning of the bilateral relationship, both the
countries have started water negotiations over the issue of sharing
transboundary rivers. But there is no significant achievement
except the Ganges water treaty. Even the Ganges water treaty has
been criticised due to less effectiveness during the dry period.
Except the Ganges treaty, the negotiations over sharing water in
Teesta and Feni are going on but could not produce any good
result yet.
In the present paper, it is seen that the water

negotiations between Bangladesh and India are being
affected due to some significant negotiation challenges such
as lack of accurate data, exchange of data, inconsistency
and
indolence in negotiation, technical knowledge gap, lack of

research, lack of coordination with the JRC, distributive
approach in negotiation, etc. In light of these observations,
some policy suggestions have been addressed in the
present paper. For a functioning proactive negotiation,
several diplomatic tracks, namely paradiplomacy, track II
diplomacy and track one and half and integrative approach
to negotiation might be useful. Another important thing is to
activate and strengthen JRC as it provides a very good
platform to discuss water sharing. In both countries, there is
also a need to establish a pool of water experts who can
properly support the negotiation process by providing
analytical assessment and relevant policy suggestions.
Additionally, in Bangladesh, there is a need to allocate

enough funds for water research. Data collection over common
rivers is another important thing. Finally, Bangladesh needs to
maintain reciprocity with India, which can help in creating
compulsion over India to negotiate water disputes. Bilateral
agreements can at best be short-term palliative. Therefore, the
solution lies in wider regional and multilateral collaboration
involving India, Nepal, Bhutan and China. The support of the
United Nations and our development partners such as the United
States, the European Union and Japan might be useful. Several
multilateral financial institutions including the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank and so forth might aid collaborative projects under the
multilateral diplomacy.
Padma
Source: Joint Rivers Commission
1
1
8
View publication stats

Bangladesh-India Water Negotiations: Challenges and Way Forward

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Bangladesh-India Water Negotiations: Challenges and Way Forward

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Bangladesh-India Water Negotiations: Challenges and Way Forward

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

Bangladesh-India Water Negotiations: Challenges and Way Forward

Syeda Tanzia Sultana

Shanjida Shahab Uddin

Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies

BRI and the Geopolitics of Energy View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Sharing river water between neighbours is a

South Asian countries are increasingly facing acute water

Shanjida Shahab Uddin and Syeda Tanzia Sultana are Research

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2017.

1 Q. K. Ahmed, Asit K. Biswas, R. Rangachari and M. M. Sainju (eds.), Ganges-

Brahmaputra-Meghna Region: A Framework for Sustainable Development, Dhaka,

Bangladesh: University Press Ltd, 2001, p. 15.

To resolve disputes over water sharing, Bangladesh

Power in a transboundary context refers to the riparian’s

3 Brahma Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground, Washington

Zeitoun and Warner introduced “Hydro -hegemony” – a

Given this backdrop, the present paper argues that the

8 Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, “Hydro-hegemony – A

• Bangladesh-India Water Negotiations: Past and Present Progress

Although Bangladesh shares transboundary rivers with

On the other hand, India has water deals with almost

• Negotiations on the Establishment of the Joint Rivers Commission

Early on, both India and Bangladesh recognised the

According to the statute, the JRC is supposed to meet at

• Ensuring most effective joint efforts in

• Formulating flood control works and

for Water Negotiations in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna System”, International

Negotiation, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2000, pp. 292-295.

• Formulating detailed proposals on flood and

• Studying flood control and irrigation projects to

• Formulating proposals for carrying joint

Although JRC has a very small list of successes, but it

• Ganges Water Sharing Negotiations

The Ganges (or Ganga) is a major river in South

Ganges water sharing negotiations started with India when

Source: Available at https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2017/01/17/even-

Despite the resistance of Pakistan, India completed

Ganges Valley, New York, USA : Mensell, 1995, p. 95.

contention through bilateral negotiations, but the efforts broke

Finally, the two countries signed the Ganges Water Sharing

• If water availability is less than or equal to 70,000

• If the water availability is above 70,000 but less than

75,000 cusecs at Farakka, then Bangladesh will get

35,000 cusecs and India may withdraw the rest.

• If water availability is more than 75,000

The Ganges treaty has been criticised due to less

With regard to Ganges Treaty, no third party was involved and

• Teesta Water Sharing Negotiations

The Teesta River originates from the Pahunri glacier

Cooperation”, available at https://www. files.ethz.ch/isn/172868/PRIO Report -

Water Scarcity in Bangladesh, accessed on 01 March 2017.

about 45 km of irrigable land, joins with the Brahmaputra

The Teesta water negotiation was started in 1951. At

30 Kumar Harshvardhan, “Teesta River Conflict”, available at

Teesta’s dry period starts in October and monsoon

32 Strategic Foresight Group, op. cit. p. 10.

• Feni Water Sharing Negotiations