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Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations

1948

The Theory of Supposition: An Answer to Some of the Difficulties

of Modern Logicians
Norman H. Langenderfer
Loyola University Chicago

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Copyright © 1948 Norman H. Langenderfer
 THE THEORY OF SUPPOSITION
AN ANSWER
TO SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF MODERN LOGICIANS

BY
NORMAN H. LANGENDERFER, S. J.

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
ARTS IN PHILOSOPHY IN LOYOLA UNIVERSITY

OCTOBER
1948
 VITA AUCTORIS

Norman Henry Langenderfer, s.J. was born at Swanton, Ohio,

December ·26, 1921.

He graduated from Central Catholic High School, Toledo,

Ohio in June 1939, and spent the following two years enrolled
in the Department of Liberal Arts at DeSales College, Toledo,
Ohio.

In September 1941 he entered Milford Novitiate of the

Society of Jesus, Milford, Ohio, and enrolled as a student at
Saint Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio. He received his Litt.
B. degree with a major in Latin from Saint Xavier University in
June 1945.

He transferred to West Baden College, West Baden Springs,

Indiana, which is a division of Loyola University, Chicago, in
September 1945, and registered in the Graduate School of
Philosophy.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Preface ------------------------------------~------------ i.
Chapter I --- An Introduction to the Problem. ----------- 1.
The purpose of the thesis. ··-· Chief exponents and
the philosophical trend of thought on which the dis-
cipline has been built. •••• Description of modern
logic. •••• Formal definition. •••• The objects of
modern and traditional logic. •••• The supposition
of terms -- the problem.
Chapter II --- Purpose and Use of Supposition in Tradi-
tional Logic. ---------------------------~ 26.
Limitations of a system of language-signs in expres-
sing the thought of the mind. •••• Diverse properties
of a term in a proposition. •••• The diverse of a
term in a proposition a point of study in logic.
•••• The need of these properties. •••• Modern lo-
gicians are conscious of the same difficulty. ••••
Number of properties. •••• Definition of supposition.
•••• Must meet the needs of the copula. •••• Natural
and accidental supposition. •••• Supposition and sig-
nification. •••• Supposition must be consistent. ••••
Amplification and restriction of a supposition. ••••
The object of logic for traditional and modern lo-
gicians. •••• Objections of modern logicians.
Chapter III --- An Application of the Boole-Schroeder
Algebra to the Syllogism and the Result-
ing Difficulties. ---------------------- 41.
A few symbols of modern logic. •••• Standard propo-
sitions of logic symbolized ••••• Existence and non-
existence implied in the symbolized proposition •••
•• Application of the algebra to the AAA syllogism.
•••• Mechanical elimination of the middle term •••
•• Importance of the universality of the middle
term. •••• Application o£ the algebra to an AII syl-
logism. •••• Application of the algebra to a fal-
 lacious syllogism ••••• Application of the alge-
bra to an EAO syllogism. •••• The existence and
non-existence implied in universal and particular
propositions. •••• An argument from the notion of
the null-class. •••• Types of existence implied
in propositions. •••• Resulting conclusions of
modern logicians.
Chapter IV --- Supposition -- An Answer to Some of the
Modern Logicians' Difficulties. ----------- 59.
Natural and accidental supposition. •••• Proposi-
tions in necessary matter imply no actual exis-
tence. •••• ·Propositions in necessary matter may
be universal or particular. •••• Propositions in
contingent matter imply actual existence •••••
Propositions in contingent matter may be universal
or particular ••••• Use of amplification andre-
striction to vary supposition. •••• In subalterna-
tion, partial conversion, and certain syllogistic
moods of inference the conclusion is legitimate.
•••• Mathematical procedure a difficulty to mo-
dern logic.
Chapter V --- The Use of the Supposition of Terms in
Modern Logic. ~-~--------------------------- 69.
The technique of modern logic follows that of
mathematics. •••• System-form of symbols needed.
•••• Things for which the symbols stand. ••••
Meaning of the symbols. •••• Problem of the null-
class ••••• Meaning of the null-class and the
empty class. •••• The significance of the symbol
11 11
0 for the mathematicians ••••• Its significance
in modern logic. •••• A point about the principle
of contradiction ••••• Null-class in traditional logic •
•••• Symbols have a substitutive value. •••• Logic
has a reference to reality ••••• Purpose of modern
logic ••••• The negligence of the modern logicians.
Bibliography
 PREFACE

A few words by way of preface perhaps will be of value for

an understanding of the development of this thesis. The purpose
of this work is not to make a comprehensive study of modern
logic, or to discuss the relative merits and demerits of the new
discipline. On the contrary, we wish to investigate a point
that seems to be a source of many of the differences between
modern and traditional logic, that is, the use of supposition.

The subject is approached by a brief history of the de-

velopment of modern logic. It is not the aim of this brief his-
tory to express the contributions of the various exponents of
modern logic, but rather to present the background and general
trend of thought upon which the discipline is founded. The
fundamental philosophic views and general thought upon which
modern logic has been built are rather carefully presented by
Frederigo Enriques in his work, The Historic Development 2!
Logic. Mr. Enriques' history presents the development of mo-
dern logical thought by an investigation of the leading contri-
butors to modern logic, and by an analysis of pertinet passages
in their works. Hence, this work was found most useful in ful-
filling the purpose of this part of the thesis, and frequently
reference is made to it.
 ii.
In treating the various questions in traditional logic it
was found necessary to select one standard work. Many works of
logic have been written by traditional logicians. Each, howeve~

has its own particular approach, and some of them express diffe~

ent opinions on certain points. To eliminate any difficulty in

this regard Maritain's work, Formal Logic has been accepted as
the standard source of reference for the exposition of tradi-
tional logic. Here again, our interest does not lie in the his-
tory, or the precise origin of logical principles, but only in
the traditional view itself expressed by Maritain.

Again, in approaching modern logic, Lewis and Langford's

work, Symbolic Logic, which is commonly accepted as a standard
text on symbolic logic, was selected as our chief source of re-
terence. Our treatment of modern logic is limited merely to
the calculus of classes, and its application to the syllogism.
This procedure was followed because the difficulties that arise
about the use of the supposition are clearly evident in the cal-
culus of classes. Furthermore, since propositional calculus and
functional calculus can be considered as developments from the
.
calculus of classes, the same difficulties are present in both
of them as are present in the calculus of classes. Hence, to
eliminate repetition and to keep the paper within the scope of
a Master's Thesis only the calculus of classes is considered.
What is said, however, about supposition in regard to the
 iii.
calculus o£ classes applies as well to the calculus o£ proposi-
tions and runctional calculus in modern logic.

Finally, to the best o£ my knowledge, there has not been

written any critical comprehensive study or modern logic from a
scholastic point o£ view which has been published. I found
Father John J. Wellmuth's unpublished manuscript, The Logic .2.!
~ Cambridge Logicians, and articles in various periodicals a
most helpful study o£ modern logic £rom the traditional logi-
cian's point of view. There is a great need for a critical an-
alysis of modern logic from this approach. Perhaps the near
future will see this lacuna £illed.
 CHAPTER I
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

Much is being written today about modern logic. Its a-

chievements are highly lauded, and, on the other hand, efforts
have been made, and not futile ones either, to point out its
various inaccuracies. But despite the many derogatory state-
ments about it, it has been found to be exceedingly useful in
the "development of experimental science."l This new discipline
has its foundations in mathematics.2 The precise name of the
new study, remark Lewis and Langford, has not been absolutely
determined.
The study with which we are concerned in
this book has not yet acquired any single
and well-understood name. It is called
'mathematical logic' as often as •symbolic
logic,• and the designations •exact logic,'
'formal logic,• and 'logistic' are also used.
None of these is ·completely satisfactory;
all of them attempt to convey a certain dif-
ference of this subject from the logic which
comes down to us from Aristotle and was given
its traditional form by the medieval scho-
last1cs.3
Perhaps, it might be remarked that the lack of an absolute

l R.A. Kocourek, "An Evaluation of Symbolic Logic," Proceedings

£!the American Catholic Philosophical Ass., XXII (1947),98.
2 Han~elchenbach, Elements of Symbolic LOgic, Macmillian Co.,
New York, 1947, v. --
3 Clarence Irving Lewis and Cooper Harold Langford, Symbolic
Logic, Century Co., New York, 1932, 3.
 2.

name is due to the great interest most modern logicians have in

developing this new discipline without ever considering just
what it really is or is really doing. Father Wellmuth states it
thus:
••• the attention of modern logicians has
been devoted rather to the elaboration of
various systems of logic and the improve-
ment of extant systems from a teehnical or
1 intrasystemic' point of view, than to a
careful study or the basic principles and
philosophic doctrines implicitly involve~
or explicitly contained in these systems.4
This same obscurity is evident again when a proper definition is
sought. The notes that distinguish it from other sciences have
not been adequately determined. Some writers characterize it
as just a ndeeper and wider study than the logic of tradition,"5
in other words, a development of a branch of traditional logic
which was unknown to the Schoolmen. Other writers say "it has a
wider meaning, that it is on the march to replace the tradition-
al Aristotelian logic in all fields."6 This divergence of opin-
ions on just what this new study is stams, I think, from lack
•
of any close comparison between it and traditional logic. Is it
just a development of traditional logic, or is it an essential-
ly new discipline?

On first appearance it seems to be just a further develop-

4 John J. Wellmuth, !h.! Losic 2[. ~ Cambridge Logicians, An

unpublished manuscript, 1937, i.
5 Lewis and Langford, 3.
6 Reichenbach, v.
 ).
ment ot traditional logic. However, recent Scholastic writers
are pointing out notes ot difference which make it an essential-
ly different discipline. It is not the purpose ot this paper to
make a comprehensive study of this point. Here we wish to in-
vestigate a point that seems to be improperly used, or better,
neglected in modern logic, namely, the use of the supposition ot
terms. But first let us trace briefly the history of this new
study. Our intention in this regard is not so much to give a
step by step analysis of the development of modern logic, but
rather to mention the men who are greatly responsible for modern
logic.?

It is difficult to point out in the history of logic the

actual beginning of the modern technique. It would, perhaps, be
impossible to say any one time saw its actual birth because so
many elements were determining factors. Even though certain
elements do not enter into symbolic logic itself, nevertheless,
they do find a place in its history, because they gave stimula-
tion and new insights into the field. The first impulse in the
direction of modern discoveries, most writers agree, was given
by Descartes. Descartes' life long ambition was to acquire
mathematical clarity in all fields of knowledge. "The seven-

7 It the reader is interested in a detailed development of

modern logic, and wishes to see each man's personal contribu-
tion to this development, he is referred to the introduction
in Lewis and Langford's work, Symbolic Logic. To treat this
point here is beyond the scope of this paper.
 4.
teenth century," writes E.G. Salmon, "through. Descartes as well
as Bacon, gives voice to the cry for order and method •••• Des-
cartes' discovery of Analytical Geometry was epochal not only
in mathematics, but also in the development of physics.n8

Although the cry of Descartes for mathematical clarity

stirred the minds of men, still his confinement of knowledge to
the intuition of a clear and evident concept "cut him off from
external reality, and transforms knowledge into a merely sub-
jective process which does not measure itself on its object, but
rather measures objects by itself."9 This subjectivistic pro-
cess found in Descartes' philosophy lived on and echoes and re-
echoes through every succeeding era of philosophical achievement.

Although Descartes is credited with the initial impulse to-

wards positivism, still, logical analysis or mathematical logic
seems to have started with Leibniz. The subjectivistic aspect
of Descartes' work is retained by Leibniz. The concept for
Leibniz is not a criterion of existence, says Enriques, but of
possibility.ll The concept is a mental construct and is said to

8 E.G. Salmon, "Philosophy and Science," New Scholasticism, XVI

(1942), 131 and 134.
9 A.J. McNicholl, "Science and Philosophy," I!!! Thomist, VIII
(1945>, 70.
10 Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Leibniz, George Allen and
Unwin, London, 193~vi11 - ix. --
11 Federigo Enriques, The Historic Development £! Logic, transl.
by Jerome Rosenthal, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1929, 77.
 5.
have real existence because of the principle of sufficient rea-
son.l2 Thus it is, Enriques asserts, that Leibniz makes the dis
tinction between being and existence. 'Being' is that Which is
distinctly able to be conceived, and, 'existence' is what is dis
be
tinctly able to/'perceived. By making being that which is able
to be conceived, Leibniz cuts logic from reality outside the
mind.l3

Working from this subjectivistic point of view, Leibniz be-

gan the development of logistics in his idea of a Characteris-
!1£! _u_n_i~v_e_r_s_a_l_i_s, and a calculus ratiocinator. In the back of
his mind Leibniz seems to have believed that a symbolic method
could be formulated which would obviate thinking, and give re-
sults equal to those received in the science of mathematics.l4
The purpose of Leibniz's Characteristica Universalis was to give
a scientific universal language which would be common to all
workers in the sciences and help in the circulation of new ideas
Besides' this, the new method would substitute ideograms for the
ordinary words of a language and help in analyzing and synthe-
sizing scientific facts. The basic element of this procedure
lay in his belief that all scientific concepts were capable of
being defined in terms of a few. Such analysis would give a few
simple ideas, he thought, which with their relations could be

12 Ib!d., 77. Cf. Russell, 209.

1) Enriques, 78.
14 Russell, 169.
 6.
expressed with certain symbols, as a rormula exhibits its ele-
ments. In a similar manner he believed the science or reasoning
could be carried out.l5 The calculus ratiocinator was this
science of reasoning carried out. It was Leibniz's attempt to
develop an organon of reasoning in ideographic signs. This cor-
responds closely with our modern logic.l6

Leibniz 1 s idea was, indeed, novel and gave rise to the la-
ter developments of symbolic or mathematical logic. The success
of Leibniz•s work would have been greater, say most modern w.ri-
ters, if he had not been impeded by certain traditional laws in
regard to the intension and extension or the subject and pre-
dicate.l7

The new insights into logic that Leibniz developed gave

stimulation to some philosophers and scientists in Europe. In-
dependently of Leibniz's discoveries, however, such men as Sir
William Hamilton, Augustus De Morgan, George Boole, and other
Englishmen began making advancements in the new discipline rrom
a difrerent approach. These new developments were taking place
in the early 19th century when mathemat~cs was making its bid

15 Lewis and Langrord, 5 - 6. cr. Enriques, 82 - 83.

16 Lewis and Langford, 5 - 6.
17 Enriques, 84. Lewis and Langford have a note on this, and
express the precise point of the difficulty. 11 For example,
the conception that every universal proposition implies the
corresponding particular; and the conception that the relati
of terms in extension are always inversely parallel to their
relations in intension. 11 7.
ror independence from philosophy. And so it was from the mathe-
matical aspect that logic was taking on a new color.l8

The developments of this period were of a peculiar nature.

The realism and metaphysics of Aristotle were being passed over
for new modes of thinking, and, with the rise of the many psy-
chological criticism of the theory of knowledge philosophy be-
comes more subjectivistic, and logic a purely formal science.
nothing more than a "doctrine ot mental processes.u19 Because
of this change in outlook in regard to the relationship of
thought to reality, the mathematicians were beginning to feel
that their science was free from all metaphysics and independent
of external reality. The activity of the mathematicians, there-
fore, centered arQund constructs of the mind. They believed it
was their work to formulate the framework, and the physicists•
duty to arrange the real order of things according to this frame·
work.20 This, however, does not mean the mathematicians are
free from all restraint. Enriques expresses this, and summari-
zes in a few lines the whole general trend of thought at this
time. He writes:
But this does not mean that mathematical pro-
duction goes on unbridled and unchecked and
that all the water of the great river is scat-
tered and lost in a thousand rivulets. The

18 Enriques, 115.
19 1!2.!,g. 1 110.
20 ~., 111.
 8.
development of thought obeys certain inner con-
trolling forces, and in the different currents
there can still be seen a reflection of tradi-
tional problems. The various specialized ten-
dencies are in this way reunited in firm knots
which give birth to higher doctrines. In short,
that order which mind is not able to derive
from external nature it finds in itself, in the
full freedom of its activities. It is not, how-
ever, an order that is giv~n; it is one that is
progressively constructed. 1
One fact stands out clear at this point in the discussion,
namely, that hand in hand with the new developments in mathe-
matics the dichoto~ of the processes of the mind trom external
reality was becoming wider. Modern mathematics possessed a dif-
ferent aspect from classical mathematics, which "held to the ex-
igencies of guantitas interminata.n22 Cassirer in speaking
about mathematics expresses this very point. He says:
Here a field of free and universal activity
is disclosed in Which thought transcends all
limits of the 'given'. The objects which we
consider and into whose objective nature we
seek to penetrate, have only an ideal being;
all the properties which we can predicate of
them, flow exclusively from the law of their
original construction.23
In the abstract science, then, of mathematics the whole con
struction flows from first principles which form the foundation
of the mathematical science. Whether these first principles are
in anyway connected with the physical sciences is arbitrary; the

21 Ibid., 111- 112.

22 Kocourek, 97.
23 Ernst Cassirer, Substance and Function, Open Court, Chicago
1923, 112, as quoted by Kocourek, 97.
important thing is, that the truth of the conclusion is inde-
pendent of physical interpretation.24 The foundation of mathe-
matics consists, it seems, not in real being but, as Larguier
says, "simply of more or less autonomus postulate systems.n2.5

The truth of this seems proved when we find the mathemati-

cal logicians writing that one abstract theory can receive many
different interpretations. George Boole states:
Those who are acquainted with the present
state of the theory of symbolic algebra are
aware that the validity of the processes ot
analysis does not depend upon the interpre-
tation of the symbols which are employed but
solely upon the laws of their combination.
Every system of interpretation which does
not affect the truth of the ~glations sup-
posed is equally admissible.
Such a statement could not be made unless it was believed that
the ultimate foundation was a construction of the mind which
may or may not find an interpretation in physical reality.

The point that we are trying to bring to light is the na-

ture of the principles on which the modern logic is based. It
seems evident that nominalistic doctrine is predominant. Enri-
ques also is of this opinion, for he writes:
But the English logicians, Boole and De Morgan,

24 Enriques, 126 - 127.

2.5 Everett H. Larguier, "Concerning Some Views on the Structure
of Mathematics," The Thomist, IV (1942), 433.
26 George Boole, Mathematical Analysis £! Logic, Cambridge, 1847
3, as quoted by Enriques, 127.
 10.

are nominalists, at least arter the manners

of conceptualism and ter.minism. Symbolism
indeed is for them a pure instrument £or the
analysis o£ thought, the process or thought
being regarded by them above all £rom an in-
ductive point o£ view, as proc~eding from
the particular to the genera1.21
The concept, it seems, has no reality other than that which the
mind constructs for it. Since they do not attain real essences
or natures through their concepts, the concept seems to be no-
thing more than a name that corresponds to nothing outside.

Keeping this fact in mind, namely, the nominalistic nature

of modern logic, we can now investigate to somewhat greater ex-
tent the development of the discipline.

The greatest advancement in symbolic logic came from George

Boole, although be£ore him such men as Sir William Hamilton and
Augustus De Morgan had rendered advancements to the science.
Hamilton's chief work centered around the quanti£ication or the
predicate. Nothing o£ importance resulted £rom this, we are
told, although, as Lewis and Lang£ord remark, "it suggested a
manner in which propositions can be treated as equations or
terms." 28

De Morgan, a follower of Hamilton, gave many new insights

to the subject of logic. By explicitly quantifying the predicat

27 Enriques, 158.
28 Lewis and Langford, 1 - 8.
 11.
11
he developed many new forms of propositions with the rules for
transformation and the statement of equivalents.n29 We will
pass over the validity of these propositions at present, and
merely state that his versatile mind made great strides in the
development of modern logic. By investigating the modes of in-
ference according to his principles he found new classifications
and presented principles to g~vern them.30

Although much of importance had been done in the develop-

ment of this new discipline by Leibniz, De Morgan, and others,
nevertheless, it is George Boole who gave the basis for all
future progress by successfully applying an algebra to logic.3l

Boola's work in the field of symbolic logic originated when

he tried to give an explanation why ordinary language is not ad-
equate to express thought. In order to give a more perfect ex-
pression of thought he began his study of symbolic languages.
In this manner he believed all the operations of language could
be carried out by a system of symbols. These symbols for Boole,
as for Leibniz before him, were taken from algebra.32 The work
of Boole and De Morgan was essentially the same. De Morgan, how
ever, did not work out as complete a notation as Boole, and so

29 Ibid., a.
30 Ibid.
31 !D!a., 9. •
32 Enriques, 159 - 160.
 12.
it is Boola who is remembered for his algebra of classes.33

Leibniz, many years before, had attempted an algebra of

logic but failed because of certain difficulties. It was by
surmounting these difficulties in his procedure that Boola suc-
ceeded. The chief difficulty with Leibniz, note Lewis and Lang-
ford, was solved when Boole considered logical relations in ex-
tension and not in intension as Leibniz had tried to do.34

Boola's algebra as applied to logic underwent various

changes before it acquired the form it has today. In this trans
ition of Boolean Algebra, w. s. Jevons, Charles s. Peirce and
John Venn had influence. Jevons formulated a method independent
of the algebraic technique of Boole. With this he was able to
solve logical problems by the manipulation of his "logical alpha
bet." Peirce and Venn contributed their bit by adding to the
Boolean Algebra a new relation of inclusion.35

With the developments of Peirce and Venn the Boolean Al-

gebra of logic reached its climax. The next development to
modern logic came when symbolic logic was united w1 th u the metho
dology of rigorous deduction, as exhiblted in pure mathematics.".36

33 Alonzo Church, "Augustus De Morgan," in Dagobert D. Runes'

The Dictionary of Philosophy, Philosophical Library, New York,
1942. -
34 Lewis and Langford, 12.
35 Ibid., lk- 15.
36 Ibid., 16.
 13.
Up to this stage modern logic was concerned with the logic or
classes. Now, however, it centers around the logic of proposi-
tions, propositional functions and logical relations. Here, in
particular, Peano, Peirce, and Schroeder advanced the modern dis-
cipline. Peirce and Schroeder concentrated on the logic of pro-
positions, propositional functions and logical relations until
they arrived at a calculus which was assimilated to the opera-
tions or mathematics. Peano, on the other hand, arrived at a
similar relationship between logic and mathematics by analyzing
mathematics in its deductive form. By giving the relations sym-
bols upon which the proors or the deructions depended, he gave
mathematics a "logistic form."37

The next important contribution was made by Russell in his

Principia Mathematica, in Which he attempted to demonstrate the
relation between mathematics and logic, or in other words, he
attempted to show that mathe-matics is reducible to logic.38
Russell was very critical in his analysis from a realistic point
of view. "He comes to the conclusion," says Enriques, "that a
proper understanding of symbolism tends naturally to bring us
back to the Aristotelian position in the degree as we break with
Boola's psychologism.n39 Russell's developments proceed in a

37 Ibid., 16.
38 Ibid., 22 - 23.
39 Enriques, 169.
 14.
different fashion, The calculus of classes for him is derived
from the calculus of propositions. Peano, also, developed his
work along this line. For him, however, the precedence of the
calculus was merely a contingent matter, Whereas for Russell it
expresses a fundamental logical relation.4o

Another point that Enriques makes in regard to Russell is

worthy of note. Boola, in order to solve difficulties, restrict-
ed his considerations of logical relations to their extension
only. Russell disagrees on this point, since the same relation
taken in extension can have different meanings in intension. En-
riques writes:
The extensional conception is above all un-
acceptable to him, because the couples con-
nected by a relation are characterized by
order; they cannot therefore be classes.
For order itself also forms, for Russell, a
certain relation among members of a class.
Russell thus writes XRY in order to repre-
sent in general a relation holding between
a certain domain X and a certain converse
domain! which form together the field (X,Y),
where R assumes meaning. In this way he
establishes a llgic ~ relations, which ex-
actly presents tself as a generalization
of the logic of propositions. It is this
which forms in the opinion of Couturat, th~
most original part of the work of Russell.~l

The development of modern logic, historically at least, had

its foundation in mathematics. The discovery of analytic

4o Ibid., 169.
41 Ibid., 170.
geometry and calculus started the search for a new universal
science which could be used in all knowledge. Boola's algebra
achieved this to some extent, and showed that some mathematical
operations could be applied to logic. Russell and Whitehead de-
veloped the discipline further and defined all arithmetical idea
in terms of logical notions.42

With that brief summary of the historic development of

modern logic it might be well to present a working definition of
the new discipline. As we already mentioned modern logic has no
as yet been given any absolute name. Again, in regard to a
standard definition little has been accomplished. The best
understanding of the new discipline is given, I believe, by
Father Wellmuth. Father Wellmuth first distinguishes logic from
the other sciences. First of all, he notes that the principal
manner of classification is according to the •objects' of which
the various sciences treat. A twofold division is made of ob-
jects, {1) ideal objects, and (2) real objects. The ideal ob-
jects are entia rationis with no real existence outside of the
mind. Real objects, on the contrary, make up the real existing
world, and can be classified as sensible or non-sensible. Logi~

then, is distinguished from the other sciences by having for its

object "ideal and non-sensible objects to the exclusion of actual

42 Kocourek, 98.
 16.
and sensibly real objects.n43

The relation o£ logic to mathematics and to philosophy bear

more serious consideration, since so many writers today disagree
whether mathematics is a branch o£ pure logic, or whether pure
logic is a part o£ philosophy. It is well to pass over this
question at present until £uture investigation is able to es-
tablish the foundation of mathematics.44

Father Wel1muth follows up his distinction between logic

and the sciences with another valuable distinction; the distinc-
tion between logic and language. For any expression of our
thoughts, a language of some sort is needed. If we concentrate
merely on the expression of thoughts, our study is entitled
"linguistics." Logic, on the other hand, is concerned about the
thought behind the expression. However, £or a full understanding
of the thought an accurate language is supremely important. Yet
it would be a misapprehension to suppose that it is possible to
perfect language by means of symbols to such an extent as to
eliminate all incorrect thinking.45 This seems to be an atti-
tude, however, of modern logicians and especially of the seman-
ticists.46 Perhaps if one supposes that the mind is limited to

4.3Wel1muth, 5.
W+ Ibid., 8.
45 Ibid., 8.
46 Leonard J. Eslick, "Grammatical and Logical Form,"
lasticism, XIII (1939), 233 - 244. --
New Scho-
pure sense experience, there is a possibility that this might be
true. But the mind has the power of thinking on its sense ex-
periences, and as such, may make mistakes despite the perfection
of the language. Language is of great importance in the accur-
ate presentation of thought. However, a study of language is
not logic. Logic, as Maritain remarks, nbears upon the act of
reason itself,n47 and therefore is concerned about the thought
content.48

After the distinction between logic and sciences, and be-

tween logic and language has been made, Father Wellmuth then dis
cusses the nature of modern logic itself. Before we quote the
definition which he expresses, let us mention a few of the va-
rious kinds of logic which are being studied today, and perhaps
we shall have a better understanding of what we are treating.
There are works today that go by such names as, 'formal' logic
as opposed to 'material' or 'applied' logic, •inductive' and 'd
ductive' logic, 'genetic' logic, 'general' logic, 'real' logic,
'transcendental' logic, and 'mathematical' or symbolic' logic.49
It is with the last that we are concerned, and this, Father
Wellmuth mentions, is nothing more than a progressive treatment
of formal logic.50

47 Jacques Maritain, Formal Logk6' trans1.,· Imelda Choquette,

Sheed and Ward, New York, 19 , 1.
48 Wellmuth, 10.
49 Ibid., 11.
50 Ibid., 154.
 18.
What, then, is rormal logic? Formal logic, Father Wellmuth
writes, quoting from Lalande's Vocabulaire ~ la Philosophie,
endeavors to establish "the necessary laws of
thought, which hold whatever be the nature of
the objects thought about." It has "nothing
to do with the truth of the facts, opinions or
presumptions, from which an inference is de-
rived; but simply takes care that the infer-
ence shall certainly be true if the premise
be true."51
11
Formal logic, he goes on to add, has always been regarded by
its proponents as {in principle at least) a distinct non-philo-
sophical science, independent of any particular system of meta-
physics.n52 Again later on he writes:
This modern formal logic is also called
'symbolic' or 'mathematical' logic: 'symbolic•,
because it is for the most part a collection
of formulae made up of non-verbal symbols more
or less like the symbols of mathematics; and
'mathematical' because, ••• it is constructed
according to the principles and methods of
mathematical systems. 53
Alonzo Church gives a similar description of formal logic in the
Dictionary ~ Philosophy.
Formal logic investigates the structure of
propositions and of deductive reasoning by a
method which abstracts from the content of
propositions which come under consideration
and deals only with their logical form. The
distinction between form and content can be
made definite with the aid of a particular
language or symbolism in Which propositions
are expressed, and the formal method can then

51 Ibid., 11. Translator not mentioned.

52 Ibid., 14.
53 Ibid. , 15.
- 19.
be characterized by the tact that it deals
with the objective form of sentences which ex-
press propositions and provides in these con-
crete ter.ms criteria of meaningfulness and
validity of inference. This formulation of
the matter presupposes the selection of a par-
ticular language which is to be regarded as
logically exact and free from the ambiguities
and irregular! ties of structure which appear
in English ••• i.e.~ it makes the distinction
between form and cont~pt relative to the
choice of a language.54
Again~ when describing symbolic logic~ Alonzo Church writes:
Symbolic logic, or mathematical logic,or
logistic, is the name given to the treatment
ot formal logic by means of a formalized
logical language or calculus whose purpose
is to avoid the ambiguities and logical in-
adequacy of ordinary language. It is best
characterized, not as a separate subject~
but as ~ new and powerful method in formal
logic. 5;,

With such a descriptive understanding of modern logic we

might well proceed to ask, what is the formal definition that
the modern logicians give for this new discipline? The student
of modern logic would be somewhat disappointed it he sought such
a definition in many of the modern books on symbolic logic~ be-
cause, in general, such a definition is not given. However,
Father Wellmuth comes to our aid and presents the definitions
which he has found. He presents the definitions given by Pro-
fessor Jprgensen and Professor Eaton. Professor J~rgensen, he

54 Alonzo Church, "Formal Logic," Dictionary 2£. Philosophy, 170.

55 .!!t!9·' 181.
~------------------------------------~
20.

says, defines logic as a "deductive science of deduction in

genera1 • It Professor Eaton presents a more elaborate definition.
"Logic is the science that exhibits all the relationships per-
mitting valid inference that hold between various kinds of pro-
positions considered merely in respect to their .form." This
last definition Father Wellmuth analyzes, and shows that Eaton
supports J¢'rgensen 1 s definition, that logic is a "deductive
science of deduction in general.n56 This means:
••• that the general statements by which it
.fulfils its task of exhibiting those log-
ical relationships between propositions
which permit of valid deduction should be
so arranged ~~ themselves to .form a deduc-
tive system • .?"£

This definition expresses rather accurately, I think, the

general .features and scope of modern logic. It is a deductive
science because of its similarity with mathematics. It starts
with certain "undefined primitive ideas" which are .. symbolized"
and combined into "postulates", or "primitive propositions."
From these postulates, in turn, are deduced theorems and other
propositions by mathematical means, especially nby substitution.'
11
Thus, modern logic is, it seems rather accurately defined as a
deductive science of deduction in general."58

It is true that the modern discipline is especially useful

56 Wellmuth, 156.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 162.
 21.
in experimental science, but it must not be confused with tra-
ditional logic.59 Traditional logic also is a formal science.60
But 1 formal 1 has a slightly different meaning according to the
traditional logicians. Traditional logic is formal in so far
as it "studies what reasoning is, and how it must proceed what-
ever ll.! content or the use which mind makes of it.n61 To stop
there in our description of traditional logic would leave plenty
of room for ambiguity. Although traditional logic has a formal
aspect it is not by any means purely a study of form. Maritain
writes: "Since logic is the art which enables us to proceed
with ease, order and correctness in the act of reason itself, it
must treat both the ,!:2!:!!! and the matter of our reasoning. n6 2

Traditional logic is broken down into two divisions; minor

or formal logic and major or material logic, as Maritain points
out. But never is traditional logic considered just a study of
the logical form abstracted from the content.63

Furthermore, a logic that is concerned merely with the

form of reasoning, if it is possible to have such a logic, could
'
never have as its object demonstration, since demonstration

59 Kocourek, 98.
60 Mari tain, 9.
61 Ibid~, 10.
62 Ibid., 9
63 "Tlie'"use of the word 'formal' in modern logic has many and
varied meanings. Father Wellmuth in his manuscript makes a
rather detailed analysis of the term. 146-155. Such an an-
alysis is outside the scope of this paper.
 22.
would require a consideration of the content of propositions,
that is, in so far as demonstration concludes to the ~ or
false. Demonstration is had in a certain sense in formal logic,
that is, in so far as formal logic sets forth the rules which
must be observed if demonstration is to be correct in relation
to the disposition of materials. But demonstration cannot be
had in formal logic in so far as demonstration concludes to the
true or false since reasoning attains to the true or false in
virtue of the matter. For demonstration, as Aristotle says, ~

syllogismus efficiens scire~4 and John of St. Thomas adds to

this, scire autem e_ll cognoscere causam, .2£ guam £.!!.! m,--.!!
illius causam esse, ~ fieri ll2!'! posse, ~ aliter ~ .!! habeat~
But the object of traditional logic is demonstration, as John of
St. Thomas explicitly states.
Respondetur, quod syllogismus, qui fit per
tertiam operationem, est principale objectum
Logicae, et inter syllogismos ratione materiae
principalior est demonstratio •••• Cum ergo
scientia Logicae proprie et essentialiter sit
directiva rat1on1s, illud est principale ob-
jectum, ubi principalius invenitur ratiocinatio
et discursus cum certitudine sine errore. Con-
tingit autem error vel ex defectu formae vel
ex contingentia materiae. Ergo principale
objectum ex parte formae est syllogismus r.ecte
dispositus, principale autem ex parte materiae
est demonstratio, in qua invenitur processus
rationis sine errore tam ex parte materiae
quam ex parte formae.66

64 Joannes A s. Thoma, Cur~us Philosophicus,Marietti, Taurini,

(ed.-Reiser) 1930, I, 773. Locus in Aristotle not given.
65 1E..!.!!~' 773.
-
66 Ibid., 265.
 It seems to follow, therefore, that a logic that is con-
cerned merely with the form of reasoning is different from tra-
ditional logic. Professor Eslick, in fact, maintains and gives
strong arguments that modern logic, Which is concerned only with
the form of propositions, and traditional logic "differ as gram-
mar and logic differ.n67 He writes:
Modern logic has been primarily concerned
with the symbolic exhibition of grammatical
form. As such, it has been more interested
in extension than intension, and in the gram-
matical relations of implication, disjunct,ion,
and conjunction, rather than in inference as
such. ••• and the distinction between impli-
cation and inference is a distigation between
two essentially different arts.
Maritain expresses a similar view:
Logistics differs essentially from Logic.
For, whereas the latter bears upon the act of
reason itself in its progress towards the true,
and thus upon the order of concepts themselves
and of thought, Logistics is concerned with
the relations between ideographic signs and
therefore with these signs themselves which,
once determined, ar~ taken as sufficient.o9
What is called modern logic, then, is strictly a formal disci-
pline concerned only with the form of propositions, and by some,
it is said to be only a study of grammatical form rather than
-
logical form. The question might be asked, why is it strictly
a fromal discipline which prescinds from the content? This

67 Eslick, 233.
68 ~., 235 - 236.
69 Maritain, 222.
~------------------------------------------~
24.
might be answered by recalling that modern logic is said to have
its foundation in mathematics,70 and is defined as, "a deductive
science of deduction in general." This i'ormal study is con-
structed, as Father Wellmuth mentions, according to the methods
of pure mathematics. Now, pure mathematics is a system of
theorems deduced from a set of undefined elements, properties,
functions, and relations, and a set of unproved propositions by
the methods of formal logic Which abstracts completely from all
reality.71 Thus, just as pure mathematics is concerned with the
realtions between the mathematical symbols which represent the
postulates and definitions, so modern logic is concerned with
the relations between "ideographic signs" which represent the
expressions of our thought.72 Here, then, can be faintly seen
the close relationship between modern logic and pure mathematics.

Modern logicians are concerned with the form, and believe

that "considerations bearing exclusively on the form sufi'ice to
explain the entire discourse."73 Naturally, there are going to
be many points of difference between a logic concerned with form
alone and one concerned with the form and matter. A discipline

70 Reichenbach, v. Cf. Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathe-

matical Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin, New York;-1930,19
71 Dagobert D. Runes, The Dictionary of Philosophy, Philosophi-
cal Library, New York, 1942, 189, ""iiathematics."
72 James A. McWilliams, "Mathematics and Metaphysics in Science,"
New Scholasticism, XI (1937), 362-369.
73 Mir!taln, 227.
 25.
that centers its attention merely on the for.m will ignore an es-
sential point in traditional logic, -- the use of the supposi-
tion of terms. That is the point of this paper. We wish to
attempt to show that some of the advancements which modern lo-
gicians claim they have made to traditional logic, and some of
the errors which they claim to have found in it, are due to a
lack of consideration of the ·use of supposition in traditional
logic.
~------------------------------~

CHAPTER II
THE PURPOSE AND USE OF
SUPPOSITION IN TRADITIONAL LOGIC

It perhaps can be said that there is no thinking man today

who would not admit that to express one's thoughts in clear,
intelligible language is tedious work. Even after much effort
and training the attempt at expression is sometimes rewarded
only with embarrassment, because of inadequacies either on the
part of the individual or on the part of the language. Maritain,
in writing about language and thought, expresses a similar
opinion.
Everything directly conceived or thought of
by our intellect, everything of which we· have
a concept or "mental word" may be expressed or
translated into language. But despite the
flexibility, the docility, the delicacy of
any system of language-signs, this expression
is always more or less deficient in relation
to thought. The loftiest intellectual know-
ledge, which reveals a world of consequences
within a single principle, must, so to speak,
be scattere~ and diluted in order to be orally
expressed.74

The proper expression of one's thoughts, however, not only

requires an effort on the part of the speaker but also an inter-
pretative effort on the part of the hearer, and, unless this

74 Maritain, 58.
~·------------------------------~
27.
twofold effort is had there remains "but a radically insufficien
system of lifeless symbols.n75 In consequence of this Maritain
continues:
Hence a twofold necessity accrues to philosophy:
it must acquire a mastery over language by
means of a whole technical apparatus of forms
and verbal distinctions (terminology), and it
must unceasingly exact from the mind an act of
internal vitality such that[si~words and for-
mulae can never replace, for they are there
but to spur the mind to this act. ••• Lan-
guage, then, expresses or signifies as much of
our thought as is necessary in order that an-
other intellect, hearing the pronounced ~ords,
may present the same thought to itself. 7

But, if words and language cannot adequately replace the

vital act of thought there must always remain a certain part of
thought that goes unexpressed. Yet, when a concept of one's
mind is expressed and understood by another this unexpressed
umargin of thought" is also conveyed. Therefore, Maritain
writes, "this unexpressed margin of thought ••• is remarkably
evinced by the diverse properties that affect the term consi-
dered, not by itself, but in~ context £! !h! proposition, !!
part of a proposition."77 It seems to be definitely implied
here that the study of the proposition transcends the mere sign-
expression of the proposition. In other words, the statement of
a proposition contains more than What is sometimes explicitly

75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 59
-
77 Ibid.
 28.
stated. Its full significance is only going to be understood
by a study of the diverse properties that affect the term in the
proposition.

Already logic has been defined as that which enables us to

advance with order, ease, and correctness in the act of reason
itself. Surely, then, these "diverse properties that affect the
term, 11 and through which the unexpressed margin of thought is
conveyed to the hearer cannot be something foreign to logic, but
must be worthy of serious study. Yet, it seems to be precisely
the neglect of these properties by modern logicians in their
study of traditional logic that makes them write, (1} that tra-
ditional logic is unsatisfactory because of certain ambiguities
in the laws of intension and •extension which affect inference,
or, (2} that the only syllogisms are those with two universal
premises and a universal conclusion, and those with one univer-
sal and one particular premise and a particular conclusion.78

The importance of these properties are immediately evident.

Even Aristotle was conscious of this when he wrote, "It is 1m-
possible in a discussion to bring in the actual thing~ discusse~

we use their names instead of them. u79 Maritain further remarks:

But we shall inevitably fall into a host of

78 Lewis and Langford, 49, 63.

19 Aristotle, Elench., I, 165a, 5, The Works of Aristotle Tran-
slated into Enflish, w. D. Ross,-red.), Clarendon Press:---
Oxtord,~8, •
~~---------------------------------~
29.
errors unless we observe that not only may
the same word have several different mean-
ings but also that the same word, .!!.!m while
having the same meaning, • • • and consequently
even while signifying the same intelligible
nature may, according to its use in th~ con-
text, stand for very different things.~O
The ancient logicians were conscious of this difficulty, and had
devised a way of rendering a solution. The theory of suppositio
and ampliatio is this solution;81 and unless these are fully
understood there is no need, as Javelli says, for anyone to at-
te.mpt a criticism of the traditional moods of inference. ~

autem adverte novitie, quod praedictas defensiones servare ~

poteris, donee intellexeris tractatum suppositionum ~ ampli-

ationum ~ appellationum et probationum terminorum.8 2

Modern logicians are also conscious of this difficulty of

language replacing thought, and it is for this reason that they
make such valiant efforts to symbolize their logic to avoid ambi·
guities. Enriques writes:
But the subtle disquisitions of scholastic
language and especially the paradoxical con-
ventions introduced from time to time into
the formulations of mathematical theories,
show how insufficient and inaccurate ordinary
language is from the point of view of a com-
plete analysis of thought. Hence the idea
of replacing verbal analysis by symbolical

80 Maritain, 59.
81 Joannes A s. Thoma, 28-42, 166-179. Ct. Javelli sub su~~ositio
82 Javelli, Logicae Compendium Peripateticae, VenetiiS, 1541, 168
 )0.
analysis and the shaping accordingly a new
language arter the fashion or algebra. 8 3
It is, indeed, a commendable ambition to attempt to remove the
inadequacies o£ language, but it is a gross error to say, as
some writers do, that the ancient logicians were in ignorance
about this difficulty, and, therefore, made rather grievous
errors in inference.84

Before we attempt to respond to some o£ the statements o£

modern logicians, a brief survey of the use of the supposition
and the amplification of terms should be made. The diverse pro-
perties of the term that determine its accurate use John of St.
Thomas numbers as five: Proprietates partium propositionis,
guae solum conveniunt illis, prout intra propositionem ~~

guingue ~~ scilicet suppositio, ampliatio, restrictio, !1!-

enatio, appellatio.85 We will pay particular attention only to
the first three.

Supposition is defined by John of St. Thomas as acceptio

termini E£2_aliguo, de guo verificatur.86 Whenever a predicate
is applied to a subject, attention must be given to the .copula
before the substitution or the term for the thing is valid. For

83 Enriques, 155. cr. Willard Van Orman Quine, Mathematical

Logic, Havard University Press, Cambridge, 1947, 6-7.
84 Lewis and Langford, 62.
85 Joannes A s. Thoma, 28.
86 .............
Ibid., 29 •
 31.
example, I may say, "The dog is an animal," or "Dog is a three-
letter word," or "Fido is a dog." In all three cases 11
dog 11 has
the same meaning. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to say
that "Fido is a dog, therefore, he is a three-letter word." For
although "dog" has the same meaning, still its use in the vari-
ous sentences differs. Supposition of a term therefore, or its
substitutive value, as Maritain notes, "is lli function .!B ,lli-
course -- (while its meaning remains the same) -- ,2! taking ~

place of a thing. !2 ~ legitimate ~ substitution (of term

for thing) must answer ~ needs E.! ..:Eh! copula. tt87

It is the latter part of this definition that deserves con-

sideration. For, in it lies the explanation of many of the dif-
ficulties of modern writers. Here again Maritain is very help-
ful in giving us an understanding of the statement. To be legi-
timate this substitution must answer the needs of the copula;
that is, if the copula expresses present time, before verifying
the. "conformity of predicate to subject, we must ascertain
whether the subject itself exists in the manner required by the
copula.u88 For example, if I say, "My horse is red,u "my horse'

stands for something which actually exists, because I can indi-

cate by thought at the present something which I can say is my
horse. If, however, I say, "F.D. Roosevelt will be president,n

87 Maritain, 60. Ct. Joannes A S. Thoma, 29, 30.

88 Maritain, 61.
 32.
"F.D. Roosevelt 11 does not stand for anything because the copula
is "will be," and there is no future being (in relation to the
future time expressed by the copula) that can be indicated as
"F.D. Roosevelt.u Thus, when it is said that "suppositio is the
the property of a term by Which it stands for, or takes the place
of, a thing in discourse, this substitution being legitimate
considering the copula," it does not mean nthat this substitu-
tion is true in the nature of things, but only that the sort of
existence-- actual (past, present or future), possible, or 'im-
aginary' -- denoted by the copula permits this substitution."89
If this is fulfilled then the proposition may be true; but, if
the subject does not stand for anything the proposition is false
That is, it is false, as John of St. Thomas says, ~ subjecto
~ supponente. However, this rule does not apply to negative
propositions. By quoting Maritain's example this is made evi-
dent. "Richelieu is not a member of the Chamber of Deputies."
This is true even though the subject does not meet the needs of
the copula by the fact that Richelieu does not actually exist.90

One further point in regard to legitimate substitution

should be considered. Some propositions express eternal truths,
that is, a proposition in which the predicate is essential to a
subject. In such instances the subject always stands for some-

89 Ibid.
90 .Ibid., 61. Cf. Joannes As. Thoma, 29, 168.
 33.
thing, and is said to have a natural supposition, because it is
11
always connected with the predicate. In such a case the copula
denotes possible existence only, and is thus outside or time."9l
11
For example, if' I say, The three angles of' a triangle are equal
to 180 degrees," I am stating a proposition in which the predi-
cate is essential to the subject, and as such is always true
even though a triangle does not actually exist here and now.
When the predicate, however, is accidental to the subject, e.g.
11
My dog is white," it is necessary to know if' the subject has a
substitutive value berore it can be said to be true, because the
copula expresses actual existence, or "existence in time.n92

Perhaps more clarity will be added to our understanding of'

supposition if' a distinction is made between supposition and
signification. The signification of' a term refers to the object
from which the name comes, that is, "to the t orm or nature which
it represents to the mind. 11 93 The supposition of' a term, on the
contrary, refers to that to which the name is given. The term,
then, considered according to its supposition, stands in place
of the thing, and is that to which the intellect "applies cer-
tain predicates." The signification or a term "relates to the
natures that are the proper object of the first operation of

91 Ibid., 61. Gf. Joannes AS. Thoma, 32.

92 Maritain, 61.
93~ •• 62.
the mind, whereas •suppositio' relates to the subjects in which
these natures are realized and which the second operation of the
mind signifies as existing with such and such predicates."94

An important point to be remembered is that the supposition

in a syllogism must remain consistent. If the supposition in
the major is taken in relation to ideal existence the supposi-
tion in the conclusion cannot be in relation to real existence.
An example of this is Descartes' proof for the existence of God.
A perfect being is one that exists necessarily.
But God is a perfect being.
Therefore, God necessarily exists.
In the major premise the perfect being has only ideal existence,
but in the conclusion real existence is indicated.95

The substitutive value of a term in a proposition can be of

various kinds. A study of these does not seem to be necess~

in this paper. Whatever the substitutive value may be, the im-
portant thing is that it conform with the principles we have al-
ready discussed, namely, (1) the supposition of a term must meet
the exigencies of the copula, (2) the supposition and the signi-
fication of a term, and, (3) the supposition must re~ain con-
sistent in a valid inference.

Thus far we have considered only the substitutive value of

94 Ibid., 62. Cf. Joannes As. Thoma, 29.

95 iirrtain, 63.
~-------------------------------------~
35.
the term as it stands in the proposition. Besides that property
others, which John of St. Thomas refers to as "amplification"
and "restriction" of a term, must be understood. These are the
properties of a term in a proposition by which the mind may
vary the supposition, e~g. from past existence to present, or
from actual to ideal existence, or ideal to actual existence.
Amplification is defined as extensio tenmini ~ minor! ~ maiorem
suppositionem.96 For example, the term "dog" is broader in this
proposition: "Every dog (as a possible being) is a quadruped,"
than it is in the proposition: "Every dog (actually existing) is
a quadruped." The first proposition includes all dogs, actual
and possible. The second, only actually existing dogs. The
operation whereby the mind enlarges the substitutive value of
the term from the second proposition to the first, is called~­

plification. Let us consider the use of the amplification in a

syllogism. For example, the syllogism:
No animal is incorruptible.
But every animal is a living being.
Therefore some living being is not incor-
ruptible.
In each of these propositions the mind amplifies the existence
to possible existence, and, therefore, by keeping the supposi-
tion consistent the mind arrives at a valid conclusion.

Restriction, on the contrary, is defined in just the oppo-

96 Joannes A s. Thoma, 37.

 3 •
site manner: Coarctatio ~ maiori ~ minorem suppositionem.97 The
term "man11 is broader in the propos! tion, "Every man (as a pos-
sible essence) is mortal," than in "Every man (as actually ex-
isting) is mortal." When the mind understands the term ''man" in
the proposition 11
Every man is mortal 11 as actually existing, it
limits the term to a lesser supposition, and the operation is
called restriction. The same operation is had in the case of a
syllogism. For example, the syllogism,
Every visionary is a dangerous man.
But every Utopian is a visionary.
Thererore, some dangerous man is a Utopian,
would be invalid if we supposed ideal existence in the premises
and actual existence in the conclusion. But the mind by means
of the use of the restriction of terms, limits the understanding
of existence to actual existence in the premises, and thus may
validly conclude, "Some dangerous man is a Utopian."

With this brief understanding of several of the diverse

properties of a ter.m in a proposition or syllogism, we may now
turn to the various difficulties presented by the modern logi-
cians. It might be well to call attention once more to a point
made earlier, namely, that no matter how flexible a system of
language-signs is going to be, it will never be perfectly capa-
ble of representing or conveying the thoughts of man. The truth

97~.
 37.
of this seems evident when we remember that language or words
are merely a material instrument used to express the thought of
a spiritual faculty -- the intellect --, which rises above
material elements in its operations. Furthermore, the fact that
a single word can have the same meaning and yet have different
substitutive values in speech will always demand the operation
11
of distinguishing" in human discourse. As long as the hUman
intellect is able to function, never will a system of signs be
so perfect as to eliminate thought, and always will there remain
a margin of thought in any discourse which will demand more than
pure passivity on the part of the receiving mind.

Traditional logicians were conscious of the immaterial as-

pect of the mind and realized that material signs could never
fully express immaterial thought. Logic, then, for them was a
tool that served the intelligence and could never replace it.
Traditional logicians accepted logic as a help to the mind,and
were interested in perfecting this too1.98 Modern logicians
accept logic as a substitute for thought, and are interested in
perfecting this logic to eliminate much of thought itself. This,
it seems, is one of the fundamental differences between tradi-
tional and modern logic. The object of modern logic as expres-
sed here is also expressed, although unconsciously perhaps, by

-
98 Ibid., 232.
 38.
Professor Reichenbach. He writes: "Symbolic logic is the analy-
sis of language."99 If we accept this statement at its face
value it seems to follow that symbolic logic is nothing more
than an analysis of a set of words. In symbolic logic the lo-
gician is interested, as Reichenbach puts it, in the "mechanical
11
manipulations with symbols." These symbols, as he adds, are
distinguished only by geometrical shape," and "take the place of
thought operations based on realizing the meaning of the sym-
bols.ulOO

The efforts of the modern logicians to analyze the means of

expression with exactness and precision is to be highly commend-
ed, because the accurate presentation of concepts is of supreme
importance. But, although they are extremely careful in the
analysis of the means of conceptual expressions, still in their
analysis and presentation of traditional logic they seem to be
lacking in this very exactitude of which they are so proud. For
the traditional logicians, it seems, were not only aware of the
difficulties which are troubling the modern logicians, but had
a keener insight into the problems, and presented a much more
subtle solution by understanding the use of suppositio and
ampliatio.lOl

99 Reichenbach, 2.
100 Ibid., 165.
101 iir!tain, 226.
 39.
Since the objects of modern and traditional logic are so
different, the two should, it seems, remain entirely diverse dis-
ciplines. Modern logicians, however, view the situation under
a different light, and as a result, maintain that they are
making additions in traditional logic,l02 and even, in fact,
finding certain principles of traditional logic erroneous.l03
The syllogism in general, subslternation, partial conversion, and
the square of opposition receive the brunt of their criticisms.
A rather lengthy and summary quotation from Lewis and Langford,
I believe, will bring the heart of the objection more clearly to
light. They write:
Traditional logic is primarily a logic of
terms. The laws of identity, contradiction,
and the excluded middle, the dictum de omn1
~ nullo, and the rules of the syllogisiiia'Il
tell us what must be or what cannot be true
of the relations of terms. But terms have
both intension and extension; they connote
concepts or essential attributes, and they
denote things or classes. The laws of inten-
sion and those of extension are analogous,
••• the relation of a given set of terms in
intension may not be parallel to their rela-
tions in extension. For example, "No tres-
passers are arrested" might be true in ex-
tension, meaning that the class of actually
arrested trespassers has no members; but
false in intension, meaning that the concepts
'trespassing' and 'being arrested' are mutual-
ly incompatible ••••
And a logic which is adequate to all pro-
positions must, therefore, cover both inten-
sion and extension. The traditional logic

102 Lewis and Langford, 103. Cf. Reichenbach, 89-97•

103 Lewis and Langford, 49.
 4o.
is unsatis£actory on thia.point. The ma-
jority o£ its rules are valid both o£ inten-
sion and o£ extension. But some o£ them are
ambiguous and are such that, Whichever inter-
pretation is chosen, they are partly incor-
r.ect. For example, the rules o£ the syllogism
sanction EAO in the third £igure. But the
argument,
No absentees are £ailed;
All absentees receive a grade o£ zero;
There£ore, some who receive a grade o£
zero do not £ail;
is fallacious •
••• The Boola-Schroeder Algebra unambiguously
applies to the relations o£ terms in extension.
When so applied it is not a complete logic o£
terms (though it is at least as adequate as
traditional principles), but it is precise
and completely accurate •••• Hence the Boola-
Schroeder Algebra a£fords not only an exact
logic but one having as wide a sphere o£ ap-
plication ~s is possible without greater com-
plexity.lOq.
What is it that causes the modern logicians to critize so se-
verly certain parts o£ traditional logic? Are certain principles
and rules o£ traditional logic actually invalid? An examination
o£ the application o£ the Boola-Schroeder Algebra to various
moods o£ the syllogism will reveal perhaps the main source o£
the di££iculties, and make an explanation possible.

104 Lewis and Langford, 49-50.

 CHAPTER III
AN APPLICATION OF THE BOOLE-SCHROEDER ALGEBRA
TO THE SYLLOGISM AND THE RESULTING DIFFICULTIES

To begin with, an understanding or a few symbols will be

needed. In the application or the algebra the symbols, ~' ~' £,
!!2• represent classes of things denoted by a term.
.! x £, or ,!B. signifies the actual common
members of the classes a and b.
-,! negative of~, will represent-
the class of things not
members of a.
-a -
-b the class or things which are
members ot a or members ot b
or members ot both. -
1, negative ot 0 will be the class in which
everything is a member.
0 null-class.
,!(.2, b includes all the members
ot a.
.!·~ class a has the same extension
as b.lU5 ·
With this knowledge ot the symbols it is now possible to proceed
with the application ot the algebra. Consider, first ot all,
the tour standard propositions ot logic, nwmely, A, E, I, o.
Writing these according to their symbolic form we have,
A. All a is b:
E. No a is b:
.! ( a -b
- ab • o•
= o.
.! (
I. Some-a is-b: ab ~ o•
O. Some .! is not _2: .! -::.2 1 o.

105 Lewis and Langford, 51.

106 Ibid.
 42.
It is interesting to note here the various equivalent rormsl07
for writing each of the propositions, and that each proposition
can be symbolized by an equation or an inequation, e.g. ~ - ~ =
o. The universal propositions are symbolized by equations and
the particular propositions by inequations. Thus by looking at
the equations above it will be seen that universal propositions
in extension assert a non-existence, and the particular affirm
an existence. This point has particular significance and will
be considered later. Lewis and Langford, however, explain its
meaning more fully.
The last expression given in each case is
an equation or an equation with one member
o, making them easily comparable •••• The
two universals each affirm something is =
0; the two particulars, that something is
1 o. That is, a universaL proposition in

107 It is well, perhaps, to note her~ that the manner of writing

the various propositions is unique to modern logic, and
characterizes the relations or terms in extension rather
than comprehension. Maritain notes this; "The ancients were
neither exclusively 1 extensivists 1 nor exclusively 1 compre
hensivists. 1 On the one hand, they emphasized the essential
role played by the relations of 'extension,• in order to as-
sureand guarantee the identirication of the two extremes
with the middle term, and in the theory of the syllogism
they followed Aristotle in rerlecting primarily upon the ex-
tension or terms. On the other hand, they said: Praedicatum
inest subjecto, understanding thereby that the judgment has
ror its primary logical runction the arrirmation or the in-
herence of aPr. in the comprehension or as.; accordingly
they ca~led propositions de inesse inasmuch as they attri-
bute a Pr. to a s. To indicate attribution, Aristotle says,
not 'A is B,• but rather •to A belongsB• ••• indicating that
ror him, as ror his scholastic disciples, the judgment and
the proposition are to be understood rirst and roremost from
the point of view or comprehension." p. 175.
 extension asserts a non-existenoe: nAll a is
b, 11 that a's whioh are not b's do not exist;
"'No .!: is ~~ 11 that .! • s whioh-are .2.' s do not
exist. And a partioular proposition in ex-
tension asserts an existenoe: "Some .! is ,2, 11
that a's whioh are b 1 s exist; and "Some a i~
not!!," that .!'s whioh are not !!'s exist:lo

Now, by making an applioation of the algebra to a syllogism,

let us see to what oonolusion this symbolization is to lead when
the premises and conolusion are all universal propositions. For
example the syllogism: All men are animals, but, all animals
are mortal, therefore, all men are mortal. Writing this syllo-
gism in symbols we have;
all .! is _e, or .! -b • o.
all b is _£, or _e -.,£ = o.
Therefore, all .! is ..£, or .! -.,£ • 0.
Sinoe this is an applioation of the algebra, the rules of the
algebra are binding. Therefore, to arrive at the oonolusion we
add the two premises and obtain
.! -,e t ,e -£ • o.
The middle term of the syllogism is _e, and to get the oonclusion
the middle term is suppressed aooording to theorem 5.51109 of
the algebra (if!!+§ -z • 0, then AB - 0; p. 43). The

108 Lewis and Langford, 52.

109 In this paper we will aooept the theorems as proved, and
merely state them with a referenoe to Lewis and Langford for
the proof. This referenoe will be plaoed in parentheses im-
mediately after the theorem.
 44.
conclusion of the syllogism then appears.
~ - £ = 0, or all ~ is £, or all men are morta1.110

Such a procedure, it is true, is an application of the al-

gebra to the syllogism, and arrives at the same conclusion as
the traditional logician will by syllogistic inference. Al-
though the conclusion arrived at is the same, still the proce-
dure widely differs. In the algebra the conclusion is obtained
by the mechanical elimination of the middle term, and as such
cannot be considered inference, even though it is a description
of it from an "operational view point." Professor Eslick clari-
fies this when he writes:
But syllogistic inference depends upon the
communication of a universal to its subjec-
tive parts or instances. The middle term,
as a universal, and not as a class, is vital
to inference, and there is no real inference
without it. This is why the dictum ,!!.! ,2!!B!
.!,i nullo is so important and why the position
of the middle term in the premises of a syllo-
gism has more than a material, accidental signi-
ficance.ll~

Hence, when the symbolic logicians arrive at a conclusion no

real inference is made, since they ignore the importance of the
universality of the middle term. Maritain explains this uni-
versality.
The essential force and merit of the syllo-
gism lies, not in the passage from the universal

110 Ibid.,55.
111 ESlick, 235.
r

to the particular but !E the identification

or·the two extremes with a same third term.
::.'This third term iiiliS't necessarily be uni-
versal if an inference is to be drawn by
means of such an identification.Il2
He adds further on:
If we were not sure of the legitimacy of the
identification of the two extremes in virtue
of their mutual identification with the middle
term, that is, if the logical functions of the
Pr. and s. in the propositions did not guarantee
that the middle term, in being identified with
T [major term,] is no smaller than it is when
it is identified-witn ! 1 [minor term] the syllo-
gism would not be absolutely foolproof, and
might sometimes lead us into error.ll3
Yet according to the Boolean rules for syllogisms the middle
term is not a universal, but only a class possessing only a
"material, accidental significance," and is eliminated by mechan
ical manipulations.ll4

Turning back again to the application of the algebra, we

find that, despite the mechanical nature of symbolic logic, many
times its conclusions are the same as those of syllogistic in-
terence.

Let us consider now an application of the algeb~a to a syl-

logism in which one premise is particular. If both of the pre-
mises are universal, Lewis and Langford tell us that "the

112 Maritain, 206-207.

11,3 Ibid., 208.
114 Eslick, 235.
 46.
conclusion is always reached ••• by the algebraic elimination o~

the middle term."ll5 However, when one premise is particular

the process varies. For example, the syllogism: All horses are
quadrupeds. Some horses are red. Therefore, some quadrupeds
are red. In symbolic form this will read;
all .! is _2, or .! -_a • o.
some .! is _2, or ac I o.
.-
Therefore, some _a is £, or 1!£ I o.
It is evident that the middle term cannot be eliminated by ad-
dition, since the middle term is positive in both premises.
Where an equation and an inequation occur the conclusion is de-
rived by expanding the premises until each contains all the terma
This may be done in virtue of the La~ of Expansion of the alge-
bra, theorem 4.6 (~ • ,!(b + -J!) • ~ -,! -b; p. 37). Thus,

the first premise becomes

.! -.!2.£ -+ .! -.Q -£ • 0,
and the second will be
~ + .! -.2.2. • o.
Again there is present an equation and an inequation, but now
the two premises have one term in common .! -~, and by another
theorem, 4.71, (,! + .Q • 0 is equivalent to the pair,.! • 0 and
£• 0; p. 39), it follows that
.! -k2 =0 and .! -.2 -.,£ • 0,

115 Lewis and Langford, 56.

which makes the ~irst premise become null. Then by theorem 6.32
(i~ A+~= 0 and A • 0, then~ 10, p. 47), the second premise
becomes
~ , o,
but by theorem 6.41 (i£ !£ 1 O, then A# O, p. 47), i£ ~ 10
it £ollows that
~ • o,
which reads some ~ is £, or, some quadrupeds are red. And this
is the conclusion o~ the syllogism. We see that by an algebraic
process we have again suppressed the middle term, and arrived at
the proper conclusion.ll6

Let us now consider several applications o£ the algebra to

syllogisms that are known to .be ~allacious. The algebra in such
cases, the writers say, will do one o~ two things; i~ a true
conclusion is possible ~om the premises it will give the cor-
rect conclusion, if no conclusion is possible the algebra will
present an equation that is incompatible, or an equation and an
inequation which have no term in common, For example, let us
take a syllogism in which the middle term is not taken univer-
sally at least once. All plants are living things, but, all
animals are living things, there~ore, all animals are plants.
Written symbolically:

116 ~., 56-67.

r 48.
- -
all a is b, or a -b • 0
- -
all .£ is ]2, or .2 -]2 • 0
therefore, all .£ is _!, or .2 -,! • o.

AccorditE to the general rule, whenever the two premises

are universal, the conclusion should follow by adding the pre-
mises and thus eliminating the middle term, but this will not
work here because the middle term is not positive in one and ne-
gative in the other premise. By adding the premises we have
.! -.2 + £ -.2 • 0,
which is an incompatible equation.ll7 This cannot be solved by
expanding the premises either, since both will reduce to zero.

Again, let us take an illegimate argument in which the fir

premise is universal and the second particular. No conclusion
follows. For example: All dogs are animals, but, some animals
are rational, therefore, some dogs are rational. In symbols we
have
all .! is b, or .! -b • 0
some ]2 is _2, or be # 0
therefore: some .! is ,2, or ..!£ # o.
According to the general rule of the algebra, when one premise
is universal and the other particular, the conclusion is attain-
ed by expanding the premises. Thus,

117 ~., 59.

 .! -b =0 becomes .! -.!?.£ t .! -]2 -,£ = 0, and

-be I 0 becomes abc t -abc

- - # o.
Here we find, however, there is no common term, and a conclusion
is not forthcoming.ll8

Thus far in the application of the algebra to the syllogism

we have found the algebra consistent with the syllogistic infer-
ences of traditional logic, at least, as far as the conclusions
of the syllogisms are concerned. In fact, the conclusions of
the algebra will be in conformity with the syllogisms of tradi-
tional logic in all the moods of the syllogism in which both pr
mises are universal and the conclusion is universal, or, when
one premise is universal and one is particular and the conclu-
sion is particular. The algebra, therefore, can be successfully
applied to all the traditional moods of the syllogism except the
moods EAO and AAI of the third figure. The algebra is accurate
in all the other moods, and besides, will frequently not func-
tion when the syllogisms are invalid.

Why does the algebra not arrive at the same conclusion as

traditional logic in these particular instances? Are th~se

moods of traditional logic invalid? Let us investigate by an ex

ample. The syllogism EAO, No animal is rational, but, all ani-
mals are mortal, therefore, some mortals are not rational, is,
r,--------------~~
50.
according to modern logicians, invalid. In symbolic form it
reads,
No a is h 1 or ab =0
all a is _£ 1 or !; -_£ •O

therefore: some .£ is not ~~ or .£ -b ~ o.

In this syllogism we have two universal premises, so ac-

cording to the general rule a conclusion should be had by adding
the premises thus,

.!.2 + !; -.£ =0
but, since,the middle term is not positive in one premise and
negative in the other, no conclusion can be drawn. The modern
logicians attempt to explain this by calling attention to the
form of the syllogism. The two premises of the syllogism affirm
that something is equal to 0, and the conclusion that something
is not equal to 0 1 or in other words, the premises assert a
non-existence, and the conclusion an existence. Thus the syllo-
gism is invalid because it implies an existence which is said
not to be implied in the premises. Lewis and Langford write in
this regard that "universals affirm that something is = o, and
particulars that something is I o. -
That is, a universal pro-
position in extension asserts a non-existence •••• and a parti-
cular proposition in extension asserts an existence.n119 As a
result, modern writers of logic immediately conclude that

119 llli·, 52.

r--------------------~
51.
certain modes of inference are invalid. Padoa, in his introduc-
tion to Peano 1 s system, remarks that this discovery of the in-
validity of certain traditional modes of inference "is one of
the first and most remarkable results of the adoption of a lo-
gical ideography.nl20

Since, according to the modern logicians, a universal pro-

position never implies existence and a particular always implies
existence, any inference from a universal proposition to a parti·
cular is going to be invalid. To strengthen this conclusion an-
other argument is presented which centers around the notion of
the null-class, Lewis and Langford write:
A particular conclusion cannot validly be drawn
from a universal premise, •••• The simplest
case in point is the traditional inference of
-
"Some a is b 11 from "All a is b." This fails
- -
- whenever no a exists. If a is an '
as a fact,
empty class (a • O), then "All a is b.,. (a -b
= 0) is true,-but "Some a is b"-(ab "'1 0)-is-
false. If there are no centaUrs' then II All
centaurs are Greek" is true, but 11 Some centaurs
are Greek" is false. In fact, if a is an em-
pty class, every universal proposition with a
as subject is true, but every particular pro~
position with~ as sub~eot is false. If there
are no centaurs, then All centaurs are z" will
be true, no matter what ~ is: all the centaurs
there ..!!:!• will be anything you please. Al~o,
UNo centaur is z" will·be true, whatever y may
be. But "Some centaur is z" and "Some centaur
is not !!." will be false, for every .!. and !!.•121

120 As quoted by Henry Bradford Smith, Symbolic Logic, F.S.

Crafts and Co., New York, 1927, 55.
121 Lewis and Langford, 62.
r
52.
If we ask, why must this be true? They respond, "Because
the principles of the algebra require this. nl 22 This, of course,
is no answer at all, since the traditional logician would merely
say that the algebra must be wrong because the principles of
traditional logic require it to be otherwise.

Sometimes,however, the argument is stated in a different

manner and rests, then, upon a principle of being. The argument
when stated in such a fashion becomes a challenge to the tradi-
tional logicians. The case of the centaurs, which is considered
and empty class or null-class, can be used as an example. The
propositions "All centaurs are Greeks," and "Some centaurs are
not Greeks" are said to be contradictory propositions, and there-
fore cannot be both true nor both false at the same time.
Modern logicians say the particular proposition, "Some centaurs
are not Greeks," could only be true if some centaur existed, but
since centaurs do not exist, it must be false. If, then, the
11
proposition, Some centaurs are not Greeks," is false, certain
modern logicians say the contradictory must be true, namely,
"All centaurs are Greeks," despite the fact that centaurs do not
exist. The particular proposition could be true, it seems, only
if there existed centaurs; and so, since the particular cannot
be true, the universal contradictory must be true even though
centaurs do not exist. Hence, they conclude from this, that the

-
122 Ibid., 62.
r
53.
universal propositions do not imply existence, and particular
propositions always imply it. About this last point a question
at present will perhaps give the general trend of the solution
which will follow. Does a particular proposition imply existenc
because it is a particular proposition, or, is it because it ex-
presses a contingent truth?

Before we take up that point, let us turn back to the pri-

mary problem, which centers around the principle of contradic-
tion. It is not hard, it seems, to see the fallacy of this rea-
soning. First of all, the principle of contradiction is a prin-
ciple of being, and the principle, therefore, is going to hold
only when applied to some form of existing being. Yet, all form
can
of being is denied when it is said that centaursAhave no ex-
istence, for, as St. Thomas remarks, Ratio a~ entis !£ ~
essendi sum1tur.l 23 Nothing more can be said about centaurs
since no proposition, much less a contradictory one, can be
mentioned, unless some type of existence is implied. This is
even more evident from what Maritain points out, "all proposi-
tions affirm or deny the actual or possible, ~ or ideal ~­

istence of a certain subject determined by a certain predicat~

Therefore, there can be no universal proposition about a subject

~ Quaestiones Duo-
123 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae
decim uodlibetales, ~ Verit., I, 1, ad 3 in contr., Marl-
ett!, Taurini, 19 1, III.
124 Maritain, 53.
r 54.
that has no existence at all. The universal contradictory pro-
position of "Some centaurs are not Greeks 11 could be had only i.f
some type of ~ were present, since contradictory propositions

- --
require esse and non-esse. But i.f centaurs have no existence,
there would be no~ o.f any kind in either the universal affir-
mative or particular negative proposition. Furthermore, neither
truth or falsity can be had once existence has been denied,
since truth .follows existence.l25 Thus, once centaurs are de-
nied all form o.f existence there can be no question of contra-
dictory propositions, or of truth and .falsity.

The point o.f the argument will perhaps be somewhat clarified

if we discuss the nature o.f existence. Whenever the verb !2 ~

is used, it signifies some type o.f existence, either ideal or

real. The whole purpose o.f the copula in a proposition is to ex-
press the relation of identification between the subject and
predicate -- two objects of thought, distinct as concepts but
identified in the thing, whether this thing has actual, or pos-
sible, or ideal existence. Thus, whenever the verb !2 ~ occurs,
it expresses the identification o.f two things which actually
exist in the real physical order, or o.f two things that can ex-
ist in the real order, or of two things that can exist only in
11
the mental order. For example, the proposition, My horse is
red,n signifies the actual existence o.f nmy horse," but the

125 Aquinas,~ Verit., I, 1, c.

 55.
proposition, nA right triangle is a triangle with one angle
equal to 90 degrees" signifies that the uright triangle 11 an ob-
ject of thought exists with possible existence outside the mind
with the form none angle equal to 90 degrees." The copula in
both of these cases signifies the real existence of the objects,
in one case it is actual, and in the other, possible. In a pro-
position in which the object is expressed as not having real ex-
istence the same copula is used. Thus the proposition, "A
chimera is unable to exist in reality," expresses an ideal ex-
istence, or an existence that can be had only in my mind.126

Hence, the verb to ~ in a proposition always expresses

some form of existence. This existence may be actual or possible
real or ideal. Thus, for the clarification of the above diffi-
culty presented by the modern logicians, two points should be
stressed, (1) when we speak about existence, actual existence is
not necessarily implied, and (2) if all existence is denied an
object, it is no longer possible to speak about contradictory
propositions, since the principle of contradiction is a princi-
ple of being and requires ~ and~-~· In the difficulty,
then, a proper understanding of existence, whether it be real

--
or ideal, and a proper understanding of esse and non-esse for
-
contradictory propositions must be had. The whole purpose of
the argument is to prove that universal propositions do not

126 Maritain, 52.

r
.56.
imply existence, and particular propositions always imply ex-
istence. It is quite evident, therefore, that Whatever the pro-
position is it must imply some form of existence. Whether it
implies ideal or real existence is not going to be determined by
the form of the proposition, that is, whether it is universal
or particular, but by the matter, that is, whether it expresses
a necessary truth or a contingent truth. When a modern logician
begins to speak about existence being implied in propositions
his science is no longer strictly formal in the sense in which
he understands it to be formal.

Modern logicians, because they believe they have proved

certain traditional moods of the syllogism to be invalid by theu
ideographic signs, immediately conclude that other traditional
inferences are also invalid. Lewis and Langford enlarge upon
this point.
These facts point to the invalidity of cer-
tain other traditionally sanctioned modes
of immediate inference also; for example,
the inference nsome b is a" from "All a is
bn; and the inferences "Some a is not b 11 and
-n-some b is not au from uNo a Ts b. 11 All of
these are invalid, committing the same fal-
lacy of interring an existence from a non-
existence. ••• The same fallacy affects the
traditional doctrine of the 'square of op-
position,' according to which A and!' contra-
ries, are supposed to be such that both may
be false but both cannot be true; 1 and Q,
subcontraries, such that both may be true
but both cannot be false; A and .Q, E and I,
contradictories, such that both cannot be
true and both cannot be false. I is supposed
r
to follow from A and 0 from E. None of these
relations really hold-except-that of contra-
diction between! and Q, ~and l• Whenz = 0,
! and E are both true, l and Q both false; the
supposed relations of contraries, subcontraries,
and subalterns all break down. ••• Since a gen-
eral principle of inference which sometimes
fails is never really valid, this entire tradi-
tional doctrine -- except for contradictories--
must be abandoned.l27

Summing up the statements of the modern logicians these

seem to be their chief claims. (1) Universal propositions im-
ply no affirmation of existence, and, (2) particular propositions
always imply existence. In consequence of these claims all in-
ferences in traditional logic from a universal proposition to a
particular are held to be invalid. Thus, the moods of the syl-
logism AAI and EAO, subalternation, and partial conversion are
considered invalid.

What appears to modern logicians as invalid reasoning on

the par~ of the traditional logicians, appears so, only, it
seems, because the modern logicians are not fully acquainted witt
traditional logic, and the work of the scholastics. The funda-
mental problem, namely, that there is a certain margin of thought
that frequently cannot be expressed by the oral sign in dis-
course, is not recognized by many modern writers. This point
was recognized by the early logicians, and by means of the

127 Lewis and Langford, 63-64.

 58.
supposition, amplification and other properties of a term, they
made allowance in order to solve the difficulty which some mo-
dern logicians still maintain is left unsolved in traditional
logic.l28 The fact that modern logic has difficulty with this
point, where traditional logic has none, shows the limitations
of an ideographic logic.l 29 Inferences that can be rightly held
by traditional logicians, who hold that logic is an aid to
thought,l30 are condemned as invalid by modern logicians,l31 be-
cause their strict mechanical process, which is suppose to re-
place thought, has no way of coping with the intricacies of a
spiritual mind.l32 How, precisely, does the traditional lo-
gician explain the difficulties of the modern logicians?

128 Reichenbach, 202-208. Cf. Lewis and Langford, 49-73.

129 Maritain, 226.
130 ~., 1.
131 Reichenbach, 202-208. Cf. Lewis and Langford, 49-73.
132 Maritain 232-233.
r

CHAPTER IV
SUPPOSITION -- AN ANSWER
TO SOME OF ~~E MODERN LOGICIANS• DIFFICULTIES

Modern logic, it is frequently said, is a strictly formal

science,l33 and as such prescinds from the matter of proposi-
tions. This being true, it is impossible, it seems, for modern
logic to investigate the existential or non-existential import
of a proposition, which depends upon the matter of a proposition
11
The fundamental error of the logisticians," writes Maritain,
"lies in their failure to distinguish between the form and the
matter of propositions and in their belief that considerations
bearing exclusively on the form su£fice to explain the entire
discourse. 11 134

The primary assertions of modern logicians that lead to the

differences with traditional logic seem to be that universal
affirmative propositions imply no affirmation of existence, and
particular propositions imply an affirmation of actual existence
Is this true? On first appearance it seems to be true, since
traditional logicians write that "propositions in necessary
matter ••• do not require the actual existence of the subject in

13) Church, 181.

134 Maritain, 226-227.
r
6o.
order to be true.n135 However, this only needs explaining to
see its true meaning.

The subject in a proposition may have a natural or an ac-

cidental substitutive value. Natural supposition is had when
the predicate is essential to the subject, in which case the
proposition expresses an eternal truth, that is, the predicate
essentially belongs to the subject.l36 A proposition expressing
11
an eternal truth, therefore, does not require the actual exis-
tence o:r the subject to be true, and has not necessarily and o:r
itself an 'existential' sense.nl37 Now, if what the modern lo-
gicians say is true, namely, that universal propositions imply
no existence -- supposing here that existence means actual ex-
istence, -- then it follows that all eternal truths should be
expressed in universal propositions. That is the point being in
vestigated at present.

Although a proposition expressing an eternal truth "abstra-

cts :from time in its veri:fication,nl38 nevertheless, Maritain
11
adds, it is false that [this] is realized only in universal
affirmative propositions and is always realized therein."l39
This he'then proves by examples.

135 Ibid., 227.

136 Joannes A s. Thoma, 32.
137 Maritain, 227.
138 Joannes A s. Thoma, 32.
139 Maritain, 227.
 61.
Every man is mortal.
Some man is creable.
Some animal (viz., man) is rational.l40
All of these propositions express eternal truths, and do not
necessarily imply an existential sense, yet, two of them are not
universal propositions. Thus, there are particular propositions
also that do not imply existence, because particular proposi-
tiona as well as universal propositions may express eternal
truths. This is true because in propositions which express an
eternal truth the subject-term always stands for something, for
11
in this instance the copula denotes possible existence only,
and is thus outside of time."l41 Such a situation may be had
in particular propositions and in universal propositions.
Whether I say, "Every man is mortal 11 or "Some animal is ration-
al," "I can and always shall be able to show by thought a thing
or an essence in the order of possibles of which I may truth-
11 11
fully affirm,nl42 This is a man,n This is an animal." Hence,
whether a proposition is universal or particular, the existence
or non-existence that is implied depends on the matter.

Moreover, there are universal propositions that imply exis-

tence as well as particular propositions. For, just as there
are propositions in necessary matter, so there are propositions

J.40 Ibid., 227.

14J. Ibid., 61.
J.42 Ibid., 61.
r
62.
in contingent matter, that is, propositions in which the pre-
dicate is accidental to the subject. In such propositions the
subject has an accidental supposition. John o~ St. Thomas
writes:
Suppositio accidentalis est acceptio termini
pro his solum, de quibus verificatur iuxta
exigentiam verbi, seu alio modo: est acceptio
termini pro eo, cui praedicatum ppn intrinsece
sed accidentaliter convenit, ••• ~3
Such propositions, since they express contingent truths, require
the actual existence of the subject in order to be true, because
the predicate, since it does not follow.from the essence of the
subject, could be verified only of a subject which actually
exists.l44 This situation, however, is true not only for parti-
cular propositions but for universal propositions as well. For
example, the following propositions mentioned by Maritain ex-
press contingent truths and demand the actual existence of the
subject, yet they are not limited merely to particular propos!-
tions.
Some angel is damned.
Every man is born in sin.
All were taken prisoners.l45

It is evident, then, that there is a certain amount of trut

in the statements of the modern logicians, since some universal

ittGJoannes A s. Thoma, 32.

Maritain, 227.
145 ~., 227.
r
propositions do not imply an existential sense, and some parti-
cular propositions imply actual existence. But it is actually
an invalid inference to argue because "some" therefore 11
all. 11
For we have seen that all propositions in necessary matter,
whether universal or particular, do not imply actual existence,
and that all propositions in contingent matter, whether universa
or particular, do imply actual existence.

Furthermore, since logic is an art which facilitates the

operations of the mind, it is only a means to an end and not the
end in itself. Thus, when a proposition expresses an eternal
truth, there is no reason why the mind cannot apply an existen-
tial meaning to the proposition even though the proposition in
itself is concerned only with the possible existence of this
subject with a certain predicate.l46 This frequently happens in
the experimental sciences, that is, the universals obtained by
induction are given an existential implication. Maritain cites
several examples of this:
Every acid makes litmus paper turn red.
Every mammal is viviparous.
He continues:
Taken in themselves these propositions would,
no doubt, remain true even were there neither
acids or mammals, but actually we never think
of them without understanding that there are
acids and that there are mammals. 147

146 Ibid., 228.

147 Ibid.
r

Again, when a particular proposition has a predicate that

is accidental to the subject, such a proposition implies the
actual existence o.f the subject in so far as the supposition is
accidental, and does not express an eternal truth. But even in
such a case, the mind may vary the supposition, and give it
merely an ideal or possible existence.l48 The ancients were
11
accustomed to this, and called the operation the ampli:Cication"
of the term, or, if the term was suppressed from a major to a
lesser supposition it was called 11
restriction11 of' a term.
Secundo vero modo ampliatio et restrictio
etiam termino singular! convenit; potest
enim aliquod singulare verificari in plur-
ibus differentiae temporum• Et tunc dicitur
ampliari terminus quantum ad differentias
temporis, quando verificari potest in plur-
ibus temporibus seu differentiis temporum
disiunctim seu divisim •••• in ampliatione
tamen logica attenduntur quinque l!i.fferen-
tiae tempor~ scilicet praesens, praeteri4-
itum et futurum, possible et imaginabile. 9

The point to be noted is that among the "differentiae !!!!!!!

porum11 are enumerated actual existence, possible, and ideal ex-
istence. Existence, then, is not limited just to actual exis-
tence; but possible existence and ideal existence are all specia
types of existence, and yet are existence in every sense of the
word. "This dog is white" expresses actual existence, and the
statement, "A myriagon is a ten-thousand-sided polygon" also

l48 Ibid.
149 :fOannes A s. Thoma, 37.
r
65
expresses existence, but a possible existence, that is, it is
able to exist in the physical order. On the other hand the
statement "The centaur is a fabulous creature" expresses exis-
tence, but ideal existence, that is, an existence that is only
in the mind. It was not uncommon to vary the supposition from
ideal to actual, or actual to ideal existence. The whole pro-
cess did not require any special reference in the proposition
itself, but the logician who had made a study of the diverse
properties of the term was conscious of what took place, and was
careful to keep the kind of existence, whether ideal or real,
the same throughout his reasoning proeess. If he understood the
premises to imply actual existence, he was consistent and main-
tained an actual existence in the conclusion. For example, the
syllogism,
All men are mortal,
But Stalin is a man,
Therefore, Stalin is mortal.
The major premise asserts an eternal truth, and in itself does
not imply actual existence, but the traditional logician would
be careful to understand actual existence, and, therefore, keep
the supposition consistent throughout the reasoning. Again, the
syllogism that the modern logicians keep presenting to show the
ambiguities of traditional logic causes no trouble once the
supposition of terms is undarstood. The syllogism,
 66.
No absentees are failed,
But all absentees receive a grade of zero,
Therefore, some who receive a grade of zero do not fai
The syllogism arrives at a perfectly valid conclusion as long as
it is remembered that the existence implied in the two premises
is restricted to actual existence. This use of the supposition
is frequent in traditional logic, and was clearly understood by
traditional logicians before they began a study of syllogistic
inference. It is in the light of this that Javelli remarked,
~ autem adverte novitie, guod.praedictas defensiones servare
~ poteris, donee intellexeris tractatum suppositionum et ~­

pliationum ~ appellationum ~ probationum terminorum.l50

Thus, the assertionsof the modern logicians about the im-

plication or non-implication of existence in the universal and
particular propositions of traditional logic seem to be nothing
more than inaccuracies. First of all, there are universal pro-
positions which imply actual existence, although the predicate
is only accidental to the subject. And besides, there are uni-
versal affirmative propositions which in themselves do not 1m-
ply actual existence, but, by a use of the supposition or am-
plification or restriction of terms, may be understood to imply
real existence. Secondly, particular propositions, which modern

150 Javelli, 168.

r

67.
writers say imply actual existenee, 1 51 may express eternal
truths, and, in so far as they express eternal truths, they do
not imply actual existence because a proposition that has an
essential supposition or expresses an eternal truth 11 abstracts
from time in its verification."l5 2 Furthermore, a particular
proposition in which the subject has only an accidental supposi-
tion and implies real existence, may be understood as having
only an ideal or possible existence.

In consequence'of this, it is immediately evident that sub-

alternation, partial conversion, and the syllogistic moods AAI
and EAO are valid if consistency in the supposition is observed.
For example in subalternation,
if we say, in abstracting from actual existence
in the A proposition:
Every man has imperfections (whether or not
men exist)
we conclude rightly that:
Therefore some man (even for example a
saint) has imperfections,
for the subaltern~te also abstracts from ac-
tual existence.l!>.::S
Likewise, with partial conversion and certain syllogistic moods
of inference we conclude legitimately if we keep the supposition
of existence consistent.

The difficulties that modern logicians find with tradition

151 Lewis and Langford, 63.

152 Joannes A s. Thoma, 32.
153 Maritain, 229.
r
68.
logic stem in part, it seems, from the mathematical procedure of
modern logic. It was Descartes and Leibniz who dreamed of a
universal mathematics which would be an instrument for all know-
ledge, 1 54 and it was Russell who finally declared mathematics
and logic to be identified.l55 But it is impossible for logic
to have a mathemati-cal clarity, and to function with the rigid
mechanical procedure of mathematics. Logic is an art, a servant
to man's mind, and as such, it cannot be a system that is rigid
and mechanical. Maritain briefly summarizes the consequences of
a system that fails to take into consideration the immaterial
nature of the mind. A system that adopts too summary an ideo-
graphic logic, he writes,
reveals the fundamental falsity of every al-
leged Logic that aims at fixing the work of
the intelligence once and for all in ideo-
graphic symbols and requires, not that these
symbols signity the diverse inflections and
the nice edge of thought more exactly than
ordinary language -- a perfectly legitimate
ambition -- but that they substitute a certain
regulated manipulation of algebraic signs for
the work of thought itself. An ideographic
logic, thus conceived, could never be adequate
to its object unless it were to replace the
difficulties of rational labour by an infinite
material complication. In truth it could not
fix thought except as in the way that most
stains used in Uistology £1! living matter --
by killing it.l.50

154 Kocourek, 98.

155 Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, 194 - 195.
156 Maritain, 233.
r

CHAPTER V
THE USE OF THE SUPPOSITION OF TERMS
IN MODERN LOGIC

The discussion thus far has centered around an understand-

ing of the supposition of terms in traditional logic as are-
futation of certain arguments of modern logicians. It is evi-
dent that the use of supposition has a very significant place
in traditional .logic, so much so, that a neglect of it leads to
many absurdities. Since it is of such importance in traditional
logic, it will not be amiss to investigate its nature and use
in modern logic. Perhaps the question might be asked at the
outset: does modern logic have a place for the use of the sup-
position of terms? In other words, do the symbols in modern
logic have some substitutive value? One would search in vain in
modern symbolic logic books for an explicit treatment of this
subject. Our treatment and conclusions, therefore, will be de-
rived from the nature of modern logic and various statements of
modern logicians and mathematicians.

It bec~e evident in our treatment that modern logic has

its roots.in mathematics, or, as Father Wellmuth puts it, "it is
itself a generalization of mathematics or (perhaps more accur-
ately) an extension of pure mathematics: inasmuch as the system
r
70.
form of pure logic is supposedly interpretable in terms of lo-
gical elements and logical relations from which the elements and
relations of pure mathematics are derived.ul57 In consequence
of this nature of modern logic, the method of development employ.
ed follows the technique of pure mathematics. Pure mathematics,
we are led to understand in the early chapters of Lewis and
Langford, is a science which has for its starting point certain
assumptions or undefined terms and unproved propositions, which
are chosen more or less arbitrarily. These undefined terms and
unproved propositions are nothing more than class characteris-
tics, which are to be fulfilled by certain objects. The objects
which fulfill these conditions are then said to be contained in
a certain class and are symbolized by various characters.l58
Hence, since modern logic follows the technique of pure mathe-
matics, it, too, has a similar beginning and development. Logic
"is developed in the same deductive fashion," write Lewis and
Langford, "from a small number of undefined ideas and a few
postulates in terms of these.nl59 It follows, then, that a
system-form of symbols is also necessary in logic.

But what are these objects, or classes in some instances,

for which the symbols stand? Father Wellmuth in explaining

157 Wellmuth, 477-478.

158 Lewis and Langford, 1-77.
159 .!ill·' 23.
 71.
Bertrand Russell's understanding of a class gives us some ink-
ling of what they are. He writes, "Each object in the totality
must itself be a possible object of thought, a thinkable 'some-
thing-or-other'; it need not be a concrete existing individual,
but may be a mere abstraction.nl60 Hence, the objects contain-
11
ed in the various classes must be possible objects of thought"
which conform with the postulates and assumptions upon which the
class is founded. Do these objects have any reality about them?
That is, i's there anything that corresponds to them in the real
.order? This question is of little importance to mathematicians.
In fact, certain mathematicians critize philosophers for some-
times demanding that all mathematics be made applied mathema-
tics. Yet, mathematicians will not say that these objects which
are represented by the symbols correspond to nothing in the real
world, because they cherish a hidden hope that sometime an ap-
plication will be found.l61 However, it seems that until this
application is found these objects remain purely beings of the
mind. Nevertheless, it is important to note here that there are
present "objects" for which the symbols are substituted, even
though the objects are beings of the mind.

The purely abstract or ideal nature of these objects is

160 Wellmuth, 220.

161 John Wesley Young, Fundamental Concepts of Algebra and
Geometry, Macmillan and Co., New York, 1927, 223.
 72.
brought out when we consider the meaning of the symbols that are
used in the logic. The symbols in mathematical or modern logic
are constituted to signify the objects of thought, the thinkable
"something-or-other." Some of them signify objects without any
particular reference to any definite characteristic of those
objects. Others, on the contrary, specifically signify definite
characteristics of objects. Thus the symbols constitute a lan-
guage of thought and are a medium of communication. As such, of
course, these symbols are subject to the user's intention. But
when the question is asked what does the symbol mean, Father
Wellmuth remarks:
It will be noticed that the complex question
'what does a symbol mean?• reveals on analysis,
not the slightest trace of such a question as,
'what is the something-or-other, or what is the
definite characteristic, to which a symbol re-
fers?• ••• the symbol tells us absolutely no-
thing about 'the something-or-other as thought
of' to Which it refers, except that it is
being thought of, or at least suggested to ui
to be thought of, by the user of the symbol. 62
He then adds:
Neither does the meaning of a symbol raise any
question about whether the object to which it
refers exists or not. The most a symbol can
do in this direction is to indicate that some-
thing-or-other is being thought of as existing,
it is necessary that what it refers to should
be a thinkable something-or-other, more or
less distinguishable in thought from other
•thinkable somethings•. Further questions as
to what that something-or-other is and

162 Wellmuth, 249.

 73.
whether it exists or not, have no bearipg on
the signi£icance o£ the symbol itsel£. 0 3
George Boole re£lects a similar opinion when he writes, "Those
who are acquainted with the present state o£ the theory o£ sym-
bolic algebra are aware that the validity o£ the processes o£
analysis does not depend upon the interpretation o£ the symbols
which are employed but solely upon the laws o£ their combina-
tion.nl64

From the above quotations it is evident that the symbol may

stand for anything at all, as long as it is a "thinkable some-
thing-or-other." The important point to us at present is not
what the "thinkable something-or-other" is, but that there is a
11
thinkable something-or-other" £or which the symbol sta~ds.

Be£ore proceeding £urther a point might be expressed about

the something-or-other for which the symbol stands. It seems
to be true, as Boole remarks, that a set o£ symbols may receive
any number of interpretations. But it must be.remembered, how-
ever, that it is always assumed by all symbolic logicians that
11
that inde£inite something-or-other" (1) remains definitely the
same throughout the whole logical process, and (2) that when it
is applied to a de£inite thing, then the £ormer indefinite sym-
bol is so applied as to mean always the same de£inite thing. In

16,3 Ibid.
164 George Boole, The Mathematical Analysis £! Logic, 3, as
quoted by Enriques, 127
 74.
a sense, the indefinite is always definitely determined. This
still does not mean, however, that the interpretation given is
without its ambiguities. A symbol is a symbol only in so far as
it directs someone's attention to a thinkable something-or-othen
But when an interpretation is given the symbol, two questions,
as Father Wellmuth also notes, might be asked: (1) What object
of thought does the user intend? And when the object of thought
is recognized, (2) does the symbol represent the results of a
correct logical analysis? Thus despite the exacting efforts of
modern logicians in the representation of the objects of thought
through symbols, they still have their difficulties, for the
most accurate symbol in the most carefully written treatise can-
not tell us the precise intended meaning as used by a particular
user on a particular occasion.l65 The difficulties that might
arise from this are beyond the scope of this paper. It might
be remarked, however, that all the difficulties that follow from
an improper use of supposition will be present. The point that
we wish to make at present is that although the symbols may re-
ceive many forms of interpretation, they still have a substitu-
tive value, even though it is a purely ideal one. That is,
whenever an interpretation is given, the symbols stand for a de-
11
finite thinkable something-or-othertt in the mind.

Our analysis of modern logic, considering its origin from

165 Wellmuth, 289.

 75.
mathematics and its use of symbols, seems to indicate that each
symbol has a definite substitutive value. A problem arises,
however, which makes it difficult to see immediately the recti-
tude of our conclusion. This problem centers around the notion
of the null-class.

The null-class is symbolized by the sign non, and is the

class which has no members. This class, we are told, has im-
portance in modern logic and accounts for new positive rela-
tiona. Hence it appears to give positive results, yet has no
members. It is, apparently, a symbol which has no substitutive
value; that is, it does not stand for a definite thinkable
"something-or-other ...

It will be necessary to investigate precisely what the

modern logicians understand by the null-class. Mrs. Langer is
rather clear on the point. She writes:
The word "the" means more than "all"; it
also expresses the fact that there is at
least one element in a certain clasS: -yf
we spea:k"of "The.wife of King Arthur, 11 we
mean (1) that we refer to the whole exten-
sion of the concept "wife of King Arthur,"
and (2) that at least one element falls
under this concept. So 11 the 11 really means
"all", and "at least one.u The singular
noun 11 wife 11 then adds, "there is just one
~~ such that~ is a wife of King Arthur."
But suppose that King Arthur had remained
celibate; would the form "x E wife of King
Arthur" define no class? Would the concept
"wife of King Arthur'' have no extension?
If we know what ~ of thing we mean by
 76.
noun or a descriptive phrase, then there is a
class of things defined thereby, for a "class"
is exactly the same thing as a "sort." Now,
there may be no wife of King Arthur; then
there is simply nothing of that sort. That
is the same as to say there is no element
which is a member of that class. The class,
therefore, is said to be empty, or to be a
null class.
its members" means none at all. 6
If a class is empty, or "nu1~ 11
then "all

Later on in her work she adds several other points of interest •

••• the null class is the one and only class
which may have incompatible properties, and
more than that, it is the class which has all
incomlatibles properti~which all absurd com-
binat ons of concepts define. ~is the class
of round squares, secular churches, solid li-
quids, and fellowmen w1 thout fellowmen. For
to any gf these we must say there is no such
thing.l 1
And again in speaking about null-classes she says:
••• their extensions are all alike, namely
"nothing," so all null-classes are identical,
and we may speak of "the null class.n
The null class is ~ined by any form that
has no true values. It is the extensiQn of
any concept that has no application.l6~
In writing about the null-class it may be noticed that Mrs. Lan-
ger makes no distinction between the empty class and the null
class. This is not the opinion of all modern logicians. Benn~

and Baylis write:

Again, other classes, although determined by

166 Susanne K. Langer, An Introduction to S~bolic Logic,

Houghton Mifflin Co7; New York, 1937, 12 •
167 Ibid., 128.
168 'f61d. ' 1)1.
 77.
self-consistent concepts, may as a matter of
fact have no members. The class of my yachts
is an example.
Classes which have no members are called
~ classes. If they are determined by a
sel~inconsistent concept, so that they could
have no members they f5e said to be not merely
empty but also ~· 9

From Mrs. Langer's remarks two points might be noted.

First, she states, "If a class is empty, or null, then 'all its
members• means none at all.u Apparently, then, the null-class
is a class that cannot be a class at all, since it can have no
members. Without members there is no thinkable something-or-
other which could be signified by it. lienee, such an understand·
ing of null-class can be of no value to logic since there is no
possible object of thought. Besides this, there is a second con-
sideration that Father Wellmuth points out. If the null-class
means a class with no actual members but one that might possibly
have some, another observation might be made. Such a class is
more properly called an uempty class." For example, the class
"The wife of King Arthur," or the class of "my yachts," represent
empty classes since they have no members. In this class would
11
be included what the traditional logician would call real pos-
sibles.11 This class has a class characteristic which distin-
guishes both the class and its members from all other classes

169 Albert A. Bennett, and Charles A. Baylis, Formal Logic,

Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1939, 102.
 78.
and members thereof. This property is the property of "not
actually existing," which again gives nothing in the way of what
11
the symbol 0 11 stands for in a reasoning process.l70 As Father
Wellmuth observes, since every symbol must stand £or a thinkable
nsomething-or-other, 11 "the question of whether the 'null-class'
is use£ul for logic can hardly be raised, for in this sense
'null-class• does not refer to a possible object of thought at
all.nl7l
This conclusion seems to be absolute when one considers fue
understanding and definition that modern logicians give for the
null-class, that is, a class of which uall its members" means
"none at all.u

The mathematicians, as mathematicians, however, view the

question in a different light. The null-class for them does
have a definite significance. It represents the point between
l and -1. Such an understanding of the null-class is applicable
to mathematics in which the negative numbers have some signifi-
cance. This significance is expressed by Professor Young:
If numbers are interpreted geometrically by
the points of a straight line in. the familiar
way by choosing an origin O, and representing
the positive numbers by points to the right of
0, the negative numbers by points on the left,
it is at once seen that a number represents not

170 Wellmuth, 230.

-
171 Ibid., 229.
 79.
merely a distance (magnitude) from QA but
also one of two directions from o.l7~
The mathematicians as logicians attempt to understand the null-
class in a similar fashion. Bennett and Baylis write:
The analogy between the number 0~ introduced
as an extension to the system of natural num-
bers, 1, 2~ 3, ••• , and the null class is
doubtless obvious •••• The null class, no
matter what its ontological status, per-
forms a similar function in the logic of
classes.173
11
The analogy between the number 0 11 , and the null-class is not
as obvious as it may seem. In mathematics the symbol 11
0 11 has
significance because it represents a point between 1 and -1.
But in logic, what would be the meaning of a negative number?
In logic to speak about a negative something-or-other means to
speak about nothing at all. If, then, -1 would mean nothing at
all, would a -2 mean twice a nothing-at-all, and more nothing-
at-all than -1? Hence, although the mathematicians may have a
place for the number 0, stil·l the mathematicians as logicians
cannot find a place for it in logic.

An interesting point arises now in relation to the expres-

sion of the principle of contradiction. For if the s·ymbol uou

stands for a point between 1 and -1, as the mathematicians say

it does, then the null-class cannot be the contradictory of 1,

172 Young~ 108.

173 Bennett and Baylis, 105.
 80.
but only a contrary. Yet, the modern logicians write, ".! -,! • 0
=-aa states the Law of Contradiction: Nothing is both.! and
not-_!.nl74 If the null-class in logic performs a function simi-
lar to the number 0 in mathematics, precisely what meaning can
the above principle have? From what has been said it seems that
the null-class, although perfectly useful in mathematics, has no
meaning in logic, for if it follows the use of the number 0 in
mathematics, the principle of contradiction cannot be stated,
and if it does not follow the 0 in mathematics, it seems to be
meaningless.

The null-class and its implications is worthy of more at-

tention than is possible in this study. At this point, however,
it might be well to point out that the null-class is not same-
thing that is new to modern logic, but long ago it had found a
place in traditional logic. Modern logicians are not conscious
of this fact, and make the boast that the traditional logicians
were ignorant of the null-class, and, since they did not take
it into consideration, modern logicians say that some traditiona
principles are false. It is true traditional logicians did not
refer to the null-class as a null-class, but they were conscious
of it although under a different terminology. To prove this,
let us first of all summarize the chief characteristics about
the null-class. From the understanding which we are given by

174 Lewis and Langford, 30.

 81.
Mrs. Langer, these characteristics appear. (1) The null-class
is the class that has no members. (2) It is the class which
has all incompatible properties which all absurd combinations
o£ concepts define. (3) It has no extension. The class o£
centaurs, £or example, or the class o£ square-circles are null-
classes; they have no members at all. In general, then, the
class o£ centaurs the class o£ square-circles, or any other
class Which has all incompatible properties are classes which
stand £or nothing at all, or, as the traditional logicians
11
would say, they have no supposition.u It is true traditional
logicians did not speak about null-cla.sses in modern terminology,
but, were they not speaking about the same thing when they spoke
i! subjecto B2n supponente? Propositions, then, in which the
subject has no supposition are nothing more than propositions
about a null-class. For example, it seems to come to the same
thing to say, "All square-circles are red," is a proposition
about a null-class, or to say it is a proposition about a subject
which has no supposition. John of St. Thomas gives example of
such propositions. Angelus corporeus movetur, or ~ creatus
intelligit. These are propositions about null-classes or classes
which have incompatible properties. John of st. Thomas refers
to them, however, as propositions about subjects that have no
supposition.l75 Such propositions, John of St. Thomas remarks,

175 Joannes A s. Thoma, 168.

 82.
are false# because they are affirmative propositions about sub-
jects that have no supposition.l76 And we might add, that they
are false because they attribute an existence to a subject which
can have no existence. Such propositions, it is evident there-
fore, have no supposition. But# do they have signification? Or,
to state the question more broadly, do propositions in which
the subject has no supposition have signification? John of St.
Thomas seems to distinguish on this point. He makes it clear
that propositions which have an intelligible subject, as for ex-
ample, Antichristus ~~ or ~ est, have signification even
though the subject has no supposition. 177 Propositions, on the
contrary, whose subjects are composed of incompatible properties
seem, from what John of St. Thomas writes, to have no signifi-
cation or supposition.l78 If they have signification it seems
to come from the simple terms which are joined into a complex
term in the proposition. The simple terms in themselves have
supposition and signification, but as a complex term, the only
signification seems to be that of incompatibility. For example,
the term angelus, and the term corporeus, or the term square, and
the term circle have supposition and significatio~ outside the
11
propositions Angelus corporeus movetur and A square-circle is
red. 11 In the propositions the subjects, angelus corporeus and

176 Ibid.~ 29.

177 Ibid., 168.
178 Ibid.
 83.
square-circle, have no supposition or signification because the
subjects are made up of incompatible properties. The only
meaning the proposition might have, it seems, might be called a
.
negative signification; that is, the meaning of the proposition
seems to be its incompatibility.

The proposition about a null-class attributes an existence

to a subject which the subject cannot have, and as a consequence
the proposition is false. The proposition is not false primari-
ly because it attributes a predicate to a subject which the sub-
ject does not have, although it is false on that count also,
but, it is said to be false first of all, because it attributes
an existence to a subject that has none. In such a case contra-
dictory propositions are impossible, because there is no~

possible. And no esse is possible because of the lack of any-

thing to realize ~·

There seems to be several reasons why modern logicians find

a place for the null-class in their logic. (1) Modern logic is
said to be strictly a formal science; because of this formal
nature, modern logicians do not have a clear idea of-esse, and
its importance in logic. (2) Modern logicians forget a pro-
position about a null-class, or about a subject that has no sup-
position, if it is afrirmative, is a false proposition. Tradi-
tional logicians saw that such propositions are false, and
hence could have no place in a valid reasoning process. Thus,
 84.
it is clear that the traditional logicians were conscious of the
nature of the null-clas~ but because they saw that propositions
about a null-class were false, they realized that the null-class
was useless in logic.

Mathematicians seem to forget what they say as mathematic!-

ans when they speak as logicians. Professor Young writes an in-
teresting paragraph when treating some objections about the ab-
stract point of view in mathematics. He writes:
Professor Klein has recently made a vigorous
protest against this point of view. To re-
gard the objects of mathematical study as
mere empty symbols sounds the death knell of
all science, he says. He recalls the witty
though uncomplimentary characterization re-
cently made by Professor Thomae of men who
concern themselves exclusively with meaning-
less symbols and empty assumptions concerning
them. Thomae dubbed such men "thoughtless
thinkers." The axioms of mathematics are not
arbitrary assumptions, Klein urges; but they
are rather sensible statements ••• • He seems
to fear that the adoption of the abstract point
of view will turn the attention away from the
all-important possibility of concrete appli-
cations. This fear seems to us groundless.
Anyone who should devote himself to the de-
velopment of an abstract symbolism with no
reference to its possible concrete applica-
tions would indeed deserve the epithet of
Thomae.179

The opinions of various mathematicians as expressed in Pro-

fessor Young's paragraph seem to reveal that everything is not

179 Young, 223.

 85.
perfectly satisfactory among the mathematicians in reference to
abstract symbolism. About that, however, we are not at present
interested. The point of interest is the last sentence of Pro-
fessor Young, from which it would seem that· all symbols for
mathematicians have some definite intelligent purpose, and that
even the symbol 11
0 11 means something. In modern logic, however,
11
it seems impossible for the symbol 0 11 to have any value; yet
the mathematicians as logicians use the symbol in logic, forget-
ting, it seems, what they said as mathematicians, namely, that
symbols have some intelligent purpose.

Summing up, then, this perhaps can be said, that all the
symbols do have some real substitutive value, and that those
that do not have any value have no meaning, either in mathematics
or in modern logic. A response to our first question now seems
11
to appear, Is there a place for the use of supposition in mo-
dern logic"? We can answer in the affirmative, that .there is,
and without it modern logicians become merely nthoughtless
thinkers."

The necessity of this substitutive value of symbols is more

obvious in logic than in mathematics. In mathematics the sup-
position is for the most part an intentional supposition, that
is, the symbols have for their substitutive value beings of the
mind or entia rationis. Such a supposition is perfectly legi-
timate since supposition may apply to entia rationis as well as
 86.
to real being, either possible or actual. The formal science
that results from such an intentional supposition may be entire-
ly satisfying from a mathematical point of view, but the facts
which the principles of logic state are not, as Lewis and Lang-
ford would lead us to believe, simply facts of our own meanings
in the use of language;l80 that is, logic is not a strictly
formal science, but the principles of logic have something to
do with the character of reality. Even though a mathematical
science can be built up without any apparent reference to reali
true logic, it seems, cannot, since the logician is interested
in more than a mere property or characteristic of a thing, which
comes before the mind in order that the things may be arranged
and mutually related and operated upon by thought; the logician
is interested in what the things are.l81

Although the modern logicians are very careful to make it

clear that their science is strictly formal, still in their
treatment of logical principles they are forced to return to a
material logic when their new technique is incapable of satis-
fying the umodalities of thought.n Their science does employ,
even though unconsciously perhaps, supposition in a general
sense, that is, in so far as their symbols stand for some object
of thought. This is shown by the fact that numbers or letters

180 Lewis and Langford, 212.

181 Wellmuth, 485.
or symbols in mathematical logic are not interchangeable, as
they would be were there no supposition. Yet, because they lack
a full knowledge o~ what supposition actually means, their ideo-
graphic signs cannot adequately express the different shades of
thought. The truth of this is made evident by the rise of
various semantic theories which aim at a proper determination of
the meanings o~ the words as they are used in the different
sciences.l82

The purpose of modern logic seems to be to integrate all

our knowledge, as Pro~essor Greenwood observes, "in a single ra-
tional perspective."l83 The success of such an endeavor seems
doomed to failure unless the operations of thought are founded
on something outside the mind, "namely in the depths of a sub-
stantial ontology.nl84

Mathematical logic is not without its good points. It has

added many new ideas and concepts to the science of thought, and,
in general, a wealth of details about logic. But, after an in-
vestigation of the modern technique, the analysis which modern
logicians have accomplished is not as pen~trating as some may
suppose. Not only has there been negligence in the analysis of

182 Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, (transl. by

Amethe Smeaton), Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., New York,
1937.
183 Thomas Greenwood, 11 The Unity o~ Logic," ~ Thomist, VIII
( 1945>' 469.
184 ~., 470.
 88.
traditional logic, but a much deeper study must be made in mo-
dern logic itself before the methods of symbolization will a-
chieve any lasting success. Until this deeper analysis has been
accomplished modern logic can never replace traditional logic,
and do the work which will need to be done as long as man does
any non-mathematical thinking. Scuh conclusions are evident,
it seems, from our discussion of supposition in modern and tradi·
tional logic.
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 APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Norman Henry Langenderfer, S.J. has

been read and approved by three members of the department of
Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the

thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact
that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the
thesis is now given final approval with reference to content,
form,and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.