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1.PALAGANAS vs PALAGANAS
G.R. No. 169144
January 26, 2011
Topic: Allowance or Disallowance of Will

FACTS:

1. Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, died single and childless. In
the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother,
Sergio, as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in
the U.S.

2. Respondent Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court,
a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special
administrator of her estate.

3. However, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the

petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines
but in the U.S. where she executed it. They added that it is invalid nonetheless for
having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of
the consequences of such act, and that Ernesto is also not qualified to act as
administrator of the estate.

4. Thereafter, the RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the
U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto.

5. On appeal, the CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the RTC,
holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent
Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the
order and his posting of required bond.

ISSUE: WON a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed. (YES)

RULING:

Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states
that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if
the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an
estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76
further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court
having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or
is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as
known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of
the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and
character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are
prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having
custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at
the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require
proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.

The RTC order is but an initial ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for
probate of Ruperta’s will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special
administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of
the will, i.e. the testator’s state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the
formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial court’s directive
for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta’s will and the certified copies of
the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.
2. Pecson v. Coronel

GR L-20374 I October 11, 1923

FACTS:
On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will
and testament of Dolores Coronel to her nephew Lorenzo Pecson, who is married to her
niece Angela Coronel, in consideration of the good services with which he has rendered.

The relatives* by consanguinity of Dolores questioned the genuineness of the will on the
following grounds: (a) That the proof does not that the document Exhibit A above copied
contains the last will of Dolores Coronel, and (b) that the attestation clause is not in
accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended
by Act No. 2645.

They argued that, it was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of
her estate, as set forth in the document Exhibit A, her true being that the same be distributed
among her blood relatives; and second, that if such will not expressed in fact, it was due to
extraneous illegal influence.

ISSUES:
1. WON the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition of her estate.
2. WON the true last will of Dolores Coronel was expressed in the testament Exhibit A.

RULING:
1. YES. It is true that ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but the Court
understands that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare.
The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs is
rendered sacred by the civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889.

The SC held that there was nothing strange in the preterition made by Dolores
Coronel of her blood relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole
beneficiary. Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the
most usual and customary, still this would not be null per se.

The testamentary capacity of Dolores Coronel is not disputed in this case.

2. The SC is of the opinion that those for the petitioner spoke the truth. It is neither
probable nor likely that a man versed in the law, such as Attorney Francisco, who
was present at the execution of the will in question, and to whose conscientiousness
in the matter of compliance with all the extrinsic formalities of the execution of a will,
and to nothing else, was due the fact that the testatrix had cancelled her former will
(Exhibit B) and had new one (Exhibit A) prepared and executed, should have
consented the omission of formality compliance with which would have required little
or no effort; namely, that of seeing to it that the testatrix and the attesting witnesses
were all present when their respective signatures were affixed to the will." And the
record does not furnish us sufficient ground for deviating from the line reasoning and
findings of the trial judge.

NOTES:
*relatives: Eriberto Coronel, Tito Coronel, Julian Gozum, Cirila Santiago, widow of the
deceased Macario Gozum, in her own behalf and that of her three minor children, Hilarion
Coronel, Geronimo Coronel, Maria Coronel and her husband Eladio Gongco, Juana Bituin,
widow of the deceased Hipolito Coronel, in her own behalf and that of her three children,
Generosa, Maria, and Jose, all minors, Rosario Coronel, Agustin Coronel, Filomeno
Coronel, Casimiro Coronel, Alejo Coronel, Maria Coronel, Severina Coronel, Serapia
Coronel, Maria Juana de Ocampo, widow of the deceased Manuel Coronel, Dionisia
Coronel, and her husband Pantaleon Gunlao.

For Ruling number 1: In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses
absolute dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases
without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the
requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud
or undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural,
unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric, as
injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or revenge can dictate. However, as has already
been shown, the unreasonable or unjustice of a will may be considered on the question of
testamentary capacity. (40 Cyc., 1079.)
3. FLEUMER v. HIX
GR No. 32636

March 17, 1930

Digested by: Lauzon, Ricardo Jr. V.

TOPIC: Allowance of Disallowance of Will

FACTS:

The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the
latter’s will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who
had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state govern.

Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the
appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a
"person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First
Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the
disallowance of the will

To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882, as found in
West Virginia Code and as certified to by the Director of National Library.

The Judge of the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the grounds
that Sec 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied with.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in
West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will. (YES)
RULING:

Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The
courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws
of the various states of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.
Petitioner alleged that the will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia by Hix who had
his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia Code, and as
certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance
with the law.

Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book
from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the
state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was
the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the
original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia as provided in Sec 301.

No evidence was introduced showing that the extract from the laws of West Virginia
was in force at the time alleged will was executed.

The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such
law in West Virginia must be proved.

PRINCIPLE:

The law of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of
the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be
proved as facts.

Note:

No Judicial Notice of Foreign Laws

The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of
the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the
various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. The
requirements of Sections 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be met.

Domicile

Where it is desired to establish the execution of a will in another jurisdiction, it is

necessary to prove that the testator had his domicile in that jurisdiction and not in the
Philippines.
4. Vda. de Perez v. Tolete,

GR 76714 I 232 SCRA 722 I 302 Phil. 764

June 2, 1994
Digested by: Lamoste
Topic: Reprobate; Requisites before will proved outside allowed in the Philippines

FACTS:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez­-Cunanan, who became American
citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived
at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his
wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death
"wheresoever situated". In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his
property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He
appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.
as substitute executor.
In his will, Dr. Jose provided that should he and his wife die under such circumstances that
there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of their deaths, the presumption is that
he died first.
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and
testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband.

On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by
fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute
executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the
Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. The two wills were admitted to
probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.

On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn, filed with the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate
proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed as special administratrix of
the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
She was granted letters of special administration and posted bond in the amount of PHP
10,000.00. As special administratrix, Salud consolidated the assets of the Cunanan spouses,
including the bank deposits of Dr. Jose.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose opposed and asked to be notified of the proceedings as
heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan. But their status as heirs were disputed by Salud, who said that
they were only collaterals and not heirs as “heirship is only by institution” under a will or by
operation of the law of New York. Since the will of Dr. Jose provided a presumption that he
predeceased his wife, his estate passed on to his wife, Dr. Evelyn. Salud, being the sole heir
of Dr. Evelyn, thus inherited the estate of the Cunanan spouses.

The Cunanan heirs soon asked that the RTC proceedings be nullified and that the
appointment of Salud as special administratrix be set aside. They also asked that Dr. Rafael
Sr., brother of Dr. Jose, be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased
spouses. They alleged that the Cunanan heirs and Salud had entered into an agreement in
the United States “to settle and divide equally the estates.”

RTC issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of
petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of
the property received by her as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents
moot and academic. The RTC Judge reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of
New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether
the wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such
evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as
the law of the Philippines.

Salud’s motion for reconsideration was granted. In another order, the RTC Judge held that
the documents presented did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and
allowance of wills but granted a motion to submit additional evidence to prove the law of
New York. However, the RTC Judge ruled that the probate of two wills in a single proceeding
is not procedural.

Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the
hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the
allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated
in separate proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wills probated outside the Philippines may be reprobated in the
Philippines?(YES)
RULING:
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
"Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes."

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated
outside of the Philippines are as follows:
(1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws;
(2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines;
(3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
(4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and
(5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran
Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500
[1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the
petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit
the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge
just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should
relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is
susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of
Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
5. Uy vs CA

GR 167679, Mar 15, 2006

Sample Date of Case

Digested by: EVL

Topic:

Powers and Duties of Probate Court

FACTS:

Petitioner (Wilson S. Uy) was appointed as regular administrator of the estate of the
deceased Jose K. C. Uy on June 9, 1998. However, private respondent (Johnny K. H. Uy) in
his motion to intervene sought to be appointed as administrator as he is not only the brother
of the decedent but also a creditor who knows the extent of the latter’s properties. Thus, the
trial court, while retaining petitioner as administrator, appointed private respondent as
co-administrator of the estate.

Petitioner asserts that his appointment as a regular administrator is already final,

unassailable or res judicata; that the inferior court has no authority to re-open the issue of
the appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator; that
private respondent is not only alien to the estate, but has a conflict of interest with it; that the
trial court’s appointment of private respondent as co-administrator constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals held that the refusal of the trial court to remove private respondent as
co-administrator of the estate is neither an error of jurisdiction nor a grave abuse of
discretion; that the appointment of private respondent was justified.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing private respondent
as co-administrator to the estate of the deceased;

RULING:
The petition is without merit. The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate
the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration.
In the case at bar, the trial court granted letters of administration to petitioner and thereafter
to private respondent as co-administrator. The preference to whom letters of administration
may be granted under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. The determination of a
person’s suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be
interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error

In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court.
Considering that the Intervenor is claiming to be the patriarch of the Uy family and who
claims to have enormous knowledge of the businesses and properties of the decedent Jose
K.C. Uy, it is the feeling of the trial court that it will be very beneficial to the Estate if he be
appointed co-administrator (without removing the already appointed Judicial Administrator)
of the Estate of Jose K.C. Uy, if only to shed more light to the alleged enormous
properties/businesses and to bring them all to the decedent’s Estate. A co-administrator
performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator,
only that he is not alone in the administration. The practice of appointing co-administrators in
estate proceedings is not prohibited. Instead of removing petitioner, the trial court appointed
private respondent, a creditor, as co-administrator since the estate was sizeable and
petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it alone.

Petitioner’s argument that the trial court cannot re-open the issue of the appointment of an
administrator without removing the incumbent administrator is erroneous. In probate
proceedings, considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or revoking its
own orders as long as the proceedings are pending in the same court and timely
applications or motions for such modifications or revocations are made by the interested
parties. In the instant case, the estate of the deceased has not yet been settled and the case
is still within the jurisdiction of the court.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 20, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72678 affirming the January 22, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial
Court in Special Proceedings No. 97-241, as well as the April 29, 2005 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.1avvphil.net

NOTES:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is

named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
6. GONZALES VS AGUINALDO
BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Branch 143, Makati, Metro Manila and TERESA F. OLBES, respondents.
G.R. No. 74769, September 28, 1990
CQJ

Facts:

On 25 October 1983, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and
private respondent Teresa Olbes, both children of the deceased, as co-administratices of the
estate.

On 11 November 1984, while petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the United States
accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in that country,
private respondent Teresa Olbes filed a motion to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as
co-administratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and
had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs.
Copy of said motion was served upon petitioner's then counsel of record, Atty. Manuel
Castro who had been suspended by the Supreme Court from the practice of law throughout
the Philippines.

After the filing of private respondent's aforesaid motion, respondent Judge Zoilo
Aguinaldo issued an Order which required Beatriz F. Gonzales and the other parties to file
their opposition, if any, thereto. Only Asterio Favis opposed the removal of Beatriz F.
Gonzales as co-administratrix, as the latter was still in the United States attending to her
ailing husband.

In an Order, respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted to

Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as the administratrix of the estate of the late
Ramona Gonzales.

Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent Judge's
Order should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not
shown by respondents to be anchored on any of the grounds provided under Section 2, Rule
82, Rules of Court, which states:

"Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator.

Proceedings upon death, resignation or removal—If an executor or administrator
neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an
order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or
absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. x x x"

Issue :
 Whether or not there were proper grounds or satisfactory cause for the removal of
Beatriz F. Gonzales as appointed co-administrator of the estate of Doña Ramona Gonzales
Vda. de Favis.

Held : (NO)

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the

principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78
takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrators for the estate.

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the
removal of an administrator, it however must have some fact legally before it in order
to justify a removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the
administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which
it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In making such
a determination, the court must exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.

Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of the

estate also on the ground that she had been absent from the country since October 1984
and had not returned as of 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned order, leaving
respondent Olbes alone to administer the estate.

From facts shown in her motion for reconsideration, the petitioner had never
abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in the
fulfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the state does not
disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate. Thus, as held in re Mc Knight's Will, a
temporary residence outside of the state, maintained for the benefit of the health of
the executors' family, is not such a removal from the state as to necessitate his
removal as executor.

Hence, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Her removal
was therefore improper.
7. EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, respondent.
G.R. No. 183053. October 10, 2012.

FACTS

The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990.

Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five
grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and
two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico's and
Cristina's only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina's death, Federico
adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
Cristina's estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.
Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the surviving spouse of
the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedent's estate; (2) as part
owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded
preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated
from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in the
petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III and
Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal
properties, and thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the decedent's estate; (6)
the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7)
Isabel's allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel's petition for letters of administration on
the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being
an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel's parents' marriage being
declared null and void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically
declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as
opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were
legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate
grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the
decedent's estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico.
Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-in-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his
grandfather's opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better
equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent,
Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died. As previously adverted to, on appeal by
certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to
include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina's estate, giving weight to his interest in
Federico's estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and Isabel,
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals' Decision
in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of
Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
 Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be
ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts
that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he
does not deserve to become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and
therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of
kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment as
administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III's actuations since his appointment as administrator by
the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the
order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis
for joint administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."
ISSUE

Who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator
of the decedent's estate. (Isabel)

RULING
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is
laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,

or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or

next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to

serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in

the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the
appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence. 8
 It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator of a decedent's estate, that the appointment of
co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6 (a)
of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that letters of administration
may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly,
we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that ". . . [w]hen an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ."
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III's demonstrable
interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules. We
gave weight to Emilio III's demonstrable interest in Cristina's estate and without a closer
scrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We
are led to a review of such position by the foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be
settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof.
Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the
discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the
appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
administrator. 31 Given Isabel's unassailable interest in the estate as one of the
decedent's legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the
appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a
demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court 32 and
depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case. 33
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III's demonstrable
interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals
that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent
Isabel points out that after Emilio III's appointment as administrator of the subject estate
in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted
to the damage and prejudice thereof
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as
administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return . . . a true and complete
inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before
the probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of Federico's exclusion of
Cristina's other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an
oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedent's estate with the end in
view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances
of Emilio III's omission and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of
his unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those
immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a
deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay,
improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their grandmother's estate.
 WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our
Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration
over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate
of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 8. GABRIEL VS CA

GR 101512

Topic: Allowance or Disallowance of Will

Digested by: Gula

FACTS:

● Private respondent, Roberto Gabriel, filed with the RTC, a petition for letters of
administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, and is fully
capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel. Private respondent
mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the
decedent
● the probate court issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of
the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel
● Aida Valencia, mother of private respondent, filed a "Motion to File Claim of (sic) the
Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging that the decision in a civil case
between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an
interest in said estate
● petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed Gabriel,
filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of
administration issued to private respondent and the issuance of such letters instead
to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, moreover
alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for
administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should be
preferred over private respondent; (3) private respondent has a conflicting and/or
adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother
and (4) most of the properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by
way of transfer of ownership to petitioners and should not be included in the value of
the estate sought to be administered by private respondent
● The probate court denied the opposition on the ground that they had not shown any
circumstances sufficient to overturn the order.
● On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of Roberto on the ground that the appointment of an
administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court which may not be
interfered with unless abused. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is sufficient ground to revoke the appointment of Roberto as an

administrator (NO)

2. Whether or not both the widow and the illegitimate son should be appointed as a
co-administrator (YES)

RULING:

1. We feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as

administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator
rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of
appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is
clearly in error. Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in the execution
of their trust as would entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus,
Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to
remove an administrator.

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such
removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient
or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In the instant case, a mere
importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial
bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Suffice it
to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates
of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its
discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply
therefor within a given time.

2. On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the
benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be
appointed since that is both legally permissible and sanctioned in practice. Section 6(a) of
Rule 78 specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving
spouse and the next of kin. In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which
may arise when there is only one administrator but which may easily be remediable where
there is co-administration, to wit: "When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is
removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also,
co-administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the extent of the interest of the
widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may further be
expected from private respondent for the same estate.

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has
been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at
all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the
deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one
to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in
harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in
the office.

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that
there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas
Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose
of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times
to have different interests represented, especially considering that in this proceeding they
will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate.
Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be satisfied, with the
representatives working in harmony under the direction and supervision of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by AFFIRMING

the validity of the appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator
and ORDERING the appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in
Special Proceeding No. 88-4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila.

SO ORDERED
9. DELGADO VDA. DE LA ROSA vs.HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN

FACTS:

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates may
be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half-
and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2)
the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his
illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo.
Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta,
Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to
Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of

Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s
life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.

The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took
place is disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50
years cannot be doubted.

The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home
the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally
adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate
child, the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo
Rustia and some collateral relatives (petitioners). On June 15, 1973, Guillermo executed an
affidavit of self- adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for
letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa and Guillermo " with
the RTC (Manila). This petition was opposed by the the sisters of Guillermo, (Marciana
Rustia vda.de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz), the heirs of Guillermo’s late brother,
Roman Rustia, Sr., and Guillermina on the grounded that Luisa and the other claimants were
barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only
surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo which was granted by the RTC.

The original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa and
Guillermo were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife. Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa who had died.

RTC: appointed Carlota as administratrix of both estates and declared that petitioners as the
legal heirs of the estate of Josefa and are entitled to partition the same among themselves
while Guillerma as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo is entitled to the
entire estate. The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by
the late Guillermo was SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.

CA: Upon appeal, REVERSED the decision and declared that Dr. Guillermo and Josefa
were legally married; the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the
children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate
estate of Josefa; the respondents as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo are entitled to
partition his estate; and the Guillerma is ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo.
Hence the petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the self-adjudication of Gulliermo proper. (NO)

2. Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?

3. Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right
of representation (NO)

4. Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia?

5. Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between
Felisa and Ramon. (Yes to Guillermo and Josefa, No to Felisa and Ramon )

RULING:

1. Self-adjudication of Gulliermo

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have
validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is
clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate.

2. The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado

It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the
children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the
decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.

The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from
each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado. However, the
petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of
Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and
nieces).

Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:

Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one- half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other one-half.

3. Grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado cannot inherit by right of

representation

However, since petitioners are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and
grandnieces of Josefa pursuant to Article 972 (NCC), the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters, consequently, it
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and
sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972.
Since the records are not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine
who were the surviving brothers and sisters or their children of Josefa at the time of her
death. Together with Guillermo, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa in accordance with
Article 1001 (NCC): Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters
or their children to the other one-half.

4. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to
successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She failed to
present authentic proof of recognition. Together with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were
held legal strangers to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them
ab intestato.

Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews. (Since the alleged illegitimate and
the ampun ampunan failed to establish such)

Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of
Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa
Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or
half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa
Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is
hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled
to share in her estate. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one - half share of Josefa
Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late
Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per
stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are
now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4.a. As to the alleged illegitimate child (Intervenor/co-respondent Guillerma)

Under the NCC, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition is compulsory in

any of the followingcases:(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of
the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;(2) when the child is in
continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother) by the direct acts
of the latter or of his family;(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence
or proof that the defendant is his father. On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing.

No Compulsory Recognition

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition

through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and
second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing. There was apparently no doubt that
she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of Guillermo.

However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could
have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any judicial action for
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of
the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed.

In this case, Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the
death of Guillermo on February 28, 1974. The claim of voluntary recognition.

No Voluntary Recognition

Guillerma’s second ground must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent which includes a
public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. Neither can the report
card nor Josefa's obituary prepared by Guillermo can be considered as an authentic writing
contemplated by the law as in wa not written nor signed by the latter.

4.b. As to the Ampun ampunan (Guillermina Rustia Rustia)

The same misfortune befalls Guillermina, who was never adopted in accordance with law
and although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo, it was dismissed upon the
latter’s death. The SC affirmes that she is a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and
therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intesta to quoting that "Adoption is a juridical
act, a proceeding in rem, which created between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the
court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is
valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To
establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence."

5. As to the validity of marriage

5. a Guillermo and Josefa (Valid)

Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not
always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises,
other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage.

Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the
name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold
themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law
and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.

5.b Felisa and Ramon

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio.
The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of
marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa
and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and
Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.
10. Lindain v. CA
G.R. No. 95305 August 20, 1992

Facts:
● Plaintiffs as minors, owned a parcel of registered land which their mother (Dolores)
as guardian, sold for P2,000.00 under a deed of absolute sale to the defendant
spouses Apolonia and Federico.
● The latter knew that the sale was without judicial approval but still proceeded with the
transaction.
● The plaintiffs now contend that the sale is null and void as it was without the court's
approval.
● The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the sale was valid, as the value of
the property was less than P2,000, and, considering the ages of plaintiffs now, the
youngest being 31 years old at the time of the filing of the complaint, their right to
rescind the contract which should have been exercised four (4) years after reaching
the age of majority, has already prescribed.
● The RTC ruled that the sale is indeed null and void, while upon appeal, the CA
confirmed the sale as valid and dismissed the complaint.
● CA upheld the sale and dismissed the complaint of the heirs who thereupon filed this
petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court and in ordering the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in
total disregard of the findings of facts of the trial court and contrary to the provisions
of law on contracts and guardianship.

Issue: WON judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minors' property by their
mother. (YES.)

Ruling:
Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as a legal administrator of the property of his
minor children does not have the power to dispose of or alienate the property of the said
child without judicial approval.

Consequently, under Rule 84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and duties of the widow
as legal administrator of her minor children's property are merely powers of possession and
management. Hence, the power to sell, mortgage, encumber or dispose must proceed from
the court (Rule 89).

Moreover, the private respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith as they knew
right from the beginning the transaction was without judicial approval. One who acquires or
purchases real property with knowledge of a defect in the title of his vendor cannot claim that
he acquired title thereto in good faith as against the owner of the property or for an interest
therein.

The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet been prescribed for "real actions over
immovables prescribed after thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code). Since the sale took place in
1966, the action to recover the property had not yet been prescribed when the petitioners
sued in 1987.

The petition is GRANTED.