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CHAPTER 17

Political culture
Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart 

A stable and effective democratic government …

Chapter contents depends upon the orientations that people have to the
political process … upon the political culture. (Almond
Introduction 285
and Verba 1963: 498)
Cultural differences around the world 285
Historical roots of the political
culture concept 288
Reader’s guide
The question of citizens’
democratic maturity 289 This chapter describes what role the concept of political
The allegiance model of the culture plays in comparative politics. We outline the
democratic citizen 290 concept’s premises, insights, and recent progress. Our
chapter places special emphasis on what we see as the
Party–voter dealignment 290
major contribution of the political culture field: increasing
The assertive model of the our understanding of the social roots of democracy and
democratic citizen 291 how these roots are transformed through cultural change.
Implicit regime affinities and In examining the inspirational forces of democracy, we com-
explicit regime preferences 299 pare key propositions of the political culture approach with
the political economy approach. The chapter concludes with
Trust, confidence, and social capital 299
some suggestions regarding the rise of democratic values in
Conclusion 300 non-Western cultures.

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CHAPTER 17 POLITICAL CULTURE 285

Introduction
Box 17.1 Norms, values, and beliefs
The term ‘culture’ covers a broad set of phenomena. It Beliefs are understood here as what people think is factu-
includes traditions, habits, and patterns of behaviour ally right or wrong. Values, by contrast, mean what people
shaped by a society’s prevailing beliefs, norms, and values think is morally good or bad. Values are internalized and
(Nolan and Lenski 1999). ‘Political culture’, then, denotes hence guide people’s behaviour without social sanctions
the subset of these phenomena that is shaped specifically that enforce them. In contrast with values, norms are be-
by political beliefs, norms, and values. havioural guidelines that are socially sanctioned, either
A society’s dominant beliefs, norms, and values are informally or formally, whether people have internalized
often described as if they constitute an inherited ‘national these guidelines or not.
character’. Such descriptions are at times unscientific.
In the Clash of Civilizations, for example, Huntington
(1996) provides descriptions of the typical beliefs, norms,
and values of entire ‘families of nations’ without any ref- focuses on population surveys as its main source of
erence to systematic data. evidence.
To avoid such unscientific tendencies, political cul- The comparative study of political culture covers man-
ture research must be based on systematic evidence. ifold themes. Since it is impossible to describe each of
A description of the typical beliefs, norms, and values them in this chapter, we have limited ourselves to those
of a society (see Box 17.1) can be accepted as scientific themes that loom largest in the discussion of democracy’s
only if it is derived from representative survey data. cultural foundations—arguably the normative lead con-
For this reason, this chapter is limited to a tradition cept in comparative politics. This limitation implies, for
of political culture research that is committed to this instance, that in this chapter we ignore, among others,
premise and derives its descriptions from cross-nation- the themes of national pride, ethnic identities, and left–
ally representative survey data. Table 17.1 provides a right orientations.
selection of milestone studies in this tradition of em-
pirical, cross-nationally comparative studies of political KEY POINTS
culture.
● A scientific approach to studying political culture re-
The foundation of the comparative study of cross-
national survey data is the Civic Culture study by Al- quires the reliance on systematic evidence based on rep-
mond and Verba (1963). These authors define the term resentative data.
political culture ‘as the particular distribution of pat-
terns of orientation towards political objects among the
members of a nation’ (Almond and Verba 1963: 13). This
is still the most widely accepted definition of the term
Cultural differences
‘political culture’. According to this definition, political around the world
culture concerns the psychological dimension of politi-
cal systems; it includes all politically relevant beliefs, Over several decades, comparative researchers have
values, and attitudes. Focusing on different reference identified various sets of questions that can be used in
populations, one can examine elite cultures and mass standardized surveys to measure cultural differences
cultures as well as local, regional, and national cultures, between societies in valid ways. Arguably, the largest of
or the subcultures of specific groups. Yet, in every case these surveys in both spatial and temporal scope is the
the concept refers to some collective unit of which peo- World Values Survey (WVS). Since the early 1980s, the
ple are aware and to which they have some feeling of WVS has been conducted at least once in more than
belonging. ninety societies worldwide, including countries from all
To what extent actual political behaviour is included in inhabited continents.
the notion of political culture is not always clear, but in Repeated analyses of WVS data over more than two
so far as certain patterns of political behaviour are ritual- decades have found a robust pattern of cross-national
ized, they can be considered to be behavioural manifesta- cultural differences (Inglehart 1990, 1997). On a global
tions of political culture. scale, much of the cultural differences between na-
Because political orientations exist in individuals, po- tions boil down to just two major dimensions: ‘sacred
litical culture research gathers data from individuals. But versus secular values’ and ‘survival versus emancipa-
the unit of interest is usually some population, so individ- tive values’ (for simplicity, henceforth secular values
ual-level data are aggregated to describe entire popula- and emancipative values). Inter-societal differences on
tions or subgroups within them. Since these descriptions these two value dimensions are usually larger, and often
should be representative, the political culture approach much larger, than intra-societal differences (Inglehart

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286 CHRISTIAN WELZEL AND RONALD INGLEHART 

Table 17.1 An overview of some milestone studies in the cross-national comparative tradition of political
culture studies

Recent Inglehart & Norris Inglehart Gibson (2005): the Dalton (2008): engaged
(2003): traditional– & Welzel nature of tolerance citizenship
secular/rational (2005): human
values empowerment
2000s Bratton & Rose & Shin (2000): Putnam (2000): social
Mattes (2000): idealistic and capital decline
intrinsic and realistic support for
instrumental democracy
support for
democracy
Late 1990s Huntington Inglehart (1997): Verba et al. Klingemann Norris (1999): critical
(1996): clash world cultural map (1995): civic (1999): dissatisfied citizens
of civilizations voluntarism democrats
Late 1980s/ Flanagan (1987): Dalton et al. Inglehart (1990): Putnam (1992): civic
early 1990s authoritarian– (1987): old and elite-challenging community, civic trust,
libertarian values new politics publics social capital
1970s Sniderman Inglehart (1977): Barnes & Kaase (1979):
(1975): materialist– unconventional
personality and post-materialist political participation
democracy values
1960s Almond & Verba Easton (1965): Inkeles (1965): Eckstein (1966):
(1963): the civic specific and individual authority orientations,
culture diffuse support modernity congruence theory
Modern Adorno et Lasswell (1951): Stouffer (1955): Rokeach (1960): the
classics al. (1950): democratic political (in) open and closed mind
authoritarian character tolerance
personality
Weber (1920):
legitimacy beliefs
Classical Tocqueville (1835):
classics De la Démocratie en
Amérique
Montesquieu (1756):
De l’Esprit des Lois
Aristotle (350 bc):
The Politics, Book IV

and Welzel 2010; Welzel 2013). Mean national posi- values.2 The theoretical range on both dimensions is from
tions on secular values and on emancipative values are zero to 1.0.
highly indicative of the typical state of mind that comes The mean national positions on secular values and
to dominance in a population at certain stages of its so- emancipative values shown in the global cultural map of
cio-economic and socio-political modernization. These Figure 17.1 hide considerable intra-national differences
values are mental representations of the development along the lines of social class, religion, and ethnicity. In
of given populations. For this reason, nations cluster fact, in almost any sample one can find at least some indi-
on these values into relatively coherent culture zones, viduals at each corner of the cultural map. Still, it is also
reflecting historically similar paths of development true for each national sample that individual respondents
(Inglehart and Baker 2000). cluster in increasing density the closer one comes to the
In Figure 17.1 each national population’s mean national mean position. These mean positions represent
position on these two sets of values is plotted including a given nation’s cultural gravity centre.
evidence from the most recent WVS and using the most The ‘revised theory of modernization’ proposed by In-
up-to-date measures of secular values1 and emancipative glehart and Welzel (2005) can explain to a considerable

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CHAPTER 17 POLITICAL CULTURE 287

.75 Sweden
Norway
.73
.70 Mean size of area Andorra
.68 wherein one finds
66% of a society's Switzerld.
.65 respondents
Finland East
Denmark NL
.63 Germany
.60 Canada West
NZ
U.K. France
.58 Australia Slovenia
EMANCIPATIVE VALUES 1995–2005

Iceland Spain
.55
Greece Japan
USA Uruguay
.53 Israel Czech R.
Croatia
.50 Italy Argentina Belgium
.48 Mexico Bulgaria Serbia
Cyprus Chile S. Korea
.45 Ireland
Peru Slovakia Hong Kong
.43 Poland Brazil Latvia
Colombia Singapore Belarus
Hungary
.40 Venez. Kyrgyztan Taiwan
Romania Malaysia Estonia
.38 Banglad. Turkey Ukraine
Vietnam China
Philipp. Albania Thailand Russia
.35 Tanzania S. Arabia India
.33 Iran Indonesia Armenia
Zimbabwe Rwanda Azerbaij.
Georgia
.30 Mali Burkina F.
Morocco Uganda
.28 Ghana Algeria
Egypt Nigeria Note: The clustering of values by societies
.25 accounts, respectively, for 30% and 37%
Pakistan
.23 of the total variation in secular values and
Iraq
Jordan emancipative values.
.20
.13 .15 .18 .20 .23 .25 .28 .30 .33 .35 .38 .40 .43 .45 .48 .50 .53 .55 .58 .60 .63 .65
SECULAR VALUES 1995–2005

Figure 17.1 A cultural map of the world

extent why national populations take which mean cultural basis of democracy, we will turn to this topic
position in both secular and emancipative values. By later in this chapter.
and large, the process of modernization has brought
rising levels of existential security for most of the peo-
ple in a society. But so far, modernization has favoured
two different versions of existential security in two dif- Box 17.2 Liberal democracy
ferent phases. The industrial phase of modernization The term liberal democracy is not to be misunderstood in
has standardized people’s life courses through the ad- an economic sense as a ‘market-liberal’ democracy that
vancement of bureaucratization. Bureaucracies nur- only has a minimal welfare state. Liberal democracy can
tured a rationalistic world view, which in turn favoured certainly be a ‘market-liberal’ democracy but it can also be
secular values. Secular values are compatible with lib- a ‘social-liberal’ democracy with an extended welfare state.
eral democracy as well as with industrial forms of au- Hence, the extension of the welfare state is not a defini-
thoritarianism. In contrast, the post-industrial phase tional criterion of liberal democracy. Instead, the term
of modernization has pluralized people’s life courses liberal democracy is to be seen in contrast with electoral
through the advancement of individualization. Individ- democracy. In an electoral democracy, citizens are holders
ualization nurtures an independent world view, which of political rights but not necessarily of basic civil liberties.
in turn favours emancipative values. These values are In a liberal democracy, in contrast, political rights rest on a
only compatible with liberal democracy (see Box 17.2). solid fundament of civil liberties.
As the rise of these values is most fundamental for the

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288 CHRISTIAN WELZEL AND RONALD INGLEHART 

KEY POINTS Démocratie en Amérique that the flourishing of democ-

racy in the US reflects the prevalence of liberal, egalitar-
● National populations differ systematically in how much ian, and participatory orientations among the American
emphasis they place on secular values and emancipative people.
values. In modern times, a disastrous illustration of the fact
● These differences show a culture zone pattern which in- that people’s orientations influence a regime’s chances
dicates historical similarities in the ways through which of survival was the failure of democracy in Weimar
societies entered the modernization process. Germany. Although the Weimar Republic had adopted
what was considered a model constitution at its time,
these institutions lacked legitimacy among much of the
public as well as among the conservative elites, who
viewed the authoritarian era of the Kaiser as ‘the good
Historical roots of the old days’. In the wake of the Great Depression, the Nazi
political culture concept Party came to power, partly as the result of free elec-
tions, with catastrophic consequences for the world.
A basic assumption of the political culture paradigm is For decades, social scientists and intellectuals sought to
that a population’s prevailing orientations, beliefs, and understand the causes of the Holocaust and the Second
values determine the type of political system by which a World War, and many of them came to the conclusion
given population is likely to be governed. This assump- that a ‘democracy without democrats’ (Bracher 1971) is
tion was formulated more than 2300 years ago by Aris- unlikely to survive.
totle (c. 350  bc) in Book IV of The Politics. In this book, In this vein, Lasswell (1951) claimed that democratic
Aristotle argued that democracies emerge from middle- regimes emerge and survive where a majority of the peo-
class-dominated societies where an egalitarian ethos is ple share orientations that are compatible with the opera-
predominant among the citizens. tion of democracy. In Lasswell’s eyes these orientations
Here we find the classical formulation of a three-fold are rooted in ‘freedom from anxiety’, which he saw as
causal process in which (1) the social structures char- nurturing a general ‘belief in human potentialities’ and a
acterizing a given population make (2) certain beliefs sense of ‘self-esteem’, as well as a sense of ‘respect for oth-
predominant among its members, which then make (3) ers’. Similarly, when Lipset (1959: 85–9) asked why mod-
specific types of political systems more widely accepted. ernization is conducive to democracy, he concluded that
Thus there is a sequence from social structures to sub- modernization changes mass orientations in ways that
jective beliefs to the legitimacy of political institutions. make them more compatible with the operation of de-
This sequence provides an early theory explaining the mocracy by increasing people’s tolerance for opposition,
origins of dictatorship and democracy: hierarchical so- criticism, and political pluralism. In philosophical terms,
cial structures lead to authoritarian beliefs under which Popper (1948 [1979]) described these characteristics as
dictatorship becomes the legitimate form of government; the prevailing mindset of The Open Society.
horizontal social structures lead to egalitarian beliefs In empirical research Almond and Verba (1963) and
under which democracy becomes the legitimate form of Eckstein (1966) introduced the term ‘congruence’, argu-
government. ing that in order to be stable political institutions must
Aristotle’s idea that the citizens’ beliefs shape political accord with people’s legitimacy beliefs. This is particu-
systems seemed realistic in the world of the Greek city- larly true of democratic institutions, which cannot sur-
states. In the history of the Greek polis, the citizenry itself vive by repressing mass preferences without corrupting
appeared several times as an ‘agent’ in engineering po- their own principles. The congruence theorem has be-
litical institutions, for instance when popular movements come the most axiomatic assumption of the political
expelled rulers who were considered tyrants (Finer 1999: culture school.
Vol. II). But the idea of ‘civic agency’ became unrealistic
in the subsequent eras of Roman imperialism and medi-
eval feudalism, falling into oblivion for centuries. Empha- KEY POINTS
sis on the importance of civic agency became widespread
● There is a historical model of the society–regime link
again only when the liberal revolutions of early modern
times and the first political mass movements brought the running from social structures to legitimacy beliefs to
people back in as agents of change. Thus, some 2000 years prevailing regimes.
after Aristotle, Montesquieu (1748) argued in De l’Esprit ● In the dictatorial version, vertical social structures nur-
des Lois that whether a nation is constituted as a tyranny, ture authoritarian beliefs that legitimize dictatorship.
a monarchy, or a republic depends on the prevalence of ● In the democratic version, horizontal social structures nur-
servile, honest, or egalitarian orientations among the ture egalitarian beliefs that in turn legitimize democracy.
people. Likewise, Tocqueville (1835) reasoned in De la

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CHAPTER 17 POLITICAL CULTURE 289

representatives of various groups position themselves.

The question of citizens’ From this positioning, they draw conclusions about
democratic maturity whether or not the proposal is in their own interest. What
is important for people to make reasonable choices, then,
Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture study (1963) had an is to have ready access to reliable clues.
immense influence on subsequent political culture re- The theory of informational shortcuts shifts the bur-
search. Comparing two old democracies (UK and US), den of democratic rationality from the expertise of the
two then young democracies (Italy and Germany), and citizens to the quality of the intermediary system. To be
a developing nation (Mexico), this study aimed to iden- capable of making reasonable choices, the citizens do not
tify the psychological attributes of a culture that sustains themselves need to become political experts. All that is
democracy. In identifying these attributes, the authors needed is political pluralism, which involves easily iden-
emphasized two concepts: civic competence and civic tifiable group clues that work as reliable informational
allegiance. shortcuts (Dalton 2006: 20–31).
Like most scholars, Almond and Verba assumed that Another phenomenon that weakens the criticism of
democracies put higher demands on the citizens than incompetent citizens in post-industrial societies is what
authoritarian forms of government. For democracy re- came to be known as ‘cognitive mobilization’ (Inglehart
quires voluntary participation in the political process, 1977; Dalton 2004: 20–31). Scholars argue that rising lev-
at least in elections, to fill positions of power. Even in a els of education, the expansion of intellectual tasks in the
limited democracy that restricts mass participation to growing knowledge sector, and the increasing exposure
elections, citizens must understand the electoral process. to informational diversity have all contributed to expand
They must be capable of evaluating what the governing people’s ability to arrive at independent judgements of
parties have done, and what the alternatives are, in order given matters. People’s factual political knowledge might
to make reasonable choices in an election. If these condi- not have significantly increased in post-industrial societ-
tions are not met, the electoral process will be irrational ies (Wattenberg 2006), but their skills in acquiring infor-
and democracy itself is a flawed idea. Thus civic compe- mation and processing it have certainly grown through
tence is a fundamental precondition for democracy to be cognitive mobilization. Thus ordinary people have be-
meaningful. come more capable of making independent judgements.
Since then the field has explored citizens’ politi- One piece of evidence that clearly supports this inter-
cal competence. To examine cognitive competence, pretation is the so-called ‘Flynn effect’: in all populations
researchers have developed survey questions asking among whom IQ tests have been carried out repeatedly
people about their political knowledge (Zaller 1992). for many years, one finds a significant, continuous, and in
Inspired by an influential study by Converse (1964), many cases remarkable increase in test scores over recent
scores of researchers demonstrated low levels of politi- decades (Flynn 2007).
cal knowledge even among the electorates of the most Civic competence has not only an objective cognitive
advanced democracies (McClosky and Brill 1983). component, but also a subjective perceptual component.
Quite often, it was concluded from such studies that one Subjective political competence was defined by Almond
should not burden democracy with too high expecta- and Verba (1963: Chapter 8) as people feeling that they un-
tions because the democratic process easily overwhelms derstand the political process and the belief that they can
most people’s capacities. These conclusions then served participate in meaningful ways, and—when they do so—
as a justification for elite-guided, strictly representa- that it helps to change things for the better. Certainly citi-
tive versions of democracy. This position rejected any zens can grossly misperceive their political competence.
attempt at extending democracy into a more mass- But, whether misperceived or not, subjective competence
participative version. Indeed, mass apathy was consid- is a political orientation that has significant consequences,
ered a stabilizing feature of democracy (Crozier et al. for people who feel competent and efficacious about what
1975; Dye and Ziegler 1970). they can contribute are more likely to participate in poli-
The description of modern mass publics as insuf- tics. They have a stronger sense of agency, which generally
ficiently competent has not remained unquestioned motivates action (Verba et al. 1995).
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Lupia and McCubbins
1998). Invoking the theory of informational shortcuts,
KEY POINTS
scholars argue that the demands for voter competence
are more modest than the critics of voter sophistication ● Democracies put a higher burden on citizens’ informa-
suggest. Politics is a remote area that ranks low in most tion-processing capacities than other regimes.
people’s daily priorities, so people economize the time ● Cognitive mobilization and other processes related to
they invest to obtain the information needed to make the rise of knowledge societies seem to have improved
reasonable judgements. Instead of studying given policy citizens’ information-processing abilities.
proposals in detail, most people pay attention to how the

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290 CHRISTIAN WELZEL AND RONALD INGLEHART 

realignments to new actors and parties, if the principle of

The allegiance model of the representation is to continue to work.
democratic citizen As a consequence, the allegiance model holds that
democracy is in danger when party–voter alignments
As much as Almond and Verba’s (1963) Civic Culture decrease in general. Three decades of growing evidence
study emphasized civic competence, it also emphasized from cross-national survey data seem to suggest that ex-
the importance of civic allegiance. In contrast with actly this has been happening throughout post-industrial
competence, allegiance is an affective mode of orienta- societies (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000).
tion. A minimum of civic competence is thought to be
necessary to make the democratic process rational. But KEY POINTS
the democratic process not only needs to be rational;
● The allegiance model of the ideal democratic citizen fa-
in order to survive, democracy also needs to be widely
accepted and to be seen as the most desirable way to vours the limitation of citizen political activity to elite-
organize politics. Accordingly, Almond and Verba con- mandating forms of participation.
sidered a basic sense of allegiance to the norms, institu-
tions, and actors of democracy as an attribute of the ideal
democratic citizen.
The emphasis on allegiance was inspired by Easton’s Party–voter dealignment
(1965) concept of political support. Easton thought that,
because modern polities mobilize the masses into poli- The allegiance model of citizenship came under strain
tics, these polities need mass support. This is particu- with the emergence of protest politics and new social
larly true of democracies, which allow collective actors movements in the late 1960s. Scholars who believed
to compete for power—which involves the possibility of that democracy suffers from mass mobilization out-
voting anti-democratic actors into office who might then side institutionalized channels viewed this develop-
abandon democracy. To minimize this possibility, mass ment with alarm, fearing that government would be
support for democracy must be sufficiently widespread overloaded with excessive demands by publics who
that anti-democratic forces have little chance of win- were too highly mobilized. It was argued that civic
ning elections. In a stable democracy, citizen disaffection mobilization outside the channels of representative
must be limited to particular policies and specific actors; institutions will render governments unable to fulfil
it must not turn into dissatisfaction with the democratic increasingly inflated mass demands. This will disap-
process and the basic principles of democracy, especially point the citizens and democratic institutions will fall
representation. Democracy can cope with low levels of into disfavour. Thus the emergence of a legitimacy
‘specific’ support for concrete policies and particular ac- crisis and a governability crisis were predicted as the
tors, but it cannot cope with the absence of ‘diffuse’ sup- consequence of increasingly elite-challenging masses
port for its basic norms, principles, and institutions. (Crozier et al. 1975).
Among scholars concerned with political support, the However, the first comparative empirical study of pro-
ideal democratic citizen is usually seen as a person who test politics reached different conclusions (Barnes and
takes part in elections and other forms of elite-mandating Kaase 1979). Based on surveys of representative samples
participation that are necessary to make representation in the US, Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Aus-
work. But the ideal citizen is not supposed to become ac- tria, and other countries, the study found that:
tive in non-institutionalized ways that challenge represen-
(1) protest participants had higher levels of formal educa-
tatives. This is because representation is the constitutive
tion and greater political skills, and felt more effica-
principle of modern democracies. To retain legitimacy,
cious than non-participants;
this principle needs reliable party–voter alignments. This
requires voters to be loyal to representatives once they (2) protest participants emphasized democratic norms
have been voted into office. Allegiant democratic citizens more strongly, not less strongly, than non-participants;
do not disobey or oppose decisions made by democrati- (3) protest participants were in general more engaged
cally elected representatives. They accept the leadership and active than non-participants.
role of their representatives and when they are not in line
with their policies, they respond by changing their politi- Parallel studies on new social movements in the fields
cal alignment. The allegiance model holds that allegiant of environmental protection, gender equality, human
democratic citizens must operate within party–voter rights, fair trade, and equal opportunities obtained simi-
alignments. They can change their alignment but not op- lar findings (Tarrow 1998; McAdam et al. 2001; Dalton,
erate in a free-floating space outside alignments. In the van Sickle, and Weldon 2009). This line of research has
allegiant model, specific support for particular actors and helped reshape our understanding of protest behaviour
parties is allowed to erode but it must be compensated by and its role in democratic politics.

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CHAPTER 17 POLITICAL CULTURE 291

For a long time the predominant explanation of elite- KEY POINTS

challenging mass activities was influenced by depriva-
tion theories designed to explain violent mass upheavals ● Party–voter dealignment and other processes of group
(Gurr 1970). But collective violence is a way of express- dealignment linked to post-industrial individualization
ing dissent that differs fundamentally from the peaceful trends have eroded the allegiance model of democratic
forms of mass protest observed in post-industrial societ- citizenship.
ies since the late 1960s. Still, the assumption of depriva-
tion theories that some sense of grievance and frustration
motivates protest behaviour strongly influenced the ini-
tial views on the rising protest movements in post-in- The assertive model of the
dustrial societies. But what is true for the supporters of democratic citizen
violent activities—that frustration about social margin-
alization is a prime motivation—is not true for peaceful Rising emancipative values
forms of dissent in advanced post-industrial societies. It
is not marginalized parts of the population and the peo- The rise of post-industrial societies nurtures elite-
ple who are most deprived of basic resources who consti- challenging mass activities in two ways. On one hand, it
tute the mass base for elite-challenging activities. Rather, increases the participatory resources that enable people
it is those who have relatively high levels of participatory to initiate and sustain the kinds of activities that put pres-
resources, including the skills, education, and networks sure on elites. On the other hand, it is conducive to value
that enable them to launch or join in various campaign changes that bring increasing emphasis on emancipatory
activities (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Verba et al. 1995; attitudes that motivate people to make their voices heard.
Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2009). Both objectively and subjectively, post-industrial mass
Post-industrial society (Bell 1973) has been linked publics are more likely to keep elites under sustained
with rising levels of formal education, more easily acces- pressure to respond to their demands.
sible information, improved means of communication This process was described in Inglehart’s Silent Revo-
and mobility, and wider opportunities to connect peo- lution (1977). The author argues that post-industrial
ple across the boundaries of locality, ethnicity, religion, society brings ‘existential security’, which is conducive to
or class (Inkeles and Smith 1975). These processes have a rising emphasis on post-materialist values. These values
increased the part of the population possessing the par- give high priority to participation and freedom of expres-
ticipatory resources that are key to the campaign activi- sion. At the same time, post-industrial society advances
ties nurturing social movements and mass pressures on the process of cognitive mobilization that makes people
elites. Surprising as it may seem, societies that are most increasingly skilled in expressing their preferences and
advanced in providing their populations with long, se- making themselves heard.
cure, prosperous, and entertaining lives show the highest In his subsequent work, Inglehart (1990, 1997) argues
rates of protest activity. In other words, people are more that post-materialist priorities are part of a broader syn-
likely to initiate and sustain civic forms of protest activity drome of ‘self-expression values’ whose components are
when their objective living conditions are more comfort- held together by an emphasis on freedom of choice and
able, not more miserable (Welzel et al.2005). equality of opportunities. Since self-expression values
This is surprising only if one believes that raising are a broad phenomenon that permeates a wide range
one’s voice results from suffering. This can and does of life domains, it can be measured by various combina-
happen, of course, but then it is often an eruptive and tions of attitudes. Inglehart and his collaborators have
violent outbreak of collective frustration that implodes continued to improve the measurement of these values
as quickly as it surfaced. Suburban riots illustrate this using data from the World Values Survey (www.world-
pattern (Snow 2006). Misery-induced types of protest valuessurvey.org). The most refined and updated mea-
are more radical in form but usually not sustainable surement of these values has recently been presented
over time because the most deprived lack in many ways by Welzel (2013) under the label ‘emancipative values’.
the resources needed to express dissent repeatedly and These values focus on the four emancipatory goals out-
continuously. Moderate, yet continuous, forms of pro- lined in endnote 2:
test activity are more prevalent where people have the
(1) an emphasis on voice reflected in post-materialist pri-
capability to mount and sustain pressures and where
orities that give people more say in important govern-
they have adopted the critical attitudes that motivate
ment decisions and how things are done at their jobs
the expression of dissent. As Inglehart (1977, 1990,
and in their communities, and for protecting freedom
1997) has argued, the transition from industrial to post-
of speech;
industrial societies increases both factors, enabling as
well as motivating citizens to put elites under increas- (2) an emphasis on choice reflected in the acceptance of
ingly effective mass pressures. divorce, abortion, and homosexuality;

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292 CHRISTIAN WELZEL AND RONALD INGLEHART 

(3) an emphasis on equality reflected in support for Empowering socio-economic context:

women having equal access to education, work, and ACTION CAPACITIES
power;
(4) an emphasis on autonomy reflected in support for in-
Empowering sociocultural context:
dependence and imagination, but not obedience, as EMANCIPATIVE VALUES
important qualities for children to learn.

The average position of national populations on the index Empowering political regime:
of emancipative values varies between a score of 0.22 for DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS
Iraq and 0.75 for Sweden. All ninety-five populations in-
cluded in the WVS show single-peaked and mean-centred
distributions on this index of emancipative values. HUMAN EMPOWERMENT:
An empowering political regime in an
As Flanagan and Lee (2003) show, modern values such
empowering social context
as these grow stronger with the rise of post-industrial
societies. This type of society satisfies most people’s
fundamental survival needs and expands their capaci- Figure 17.2 The human empowerment concept
ties to exercise freedoms. Thus, freedoms gain in utility
in a very objective sense. As people become aware of
this they emphasize freedoms more, which is reflected choices for them. But this decline in elite-mandating ac-
in stronger emancipative values. With growing emanci- tivities is only one side of the coin. The other side is an
pative values, democratic institutions that allow people increase in activities linked to the new assertive model
to exercise freedoms obtain an increasing impact on of citizenship. Citizens are less attracted by those parts
people’s life satisfaction (Inglehart et al. 2008; Welzel and of the democratic process that are designed to mandate
Inglehart 2010). elites. They are more attracted to activities in which they
Based on prior work by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), express themselves and challenge elites. This is part of the
Welzel (2013) theorizes that the close connection that ties explanation why Norris (2002) in Democratic Phoenix
emancipative values to socio-economic development, on finds various forms of self-initiated and elite-challenging
the one hand, and effective democracy, on the other hand, activities to be on a long-term rise.
constitutes a ‘human empowerment framework’. In this The assertive model of citizenship has far-reaching
framework (see Figure 17.2), socio-economic development consequences, some of which are outlined below. These
empowers people on the level of abilities by widening the consequences are strikingly evident from the temporally
means, skills, and opportunities that enable them to ex- and spatially widest exploration into political culture ever
ercise democratic freedoms. Self-expression values em- carried out, the WVS.
power people on the level of motivations by increasing
the priority they give to exercising democratic freedoms. KEY POINTS
Finally, effective democracy empowers people on the level
● As part of a broader process of human empowerment,
of entitlements by giving them the rights to exercise demo-
emancipative values have been on the rise throughout
cratic freedoms. The common theme of human empower-
post-industrial societies during the past decades.
ment underlies these three elements, so that democracy
becomes increasingly effective in response to people’s
growing motivation to exercise freedoms, which in turn
reflects their growing ability to do so.
In line with the human empowerment model, eman-
Criticality and disaffection
cipative values have been on the rise throughout the As outlined by Nevitte (1996) in Decline of Deference and
post-industrial world, as Figure 17.3 illustrates. And, in- by Norris (1999) in Critical Citizens, the value changes
creasingly emancipative publics emphasize new citizen- that accompany the post-industrial transformation of
ship norms (Dalton 2008). As Dalton and Welzel (2013) modern societies make people increasingly critical of in-
note, rising emancipative values turn allegiant citizens stitutionalized authority over them. Indeed, all societies
into assertive citizens for whom the role of a loyal and for which survey data are available over a considerable
obedient follower of elected elites loses appeal. This is time series show a decline of people’s confidence in hierar-
a major reason why Putnam (2000) observes in Bowl- chically structured mass organizations and in institutions
ing Alone a decline in various types of civic activities, that exert authority over people, as Dalton (2004) dem-
including participation in elections and voluntary work onstrates in Democratic Choices—Democratic Challenges.
in a number of formal associations. Most of these activi- This tendency affects representative institutions di-
ties are linked with the allegiance model of citizenship in rectly, because the principle of representation is designed
which citizens are supposed to mandate elites to make to transfer authority from the people to institutions.

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CHAPTER 17 POLITICAL CULTURE 293

0.70
0.68 40–50 years
0.66 old people
0.64 in 2005 2005
0.62
0.60 Mean in 2005
Gain due to 25 years
0.58
cohort difference at
0.56 the same time
0.54
0.52 +.15
Emancipative Values

0.50
0.48
0.46 Gain due to 25 years
Mean in 1980 time difference in
0.44
the same cohort
0.42
0.40 40–50 years
1980
0.38 old people
0.36 in 1980
0.34
Mean range
0.32
of 1 SD per
0.30
birth cohort
0.28
0.26
0.24
0.22
0.20
before 1921 1921–30 1931–40 1941–50 1951–60 1961–70 1971–80 after 1980
Birth Cohorts

Figure 17.3 The rise of emancipative values in post-industrial societies

Note: Evidence based on samples from Australia, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, US, and UK. Each sample weighted to a size of N = 1000.
Source: WVS I (1981–3) and WVS V (2005–7).

Accordingly, rates of confidence in parliaments and iden- channels, they are gaining a growing sense of efficacy
tification with political parties have shown a long-term about their ability to shape their lives. This rising sense
decline (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). These tendencies of ‘civic agency’ seems to be a consequence of the acti-
seem to be most pronounced in societies where emanci- vating tendencies linked with rising emancipative values.
pative values have become strongest. As Inglehart et al. (2008) demonstrate, throughout post-
In keeping with these findings, the evidence in industrial societies, people have been developing a rising
Figure 17.4 shows that individuals with stronger emancipa- sense of efficacy.
tive values have lower ‘vertical’ trust in institutions of order This has important implications for a society’s capac-
(i.e. the police and the military) but higher ‘horizontal’ trust ity to initiate and sustain elite-challenging actions, and
in their fellow citizens. This tendency is most pronounced thus for democratic mass power. It is known from protest
in ‘strongly emancipative’ societies in which emancipa- mobilization research that some sort of grievance pro-
tive values are most widespread: individuals with the same vides an important motivation for the mass actions that
scores on these values show lower levels of vertical trust challenge elites (Klandermans 1997). But grievance is
and higher levels of horizontal trust when they live in soci- only a necessary but not sufficient condition to motivate
eties where emancipative values are more widespread. people to elite-challenging actions. When grievance goes
together with low feelings of efficacy, it results in resig-
nation and passivity. Only when grievance goes together
Efficacious and elite- with strong feelings of efficacy do people feel encouraged
to actively express their concerns in public. Hence, the
challenging publics combination of grievance with a growing sense of agency
These trends are reshaping political life. As people be- has a powerful effect on a public’s tendency to initiate and
come more dissatisfied with politics in representative sustain elite-challenging activities.

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294 CHRISTIAN WELZEL AND RONALD INGLEHART 

0.70 EV01: Emancipative values 0 to .10

EV02: Emancipative values .11 to .20

STRONG
0.68
EV01 EV03: Emancipative values .21 to .30
0.66 EV04: Emancipative values .31 to .40
EV05: Emancipative values .41 to .50
0.64 EV06: Emancipative values .51 to .60

We
EV02 EV07: Emancipative values .61 to .70

akl
0.62
EV08: Emancipative values .71 to .80

yE
EV03
EV09: Emancipative values .81 to .90

ma
0.60
EV04 EV10: Emancipative values .91 to 1.0

nci
0.58

pat
EV03

iv
0.56 EV05

eS
EV04

ocie
0.54 EV05
ti
es EV06 EV06
Vertical Trust

0.52 EV07
0.50 EV08
EV07
0.48 Str
ong
ly E EV09
0.46 EV08 ma
nci
pat
0.44 ive
Soc
ieti
0.42 es
EV10
0.40
0.38
0.36
0.34
MODE
WEAK

0.32
0.30
0.30 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.400.420.440.460.48 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.600.620.640.660.680.70

WEAK Horizontal Trust STRONG

Figure 17.4 Emancipative values, vertical trust, and horizontal trust

Notes: ‘Weakly emancipative societies’ score below 0.33 scale points; they include Burkina Faso, China, Egypt,
Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Morocco, Russia, Rwanda, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and
Vietnam. ‘Strongly emancipative societies’ score above 0.5 scale points; they include Andorra, Argentina,
Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany (West and East), Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US, and Uruguay. All national samples are weighted to equal size
(N = 1000).
Horizontal axis ranges from a theoretical minimum of zero when no respondent in a society reports trust in other
people to a theoretical maximum of 1.0 when each respondent reports trust.
Vertical axis ranges from a theoretical minimum of zero when each respondent in a society reports no confidence
at all in the police, the army, and the civil service to a theoretical maximum of 1.0 when each respondent in a soci-
ety reports a great deal of confidence in each of these institutions.

Indeed, as the evidence in Figure 17.5 indicates,

KEY POINTS
individuals with stronger emancipative values have
a stronger sense of agency and a stronger affinity to Emancipative values make citizens:
elite-challenging actions. Again, this tendency is more ● more critical of and disloyal to representative institutions;
pronounced in societies where emancipative values are ● more efficacious and elite-challenging in their political
more widespread. actions.

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CHAPTER 17 POLITICAL CULTURE 295

0.80

STRONG 0.75 EV10

s
ietie
0.70

Soc
0.65

tive
cipa
EV09
0.60

n
Ema
ngly
0.55
EV08

Stro
Action Tendency

0.50

0.45 EV07
EV08
0.40
EV06
s
tie

EV07
cie

0.35
So

EV05
ive

EV06
at

0.30 EV04
cip
an
Em

EV05
0.25
ly

EV04
k

EV03
ea
W

EV03
0.20
EV02
WEAK

0.15
EV01
0.10
0.50 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.80

WEAK Sense of Agency STRONG

Figure 17.5 Emancipative values, agency, and action tendencies

Notes: Horizontal axis ranges from a theoretical minimum of zero when each respondent in a society reports hav-
ing no choice at all about how his/her life turns out to a theoretical maximum of 1.0 when each respondent of a
society reports having a great deal of choice about how his/her life turns out.
Vertical axis ranges from a theoretical minimum of zero when each respondent of a society reports not having not
participated in a petition, boycott, or demonstration to a theoretical maximum of 1.0 when each respondent in a
society reports having participated in each of these activities.

Democracy: more liberal WVS. These questions ask people to indicate, among ten
understanding, more critical different characteristics, whether they consider them es-
sential characteristics of democracy, using a scale from 1
assessment (‘not at all a defining element of democracy’) to 10 (‘ab-
With rising emancipative values, the democratic idea that solutely a defining element of democracy’). These items
power belongs to the people resonates more strongly in a include liberal characteristics, such as free elections, civil
society. This has two consequences. First, people’s under- liberties, and equal rights. However, they also include
standing of democracy becomes more liberal: people base populist issues, such as punishing criminals harshly or
their definition of democracy more on the freedoms that having economic prosperity, and outright anti-liberal
empower people and less on strong leadership and popu- items, such as military takeovers. When one examines
lar policy outcomes such as order and prosperity. This is how people define democracy, it is clear that emphasis on
demonstrated by the results from a battery of questions ‘liberal’ characteristics is linked with stronger emphasis
fielded for the first time in the most recent round of the on emancipative values (see Figure 17.6).

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296 CHRISTIAN WELZEL AND RONALD INGLEHART 

0.80

STRONG
EV10
0.75

EV09

ies
iet
0.70

c
So
e
tiv
EV08

ipa
0.65

c
an
Em
EV07

ly
ng
ro
0.60

St
Cosmopolitanism

EV08
0.55 EV06

s EV05
EV07
ietie

0.50 EV04
Soc

EV05
EV06
EV04
ive
ipat

0.45 EV03
EV03
anc
Em

0.40 EV02
kly
Wea

EV01
0.35
WEAK

0.30
0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70

WEAK Out-group Trust STRONG

Figure 17.6 Emancipative values, out-group trust, and cosmopolitanism

Notes: Horizontal axis ranges from a theoretical minimum of zero, when each respondent in a society reports no
trust at all in people one meets for the first time, people of a different nationality, and people of a different reli-
gion, to a theoretical maximum of 1.0, when each respondent in a society reports complete trust in each of these
three groups of people.
Vertical axis has a theoretical minimum of zero when each respondent in a society supports an ethnocentric
form of citizenship (‘having ancestors from my country’), rejects ethnic diversity, and emphasizes identity
societies that establish group boundaries (locality, nation) at the expense of societies that defy such boundaries
(individual, world). The theoretical maximum is 1.0 when each respondent in society holds opposite attitudes on
each of these three accounts.

It is also true that people who emphasize emancipative deviate from the ‘objective’ expert ratings that Freedom
values assess their society’s actual level of democracy House assigns that country. One can interpret these dis-
more critically than others. This becomes evident when crepancies as indications of an uncritical versus critical
one uses Freedom House’s expert ratings of democracy assessment of democracy. The more a respondent over-
as an indicator. The 2007 round of the WVS asked peo- rates his/her country’s level of democracy relative to the
ple to rate their country’s level of democracy on a scale expert ratings, the more ‘uncritical’ is the democracy
from 1 (‘not at all democratic’) to 10 (‘fully democratic’). assessment. Vice versa, the more a respondent under-
If one compares people’s democracy ratings of their rates his/her country’s level of democracy relative to
country with the ratings that Freedom House assigns the expert ratings, the more critically he/she assesses
it, one finds that their ‘subjective’ personal ratings often democracy.

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CHAPTER 17 POLITICAL CULTURE 297

Comparing these ratings, it becomes clear that people stronger altruistic values. Apparently, emancipative
with stronger emancipative values assess their coun- values merge individualism and altruism into what one
try’s state of democracy more critically than people with might call humanism.
other values (see Figure 17.6). Objectively, people who These findings seem paradoxical if one equates indi-
emphasize emancipative values are more likely to live vidualism with selfishness, which is a widespread mis-
in democracies than those who do not. But people with conception. Scholars often think of collectivism as the
emancipative values assess their own society’s level of basis of human solidarity and of individualism as its
democracy more critically than others. Again, the ten- enemy (Triandis 2001). In fact, however, individualism
dency is more pronounced—in this case, much more does not destroy solidarity but places it on a different
pronounced—in strongly emancipative than in weakly basis. This was recognized early on by sociologists such
emancipative societies. as Durkheim (1893/1988) and Tonnies (1887/1955). They
described the individualization trend of modernity as
bringing a transition from ‘mechanical’ solidarity to ‘or-
Wider circles of solidarity and trust ganic’ solidarity or from ‘community’ to ‘association’. Both
One of the most surprising findings from this body of re- descriptions refer to a transition from externally imposed
search is that rising emphasis on emancipative values is solidarity to internally chosen forms of solidarity. Beck
not linked with greater selfishness, as Flanagan and Lee (2002) describes the solidarity effects of individualization
(2003) assume. On the contrary, the evidence is clear in similar terms, speaking of a transition from ‘communi-
that stronger emphasis on emancipative values widens ties of necessity’ to ‘elective affinities’. Empirical research
the circle of others with whom people build up a sense of of interpersonal networks supports the view that modern
solidarity ( Welzel 2010). individualized societies integrate people into more wide-
Emancipative values are weak when pressing existen- spread and more diverse solidarity networks (Wellman
tial conditions force people into bonding behaviour, in and Frank 2001).
which people ally with members of their in-group while Collectivism means that people see others not as au-
discriminating against members of out-groups (Tajfel tonomous individuals but as group members by birth
1970). When more favourable existential conditions give (Triandis 2001). When group categorization domi-
rise to emancipative values, group boundaries become nates people’s views of others, people tend to privilege
more variegated, porous, and permeable (Simmel 1908 members of their own group and discriminate against
[1984]). This diminishes both the forcefulness of intra- members of other groups (Tajfel 1970). Collectivism in
group harmony and the fierceness of inter-group conflict, this sense is a form of group-egoism that hinders the
allowing people to overcome bonding behaviour and to creation of solidarities beyond group boundaries. Indi-
engage in bridging behaviour. This process places human vidualism, by contrast, means that one does not consider
solidarity on a different basis. Familiarity, belongingness, others as members of groups in the first place but as au-
and alikeness with others become less important, while tonomous individuals. This orientation provides a com-
mutually agreed interests and empathy with the situation mon ground—personhood—on which one can place all
of others become more important factors in creating a people equally. Consequently, individualism and altru-
sense of solidarity. Group affinity becomes more intrinsi- ism go together with emphasis on emancipative values
cally chosen and less externally enforced. ( Welzel 2010).
Evidence supporting these claims is provided by the
2005–7 round of the WVS which uses a trust battery of KEY POINTS
items to distinguish between ‘in-group’ trust (towards re-
lated and familiar others) and ‘out-group’ trust (towards Emancipative values make citizens:
unrelated and dissimilar others).Another set of questions ● more liberal in their understanding of democracy and

makes it possible to measure cosmopolitanism by the ex- more critical in the assessment of its operation,
tent to which people (1) reject a xenophobic notion of ● more open and tolerant in their attitude towards
citizenship, (2) tolerate ethnic diversity, and (3) define out-groups.
themselves by identity categories that transcend rather
than establish group boundaries. Analysing the responses
to these questions, Figure 17.7 demonstrates that people
with strong emancipative values have stronger out-group Emancipative values as a
trust and a more cosmopolitan orientation. Once again,
these tendencies are most pronounced in societies with a
democratizing motivational force
strong emphasis on emancipative values. If one examines the aggregate levels of emancipative val-
Similarly, Welzel (2010) finds that stronger emanci- ues of an entire society, these values appear to be a good
pative values not only go together with stronger indi- indicator of its quality of life on various dimensions. On
vidualistic values (which is not surprising) but also with the one hand, this is evident from the fact that these

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298 CHRISTIAN WELZEL AND RONALD INGLEHART 

0.70

CRITICAL
0.65

EV09 EV10
EV07 EV08
0.60
s
EV06 etie
S oci
0.55 EV05 tive
ipa
manc
EV04
ly E
ong
EV03 Str
0.50
Rating of Democracy

0.45

0.40
EV08
EV07
0.35 EV06
EV04 s
ietie
EV05 S oc
EV02
0.30 ive
i p at
UNCRITICAL

EV03 a nc
EV01 Em
0.25 kly
ea
W

0.20
0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90

NON-LIBERAL Definition of Democracy LIBERAL

Figure 17.7 Emancipative values, understandings of democracy, and assessments of democracy

Notes: Horizontal axis has a theoretical minimum of zero when each respondent in a society considers free
elections, civil liberties, equal rights, and referendums not at all an essential characteristic of democracy, while
considering military takeovers, religious authority, punishing criminals, and prosperity absolutely essential
characteristics of democracy. The theoretical maximum is at 1.0 when each respondent of a society takes the exact
opposite position.
Vertical axis has a theoretical minimum of zero when each respondent in a society rates his/her country as absolutely
democratic while Freedom House gives it the lowest political rights and civil liberties rating in the year of the survey.
The theoretical maximum is at 1.0 when each respondent in a society rates his/her country not at all democratic
while Freedom House gives it the highest political rights and civil liberties rating in the year of the survey.

values are closely associated with almost any indicator with emancipative values at the mass level (Inglehart and
of socio-economic development, as Inglehart and Welzel Welzel 2005: 151). Here the causal relationship seems to
(2005: 150) have demonstrated. As they argue, this rela- operate in a different direction. Emancipative values do
tionship exists because the fading of existential threats not primarily result from democratic and accountable
on a mass level tends to give rise to emancipative values. governance; the stronger causal flow seems to reflect
An equally strong relationship exists between eman- the fact that increasing emphasis on emancipative val-
cipative values and indicators of the quality of a society’s ues motivates elite-challenging mass actions, which help
institutions. Measures of democracy and of ‘good gover- to remove authoritarian elites from power and to make
nance’, including rule of law, absence of corruption, and democratic elites behave in a more responsive manner
accountable governance, all correlate strongly positively ( Welzel 2007: 417–18). Thus emancipative mass values

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CHAPTER 17 POLITICAL CULTURE 299

constitute an important motivational force in bring-

ing about democracy where it does not yet exist and in
Trust, confidence,
strengthening it where it is already in place. and social capital
Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (1993) paid renewed
Implicit regime affinities and attention to the political culture approach in compara-
explicit regime preferences tive politics. In stark contrast with neo-institutional
approaches, his study seemed to demonstrate that dif-
Emancipative values are inherently conducive to demo- ferences in the design of institutions can be ignored and
cratic institutions because they emphasize autonomous that civic traditions account for most of the differences in
choice in all domains of life, including the political. This im- explaining a community’s democratic performance.
plies a rejection of unlimited authority over people, making For good reasons, Putnam’s understanding of social
authoritarian systems seem illegitimate. Because of this, capital emphasizes psychological orientations that fa-
emancipative values have an inherently pro-democratic cilitate human interaction. The orientation supposed
regime affinity. The civil and political freedoms that define to be most instrumental in this respect is interpersonal
democracy intuitively resonate with these values. trust. Trust is understood to overcome collective action
Because they are anchored in people’s values, regime dilemmas, for people who trust others do not see them-
affinities have strong motivational power, even though selves in the prisoner’s dilemma when interacting with
these affinities are only implicit. Regime preferences, by people (Uslaner 2001). Hence, interpersonal trust shapes
contrast, are explicit but their motivational effects are the collective action capacity of a society. It enables the
uncertain. In surveys, people express a preference for de- masses to initiate and sustain the actions that put elites
mocracy for many reasons. It might be that they are influ- under popular pressure and make them responsive.
enced by the current social desirability of the term or that Interpersonal trust certainly increases a society’s collec-
they prefer democracy simply because they associate it tive action capacity. But it does not tell us for which ends
with other desirable things, such as prosperity, peace, and this capacity will be used because purely by itself trust is
low corruption (Inglehart 2003). In these cases the moti- not directed towards a particular end, such as democratic
vation to prefer democracy is not based on an intrinsic freedoms. This is often overlooked in theories of trust.
valuation of the freedoms that define democracy, making However, research based on the WVS shows that trust
it unlikely that these preferences strongly motivate peo- matters mostly in conjunction with emancipative values,
ple to struggle for democratic freedoms. However, when not in isolation from them. In isolation from orientations
people value freedoms intrinsically, as they do when they that give trust a direction, trust does not show a strongly
emphasize emancipation, there is a strong motivation to pro-democratic effect, neither in helping to attain democ-
struggle for democratic freedoms as something good in racy nor in sustaining it (Welzel 2007: 405).
itself. In this case the emergence of effective mass pres- Another aspect of trust that has been considered im-
sures in support of these freedoms is more likely. portant for democracy is political trust, usually measured
Accordingly, Welzel (2013) finds that the implicit af- as confidence in a set of basic societal institutions, such
finities with democracy inherent in emancipative val- as the national parliament or the civil service (Newton
ues provide a stronger force in sustaining and attaining 2001). Inspired by the allegiance model of democratic
democracy than do explicit preferences for democracy. citizenship, scholars assume that in order to flourish,
Emancipative values motivate people to initiate and sus- democracy needs people who place trust in basic insti-
tain elite-challenging actions that mount effective pres- tutions. However, evidence that a society’s democratic
sure on power-holders, even if the political system is performance depends on the amount of the citizens’
undemocratic and confronts people with the risk of sup- political trust is non-existent. On the contrary, Welzel
pression ( Welzel 2007). (2007: 405) finds that higher political trust affects a soci-
From the perspective of this research, the mainstream ety’s democratic performance negatively, even after con-
in political culture research has been misguided in focus- trolling for a society’s democratic tradition and various
ing on measuring explicit regime preferences (asking if other factors. Accordingly, low levels, not high levels, of
people prefer democratic institutions) rather than intrin- political trust are conducive to democracy.
sic regime affinities based on given values. From the viewpoint of Norris’s Critical Citizens (1999),
this finding is not surprising. From this perspective, low
political trust can be interpreted as a widespread critical
KEY POINTS attitude towards authorities and such a critical attitude
● Emancipative values are a more valid indicator of true can be a source of the mass pressures that help to keep
mass demands for democracy than explicit regime pref- the elites responsive.
erences for democracy. When social capital is understood to include orienta-
tions that motivate people to initiate and sustain collective

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300 CHRISTIAN WELZEL AND RONALD INGLEHART 

actions, emancipative values should certainly be included Political economy or political culture?
in the notion of social capital. For these values motivate
people to undertake collective actions, especially the Both the political economy approach and the political cul-
elite-challenging actions that have been found to help ture approach argue that modernization works in favour
in bringing about and strengthening democracy. In that of democracy, but their claims contradict each other. From
sense, emancipative values constitute a particularly pro- the point of view of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), mod-
democratic form of social capital. ernization favours democracy because it brings growing
income equality and capital mobility that make democ-
racy more acceptable to elites. From the political culture
Conclusion viewpoint (Inglehart and Welzel 2005), modernization fa-
vours democracy because the masses become increasingly
effective in struggling for democracy, and increasingly
Declining social capital or growing motivated to demand democratization from the elites.
human empowerment? These opposing views reflect different understandings
of democracy and its motivating forces. In political econ-
Two main approaches exist for interpreting ongoing cul- omy it is thought that the driving force behind democracy
tural changes in post-industrial societies. Both of them is the demand of the impoverished masses for universal
view individualization as a key trend in post-industrial suffrage in order to obtain economic redistribution. It is
societies, but they interpret this trend in opposite ways. assumed that the masses profit from universal suffrage
Influenced by Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2000), the declin- because it enables them to impose redistributive poli-
ing social capital approach views individualization as a cies, and so their demand for democracy is a constant.
process that erodes trust between people, brings growing The privileged elites, in contrast, fear it for exactly the
selfishness, and diminishes collective action. This inter- same reason. Thus authoritarian regimes do not survive
pretation sees individualization as a threat to democracy. because the majority of the public does not prefer democ-
In contrast, the progressing human empowerment ap- racy—the majority always prefers democracy. Instead,
proach proposed by Welzel (2013) interprets individual- authoritarian regimes survive because elites are able to
ization as a positive trend that empowers people to shape repress the majority. Consequently, the only way democ-
their commitments, solidarities, and actions as they racy can be established is to make elites accept it and con-
prefer. This author sees individualization as conducive to cede it to the masses. Modernization tends to equalize the
democracy. income distribution so that mass demands for redistribu-
In our view, progressing human empowerment of- tion become less radical. As a consequence, democracy
fers an explanation that accounts for a wider range of becomes less threatening to the elites. Eventually, elites
phenomena than declining social capital. Some types of may come to see continuing repression of mass demands
association are indeed declining, and some types of col- for democracy as more costly than conceding democracy.
lective action are decreasing—but others are increasing. From a historical perspective, these assumptions seem
Declining social capital can only account for the decreas- doubtful. Throughout history, most authoritarian re-
ing part. Progressing human empowerment, in contrast, gimes did not survive mainly because of their ability to
explains both trends as opposite sides of the same coin. suppress dissenting majorities, but because until recently
Modernization transforms life from something dictated they were not confronted with well-organized and mo-
by needs into a life offering opportunities. This process tivated dissenting majorities. This reflects the fact that
makes people agents in shaping their lives. Accordingly, throughout most of pre-modern history the masses had
all kinds of commitments and activities that are imposed neither the capabilities nor the motivation to express
by external needs tend to decrease. But, by the same and organize political dissent (Gat 2006: 570–661; Nolan
token, all kinds of commitments and activities that are and Lenski 1999: 233–55). The major effect of modern-
nurtured by intrinsic choices tend to increase. The two ization is not that it makes democracy more acceptable to
are flip sides of the same coin. elites, but that it confronts elites with increasingly articu-
late, capable, and motivated masses. When the masses
become able and motivated to struggle for democratic
KEY POINTS
freedoms, the elites are left with little choice in the matter.
● With declining social capital, one can only explain the Moreover, it is not true that the masses invariably
downward trends in some political culture variables but prefer democracy. Throughout most of history, vast
not the upward trends in other political culture variables. numbers of people accepted such legitimating myths as
● With progressing human empowerment, one can ex- the divine right of kings. How strongly people take action
plain both the downward and upward trends in different in demanding democracy depends on their values—and
political culture variables. mass demands for democracy become stronger as peo-
ple place increasing emphasis on human freedom and

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CHAPTER 17 POLITICAL CULTURE 301

emancipation. The strength of mass demands for democ- freedom on the part of increasingly articulate, organized,
racy is definitely not a constant, as the political economy and motivated masses. Future research should clarify to
model assumes. Furthermore, it seems evident that the what extent these opposing emphases can be reconciled.
most recent wave of democratization was not simply mo-
tivated by mass desires for greater income equality. In the
KEY POINTS
ex-communist countries, regimes that provided high lev-
els of economic equality but low levels of freedom were ● The political economy approach argues that moderniza-
replaced by regimes that provide much less economic tion favours democracy because it makes democracy
equality but much higher levels of freedom. more acceptable in the eyes of the elites.
While political economists assume that the motivat- ● The political culture approach argues that moderniza-
ing force behind democracy is a mass desire for universal tion favours democracy because it confronts elites with
suffrage in order to obtain economic redistribution, from more capable and ambitious mass publics.
the political culture point of view it is largely a struggle for

Questions
1. Is culture or the economy more important for understanding 6. What is stated by the allegiance model of the democratic
political modernization? citizen?
2. What is the difference between norms, values, and beliefs? 7. How can one define social capital and trust?
3. Can one say that there are distinct national cultures? 8. How important are secular values in the modern world?
4. What is the difference between secular and emancipative 9. Does political culture affect the functioning of political insti-
values? tutions and how?
5. Do civilizations matter for politics? How compact are world 10. Are all cultures compatible with or conducive to democracy?
religions and major cultures?

Further reading
Almond, G. A. and Verba, S. (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Inglehart, R. (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization:
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies
Princeton University Press). (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Dalton, R. J. and Welzel, C. (2013) The Civic Culture Transformed: Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2003) Rising Tide: Gender
From Allegiant to Assertive Citizenship (New York: Cambridge Equality and Cultural Change Around the World (Cambridge:
University Press). Cambridge University Press).
Huntington, S. P. (1995) The Clash of Civilizations and the Putnam, R. D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in
Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster). Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Inglehart, R. (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values Putnam, R. D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of
and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ: American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster).
Princeton University Press). Welzel, C. (2013) Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the
Quest for Emancipation (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Web links
www.cses.org www.globalbarometer.org
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Global Barometers Project.

www.issp.org www.worldvaluessurvey.org
International Social Survey Program. World Values Surveys.

For additional material and resources, please visit the Online Resource Centre at:
www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/caramani3e

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