Rand Pea112-2

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 43

PERSPECTIVE

E X P E R T I N S I G H T S O N A T I M E LY P O L I C Y I S S U E
APRIL 2023

TRUTH DECAY AND


NATIONAL SECURITY
Intersections, Insights, and Questions for Future Research

HEATHER J. WILLIAMS AND CAITLIN MCCULLOCH

C O R P O R AT I O N
For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/PEA112-2.

About RAND

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the
world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest.

Research Integrity

Our mission to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis is enabled through our core values of quality and
objectivity and our unwavering commitment to the highest level of integrity and ethical behavior. To help ensure our research and analysis
are rigorous, objective, and nonpartisan, we subject our research publications to a robust and exacting quality-assurance process; avoid both
the appearance and reality of financial and other conflicts of interest through staff training, project screening, and a policy of mandatory
disclosure; and pursue transparency in our research engagements through our commitment to the open publication of our research findings
and recommendations, disclosure of the source of funding of published research, and policies to ensure intellectual independence. For more
information, visit www.rand.org/about/research-integrity.

RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

© 2023 RAND Corporation

is a registered trademark.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

ISBN: 978-1-9774-1083-2

Design: Jessica Arana

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights

This publication and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for
noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to its webpage on rand.org is encouraged.
Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research products for commercial purposes. For information
on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
R
ECOGNIZING TRUTH, AGREEING upon truth, and level, citizens are an increasingly recognized force in driving
proclaiming truth are relevant to American national foreign policy and often build foreign policy positions from
security in a multitude of ways. Agreement about partisan cues rather than objective facts. The current media
objective facts and confidence in the institutions environment further enables individuals to affirm preexisting
that produce them allow politicians to rely on Intelligence opinions. Truth Decay can drive elites and policymakers
Community reports, provide a foundation for trust among to more extreme positions, and the biases and opinions of
military units, allow policymakers to agree on foreign policy policymakers can have great impact on foreign policy. At an
crises even across the aisle, and enable great powers to main- institutional level, Truth Decay can harm the recruitment,
tain credibility in both their overtures of friendship and their retention, and morale of U.S. national security institutions—
threats to use force. In these ways and others, the trends that including the U.S. military and the Intelligence Community.
the RAND Corporation has labeled Truth Decay have impli- More polarized and less informed discourse in U.S. legislative
cations for national security. This Perspective serves as a and executive institutions can impair quick policy action,
preliminary examination of the many roles and the complex especially in crisis. At a societal level, Truth Decay can
intersection of Truth Decay and national security; in it, we diminish the United States’ ability to use national power, the
examine how eroding confidence in facts and fact-finding availability of resources to focus on national security, and the
institutions can affect U.S. national security. In addition U.S. resilience to homeland security threats. The United States
to framing these intersections, we examine whether Truth and its allies are also more vulnerable to these trends than many
Decay’s role in national security has changed over time and of the United States’ adversaries, where post-truth politics are
the impact of the changing definition of national security. common. But, ultimately, there is much about the interplay of
Truth Decay affects the United States on individual, Truth Decay’s trends that we still do not understand.
institutional, societal, and normative levels. On an individual

1
This work is intended to serve multiple purposes. The
first is understanding: to better explain the broad impacts KEY PURPOSES
of Truth Decay on American national security. The second is
to frame future research: both to highlight areas where gaps › How does Truth Decay impact
exist and future research could be most fruitful and to provide U.S. national security?
a framework for how that work would connect to the overarch-
ing strategic question. The third is response: to suggest what › What future research needs to be done?
actors are best positioned to address Truth Decay in national
security and potential mitigating initiatives. It is our hope that › How can we address this problem?
this work will demonstrate the importance of improving our
understanding of Truth Decay in national security and com-
bating the national security vulnerabilities it creates.

at both ends of the political spectrum. As discussed in RAND’s


Definitions previous Truth Decay work, polarization is one of the primary
drivers of Truth Decay, and erosion of civil discourse and
In this Perspective, we use the term Truth Decay as it is defined political paralysis are major consequences.
in RAND’s previous Truth Decay work. Truth Decay refers to a National security is a term not easily defined, especially
set of four related trends: (1) increasing disagreement about with regard to what the term encompasses. A textbook defini-
facts, (2) the blurring of the line between opinion and fact, tion is that national security “refers to the safeguarding of a
(3) the increasing volume and influence of opinion over fact, people, territory, and way of life” (Meese, Nielsen, and Sond-
and (4) declining trust in formerly respected sources of fact, heimer, 2018). This would include the narrowest sense of
such experts. For this project, we also looked for interactions national defense as the protection of the state from external
between Truth Decay and other trends, such as polarized or attack or overthrow. However, the range of what are consid-
partisan policymaking; the paralysis that partisanship can ered to be national security issues has expanded, as more
bring to the policymaking process; and the virulent spread of and more concerns are recognized as potential threats to
misinformation, pervasive conspiracy theories, and extremism the nation and its people. The concept of national security is
constantly evolving as social issues, such as environmental
change, migration, and public health, become more securitized
For a full discussion of the definition of Truth and framed as national security threats. While these concerns
Decay and more information about each are outside the traditional bounds of national security, they are
of these trends, please see Truth Decay: An potentially more disruptive to the American economy and
Initial Exploration of the Diminishing Role of social dynamics than traditional state actors—as evidenced by
Facts and Analysis in American Public Life, by
the COVID-19 pandemic. What is considered national security
Jennifer Kavanagh and Michael D. Rich.
can also evolve over time. For example, in 1993, President Bill

2
Clinton characterized environmental security as a national disagree on how to prioritize them—and opinions are nearly
security problem, but the subsequent Bush administration guaranteed to diverge on how to address them.
removed it from the national security portfolio (Floyd, 2010), The complexity of national security problems and the
and while this has continued to oscillate with changes in national security environment—and limited knowledge about
administration, the impacts of climate change on Americans’ the intentions and resolve of other players—can play into
way of life are increasingly evident. cognitive biases, a driver of Truth Decay. Policymakers may
Of course, many Truth Decay trends are not unique to the present some facts about national security issues, but they will
national security realm. In addition to the definitional issues often present, with similar confidence, their opinions about
discussed above, this makes it challenging to define the scope what the facts mean and what must be done about the threats.
of our inquiry. For most of this Perspective, we focus on the We live in a period when even America’s role in the
traditional, narrow conception of national security as national world is subject to debate (a debate that RAND has dedicated
defense, and principally against the threats posed from other a space for with its Center for Grand Strategy). Varied opin-
states. However, we have also included a section extending ions about how the United States should approach and shape
this discussion to less traditional areas that could be associ- the world are held both between the major political parties
ated with national security, such as natural disaster response, and within the political parties. Even expert judgment can
public health concerns, and refugee migration. Internal secu- vary dramatically. For example, Foreign Affairs features an
rity threats, particularly those posed by domestic extremist “Ask the Experts” column in which it polls leading scholars
movements, are particularly thorny. We have made a special on questions about the future (i.e., Will more states acquire
effort to include experts in disinformation and extremism in nuclear weapons?) and the past (i.e., Should NATO have been
our focus groups, but we leave the questions as to how these enlarged?), and the important consistency is that the experts
trends may be undermining the American way of life or the rarely agree. It is against this backdrop that Truth Decay is
societal fabric to other work. playing out.

Framing the Problem Methods and Information Sources

What are perceived as threats to national security and what In producing this Perspective, we drew on existing literature
national security strategy should be are not based entirely in and the wide breadth of expertise available within RAND.
fact: National security strategy blends facts, expert opinion, We conducted six focus groups and spoke to 33 RAND experts
and perspectives and beliefs. Although all Americans may on the overlap between Truth Decay and national security, both
agree on desired outcomes—a safe, prosperous, democratic, broadly and in their areas of focus. We additionally conducted
and free United States—Americans are not in agreement on nine follow-up interviews.1 We drew from a broad range of
how to best achieve these goals. Similarly, Americans may experts at RAND, including historians, political scientists,
generally align on what the threats to national security are but Grand Strategy specialists, regional specialists, military
experts, terrorism and extremism scholars, and nontradi-

3

Existing work relevant to this topic is
often siloed in different areas of academia,
the policy realm, and think tanks.

tional security experts, organizing the focus groups around (Parent and Uscinski, 2014). Existing scholarly literature
similar areas of expertise. We identified researchers with touches on the impact of Truth Decay on individuals, includ-
expertise in these areas, with one focus group allowing ing policymakers, members of the executive branch, and
researchers to nominate themselves to participate. Although members of the public, but usually require melding the work
focus groups were semistructured, with flexibility to allow of multiple scholars to reach relevant conclusions specific
conversations to expand naturally, sessions were organized to our research question. For example, there is ample existing
around structured questions related to which actors (civil- work on the psychology and delusions of leaders, and ample
ians, leaders, countries as a whole) used or experienced Truth work on the impacts of misinformation on the public, but little
Decay, broad impacts the experts observed in national security, work examining the impact of misinformation or Truth Decay
and possibilities for mitigation of Truth Decay in national specifically on the psychology of leaders, or on elites more
security. broadly. Existing work relevant to this topic is often siloed
In our review of existing literature, we uncovered exist- in different areas of academia, the policy realm, and think
ing work that speaks to the intersection of Truth Decay and tanks. There is an additional lack of research on the impact of
national security. Truth Decay itself is a burgeoning area of Truth Decay on the U.S. military, civil-military relations, the
research. Building on Kavanagh and Rich’s seminal 2018 Intelligence Community, or functional military specialties,
work on Truth Decay, RAND researchers have subsequently such as information warfare. RAND researchers have begun
considered Truth Decay and its relationship to COVID-19 to conduct work on the impact of bias and perceived bias in
misinformation by Russian and Chinese actors, Truth Decay the Intelligence Community on its products (Dictus et al.,
in Europe, racial inequalities, disinformation online, and forthcoming), but broadly there is little work on the impacts
other topics with direct relevance to national security. Other of Truth Decay on U.S. national security institutions. In this
academic work has explored how rumors, conspiracy theories, Perspective, we draw on these various research threads and
and false information on political issues, including national our conversations with our colleagues to suggest how Truth
security topics, are prevalent in American society, even if Decay affects the national security domain.
these phenomena are not always labeled as Truth Decay

4
5
FRAMEWORK


We propose an organizational
framework for the multiple impacts
of Truth Decay on the national
security within the United States, on
U.S. allies, and on U.S. adversaries.

6
Organizational Framework This framework offers a number of benefits. First and
foremost, it provides a platform for similar and overlapping
We propose an organizational framework for the multiple research to speak to each other and encourages coordination
impacts of Truth Decay on the national security within the across different areas of research on this topic. Second, it
United States, on U.S. allies, and on U.S. adversaries. Our provides researchers with a shared language for communicat-
research exposed a wide variety of impacts on these three ing about future efforts on Truth Decay and national security.
areas that are also spread over a spectrum of different actors. Third, it allows categorizing and organization of these disparate
We have chosen to break these impacts down by the actor research efforts, so that existing work can be linked into the
involved and the level at which they acted: individual, institu- Truth Decay framework, and it opens brainstorming for further
tional, or societal. We also consider Truth Decay impacts at a issues that may fall in these different areas of the framework.
fourth level: those that affect norms and concepts, as opposed Finally, it encourages researchers not to overlook Truth Decay as
to having a more direct, pragmatic policy effect on a particular they conduct research on such issues as polarization or extremist
individual or institution. groups, where Truth Decay may be contributing factor.

FRAMEWORK
The individual level focuses on human actors,
including leaders, policy decisionmakers, and
members of the public.

The institutional level focuses on institutions or


structures of governance, such as Congress, the
military services, and the Intelligence Community.

The societal level focuses on impacts on society—


whether U.S. society or the societies of U.S. allies or
adversaries—and usually indicates broader trends,
such as domestic stability or economic stability.

The normative level focuses on impacts at the


conceptual or norm-based level, such as belief in
the traditions, customs, or best practices of the
country, including democracy and civic pride.

7
Individual-Level Impacts of one’s perceptions of public opinion, which could further intensify
Truth Decay in America partisan cues and the acceptance of misinformation. Con-
necting the dots, this literature indicates that public opinion
CITIZENS is increasingly relevant in shaping national security, that this
influence is connected to increasingly partisan politics, and
Foreign policy has often been considered elite-driven—an area that polarization can contribute to Truth Decay. A public opinion
where leaders drive public opinion and where public opinion subject to the negative cycle of (1) disinformation feeding
has little influence on policy decisions. However, a growing polarization and (2) polarization feeding disinformation will
body of literature challenges this belief, highlighting the lead to public opinion on foreign policy that is broadly less
importance of the domestic public in shaping or constraining grounded in fact and objective analysis.
foreign policy.2 Recent academic work has stressed the impor-
tance of public opinion in informing policymakers’ decisions
There is a counterweight to this trend. Although
regarding military force (Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo, 2019) more-partisan attitudes may lead to sharper, more
and broader foreign policy decisionmaking (Kertzer and extreme positions, disinformation can also encourage
L E V E L S O F I M PA C T

Zeitzoff, 2017). But to what extent does the public conform to disengagement—both from reality and from interest
“rational” interest? Scholars argue that foreign policy opinions in policy (Wenzel, 2019). Truth Decay can therefore
are often built from foreign policy cues, such as the statement also encourage the public to disengage from influencing
of a trusted leader, rather than objective facts, with more par- foreign policy.
tisan cues leading to the public holding more strongly held
foreign policy opinions (Cavari and Freeman, 2017). In other
words, polarization in politics “intensifies the impact of party The current media environment further creates an envi-
endorsements on opinions, decreases the impact of substan- ronment where Americans can “pick the authorities they want”
tive information, and perhaps ironically, stimulates greater and reaffirm preexisting beliefs by seeking media sources that
confidence in those—less substantively grounded—opinions” confirm their opinions rather than seeking facts in a nonparti-
(Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus, 2013, p. 57). In the other san manner. There are increasingly partisan clusters of media
direction, academic researchers have found that increased providing new tailored to polarized positions, with many
exposure to misinformation on social media platforms Americans preferring news platforms outside the mainstream
leads to polarization, most pointedly in the case of Russian that more closely align with their chosen identities, such as their
misinformation around the 2016 election stoking partisan ethnicity, religious group, or political party. This encourages
divides. (Grinberg et al. [2019] explore this misinformation and more insular community interaction and the sharing of more
what it was directed at.) In this way, polarization and Truth biased news, and it makes it easier for citizens to seek infor-
Decay can have a compounding impact on one another in mation that better aligns with their views but may be less
shaping public opinion. In addition to the impact of partisan factual. A 2021 set of Pew polls revealed that Republicans who
leaders on public opinion, the recent work of scholars Kertzer consumed right-leaning news, and Democrats who consumed
and Zeitzoff (2017) shows that one’s peers may also influence left-leaning news, held deeply varying views of China, even

8
9

L E V E L S O F I M PA C T
ISSUE EX AMPLE

The Iranian Nuclear Deal

THE IR ANIAN NUCLEAR deal, known as the Joint force, as 2019 Gallup poll found that a majority of Ameri-
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and its impact cans wanted to deal with Iran diplomatically rather than
on the Iranian nuclear threat is a complicated topic, and militarily, with 78 percent wanting America to rely on
there are justified alternative points of view about the economic and diplomatic efforts (Younis, 2019).
merits of the United States entering into the deal initially The Iranian deal was a politically charged issue in the
in 2015, withdrawing from it in 2017, and potentially 2016 and 2020 elections, and misinformation about the
reentering it in the future. But the facts are that, since Iranian deal was perpetuated by politicians and by social
the 2017 U.S. decision to withdraw unilaterally from the media. For example, Donald Trump, while a candidate
L E V E L S O F I M PA C T

deal, Iran has advanced its nuclear capabilities, expanded and as President, claimed 136 times that the United States
its missile arsenal, directly attacked Saudi Arabia, and had given Iran $150 million as part of the Iranian nuclear
expanded hardliner control of the government, trends deal, a false claim that also became a meme (Spencer,
that are all detrimental to U.S. national security (Nadimi, 2019; Kessler and Fox, 2021). This issue also shows the
2021; Smith, 2019; Fitzpatrick, 2020; Hickey, 2020; disconnect between expert opinion and popular opinion:
Mortlock, 2020; Haaretz, 2021). Despite generally shared Although 94 percent of U.S. international relations schol-
American views about the fact that Iran represents a ars disapproved of a unilateral withdrawal from JCPOA,
threat and that diplomatic tools should be the primary the public was divided fairly evenly in opinion (Peterson,
approach to dealing with threat, the United States Powers, and Tierney, 2018). The dearth of facts and abun-
unilaterally abandoned a diplomatic agreement that put dance of inaccurate facts likely affected public support for
constraints on Iran’s nuclear development. JCPOA. In 2015, a Pew poll asked about the deal without
As a baseline, American views of Iran are generally any specifics about its content and found the deal to be
and consistently unfavorable: Between 80 and 90 percent generally unpopular, with 48 percent of the 79 percent
of Americans have viewed Iran unfavorably since 1989 of Americans aware of the deal disapproving of it, and
(Gallup, 2022). Although a majority of Americans have only 38 percent approving (Pew Research Center, 2015).
historically supported the use force if necessary to pre- However, the Washington Post and ABC News conducted a
vent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons (Pew Research poll during the same period that asked Americans about
Center, 2019b), and Republicans on average have been the deal while also describing its general contours—lifting
less concerned about the consequences of using military economic sanctions in exchange for Iran agreeing not to

10
produce nuclear weapons and to allow monitoring of its providing factual information, rather just than capturing
facilities. This poll found that 56 percent of Americans gut reactions, which is particularly important on an issue
supported the deal and 37 percent opposed it (Washington like the JCPOA, where there was frequent misrepresenta-
Post and ABC News, 2015). This example illustrates how tion of the facts.
polls can drive public opinion on a foreign policy issue by

when compared with members of their own party. Seventy- when they are seen as part of an out group (Flynn, Nyhan, and
nine percent of Republicans with right-leaning news sources, Reifler, 2017).
compared with 55 percent of Republicans more broadly, said When we tie together these disparate literatures in the
that limiting the influence of China should be a foreign policy context of national security, they point to two takeaways.

L E V E L S O F I M PA C T
priority (Silver and Shearer, 2021). This suggests that polarized First, some Americans’ attitudes toward national security
positions, not based in shared fact, are already influencing situations or allies and adversaries are built on misinformation,
public foreign policy opinions. Individuals are additionally such as the 9/11 belief discussed above or unsupported
vulnerable to false narratives, including those related to theories about the origin of COVID-19. Second, even correct
foreign policy: Research shows that around 50 percent of information often will not move Americans from entrenched
Americans ascribe to at least one conspiracy theory, although partisan or other positions, and this partisan gap can lead to
this proportion does not appear to have changed over time pushes for more extreme national security actions. Given the
(Uscinski et al., 2022). One poll, as an example, suggests that research indicating that the gap between policymaker deci-
one in six Americans believe in the conspiracy theory that sionmaking and public decisionmaking may not be as large as
the Bush administration allowed the attacks of 9/11 to justify previously suggested, elite policymakers may operate under
an invasion of Iraq (Cox, 2020). Beyond the impact that such these same misperceptions (Kertzer, 2022).
a belief may have on a citizen’s trust in national institutions,
it could affect opinion on the Iraq War or U.S. policies in the ELITES, POLICYMAKERS, AND EXECUTIVE
Middle East (Vedantam, 2014; Byler and Woodsome, 2021). LEADERSHIP
Academic research also shows that misinformation or rumors
are more prevalent on controversial topics, which in foreign Although, as discussed previously, public opinion plays an
policy are often those that touch such domestic topics as important role in shaping foreign policy, research does con-
immigration (Kertzer, Brooks, and Brooks, 2021). Popular firm that elites are more influential than the general public
political figures are typically themselves perceived as parti- in direct foreign policy decisionmaking (Saunders, 2022).
san, which can limit the resonance of corrective, fact-based The most impactful are individuals in positions of executive
information they provide in dispelling public misperceptions leadership or highly influential policymakers. When these

11
individuals fail to respect facts and the institutions that are to the effects of leaders’ delusions or psychological biases on
sources of facts, they can be even more destructive to pro- their decisionmaking about foreign policy and conflict, and
ductive or optimal national security decisionmaking than a this has been the subject of study for decades (Snyder, Bruck,
misled general public. and Sapin, 1962; Hall and Yarhi-Milo, 2012; Kertzer and Ting-
The combination of partisanship and Truth Decay can ley, 2018). Leaders’ delusions and decisionmaking biases have
lead policymakers to take more extreme bargaining posi- been explored as key contributors to war (Lake, 2010/2011),
tions (Wenzel, 2019), ultimately leading to political paralysis with Jerrold Post (1993) finding that the decisionmaking capa-
on partisan issues. However, the interplay of these drivers is bilities of a narcissistic leader are “often impaired.” If these
not well understood. Academic work shows that bipartisan findings apply to executives influenced by Truth Decay, then
actions in America have declined (Harbridge, 2015), while partisan and nonfactual attitudes in individual policymakers
negative partisanship has increased (Abramowitz and Web- can affect decisions about conflict, how the United States is
ster, 2018). This body of research on the effects of polariza- treated abroad, whether the United States is targeted in dis-
tion on policymaking bodies does not focus heavily on the putes, and U.S. credibility in threats and reassurances (Prins,
role that Truth Decay plays in interacting with polarization. 2001; Foster, 2008; Clark, Fordham, and Nordstrom, 2011;
L E V E L S O F I M PA C T

There is limited literature examining partisanship impacts on Clare, 2014).


security issues. For example, Brian Rathbun (2004) shows that
right- and left-wing governments in Europe conduct humani-
tarian interventions very differently because they understand Institutional-Level Impacts
the world in very different ways, and this research has been
updated and built upon in the work explored in Tapio Raunio Although there is little literature on Truth Decay in national
and Wolfgang Wagner (2020). They show that there are security at the institutional level, we suggest that Truth Decay
genuine ideological differences between political parties on could have broad institutional impacts on U.S. national secu-
security policy and security policy decisionmaking but do not rity institutions. Those could include diminishing the morale
directly explore polarization or misinformation. of those within the federal workforce, because they feel less
We know that individual policymakers’ private opinions relevant—given the declining trust put in their institution by
or partisan-leaning can have great impact on foreign policy. policymakers compromised by Truth Decay—or because of a
Such scholars as Michael Horowitz, Alan Stam, and Cali Ellis tarnished reputation with the public. This could make it more
have dedicated an entire book to the importance of the impact difficult to retain personnel and recruit future personnel.
of military service history on leaders’ decisions to go to war Officials within U.S. government institutions who circulate
(Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis, 2015), and Elizabeth Saunders misinformation or opinion as fact on social media could erode
(2011) found that major U.S. foreign policy decisions can be national security professionals’ trust in their colleagues,
explained by the personal beliefs of Presidents about dangers weakening the bonds of trust that are built in the workforce
posed by other governments. However, there is a notable gap and in the field. Truth Decay can diminish the potential for
in work focused specifically on how Truth Decay affects these respectful, civil discourse between subordinates and supe-
personal views. The most relevant academic literature speaks riors and blur the lines about what topics are appropriate

12
to discuss, either face-to-face or indirectly via social media training, can become pitfalls in which service members
posts, as misinformation leads to obvious political fault lines come to distrust the judgment or decisionmaking abilities
and reinforces polarization. of fellow service members whose views they do not share.
The potential impacts of increasing polarization and Most recently, the military has had to grapple with increasing
Truth Decay on the military are particularly concerning. The domestic extremism and the COVID-19 vaccine mandate for
chain of command and unit cohesion and trust among service service members, topics for which even factual information
members and are critical to a well-functioning military, but is often considered partisan or polarized. If service members
Truth Decay can reduce unit cohesion and trust both in unit relaying or receiving information on politicized issues see the
members and in the chain of command. Truth Decay can do information as false or as opinion rather than fact, not only
so by eroding common ground between service members and will any positive impact be lessened, it could degrade that
politicizing issues that might not have previously been partisan, service member’s confidence in the greater institution. These
if individuals repeat conspiracy theories or disinformation. negative impacts on unit dynamics can pose direct risks to
Routine conversations and events, such as workshops or military readiness and function.

L E V E L S O F I M PA C T
ISSUE EX AMPLE

COVID-19 Misinformation and the Military

IN AUGUST 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) separated for refusing the COVID-19 vaccine (Mongilio,
mandated vaccination against COVID-19 for active-duty 2022). And although 97 percent of the active-duty force
and Ready Reserve service members. Mandatory military was vaccinated by December 2021, misinformation was
vaccination is not new or unusual: Vaccination for mili- seen as the primary driver of the reluctance and refusal
tary service members has been mandated since vaccines of some service members to vaccinate (Jackson, 2021).
first became available (and inoculation against smallpox Although this is a small percentage of the overall force,
was mandated even before that [College of Physicians given the costs of recruiting and training service members,
of Philadelphia, undated]). When DoD announced the this loss is not insignificant. Further, it points to general
COVID-19 vaccine mandate, nine vaccinations were vulnerabilities of military personnel to misinformation.
already required before initial entry or basic training,
with more required depending on circumstance. Despite
this, as of July 12, 2022, 6,748 service members had been

13
Similarly, there are serious impacts on the Intelligence everyday actions of foreign policy, such as ambassadorial
Community, beyond general issues with personnel morale appointments, ratification of treaties, and staffing the foreign
and recruitment. Politicization of intelligence is a perennial service. Misinformation about an ambassadorial candidate, or
concern, and while there was debate among our participants the countries that are party to a treaty, could easily damage or
over how that has changed over time, there appeared to be lengthen processes that are necessary for the continued func-
agreement that Truth Decay would make intelligence appear tioning of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus.
less credible to policymakers who are seeking information This indicates that if foreign policy topics—such as Russia’s
that conforms to their preexisting views. This would not only war in Ukraine or Chinese activities in the South China Sea—
undermine Intelligence Community morale but also might become more partisan, and if disagreement on the facts
encourage policymakers to discard Intelligence Community surrounding foreign policy topics interacts with this polariza-
products and move to less informed national security policy tion, policymaking in those areas might slow, as might the
decisionmaking. Focus group participants with an intelligence government’s ability to take quick action, especially in crisis
background had often experienced that, when briefing policy- situations with adversaries. Mistakes in decisionmaking in
makers who were “very ideological,” regardless of political crises have long been of interest to political science, and in
L E V E L S O F I M PA C T

leaning, “they [would] sometimes reject intelligence assess- a 1987 study of decisionmaking in international crises, out-
ments,” perceiving it as coming from a partisan position. These comes tended to have adverse effects on U.S. interests and
trends affect the core mission of the Intelligence Community. were more likely to escalate when more mistakes were made
The goal of intelligence professionals is to sift through infor- (Herek, Janis, and Huth, 1987). More recent work has tied
mation to identify the facts and present to policymakers; if these foreign policy crisis and international conflict mistakes
policymakers are not interested in the truth, then what is the to delusions, 4 psychological biases (Kertzer and Tingley,
point of the intelligence enterprise and the contributions of 2018), and assumptions made from heuristics (Edwards,
those who serve in it? 2022). Adversary states would be especially motivated to
Partisanship has not impeded Congress from performing weaponize disinformation in a time of crisis, and academic
its core function of enacting legislation agenda (Lee, 2105), 3 work suggests U.S. vulnerability to these types of information
and a 2015 review of the academic literature indicate that attacks. As previously argued, misinformation and polarization
polarization has not yet affected congressional productivity lead to a deleterious cycle (of disinformation feeding polariza-
in the aggregate, over all areas of legislation (Lee, 2015)—but tion and polarization feeding disinformation) that reinforces
there are signs that highly polarized legislative areas may extreme heuristics, likely leading to adverse foreign policy
be less productive (Mayhew, 2005). Partisanship has been outcomes for the United States.
linked with undermining policy responses to collective risk,
and partisanship makes it particularly difficult to reach
agreement on policies around such issues as public health
measures, climate change, and immigration (Milosh et al.,
2021). The combination of polarization and Truth Decay could
lead to further congressional deadlock and could hold up the

14
15

L E V E L S O F I M PA C T
Society-Level Impacts However, American domestic stability is built on many
factors, including economic stability, social cohesion, insti-
At the broader societal level, Truth Decay may have several tutional strength, all interacting with and reinforcing each
less direct and more sweeping or diffuse impacts. Truth other. Given this complexity, we recognize that it is difficult
Decay, along with other variables, may affect America’s ability to isolate the impacts of Truth Decay in diminishing home-
to use national power, the availability of resources to focus land stability.
on national security, and U.S. resilience to homeland security
threats. For example, in the event of a large-scale attack or ter-
rorist or extremist event, Truth Decay may make the portions Norm-Level Impacts
of the public more likely to be exposed to and believe misin-
formation abound the attack. This could make evacuation, Increased partisanship has splintered support for demo-
response, recovery over time, and reconciliation within the cratic norms and constitutional protections (Kingzette et al.,
affected communities all more difficult. A less likely potential 2021). We note two major areas where Truth Decay might
consequence is violent action and instability, to the point of affect American norms. First, Truth Decay might influence
L E V E L S O F I M PA C T

civil conflict, from belief in and support


disagreement over the of broader democratic
The January 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol Building
truth—that is, for some was a violent action stemming from disagreement over
norms. Democracy and the
of the more polarized the facts around the 2020 presidential election and, insofar importance of democratic
issues where truth is in as it was an action destabilizing U.S. unity and its ability norms have long been a
dispute, friction could to use national power, a direct threat to national security. rhetorical linchpin of U.S.
spiral into violence. President Trump’s supporters were rallied directly before actions abroad. If Truth
This would likely occur the action by his speech, which included encouragement to Decay, especially Truth
in conjunction with other reject the vote as illegitimate and to “never concede” the Decay spread by autocratic
factors, such as preexisting election (Lonsdorf et al., 2022), despite credible support adversary states, further
tensions in a community. that the election was secure and voter fraud was negligi- erodes American faith
Finally, a lack of truth- ble (Cuthbert and Theodoridis, 2022). Some scholars argue in democratic norms, it
that this action should be classified as a failed coup (Cline
ful economic information could be detrimental to
Center, 2021). While the assault has not led to a larger civil
could affect U.S. credibility domestic and international
conflict, it is certainly a sign of increased instability in the
abroad, and misinformation belief in the United States
United States.
or disinformation that and its national security
damages U.S. economic community.
capabilities or business interests could reduce the United Political paralysis was identified as one consequence of
States’ ability to offer foreign aid and reduce overall U.S. Truth Decay in RAND’s initial report on the subject (Kavanagh
influence abroad. and Rich, 2018), pointing to a worrying trend that could be a
result of the inability of members of Congress to reach consensus:

16
the recent uptick in the use and abuse of emergency powers or year to an average of 55 per year from President Trump and
powers that circumvent the regular policymaking process. The an average of 60 per year from President Biden (Peters and
use of executive orders did fluctuate before the contemporary Woolley, 2022). This use of executive power to advance poli-
era, but Presidents Trump and Biden have both increased the cies departs from normative political behavior in the United
number of executive orders used relative to the five presiden- States and from relying on shared facts to build consensus
cies preceding them, from an average of between 35–48 per and advance policymaking.

ISSUE EX AMPLE

American Belief in Democracy and Democratic Norms

L E V E L S O F I M PA C T
THE ADVANCEMENT OF American values, chief among surrounding the results of the 2022 election is a critical
them belief in American democracy, is a core pillar of reason why. A January 2022 NPR/Ipsos poll found that
U.S. national security strategy, regardless of the politi- 64 percent of Americans believed that U.S. democracy
cal party in power. However, Americans are cynical was “in crisis and at risk of failing.” This opinion was
about the future of democracy, and misinformation more common among Republican voters, and two-thirds
of GOP respondents agreed that “voter fraud helped Joe
Biden win the 2020 election” (Rose and Baker, 2022).
The National Security Strategy penned by the A July 2022 poll by the New York Times and Siena Col-
Trump administration was built on four pillars, lege found that “discontent among Republicans is
one of which was to “advance American influence driven by their widespread, unfounded doubts about
because a world that supports American interests
the legitimacy of the nation’s elections” (Epstein, 2022).
and reflects our values makes America more
The same poll found that a majority of American voters
secure and prosperous.” The strategy listed those
believed that the American system of government no
values as “America’s commitment to liberty,
democracy, and the rule of law” (The White
longer worked and needed major reforms or a complete
House, 2017). The National Security Strategy of overhaul. Belief in democratic norms underpins U.S.
the Biden administration states that “our democ- foreign policy, and democracy promotion, for good or ill,
racy is at the core of who we are” and that has been an important part of American rhetoric around
“actions to bolster democracy and defend human foreign policy for decades. 5 An increasing lack of internal
rights are critical" (The White House, 2022). belief in democracy undermines U.S. ability to promote
that value abroad.

17
Compounding Influences on Truth Decay EU, where the European Commission has initiated legal chal-
lenges and established a committee to police hate speech on
Truth Decay can also act as a threat multiplier, or a factor which social media platforms (European Commission, undated)—but
has the potential to exacerbate other drivers of insecurity, regulation still lags behind the evolution of these factors. The
instability, or other deleterious impacts on national security. evolution of technology is inextricably linked with the ampli-
In these cases, Truth Decay fication of Truth Decay in American society. Additionally,
Threat multiplier is a term that
may not be a lone catalyst, increased polarization is tied to increasing access to social
is often used to discuss the but it can be an accelerant. media platforms and the internet (Barrett, Hendrix, and Sims,
impact of climate change on First, Truth Decay can 2021; Trussler, 2020).
other factors of instability. exacerbate the effects of
polarization. Conspiracy
theories and misinforma- Change over Time
tion interact continuously with the broader phenomenon
of increasing polarization. The ability to “choose” facts and The original RAND Truth Decay report (Kavanagh and Rich,
media sources that align with preexisting opinions reinforces 2018) addressed the question of whether Truth Decay was a
polarization (Lee, 2016), and polarization encourages individual new phenomenon. In an exploration of three historical periods
actors to spread opinions and misinformation as facts in the United States, going back to the 1880s, the authors found
(Osmundsen et al., 2021). While Truth Decay is clearly not the evidence of two of the four trends identified as part of Truth
only factor causing polarization, it appears to exist in a feedback Decay: the blurring of the line between opinion and fact and
loop with polarization, as both feed into and increase the effect the increasing relative volume of opinion over fact. Decline in
of the other; this is a worrisome relationship, given that both trust in institutions and increasing disagreement over facts
chambers of Congress have become more polarized since the were seen as trends associated with the contemporary era.
1970s (Neal, 2020). Polarization, therefore, while an external Dishonesty is not new in national security and—when
driver that is not wholly caused by Truth Decay, is inextricably used appropriately for denial or deception against U.S.
linked with Truth Decay and many of its impacts. adversaries—is in fact an important weapon in the arsenal
The second evolving factor that heavily interacts with of the U.S. military. Then–Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisen-
Truth Decay is technology. Changing technology, social media hower, in a 1947 memo, stated that “no major operations
platforms, the constant flow of information, and poor controls should be undertaken without planning and executing appro-
on technological evolution are all tied to the increase in Truth priate deception measures” (Galambas, 1979). This type of
Decay. As media platforms proliferate, it is easier for individuals deception is not Truth Decay but rather strategic deception for
to pick and choose among them. As social media platforms the purpose of national security. But there has always been
connect more extreme opinion groups, it is easier for individuals some dishonesty in domestic political discourse, and, more
to stay in an echo chamber of opinions that align with their deleteriously for the country’s national security and stability,
own beliefs. Attempts to moderate extremism on social media politicians and appointed figures have often manipulated or
platforms, such as Facebook, are ramping up—notably in the

18
ISSUE EX AMPLE

Disinformation About Immigrants in the European Union

ONE EX AMPLE OF a nontraditional security threat Decay. Western European beliefs about immigrants are
being exacerbated by Truth Decay is in Belarus, where heavily shaped by disinformation (Szakacs and Bognar,
migration has been used as a tool of coercion. In late 2021), and far-right groups in the targeted Western
2021, Belarusian leadership threatened to send migrants European countries used immigration opinions mas-
to European Union (EU) countries ill-equipped to support querading as facts to drum up xenophobia and support.
them—for example, using disinformation to lure Iraqis For example, in Western European countries, it is a consis-
and Kurds to the border with Poland with the false tently cited “fact” that migrants in the EU are responsible
promise of easy entry into the EU—as a form of diplo- for a wave of sexual assault, which has been used as evidence
matic confrontation with the EU (Galeotti, 2021). How- that immigration needs to be slowed (Szakacs and
ever, perceptions of the threat were multiplied by Truth Bognar, 2021).

distorted the facts, or outright lied, about national security topics, usage of technology. “The phenomenon is familiar, the deliv-
be it to advance a partisan agenda or for personal prestige. ery mechanism is novel,” quipped one participant.
However, most of our experts believed that the frequency
and magnitude of dishonesty around foreign policy issues have
changed, for several reasons. First, several of the experts we Vulnerable Populations
interviewed suggested that leaders now lie more shamelessly
and more constantly. Second, technology has grown by leaps Another form of complexity in exploring the impacts of Truth
and bounds in recent decades, and lies can more easily have Decay on national security is that Truth Decay does not affect
widespread or even global reach. For example, the President all individuals equally. Polarization makes individuals more
and many members of Congress now have Twitter and other vulnerable to Truth Decay, but so do other personal charac-
social media accounts, and members of the public who wish to teristics. These points were raised by our focus group partici-
can be connected constantly to their political representatives. pants. Racial or ethnic marginalized groups, religious groups,
Finally, there is not yet an agreed upon guiding legal or normative and class groups were highlighted as being more vulnerable to
monitoring and policing mechanism for the rapid growth and Truth Decay. Members of marginalized populations may be

19
20
“ Truth Decay can prompt a focus on
the crisis of the moment but not
its underlying systemic issues.

more vulnerable because they often do not feel represented, lenge of identifying the impacts of Truth Decay on national
or because they are not as well-represented in mainstream security. Expanding the definition of national security to
media, and thus may be more likely to get their news from encapsulate such issues as natural disaster response, public
sources outside the mainstream media. Class groups, in par- health, climate, and migration expands the types of research
ticular, came up several times in our discussions, with focus that should be explored. COVID-19 disinformation, or public
group members agreeing that lower-income or less educated health disinformation, is a clear sign of the serious impact of
Americans are more likely to favor “working class populism” Truth Decay on national preparedness to face public health
and to distrust those who are wealthier or seen as intellectual crises. Similar issues are echoed in work on natural disasters
or erudite, including those with scientific expertise. As future and the government’s ability to communicate important
research further examines the linkages between Truth Decay information—and cut through disinformation—in the event
and national security, these are important factors to consider. of a natural disaster. This is an issue serious enough that the
U.S. national security institutions, including the military, do U.S. Department of Homeland Security has released a report
not draw representatively from the U.S. population, and America on natural disaster misinformation, including case studies
is facing increasing threats from within its own population in and suggested best practices (U.S. Department of Homeland
the forms of violent extremism. Security, Social Media Working Group for Emergency Services
and Disaster, 2018). Beyond direct disinformation, broader
Truth Decay can prompt a focus on the crisis of the moment
Nontraditional Security Threats to but not its underlying systemic issues. When spreaders of
National Security disinformation exploit and expand vulnerabilities in United
States’ ability to respond to crises, such as COVID-19, they
Nontraditional security considerations further exacerbate both misdirect United States’ energy and investment and also
U.S. vulnerabilities and add further complexity to the chal- clearly highlight vulnerabilities for adversary states.

21
Truth Decay and Ally and Adversary bases abroad (Posen, 2015). However, the need for the United
Relationships States to maintain some form of ties with most other countries
is recognized by a majority of academics and politicians,7 and
Truth Decay also affects U.S. allies and adversaries, both in those alliances are underpinned by confidence that the United
terms of domestic dynamics within that ally (or adversary) States speaks truthfully in its commitments to its allies. The
and in terms of their relationship with the United States. We United States also provides a credible partner to mediate global
can see impacts of Truth Decay both within foreign countries conflicts and prevent them from escalating to regional conflict.
and in the bilateral and multilateral relationships these coun- Despite disagreement about whether the United States is too
tries have with the United States. These impacts can strain concerned with its credibility or how that credibility is estab-
U.S. alliances or make for more formidable adversaries. lished, credibility is generally acknowledged as important to
American foreign policy in based in a complex alliance U.S. foreign policy (Walt, 2022).
structure of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, often
M U LT I N AT I O N A L R E L AT I O N S H I P S

grounded on military or economic cooperation. This includes TRUTH DECAY’S IMPACT ON ALLY
multilateral security agreements, such as the North Atlantic REL ATIONSHIPS
Treaty Organization (NATO); multilateral forums, such as the
United Nations; and bilateral security agreements, such as There is limited literature on the impacts of Truth Decay on
the one between the United States and Japan. Many of these U.S. allies or U.S. ally relationships, but in our focus groups
relationships are based on formal and rhetorical commit- and interviews, participants identified a number of areas
ments to protect and provide for allies and partners, who in where Truth Decay could have an impact. Our framework can
turn provide support for U.S. global hegemony and the U.S. be applied to organize some of these various affects. While
vision of a prosperous and peaceful world order. Although this Perspective is focused on the impacts of Truth Decay
alliances put in place obligations and restrictions in exchange in America on national security, there are signs from RAND
for certain benefits, there is no guarantee that these bargains research that U.S. European allies are also experiencing internal
will be honored, so credibility is very important in maintain- Truth Decay, if to a lesser extent. Axelle Devaux, Sarah
ing alliances (although the topic of credibility is an area of Grand-Clement, and Stijn Hoorens have explored Truth Decay
active scholarly discussion [Walt, 2022]). The United States trends in Europe, including the role of polarization and
has maintained roughly the same alliance system since the increasing erosion of civil discourse and political paralysis,
end of World War II, to counter threats from the Soviet Union, and emphasize the importance of European educational sys-
North Korea, and China, and has invested significant national tems in guarding against some of the more serious impacts
resources in building the capacity of U.S. partners and allies. of Truth Decay (Devaux, Grand-Clement, and Hoorens, 2022).
There is a valid and ongoing debate about the national security We will not delve into these specific effects except to say that
value to the United States of this alliance system, and whether they may vary by country and are interesting and worthwhile
the United States would benefit from diminishing its extensive areas for deeper study, and that Truth Decay can exist at the
alliance ties, 6 or at least having a smaller international foot- same levels that we identified earlier—individual, institutional,
print and fewer formalized alliance ties with associated U.S. societal, and normative—within an ally. In this section, we

22
ISSUE EX AMPLE

U.S. Financial Support of NATO

NATO IS TOUTED as “the most powerful and successful There is some validity to this statement, given that
Alliance in history” (U.S. Department of State, 2021), and not all members meet NATO’s 2014 Defence Capabilities
it is foundational in defining U.S. relations with Europe Initiative guideline that 2 percent of a country's gross
and Russia. The fall of the Soviet Union prompted exis- domestic product should be allocated to defense spending.
tential questions for NATO, and NATO’s focus, structure, (Notably, President Barack Obama also used the language
and required contributions by its members continue of “free riders” in 2016 [Goldberg, 2016].) However,

M U LT I N AT I O N A L R E L AT I O N S H I P S
to evolve in the face of militant nationalism, terrorist Trump’s statements inaccurately described the state of
threats, and most recently, the Russia’s war with Ukraine. NATO’s direct spending, which is distributed equally
Eight in ten Americans said in 2019 that NATO is benefi- among members on the basis of gross national income
cial for the United States, but there was still a partisan (Kessler, 2016). Consistent with the academic research
gap in views over the alliance, with Republicans being cited earlier in this Perspective that partisan cues—rather
more likely than Democrats to see the alliance as more than facts—often influence public opinion on foreign
beneficial for U.S. allies than it is for the United States policy topics, academic research on this topic found a
(Pew Research Center, 2019). drop in support for the U.S.-NATO alliance after 2016,
As President, Trump reframed criticism of the U.S.- but along partisan trends—with Republicans expressing
NATO relationship to more strongly emphasis the finan- greater skepticism and Democrats expressing greater
cial costs of the alliance to the United States, but he also support for the alliance (Lee and Goidel, 2022). Addition-
perpetuated misinformation and falsehoods about the ally, Trump’s statements left allies feeling the need to
payment of the alliance to support NATO. Trump stated defend themselves and push back (Flaherty, 2018), and
repeatedly and explicitly that the United States was they eroded confidence in the alliance itself, driving
paying a disproportionate amount to sustain NATO, with European states to see NATO as increasingly fragile
other allies getting “a free ride” (Kessler, 2016). (Richter, 2021).

23
apply the same framework to think about the impacts specific the course of Trump’s presidency. Recognizing that we do not
to allies and to U.S.-ally relationships. know the extent to which President Trump believed his own
Scholars have also suggested the diffusion of transna- public statements, the perception that he believed falsehoods
tional far-right groups that favor perpetuating Truth Decay and did not trust expert opinion harmed U.S. credibility. The
(Ramos and Torres, 2020). Truth Decay, conspiracy theories, negative impacts of U.S. leaders being perceived as not credible
and conspiratorial thinking within the politic or public of can last past their terms in office, as allies may fear that a
U.S. allies can affect U.S. national security. Limited academic similar shift of a U.S. foreign policy stance based in nonfactual
evidence shows that conspiracy theories can shift public information could come with a change in administration.
views on alliances—such as research that has shown a shift Individual elites and policymakers also play a role in
away from the West toward Russia in Slovakia (Onderco and signaling and messaging to U.S. allies and adversaries. Truth
Stoeckel, 2020). This indicates that Truth Decay in U.S. allies Decay can confuse those messages, creating doubt about who
could serve as a blow to alliance strength. An area that begs for represents the U.S. government and its policies. For example,
M U LT I N AT I O N A L R E L AT I O N S H I P S

future research is the impact of American-exported right-wing in June 2021, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
extremism and the spread of its brand of Truth Decay to cer- Nikki Haley was received by former Israeli Prime Minister
tain allies (Caiani and Kroll, 2015; Perry and Scrivens, 2016; Benjamin Netanyahu. Neither were actively in positions of
Heft et al., 2020). This transnational network has served to government, but Netanyahu treated Haley as an official U.S.
mutually reinforce these groups and the particular opinions representative and acted as if he were still in office and Haley
or conspiracy theories that they spread (Ramos and Torres, tweeted a photo referring to Netanyahu as the Prime Minister
2020). While these groups may play on existing partisanship (Times of Israel Staff, 2021). Casual observers of the event
or ideological differences, the amplification and spread of could understandably perceive it as an official state visit,
partisanship or ideological differences is a serious concern for given that it had much of the dressings of official protocol and
allied strength. 8 There is little research on the impact of the these individuals’ previous official roles. These sorts of events
spread of these groups on U.S.-ally relationships. could have longer-term impacts on the United States’ reputa-
U.S. leaders’ perpetuation of misinformation or downright tion and diminish the United States’ ability to make effective
falsehoods can undermine the United States’ credibility with statements of support or deterrence. There is well-supported
its allies. Several foreign policy experts have suggested that academic research suggesting that lack of credibility makes
President Trump’s reliance on opinion rather than fact was a deterrence more difficult.9
blow to American credibility abroad that will last beyond his Further, U.S. allies often respect that the United States forms
presidency (Ashbrook, 2020). As President, Trump had gener- policy positions based on expert opinion. One researcher echoes
ally negative confidence ratings both among the United States’ several others in the focus groups in noting that there was
closest allies and the world as a whole, with 29 percent of 32
countries polled saying they had low confidence in Trump in concern among several of our allies and partners,
2020 (Wike et al., 2020). This was especially the case among . . . Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, the
key Western European allies (Poushter, 2020). Views of the idea that Americans seem, at an official level, to be
United States, while still favorable overall, also declined over turning away from reliance on expertise that would

24
be reflected in policy. Real concern at senior level States’ broad national security agenda. Allies depend on hon-
in these countries that America domestically would esty and transparency in their relationships with the United
undervalue and eventually underfund and ignore the States, and if they are given a sense of doubt that U.S. leaders
sorts of expertise that, from U.S. allied perspective, are not telling the truth, especially at the executive level, then
had underpinned policymaking in the U.S., that that they may not support the U.S. agenda. This can have secondary
was going away. consequences, such that the United States is less credible
because of internal Truth Decay and, with that diminishing ally
Truth Decay can undermine the credibility of U.S. institu- support, looks as if it stands alone from its allies. It can also
tions, which play an important function in U.S.-ally relationships. create the perception that the United States is not a truthful
As a prime example, the U.S. Intelligence Community has or reliable country, which would also affect the United States’
close relationships with intelligence agencies of allies, which reputation in situations where it wishes to be seen as a neutral
“often reflect mutual security interests and the trust each side actor. Mediation, and the ability to mediate internationally, is

M U LT I N AT I O N A L R E L AT I O N S H I P S
has of the other’s credibility and professionalism” (DeVine, something the United States already struggles with; dimin-
2019). These relationships provide concrete benefits to U.S. ished reputational credibility would make that international
national security. But, increasingly, we have seen politicization mediation even harder.
and false accusations targeting the Intelligence Community, Truth Decay could fuel anti-Americanism abroad, feeding
which could affect ally confidence in U.S. intelligence. The into conspiracy theories already present in those countries.
United States is still recovering from the blows to its reputation Additionally, if the United States’ democracy and respect for
stemming from the use of faulty intelligence on Iraq’s possession democratic norms is not healthy, it will become harder, and
of weapons of mass destruction to lobby the international more hypocritical, for the United States to advocate for the
community for invasion (Roberts, 2021). It does appear that American model.
the quality of actual intelligence has been protected by internal
review processes—some put in place because of those failures.
But in the Trump administration there was well-broadcasted Truth Decay and American Adversaries
discontent with Intelligence Community findings, particularly
on Russian interference in the U.S. election. This criticism may There has been significant research on U.S. adversaries’
have been motivated by a personal or party agenda, but there relationship with Truth Decay, by RAND researchers and
is a risk that it fostered a perception of a failing Intelligence others, particularly on Russia’s promotion of false narratives,
Community among U.S. allies. disinformation about the 2016 U.S. presidential election,
On a normative level, Truth Decay can harm the United and Russian and Chinese misinformation around COVID-19.
States’ reputation as the global leader and the leader of a These examples illustrate how Truth Decay leaves America
global alliance. Relationships between allies are most clearly more vulnerable to adversary states. Academic literature sup-
tested in war, specifically whether allies are willing to join ports that misinformation can have serious impacts on public
in hostilities. However, the depth of U.S.-ally relationships attitudes toward national security—for example, increasing
is also visible in whether allies decide to support the United “misperceptions” about the Iraq war were associated with

25

Truth Decay
makes the
United States
more vulnerable
ISSUE EX AMPLE to foreign
Chinese Misinformation in Nepal influence and
M U LT I N AT I O N A L R E L AT I O N S H I P S

information from
IN 2017, the United States and Nepal signed an
agreement for a $398 million grant, under the U.S. adversaries.
Millennium Challenge Corporation, to improve
the Nepalese electric grid (Millennium Challenge
Account Nepal, undated). However, due largely to a
Chinese disinformation campaign, this grant was
portrayed as undermining Nepali sovereignty and
as evidence of “coercive diplomacy” by the United
States (Katmandu Post, 2022). The topic became so
divisive that it led to protests in multiple cities and
a risk to the coherence of Nepal’s ruling coalition
government (Poudel, 2022).

26
higher levels of support for the conflict (Kull, Ramsay, and minds of electorate and sway some reps and you can’t agree
Lewis, 2013). Russian misinformation about the 2016 election on the basic things, it can lead to inaction and create condi-
influenced the performance of U.S. democratic institutions tions where an adversary can take certain steps which can
(Zeigler, 2017). Russia has also spread disinformation and be truly dangerous down the road, and it won’t be met with
propaganda about U.S. actions abroad—for example, Russian a response.” This echoes fears discussed earlier that Truth
state news sources attacked Kurdish partners of the United Decay internally might have a similar influence, leading to
States during the Syrian civil war (RT, 2021; Rosen, 2021). political paralysis.
Below the state level, extremist groups, such as QAnon, There was additional discussion of what Truth Decay
believers, regularly spread disinformation on a wide variety might look like in adversary states. Autocrats may often
of topics, including national security—for example, linking believe their own misinformation and be surrounded by
the CIA to assassination attempts (Douglas et al., 2019). Other individuals unwilling to correct those narratives, and Truth
RAND Truth Decay research has examined adversary misin- Decay can act to exacerbate this. These delusions can nega-

M U LT I N AT I O N A L R E L AT I O N S H I P S
formation and its direct impacts.10 tively affect leaders’ foreign policy decisions. However, Truth
The academic literature shows that the spread of misin- Decay may affect many U.S. adversary populations and social
formation in the United States among citizens can encourage cohesion less than it does the United States, because many
public disengagement from international multilateral organi- U.S. adversaries already operate in a post-truth space. As one
zations, such as the United Nations, and this disengagement researcher said, “There is no Truth Decay in North Korea.
allows for the undermining of those organizations and the There is only the Truth.” In many adversary countries, gov-
possible creation of competitive authoritarian organizations ernment perspectives, regardless of their relationship to reality,
by adversary states (Drezner, 2017). are laid down firmly. And as another researcher argued,
Truth Decay makes the United States more vulnerable domestic adversary citizens may “already be inoculated”
to foreign influence and misinformation from adversaries. after many years in a society where what is considered truth
Interviewees characterized Truth Decay as a “huge vulner- is more fungible. For example, someone who grew up in the
ability,” an “obvious one,” one whose the impact which would Soviet system, where the truth was never transparent, may
“jump off the page” at them, and a clear factor pushing the come to see the truth as unknowable. American adversary
United States further into polarization and spreading more states may simply be less vulnerable to the impacts of Truth
misinformation in the public. Additionally, a researcher Decay, as their societies may have a very different relationship
pointed out that, even if adversaries are not able to exploit with what “truth” is and how it is created and defended.
U.S. vulnerabilities related to Truth Decay, the United States
might incorrectly determine the threat to be credible and
commit resources to try to mitigate it.
Adversaries might be able to use Truth Decay to further
stagnate foreign policy and national security policy by
pushing gridlock through increased partisanship. As one
researcher put it, “If you can introduce enough doubt into

27
Mitigating Influences and Mechanisms • Political figures with moderate views could provide
mitigating influences, particularly by framing more
There are many ways to mitigate Truth Decay. Media literacy factual information as nonpartisan and trying to
workshops, classes, and messaging may help, although the stall the polarization–Truth Decay cycle. On national
literature on their effectiveness is mixed. Civic education security issues, the military can also play this role.
has been shown to help combat misinformation (Jones-Jang, While the military has recently become seen as more
Mortenson, and Liu, 2019), in both helping citizens identify partisan-coded,11 there is still high trust in the military
false news stories and avoid their harmful influences. Media as an institution (Pew Research Center, 2019a).12 One
literacy interventions have been shown to increase political shortfall, however, is that recent RAND research shows
engagement beyond national security (Kahne and Bowyer, that portions of the population do not trust any authority
2019); however, civic education also affects attitudes about figure enough to find them credible (Matthews et al.,
national security. There is less research and evaluation of 2022), suggesting political or military figures could
policy efforts to combat Truth Decay, such as the efforts of the not mitigate Truth Decay among these groups.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) to combat
electoral misinformation. As efforts to mitigate Truth Decay • Other RAND Truth Decay efforts are exploring the
expand, this is an area of research that should also cor- importance of civic education and media literacy in
respondingly expand. The issue of Truth Decay in national American schools, although
security is one that, at its face, seems too complex to handle there is mixed evidence on For a single recent
with any single initiative, actor, or edict. When we asked focus the effectiveness of different example, see
group participants about actors who might serve to combat types of media literacy efforts Baker et al. (2021).
Truth Decay in the arena of national security, there was little (McCulloch and Watts, 2017).
agreement—instead, they suggested a variety of actors, orga-
nizations, and agencies: • Within the government, while most agencies are
bound to action overseas alone, the U.S. Department
• Domestic legal restraint institutions could play an of Homeland Security, specifically those departments
important role in raising the penalties for those who with misinformation-focused efforts, such as the
spread misinformation in this area. Actors who spread Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
misinformation are beginning to be punished when and the Center for Prevention Programs and Partner-
it crosses lines into regulated areas. For example, in ships, are beginning to invest in combating misinfor-
Texas, a man was given a jail sentence for spreading mation online in specific areas. While it is unlikely
COVID-19 misinformation, under a federal law that that it could do a wider initiative, CISA has released a
makes false information about biological weapons a COVID-19 Disinformation Toolkit and an Election Dis-
criminal act (Elamroussi, 2021). information Toolkit.

28
• Private-sector actors, such as technology companies • Activist and nonprofit groups are currently combating
and social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, etc.), Truth Decay in national security in a broad variety of
bear significant responsibility for the role they some- ways, including providing media literacy education
times play in spreading Truth Decay, and they could do and fact-checking misinformation on national security
more to moderate and regulate what is posted on their topics, and think tanks are supporting truthful report-
platforms. However, most actions they have taken thus ing and analysis of scenarios.
far appear to have come because of intense negative
public attention or as a result of pressure from govern- • The media similarly can serve to fact-check incorrect
ment regulators. As discussed previously, it has taken information and propagate factual information, and
European Union legal action in France and Germany the media could do more to mark partisan information
to press for change in the area of extremism (Financial or opinion pieces and avoid amplifying misinformation.
Times, 2022) and hate speech, although it has been suc- There are signs that newspapers are beginning to do
cessful in doing more to police the latter on its platforms more transparent and highlighted fact-checking of
(European Commission, 2021). political news (Lee, 2022).

ISSUE EX AMPLE

Exposing Russian Disinformation About Ukraine

RUSSIA ACTIVELY USES misinformation and disinfor- States exposed Russian efforts to create a fake video,
mation in foreign policy. In addition to its extensive use of using actors and corpses, to justify its initial invasion,
misinformation to undermine free and fair elections in in what was described as “pre-bunking” rather than
the United States and elsewhere, Russia has used disin- debunking (Myre, 2022). To the extent that this information
formation to justify its war with Ukraine and the nature is seen as accurate and
of it.✴ The United States, however, has used strategic dis- credible, this also can ✴
For some examination of Russian
closures of intelligence to establish the facts and expose potentially give the disinformation around Ukraine
Russian disinformation efforts (Boot, 2022). This has Intelligence Community a right before the invasion justifying
allowed the United States to frequently preempt mechanism to be seen as a it, see Grossman et al. (2022) and
a forthcoming false narrative, before a misinformation truth-telling organization the Stanford Web Observatory’s
further expansion on the same
campaign has gained momentum. For example, the United in the public sphere.
topic in Giles (2022).

29
Future Research

This Perspective has highlighted many gaps in the current


research on Truth Decay and national security. Several are
especially pressing to fill, as they have serious implications
for the national security of the United States. In particular,
it is important to study the following in greater depth:

• how leaders’ and policymakers’ receptivity to mis-


information or lack of confidence in facts and expert
judgment affects national security decisionmaking

• the impact of Truth Decay on national security insti-


tutions, such as the military and the Intelligence
Community

• ally opinions about Truth Decay in the United States

• Truth Decay in ally or adversary states

• the role of adversary states in spreading Truth Decay


around national security topics

• how to effectively mitigate Truth Decay around


national security topics.

Truth Decay is currently a strong weapon in the hand


of American adversary states. The United States and its
allies are not yet prepared to address and mitigate the
threat it poses to their security and the international
system. We hope that this Perspective offers a first step
toward more discussion and research on this topic.

30
31
Level Affected Group Examples of the Potential Impact of Truth Decay

Citizens • Public, civil servants, elites: Increased polarization


Voting members of the public; and partisanship; more engaged in discourse on
popular figures on social media, national security matters with more extreme
mainstream talk shows, podcasts, opinions
and blogs
 olicymakers, executive leaders: Belief
• P
Elites
in misinformation can lead to substandard
Academic experts, lobbyists,
policymaking
journalists, and others informing
Individual
policymaking
 ll: Reinforced partisanship means more extreme
• A
Policymakers divides and lack of bargaining territory
Members of Congress; officials in the
executive branch involved in national
security issues, such as senior
policymakers in the Departments of
Defense and State

Executive leaders
In the United States, the President; in
other countries, the president, prime
minister, or monarch

Military • Military and Intelligence Community: Undermines


Some or all of the six service unit cohesion and respect for chain of command
branches of the U.S. military or the
Department of Defense • Legislature: Foreign policy paralysis and slower
decisionmaking
Intelligence Community
Institutional
Some or all of the 18 organizations
• Executive branch: Increased use of emergency
comprising the U.S. Intelligence
powers and circumvention of established processes
Community

Legislature • All: Degrades institutions, weakens federal


Members of Congress bureaucracy, diminishes morale, and makes it
harder to recruit qualified personnel
Executive branch
The White House and National
Security Council Staff

32
Level Affected Group Examples of the Potential Impact of Truth Decay

Societal resilience • All: Undermines social cohesion, leads to a negative


Ability of the United States to recover cycle with misinformation or information attacks
from misinformation, disasters, from adversary states
conflict, and other obstacles
Societal • All: Diminishes American productivity, which
Internal stability
diminishes the United States’ ability to influence
Impacts affecting the internal
and coerce on the global stage
stability or governance of the United
States

Economy
Impacts affecting the financial
stability of the United States

Democratic norms • All: Lack of agreement on basic values leads to


Impacts affecting the behavior of the splintering and increased partisanship, lack of trust
American public and policymakers in the electoral process, diminished will to fight
Normative toward the concept of democracy and willingness to promote democracy abroad

Norms of behavior in domestic


• All: Distrust in the Intelligence Community and
policymaking
shared facts make it more difficulty to reach
Impacts affecting senior
agreement
policymakers and their respect
for the accepted rules of action in
• All: Increased use of emergency powers and
policymaking
executive functions outside the norm

33
NOTES

1  Focus
 groups were conducted from June 2021 to August 2021. 7  For
 further information on the arguments scholars of alliance
Follow-up interviews were conducted from November 2021 to restraint make and the boundaries they suggest putting on
March 2022. relationships with other countries, see Priebe et al., 2021.

2  New
 research, such as that by Tomz et al. (2019), highlights 8  Germany
 and its Alternative for Germany (AfD) serves as an
the importance of the foreign policy positions of the public in excellent example for how influential these populist groups who
national security decisionmaking. favor misinformation are (see Denney, 2021; on the AfD’s use of
misinformation, see Scott, 2021).
3  This topic is also explored and extended in Curry and Lee (2020).

9  Effective
 deterrence is especially difficult if the country trying to
4  Self-delusions
 and biased decisionmaking are both cited as achieve it has a long-standing reputation for not being credible.
causes for the Iraq War in Lake (2010/2011). There is a rich literature on reputation and alliance formation,
war, and conflict more broadly. For some examples, see Huth
5  For
 an exploration of this in economic statecraft, see Collins (1997), Tomz (2012), and Sechser (2018).
(2009); for an exploration of this in military matters, see
Hermann and Kegley (1997), updated in such works as Downes 10  Examples from RAND include Johnson and Marcellino (2021)

and Monten (2013). and Matthews, Migacheva, and Brown (2021).

6  Posen,
 2015; Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, 1997; and Glaser, 11  See the discussion of critical race theory in the military in

Preble, and Thrall, 2019, p. 31, are all excellent examples of Kurtzleben (2021).
scholars with this viewpoint, while an example of a policymaker
who deplores the cost of the U.S. alliance system abroad is Senator 12  Even with a decrease in 2022, Americans’ trust in the military

Rand Paul. as an institution remains strong (Pew Research Center, 2022).

REFERENCES

Abramowitz Alan I., and Steven W. Webster, “Negative Partisanship: Barrett, Paul, Justin Hendrix, and Grant Sims, “How Tech Platforms
Why Americans Dislike Parties but Behave Like Rabid Partisans,” Fuel U.S. Political Polarization and What Government Can Do About It,”
Political Psychology, Vol. 39, No. S1, February 2018. Brookings Institution, September 7, 2021.
Ashbrook, Cathryn Cluver, “The Trump Legacy and Its Consequences,” Boot, Max, “Why the U.S. Ramped Up Its Information War with Russia,”
Internationale Politik, March 1, 2020. Council on Foreign Relations, February 10, 2022.
Baker, Garrett, Susannah Faxon-Mills, Alice Huguet, John F. Pane, and Byler, David, and Kate Woodsome, “Opinion: False, Toxic Sept. 11
Laura S. Hamilton, Approaches and Obstacles to Promoting Media Literacy Conspiracy Theories Are Still Widespread Today,” Washington Post,
Education in U.S. Schools, RAND Corporation, RR-A112-19, 2021. As of September 10, 2021.
January 6, 2023:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA112-19.html

34
Caiani, Manuela, and Patricia Kroll, “The Transnationalization of the Douglas, Karen M., Joseph E. Uscinski, Robbie M. Sutton, Aleksandra
Extreme Right and the Use of the Internet,” International Journal of Cichocka, Turkay Nefes, Chee Siang Ang, and Farzin Deravi,
Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, Vol. 39, 2015. “Understanding Conspiracy Theories,” Political Psychology, Vol. 40, No. 1,
2019.
Cavari, Amnon, and Guy Freedman, “Partisan Cues and Opinion
Formation on Foreign Policy,” American Politics Research, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2017. Downes, Alexander B., and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to Be Free? Why
Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization,”
Clare, Joe, “Hawks, Doves, and International Cooperation,” Journal of International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2013.
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 7, 2014.
Drezner, Daniel W., “The Angry Populist as Foreign Policy Leader: Real
Clark, David H., Benjamin O. Fordham, and Timothy Nordstrom, Change or Just Hot Air?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, 2017.
“Preying on the Misfortune of Others: When Do States Exploit Their
Opponents’ Domestic Troubles?” Journal of Politics, Vol. 73, No. 1, 2011. Druckman, James N., Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus, “How Elite
Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation,” American
Cline Center, “It Was an Attempted Coup: The Cline Center’s Coup D’état Political Science Review, Vol. 107, No. 1, February 2013.
Project Categorizes the January 6, 2021 Assault on the US Capitol,”
January 27, 2021. As of December 4, 2022: Edwards, George C., III, Prisoners of Their Premises, University of Chicago
https://clinecenter.illinois.edu/coup-detat-project-cdp/statement_ Press, 2022.
jan.27.2021
Elamroussi, Aya, “Texas Man Sentenced to 15 Months in Prison for
College of Physicians of Philadelphia, “U.S. Military and Vaccine Posting Covid-19 Hoax on Social Media,” CNN, October 6, 2021.
History,” webpage, undated. As of January 6, 2023:
https://cpp-hov.netlify.app/vaccines-101/how-are-vaccines-made/us- Epstein, Reid J., “Many American Voters Want to Upend System, Poll
military-and-vaccine-history Finds,” New York Times, July 13, 2022.

Collins, Stephen D., “Can America Finance Freedom? Assessing U.S. European Commission, “The EU Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal
Democracy Promotion via Economic Statecraft,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Hate Speech Online,” webpage, undated. As of January 6, 2023:
Vol. 5, No. 4, October 2009. https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-
and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination-0/racism-and-
Cox, Daniel A., “Conspiracy Theories, Misinformation, COVID-19, and xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en
the 2020 Election,” Center for American Progress Survey, Center on
American Life, October 13, 2020. European Commission, “6th Evaluation of the Code of Conduct,”
October 7, 2021. As of January 6, 2023:
Curry, James M., and Frances Lee, The Limits of Party: Congress and https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2021-10/factsheet-6th-
Lawmaking in a Polarized Era, Chicago University Press, 2020. monitoring-round-of-the-code-of-conduct_october2021_en_1.pdf
Cuthbert, Lane, and Alexander Theodoridis, “Do Republicans Really Financial Times, “Top German Court Instructs Facebook to Divulge Data
Believe Trump Won the 2020 Election? Our Research Suggests That They on Users Who Insulted MP,” February 2, 2022.
Do,” The Monkey Cage, January 7, 2022.
Fitzpatrick, Mark, “Two Years After JCPOA Withdrawal, Americans Are
Denney, Sam, “The German Far Right Doesn’t Need to Win Elections to Less Safe, the Middle East Less Peaceful,” International Institute for
Be Dangerous,” Lawfare, March 17, 2021. Strategic Studies, May 12, 2020.
Devaux, Axelle, Sarah Grand-Clement, and Stijn Hoorens, Truth Decay Flaherty, Anne, “AP Fact Check: Trump Falsely Claims Credit on NATO
in Europe: Exploring the Roles of Facts and Analysis in European Public Life, Spending,” July 13, 2018.
RAND Corporation, RR-A112-22, 2022. As of January 6, 2023:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA112-22.html Floyd, Rita, Security and the Environment, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

DeVine, Michael E., United States Foreign Intelligence Relationships: Flynn, D. J., Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler, “The Nature and Origins
Background, Policy and Legal Authorities, Risks, Benefits, Congressional of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About
Research Service, R45720, May 15, 2019. Politics,” Political Psychology, Vol. 38, No. S1, February 2017.

Dictus, Christopher, Yuliya Shokh, Isabelle Nazha, Marek Posard, Foster, Dennis, “Comfort to Our Adversaries’? Partisan Ideology,
Rich Girven, Sina Beaghley, and Anthony Vassalo, Has the U.S. Domestic Vulnerability, and Strategic Targeting,” Foreign Policy Analysis,
Experienced Sooth Decay? Examining the Relationship Between Policymakers Vol. 4, No. 4, 2008.
and Intelligence Providers, RAND Corporation, RR-A864-1, forthcoming.

35
Galambas, Louis, From the Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Chief of Hickey, Samuel M., “A Worthless Withdrawal: Two Years Since President
Staff, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979. Trump Abandoned the JCPOA,” Center for Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation, May 11, 2020.
Galeotti, Mark, “How Migrants Got Weaponized: The EU Set the Stage for
Belarus’s Cynical Ploy,” Foreign Affairs, December 2, 2021. Huth, Paul K., “Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical
Assessment,” Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1997.
Gallup, “In Depth: Iran,” last updated February 2022. As of December 4,
2022: Jackson, Douglas D., “COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy in the Military Is a
https://news.gallup.com/poll/116236/iran.aspx Manageable Challenge,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 30,
2021.
Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come
Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” Johnson, Christian, and William Marcellino, Bad Actors in Reporting:
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4, Spring 1997. Tracking News Manipulation by State Actors, RAND Corporation,
RR-A112-21, 2021. As of January 6, 2023:
Giles, Christopher, A Front for Influence: An Analysis of a Pro-Kremlin https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA112-21.html
Network Promoting Narratives on COVID-19 and Ukraine, Stanford
Internet Observatory, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Jones-Jang, S. Mo, Tara Mortenson, and Jingjing Liu, “Does Media
Studies, August 24, 2022. Literacy Help Identification of Fake News? Information Literacy Helps,
but Other Literacies Don’t,” American Behavioral Scientist, August 2019.
Glaser, John, Christopher A. Preble, and A. Trevor Thrall, “Towards a
More Prudent American Grand Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 61, No. 5, 2019. Kahne, Joseph, and Benjamin Bowyer, “Can Media Literacy Education
Increase Digital Engagement in Politics?” Learning, Media and Technology,
Goldberg, Jeffrey, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016. Vol. 44, No. 2, April 2019.
Grinberg, N., K. Joseph, L. Friedland, B. Swire-Thompson, and D. Lazer, Katmandu Post, “US Envoy Nominee: Nepal Ratified MCC Despite China’s
“Fake News on Twitter During the 2016 US Presidential Election,” ‘Disinformation Campaign,’” July 15, 2022.
Science, Vol. 363, No. 6425, 2019.
Kavanagh, Jennifer, and Michael D. Rich, Truth Decay: An Initial
Grossman, Shelby, Catarina Buchatskiy, Benjamin B.-B., Kate D., Renee Exploration of the Diminishing Role of Facts and Analysis in American Public
DiResta, Christina H., and Julia Steinberg, “Full-Spectrum Pro-Kremlin Life, RAND Corporation, RR-2314-RC, 2018. As of December 4, 2022:
Online Propaganda About Ukraine,” Stanford Internet Observatory, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2314.html
February 22, 2022.
Kertzer, Joshua, “Re-Assessing Elite-Public Gaps in Political Behavior,”
Hall, Todd, and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “The Personal Touch: Leaders’ American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 66, No. 3, July 2022.
Impressions, Costly Signaling, and Assessments of Sincerity in
International Affairs,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 3, Kertzer, Joshua D., Deborah Jordan Brooks, and Stephen G. Brooks, “Do
September 2012. Partisan Types Stop at the Water’s Edge?” Journal of Politics, Vol. 83,
No. 4, October 2021.
Harbridge, Laurel, Is Bipartisanship Dead? Cambridge University Press,
March 2015. Kertzer, Joshua D., and Dustin Tingley, “Political Psychology in
International Relations: Beyond the Paradigms,” Annual Review of
Haaretz, “The Iran Deal Was a Mistake. Withdrawing from It Was Even Political Science, Vol. 21, May 2018.
Worse,” November 21, 2021.
Kertzer, Joshua D., and Thomas Zeitzoff, “A Bottom-Up Theory of Public
Heft, Annette, Curd Knüpfer, Susanne Reinhardt, and Eva Mayerhöffer, Opinion about Foreign Policy,” American Journal of Political Science,
“Toward a Transnational Information Ecology on the Right? Hyperlink Vol. 61, No. 3, July 2017.
Networking Among Right-Wing Digital News Sites in Europe and the
United States,” International Journal of Press/Politics, 2020. Kessler, Glenn, “Trump’s Claim That the U.S. Pays the ‘Lion’s Share’ for
NATO,” Washington Post, March 30, 2016.
Hermann, Margaret G., and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., “The U.S. Use of
Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record,” Kessler, Glenn, and Joe Fox, “The False Claims That Trump Keeps
International Interactions, Vol. 24, No. 2, March 1997. Repeating,” Washington Post, January 20, 2021.
Herek, Gregory M., Irving Janis, and Paul Huth, “Decision Making Kingzette, Jon, James N. Druckman, Samara Klar, Yanna Krupnikov,
During International Crises: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome?” Matthew Levendusky, and John Barry Ryan, “How Affective Polarization
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1987. Undermines Support for Democratic Norms,” Public Opinion Quarterly,
Vol. 85, No. 2, Summer 2021.

36
Kull, Steven, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis, “Misperceptions, the Media, Milosh, Maria, Marcus Painter, Konstantin Sonin, David van Dijcke, and
and the Iraq War,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 4, Winter 2003. Austin L. Wright, “Unmasking Partisanship: Polarization Undermines
Public Response to Collective Risk,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 204,
Kurtzleben, Danielle, “Top General Defends Studying Critical Race December 2021.
Theory in the Military,” NPR, June 23, 2021.
Mongilio, Heather, “Navy Nearing 1,5000 COVID-19 Vaccine
Lake, David A., “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Separations,” U.S. Naval Institute, July 27, 2022. As of December 4, 2022:
Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War,” International Security, Vol. 35, https://news.usni.org/2022/07/27/navy-nearing-1500-covid-19-vaccine-
No. 3, Winter 2010/2011. separations
Lee, Ella, “Fact Check: Earliest Attacks on US Capitol Date Back to 19th Mortlock, David, “Trump’s JCPOA Withdrawal Two Years on: Maximum
Century,” USA Today, March 10, 2022. Pressure, Minimum Outcomes,” Atlantic Council, May 11, 2020.
Lee, Frances, “How Party Polarization Affects Governance,” Annual Myre, Greg, “As Russia Threatens Ukraine, the U.S. ‘Pre-Bunks’ Russian
Review of Political Science, Vol. 18, 2015. Propaganda,” All Things Considered, National Public Radio, February 8, 2022.
Lee, Frances, “Impact of Social Media on Opinion Polarization in Varying Nadimi, Farzin, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal Is Still Growing in
Times,” Communication and Society, March 2016. Size, Reach, and Accuracy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Lee, Kyung Suk, and Kirby Goidel, “U.S. Public Support for the U.S.-NATO December 13, 2021.
Alliance,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 34, No. 2, Neal, Zachary P., “A Sign of the Times? Weak and Strong Polarization in
Summer 2022. the U.S. Congress, 1973–2016,” Social Networks, Vol. 60, January 2020.
Lonsdorf, Kat, Courtney Dorning, Amy Isackson, Mary Louise Kelly, and Onderco, Michal, and Florian Stoeckel, “Conspiratorial Thinking and
Ailsa Chang, “A Timeline of How the Jan. 6 Attack Unfolded—Including Foreign Policy Views: Evidence from Central Europe,” Journal of Elections,
Who Said What and When,” NPR Politics, June 9, 2022. Public Opinion and Parties, August 2020.
Matthews, Miriam, Katya Migacheva, and Ryan Andrew Brown, Osmundsen, Mathias, Alexander Bor, Peter Bjerregaard Vahlstrup, Anja
Superspreaders of Malign and Subversive Information on COVID-19: Russian Bechmann, and Michael Bang Petersen, “Partisan Polarization Is the
and Chinese Efforts Targeting the United States, RAND Corporation, Primary Psychological Motivation behind Political Fake News Sharing on
RR-A112-11, 2021. As of January 6, 2023: Twitter,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 115, No. 3, May 2021.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA112-11.html
Parent, Joseph M., and Joseph Uscinski, American Conspiracy Theories,
Matthews, Luke, Andrew M. Parker, Katherine Grace Carman, Rose Oxford University Press, 2014.
Kerber, and Jennifer Kavanagh, Individual Differences in Resistance to
Truth Decay: Exploring the Role of Reasoning and Cognitive Biases, RAND Perry, Barbara, and Ryan Scrivens, “Uneasy Alliances: A Look at the
Corporation, RR-A112-17, 2022. As of January 6, 2023: Right-Wing Extremist Movement in Canada,” Studies in Conflict and
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA112-17.html Terrorism, Vol. 39, 2016.
Mayhew, David, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking and Peters, Gerhard, and John T. Woolley, “Executive Orders,” The American
Investigations, 1946–2002, Yale University Press, 2005. Presidency Project, website, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, eds.,
last updated December 23, 2022. As of January 6, 2023:
McCulloch, Caitlin, and Stephen Watts, Evaluating the Effectiveness of https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/323876
Public Communication Campaigns and Their Implications for Strategic
Competition with Russia, RAND Corporation, RR-A412-2, 2021. As of Peterson, Susan, Ryan Powers, and Michael J. Tierney, “Experts Don’t
January 6, 2023: like Trump’s Withdrawal from the Iran Deal—or His Foreign Policy in
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA412-2.html General,” Washington Post, May 16, 2018.
Meese, Michael J., Suzanne C. Nielsen, and Rachel M. Sondheimer, Pew Research Center, “Public Takes Strong Stance Against Iran’s Nuclear
American National Security, Seventh Edition, Johns Hopkins University Program,” February 15, 2012.
Press, 2018.
Pew Research Center, “Iran Nuclear Agreement Meets with Public
Millennium Challenge Account Nepal, “Electricity Transmission Skepticism,” July 21, 2015.
Project,” webpage, undated. As of January 6, 2023:
https://mcanp.org/en/projects/electricity-transmission-project/

37
Pew Research Center, “Americans’ Trust in Military, Scientists Relatively Saunders, Elizabeth N., “Elites in the Making and Breaking of Foreign
High; Fewer Trust MEDIA, business Leaders, Elected Officials,” Policy,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 25, 2022.
March 22, 2019a.
Scott, Mark, “Voter Fraud Misinformation Gains Momentum in
Pew Research Center, “Large Majorities in Both Parties Say NATO Is Germany” Politico, June 18, 2021.
Good for the U.S.,” April 2, 2019b.
Sechser, Todd S., “Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining,”
Pew Research Center, “Americans’ Trust in Scientists, Other Groups Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 62, No. 2, 2018.
Declines,” February 15, 2022.
Silver, Laura, and Elisa Shearer, “Americans in News Media ‘Bubbles’
Posen Barry, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell Think Differently About Foreign Policy Than Others,” Pew Research
University Press, 2015. Center, June 2, 2021.
Post, Jerrold M., “Current Concepts of the Narcissistic Personality: Smith, Dan, “The US Withdrawal from the Iran Deal: One Year on,”
Implications for Political Psychology,” Political Psychology, Vol. 14, No. 1, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, May 7, 2019.
March 1993.
Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, “Decision-Making as
Poudel, Santosh Sharma, “Nepal’s MCC Debate Reflects Flaws in Its an Approach to the Study of International Politics,” in Richard C. Snyder,
Decision-Making,” The Diplomat, February 18, 2022. H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Free
Press of Glencoe, 1962.
Poushter, Jacob, “How People Around the World See the U.S. and Donald
Trump in 10 Charts,” Pew Research Center, January 8, 2020. Spencer, Saranac Hale, “Obama Didn’t Give Iran ‘150 Billion in Cash,’”
Factcheck.org, March 1, 2019.
Priebe, Miranda, Bryan Rooney, Caitlin McCulloch, and Zachary
Burdette, Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the United States in Szakacs, Judit, and Eva Bognar, The Impact of Disinformation Campaigns
Conflict? RAND Corporation, RR-A739-3, 2021. As of January 6, 2023: About Migrants and Minority Groups in the EU, European Parliament,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA739-3.html June 2021.
Prins, Brandon C., “Domestic Politics and Interstate Disputes: Examining Times of Israel Staff, “Though No Longer Premier, Netanyahu Hosts
US Mid Involvement and Reciprocation, 1870–1992,” International Nikki Haley at Official Residence,” Times of Israel, June 15, 2021.
Interactions, Vol. 26, 2001.
Tomz, Michael, Reputation and International Cooperation, Princeton
Ramos, Jennifer, and Priscilla Torres, “The Right Transmission: University Press, 2012.
Understanding Global Diffusion of the Far-Right,” Populism, Vol. 3, 2020.
Tomz, Michael, Jessica L. P. Weeks, and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Public
Rathbun, Brian C., Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Opinion and Decisions About Military Force in Democracies,”
Enforcement in the Balkans, Cornell University Press, 2004. International Organization, Vol. 74, No. 1, December 2019.
Raunio, Tapio, and Wolfgang Wagner, “The Party Politics of Foreign and Trussler, Marc, “Get Information or Get in Formation: The Effects of
Security Policy,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 4, October 2020. High-Information Environments on Legislative Elections,” British Journal
of Political Science, Vol. 51, No. 4, February 2020.
Richter, Andrew, “NATO in the Age of Trump: Alliance Defense Spending
During the Trump Presidency,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2021. Uscinski, Joseph, Adam Enders, Casey Klofstad, Michelle Seelig, Hugo
Drochon, Kamal Premartne, and Manohar Murthi, “Have Beliefs in
Roberts, William, “‘Blot’ on Powell’s Record: Lies to the UN About Iraq’s Conspiracy Theories Increased over Time?” PLOS One, July 20, 2022.
Weapons,” Al-Jazeera, October 18, 2021.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Social Media Working Group
Rose, Joel, and Liz Baker, “6 in 10 Americans Say U.S. Democracy Is in for Emergency Services and Disaster Management, Countering False
Crisis as the ‘Big Lie’ Takes Root,” NPR, January 3, 2022. Information on Social Media in Disasters and Emergencies, March 2018.
Rosen, Kenneth R., “The Inside Story of How Trump ‘Kept the Oil’ in U.S. Department of State, “The Ironclad U.S. Commitment to NATO,”
Syria and Lost,” Washington Public Institute for Near East Public Policy, fact sheet, November 29, 2021. As of January 6, 2023:
May 31, 2021. https://www.state.gov/the-ironclad-u-s-commitment-to-nato/
RT, “‘Just Like Pirates’: Syrian Minister Says US Controls Most Crude Vedantam, Shankar, “More Americans Than You Might Think Believe
Reserves in Northeast, Loots Oil to Strangle Country’s Economy,” In Conspiracy Theories,” NPR, June 4, 2014.
March 20, 2021.

38
Walt, Stephen M., “America Has an Unhealthy Obsession with Photo credits
Credibility,” Foreign Policy, January 29, 2022.
Cover: stockdevil / Getty Images; filo / Getty Images
Washington Post and ABC News, poll about support for the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (“As you may know, the U.S. and other Page iii: imamember / Getty Images
countries have announced a deal to lift economic sanctions against Iran Page 5: EvgeniyShkolenko / Getty Images
in exchange for Iran agreeing not to produce nuclear, weapons ...”),
July 19, 2015. Page 6: stockdevil / Getty Images

Wenzel, Andrea, “To Verify or to Disengage: Coping with ‘Fake News’ Page 7: fonikum / Getty Images; FingerMedium / Getty Images;
and Ambiguity,” International Journal of Communication, Vol. 13, 2019. Nithinan Tatal / Noun Project; PeterSnow / Getty Images

The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Page 9: Tim Bieber / Getty Images; Sam Edwards / Getty Images;
December 2017. As of January 6, 2023: AzmanL / Getty Images; Smederevac / Getty Images
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/
Page 15: YaroslavKryuchka / Getty Images
NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
Page 20: guvendemir / Getty Images
The White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022. As of
January 6, 2023: Page 26: filo / Getty Images
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-
Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf Pages 30/31: Stephen Emlund / Getty Images

Wike, Richard, Jacob Poushter, Janell Fetterolf, and Shannon


Schumacher, “Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of
U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 8, 2020.
Younis, Mohamed, “Do Americans Want War with Iran?” Gallup,
August 20, 2019.
Zeigler, Charles E., “International dimensions of Electoral Processes:
Russia, the USA, and the 2016 Elections,” International Politics, Vol. 55, 2017.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

HEATHER J. WILLIAMS is a senior policy researcher at CAITLIN MCCULLOCH is an associate political scientist at
the RAND Corporation. Her research focuses on violent the RAND Corporation. Her primary research interests are
extremism and targeted violence, Middle East regional alliance ties, security cooperation, misinformation/information
issues, and intelligence policy and methodology. Williams warfare, Eastern Europe and the impact of environmental
has an M.S. in strategic intelligence from the National change on conflict. She received her Ph.D. in government and
Intelligence University. politics from the University of Maryland, College Park.

39
ABOUT THIS PERSPECTIVE

THIS PERSPECTIVE EXPLORES the overlap between Truth Acknowledgments


Decay and national security. It is intended to encourage cross-
disciplinary discussion of the disparate areas of national We would like to thank Jennifer Kavanagh and Michael Rich,
security and security studies affected by Truth Decay, with for both creating the foundation for this work and tirelessly
the ultimate aim of highlighting research gaps currently open supporting its development. We are also greatly appreciative
in this field, identifying pathways to further discuss and to Samantha Cherney, who helped us organize and set up our
explore in this overlap area, and encouraging a shared foundation focus groups and record and distill the conversations, and
and framework for future research. Katie Carman for her continuous support and patience. We are
This work is part of the RAND Corporation’s Truth Decay continuously grateful for Jessica Arana and her beautiful con-
initiative (Kavanagh and Rich, 2018), which studies the tributions to publication design.
diminishing role of facts and analysis in public life. Through We would additionally like to thank the participants in
this initiative, RAND has invited researchers and engaged our focus groups: Trupti Brahmbhatt, Ryan Brown, Aaron
stakeholders to find solutions that counter Truth Decay and Clark-Ginsberg, Cortez Cooper, Alyssa Demus, Matt DeNardo,
the threat it poses to evidence-based policymaking. More Emily Ellinger, Joe Eyerman, Christy Foran, Bryan Frederick,
information about Truth Decay is available at www.rand.org/ Gian Gentile, Rich Girven, Todd Helmus, Elicia John, Alexandra
truth-decay. More information about RAND can be found at Evans, Debra Knopman, Michael Linick, Dara Massicot, Luke
www.rand.org. Questions about this report should be directed Matthews, Angela O’Mahony, James Marrone, Mike Mazarr,
to Heather_Williams@rand.org. Laura Miller, Pauline Moore, Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin,
Bryan Rooney, Patricia Stapleton, Andrew Stravers, Tom
Szayna, Elina Treyger, Kristin Van Abel, and J.D. Williams.
Funding Lastly, we appreciate all the comments from our peers on
our final draft: the careful edit provided by our consummate
Funding for this research was provided by gifts from RAND colleague Michelle Grisé; the quality assurance comments
supporters and income from operations. provided by Ben Sacks and Chris Chivvis; and the review
oversight of Mike Spirtas and Jim Powers.

40
ABOUT THIS PERSPECTIVE

The authors of this Perspective explore how Truth


Decay—the diminishing role of facts and analysis in
American public life—affects U.S. national security,
what should be done about it, and what future
research on this topic should focus on. They high-
light research gaps in this field, identify pathways
to further discuss and explore in this overlap area,
and encourage a shared foundation and framework
for future research.

C O R P O R AT I O N $26.00
ISBN-10 1-9774-1083-9
ISBN-13 978-1-9774-1083-2
52600

9 781977 410832

WWW.RAND.ORG PE-A112-2

You might also like