University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln

US Army Research U.S. Department of Defense

2017

The Indo-Asia Pacific and the Multi-Domain Battle

Concept
Robert B. Brown
U.S. Army

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usarmyresearch

Brown, Robert B., "The Indo-Asia Pacific and the Multi-Domain Battle Concept" (2017). US Army Research. 363.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/usarmyresearch/363

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the U.S. Department of Defense at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in US Army Research by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
The Indo-Asia Pacific
and the Multi-Domain
Battle Concept
Gen. Robert B. Brown, U.S. Army, Commander of United States Army Pacific

T he United States Armed Forces are at a cross-

roads, facing both institutional and operational
challenges. The character of war continues to
change at a quick pace, requiring military leaders to
reassess some of their core beliefs. This situation has led
times simultaneously.1 The nascent Multi-Domain Battle
concept, some elements of which are described in a forth-
coming white paper jointly authored by the Army and
the Marine Corps, addresses the increasing complexity
of the battlefield and its requirement for service integra-
to the testing and refinement of concepts, capabilities, tion.2 While still in development and experimentation,
and people to ensure U.S. forces are ready for the con- the concept is already affecting operational and resource
flicts of today and tomorrow. Without doubt, any future decisions, especially in the Indo-Asia Pacific.
conflict will be increasingly complex and distributed, This article presents three topics to illustrate how
involving actions across multiple domains—land, air, we are thinking about the implementation of the Multi-
sea, space, and cyber—by multiple military services, at Domain Battle concept in the Pacific Command area of

MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · MARCH 2017

2
 MULTIDOMAIN PACOM

(Graphic by Staff Sgt. Mark A. Moore II, U.S. Army)

responsibility. First, it briefly discusses the strategic situa- and] $1.2 trillion of this sea-based trade destined to, or
tion in the Indo-Asia Pacific, which typifies the need for exported from, the United States.”5 Additionally, “the
a new operating concept to integrate all the United States Strait of Malacca alone sees more than 25 percent of
Armed Forces. Next, it describes the Multi-Domain oil shipments and 50 percent of all natural gas transits
Battle concept, including the three elements that help each day.”6 In addition, the area is disaster-prone, with its
define its desired effects: joint integration, technology, typhoons, earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, and other
and people. Finally, it presents a vignette of multi-domain events representing “over 60 percent of the world’s nat-
battle as it might apply at the tactical level. ural disasters.”7 In short, global prosperity hinges on the
stability and security of this vast and complex region.
The Strategic Context in the These demographic and economic dynamics inter-
Indo-Asia Pacific act with the increased rate of technological change to
Given that the international state of play in this add to the political and military complexity found in
region is more tenuous than ever, the Multi-Domain the Indo-Asia Pacific. Dramatic technological shifts
Battle concept is sorely needed. The region contains created by unmanned capabilities, robotic learning,
thirty-six countries in sixteen time zones, more than artificial intelligence, nanotech, biotech, and big data
half the world’s population, and twenty-four of the are only expanding military competition between geo-
thirty-six megacities on Earth, and it covers more than political rivals. Much of these new technological tools
half the world’s surface area.3 The region contains three depend on the use of digital connectivity—with seven
of the world’s largest economies, seven of the largest billion devices being connected to the Internet in 2016
militaries, and five of the United States’ seven mutu- and a projected fifty billion by 2020—only increasing
al defense agreement partners.4 According to Adm. the already dangerous situation in cyberspace and its
Harry B. Harris Jr., commander of United States Pacific dependence on space assets for connectivity.8
Command, “approximately $5.3 trillion in annual global Technological shifts are also feeding and increasing
trade relies on unimpeded access to sea lanes [such as security challenges in the Indo-Asia Pacific, with some
those in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, the world’s most intractable problems among them.

MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · MARCH 2017

3
 Sea Space Air

Human

Cyber

Weaponized
social media and
cultural
engagement

Land
(Graphic by Arin Burgess, Military Review)

Multi-Domain Battlefield

Challenges include an increasingly belligerent North strengths based on power projection, joint operations,
Korea that is sharing its increasingly capable missile and technological overmatch led to unprecedented
technology with Iran, a growing China that is chal- tactical success. As such, adversaries have developed
lenging international rules and norms, a revanchist capabilities and concepts that attempt to remove those
Russia that is increasingly active in the Pacific with advantages, increasing the complexity of the battlefield
a provocative military posture, a continuing nu- for the United States Armed Forces. This has led to
clear-backed friction between India and Pakistan, an increasingly contested global commons, with a loss
increasing activities by violent extremist networks of U.S. military dominance in the air and sea due to
operating in partner and ally nations, and political denial technologies and tactics. Whether opponents
and diplomatic instability from changes in execu- take gradual or sudden actions, the United States needs
tive leadership of key regional allies and partners. to significantly improve its strategic advantage in the
The most dangerous threat in the Indo-Asia Pacific Indo-Asia Pacific, or it will risk losing ground militarily,
comes from regional actors with nuclear arsenals diplomatically, and economically.
and the intent to undermine the international order. Because of these strategic trends, both positive and
Sophisticated denial capabilities and less-than-mili- negative, U.S. and partner forces need to maintain cur-
tary forces managed by the state but backed by large rent military advantages and recapture those that have
militaries with interior lines of communication cre- been lost. Reducing the risk of conflict and ensuring the
ate the danger of faits accomplis. stability of the current international system depend on
Like the international state of play, the military sit- our ability to deter key actors from aggressive and detri-
uation is also increasingly dangerous. Adversaries and mental actions. We must interrupt enemy decision cycles
enemies have learned from U.S. successes and failures and present enemies with multiple dilemmas that create
over the last few decades. They recognize that U.S. uncertainty and paralyze their efforts. If aggression leads

MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · MARCH 2017

4
 MULTIDOMAIN PACOM

to conflict, however, we must be prepared to defeat our 1794 to 1950, the Army was responsible for coastal and
enemies unambiguously. harbor defense, and later for the air defense of the home-
This approach is the driving force behind the Multi- land. The Army’s Warrant Officer Corps originated from
Domain Battle Concept, which is designed to overcome the need in World War I for technical specialists to staff
denial technologies and jointly affect all domains to create the Army’s undersea Mine Planter Service. The idea of or
localized areas of overmatch.9 These effects will then desire for cross-domain effects is not new.12
re-enable maneuver for the entire joint force operating While all the services are being asked to perform their
in any region, thereby placing an enemy in a position of missions in a manner not terribly different from the past,
disadvantage so U.S. forces can gain the initiative. there will be differences. We in the Army can no longer
simply focus on the land, leaving the air and sea to other
Elements of the Multi-Domain services. Nor can the Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, or
Battle Concept Coast Guard simply focus on “their” domains. We must
The Multi-Domain Battle concept may at first sound all better integrate our planning, operations, command
like nothing more than traditional joint operations. There and control, and effects across all the domains.
is some truth to this. What we are trying to achieve— To achieve integration requires a new approach,
cross-domain effects—is not entirely new. For example, a new mind-set. All U.S. forces must change their
at Thermopylae and Salamis, the ancient Greeks em- distinct service cultures to a culture of inclusion and
ployed both land and naval forces to defeat the invading openness, focusing on a
Persians.10 Much closer to our own time, the United “purple (or joint) first” Gen. Robert B. Brown,
States of America owe their independence to the effective mentality. The Army U.S. Army, is the com-
employment of American and French ground and naval must further integrate a manding general of
forces against Lord Cornwallis’s army at Yorktown. mission command mind- United States Army Pacific
Another historical example is the Vicksburg set, where every person (USARPAC). He has served
Campaign during the American Civil War. With its is empowered to gain the over twelve years with units
ability to control navigation on the Mississippi River, initiative based on his or focused on the Indo-Asia
Confederate Vicksburg’s artillery, infantry, and cavalry her role and function. And Pacific region, including
forces constituted a formidable anti-access and area it must focus on develop- as commanding general,
denial challenge to Union forces. Union Gen. Ulysses ing leaders who thrive in I Corps and Joint Base
S. Grant overcame that challenge only by combining ambiguity and chaos. Lewis-McCord; deputy
the capabilities and effects of his own artillery, cavalry, Joint integration. commanding general, 25th
and infantry forces with the naval ships led by Flag The Multi-Domain Battle Infantry Division; director
Officer Andrew Hull Foote.11 concept is expected to of training and exercis-
The introduction of the airplane, the submarine, and integrate three key areas: es, United States Pacific
the aircraft carrier in World War I, and the incorporation organizations and process- Command (USPACOM)
of mobile radio communications and radar systems in es, technology, and people. J7 (now J37); executive
World War II, vastly increased a strategic commander’s Changes in organizations assistant to the commander,
ability to operate across several domains simultaneously. and processes will be USPACOM; plans officer,
More recently, the development of AirLand Battle in designed to provide dif- USARPAC; and command-
the 1980s and then Air-Sea Battle in 2013 show military ferent and better-focused er, 1st Brigade Combat
thinking evolving along the same general line—how to Army tools to joint forces Team (Stryker), 25th Infantry
win decisively, even if outnumbered or technological- to overcome the United Division. Assignments in the
ly overmatched, by integrating operations in multiple States’ loss of superiority or generating force include
domains to present enemies with multiple dilemmas. parity in certain domains, commanding general, U.S.
Different services have regularly supported each other particularly in the air, at Army Combined Arms
in all domains. Therefore, when Harris says he wants the sea, and within cyberspace. Center, and commanding
Army to provide effects outside the land domain, he is The Army can no longer general, Maneuver Center
not asking it to do something without precedent. From focus exclusively on the of Excellence.

MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · MARCH 2017

5
land domain; as part of a joint force, Army forces must thinking skills.13 Failure must be an option, under the
provide other services effects in their domains to over- principle that learning exercises develop leaders who
come their operational challenges, and vice versa. This will respond better in actual conflicts. Leaders must also
means change must focus on greater ability to have receive some measure of cultural education and training
cross-domain effects and more seamless and effective that would allow them to experience different ways of
integration across joint forces. thinking. In USARPAC, we are addressing both critical
In United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), we thinking and cultural understanding through a regional
are attempting this through three areas. The first is to leader development program run by and for personnel
design and experiment with flexible command and at the Army service component command level. As the
control designs, tailorable and scalable units, and flex- Army’s advise-and-assist brigades come online, we will
ible policies in key areas. Second, most of this experi- also include unit personnel headed to the Pacific in this
mentation will occur as a part of a redesigned exercise education and training pipeline to prepare them for
program designed to make all events joint and multi- operations in this region.
national, with the aim point being the Navy’s Rim of
the Pacific exercise in 2018. Finally, we are supporting Multi-Domain Battle in Practice
increased innovation across the services in cross-com- The following fictional vignette illustrates the
ponent and combatant-command processes. Multi-Domain Battle concept applied at the tactical
Technology. Another key area is technological level. This example is based on a hypothetical location
change. We must overcome and leverage the velocity of in the Indo-Asia Pacific region.
technological change, rather than losing our overmatch Let us say there was an island chain or a coastal land
capabilities through slow acquisitions programs. The mass whose location would make it decisive terrain,
Department of Defense and the Army have already influencing aerial or maritime navigation or access to
created the foundation for rapid material solutions with a strategic port. Possession of this feature by a certain
the Strategic Capabilities Office at the Office of the hostile power would constitute a serious threat to the
Secretary of Defense and the Rapid Capabilities Office at international order and the stability and security of the
Headquarters, Department of the Army. These offic- Indo-Asia Pacific region.
es are doing an admirable job of repurposing current The hostile power then seized control of the fea-
technology to innovate in application, a key component ture and announced it would restrict commercial air
of recapturing our tactical edge. USARPAC is tied tightly and sea traffic, denying access to any nation aligned
into these efforts. It is including every piece of equipment with the United States. Treaty obligations would
in exercises and experimentation. As has been the case require the United States to intervene militarily,
in this theater for years, USARPAC takes advantage of though the enemy’s arsenal of weaponry and elec-
the great “battle lab” culture this command has developed tronics was formidable.
over the past decade or more. Technology offers key tools A military option that applied the Multi-Domain
to support decision making, lethality, and protection. We Battle concept might include using cyber and space
must leverage this technology to empower our men and capabilities to temporarily blind and disrupt enemy
women and increase their lethality and effectiveness. command and control systems so special operations
People. The final area the Multi-Domain Battle forces could move in and gain a foothold in the island
concept addresses is people. The U.S. Armed Forces chain. They then would facilitate Marine amphibious
must use its people to overcome the challenges of being forces to secure the beachhead, an airfield, and other
outnumbered, outdistanced, and “outlearned” by adver- major structures required to create a secure beachhead.
saries and enemies. People are America’s greatest stra- Immediately behind them would be Army watercraft
tegic advantage. To leverage this advantage, the Armed loaded with heavy engineering equipment to repair the
Forces must develop agile and adaptive leaders through airstrip, if necessary, and construct hardened defensive
education and training. Rigorous iterations of decision positions. Simultaneously, Air Force C-17s and C-130s
making, including “impossible” scenarios or “black swans” would bring in an Army Stryker battalion task force
that soldiers would not expect, can help develop critical with a High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System battery,

MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · MARCH 2017

6
 MULTIDOMAIN PACOM

specially equipped with anti-ship cruise missile pods Multinational forces march in formation 15 February 2017 after the
and a battery of the Indirect Fire Protection Capability official opening ceremony of Cobra Gold 2017 in Utapao, Thailand.
Cobra Gold, in its thirty-sixth iteration, is the largest Theater Security
weapon system for short-range air defense. In addition, Cooperation exercise in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. This year’s focus is to
a battery of 155 mm howitzers with hypervelocity advance regional security and ensure effective responses to region-
rounds would be offloaded as the Marines retrograded al crises by bringing together a robust multinational force to address
in the newly empty aircraft to reconstitute for subse- shared goals and security commitments in the Indo-Asia-Pacific re-
gion. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Marc Castaneda, U.S. Navy)
quent forced-entry operations, if needed.
Within ninety-six hours, the Stryker battalion task
force would be dug in and ready. With Air Force manned
and unmanned systems, Navy ships and underwater
drones, a suite of Army radar systems (such as AN/ the current doctrinal requirement of seventy-two hours
TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37, or Sentinel) and the aerial threat for a unit of this size. But with advancements in mobile
detection Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense water purification, solar panels, batteries, wind turbines,
Elevated Netted Sensor System to see over the horizon, and wave and tidal energy, as well as additive manufac-
there would be an overlapping multi-domain network of turing printers to make repair parts, such a unit could
sensors that could operate indefinitely to identify, target, be self-sufficient far longer than even much larger ones
and employ lethal and electronic fires in all the do- were in the previous century. They would still need fuel
mains—land, sea, air, cyber, and space—simultaneously. for their vehicles, but with drones and other autono-
The task force might be cut off from resupply or mous platforms enhancing force protection, they could
communication for indefinite periods. That is why this limit the need for fossil fuel-powered vehicles and sup-
task force of about one thousand personnel would be plement organic support assets with Air Force’s Joint
able to support itself for up to thirty days—ten times Precision Airdrop System.

MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · MARCH 2017

7
 To reiterate, these units might have to operate in at United States Army Training and Doctrine
extremely austere conditions with limited resources and Command. Today in the Pacific, this is occurring. We
without a constant ground, sea, or aerial line of commu- are applying the joint integration, technology, and
nication linking them to other friendly forces. However, people aspects of the Multi-Domain Battle concept
these men and women would be ready, with exceptional through rigorous inclusion of concepts and capabil-
leaders exercising mission command. ities in all our exercises, which will culminate in a
Again, this is just a thought exercise based on how major test at the Navy’s Rim of the Pacific exercise in
Army forces in the Pacific are thinking about and 2018. Moreover, we are considering how to integrate a
experimenting with multi-domain battle. Application multi-domain approach with our planning, equipping,
of the concept may look different in other parts of and leader-development efforts.
the world, or even in different areas of the Indo-Asia The Army should not hesitate to resource and
Pacific. However, it is clear that no matter the geogra- test this effort. Many of the concepts and capabilities
phy or the adversary, Army units must be well led, well found in the Multi-Domain Battle concept will be
trained, and well equipped to operate in and across needed not just for future conflict but also for near-
multiple domains in support of a joint force. term conflicts that might require us to be ready to
One way to ensure this is the case is through ho- “fight tonight.” Make no mistake: testing and imple-
listic operational testing, with Army service compo- menting a multi-domain approach will increase our
nent command and subordinate units working hand readiness today, as well as prepare our men and wom-
in hand with the concepts and doctrine developers en to win wars if the Nation requires it.

Notes
1. Sean Kimmons, “Battles of the future will be fought in pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/610925/
multiple domains, senior leaders say,” Army.mil, 5 October aspen-security-forum-remarks-by-adm-harris/.
2016, accessed 27 February 2017, https://www.army.mil/ 7. Jennifer D. P. Moroney et al., Lessons from Department of
article/176230/new_multi_domain_battle_concept_to_drive_ Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region (Santa
change_in_armys_future. Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 1.
2. David G. Perkins, “Multi-Domain Battle: Joint Combined 8. Peter Singer, presentation at the U.S. Army Pacific Com-
Arms Concept for the 21st Century,” Association of the United manders Conference, 13 October 2016.
States Army website, 14 November 2016, accessed 24 February 9. Kevin Benson, “Extending the Second Offset and Multi-Do-
2017, https://www.ausa.org/articles/multi-domain-battle-joint- main Battle,” The Strategy Bridge website, 29 November 2016,
combined-arms-concept-21st-century. The Army Capabilities accessed 27 February 2017, http://thestrategybridge.org/the-
Integration Center is expected to publish a white paper on the bridge/2016/11/29/extending-the-second-offset-and-multi-do-
Multi-Domain Battle concept in 2017. main-battle. See also J. P. Clark, “In Defense of a Big Idea for Joint
3. U.S. Pacific Command, “USPACOM Area of Responsibility,” ac- Warfighting,” War on the Rocks website, 22 December 2016,
cessed 27 February 2017, http://www.pacom.mil/About-USPACOM/ accessed 21 February 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/
USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility. in-defense-of-a-big-idea-for-joint-warfighting/.
4. CNN Money, “World’s largest economies,” http://money. 10. See Barry Strauss, The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter
cnn.com/news/economy/world_economies_gdp/, accessed 28 That Saved Greece—and Western Civilization (New York: Simon and
February 2017. Schuster, 2005), 15.
5. Harry B. Harris Jr., “Role of Land Forces In Ensuring Access 11. See Terrence J. Winschel, Triumph and Defeat: The Vicksburg
to Shared Domains” (speech, Association of the United States Campaign (Mason City, IA: Savas Publishing, 1999).
Army Institute of Land Warfare LANPAC Symposium, Honolulu, 12. Numerous resources address each of these aspects the U.S.
Hawaii, 25 May 2016), accessed 27 February 2017, http://www. Army’s history at the Center of Military History website, accessed 27
pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/781889/lanpac- February 2017, http://www.history.army.mil.
symposium-2016-role-of-land-forces-in-ensuring-access-to- 13. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the
shared-domains/. Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2010). The author
6. Harris, “ASPEN Security Forum Remarks by Adm. describes the term “black swan” as an occurrence that is a rarity, is
Harris” (speech, ASPEN Security Forum, Aspen, Colora- extremely impactful, and has retrospective (though not prospec-
do, 23 July 2015), accessed 27 February 2017, http://www. tive) predictability.

MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · MARCH 2017

8