Titus Lucretius Carus was a first-century Roman aristocrat, philosopher, poet, and atomic

theorist affiliated with the Epicurean School of Philosophy. While he is most famous for his
atomic theory, this essay will primarily focus on his theory of the materiality of the soul.
Lucretius' On the Nature of Things posits that the soul is material and mortal. The following
paper will explore his argument for the soul's materiality, focusing on the cases made in lines
161-177 of book 3, and explain the objecting view of medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas in
his Summa Theologica before judging which argument is superior.

In On the Nature of Things, Lucretius argues that the soul must be material as the moving
principle of the body. While he may not use this vernacular, he writes, "The spirit strikes and
drives the body forward. And we learn By means of this same reasoning that the nature of the
mind And of the spirit is a physical one." This text demonstrates that Lucretius believes the soul
is the body's moving principle. As nothing gives what it has not, for example, something cold
cannot give heat, he also asserts that the soul cannot move the body until moved. Thus, Lucretius
finds that the mind must move the soul, writing that the spirit only moves the body when "struck
by the mind's power." Likewise, the mind itself moves only when outside forces strike it.

Further, he asserts that motion's nature indicates the soul's materiality. Lucretius writes that
bodily movement can "be brought about only by means of touch." This claim begs the conclusion
that the soul must be a material entity inasmuch as it can move the body. With all of the
proceeding claims being asserted, Lucretius determines that the soul must be material. Next, to
fully illustrate Lucretius' view of the soul, this essay will discuss Lucretius' second argument for
the soul's materiality in lines 169-177 of On the Nature of Things' third book.

In his second demonstration of the soul's corporeality, Lucretius examines the commonality of
experience between the mind and body. He draws a relationship between bodily and mental
damage, using an example of a man stabbed by a spear. He writes that the man struck by a spear
suffers physical pain and is "overtaken by a giddy swoon." This, Lucretius finds, indicates that
damage has been done to the soul and mind by the spear. The man loses his wits and rationality,
unable to order his thoughts or act upon them. As the man becomes unable to order his thoughts,
his mind becomes unable to move the soul. Likewise, as the soul cannot be moved, it finds itself
unable to move the body. A review of the argument in the prior paragraphs determines that these
injuries manifest damage done to the mind and soul by the spear. This manifestation being
evident, and considering that a material thing can only damage other material things, one must
conclude, according to Lucretius, that the soul is material.

As Lucretius' argument on the soul appears cogent and free of logical fallacy, readers are
behooved to investigate a diametrically opposed worldview to that of Lucretius to determine the
veracity of his claims about the soul's materiality. Readers can look to Saint Thomas Aquinas of
the Catholic Church for such a worldview. Aquinas was a doctor of the Church who lived from
1225 to 1274 and authored the Summa Theologica. Aquinas examined over 500 theological
questions in the Summa to provide theology students with an instructional guide for almost all
the questions of their craft. The Summa's second book contains its seventy-fifth question,
examining man's spiritual and corporeal composition. Aquinas addresses the soul's materiality in
the question's first and fifth articles.
Article one of the Summa's seventy-fifth question, entitled "Whether the soul is a body," accepts
several premises established by Lucretius in On the Nature of Things. In the opening words of
the article, Aquinas acknowledges that "the soul is the moving principle of the body... [and] nor
does it move unless moved." Such a concession, juxtaposed with the assessment that all
principles of action are necessarily corporeal, would point towards Lucretius' conclusion that the
soul is material being inarguable.

However, Aquinas rejects the proceeding assessment, writing that "the philosophers of old...
supposed that the principles of these actions were something corporeal: for they asserted that
only bodies were real things." Aquinas instead asserts that the soul must be incorporeal because
of its place as the distinguishing item between animate and inanimate things. To this point, he
adds that the soul, as the first principle of life, cannot be a body. His reasoning for such a
conclusion is as follows. "It is clear that to be a principle of life... does not belong to a body...
since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing." This being the case, if the soul
is both the moving principle of the body and a body itself, all things would be animate by the
merit of their bodies. Because this is absurd, Aquinas concludes that the soul is not a body and,
many believe, disproves Lucretius.

In the same article, Aquinas addresses Lucretius' point about the nature of motion. He offers a
claim that, to our earlier analogy, nothing can give what it does not have, citing that items that
are not hot do not give heat. This is taken as a demonstration that the body can only move if the
soul is moved and is, therefore, a moved mover. However, Aquinas argues that the soul is
atypical in its cause for movement, claiming that "there is... another kind of mover, which... is
moved accidentally; and for this reason, it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover
is the soul." According to Aquinas, such an item, which does not cause invariable movement,
cannot be a body. Instead, variable movers like the soul move the body, of which they are the
moving principle, but move spontaneously rather than being moved by another item.

Article five of the Summa's seventy-fifth question directly challenges Lucretius' claim that the
soul is a material item. Entitled "Whether the soul is composed of matter and form," Aquinas
argues in the negative, claiming that the soul has no matter. He writes that the soul itself is the
form of the body. This is the case either by virtue of the soul itself in its entirety or by virtue of
some part of itself. If the prior is true, then, according to Aquinas, "it is impossible that any part
of it should be matter... for a form... is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part
of an act." This finding is the case because potentiality is antithetical to actuality, yet the body's
actuality is the soul. As such, the soul is necessarily incapable of being material itself. If,
alternatively, the soul is a form by virtue of a part of itself, Aquinas stipulates that it will
actualize only a particular part of the body. However, the actual nature of the soul remains. As
such, Aquinas writes that "that matter which [the soul] actualizes first, we call the primary
animate."

Aquinas makes one more argument that the soul is immaterial in Article Five. Said argument
stems from the notion of man's intellectual soul. Aquinas writes that "the intellectual soul knows
a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone, and therefore
the form of a stone absolutely." As such, he asserts that the intellectual soul itself must be an
absolute form, for if it were composed of matter, the forms of things would be unperceivable. If
this were the case, the soul would recognize an individual stone but be unable to know the form
of all stones. Therefore, Aquinas concludes that the human soul is not composed of matter and
form but, instead, is only form, rejecting Lucretius' findings.

Upon review of the above arguments, it is the judgment of this essay that one must reject
Lucretius' view on the soul's materiality. While some may argue that Saint Aquinas fails to reject
the argument posed in lines 169-177 of On the Nature of Things, said argument relies on the
veracity of the one immediately prior to it. This is the case as one can only accept Lucretius'
claim that material items can damage the mind and soul if the body moves at the behest of a
material soul. As Aquinas demonstrates in article one of the Summa's seventy-fifth question,
such a claim is demonstrably false, for all bodies would be animate if the soul were material.
Thus, Aquinas invalidates both arguments in one fell swoop. Additionally, Aquinas offers
several other arguments beyond Lucretius' claims which demonstrate that the soul lacks a
material element. As such, it is clear that Aquinas offers a superior case on the materiality of the
soul, and readers ought to conclude that the soul is, in fact, an immaterial item.