Kamuzu's Legacy: The Democratization of Malawi: or Searching For The Rules of The Game in African Politics

Kamuzu's Legacy: The Democratization of Malawi: Or Searching for the Rules of the
Game in African Politics

Author(s): Jan Kees van Donge
Source: African Affairs , Apr., 1995, Vol. 94, No. 375 (Apr., 1995), pp. 227-257
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/723780
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African A2hairs (1995), 94, 227-257
KAMUZU'S LEGACY: THE

DEMOCRATIZATION OF MALAWI
Or searching for the rules of the game in

African politics
JAN KEES VAN DONGE
A UGANDAN LADY gave me a lift on the morning of 18 May 1994 when the
Malawian election results were streaming in. There seemed to be every
reason for optimism: the elections had been very peaceful and Malawi had
been transformed in a period of two years from a dictatorship into a
democracy. Yet, she was shocked and said: 'The Malawians do not know
the trouble they are in', referring to the emerging regional pattern of voting
which evoked traumatic forebodings for a Ugandan. 1 This anecdote
suggests common predicaments in African politics, and the aim of this
paper is to explore whether we can see in the Malawian experience patterns
which are common to many African contexts. The conduct of African
politics seems to be governed by rules or patterns, possibly not unique to
Africa, but particularly strong there.
First, sectionalism of a regional, religious or ethnically defined nature is
the most potent fault line along which political cleavages form. Ideology,
policies or class play hardly any role, especially since Matsism has
lost much of its attraction. Second, this fragmentation is countered by
the formation of all embracing maximum coalitions. Democratization
movements often originate as broad fronts National Conferences in
Francophone Africa; the Movement of Freedom and Justice in Ghana; the
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy in Kenya; the African National
Congress in South Africa. These tend to disintegrate along the
above-mentioned sectional lines when multipartyism is reintroduced, but
politicians continue to struggle for broad representation. The relative
persistence of such maximum coalitions is typical in situations where
democratization is considered as on the whole successful: the Movement
for Multiparty Democracy in Zambia, the National Conference in Benin
and the African National Congress in South Africa are examples. Third,
political debate centres on the moral integrity of candidates. A contender
who is seen as superior in this respect can overcome regional cleavages and
Jan Kees van Donge is in the Department of Public Administration, Chancellor College,
University of Malawi, Zomba. He wishes to thank his research assistants Anthony Chirwa,
Levi Pherani and Maxwell Phiri.
1. Phares Mutibwa, Uganda since independence, A story of unfulfilled hopes, (Hurst and
Company, London, 1992).
227

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228 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
form a broad coalition. Opposing candidates can, however, hang on to

strong regional base. That was very much the case in Zambia whe
Chiluba managed to hold on to a maximum coalition, while Kaun
retained his influence in Eastern Province. Rawlings in Ghana h
similarly broad support in all regions except Ashanti where Boah
remained more influential. When one looks at the respective roles
Mandela and Buthelezi, then South African politics is also very mu
African politics.2 The one-party state is of course in its conceptio
maximum coalition under a leader who is supposed to be beyo
reproach. The main difference between now and then is that the legisl
tive power of the state is no longer a ready political instrument to enfo
this. Similarly the moral stature of the leadership of such a coalition n
has to be earned, it can no longer be taken for granted.3
Such a universalistic perspective should not blind us to particul
national political cultures.4 Ugandan political history, fol example, is
course very different from that of Malawi. The problem of Buganda is
constant theme in Ugandan political history and has no equivalent
Malawi. As will be shown, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) a
Kamuzu Banda have dominated Malawian society to a much greater exte
than Obote and the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) ever did and, as wi
become clear, that has had a pervasive influence on Malawian politi
One can narrate contemporary African political history with equal justi
cation from either an idiosyncratic or a universalistic perspective; this paper
opts for the latter. The unexpected nature of political developments i
Africa in the past five years points to a need to search experimentally f
paradigms based on analysis of the narrative of events.
2. John R. Heilbrunn, 'Social origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo', T

ffournal of Modern African Studies, 31, 2 (1993); Richard Jeffries and Clare Thomas, 'T
Ghanaian elections of 1992', African Affairs, 92, (1993); Andrew Reynolds (ed.), Election
South Afriica; the campazgns, results and future prospects, James Currey, London, 1994); Da
Throup; 'The changing calculus of legitimacy in Kenya', Africa, 63, (1993); Jan Kees van
Donge, 'Kaunda and Chiluba: MO instruments of God's will or enduring patterns of polit
culture in Zambia' in J. Wiseman (ed.), The road to multi-party democracy in Afrzca, (Routled
London), forthcoming.
3. This paradigm excludes the relation of African politics with the outside world, which has
been given new prominence by Jean-Francois Bayart's The state in Africa: the politics of the belly,
(Longman, London, 1993). He uses the concept of extraversion which refers to a struggle to
gain access to outside resources as a central issue in African politics. I do not doubt that such
struggles are important, but they do not explain the particular way in which African politicians
mobilize support, make coalitions, etc.
4. The concept of political culture is central to this analysis. It refers here to the regularities
in political behaviour which reveal rules of political behaviour. These rules are not
necessarily explicit and are not necessarily adhered to in a normative way. It differs therefore
from Schatzberg's welcome plea for more attention to be paid to culture in the study of
African politics, Michael Schatzberg, 'Power, legitimacy and democratisation in Africa',
Africa, 63, (1993), which relies on discourse analysis and openly stated political thought.
Culture is inferred in this paper from observable behaviour, because the relation between
stated thought and observable behaviour may be tenuous. Discourse analysis assumes a
pragmatic character of language: a direct relation between stated intentions and behaviour.

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KAMUZU'S LEGACY: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF MALAWI 229
At first sight, Malawi does not fit the pattern described above, as
fragmentation does not seem to be countered by the search for a maximum
coalition, but closer inspection will show that such a search was a
structuring force in political behaviour. Very soon after the liberalization
of political life it was clear the regionalism was the dominant force, and up
to the present the political spectrum is fragmented along such lines.
Malawi's three regions are each dominated by one political party, but this
did not lead as in other African countries- Kenya, Togo, Zaire to a
fundamental breakdown in consensus or even disintegration of the
democratization process.5 Political order, which persisted during and
after the dismantling of authoritarianism, was carried by a politics of
consensus. An analysis of the nature of the parties will show a persistent
search for a nationwide identity and the parties cannot therefore be reduced
to merely regional entities. The fact that personality issues dominated the
campaigns and that none of the leading personalities could command a
clear moral lead over the others in this contest was a major obstacle to
securing national appeal. The main thesis of this paper is, therefore, that
there is a persistent search for such a maximum coalition in the Malawian
political process and, instead of portraying democratization as dominated
merely be regional fragmentation, equal attention should be paid to the not
always unsuccessful search for consensus politics.
The persistence of order: democratization in Malawi6

In retrospect it appears that the democratization process in Malawi was
carried by a spirit of consensus, but that seemed unlikely when it
started. In the first half of 1992, unprecedented internal opposition
emerged in Malawi which had been almost thirty years under the totali-
tarian control of MCP under the leadership of His Excellence Life
President Ngwazi Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda.7 In March, the Catholic
bishops issued an episcopal letter in which they criticized the Malawi
5. David Throup, 'The changing calculus'; Stephen Ellis, 'Rumour and power in Togo',
Africa, 63, 4 (1993); Mary Harper 'Lunch with Mobuto' and 'Crisis in Katanga', BBC Focus
on Africa, 4, 1, ( 1993) .
6. The following account is primarily based on the Malawi press supplemented by personal
observation. It fact the press would not have been intelligible to me if I had not been walking
and talking in Malawi during the period. It became apparent to me while working on this
paper that the MCP-owned Daily Times and Malazvi Nezvs, were the best sources, but one
must be able to decode them. I shall refer in the annotation to particular newspaper articles
only when mentioning interpretations which may be controversial, for example, when there
are allegations instead of matters of fact, or points which are hardly noticed and are not
obvious when going through the ledgers.
7. See on Malawian politics under MCP rule: Richard Hodder-Williams, 'Dr. Banda's
Malawi', The 3rournal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 12, (1974)- T. David
Williams, Malazvi; The politics of despair (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1978)- Leroy
Vail and Landeg White, 'Tribalism in the political history of Malawi' in Leroy Vail (ed.), The
creation of tribalism and SouthernAfrica, James Currey, London, 1989); LeroyVail and
Landeg White, Pozver and the Praise poem: Southern African voices, James Currey, London,
1992), Chapter 8 'Of chameleons and clowns: the case of Jack Mapanje'. The last reading is
especially recommended, although its title may not seem directly relevant to politics.

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230 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
government because of corruption, persistent poverty and lack of

democracy.8 Students at two campuses of the University of Malawi
(Chancellor College in Zomba and later the Polytechnic in Blantyre)
demonstrated originally in support of the bishops but later voicing
demands for multipartyism-and the colleges were closed thereafter.
A referendum on the one-party state was called for publicly in April by
Chakufwa Chihana, until then a virtually unknown figure, on his return
from a conference of mostly exile politicians in Lusaka. In May, the fabric
of society seemed fundamentally shaken by riots resulting from industrial
unrest, during which there was widespread looting in the cities of Blantyre
and Lilongwe of, in particular, shops owned by the Press Corporation.
Kamuzu holds the shares of Press Corporation on behalf of the nation and
this was therefore a direct attack on him. The government reacted
initially by repression: Chihana was detained, the university was closed and
the riots in the cities were violently suppressed.
Malawi did not, however, appear to be governed by a tottering regime
in the first months after these momentous events. The legitimacy of the
government was undoubtedly questioned. State fianctions like
Kamuzu's birthday and independence day did not draw the normal
crowds. There were numerous rumours about people writing open
letters to John Tembo, commonly believed to be the power behind the
throne as Minister of State in the Office of the President and Cabinet.
Nonetheless, order seemed to have reestablished itself. For example,
when Kamuzu moved with the Zanzibari President Salmin Amour
through Blantyre during the independence day celebrations in July, all
offices and shops closed in the city. People lined the streets and there
was no obvious oppressive presence of security forces. The official
discourse continued to produce the same eulogies of Kamuzu and his
government. On independence day Banda's speech confronted his
critics and defended his record without shame: there was, according to
him, a free press in Malawi, but all newspapers except the government
sponsored ones were small because the country could not carry a large
circulation. Again according to him, there were hardly any political
prisoners in Malawi, because most of those thus described had been
convicted in the courts.9
Nevertheless there were changes, and an emergent independent press

was the most important one. The bi-weekly Financial Post was a fought
over item, especially when it published news about newly formed pressure
groups: Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (AFORD), Chihana's
8. 'Bishops' Lenten Letter March 1992', Appendix I in John Lloyd Lwanda, Kamuzu Banda
of Malawi: A study in promise, power and paralysis, (Dudu Nsomba publications, Glasgow,
1 993) .
9. 'Appeal for protection of the nation against evils', radio address on the eve of Malawi
Independence Day as reprinted in the Daily Times, 6 July 1992.

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KAMUZU S LEGACY: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF MALAWI 231
party, and United Democratic Front (UDF) under the leadership of Bakili
Muluzi. It should be noted that this was not an underground publication
and news about the pressure groups could also be found in the MCP
papers. The emergence of internal opposition seemed thus to be
unstoppable. UDF and AFORD avoided calling themselves political
parties as that would have been illegal, but as pressure groups they started
to sell membership cards. The court appearance of Chakufwa Chihana
were also occasions for manifestations of protest. Many Malawians
behaved courageously, and there was also more protection for dissenters
than ever before.
The donor community, which had supported Malawi staunchly during
the Cold War years when especially Banda's non-confrontational stance
on South Africa was very welcome had become critical. All aid, except
that of a humanitarian nature, had been suspended. That may be the
major reason for the MCP's U-turn. The issue of a referendum on the
one-party state was tabled at the MCP Annual Convention in Lilongwe in
late September 1992. It was rejected, and critics were asked to channel
their complaints to a Presidential Commission on Dialogue (PCD).
Nevertheless, Kamuzu announced a referendum on the one-party state a
few weeks later. Negotiations with the opposition were institutionalised
when they organized themselves into a Public Affairs Committee (PAC)
composed of representatives of UDF, AFORD and the churches. The
government invited United Nations' representation, which was asked to
monitor and support the process of change. A National Referendum
Commission was established under the leadership of the Vice Chancellor of
the University of Malawi, Professor Brown Chimphamba. In January
1993 the opposition was allowed to campaign openly and huge audiences
attended mass rallies. The independent press started to flourish. MCP
campaigned vigorously also. Kamuzu Banda in his nineties visited all
districts of the country twice.
The liberalization of political life remained restricted however. MCP
continued to dominate the radio. Malawi Broadcasting Corporation
(MBC) broadcasts were virtually completely filled with reports of Banda's
tours. Radio is the major means of communication in most of Malawi and
is listened to almost continuously. MCP's rallying cry Kzuacha (dawn)
penetrated Malawian life. The opposition dominated foreign broad-
casting however, and this domination was especially significant in the case
of South Africa's Channel Africa which broadcasts in Chichezva. The fear
of listening to such broadcasts disappeared. Exiles remained outside the
country and the exile press notably AFORD's paper Malazui
Democrat was officially banned until the ban was reversed by the courts.
Political prisoners were not released. Veteran politician Orton Chirwa
died in prison and his wife Vera was not even let out for the funeral.

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232 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Above all, Chakufwa Chihana, the leader of AFORD, was only released the
day before the referendum.
The persisting restrictions seemed to provide numerous reasons for
conflict and the breakdown of the democratization process, but that did not
happen. There were conflicts, but these were resolved. For example, the
composition of the referendum commission was changed at the insistence
of the PAC so that more opposition representatives were included. MCP
wanted an early date for the referendum. At first they mentioned Decem-
ber 1992, but this was later changed to March 1993. Finally, the agreed
date became 14 June 1993 at the insistence of the opposition. Right to the
end, there was a threat that the opposition would boycott the referendum
on the issue of the number of ballot boxes in each polling station. The
opposition wanted one, MCP wanted two. MCP elections had always
been held using several ballot boxes. Voters were issued with a ballot
paper which, when completed, was put into the box designated for their
chosen candidate. In a morning broadcast Kamuzu gave in to the
opposition's demands. He did this after an envoy of the UN secretary-
general had come to make a special plea. The way was now clear for
participation by the opposition. The effect of this was more symbolic than
anything else: it was unprecedented in Malawi for Kamuzu to accede
publicly to opposition demands, albeit that he phrased it as giving in to a
UN plea.
The role of the referendum commission was controversial
Chimphamba deliberately chose a passive role and claimed that
commission could only hear complaints on the implementation of th
referendum and would not act or intervene. It could do little else if
wanted to avoid a head-on clash with Kamuzu. For example, Kam
announced suddenly, without any consultation, that the registration p
for voters was extended. More importantly, one of the rules drawn up
the conduct of the referendum was that Kamuzu Banda's persona
should be no part of the contest. Banda made that an issue by vigorou
campaigning on lines like: Your Kamuzu wants you to show that the
people are liars. He claimed to do all his campaigning as Head of Stat
and this was also his excuse to dominate the radio. The passive role of
referendum commission may have had the advantage that it kep
authoritative voice for the ultimate stage when the results had t
declared free and fair or otherwise. There were also opposition dem
both to cancel the referendum and hold immediately multiparty elect
and for the establishment of an interim government. These dem
were not pressed hard however, and it is doubtful whether they would ha
met with much popular appeal: people were looking forward to votin
Referendum day, Monday 14 June, was an impressive day in Malaw
solemn air of quiescence had descended on the country. People dress

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up specially to go and vote. There was silence on the day after, but life
continued its normal course. Tension started to build up however when
results were not announced on the Wednesday until noon. It was not
Kamuzu, but Brown Chimphamba, the chairman of the referendum
commission, who announced the results: victory for multipartyism. MCP
had only held on to the Central Region; the Northern and Southern regions
had voted overwhelmingly for multipartyism. It was noted that Brown
Chimphamba, when announcing the results, omitted the obligatory word
of thanks to Kamuzu for holding the referendum. The result was greeted
with dancing and singing in the streets, Kamuzu reacted in the evening
with a broadcast in which he announced multiparty elections but insisted
that, until these were held, he would remain in power. This was contested
by the opposition which called for an interim government to lead the
transition to a multi-party system.
Characteristically, the result was a compromise, but one which left
executive power firmly in the hands of the government. A National
Consultative Council (NCC) (from which was to be drawn a National
Executive Council [NEC]) was established with a limited brief to work out
the transitional arrangements. It was composed of representatives of the
pressure groups and other institutions, notably the University of Malawi.
The chairmanship of the NCC rotated among the various parties who gave
regular press conferences which were broadcast on the radio once MBC
opened up to the voices of the opposition. The meetings of the NCC
itself were closed and not reported upon in detail.
Although its brief was limited, the committee started more and more to
discuss wider issues, for example, the sugar shortage in the country or a
breakdown of law and order in Lilongwe where expelled students were
terrorising pupils and teachers in protest against their expulsion.
Important negotiations took place within the committee, but the deliber-
ations threatened all the time to become a talking shop. The NEC-
drawn from the NCC was a moribund institution from the start and was
not heard of as such. The PCD and PAC were not disbanded, but these
institutions quickly lost their role as negotiators between the government
and the NCC, and went into oblivion.
A timetable was soon drawn up to implement legal changes appropriate
to multipartyism and to chart the progress towards the elections. As in the
period up to the referendum, it was striking how conflict was contained and
consensus politics emerged. The acceptance of a relatively powerless
NCC is of course a first indication. This had an obvious advantage for the
opposition as they had to cope with major internal struggles. The
incorporation of the exile groups, who returned after an amnesty, is another
example. UDF and AFORD argued that they could be incorporated into
their parties. The exiles, however, wanted to establish their own parties

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234 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
and to be incorporated in the NCC as equal partners. The demand was

granted. The deadline for registration was 30 November 1993, but when
Kanyame Chiume returned from exile and formed his Conference for the
Second Republic (CSR) the following March he was also given a place.
Further small parties with little following diluted the effectiveness of the
NCC as a negotiating platform. The NCC boosted the status of the
minor parties however, in particular, the rotating chairmanship meant that
they could raise their profile.
In the first half year after the referendum, the political scene was
dominated by other matters than democratization. Malawi was hit by
widespread industrial unrest in essential sectors: hospitals, electricity
supply, teachers, and the civil service. The private sector was also hit, but
there the threat to dismiss was so effective that worker militancy dis-
appeared quickly. The public sector strikes were threatening, but work
was resumed before any serious consequences, like closure of the hospital
for emergency services or interruption of electricity supply, occurrezd.
The most persistent strike was that of the teachers which erupted again just
before the elections, for the explicitly stated reason that the teachers were
doubtful whether a new government would honour the pledges made
which, according to them, had not been fulfilled. Only one strike-at the
SUCOMA sugar plantation resulted in violent confrontations with the
police when workers set fire to the cane fields. These strikes were partly a
result of high expectations as a result of winning the referendum, and partly
a manifestation of long festering bad human relations in an authoritarian
context.
A deterioration in Kamuzu's health he had to undergo brain surgery in
South Africa-was potentially a very serious threat to the political order.
MCP appointed a caretaker triumvirate which included John Tembo,
considered by many people to be the evil genius in MCP. The opposition
protested and demanded an interim government. Calls for a day of
action, in the form of a general strike, were made. The idea of protesting
to demand an interim government had been mooted before: Kamuzu
should be elevated to a titular position or resign together with his official
hostess, Cecilia Kadzamira, and her uncle John Tembo. The protest
never materialized on the first occasion and did not have popular appeal
either when Kamuzu became ill. Industrial unrest remained economic in
nature.l? The matter was brought by government to the High Court,
which ruled that such a protest would be illegal. The appointment of the
triumvirate was in accordance with the constitution. AFORD and a
10. Industrial unrest has continued after the elections which indicates its non-partisan
nature. This industrial unrest did not lead to the emergence of a powerful trade union
movement. The churches are the only civic associations which have emerged as a political
force in Malawi, besides the political parties.

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minor party, Kamlepo Kalua's Malawi Democratic Party (MDP), contin-

ued to call for protest and for a while boycotted NCC meetings but, as their
protest appeared to be futile, they returned to the NCC.
In December 1993 a more serious threat to public order emerged. The
NCC was then discussing the fate of the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP),
a para-military wing of MCP. MCP was proposing that they be incorpo-
rated into the army, police and civil service, but grassroots events overtook
these discussions. A bar brawl erupted in Mzuzu between MYPs and
soldiers of the regular army resulting in the deaths of several soldiers.
This led to a breakdown in discipline in the army. Soldiers went on the
rampage against MYP, and the trouble spread to Lilongwe where soldiers
started to hunt MYPs in the residential areas and to loot. The army
commander did nothing to reestablish discipline, because he was too
preoccupied with his daughter's wedding. The army continued in the
following days to disarm the MYP, but order was restored. There was no
more looting, and the whole 'Operation Bwezani' took place without
disruption of public life. MYPs went into hiding, reportedly in
Mozambique. It was Kamuzu who took the lead to reinstall order in a
sorrowful but not a righteous radio speech announcing the disbandment of
MYP and a shake-up in the army command. To most people's surprise
he recovered sufficiently from his illness to make radio statements until the
elections were over. Public appearances were rare however. After the
referendum he stopped partisan campaigning and portrayed himself as a
statesman above the parties.ll
In the meantime, multipartyism was legalized and political parties
registered. Exiles returned and political prisoners were freed. The
political parties held congresses and issued manifestos, but these were
hardly inspiring policy documents. Many statements were made about
land, an explosive issue in a country where land shortage is a major
problem, but these were so general in nature that they were
inconsequential. UDF was the most explicit party on policy measures but
their proposals were more aspirational than concrete: labour migration to
South Africa should be resumed; and universal free primary education
should be introduced. A backward looking attitude on the murky past of
MCP, rather than a vision for the future, was more typical however. The
independent press was full of articles on the cabinet crisis of 1964 and the
Mwanza road accident in which three MCP ministers died in 1983.
The most important issues the constitutional arrangements were not
therefore brought to public attention as they should have been. These
were, however, crucial from the beginning, and it was striking how
11. There was one notable exception. During a visit to the Cobbe barracks in Zomba he
asked the soldiers to vote MCP: Nation, 18 April 1994; 'Kamuzu woos soldiers'. This
incident, however, played no further role in the elections.

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236 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
consensus was sought: every attempt was made not to alienate players in th
political game. The politicians were much more aware than the gener
public of the problems involved. After the referendum it was clear th
regionalism was an entrenched force and, as the vote was split among three
regions, it was unlikely that one party would get an absolute majority
parliament. The president, if elected on the basis of a simple majority
could therefore face a hostile parliament, and stalemate could resu
UDF and MCP were advocating originally one general election for parl
ment instead of separate presidential and parliamentary elections; the ch
executive would then have to emerge from parliament. 12 Such an arran
ment would open the way for coalition formation if none of the parti
obtained an absolute majority in parliament, as actually happened. Th
was fiercely resisted by AFORD for the likely reason that they also expected
a minority vote in the parliamentary elections, but hoped that Chiha
would stand a chance of winning the presidential elections. He had led
call to multipartyism and suffered one year's detention for it. MCP a
UDF did not press the case. The likelihood of pressure being put on M
to cross the floor in order to give the president a parliamentary majori
became then a major consideration. But if crossing the floor meant th
MPs would consequently have to stand for re-election in a by-election th
this procedure would be ineffective, and thus this became a major issue
the negotiations. If party affiliations are regionally entrenched, such a
MP would definitely lose if the MP had switched parties.l3
The major catalyst in bringing constitutional issues to the attention of th
general public was the Legal Resources Centre led by Vera Chirwa the
wife of Orton after her release from prison. She organized a constitu
tional symposium which spurred the NCC to organize a constitutional
conference as well. UDF and AFORD were again the main antagonis
while MCP was little heard of. The relative role of parliament an
president was a major issue of confrontation.l4 UDF, however, then too
the most uncompromising stance over an issue which was vital to the
During the election campaign it emerged that UDF's Bakili Muluzi had
been convicted of theft in the sixties. UDF insisted that there should be
seven year limit on the clause that a criminal past would bar candidat
from the presidency. UDF threatened to create chaos in the country i
that request was not granted. Participants at the symposium were
overwhelmed by the complexities which emerged that they called for
delay in the elections until a constitution had been drawn up. This wa
fiercely resisted by the major politicians.
12. Malawi Democrat, 12 December 1993; 'UDF supports MCP'.

13. For example, in a conversation with the Dutch ambassador, MCP's Hetherwick Ntab
advocated that MPs who crossed the floor should not have to stand for re-election in
by-election. Private conservation with the Dutch ambassador, May 1994.
14. UDF Nezvs, 10 March 1994: Editorial.

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Political debate became less and less focused, but this situation was
resolved by the emergence of a powerful new institution: the National
Electoral Commission, composed of representatives of the parties under the
chairmanship of Supreme Court Judge Msosa. Unlike the chairman of the
referendum commission, she played an interventionist role and overrode
issues which could delay the process. At the start of her work the NCC
wanted to delay the elections, but she ignored this. She overrode
government's decision that the army and police would not vote (they had
not done so in the referendum). The electoral commission did, however,
also strive for consensus. Chakufia Chihana (AFORD) and Kamlepo
Kalua (MDP) failed to get the necessary signatures to stand as presidential
candidates. Ten signatures from each district were mandatory in order to
stand. They were not barred from standing however. 15 The presentation
of the nomination papers brought the main contenders for the presidency,
Kamuzu, Muluzi and Chihana, together amicably on one platform.l6
The constitutional issues of course had not disappeared. There was a
firm decision that on the eve of the election there would be a new
constitution in place. The process of drafting this constitution was a
veiled one. To the public eye there were three stumbling - blocks to
agreement: a legalisation of illegitimate children, the abolition of the death
penalty and a second chamber representing organized life in Malawi.
However, a main difference between the draft constitution and the one
adopted was that, in the former, the president could not appoint ministers
without the permission of parliament. This change makes a huge differ-
ence in presidential power and was pushed through by a coalition of UDF
and MCP.17 Nevertheless, the adopted constitution still gives much
power to parliament. Notably it gives parliament a veto over the appoint-
ments of the chiefs of police, prisons, army, diplomatic and civil service.
MPs have to stand for reelection in a by-election if they switch parties.
The constitution adopted allows therefore ample scope for a stalemate
between parliament and president. Indeed, the emergence of just such a
stalemate after the elections puts the search for consensus centrally on the
political agenda in Malawi.
15. This shows the inability of AFORD to reach out of their regional northern base.
AFORD also had difficulty in getting enough signatures for parliamentary candidates to
stand. Unlike UDF and MCP, they failed to put up candidates in five central and ten
. .
sout lern constltuencles.

16. Nation, 18 April 1994: 'NCC bashes electoral commission;: 'Commission chairman
Justice Anastasia Msosa is on record as saying the commission would take no orders from any
person or organisation'; Monitor, 28 March 1994: 'Chakufwa, Kamlepo and time given until
March, 31'; Enquirer, 21 May 1994: 'Justice Msosa scores a point' sums up the role of the
electoral commission.
17. Compare section 97, 1 of the Draft Constitution with Section 94 of The republic of
Malawi Constitution Bill, 1994. AFORD's Dr Matembo Mzunda used this agreement
between UDF and MCP as an argument to defend AFORD's alliance with MCP at a meeting
in Zomba attended by my research assistant Anthony Chirwa.

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AFRICAN AFFAIRS
238
TABLE 1
Registration and turnout in 1993 and 1994 Malawian elections (percentages of eligible voters
estimated from the 1987 census)
Referendum Elections
Registered Voter Registered Voter

Eligible voters turnout voters turnout
District voters per cent per cent per cent per cent
Northern Region
Chitipa 59,044 99 70 91 78
Karonga 93,464 118 70 90 77
Nkhata Bay 86,896 149 75 83 69
Rumphi 59,603 99 86 104 91
Mzimba 268,918 101 84 101 88
Central Region
Kasungu 206,988 112 87 76 71
Nkhota Kota 98,380 136 81 89 76
Ntchisi 72,629 88 72 92 63
Dowa 197,488 98 71 75 61
Salima 117,612 80 67 79 61
Lilongwe 606,199 98 63 75 65
Mchinji 155,010 127 75 81 64
Dedza 242,006 76 58 76 56
Ntcheu 215,497 66 47 60 46
Southern Region
Mangochi 304,268 116 66 84 68
Machinga 312,051 110 64 83 70
Zomba 275,973 94 62 78 64
Chiradzulu 131,712 75 63 75 52
Blantyre 392,061 69 59 68 56
Mwanza 73,049 103 57 67 54
Thyolo 269,973 69 57 65 50
Mulanje 389,825 89 49 66 44
Chikwawa 194,959 100 55 62 41
Nsanje 122,081 87 48 58 48
Any narrative of this process of change is necessarily selective. I have

concentrated on those elements which illustrate consensus politics. That
does not mean that there was, for example, no intimidation, nor that there
were no irregularities, but these were marginal to the process and certainly
did not influence the result. It is also crucial to Malawian democratization
that the consensus emerged from among the negotiating parties. For
example, the courts played a role, but not a formative one influencing the
outcome. Their decisions sometimes obviously supported the govern-
ment, notably in the continued detention of Chihana, but on the other
hand the courts allowed reinstatement of students who had demonstrated
and unbanned the exile press. The police force is widely considered to be
a pillar of support for MCP. Lunguzi, the Inspector General of the police,
resisted the pressure of the electoral commission to allow his subordinates
to vote. He gave in, but few policemen registered. During the referen-
dum campaign, there had been an incident in Dedza an MCP

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stronghold which may have reinforced their neutral role. The local
MCP chairman shot the police commander as the latter did not resist
multipartyism. He was condemned to death.l8 The army played a role
in the confrontation with MYP, but it is striking that in the incident
internal problems between army command and lower ranks were more
important than politics. It may be that, as in the case of the strikes, it was
also a reaction to long standing human relations problems in the army.
The independent press had carried several articles on discontented
junior ranks complaining about the parasitic lifestyle of their commanding
officers . l 9
The actual election results showed fragmentation within the country, but
the democratization process itself was characterized by a search for
consensus which was definitely not imposed from outside the political
sphere.
The election results20

The 1994 elections were won by the UDF. Their leader, Bakili Muluzi,
became president without an absolute majority (1,404,754 or 47 per cent),
followed by Kamuzu Banda, MCP, (996,553 or 33 per cent), Chakufira
Chihana, AFORD, (585,689 or 19-5 per cent) and Kamlepo Kalua, MDP,
(15,624 or 0 5 per cent). The last was the only presidential candidate
from the five minor parties. None of these latter parties won any
parliamentary seat, neither did any of the few independents, and they are a
fringe phenomenon in Malawian politics.
The election result showed, first and foremost, a regional pattern.
AFORD won all parliamentary seats in the north, and Chihana got
between 85 and 92 per cent of the vote in all districts there. The picture
in the Central Region was more complicated. There was a much wider
range in the presidential vote: Kamuzu Banda scored highest in Dowa
district (81 per cent), but only 24 per cent in Ntcheu. MCP won all
parliamentary seats in three adjacent districts: Mchinji, Dowa and Ntchisi
as well as in rural Lilongwe. AFORD won two in Kasungu and one in
18. Flame, 10 March 1993: 'Mlombwa Phiri to hang!'
19. Personnel grievances and political issues mostly stated as professionalism versus
political interference intertwined in the incident. The soldiers' grievances can be found in
Mirror, 22 April 1994: Editorial 'Why have soldiers been remembered so late', and letters to
the press by soldiers. For example: UDFNews, 2 February 1994: 'Segregation in the Malawi
Army' by obedient ex-soldier: 'I want the new bosses to think about other ranks . . . Private
soldiers have not been thought of for a very long time'; Monitor, 4 March 1994: 'Army officers
affected by MCP syndrome': 'We are very disappointed with the newly promoted Army
commanders'; UDFNews, 7 June 1993: 'Army not liable for the job' by C. V. Nthani, Mchinji:
'The current generals in command are running the army as a personal thing'; 'Officers are not
being anxious to help us juniors perform our duties', Concerned soldiers, Zomba. A party
political stand was studiously avoided in these arguments.
20. The referendum results were taken from Nezv Express, 18 June 1994. The results of the
parliamentary and presidential elections were obtained from the electoral commission's office
in Blantyre. Turnout was calculated on the basis of: Malawi Population and Housing Census
1987, vol. I (National Statistical Office, Zomba, 1993).

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AFRICAN AFFAIRS
240
TABLE 2
Election results in 1993 and 1994 Malawian elections
Multiparty vote Opposition vote

Referendum Elections
District per cent per cent Seats won (1)
Northern Region
Chitipa 90 89 A 5 M 0 U 0
Karonga 93 92 A 5 M 0 U 0
Nkhata Bay 91 88 A 7 M 0 U O
Rumphi 86 93 A 4 M 0 U 0
Mzimba 86 89 A12 M 0 U 0
Central Region
Kasunga 27 35 A 2 M 7 U 0
Nkhota Kota 45 59 A 1 M 2 U 2
Ntchisi 22 34 A 0 M 4 U 0
Dowa 15 20 A 0 M 7 U 0
Salima 44 52 A 0 M 3 U 2
Lilongwe 27 33 A 0 M14 U 3
Mchinji 30 29 A 0 M 6 U 0
Dedza 25 30 A 0 M 3 U 1
Ntcheu 74 73 A 1 M 1 U 6
Southern Region
Mangochi 89 89 A 0 M 0 U 10
Machinga 90 90 A 0 M 0 U10
Zomba 86 87 A 0 M 0 U 8
Chiradzulu 86 88 A 0 M 0 U 5
Blantyre 86 85 A 0 M 0 U10
Mwanza 70 71 A 0 M 0 U 7
Thyolo 80 77 A 0 M 0 U11
Mulanje 76 75 A 0 M 0 U11
Chikwawa 75 61 A 0 M 1 U 5
Nsanje 81 46 A 0 M 4 U 1
(1) A=AFORD; M=MCP; U=UDF.
Nkhota Kota, in those parts of the districts which had formerly belonged to
Northern Province. UDF won one in Dedza, two in both Nkhota Kota
and Salima, three city seats in Lilongwe and six in Ntcheu. So there was
a clear MCP heartland in the Central Region. At the margins of the
region, AFORD had some influence in the north, and further to the south
UDF became an electoral force at the margin.
In the Southern Region, the vote for Bakili Muluzi ranged from 91 per
cent in his home district Machinga to 43 per cent in Nsanje. Nsanje is in
the Shire Valley and MCP's Gwanda Chakuamba comes from there.
MCP gained one seat in Chikwawa district and four in Nsanje, both in the
Shire valley. Nevertheless, there was also a- clear UDF heartland in
the Southern Region as is shown by the presidential vote for Muluzi:
Mangochi, 89 per cent; Machinga, 91 per cent; Zomba, 84 per cent;
Chiradzulu, 89 per cent, as compared with for instance Mwanza, 69 per
cent; Mulanje 66 per cent or Thyolo, 71 per cent. AFORD's vote in the
south was negligible. So AFORD had the strongest regional base in the

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north. UDF dominated in the south where MCP continued to have some
following and MCP clung to a strong heartland in the Central Region
where towards the north AFORD had some strength, and towards the
south UDF had made inroads.
A comparison of the vote for multipartyism with the combined opposi-
tion vote should give an insight into whether MCP managed to re-establish
itself after the referendum or whether the opposition gained ground in
MCP areas during the election campaign. Throughout the Central
Region the opposition gained ground in the period between the referendum
and the elections: varying from 5 per cent in Dedza to 14 per cent in
Nkhota Kota.The most striking difference was in Ntchisi where the
opposition gained 12 per cent in a district which voted a massive 77 per
cent for a single party. This is probably due to the influence of Justin
Malewezi, the UDF vice-president, who comes from there. Mchinji and
Ntcheu were the exceptions and did not register significant change, the
latter was already an opposition area in the referendum (74 per cent
multiparty). The swing of votes from MCP went virtually wholly to UDF
as AFORD was strong in few constituencies outside the north. These
swings had probably little effect and one cannot point to particular seats
which have been gained because of them. Outside the centre there was a
significant change away from MCP to the opposition only in Rumphi (7 per
cent), but that district where Chihana comes from was already 86 per
cent multiparty. MCP gained 14 per cent in Chikwawa, and significantly
in Nsanje, 46 per cent combined opposition vote in the elections as
compared with 81 per cent for multiparty in the referendum. Again, the
person of Chakuamba is the obvious explanation. So on the whole MCP
lost a little ground in the centre and gained a little in the south, but the
basic pattern of political allegiance did not change in the interim period
between referendum and elections due to campaigning.
These elections showed a tremendously increased level of political
participation in Malawi which was sustained after the referendum. MCP
had organized parliamentary elections in 1987 and 1992. The 1992
elections showed a great increase in the number of votes, from 477,493 in
1987 to 843,037 in 1992, despite the fact that the number of uncontested
seats increased from 40 to 49. This is remarkable as the 1992 elections
were held just after opposition against MCP erupted and there were
widespread calls to boycott them, and the increase was not regional
either. This turnout compares poorly, however, with those in the refer-
endum and the elections, 3,153,448 and 3,040,655, respectively. If one
reckons that half of the population in a country like Malawi is below voting
age and that Malawi's population is estimated at 7-8 million then these are
respectable figures. Registration of voters for the referendum was higher
than for the elections. It is likely, however, that in certain areas there were

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242 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
widespread attempts at over-registration for the referendum. Fo

example, in Nkhata Bay 129,5 14 people registered for the referendum (14
per cent of the eligible population) and the turnout was only 47 per cent
the registered voters, while only 72,051 (83 per cent of the eligibl
population) people registered for the elections and the turnout was the
much higher: 83 per cent of registered voters. The same was the case i
other districts where the number of registered voters was substantiall
higher than was to be expected on the basis of the census.
The percentages of the estimated eligible population on the basis of th
census who voted are of course a more significant indication of partici
pation than percentages of registered voters. This shows a startlin
north-south pattern and it appears that these percentages are highest in the
AFORD-dominated north and lowest in the UDF-dominated south.
UDF had therefore mobilized the population significantly less in their
heartland than the other parties and may have weaker local roots.
The results showed, therefore, voting patterns which were regionally
dominated by AFORD in the north, MCP in the centre and UDF in the
south. UDF made more inroads to the north than AFORD did i
the south, but on the whole MCP held on to the centre.
The search for meaning in Malawian politics

Malawian politics since the onset of democratization has thus been
characterized by two contradictory trends: on the one hand a search for
consensus guiding the transition and on the other hand fragmentation
along regional lines. It is tempting to see the parties which have emerged
therefore as merely regional phenomena, but that would overlook their
attempts to portray themselves as of much wider significance and the great
role of personality in political competition. These factors are directly
linked to the their attempts to create national appeal: to overcome the
division of the country into three regionally identified parties.
After the referendum it was clear that MCP had retained its hold on the
Central Region and remained a political force to be reckoned with. The
danger of an MCP victory in general elections because of a divided
opposition as in Kenya was obvious. Opposition to MCP seemed to
be a logical ground for unity between AFORD and UDF. This spirit
exudes from the following lines taken from WASI a Malawian writers'
journal reporting on the wedding of Du Chisiza Jr, a hugely popular
actor/entertainer who had produced plays supporting the opposition,
notably 'Barefoot in the Heart' which drew an analogy between the struggle
for independence and the struggle for multipartyism:
The blend of romance and politics prevailed at the reception, held on the club
ground by the swimming pool, flanked and shaded by the tropical trees on the
other side. As the Love Aquarius Band serenaded the newlyweds on the stand

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in front, Chakula Chihana of AFORD embraced Bakili Muluzi of UDF in the

VIP section . . . Mrs Edda Chitalo and Mrs Malango Banda, the cake cutting
oicials used multiparty colours or symbols. Both women danced to the cake
stand . . . one with a yellow (UDF) flag, the other with a blue (AFORD) flag.2l
Du Chisiza Jr joined MCP a few months later and became Minister for
Youth, Sports and Culture.
Bakili Muluzi is now president of Malawi. After the elections,
Chakufwa Chihana spurned the offer to his party to participate in a
secondary role in a UDF led government and made an alliance with MCP
in opposition. A few months later he decided to join the UDF govern-
ment after all. Any analysis of Malawi politics has to come to terms with
these shifts in position. An immediate explanation in terms of political
opportunism and politicians being for sale may seem obvious, but that
would obscure the pertinent challenge faced by any political party in
Malawi: how to overcome the regional confinement. The way in which
the parties represented themselves in the campaigns will show this.
MCP portrayed itself as a reformed party after it had lost the
referendum. MYP members were then strictly returned to base.22
MCP, as the government, was conciliatory in negotiations leading up to the
elections and took great pains to clear itself of any allegations of rigging. It
distanced itself from the past and, towards the end of the campaign, the
MCP newspaper Daily Times carried a big portrait of Vera Chirwa, the
personification of the victims of MCP persecution, in a front-page
article. MCP praised the 1992 Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter because
it helped MCP to reform23
It was clear however to MCP and the other parties that their chance of
winning the elections lay in widening their support outside the regional
heartlands. MCP made the biggest scoop in that respect by recruiting
Gwanda Chakuamba as their secretary-general. Chakuamba originates
from the Lower Shire in the Southern Region. He had formerly been
secretary-general of MCP and commander of the MYP. Chakuamba is a
grass roots politician with a clear eye for patronage; the school fees he paid
for many children in the Lower Shire are part of his legend. He probably
became too big a force and was detained by MCP from 1980 until after the
referendum in 1993 charged with an assassination plot against Kamuzu.
The only evidence for that was a gun found in his house. He claimed to
have joined UDF in prison and started by campaigning openly for UDF
21. 'Drama news: wet weds' Wasi, 5, 1, (1993). p. 52.

22. MCP agreed in the NCC negotiations that MYP should be disarmed and that its
personnel should be absorbed into the army, police and civil service. Young Pioneers,
however, marched with their arms through Limbe, Blantyre's twintown, in defiance. This
was disavowed by MCP. Malawi News, 2 October 1994: 'Second MYP march
unnecessary official'.
23. Daily Times, 28 April 1994: 'Where is it? Legal Resource Centre queries details of Draft
Constitution': Daily Times, 29 April 1994: 'Blessing began with the pastoral letter'.

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244 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
after his release. The immediate response in the independent press to his
subsequent switch to MCP was that he had been bought. This he denied
of course, and there were other obvious reasons for him to join MCP.
When he came out of prison he was outside the power structure of UDF as
it had evolved. There were many people of his background and calibre in
that party. He is by all accounts a very ambitious man, and his switch to
the top post secretary-general of MCP made him suddenly a contender
for the presidency of Malawi. He was totally unapologetic for his move
and, for example, gave an interview to the Malazvi Democrat (AFORD's
newspaper) in which he stressed his good relationship with John Tembo:
'We have never been enemies'. Tembo is considered to be the power
behind the throne in MCP: Chakuamba had been best man at Tembo's
wedding to his wife Ruth.24
Two northerners suddenly joined MCP at the same time as Chakuamba:
Du Chisiza Jr and Donton Mkandawire. The latter was and is a dark
horse, but the recruitment of Du was a great surprise. Not only had he
been an active advocate of multiparty politics, but he came from a
politically legendary family. Du Chisiza Sr was one of the major figures in
the independence struggle, and he died in a tragic car accident. Such car
accidents are not seen as accidental in Malawi. His switch to MCP led to
highly publicized quarrels in the family in which he was backed by his
mother's side. The immediate rumours in his case also were that he had
been bought, but again in his case that would not wholly explain his
decision. For Du Chisiza Jr his integrity as an artist was at stake, and he
responded by producing a play in which he compared democracy to an egg
which is very breakable. Through metaphors he defended his decision:
he attacks the mentality of voting for no reason other than just to have a
change. The play had enormous appeal. Du Chisiza has an independent
mind which defies encapsulation and his move to MCP has prevented him
becoming an icon of the opposition parties.25
He also brought a whole new style to MCP: he threw handfuls of badges
bearing Kamuzu's portrait into audiences. Such items had always before
been treated with reverence. In radio commercials he compared the
election struggle to a football match. He called His Excellency the Life
President Hastings Kamuzu Banda by a new name: Alidzi (the leader).
Nobody in MCP had dared to treat the image of their Kamuzu as
mundanely as he did.
Kamuzu remained the MCP presidential candidate however, albeit that
Chakuamba was the running mate: vice-president. One explanation may
24. Malawi Democrat, 13 October 1994: 'Who can bribe me.> Chakuamba'.
25. Mchiru Sun, 12 November 1994: 'Du Chisiza Jr The right to choose'; Monitor, 23
November 1993: 'Du's family happy with move'. His mother: 'The Chisiza family myself
and my three sons and no one else.

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be that any other arrangement would have brought the position of John
Tembo under discussion. Tembo was not acceptable as the face of the
party to many voters. Tembo is an uncle of Mrs Kadzamira, for a long
time Kamuzu's official hostess. In the perspective of most Malawians,
Tembo and the Kadzamiras are the evil forces surrounding Banda. The
aura of evil is easily evoked when they are discussed, but people fail to
mention concrete instances to substantiate them. If Tembo was respon-
sible for many of the cruelties and other wrongs during MCP rule then he
was extremely adroit in avoiding exposure or concrete evidence of guilt.26
The Tembo/Kadzamira syndrome is part of a general reluctance in
Malawi to accept the cruelty of the MCP past as being the work of
Kamuzu. Popular thinking often absolves Kamuzu from blame by point-
ing to them as the people who in commonly used words keep him
prisoner, but the personality and work of Kamuzu became open topics of
discussion, especially after the referendum result. Automatic respect for
Kamuzu declined, and this was obvious for example when mocking
Polytechnic students blocked his motorcade in Blantyre towards the end of
the election campaign. Blantyre and Lilongwe were unruly during his last
campaign meetings for the elections. The story that Kamuzu was not a
Malawian but an Afro-American who hijacked a Malawian identity
circulated widely. Such a story of course exorcises Malawian guilt for
the cruelties. It also indicates that Kamuzu's prestige was not longer
rigorously enforced and it was striking that it did not disappear.
The opposition even seemed to desire to rally him to their cause.
Typical was the story of the unexplained long flight from Karonga to
Mzuzu during the referendum campaign: it was widely believed that he had
stopped and proposed to give up the struggle and accept multipartyism.
This story is apocryphal, but it is telling that there was such a willingness to
believe it. People who came out of long detention were also usually
surprisingly mild about Kamuzu. Vera Chirwa, who spent twelve years in
prison and was not allowed to see her husband when he died or attend his
funeral, said: 'Well, I have nothing personal against the President. We
were against the politics, not against him personally. Sometimes I feel
sorry for him-as a man you know to hear what is happening and how he
looks sometimes. I haven't seen him personally, but it is really a pity that
our good times, which we had at first with him-not only us but with
others have been spoiled'.27 Both Muluzi and Chihana immediately
26. Financial Observer, December 1992: J. Z. U. Tembo: 'What do I do that people fear';
Nation, 27 January 1994: 'Confession in Mangochi; Tembo plays Mr Clean, attacks press';
Malawi Democrat, 6 December 1994: 'John Zenus Ungapake Tembo': 'There is surprisingly
no one who can say that they know for sure that J. Z. U. Tembo really did this. Everyone just
says that they know someone who knows someone who knows friends who saw J.Z.U. do this
or that'.
27. 'Interview Vera with Veronique Edwards', BBC: Focus on Africa, 4, 3, (1993), p. 61.

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246 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
sent get well messages when Kamuzu was hospitalized in South

Africa. As the general election came nearer they spoke more and more
mildly of him.
It has often been suggested that Banda was not really in control any
more towards the end. His old age is then mentioned in combination
with the influence of Kadzamira/Tembo. However, people who met
him in the period after the bishops' letter were often surprised by his
presence of mind. For example, when he went to visit the sick at
Chiradzulu during Christmas 1993 the Regional Health Officer was
asked a sensible-albeit simple medical question. His main influence
was through radio speeches, and these showed a very astute
strategy. He managed to move in the public eye from the image of a
ruthless dictator to that of a man who gracefully accepts defeat. This
latter was the apotheosis of a shift from vigorous campaigning for the
referendum asking people to follow 'Your Kamuzu' to statesmanlike
behaviour, avoiding partisan campaigning, afterwards. His return to
active politics after the MYP crisis was also presented primarily in terms
of national rather than partisan interest, and his acceptance of defeat was
universally seen as admirable.
Throughout the whole campaign there was simply not much political
capital for the opposition in rallying against Kamuzu there was too much
popular respect, admiration for his intelligence etc. while to be seen with
him for example, at the presentation of presidential nomination
papers was an asset which he distributed carefully. Nevertheless,
Kamuzu failed to rally the nation behind MCP. It became a regional
party, and the question of what leadership will emerge after Kamuzu
remains a threatening issue to the whole party because of Tembo's
unpopularity.
An alliance between AFORD and MCP seemed to be the most unlikely
event to happen in Malawian politics. AFORD was formed during a
conference in Lusaka which brought exiles and people living in Malawi
together to form an opposition party. Chihana flew into prison from that
conference. It was the first pressure group to come into the open, and its
existence was the main point of discussion at the MCP national convention
in September 1993. The fact that the MCP leadership branded it
immediately as a merely northern affair aroused great resistance among the
northern delegates at the conference. Its leader Chakufwa Chihana came
from the north, but its executive was regionally diverse. Of the eleven
members, five came from the north, four from the south, two from the
centre. AFORD's leadership is a fluid group of people because from the
beginning it has been plagued by quarrels and resignations. It is hard to
know at any given moment who exactly is in it. Six of the original
executive of AFORD are still in the party, three of whom are from the

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north, and all three are MPs. The other three are very low profile, two of
them stood as MPs and lost.
AFORD's difficulty in forming a coherent leadership was compounded
by desperate attempts to recruit people who were not from the north.
Their treasurer, Justin Malewezi from Ntchisi in the centre claimed
straight away that he had not been consulted on his appointment. He
joined UDF soon thereafter and became a member of its executive.
AFORD then found a new treasurer, George Makwangwala, originating
from Ntcheu, but he resigned in mid-September 1993. His place was
taken by a resident European, Jan Jaap Sonke, who had been very helpful
in channelling Dutch NGO money to AFORD. Sonke resigned in
November 1993. The AFORD congress in December then elected
Ashraf Lambat, of Asian origin, who resigned in mid-February 1994. The
deputy treasurer, Chenda Mkandawire, a big businessman from Mzuzu in
the north then took over. Their succession of publicity secretaries shows
a similar pattern. Originally, Harry Chiume a Blantyre based lawyer
originating from Nkhata Bay, was their spokesman. He was prone to
wildly exaggerated statements. For example, at a hearing of Chihana's
case he said that seven people died in a clash between MYP and the public
which was simply not true. A much stated reason for his dismissal,
however, was misuse of party funds. He disappeared from the scene and
his position was taken over by the Reverend Peter Kaleso from Mulanje,
who resigned in November 1993. He was succeeded by Mordecai
Msiska, a lawyer originating from Rumphi. Msiska fell out with the
leadership however. He stood in absentia against Chihana at the party
congress and got only five votes. The other contender, a street trader
from Kasungu, got ten. Harry Chiume was then re-elected to the post of
publicity secretary. His comeback did not last long however. The High
Court issued a warrant for his arrest for alleged malpractice, and he
disappeared. His vice-publicity secretary, Simon Pamdule, took over and
was later confirmed in the post of publicity secretary. Nothing much was
ever heard of him however; the Reverend Peter Kaleso became again the
principal spokesman for AFORD. Kaleso had been elected in absentia
vice-chairman of AFORD at the congress. The main reason was that the
party was desperate for a vice-chairman from the south. He initially
declared that it was time for churchmen to keep clear of politics, but later
changed his mind. He lost his job as secretary-general of the Malawian
Council of Churches and then found politics attractive again. After the
elections, Kaleso left AFORD and joined UDF. He was followed by
Dr Mekki Mtewa, the last prominent AFORD member from the south,
who also later resigned from the party. Their vice-president, Austin
Nthambale, is the only big name from the centre and remains in the
party. He is respected but extremely quiet. AFORD became more and

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248 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
more a northern dominated party, but this does not mean that there wer
no leadership quarrels among AFORD officials from the north. Founder
member Dennis Nkhwazi, who originates from Chihana's home district in
Rumphi, resigned from the AFORD executive at the same time as
Sonke. Sonke was diplomatic in giving reasons for his resignation: unless
AFORD merged with UDF it stood a great chance of being defeate
by MCP. Dennis Nkhwazi remained quiet, but his wife Joyce led a
major attack against Chihana citing his misuse of money and dictatorial
tendencies.
It is striking how most of these leadership quarrels erupted after Chihana
was released from detention just before the referendum. His detention
was of course a big handicap in AFORD's referendum campaign. Their
chance came when he was released. For many Malawians outside his
home area, Chihana was an unknown entity until he was detained in 1992,
but what is known of his biography could have led to the expectation of a
strong personality arriving on the scene.28 He probably was a founder
member of MCP, but definitely not a prominent one. He was more active
as a trade unionist. He fell foul of Kamuzu in 1964 and was banished to
his home district of Rumphi in the north. There he was mysteriously
attacked and subsequently picked up by a Catholic priest who took him out
of the country. He was a 'labour advisor' in Kenya from 1964-71. Then
he was deported to Malawi because of involvement in organizing
strikes. He landed into detention where he remained for seven years.
After he was released in 1978, probably due to outside pressure on the
Malawi government, he went to Europe where he studied mostly political
science related subjects in England (Ruskin College, Oxford, Bradford
University) and in Dubrovnic, forlller Yugoslavia. From 1981-84 he was
a research fellow at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo. Thereafter he
returned to Africa to take up a position as a research fellow at the
University of Botswana. When the Southern African Trade Union
Congress Council (SATUCC), incorporating all SA13EC countries, was
formed he became the secretary-general. In 1988 SATUCC was moved
to Lilongwe and Chihana operated from there under the protection of an
. . . .
nternatlona. , organlzatlon.
The strength of character that kept Chihana active despite several
detentions is admirable. Chihana was also successful in economic terms:
he owned estates and a lakeside motel in Rumphi district when he went
into detention in 1992. He might have opted for a comfortable life
outside politics, albeit that his financial acumen may leave something to be
28. Unlike the other candidates, Chihana strongly promoted an official biography. Mchiru
Sun, 28 January 1994: 'AFORD's Chakufwa Chihana, who is he?' Malawi Democrat, 6-7 April
1994: 'So, who is this Chakufwa Chihana'. This biography was not beyond dispute however.
See for example: Mirror, 4 March 1994: 'Chihana is a fraud' and Enquirer, 18 January 1994:
'Who takes over Capitol Hill?'

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desired as the most bitter conflicts in the party centred on this issue. That
may be his Achilles heel, although there are other reasons for his failure to
build a national following. He portrays himself as an intellectual, and
AFORD as a party often tries to project an intellectual image. Northern
Malawi has been advantaged in education since early colonial times and
therefore, in Malawian politics, education can be easily linked to regionalist
sentiments. He was soon accused of tribalism, especially because of the
personnel appointments he made in the SATUCC office in Lilongwe.
Not only was it a question of the north versus other regions, but he was also
accused of favouritism towards Rumphi as compared with other parts of
the Northern Region. His personal use of party money and general
financial mismanagement of the party reached crisis point in mid-
February. The sheriff took the office equipment from the AFORD offices
in Lilongwe on behalf of Capital City Motel in Lilongwe; Chihana
appeared to have large debts at Hardware and General Dealers stemming
from the time he built his motel; Air Malawi started a court case against
him because of airline tickets which he had ordered on behalf of SATUCC
but for which that organization refused to pay.
AFORD had portrayed itself as an intellectual party, but more impor-
tantly it sought the image of the untainted party: the party of those who had
no MCP past. That was not wholly true. One founding member,
Rodwell Munyanyembe, originating from Chitipa in the north, was a
former cabinet minister, ex-secretary-general of MCP. He has been the
lowest profile AFORD leader among several who were extremely low
profile. AFORD hoped that the returning exiles would join the party with
a clean past. There should be no room for those who had been part of the
party of'darkness and death'. That hope was idle, the returnees formed
their own parties.
AFORD's position on this matter remained the biggest stumbling block
in unity talks with UDF whose leader and many around him had a long
history in MCP politics. It was therefore unexpected to say the
least when AFORD moved closer and closer to MCP. Chihana himself
increasingly spoke against witch hunts against MCP and urged continued
respect for Kamuzu after the elections. MCP stopped attacking
Chihana. That was of course sensible from their perspective: it was by
then clear that no party other than AFORD would gain support in the
north. In the south they could maybe still have a chance, because
Chakuamba came from there.
It was more difficult to explain this rapprochement from AFORD's
perspective. The most obvious explanation seemed to be money.
AFORD's biggest financial problems disappeared overnight. Air
Malawi's court case against Chihana ceased to be mentioned, and neither
was there any further mention of his debts to Hardware and General

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250 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Dealers, a subsidiary of Press corporation. John Tembo is chairman o

both corporations.29
The rapprochement of AFORD to MCP cannot, however, merely be attrib-
uted to opportunistic motives. Although there were several talks about
unity between AFORD and UDF, often because the churches urged them to
do so, these seemed bound to fail. AFORD's Mordecai Msiska, who later
challenged Chihana for the leadership of the party, said in September 1993:
'We in the opposition seem to find it difficult to talk to each other. What is
happening now is that we find it a lot easier to talk to the MCP on the other side
of the table than to talk to each other. I have not seen a situation where UDF
and AFORD have said let's talk to each other, except when we are compelled to
do so in a PAC caucus prior to meeting with the other side'.30
Chihana spoke strongly against UDF in a Zambian television interview in

November 1993. He predicted that UDF would do worse in the election
than MCP. He also accused UDF of trying to destroy his reputation 'to the
effect that AFORD was a party for northerners'.3l There seemed therefore
to be more real affinity between AFORD and MCP than between AFORD
and UDF, despite the fact that the latter two emerged in opposition to MCP.
UDF is also a very different party from AFORD. It has a much broader
leadership: UDF's first executive had forty members as compared with
AFORD's nine. There was only one major defection from the first UDF
executive: the vice-president Chaziya from the centre ultimately became an
MP for MCP. The elections at the UDF congress returned 63 per cent of
those in the original executive, while its size was contracted to 29
members. The only sharply contested post was that of first vice-president
with two candidates from Nkhata Bay seeking the position: Aleke Banda
won and Dr George Mtafu lost. Mtafu was a founder of UDF while Aleke
Banda jointed later. Another founder Brown Mpinganjira lost as well,
and it is typical of UDF's style that both were coopted again into the
leadership through the creation of a shadow cabinet. The shadow cabinet
was big, 51 members. All elected members of the executive were in
it. The other members of the shadow cabinet were either influential
29. Mirror, 4 March 1994: 'MCP, AFORD unite'; Mirror, 15 March 1994: 'NlCP money for
AFORD'; UDFNews, 7 April 1994: 'Latest praise singer': 'It is widely believed that the MCP
has settled many of the debts AFORD was failing to pay and that Chihana himself received a
golden handshake'; Monitor, 13 April 1994: 'Respect Ngwazi, Chihana pleads'; UDF News, 2
May 1994: 'Chihana dines with Banda'; Enquirer, 16 May 1994: 'AFORD, MCP alliance no
longer a secret'. Chihana denied this strongly however: Monitor, 2 May 1994: 'Chihana
scoffs at merger'; Malawi Democrat, 3 May 1994: 'We are not bed-fellows. MCP is still a
party of darkness and death'. MCP denied it as well: Daily Times, 9 May 1994: 'Chihana,
easy, over, out'.
30. Malawi News, 25 September 1994: 'Quotable Quote from Nation, 23 September
1993'. From an early stage, Chihana was suggesting the possibility of working with
MCP. Monitor, 15 November 1993: 'Merger out of question Chihana' Essence is
'plurality of political opinions and political practice . . . the true test of this is whether we can
tolerate those views we find most repugnant, for this reason AFORD is committed to working
together with all political parties including the Malawi Congress Party.'
31. Mirror, 12 November 1993: 'UDF destroying me Chihana'.

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members who had lost in the election, or intellectuals boosting the image of
the party, or people from areas where UDF was weak. UDF was a
southern dominated party: more than half of those elected to the executive
were southerners. They tried to balance the regions carefully at the top
however: the president Bakili Muluzi comes from Machinga district in the
south; the two vice-presidents, Aleke Banda and Justin Malewezi, come
from the north and from the centre, respectively.
The main difference in public dispute between AFORD and UDF how-
ever was not so much in their regional base as the fact that UDF's top
leadership contained many people who had been prominent in MCP.
Bakili Muluzi and Aleke Banda had both served as MCP secretary-general,
and Aleke Banda was the first commander of MYP. AFORD claims to
have been the first opposition group to operate in Malawi, but that was a
source of bitter dispute. According to UDF they had been excluded from
the meeting with exiles in Lusaka where AFORD was formed: the latter had
monopolized the airline tickets.32 The origins of UDF are not crystal clear,
but according to MCP's papers, Mpinganjira was the original founder.
After his release from prison he was said to have been approached by 'some
whites in the United Kingdom' to establish an opposition party in
Malawi. He then approached Muluzi, and that was the start of an internal
organization of opposition in Malawi.33 These allegations came up
after the referendum, when unity talks between UDF and AFORD were
still on. Gradually, however, the polarization between the two parties
intensified, and AFORD's main target was UDF's leader Bakili Muluzi.34
Muluzi's career shows him to be a survivor. He started as a court clerk
in Machinga. That position came to an unfortunate end. AFORD's
newspaper, Malazui Democrat, made the accusation that he lost the job after
being convicted for the theft of six pounds from the government and began
spreading the nickname 'Mr. Six Pounds'. He recovered miraculously
from this setback. He became a teacher and was sent to England and
Denmark for courses in technical education. This was crowned by his being
32. This story broke when exiles returned. Independent, 21 July 1993: 'Chihana did not
blow wind of change in Malawi-UFMD'; Nation, 2 October 1994: 'AFORD broke from
UFMD-Ngwira': 'Mr Chihana's airtickets 1992 by Loveness Phiri (Mrs), Blantyre.'; Nation,
9 October 1993: 'AFORD denies wrong doing'; Monitor, 11 October 1993: 'Understand
issues' by Dr Harry Bwanausi. He claimed to have 'sent 11 tickets to the likes of Mr Muluzi,
Mr Bwanalai and others who never got the tickets'.
33. Daily Times, 23 February 1993: 'Why Muluzi defers to Mpinganjira'; Malawian, 26
August 1994: 'Cabinet crisis; Mpinganjira not wanted' mentions the name of David Steel in
this connectlon.
34. The attacks started in Malawi Democrat, 11 February 1994: 'Muluzi: how he stole six
pounds and was jailed'. An example of the use of MCP documents: Malawi Democrat, 15
April 1994: 'Mrs Chakuamba and Mrs Aleke must leave Blantyre-Bwanali and Bakili Muluzi
whose vice president now is Aleke Banda recommended this to Kamuzu'. The paper's attack
on Muluzi can be summed up in this quote from an editorial in Malazui Democrat, 4 February
1994: 'We want a constitution that will ensure our president has neither a criminal record nor
a poor financial record . . . Bad debtors and thieves will only assist to further dry our already
empty coffers'.

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252 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
given the position of principal of a technical training college which was

strongly allied to MYP. From there he was nominated as a member of
parliament and thence his rise to secretary-general of MCP. His tenure
came to an end in the early eighties. During the referendum campaign,
MCP made allegations that he was sacked from the post because he had stolen
money from the party in order to buy a truck. Muluzi himself maintains that
he resigned. It is striking, however, that Muluzi could rise to such heights,
quit his job in disputable circumstances and not be detained afterwards.
He then went into business and started a firm called Ntaja Investments,
mainly involved in transport and estates. More importantly, however, he
became the biggest sugar distributor in the country outside the Press
controlled chains. That made him a major target for attack during the
whole democratization process. Sugar shortages occurred, probably
because of massive smuggling abroad, and within Malawi sugar was only
available at exorbitant black market prices.
After the referendum, the personal attacks on Muluzi came mainly
from AFORD's newspaper. Besides the conviction for theft and the
accusation of black marketeering in sugar, Malazui Democrat also carried a
story that Muluzi had conned one of the major banks, the National
Bank, into enormous loans which are unrecoverable. Another line of
attack was the printing of compromising letters from Muluzi to Kamuzu
Banda, implicating him in repression by MCP. The suggestion that the
letters were fed to the paper by MCP seems likely. MCP's newspapers
hardly targeted Chihana for attack any more. They carried the stories
about Muluzi from Malazvi Democrat after their publication by that
paper. Muluzi had kept quiet about the attacks and called them slander
in a radio interview just before the elections.35 The attacks did not
35. Muluzi avoided a direct confrontational defence, but he sometimes alluded to the
accusations. MCP actually brought him to court on the accusation of theft while secretary-
general. Muluzi then maintained that he had been sacked because Kamuzu found it intoler-
able that Muluzi had been addressed as vice-president during a visit to the United States.
Financial Observer, March 1993: 'Muluzi denies stealing from MCP K. 20, 105, 1981 '. The
court case was quietly dropped. A reaction to involvement in MCP repression: Nation, 27
September 1993: 'Chaziya once refused to join UDF': 'Before I joined politics I became the
principal of Danish Malawi Technical College at Nasawa, but that had nothing to do with the
Young Pioneers . . . I have never been a commander of the MYP or even a member of that
organisation'. Nasawa was indeed never part of MYP, but Young Pioneers were sent there
and to no other technical college. See for a defence of Muluzi in the 'six pounds affair': UDF
News, 10 March 1994: 'Muluzi's implications plot of theft of 6 pounds refuted', a letter by a
retired police officer. It claimed that he was confused with somebody bearing a similar name,
but this was refuted by producing the prison photograph taken of Muluzi. This picture,
which government tried to suppress, was again reproduced in an MCP affiliated paper,
Malawian, after the election. However, the Minister of Justice curtailed further publicity in
court cases by admitting that the picture showed Muluzi, the then President. Malawi
Democrat, 27 July 1994: 'Banned!'; Malawian, 28 July 1994: 'Muluzi is a liar Nakanga'.
The reactions to allegations of business mismanagement were remarkably muted, claiming
that other politicians had debts too. See for example: UDF News, 5 May 1994: 'Chihana
owes K. 95,000': 'If we are to go by AFORD's standards of a presidential candidate, then Mr
Chihana should resign immediately'. For a general defence of Muluzi see also: Mirror 23
March 1994: 'Reactions to Malawi Democrat, and AFORD'.

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harm him, however, in his regional base which proved to be the basis for
victory.
Another line of attack was an attempt to create rifts in UDF between
Aleke Banda and Muluzi. There is little doubt that Aleke Banda, the
northern outsider, is the organizing genius in UDF. This attack was led
not by AFORD's Malazvi Democrat, but by MCP's Daily Times. The
paper harped upon the indispensability of Aleke Banda to Muluzi, and the
latter resented that. At the congress, the little known Joseph Kubwalo was
elected campaign manager, and according to the Daily Times he had to be
replaced by Aleke Banda. UDF denied that and argued that Kubwalo was
still campaign manager but that Aleke Banda was chairman of their
campaign committee. Another story they carried was about Muluzi
depending primarily upon Brown Mpinganjira who had lost in the UDF
elections. Mpinganjira was depicted as the power behind the throne. He
is a southerner and there was implied therefore not only a conflict between
the party faithful and the leadership, but a regional conflict as well. Aleke
Banda, his supposed opponent, comes from the north and had won a tough
election with a respectable victory at the party congress.36 As the elections
approached, the conflicts surrounding Aleke Banda seemed to become
more and more serious. UDF made a rule that parliamentary candidates
would have to stand in their home areas. Aleke Banda wanted to stand in
the Namiwawa constituency in Blantyre but was forced to stand in Nkhata
Bay.37 He is deeply unpopular there. A major reason for that is the
persecution of Jehovah's witnesses there when he was commander of
MYP. It was no surprise that he lost in that constituency. He probably
would have won in Namiwawa in Blantyre which has a large elite
component of people with a similar background to Aleke's. The
southerner Kubwalo (previously mentioned in connection with the argu-
ment about campaign leadership) stood there however. Aleke Banda's
position seemed fiarther threatened by sudden moves by Muluzi to make
alliances or mergers with minor parties. There seemed little electoral
benefit in this, but as a consequence Aleke's position of vice-president in
UDF came under debate: representatives from the minor parties
demanded that post.38 A major new element was the emergence of a new
newspaper, The Daily Herald. Its main target of attack was AFORD's
36. Daily Times, 10 February 1994: 'Crisis hits Muluzi's "Cabinet" '; Daily Times, 23 March
1994: 'UDF fires campaign director'.
37. It should be noted in this context that Aleke Banda was born in Livingstone, then
Northern Rhodesia and grew up in Southern Rhodesia. Aleke's parents originated from
Nkhata Bay and he himself saw Malawi for the first time when he was deported there by the
colonial authorities in 1959. Robert I. Rotberg, The rise of nationalism in Central Africa; The
making of Malazvi and Zambia, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1965), p. 308.
38. Malazvi Democrat, 13 May 1994: 'Unity not working says Aleke: Problems face the
Common electoral grouping of CSR, UFMD and UDF'; Daily Times, 6 April 1994: 'UDF
shaken by merger; Shadow cabinet may disband watch out for Aleke Banda'.

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254 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Malazvi Democrat. This attack culminated in a story about the editor

forcing a girlfriend, whom he had met at revivalist christian meetings, to
have an abortion a smear aimed directly at the Catholic support base in
AFORD.39 It also accused Aleke Banda of working against Muluzi
however, thus openly underrnining Aleke Banda's credentials as a UDF
leader and questioning his loyalty to Muluzi. These allegations were
surprising as Aleke Banda had saved Muluzi in the negotiations on the
constitution by insisting that criminal convictions dating back more than
seven years would not disbar a presidential candidate, 'Otherwise there
would be chaos in this country'.40
The regional factor is a crucial element in any understanding of
party formation in Malawi, but it is one among others. All three parties
tried to portray an image of wider significance: AFORD the pure party
of resistance with an intellectual allure; MCP the reformed party which
had brought peace, stability and progress; UDF the national party which
was professionally managed and kept together under attack. However,
ultimately, the 1994 election campaign in Malawi was fought on the issue
of personality. It was essentially a negative campaign: all parties suc-
ceeded in severely damaging the moral credentials of their opponents
and, as a result, it was only the regional base which determined the
vote.
Conclusion
The story of Malawian democratization shows the distinct patterns,
which are particularly strong in African politics, outlined in the beginning
of this paper: regional fragmentation, a continuing search for a maximum
coalition combining all regional forces, and a prominent role for personality
politics in the attempt to bring such a coalition about. The search for
unity a maximum coalition remains essential in Malawian politics. A
basic consensus held in regulating the transition to multiparty politics9 but
failed in the case of uniting the opposition to MCP. Such a coalition
39. The Herald, 1 March 1994: 'Aleke crucifying Muluzi?'; The Herald, 5 April 1994:
'Kubwalo, Mpinganjira to sue Daily Times'; The Herald, 22 January 1994: 'Of lies, confusion,
distortion and Frustrado'; The Herald, 29 April 1994: 'Horrifying sex-scandal AFORD'. It
should be noted that The Herald, pushed religion to the centre of the debate. Muluzi is a
Muslim and there had been allegations and smears about Middle East connections. For
example: Malawi News, 19 March 1994: 'Muluzi and his Mid-East deals: Arab slave trade
returning'; Malazvi Democrat, 8 April 1994: 'MK 1 billion Islam money for Malawi; We have
all been sold!'. The last story proved to be unsubstantiated. A cartoon in The Herald,
portraying Muluzi being nailed to a cross by Aleke Banda aroused indignation: Malazvi
Democrat, 3 March 1994: 'Muluzi replaces Jesus? It is blasphemy'. Religion never took a
central place in the election struggle however.
40. Malawi Democrat, 24 February 1994: 'Aleke says there'll be chaos if the constitution
does not allow Bakili to stand'; Independent, 25 February 1994: 'We will wreck the
nation Aleke'. Aleke Banda continued to rally the forces behind Muluzi in the wake of
further accusations: Monitor, 4 March 1994: 'UDF executive united Aleke'; Daily Times, 4
March 1994; 'Aleke confirms division; there is no secret under the sun'; Mirror, 8 March
1994; UDF is Intact Aleke.

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would have countered the effects of voting along regional lines. The
inability of any one party to produce a leader with greater moral stature
than the others is a major factor in their inability to overcome the regional
divide. The result was a victory for the party originating from the most
populous region with the consequence that the president has to rule with a
parliament in which his own party is a minority.
UDF has the task first and foremost to establish itself as a national
party. That is the main ground on which to fight the opposition. Not
only did Muluzi appoint a large cabinet reflecting the strategy of including
as many forces as possible, but the strongest members came from the areas
where they lost in the parliamentary elections: Justin Malawezi from the
centre, vice-president; Aleke Banda, from the north, Minister of Finance;
Kassim Chilumpha, from Nkhota Kota, Minister of Defence. These
people can be seen as technocrats surrounding the populist Muluzi.
There is a mutual dependence at the top of UDF between the southerners
and Muluzi on the one hand and these strong cabinet ministers on the
other. Muluzi needs the latter in particular because he needs national
appeal and expertize, but these ministers would not be in power without
the southern power base.
Immediately after the election, MCP demanded a national cabinet in
which all parties would be represented.41 Muluzi ruled out cooperation
with MCP, but welcomed participation by AFORD. These negotiations
broke down quickly however, which was not surprising. During the whole
democratization process, UDF and AFORD did not align with each other
at all on issues, but MCP could do business with both parties in varying
situations. UDF and MCP defended similar positions several times
during the transition period: in the beginning advocating parliamentary
rule and, towards the end, agreeing on presidential appointment of
ministers. The latter happened despite the fact that the contours of a
coalition between AFORD and MCP were becoming more and more
obvious.
The opposition alliance which AFORD and MCP formed after the
elections was, for the reasons given above, not as surprising as it may have
seemed. They formed a shadow cabinet and Kamuzu occupied the
central place in the official photograph. John Tembo was shadow minister
of finance and Mrs Kadzamira was also prominent on that occasion. It
may have been the last political act of Kamuzu who refused to be associated
with the new government. Muluzi was magnanimous towards Kamuzu:
he could stay as long as he wanted in Sanjika palace, and the new president
wanted to pay a courtesy visit soon after taking over. The courtesy visit
was rebuffed and Kamuzu soon moved out of Sanjika to Mudi House in
41. Malawi News, 21 May 1994: 'Muluzi Mistake before he can count one'.

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256 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Blantyre the former colonial governor's residence there.42 He definitely

did not want any party other than MCP to benefit from his charisma.
AFORD and MCP had a majority in parliament and were in a position to
paralyze the government. The net effect was not power for MCP how-
ever, but a maximization of the negotiating position of AFORD. In
September 1994, Chihana accepted the position of second vice-president
and four AFORD ministers were added to the government.
MCP still clamours for inclusion in the government and they have great
interests to defend. Press Corporation and other parts of Kamuzu's busi-
ness empire dominate the national economy. John Tembo is chairman of
Press and therefore still in a pivotal position in Malawi's power structure.
The parliamentary majority of AFORD/UDF makes it possible to move
against these powerfill irlterests. This would be difficult, as harming Press
means harming the Malawian economy given its dominant position, but it is
not impossible. Since AFORD joined the government, Malawian politics
seems to be dominated by the issue of the ownership of Kamuzu's grand
houses. MCP claims that these are his personal property, but this is
challenged by UDF. Highly symbolic issues intermingle here with eco-
nomic ones because, if the houses are not Kamuzu's, who owns the Press?
It remains to be seen whether moving against Kamuzu will bring political
gains. It is also possible that AFORD's joining of the government will
lead to a loss of popularity. The MCP/AFORD alliance was followed by
a highly successful tour of the north by Chakuamba and Chihana.
Chihana and Muluzi appeared there at the centenary of the Livingstonia
Mission, but they received a mixed reception and it was a low key
event. A delegation from Livingstonia visited Kamuzu a few weeks later
as well. It would be strange if the persistent animosity between AFORD
and UDF in the run-up to the election has disappeared overnight.43
AFORD's position is also ambiguous. There is a claim from both sides
that the alliance with MCP is still in place as well.44
National unity was the stated rationale for the coalition in opposition
between AFORD and MCP, and this theme is still adhered to. One
partyism has disappeared and Malawi is a very different society from what
it was under MCP rule: democratic freedoms which were absent are now
present, and democracy has taken root. However, it can be argued that
one partyism has persisted, but on a regional basis. It is certainly there in
the north where AFORD is unrivalled, and there is a similar situation in a
42. Muluzi was already early on trying to neutralise the Kamuzu factor: Enquirer, 5 January
1994: 'Decent pension for Kamuzu; UDF New Year's message'; Monitor, 10 June 1994:
'They can hang with their Kamuzu Muluzi'.
43. AFORD's newspaper was very critical of Chihana. Malawi Democrat, 30 September
1994: 'Chakufwa Tom Chihana; and the hypocrisy that men do to get power'; 'And Muluzi
laughed;. A distrustful voice from the UDF camp: Mirror, 13 October 1994: 'Irritating'.
44. Daily Times, 28 September 1994: 'Is alliance in place?' Daily Times, 30 September 1994:
'Good luck, Alliance to prevail despite Chihana's move'.

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large part of the centre (MCP) and the south (UDF). This may explain
why interparty violence was rare in the democratization process.
The search for maximum coalition at national level taps grass roots'
feeling. There was great pressure from below, especially from the
churches, on UDF and AFORD to merge while the leadership obviously
could not agree.45 The position of MCP in this search for national unity
remains puzzling. It has remained more of a national party than any of the
others in the sense that there was some voting for MCP in the north, but
virtually none for UDF, and in the south the position was the same as
AFORD's influence was negligible. The question is whether this is a
legacy from Kamuzu or whether it will wither away in a succession struggle.
The remarkable fact remains that Kamuzu Banda shaped the careers of
the major political personalities. This influence remains and one cannot
overlook, for example, what the present president Bakili Muluzi said on 10
August 1977 in parliament: 'Mr. Speaker, Sir, I was nothing before I came
to Parliament, but His Excellency the Life President made me what I
am'.46 Kamuzu Banda built a highly personalized political system of
which the majority of the present leadership was part. No less than four
previous secretary-generals of MCP can be found on the executives of the
parties: Bakili Muluzi (UDF), Aleke Banda (UDF), Gwanda Chakuamba
(MCP) and Rodwell Munyanyemba (AFORD). The leaders of the
parties know each other well. There are obvious reasons for acrimony
among them. Gwanda Chakuamba, Aleke Banda and Chakufwa Chihana
have all been detained for long periods while their present political
companions were in power, but that does not seem to prevent present
loyalties. Indeed, shifting loyalties are typical of Malawian politics today.
The real challenge for politicians in Malawi is to create a symbolic and
policy framework which gives direction to the country. Such an approach,
rather than the adversarial politics in which politicians of all parties excel,
could give much more impetus to bridging regional loyalties. Although it
does not diminish his ruthlessness, Kamuzu's rule was highly effective in that.
45. It should be noted that from the very beginning UDF tried to stop the opposition
attacking each other, while AFORD resisted these moves: Malawi Democrat, 12 November
1993: 'Letter from Bakili Muluzi'; 'UDF supports MCP'- Monitor, 29 June 1994: 'Unite
IJDF and AFORD told': 'The religious leaders drawn from the Catholic, Muslim and CCAP
churches and the Christian council made the advice when they met the leaders of the two
pressure groups in Lilongwe last week'; For the break-up of these talks see: Malawi Democrat
13 January 1994: 'We throw in the towel say UDF': 'UDF has asked members of the
opposition parties to refrain from exposing each other at rallies or through media'; 'AFORD
presented a position paper where it reiterated its opposition to the formation of one giant
opposition party'. After the election there were also calls for a national government outside
the MCP camp: Mchiou Sun, Malawi Elections Special 1994: Editorial: 'Congratulations
but ...': 'We believe Mr. Mandela and Mr. de Klerk have set a classic example which
Malawi's state President Muluzi and his MPs should not ignore'. Independent, 24 May 1994:
'Coalition government need for prevention of one party rule'. Throughout the whole period
there were many letters to the papers urging unity between AFORD and UDF.
46. Quoted in Malawi News, 8 May 1993.

13.234.243.76 on Fri, 24 Mar 2023 20:34:21 UTC

Kamuzu's Legacy: The Democratization of Malawi: or Searching For The Rules of The Game in African Politics

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