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Evaluation of Flight Attendant Technical Knowledge

Article · February 1997

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Published in the Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology (1997) (pp.527-531),
Columbus, OH

Evaluation of Cabin Crew Technical Knowledge

Melisa G. Dunbar
San Jose State University / NASA Ames Research Center

Rebecca D. Chute
Raytheon / NASA Ames Research Center

Kevin Jordan
San Jose State University

ABSTRACT
Accident and incident reports have indicated that flight attendants have numerous
opportunities to provide the flight-deck crew with operational information that may
prevent or lessen the severity of a potential problem. Additionally, as carrier fleets
transition from three to two person flight-deck crews, the reliance upon the cabin crew
for the transfer of such information may increase further. Recent research indicates that
flight attendants do not feel confident in their ability to describe mechanical parts or
malfunctions of the aircraft. Additionally, this lack of flight attendant technical training
has been referenced in a number of recent reports. The present study explored both flight
attendant technical knowledge and flight attendant and pilot expectations of flight
attendant technical knowledge. Results suggest that cabin crews are not receiving the
amount of technical training that both pilots and cabin crew members believe is necessary
for the efficient exchange of safety information. Implications for training are discussed.

On July 19, 1989, a United Airlines DC-10 experienced an uncontained failure of the
number two engine during cruise flight resulting in the loss of all the aircraft’s hydraulic
systems. Thereafter, the aircraft was flown by manipulation of the power controls for the two
engines that remained functional. During this time, a flight attendant reported to the flight crew
that there was damage to the “back wing” (National Transportation Safety Board, 1989). The
second officer proceeded to the cabin and looked at the wings, but the damage was actually to
the horizontal stabilizer rather than a wing. While in this example of the Sioux City accident,
there was sufficient time and personnel available to assess the accuracy of the flight attendant’s
report, the implications of an inadequate command of aircraft terminology and mechanical
knowledge by flight attendants are potentially serious (National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), 1989).
The 1989 Kegworth accident provides an example of what can result under circumstances where
the cabin crew might have provided critical information which the flight-deck crew could not have
gathered themselves. Leading to the Kegworth crash, a British Midlands Boeing 737-400 experienced
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an engine fire about 13 minutes after taking off from Heathrow Airport. The pilots reduced power to the
right engine, which diminished the vibration in the aircraft, and led them to the conclusion that the
problem was with the right engine. The flight-deck crew then proceeded to shutdown the right engine.
While this decision making was taking place in the cockpit, flight attendants and passengers could see
flames shooting from the left engine. Yet even after a flight-deck announcement to the passengers that
there had been trouble with the right engine, which had now been shut down, none of the flight
attendants reported the discrepancy or their concerns to the cockpit (Department of Transport, 1990).
Recently, several factors have emerged which compel a closer examination of the
interface between the cabin and cockpit crews, and the facilitation of the transfer of technical
information specifically. First, automation has led to the proliferation of 2-pilot aircraft. As the
position of the flight engineer has been replaced by advanced technology, the flight crew has also
lost the trained eyes and ears of an intermediary to information beyond the cockpit door.
Responsibility for detecting anomalies in proximity to the cabin which are outside the
capabilities of the automated systems and for accurately relaying that information to the pilots
now falls to the cabin crew.
Second, flight attendants have not been trained to be technically aware nor articulate in
order to facilitate effective information transfer. Chute and Wiener (1996) report that when
flight attendants were asked to describe their confidence in their ability to describe mechanical
parts or malfunctions of the aircraft, almost 60% responded “moderately” or less. These results
are not surprising when one considers that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) flight
attendant initial and transition ground training requirements (FAR 121.421) only specify that the
flight attendant be aware of the physical characteristics of the aircraft that may have a bearing on
responsibilities such as ditching, evacuation, and inflight emergency procedures and on other
related duties. Examples of the required topics are: The use of the public address system,
electrical galley equipment, and the controls for cabin heat and ventilation. Presently, most
training curricula incorporate only these topics.
And third, research has shown that effective communication between the cockpit and
cabin is hampered by barriers that exist between the two crews (Chute & Wiener, 1995). Not
only are the flight attendants nonconversant in technical knowledge, but their input is not
cultivated as a source of information.
The lack of flight attendant technical training has been referenced in a number of reports
(National Transportation Safety Board, 1992; Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 1995;
Chute & Wiener, 1996). As we saw with the Sioux City accident, valuable time could be lost if
information is not conveyed in a timely and accurate manner. Conversely, if the cabin crews
have a working knowledge of aircraft systems and terminology, information transfer can be
facilitated.
The purpose of this study was to measure the technical knowledge currently possessed by
cabin crewmembers, as well as to explore the level of technical knowledge both flight deck and
cabin crew members expect flight attendants to maintain.

METHOD
Participants
In order to examine technical knowledge, flight attendants from two United States
airlines voluntarily completed questionnaires. These participants included 122 female and 55
male current flight attendants ranging in age from 22 to 75 (M=39, SD=8.40). The average
number of years as a flight attendant was 12 (SD=8.49). Ninety-one percent of the flight
attendants had some college experience and 41% were college graduates. The average number
of months since their last recurrent training class was five (SD=3.81). Only 16% of the flight
attendants had any kind of pilot instruction and only three had their private pilot license.
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To investigate expectations of flight attendant technical knowledge, pilots and a second

sample of flight attendants from the same two airlines completed a second set of surveys. Flight
attendant volunteers included 78 females and 18 males, with the average age of the participants
again being 39 years (SD=8.40), ranging from 25 to 64 years of age. The mean number of years
as a flight attendant was 14.09 (SD=8.35). Eighteen percent of the flight attendant volunteers for
this survey had some piloting experience, which ranged from ground school to a private pilot
license. One hundred eighty-one pilots participated in the study. All but one of the pilots was
male. One hundred six volunteers were captains, 56 were first officers, and 19 were second
officers. The average number of years as a pilot was 18.96 (SD=8.61) and the mean age of the
pilot group was 48 years (SD=7.65), ranging from 32 to 73 years.
Materials
Flight attendant technical knowledge was measured using a 13-item questionnaire
consisting of questions addressing basic aerodynamics, aircraft systems and components, and
procedural issues. Both cockpit and cabin crew members’ expectations of flight attendant
operational knowledge were assessed using a 13-item survey consisting of a series of ten skill
areas and three short fill-in questions. Volunteers were asked to rate each skill area, on a five-
point scale, as to their expectation about how knowledgeable a flight attendant would be in the
given area. Confidentiality of the participants was guaranteed through the anonymity of the
questionnaires.
Procedure
Technical questionnaire. Upon the approval of both the flight attendant union and
management, flight attendants were recruited from their company briefing area and asked to
volunteer 15 minutes of their time to complete the technical questionnaire. Flight attendants who
chose to participate in the study were then given written instructions and a copy of the
questionnaire. Participants completed the questionnaire and returned it directly to the researcher.
Flight attendant and pilot expectation survey. Survey packets were randomly distributed
to a sample of flight attendants and pilots in their company mailbox. Each packet consisted of an
informed consent letter, a copy of the survey, and a stamped, addressed return envelope.
Participants completed the survey and returned it directly to the researcher in the envelope that
was provided. Flight attendant volunteers who completed the technical questionnaire were asked
not to participate in the training topics survey. A total of 600 surveys were distributed to each
group, with a 30% return rate for pilots and 16% for flight attendants.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Technical questionnaire
The technical survey included ten multiple choice items examining flight attendants’
knowledge of aircraft systems and procedures and a question on the theory of flight. Frequencies
of correct answers were calculated for each question and the results are provided in Figure 1.
Sterile cockpit. Analyses of the technical survey revealed several areas where flight
attendant training programs may be inadequate. One of the most important issues is that of the
“sterile cockpit.” Chute and Wiener (1996) have addressed concerns about the application of
sterile cockpit regulations to the cabin and of the confusion cabin crew members seem to have in
the interpretation of the regulation. The FAA regulation of “sterile cockpit” states that no flight
crew member shall perform any duties during a critical phase of flight except those duties
required for the safe operation of the aircraft, and furthermore, that no flight crew member may
engage in any activity during a critical phase of flight which could distract a crew member or
interfere in any way with the proper conduct of the flight (FAR 121.542). Previous research
(Chute, 1994) describes
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100

90
80

70
60

50
40

30
20

10
0
Sterile Electrical Smoke APU Theory of Hydraulic Icing/Snow Fire Alerting Hypoxia
Cockpit system Torching Flight system Detection systems

Question Content

Figure 1. Frequency of flight attendants’ correct answers on multiple choice items.

the hesitancy of cabin crew members to interrupt sterile cockpit and the need for clarification of
this regulation. The present study confirmed that the understanding of sterile cockpit rules
remains unclear. When given the scenario, “You are sitting at an exit door. One minute after
takeoff you hear an UNUSUAL whistling sound that appears to be located near the door. As
lead flight attendant what action would you take?” only 50% of the participants would call the
flight deck immediately and 3% either would not call at all or did not know what to do. Less
than half of the volunteer flight attendants stated that they would pass forward information about
the exit door’s unusual whistling sound, regardless of sterile cockpit. This result is of particular
significance since a similar situation, on an ATR 72 resulted in the separation of the rear cabin
door during takeoff at approximately 800 feet AGL (National Transportation Safety Board,
1995a). The lead flight attendant reported hearing a very loud humming noise coming from the
door after takeoff and that the noise was unlike anything she had ever heard in the past. Despite
this, she did not use the interphone to contact either the #2 flight attendant or the cockpit crew
regarding the noise. In an interview with an NTSB investigator, when asked under what
conditions would she consider calling the cockpit during the sterile cockpit phase, the flight
attendant responded that she, “Would call the cockpit if there was an emergency such as a fire or
a problem passenger (National Transportation Safety Board, 1995b).” Responses to the sterile
cockpit question indicate that the sterile cockpit regulation continues to be a point of confusion
for flight attendants regarding appropriate reasons for the interruption of the sterile cockpit.
Smoke detection. Smoke detection is another important area where knowledge can
prevent or lessen a dangerous situation. An understanding of smoke and fire detection could be
helpful in identifying the source of a fire and in leading to a more expeditious solution.
Additionally, knowledge of characteristics of different types of smoke may help the cabin crew
communicate reports of smoke or fire to the flightdeck more clearly and effectively. Flight
attendants who participated in the technical survey were not aware that there are differences
between the look and smell of smoke from an electrical system fire versus that of the smoke
from a heating/cooling system fire. Twenty percent of the flight attendants did not think there
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was any difference between the two types of smoke and 24% answered that they did not know
whether there was a difference or not.
APU torching. Torching on auxiliary power unit (APU) start up was also addressed.
Only 52% of the participants were aware that this is a common occurrence on some aircraft
types, and is a self-contained engine fire and is not a problem. There have been numerous
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) reports of passenger-initiated evacuations that were
the result of passengers seeing a sudden flash of fire during APU start up. Familiarity with the
APU may provide flight attendants with the knowledge to relieve the concerns of passengers and
deter ensuing unnecessary evacuations. Eight percent believed that torching on APU start up
was an emergency situation and approximately 19% could not answer the question.
Theory of flight. The question regarding the theory of flight proved to be one of the most
difficult. Only 29% of participating flight attendants knew that the four counterbalancing forces
are lift, weight, thrust, and drag.
Aircraft Systems and Procedures. When examining flight attendants’ knowledge of
aircraft systems and procedures, over 86% of participants knew that the hydraulic system
provides the power (force) needed to move the ailerons, elevators, and rudders of the large
aircraft. Eighty-two percent were aware that snow build-up, as well as icing, can be a problem.
Another question assessed whether the flight attendants know where fire detection systems may
be located. Only 72% of the participants knew that fire detection systems can be located in the
engines, in the cargo compartment, as well as in the main gear wheel wells and 16% did not
know of any location.
Aircraft components. Still another area of flight attendant technical training that falls
short is that of knowledge of the aircraft itself. Only 11% of the flight attendants were able to
correctly match the labels of eight basic aircraft components on a diagram. These components
included such parts as the vertical and horizontal stabilizers, the trailing-edge flaps, the spoilers,
and the rudder. A breakdown of responses for each component is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Frequency of correct answers on diagram of aircraft components .
80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Ailerons Elevators Horizontal Leading Rudder Spoilers Trailing Vertical
Stabilizer Edge Flaps Edge Flaps Stabilizer

Aircraft Components
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Additionally, 83% of participants did not know that aircraft engines are numbered from left to
right. Ninety-five percent of the flight attendants correctly labeled the right and left sides of the
aircraft, which can be a point of confusion as flight attendant duties and jumpseats often require
them to face the opposite direction of reference. A basic knowledge of these aircraft parts can
not only help the cabin crew more clearly describe concerns to the flight deck, but may also help
flight attendants understand information that they receive from the flightdeck.
Overall Scores. Percentage of total correct responses was calculated to determine an
overall score on the technical questionnaire (M=61%, SD=16%). To examine whether number
of years as a flight attendant and number of months since last recurrent training class influence
the overall score, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated. Results indicated no
significant relationship between overall score on the technical questionnaire and time as a flight
attendant, and overall score and time since recurrent training (r = .15, p = .06; r = -.03, p = .70,
respectively).
Previous piloting experience is another variable that could have influenced the overall
score on the technical questionnaire. As noted earlier, 16% of flight attendant participants had
some previous piloting experience. In order to assess the influence of this variable, a two (pilot
experience) by thirteen (subject area) mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted on scores on the technical questionnaire. Pilot experience was a between subjects
factor. Results revealed a subject area by pilot experience interaction (F(12,2100) = 17.86, p <
.001). The pattern of the means indicates that flight attendants who had some piloting
experience scored better in some subject areas than did those flight attendants without piloting
experience.
In order to examine the interaction further, several one-way ANOVAs were conducted.
Results of the analyses revealed a significant difference between flight attendants with piloting
experience and those without, in the areas of basic aerodynamics (F(1,175) = 13.89, p < .001), fire
detection systems (F(1,175) = 5.13, p < .05), and labeling of aircraft components (F(1,175) = 15.52,
p < .001). Examination of the pattern of means showed that for each of these three items, flight
attendants with piloting experience scored higher than those without piloting experience.
Expectations of Flight Attendant Technical Knowledge
Ratings of knowledge expectation. Pilots and a different sample of flight attendants were
asked to rate, on a five-point scale (1=not at all knowledgeable to 5=very knowledgeable), a
series of operational skill areas according to their expectation that a flight attendant would be
knowledgeable in that given area. Expectations of flight attendant knowledge varied across
topics. Both pilots and flight attendants expected flight attendant knowledge to be highest
regarding safety procedures and sterile cockpit rules and lowest in the more technical areas of
basic aerodynamics and function of aircraft components.
. A two (job position) by ten (skill area) mixed design analysis of variance was conducted
on expectations of flight attendant technical knowledge. Results revealed a skill area by position
interaction (F(9,2430) = 9.63, p < .001). Figure 3, illustrates that pilots and flight attendants had
similar expectations for many skill areas, but different expectations for others.
6 F/As 7
Pilots
5

Topic Area

Figure 3. Average ratings of flight attendant and pilot expectations of technical knowledge.
Note: A rating of five is defined as the expectation that a flight attendant would be very
knowledgeable in the given area, and a rating of one, as the expectation that a flight attendant
would be not at all knowledgeable in that specific area.

60

50

40

30

20

10

Pilot Responses Flight Attendant Responses

Figure 4. Five most frequently given subject areas that flight attendants and pilots believe
should be included in flight attendant training.
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In order to examine the interaction further, several one-way ANOVAs were conducted. Results
of the analyses revealed a significant difference between pilot and flight attendant expectations
of flight attendant knowledge in the areas of basic aerodynamics (F(1,275) = 11.91, p < .01),
aircraft systems (F(1,275) = 10.80, p < .01), sterile cockpit (F(1,275) = 22.28, p < .01), and crew
resource management (CRM) (F(1,273) = 12.37, p < .01), with flight attendants having higher
expectations of knowledge than pilots in all cases except crew resource management (CRM).
Need for flight attendant technical knowledge. Pilot and flight attendant volunteers were
asked to list five subject areas that they thought should be part of flight attendant training. The
five most frequently given responses to this question are shown in Figure 4.
Thirty-seven percent of pilots and 40% of flight attendants included flight attendant technical
training as one of the five most important training needs. Additionally, pilots and flight
attendants stated that they do not believe that flight attendants are receiving the amount of
technical knowledge necessary for the efficient exchange of safety information. Sixty-seven
percent of pilots and 59% of flight attendants found this type of training lacking. One pilot
summed up his thoughts with, “When a flight attendant tells me that the “thingy” on the
“whatsit” is loose, I know there’s not enough technical training,” and a flight attendant
concurred, “The only time we learn about mechanical problems on the aircraft is when they
occur. We should have at least one day of training to include information on turbulence, theory
of flight, and basic operations of the aircraft.” Both incidents and accidents demonstrate that
cabin crew members have numerous opportunities to provide valuable safety information to the
flightdeck. In the present survey, 62% of pilots responded that they have received important
safety information concerning the aircraft (aside from cabin equipment), from a flight attendant
and 69% of the flight attendants reported providing the flight-deck crew with that safety
information. For example, one pilot reported, “A flight attendant came to the flightdeck to pass
on information that an engine was loose and hanging from the wing. We were not aware
because all indications were normal.” Another reported, “In Moscow - taxiing for takeoff to
New York. Maximum gross takeoff weight. A flight attendant called us while taxiing and
reported a popping noise ‘under the aircraft at the wings.’ It was a blown tire. We (pilots) had
no idea it was blown.”
CONCLUSIONS
The present study reports several important findings. First, the results indicate that flight
attendants do not evidence a great deal of technical knowledge in the areas sampled by the
technical survey. Despite this result, the responses to the open-ended questions on the second
instrument indicated that there are many instances where flight attendants have the potential to
provide technical information to the flight-deck crew. Second, both flight attendant and pilot
expectations of flight attendant technical knowledge overall were low, with only half of the topic
areas receiving a rating of 3.5 or better. Third, flight attendant technical knowledge does not
appear to be acquired while on the line.
Regarding pilot and flight attendant expectations, it may be that since flight attendant
training curricula rarely include the technical issues studied here, the low expectations described
above may reflect the level of knowledge to which pilots and flight attendants have become
accustomed. This conclusion is also indicated by the fact that some of the specific skill areas,
such as basic aerodynamics and sterile cockpit, where flight attendants had difficulty on the
technical survey, were also areas in which pilots expected even less knowledge than did flight
attendants. These low expectations may have an impact on the communication process. If the
pilots do not expect reliable information from the flight attendants, they may be more skeptical
about the information they do receive and more hesitant to utilize cabin crew members as a
source of information. Likewise, if flight attendants are not comfortable with their flying
partners’ technical knowledge, or even their own, they may be less willing to pass information
forward to the flight-deck crew.
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Finally, the results of the study also suggest that flight attendants are not picking up this
technical knowledge while on the line, evidenced by the fact that overall knowledge was not
significantly related to number of years as a flight attendant. Both initial and recurrent flight
attendant training could promote a better understanding of aerodynamics, aircraft systems, and
basic components of the aircraft, so the knowledge is maintained over time and new issues
addressed. Providing a common technical language for the cabin and cockpit crews is only a
starting point. Given the continuing confusion over the sterile cockpit regulation, an emphasis
must be made in training as to the importance of passing information up to the cockpit to let the
pilots decide its relevance or importance. If the information never gets passed between the
crews, it is of little value. Recently, the FAA ruled on a new training requirement for flight
attendants under part 121 and part 135 operations (Federal Aviation Administration, 1996). The
regulation requires both initial and recurrent flight attendant training curriculum to include crew
resource management training. This new curriculum ruling can be a good opportunity for
airlines to address technical issues.
In addition to CRM training, jumpseat experience would give flight attendants an idea of
the types of information to which the pilots do not have access, as well as demonstrating
standard flight operations and pilot workload. While some airlines have begun to allow cockpit
jumpseat or simulator rides for flight attendants, this practice could be expanded.
While no one expects flight attendants to attain the level of technical knowledge that
pilots possess, improvements can be made to raise the current level of flight attendant technical
knowledge in order for cabin and cockpit crew members to be able to communicate safety
information more clearly, quickly, and effectively. Finally, future research should examine
further the complex elements of inter-group processes in effective communication within the
context of airline operations and their implications for flight safety.
REFERENCES
Chute, R. D. (1994). Issues in cockpit/cabin communication and coordination.
Unpublished master’s thesis. San Jose State University, San Jose, CA.
Chute, R. D., & Wiener, E. L. (1995). Cockpit-cabin communication: I. A tale of two
cultures. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 5(3), 257-276.
Chute, R. D., & Wiener, E. L. (1996). Cockpit-cabin communication: II. Shall we tell
the pilots? The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 6(3), 211-231.
Department of Transport (1990). Report on the accident to Boeing 737-400 G-OBME
near Kegworth, Leicestershire on 8 January 1989. (Aircraft Accident Report 4/90).
Federal Aviation Administration (1996). Final Rule. Docket No. 27993; Amdt No.121-
50 and 135-57. Washington, DC: Author.
National Transportation Safety Board (1989). United Airlines Flight 232, McDonnell
Douglas DC-10; Sioux Gateway Airport, Sioux City, Iowa; July 19, 1989 (NTSB-AAR-90/06).
Washington, DC: Author.
National Transportation Safety Board (1992). Special investigation report: Flight
attendant training and performance during emergency situations (NTSB/SIR-92/02).
Washington, DC: Author.
National Transportation Safety Board (1995a). Factual report, aviation; American
Eagle Flight 4127, ATR 72-212; O’Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, July 9, 1995.
Washington, DC: Author.
National Transportation Safety Board (1995b). Survival factors specialist report:
American Eagle Flight 4127, ATR 72-212; O’Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, July
9, 1995. Washington, DC: Author.
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Transportation Safety Board of Canada (1995). A safety study of evacuations of large

passenger-carrying aircraft (SA9501). Canada: Minister of Supply and Services.

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