sustainability

Article
A Method for Allocation of Carbon Emission Quotas to
Provincial-Level Industries in China Based on DEA
Chenpeng Feng 1 , Rong Zhou 1 , Jingjing Ding 1 , Xiangze Xiao 2, * and Mingyue Pu 3, *

1 School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China

2 Zhejiang Economic Information Center, Hangzhou 310006, China
3 School of Accounting and Finance, Anhui Xinhua University, Hefei 230088, China
* Correspondence: [email protected] (X.X.); [email protected] (M.P.)

Abstract: At present, China implements a quota-based trading mechanism to achieve carbon emission
reduction, in which the allocation of carbon emission quotas among different provinces is short
of considering the influence of unbalanced provincial development. Heterogeneity among the
provincial-level three major industries, namely, agriculture, manufacturing and mining, and service
industries, is a case in point. To address this insufficiency, this paper proposes a novel parallel data
envelopment analysis (DEA) based method for carbon emission quota allocation. The method models
each province as a decision-making unit (DMU) and the provincial-level three major industries as
parallel sub-decision-making units (SDMUs). A distinguished feature of the method is that it makes
explicit tradeoffs between efficiency and equality considerations for policymakers in allocating the
carbon quotas among three heterogeneous provincial-level major industries. The empirical results
show that the proposed method effectively improves the overall provincial gross domestic product
(GDP) potentials through the reallocation of carbon quotas among industries while the equality level
is not worse off. This work is helpful for policymakers to achieve a long-term emission reduction
target and provides suggestions for improving the initial allocation mechanism of a national carbon
trading market.

Keywords: data envelopment analysis (DEA); parallel structure; allocation of carbon emission quotas;
Citation: Feng, C.; Zhou, R.; Ding, J.; Gini coefficient; three major industries
Xiao, X.; Pu, M. A Method for
Allocation of Carbon Emission
Quotas to Provincial-Level Industries
in China Based on DEA. Sustainability 1. Introduction
2023, 15, 2632. https://doi.org/
Global warming has become a pressing issue that needs to be addressed by all coun-
10.3390/su15032632
tries. To respond to the threat of climate change, it is universally agreed that greenhouse
Academic Editors: Jinhua Xu and gases need to be maintained at an adequate level, which led to the successful signing of the
Hongguang Nie Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. Later, 196 members of the United Nations Framework
Received: 17 December 2022
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiated and finally adopted the Paris Agree-
Revised: 18 January 2023
ment at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, pledging to limit
Accepted: 30 January 2023
global warming to 2 ◦ C above pre-industrial levels while pursuing more ambitious efforts
Published: 1 February 2023 to limit the rise of temperature further to 1.5 degrees and arrive at “net zero” greenhouse
gas emissions worldwide in the 21st century [1].
The carbon trading market is a critical mechanism for achieving carbon emission
reduction. The Kyoto Protocol permits carbon emission quotas to be traded among parties,
Copyright: © 2023 by the authors. which opens the possibility of “carbon trading” among countries under different models
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. leading up to the birth of a carbon trading market in the European Union (EU) in 2005 [2].
This article is an open access article The existing carbon trading market operation mechanisms fall into two categories: quota-
distributed under the terms and based trading and project-based trading. The quota-based trading model is the most widely
conditions of the Creative Commons adopted one. Included in this category, for example, are the European Union Emissions
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and the Western
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
Climate Initiative (WCI).
4.0/).

Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15032632 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability

Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 2 of 21

China introduced a quota-based national carbon market in 2011 and carried out trad-
ing pilot work in seven regions successively (i.e., Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing,
Hubei, Guangdong, and Shenzhen). By the end of 2021, the cumulative volume of carbon
quotas traded in the national carbon market achieved 140 million tons. In addition to
the development of the national carbon market, some provinces have created local car-
bon emission trading markets as an indispensable part of China’s carbon market. For
example, Zhejiang province has established the first local carbon-inclusive market in the
city of Yueqing, where both enterprises and individuals can participate in carbon trading
independently [3].
The carbon emissions from China are among the highest in the world, which means
China needs more efforts to reduce carbon emissions. According to statistics from British
Petroleum (BP) [4], the carbon emissions of China in 2021 were 10,398 tons, far exceeding
the shares of other countries. In the meantime, China has set up an ambitious national
plan to actively control carbon emissions. For example, to achieve the Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution (INDC) target specified in 2015 for addressing climate change, the
Chinese Government Work Report proposed a binding constraint for the carbon emission
intensity to decline by 18% compared with that of 2020 during the “14th Five-Year” Plan
period, i.e., 2021–2025.
Allocation of carbon quotas is a fundamental issue in implementing a carbon trad-
ing mechanism [5]. The current carbon quota allocation mechanism in China is facing
challenges. Presently, China allocates national carbon reduction targets on a provincial
basis. However, this method has called into question the viability of allocation results. For
example, the economic development of industrial provinces such as Hebei, Shanxi, and
Inner Mongolia heavily depends on high energy-consuming sectors. Under the allocation
method, these provinces are in huge carbon emission deficits, i.e., their actual carbon emis-
sions are much larger than their carbon quotas. In the meantime, service industry-oriented
regions such as Beijing and Shanghai, where the tertiary industry accounts for a larger share,
are found in a “low emission, high quota” situation [6]. In this case, the allocation method
is short of considerations of differences in regional industrial structures. It has generated
large proportions of emission reductions for some regions, provinces, or municipalities,
making it difficult to achieve the targets and causing pain to the economies. Therefore,
it is worthwhile and necessary to study an alternative allocation method that considers
differences in regional industrial structures. As regions (provinces or municipalities) are
different in economic and social development, emission reduction potential varies. Taking
into account differences in carbon quota allocation schemes undoubtedly reduces the bias
of targets and enhances feasibility.
The differences among the three major industries (i.e., agriculture, manufacturing
and mining, and service industries, hereinafter referred to as primary industry, secondary
industry, and tertiary industry) in carbon quota allocation have not yet attracted atten-
tion in academia. In the literature, scholars propose that policymakers need to consider
the criteria of efficiency and equality to better account for the unbalanced development
among provinces. Many papers report on the allocation of provincial-level carbon quotas
based on these two criteria. They show empirically that the heterogeneity arising from
different sectors, regions, or industries has a significant impact on the allocation of carbon
quotas [7–10]. However, they have not provided a quantitative decision tool to incorporate
the impact of the uneven development of provinces and the heterogeneity among the three
major industries on carbon quota allocation.
Hence, it is necessary to design a suitable mechanism to improve the provincial-level
carbon quota allocation in China. In the literature, scholars tend to analyze a production
process that simultaneously generates desirable and undesirable products as byproducts
(e.g., pollutants) based on the joint-production theory of production economics [11,12]. In
addition, as a non-parametric evaluation technique, they often apply the Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) technique to model joint-production processes with both desirable and
undesirable outputs. Some researchers have proposed DEA-based models, taking into
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 3 of 21

account efficiency and equality, and used them in provincial carbon quota allocation in
China [13,14]. Regarding the equality criterion, the Gini coefficient is a standard tool widely
used to analyze income inequality. Many studies propose to measure the equality of carbon
emissions among countries by the Gini coefficient [15,16].
Based on the current studies, in this paper, to model the differences in regional indus-
trial structures, we propose a parallel DEA model to allocate quotas and balance efficiency
and equality considerations. Regarding the equality criterion, we draw on existing studies
and use the Gini coefficient as an indicator of equality for carbon quota allocation. Re-
garding the efficiency criterion, this paper aims to maximize the overall desirable output
potentials. The parallel DEA-based allocation model can generate more efficient results
since it is capable of utilizing the information on the internal structural features of decision-
making units (DMUs) [17,18]. Finally, note that even though the three major industries
belong to different fields and have their industry characteristics, they utilize similar input
factors. Thus, the three major industries are modeled as three parallel sub-decision-making
units (SDMUs).
In general, the paper aims to investigate and recommend carbon quota schemes
for the three major industries at the provinciallevel in China from the perspective of
efficiency and equity. The contributions of this paper are twofold: first, distinct from
the previous research, this paper takes into account the differences in the structure and
development of the three major industries in each province and provides a more scientific
and reasonable carbon quota allocation scheme among provincial industries under the
criterion of balancing efficiency and equality. Second, this paper improves the existing DEA
models and constructs a parallel structured allocation model based on the DEA model that
contains undesirable outputs while introducing the Gini coefficient in the model to ensure
the equality of the allocation results.
The rest of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the related studies of carbon
quota allocation based on the DEA model and the studies of evaluation and allocation based
on the parallel structure DEA model. In Section 3, this paper presents a parallel structure
DEA allocation model. Section 4 constructs a parallel-structured resource allocation model
that balances efficiency and equality by incorporating the Gini coefficient into the model.
In Section 5, we show an empirical study involving 30 provincial industrial sectors in
China, which is based on the proposed model in this paper. Finally, Section 6 provides
the conclusions.

2. Literature Review
2.1. Related Research on Carbon Quota Allocation Based on DEA Models
Many studies have studied the allocation issue based on a single criterion: either effi-
ciency or equality. Gomes and Lins [19] proposed that the ZSG-DEA model is particularly
suitable for equilibrium models and used it to analyze the allocation of CO2 emission rights
among countries under the Kyoto Protocol. Fang et al. [20] proposed an allocation plan
for the provincial carbon quota allocation of China based on the 2030 emission reduction
target by improved DEA models. Yang et al. [21] used an environmental DEA model
to propose that carbon quotas could be allocated through two principles: incremental
efficiency improvements and emissions abatement planning. Mahdiloo et al. [22] proposed
a DEA model based on the eco-efficiency values of electricity generators to analyze carbon
emissions and carbon quotas.
However, when allocating carbon quotas among regions, there is also a need to
consider equality of allocation in addition to efficiency. Kong et al. [23] conducted a study
on the allocation of carbon quotas in various geographic regions of China based on the
entropy method and DEA model. In this work, the authors introduced an environmental
Gini coefficient as a measure of equality of allocation schemes. Chen et al. [9] combined
the entropy method, the Super-SBM model, and the ZSG-DEA model and applied them to
allocate the 2030 emission abatement target for China. From the perspectives of efficiency,
equality, and equity, Zhan et al. [24] constructed a ZSG-SBM-based allocation model to
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 4 of 21

obtain a reasonable scheme for the allocation of carbon quotas among provinces in China in
2019. Cheng et al. [25] considered the implied emissions of inter-provincial power transfer,
combined with the DEA model and environmental Gini coefficient, and designed a dynamic
carbon quota allocation model. Their model utilized four criteria: egalitarianism, historical
responsibility, emission reduction capacity, and emission efficiency. Shojaei and Mokhtar [5]
combined environmentally relevant DEA and equilibrium efficient frontier DEA models
to integrate a carbon quota allocation scheme and a carbon quota trading scheme into a
framework that effectively translates the overall reduction target into a reduction target for
each country.
In addition, the differences in industrial structure and economic development among
provinces cause concerns in solving the allocation issue. Scholars have studied the allocation
of provincial-level carbon quotas in China from the perspective of industries and sectors.
Wu et al. [26] used the DEA method to allocate carbon quotas in provincial industrial
sectors of China to reduce energy intensity. Li et al. [27] allocated thermal power carbon
quotas in 30 provinces in China. Gan et al. [28] integrated a fixed-cost allocation model and
a zero-sum DEA model to allocate carbon quotas to the public building sector in China
for 2030.
Table 1 summarizes the above research related to carbon quota allocation based on
DEA models. As can be seen from Table 1, scholars have balanced equity and efficiency cri-
teria when developing carbon quota schemes in recent years, and this paper is no exception.
Next, most of the decision variables in the literature consist of energy consumption, capital
stock, and population as input variables, and GDP and carbon emissions as output vari-
ables. Some scholars use CO2 as an input in their studies. However, CO2 is a by-product
of the production activity, and it would be more in line with the physical production
process to consider it as an undesirable product. Some scholars have broken down the
emission reduction targets by sector, considering the characteristics of sectors to generate a
quota allocation scheme for the sectors in each province. However, no scholars have yet
considered the differences among the three major industries in each province. This paper
has created a set of quota schemes for the three major industries in each province based on
the total amount of carbon quotas in China as a whole, which effectively fills this gap.

2.2. Related Research on Parallel DEA Models

To address the limitations of a ‘black-box’ approach in efficiency measurement, re-
searchers started to model a DMU considering its unique internal parallel structure.
Kao [29] constructed a class of parallel structure DEA models to measure the efficiency
of a system composed of independent parallel units, helping decision-makers identify
inefficient parts and make subsequent improvements. On this basis, scholars continue to in-
novate parallel structure DEA and apply it to evaluation and improvement work in various
fields. Similarly, Storto [30] proposed a more accurate measure of water use efficiency by
combining Kao’s parallel structure DEA model with fixed and shared inputs and outputs.
Kordrostami [17] improved the parallel model to evaluate data with shared sources and
bounded intervals. Lei et al. [31] extended the parallel structure DEA model, treating
the Olympic Games as a parallel system to evaluate the efficiency of each participating
country. Esmaeilzadeh and Kazemi [18] extended the multi-period DEA model to evaluate
the overall and specific period efficiencies of the parallel internal structures in each period.
Later, some scholars introduced cross-efficiency, and on the basis of directional distance
function(DDF) cross-efficiency evaluation, Lin and Tu [32] proposed a parallel structure
DDF efficiency evaluation model. Gan et al. [33] proposed a two-stage parallel tandem
network DEA model and applied it to the risk and other assessments in natural disasters.
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 5 of 21

Table 1. This paper vs. the literature of carbon quota allocation based on DEA models.

Allocation Guidelines Variable

Undesirable
Input Output
Reference Sectors Output
Efficiency Equality Energy Con- Capital CO2 (CO2 )
Population Others GDP Others
sumption Stock Emission
Gomes and √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Lins [19] (2008)
Population,
√ Historical √
Fang et al. [20] energy
carbon
(2019) intensity
emissions
et al.
Yang et al. [21] √ √ √ √ √ √ √
(2019)
Generated
Mahdiloo √ electricity, SO2 , NOX
Fuels Electricity
et al. [22] (2018) SO2 , NOX and CO2
and CO2
Kong et al. [23] √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
(2019)
Chen et al. [9] √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
(2021)
Zhan et al. [24] √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
(2022)
Population
Cheng et al. [25] √ √ √ and Energy
CO2
(2022) consump-
tion
Shojaei and √ √ √ √ √ √
Mokhtar [5] CO2
(2022)
Wu et al. [26] √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry
(2016)
Population
Li et al. [27] √ √ √ and thermal
CO2 Power
(2016) powergener-
ation
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 6 of 21

Table 1. Cont.

Allocation Guidelines Variable

Undesirable
Input Output
Reference Sectors Output
Efficiency Equality Energy Con- Capital CO2 (CO2 )
Population Others GDP Others
sumption Stock Emission
The added
√ √ √ CO2 , HDD value of the
Gan et al. [28] Public
and CDD in tertiary
(2022) buildings
2030 industry in
2030
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ Three major √
This paper
industries
√
Note: Where indicates that the item is included in the literature.
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 7 of 21

In contrast to the widespread evaluation studies using the parallel DEA, few studies
have applied it to the allocation of resources. Xiong et al. [34] proposed a new DEA method
to allocate resources in bidirectional interactive parallel systems. Liu et al. [35] proposed
a parallel DEA model considering sub-system preferences and streaming data to provide
suggestions for improving the integrated environmental efficiency of the road transport
industry. Ang et al. [36] further extended the two-stage DEA model with a parallel structure
to propose intra-organizational and inter-organizational resource allocation schemes for
two different organizational systems. Xiong et al. [37] combined cross-efficiency with
parallel structure DEA to balance organizational goals and individual preferences in the
resource allocation process.
Table 2 summarizes the above research related to parallel DEA models. It can be
found that since the parallel structure DEA was proposed, scholars have mostly applied
it to efficiency evaluation and less to resource allocation. In fact, considering the internal
composition structure of decision units in the resource allocation process can effectively
identify inefficient sub-units and make targeted improvements. Based on this observation,
this paper applies parallel structure DEA to carbon quota allocation based on three major
industries to propose a more scientific and reasonable carbon quota allocation scheme.

Table 2. This paper vs. the literature of parallel DEA models.

Allocation
Resource Allocation
Guidelines
Reference Carbon Quota Sectors
Efficiency Equality Others
Allocation
√
Kao [29] (2009) √
Lo Storto [30] (2020) √ Urban water industry
Kordrostami [17] (2014) √
Lei et al. [31] (2015) √
Esmaeilzadeh and Kazemi [18] (2019) √
Lin and Tu [32] (2021) √ √
Gan et al. [33] (2022) √ √
Xiong et al. [34] (2018) √ √
Liu et al. [35] (2020) √ √ Road transport industry
Ang et al. [36] (2020) √ √
Xiong et al. [37] (2022) √ √ √ √
This paper Three major industries
√
Note: Where indicates that the item is included in the literature.

3. Parallel Structure DEA Allocation Model

Suppose there are n DMU j ( j = 1, . . . , n), where each DMU j contains q parallel
p
SDMU j ( p = 1, . . . , q), and each DMU and SDMU contains m inputs, s desirable outputs,
and l undesirable outputs. As shown in Figure 1, the input, desirable outputs, and unde-
p p
sirable output vectors of the p-th SDMU of DMU j are Xij (i = 1, . . . , m), Yrj (r = 1, . . . , s),
q q q
p p p p
Rdj (d = 1, . . . , l ), then Xij = ∑ xij , Yrj = ∑ yrj , and Rdj = ∑ rdj , respectively. Let
p =1 p =1 p =1
Bd (d = 1, . . . , l ) be the total undesirable output to be allocated, the undesirable output
p p
allocated to DMU j is bdj , and the undesirable output allocated to DMU j within DMU j is bdj ,
n q
p
then Bd = ∑ ∑ bdj . Note that we only study the one desirable output and one undesirable
j =1 p =1
output production system in this paper that perfectly serves our research purpose. We
use the gross domestic product (GDP) as the desirable output and carbon emissions as the
undesirable output, which are typical indicators documented in many studies [11,38].
 n q
is bdjp , then Bd =  bdjp . Note that we only study the one desirable output and one
j =1 p =1

undesirable output production system in this paper that perfectly serves our research
purpose. We use the gross domestic product (GDP) as the desirable output and carbon
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 8 of 21
emissions as the undesirable output, which are typical indicators documented in many
studies [11,38].

Figure1.1.Parallel
Figure Parallelstructure
structuresystem.
system.

The
TheDEA
DEAmodels
modelsdesigned
designedininthis
thispaper
paperall
allsatisfy
satisfythe
thefollowing
followingassumptions:
assumptions:
(1)
(1) Variable returns-to-scale (VRS).
Variable returns-to-scale (VRS).
(2)
(2) Weak disposability.
Weak disposability. Reducing
Reducing the
the undesirable
undesirable outputs
outputs under
under the
the current
current technology
technology
will inevitably reduce the desirable outputs.
will inevitably reduce the desirable outputs.
(3) Null joint-ness. The only way to eliminate
(3) eliminate the
the undesirable
undesirable output
output isis to
to shut
shut down
down
production.
production.
Combingthe
Combing theVRS
VRSassumption
assumption and and
thethe weak
weak disposability
disposability and joint-ness
and null null joint-ness as-
assump-
sumptions
tions pose apose a challenge
challenge to modeling
to modeling in the literature.
in the literature. Zhou
Zhou et et al.
al. [39] [39] proposed
proposed a new asetnew
of
set of environmental
environmental production
production possibilities
possibilities to achieve
to achieve this purpose.
this purpose. In thisthe
In this paper, paper, the
parallel
parallel allocation
allocation model (1)model (1) is based
is provided providedon thebased on themodel
allocation allocation
undermodel under
the VRS the VRS
assumption
assumption proposed by
proposed by Feng et al. [38]. Feng et al. [38].
q n n p p
max ∑ ∑ ∑ λhj yh
p =1 h =1 j =1
n p p p p
s.t. ∑ λhj xij ≤ σh xih i = 1, . . . , m; p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
j =1
n p p p p
∑ λhj R j = Rh − bh p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
j =1
n q
p (1)
∑ ∑ bh = B
h =1 p =1
n p p
∑ λhj = σh p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
j =1
p
λhj ≥ 0 p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , n
p
ε ≤ σh ≤ 1 p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
p p
R h − bh ≥ 0 p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
p
The subscript h denotes the evaluated unit, i.e., the h-th DMU, and λhj denotes the
p p
weight vector when evaluating the SDMUh . σh is an adjustable variable, a positive number
not greater than 1, which is a correction for the weak disposability as well as the null
p p p
joint-ness. R j − bh denotes the expected carbon emission level of SDMUh . B denotes
the overall carbon reduction level. The objective of model (1) is to maximize the overall
desirable output, i.e., GDP potentials, for a certain level of carbon reduction.

4. Equality-Enhanced Parallel Resource Allocation Model

The Gini coefficient is an important measure of inequality, which has been used to
capture the degree of equality in income distribution. Additionally, it has been widely
applied to guide resource allocation [8,9,40]. To compute the Gini coefficient, one needs
to first identify a service unit, which is the service (or goods) that need to be allocated
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 9 of 21

according to an equality indicator [41,42]. For example, in this paper, we argue that a
carbon emission reduction quota should be allocated according to the GDP proportion of a
province in the national GDP. In this case, the carbon reduction quota serves as a service
unit and the GDP as an equality unit.
Let us denote S j ( j = 1, . . . , n) the service units and L j ( j = 1, . . . , n) the equality
units. According to Mandell [43], the Gini coefficient can be written as the following
analytical formula:
∑ ∑ | l k St − l t Sk |
t k>t
G= ,
∑ St
t
Lt
where lt = ∑ Lj
. From the above formula, it can be seen that G ∈ [0, 1].
j
Below we introduce the Gini coefficient of carbon emissions of the three major in-
dustries as an indicator to measure the equality of carbon quota allocation to capture the
equality of allocation among the three industries [44]. Specifically, the initial carbon emis-
sion of an industry in a province is taken as a service unit and the GDP of the industry in the
province is taken as the equality unit before carbon quota allocation. The Gini coefficient of
the initial industrial carbon emission indicates the equality of carbon emission allocation in
terms of its GDP. Its analytical formula is given below.
 
p p p p
∑ ∑ k t
l R − l R
t k
p t k>t
G = p ,
∑ Rt
t

p
p yt
where lt = p denotes the proportion of provincial-industry level GDP in the national
∑ yj
j
p p p p
GDP of industry p. Rt , Rk indicate the carbon emissions of SDMUt and SDMUk before the
allocation, respectively. Similarly, after the allocation of carbon emission, using the expected
carbon emission level as the service unit, the industry carbon emission Gini coefficient is
defined as follows:     
p p p p p p 
∑ ∑ lk Rt − bt − lt Rk − bk 
p t k>t
G0 = 
p p
 .
∑ R t − bt
t

To ensure that the equality of the allocation scheme after the carbon quota allocation
is not inferior to the initial carbon quota scheme, it is reasonable to require that the after-
allocation carbon emission Gini coefficient of the industry is less than or equal to the
p
initial carbon emission Gini coefficient, that is, G 0 ≤ G p . Based on the model (1) and the
Gini coefficient of industrial carbon emissions, this paper proposes the equality-enhanced
parallel resource allocation model (2). The 5th constraint ensures that the equality of the
allocation does not deteriorate. In this way, model (2) is able to combine the efficiency
and equality criteria into a model so that the trade-offs between the two criteria can be
handled effectively.
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 10 of 21

q n n p p
max ∑ ∑ ∑ λhj yh
p =1 h =1 j =1
n p p p p
s.t. ∑ λhj xij ≤ σh xih i = 1, . . . , m; p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
j =1
n p p p p
∑ λhj R j = Rh − bh p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
j =1
n q
p
∑ ∑ bh = B
h =1 p =1
n (2)
p p
∑ λhj = σh p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
j =1
n n p p p p p p
∑ ∑ |lk ( Rt −bt )−lt ( Rk −bk )|
t =1 k > t
n p p
≤ Gp p = 1, . . . , q
∑ ( R t − bt )
t =1
p
λhj ≥ 0 p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , n
p
ε ≤ σh ≤ 1 p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
p p
R h − bh ≥ 0 p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n

To transform model (2) to a linear one, we propose the following substitutions of variables:
   
p p p p p p p+ p−
lk Rt − bt − lt Rk − bk = ztk − ztk t = 1, . . . , n; k > t.

The model (2) can thus be transformed into the linear programming form (3).
q n n p p
max ∑ ∑ ∑ λhj yh
p =1 h =1 j =1
n p p p p
s.t. ∑ λhj xij ≤ σh xih i = 1, . . . , m; p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
j =1
n p p p p
∑ λhj R j = Rh − bh p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
j =1
n q
p
∑ ∑ bh = B
h =1 p =1
n (3)
p p
∑ λhj = σh p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
j =1
n n p+ p− n p p
∑ ∑ (ztk + ztk ) ≤ G p ∑ ( Rt − bt ) p = 1, . . . , q
t =1 k > t t =1
p p p p p p p+ p−
lk ( Rt − bt ) − lt ( Rk − bk ) − ztk + ztk =0 p = 1, . . . , q; t = 1, . . . , n; k > t
p
λhj ≥ 0 p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , n
p
ε ≤ σh ≤ 1 p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n
p p
R h − bh ≥ 0 p = 1, . . . , q; h = 1, . . . , n

5. Empirical Analysis
5.1. Data Sources and Parameter Specifications
Each province is modeled as a DMU, and the three major industries in the province are
considered as SDMUs. The inputs of each industry are capital stock, year-end employment,
and energy consumption; the desirable output is GDP, and the undesirable output is carbon
emission. Due to the availability of data, this paper collects the data of the year 2019 related
to the three major industries of 30 provinces of China (excluding Tibet, Hong Kong, Macao,
and Taiwan). The data sources and units of measure are provided as follows:
1. Capital stock (Unit: 100 million RMB): The data are estimated based on statistical data
from Historical Information on China’s GDP Accounting 1952–2004, Statistical Year-
book of the Chinese Investment Field, Statistical Communique on National Economic
and Social Development of each region, and Statistical Yearbook of each province,
using Zhang’s perpetual inventory method [45]. To clarify, in this paper, the gross
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 11 of 21

fixed capital formation since 2002 is selected as the total investment in fixed assets in
the calculation of capital stock [46], while the total investment in fixed assets in each
region after 2017 is indirectly calculated from Statistical Communique on National
Economic and Social Development. The investment deflator for the three industries is
adopted from the investment deflator construction method proposed by Zong and
Liao [46]. The depreciation rate of fixed assets is set to 9.6%, proposed by Zhang [45].
We chose the year 2000 as the base year, and the base year capital stock of the three
industries across regions is calculated by the method proposed by Li [47].
2. Year-end employment (Unit: 10,000 people): The data are extracted from the respective
provincial Statistical Yearbook 2020.
3. Energy consumption (Unit: 10,000 tons of standard coal): The amount is calculated
based on the comprehensive energy balances of provinces and cities from the China
Energy Statistical Yearbook 2020. The 29 energy types involved in the energy consump-
tion calculation were determined by following the guidelines of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [48] and the China Energy Statistical Yearbook. The
conversion coefficients of each energy source were obtained from the National Bureau
of Statistics of China. The industrial attribution of each sector is based on the Indus-
trial Classification for National Economic Activities (GB/T 4754-2017) [49] and the
Regulations on the Dividing Basis of Three Industries. Finally, the energy consump-
tion of industries in each province was derived from the conversion coefficients of the
29 energy types and the conversion coefficients of each sector.
4. GDP (Unit: 100 million RMB): The data are from the respective provincial Statistical
Yearbook 2020.
5. Carbon emissions (Unit: 10,000 tons): The data are calculated based on the energy
consumption of provinces and cities from China Energy Statistical Yearbook 2020.
Note that the calculation requires first categorizing the 29 energy sources into five
major categories: coal, oil, natural gas, electricity, and heating power. Then, the
product of the energy consumption of each industrial sector and the corresponding
energy carbon emission factor is the carbon emission of that energy category. The
emission factors of coal, oil, and natural gas can be obtained directly from the Energy
Statistics Yearbook, while the carbon emission factors of electricity and heating power
are calculated based on the fuel combustion in the power sector [50].
Specific data for each indicator can be found in Table A1.
Before allocating resources, the total amount of carbon quotas to be allocated needs
to be determined. The actual national carbon emissions of the year 2020 are taken as the
total amount of carbon quotas targets. According to the 70th edition of the World Energy
Statistics Yearbook published by BP [4], the total carbon emissions from China in 2020
would be 9.786 billion tons. According to the “13th Five-Year” Plan to Control Greenhouse
Gas Emissions [51], the national carbon intensity was expected to be reduced by 18% in
2020 compared with 2015. The actual result shows that this indicator eventually decreased
by 18.8%, which exceeded the target.
Model (3) is applied to obtain the allocation of carbon quotas for the three major
industries in 30 Chinese provinces in the year 2020. Before running the model, it is also
useful to limit the allowed range of variation of carbon quotas for each SDMU. To this end,
we run model (3) with different range restrictions to obtain total GDP potentials. Figure 2
reports the results.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the total GDP potentials gradually increase as the range
of the carbon emission reduction ratio is broadened. However, too large a percentage of
emission reductions would make the program impractical, if not infeasible. This paper
finally fixes the upper and lower bounds of carbon emissions for SDMUs at [0.5, 1.5] of the
initial carbon emissions.
 decreased by 18.8%, which exceeded the target.
Model (3) is applied to obtain the allocation of carbon quotas for the three major
industries in 30 Chinese provinces in the year 2020. Before running the model, it is also
useful to limit the allowed range of variation of carbon quotas for each SDMU. To this
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 end, we run model (3) with different range restrictions to obtain total GDP potentials.
12 of 21
Figure 2 reports the results.

1,210,000.00
Total GDP potential/100 million RMB

1,200,000.00
1,190,000.00
1,180,000.00
1,170,000.00
1,160,000.00
1,150,000.00
1,140,000.00
1,130,000.00
1,120,000.00
1,110,000.00
0.9−1.1 0.8−1.2 0.7−1.3 0.6−1.4 0.5−1.5 0.4−1.6 0.3−1.7 0.2−1.8 0.1−1.9 0−2

Range of carbon emission reduction ratio

Figure 2. Schematic diagrams of the relations between the total GDP potentials and the value range
Figure 2. Schematic diagrams of the relations between the total GDP potentials and the value range
of the carbon emission reduction ratio.
of the carbon emission reduction ratio.
5.2. Analysis of the Results
The results show that the total GDP potential is 119.9006 trillion RMB, which is a
significant increase from the actual national total GDP of 98.3635 trillion RMB in 2020. The
Gini coefficients of carbon emissions for each industry after the allocation are the same as
those before the allocation, and the Gini coefficient of carbon emissions among provinces
decreases by 0.0233 after the carbon quota allocation. Namely, the resulting allocation result
is more equal to the initial allocation scheme, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Comparison of carbon emission Gini coefficient before and after allocation.

Primary Industry Secondary Industry Tertiary Industry Provincial

Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient
Initial Gini coefficient 0.2912 0.3835 0.2291 0.3444
Post-quota Gini coefficient 0.2912 0.3835 0.2291 0.3211

1 2
Table 4 reports the carbon quota allocation results. In Table 4, the columns R0j , R0j ,
3
and R0j are allocated carbon quotas (in 10,000 tons) for the primary, secondary, and tertiary
p p
industries by region. The relative changes are shown in columns (R0j /R j ) and visually
displayed in Figure 3. The column R0j indicates the total carbon quotas by region after the
1 2 3
allocation (in 10,000 tons) (R0j +R0j +R0j ).

Table 4. Results of industrial carbon quota allocation by region.

1 2 3 1 2 3
DMU R’j R’j R’j R’j /R1j R’j /R2j R’j /R3j R’j R’j /Rj

Beijing 94.74 2267.74 5327.54 1.43 1.00 1.00 7690.02 1.00

Tianjin 197.11 12,943.25 2970.17 1.00 1.08 1.09 16,110.53 1.08
Hebei 1028.71 68,542.18 6791.90 0.87 1.00 0.89 76,362.79 0.99
Shanxi 537.74 37,884.06 4471.11 0.72 1.01 0.91 42,892.91 0.99
Inner Mongolia 717.09 55,674.47 4993.32 0.73 1.00 0.78 61,384.88 0.97
Liaoning 582.45 45,750.92 6709.27 0.92 1.11 0.96 53,042.64 1.09
Jilin 295.11 10,047.89 2918.42 0.78 0.81 0.78 13,261.42 0.80
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 13 of 21

Table 4. Cont.

1 2 3 1 2 3
DMU R’j R’j R’j R’j /R1j R’j /R2j R’j /R3j R’j R’j /Rj

Heilongjiang 1410.22 12,113.03 4808.62 1.00 0.91 0.78 18,331.87 0.87

Shanghai 84.43 14,022.98 8740.16 1.00 1.07 1.00 22,847.57 1.04
Jiangsu 1035.46 57,531.02 10,012.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 68,579.20 1.00
Zhejiang 727.82 36,645.42 6789.41 1.19 1.27 1.01 44,162.66 1.22
Anhui 366.66 24,180.58 4676.35 0.76 1.04 0.97 29,223.59 1.02
Fujian 371.96 23,178.09 4962.81 1.00 1.16 1.27 28,512.86 1.17
Jiangxi 229.58 17,535.92 3749.89 0.79 1.00 0.91 21,515.39 0.98
Shandong 1315.58 78,277.87 9957.18 1.00 1.00 0.96 89,550.63 1.00
Henan 967.74 34,005.57 7185.79 0.95 1.00 0.92 42,159.10 0.98
Hubei 2023, 15, x FOR PEER
Sustainability 739.01
REVIEW 22,413.64 7174.58 0.98 1.16 1.09 30,327.24 13 of 1.14
22
Hunan 1008.68 18,489.62 6532.78 0.84 1.13 0.96 26,031.08 1.07
Guangdong 1089.82 38,158.48 13,409.46 1.08 1.00 1.00 52,657.76 1.00
Guangxi 289.23 51,485.34 3650.96 0.91 1.00 1.24 55,425.53 1.01
Hainan
Hainan 269.50269.50 2923.80
2923.80 1791.42
1791.42 1.001.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4984.73
4984.73 1.00 1.00
Chongqing
Chongqing 175.67175.67 10,274.48
10,274.48 3792.68
3792.68 1.001.00 0.99 0.99 1.21 1.21 14,242.82
14,242.82 1.04 1.04
Sichuan
Sichuan 353.63353.63 26,246.11
26,246.11 6046.00
6046.00 1.001.00 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 32,645.74
32,645.74 1.49 1.49
Guizhou
Guizhou 346.26346.26 11,283.82
11,283.82 5727.82
5727.82 0.740.74 1.05 1.05 0.99 0.99 17,357.90
17,357.90 1.03 1.03
Yunnan
Yunnan 417.52417.52 18,713.56
18,713.56 3997.92
3997.92 0.870.87 1.50 1.50 1.36 1.36 23,129.00
23,129.00 1.45 1.45
Shaanxi
Shaanxi 385.54385.54 19,069.25
19,069.25 4377.22
4377.22 1.001.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 23,832.01
23,832.01 1.00 1.00
Gansu
Gansu 347.89347.89 12,053.75
12,053.75 2497.29
2497.29 1.021.02 1.27 1.27 1.26 1.26 14,898.94
14,898.94 1.26 1.26
Qinghai 24.03 3525.22 1087.86 1.00 1.00 1.50 4637.11 1.08
Qinghai 24.03 3525.22 1087.86 1.00 1.00 1.50 4637.11 1.08
Ningxia 143.25 17,060.94 1003.21 0.73 1.00 1.00 18,207.40 1.00
Ningxia 143.25 17,060.94 1003.21 0.73 1.00 1.00 18,207.40 1.00
Xinjiang 1188.75 31,797.70 2908.24 1.00 1.00 0.81 35,894.69 0.98
Xinjiang
Total 1188.75
16,741.2131,797.70
814,096.68 2908.24
159,062.11 1.00 1.00 0.81 35,894.69 0.98
Total 16,741.21 814,096.68 159,062.11

Figure
Figure 3. Change
3. Change inin industrialcarbon
industrial carbon emission
emission ratio
ratioofofeach province
each before
province and and
before afterafter
allocation.
allocation.

Table 4 and Figure 3 indicate that the resulting reductions for provinces or munici-
palities show different features. In the primary industry, Beijing has the largest propor-
tion of incremental emissions, followed by Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Gansu; 14 prov-
inces, including Ningxia and Shanxi, need to reduce emissions, with Shanxi having the
largest proportion of emission reductions. In the secondary industry, only Jilin, Hei-
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 14 of 21

Table 4 and Figure 3 indicate that the resulting reductions for provinces or municipal-
ities show different features. In the primary industry, Beijing has the largest proportion
of incremental emissions, followed by Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Gansu; 14 provinces,
including Ningxia and Shanxi, need to reduce emissions, with Shanxi having the largest
proportion of emission reductions. In the secondary industry, only Jilin, Heilongjiang, and
Chongqing need to reduce emissions, and 13 provinces, such as Sichuan and Yunnan, need
to increase emissions, with Sichuan and Yunnan having the largest proportion of emissions
increase. In the tertiary industry, 10 provinces, such as Qinghai and Sichuan, need to
increase emissions, and Qinghai and Sichuan have the largest proportion of increased
emissions; and 13 provinces, such as Tianjin and Inner Mongolia, need to reduce emissions,
of which Inner Mongolia, Jilin, and Heilongjiang have the largest proportion of reductions.
It should be noted that the overall allocation scheme is basically in line with the current
situation of regional industrial development (for example, heavy industrial regions such as
Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Liaoning, whose carbon quota allocation is still dominated by
the secondary industry).
The total amount of carbon quotas to be allocated is higher than the total amount
of carbon emissions in 2019, which is the main reason for the increases in carbon quotas
for industries in the majority of regions in Figure 3. Among them, the carbon before and
after the allocation of the three major industries in Jiangsu, Hainan, and Shaanxi do not
p p
change; the ratio (R0j /R j ) of the three major industries in Zhejiang and Gansu is greater
than 1 after allocation. Put differently, they have obtained more carbon quotas and occupy
p p
a favorable position in the carbon trading market. The post-allocation ratios (R0j /R j ) of
the remaining regions show a great variation. For example, the primary industries in Hubei
and Yunnan need to reduce carbon emissions, and the secondary and tertiary industries
need to increase carbon emissions to reach their optimal GDP potentials. This implies that
the differences among industries have an effect on the outcome of the allocation process,
which is anticipated.
It is worth noting that regional industrial carbon quota changes can be expressed in
absolute and relative terms. When the initial carbon emissions quantity is large, even a
small relative change to the proportion of carbon emissions can lead to a larger absolute
change in quantity. In that case, it is a great challenge to implement emission reductions
for regional industries. To address this issue, regional industries that are to receive fewer
carbon quotas can first consider coordinating industries to better use quotas within the
region; if their carbon quotas have dropped significantly from the pre-allocation level,
and they fail to meet the emission reduction targets through internal coordination, they
may obtain more carbon quotas through carbon trading mechanisms. For example, the
increase in carbon quotas for the secondary industry in Shanxi is much smaller than the
reductions in the primary and tertiary industries, and the reductions in carbon quotas for
the secondary industry in Chongqing is smaller than the increase for the tertiary industry.
The provinces with sufficient carbon emission quotas, such as Hubei, Sichuan, and Yunnan,
can profit from carbon trading.
Since regional differences are prominent in China, many policies need to be specified
at the regional level. The Development Research Center of the State Council divided China
into eight comprehensive economic zones based on resources, regional development, and
other factors (as shown in Table A2 [23]). Below we analyze the regional carbon quota
allocation results based on this classification. The specific quota results are shown in Table 5
and Figure 4. From Table 5, it can be found that the regions with the largest total carbon
quotas before and after allocation are both northern coastal regions, and the smallest total
carbon quotas are both northwestern regions.
 Sustainability 2023, 15, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 of 22
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 15 of 21

Table 5. Regional industry carbon quota results in China.

Table 5. Regional industry carbon quota results in China.
Pre-Quota Allocation Post-Quota Allocation
Province Primary Secondary
Pre-QuotaTertiary
Allocation Primary Secondary Tertiary
Post-Quota Allocation
Total Total
Province Industry
Primary Industry Industry
Secondary Tertiary Industry
Primary Industry Industry
Secondary Tertiary
Northern coastal 2765.40 Total 2636.15 Total
Industry 161,074.26
Industry 26,030.49
Industry189,870.16 162,031.04
Industry 25,046.79
Industry 189,713.98
Industry
Southern coastal 1647.83 61,125.40 19,122.09 81,895.33 1731.28 64,260.37 20,163.69 86,155.34
Northern coastal 2765.40 161,074.26 26,030.49 189,870.16 2636.15 162,031.04 25,046.79 189,713.98
Eastern coastal 1729.28 99,438.25 25,456.03 126,623.55 1847.71 108,199.42 25,542.28 135,589.42
Southern coastal 1647.83 61,125.40 19,122.09 81,895.33 1731.28 64,260.37 20,163.69 86,155.34
Middlecoastal
Eastern Yangtze 1729.28 99,438.25 25,456.03 126,623.55 1847.71 108,199.42 25,542.28 135,589.42
2722.40 76,495.25 22,352.14 101,569.79 2343.94 82,619.76 22,133.61 107,097.30
River River
Middle Yangtze 2722.40 76,495.25 22,352.14 101,569.79 2343.94 82,619.76 22,133.61 107,097.30
Middle
Middle Yellow
Yellow Riv-
River 3130.43 146,347.71 23,571.16 173,049.30 2608.11 146,633.34 21,027.45 170,268.90
3130.43 146,347.71 23,571.16 173,049.30 2608.11 146,633.34 21,027.45 170,268.90
Northwest
er 1750.41 61,884.26 7301.47 70,936.14 1703.93 64,437.61 7496.61 73,638.14
Southwest
Northwest 1796.32 61,884.26
1750.41 102,543.21 7301.47
18,827.1370,936.14
123,166.661703.93
1582.3164,437.61
118,003.30 23,215.38
7496.61 142,801.00
73,638.14
Northeast
Southwest 2420.28 102,543.21
1796.32 66,982.99 18,827.13
16,938.82123,166.66
86,342.091582.31
2287.77 67,911.84
118,003.30 14,436.31
23,215.38 84,635.92
142,801.00
Northeast 2420.28 66,982.99 16,938.82 86,342.09 2287.77 67,911.84 14,436.31 84,635.92

180,000.00

150,000.00
Allocation quotas (CO2 /10,000 tons)

120,000.00

90,000.00

60,000.00

30,000.00

0.00
Northern coastal Eastern coastal Middle Yellow River Southwest
Region

Pre-quota primary industry Post-quota primary industry

Pre-quota secondary industry Post-quota secondary industry
Pre-quota Tertiary industry Post-quota Tertiary industry

Figure 4. Comparison of carbon quota allocation results for regional industries.

Figure 4. Comparison of carbon quota allocation results for regional industries.
Figure 5 visualizes the changes in the proportion of each regional industry before
andIn after
addition, the allocation
the allocation. Fromofthe industrial
perspectivecarbon quotas
of the nation,hasthethe feature
carbon that the
quotas primary
of the
industry
southern coastal, eastern coastal, Middle Yangtze River, northwestern, and southwesternquotas
and the secondary industry are respectively allocated the lowest amount of
andregions
the highest amounts ofincreased,
have significantly quotas in all regions.
while the carbonAmong
quotas the primary
of the northernand secondary
coastal,
industries, the northern
Middle Yellow coastal
River, and region obtains
northeastern the highest
regions have amount
decreased. From of ancarbon quotas.
industrial per- This
is because
spective,thethe Northern coastal
carbon quotas has
of all two large
regions in theindustrial
secondary provinces,
industry rise.Shandong
The reason andforHebei.
this isbased
Finally, that theonsecondary industryofoccupies
the breakdown the largest
the tertiary sharequotas,
industry of the national
it can beeconomy,
seen that the
and its
eastern corresponding
coastal carbon
region gets the emissions will alsoofrise
highest amount whenquotas,
carbon the overall carbon
which emissions
is due to the rapid
rise. Secondly, the carbon quotas for the primary and tertiary
commercial and financial development of Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, which industries in the north-have a
eastern,
large share Middle Yangtze GDP.
of the national River, Middle Yellow River, and northern coastal regions
Figure 5 visualizes the changes in the proportion of each regional industry before and
after the allocation. From the perspective of the nation, the carbon quotas of the southern
coastal, eastern coastal, Middle Yangtze River, northwestern, and southwestern regions
have significantly increased, while the carbon quotas of the northern coastal, Middle Yellow
River, and northeastern regions have decreased. From an industrial perspective, the carbon
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 16 of 21

Sustainability 2023, 15, x FOR PEER REVIEW

quotas of all regions in the secondary industry rise. 16 of 22
The reason for this is that the secondary
industry occupies the largest share of the national economy, and its corresponding carbon
emissions will also rise when the overall carbon emissions rise. Secondly, the carbon quotas
for the primary
shrink, and tertiary
which means these industries in under
regions are the northeastern, MiddletoYangtze
greater pressure reduce River,
carbonMiddle
emis-
Yellow River, and northern coastal regions shrink, which means these regions
sions. In contrast, the southern coastal and eastern coastal regions have a positive aregrowth
under
greater pressure
in carbon quotastofor
reduce carbon emissions.
all industries, In contrast,
which could be due the southern
to better coastal andlocation,
geographical eastern
coastal regions have a positive growth in carbon quotas
along with the advantages of early opening-up policies. for all industries, which could be
due to better geographical location, along with the advantages of early opening-up policies.

Figure 5. The
Figure 5. The proportion
proportion of
of regional
regional industry
industry quota
quota changes
changes before
before and
and after.
after.
6. Conclusions
6. Conclusions
From the perspectives of efficiency and equality, this paper considers CO2 as an
From the
undesirable perspectives
output and proposesof efficiency
a parallel and
DEA equality,
resource thisallocation
paper considers CO2 as an
model considering
undesirable output and proposes a parallel DEA resource allocation
industrial structure characteristics of regions, and conducts an empirical study on the allo- model considering
industrial
cation structure characteristics
of provincial-level carbon quotas of regions, andmajor
for the three conducts an empirical
industries in China.study on the
The method
allocation of provincial-level carbon quotas for the three major industries
provided in this study can implement carbon emission quota allocation in pursuit of maxi- in China. The
method provided in this study can implement carbon emission
mizing macro performance. This is a useful modification to the current carbon emissions quota allocation in pur-
suit of maximizing
trading market in China,macrowhich
performance.
is gradually This expanding
is a useful modification
its coverage. to The the current car-
methodology
bon emissions trading market in China, which is gradually expanding
we provide assesses regional carbon emission efficiencies from a more comprehensive its coverage. The
methodology
perspective andwe provide
also assesses
facilitates regional and
more scientific carbon emission
precise guidance efficiencies
for local from a more
governments
comprehensive
to improve carbon perspective and also
emission control and facilitates
improve more scientific sustainability.
environmental and precise guidance for
In addition,
local governments to improve carbon emission control and improve
the Chinese government has clearly proposed to transit from the dual control of total energy environmental sus-
tainability. Inand
consumption addition,
energythe Chinese
intensity to government
the dual control has ofclearly proposed
total carbon to transit
emissions andfrom the
carbon
dual control of total energy consumption and energy intensity to the
intensity. This implies that the scope of inclusion of carbon emission control is expanding dual control of total
carbon
from emissions
trading and carbon
enterprises to theintensity.
whole society.This implies
The method that the scope of
provided ininclusion
this studyofcan carbon
be a
emission control
powerful reference is expanding
for formulatingfrom and
trading enterprisescarbon
decomposing to the emission
whole society.
control The method
targets by
provided inand
sub-region this study can be a powerful reference for formulating and decomposing
industry.
carbon
Theemission
empirical control targets
results showbythatsub-region and industry.
the equality of the resulting allocation scheme is
The empirical
the same as that ofresults show
the actual that the
carbon equalityallocation
emissions of the resulting
scheme, allocation
while the scheme
total is the
GDP
potentials
same as thatis substantially
of the actual increased compared
carbon emissions to the initial
allocation totalwhile
scheme, GDP.the Thetotalresults
GDP show
po-
the effectiveness
tentials and rationality
is substantially increased of the proposed
compared to the method.
initial totalFor example,
GDP. carbon
The results quotas
show the
in Shandong, and
effectiveness Innerrationality
Mongolia,ofand theother heavy method.
proposed industrialFor regions are still
example, dominated
carbon quotas byin
secondary
Shandong, industries.
Inner Mongolia,Furthermore,
and other theheavy
resulting allocation
industrial scheme
regions takesdominated
are still into account by
regional
secondary industrial
industries.characteristics.
Furthermore, In the
addition, the carbon
resulting quotas
allocation of Jiangsu,
scheme takes intoHainan, and
account
regional industrial characteristics. In addition, the carbon quotas of Jiangsu, Hainan, and
Shaanxi remain unchanged before and after the allocation. In the meantime, the carbon
quotas of Jilin and Heilongjiang have declined disproportionately. Particularly,carbon
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 17 of 21

Shaanxi remain unchanged before and after the allocation. In the meantime, the carbon
quotas of Jilin and Heilongjiang have declined disproportionately. Particularly, carbon
quota allocations for all three major industries in Jilin have declined significantly after
allocation, indicating that it will face greater pressure in the future to purchase carbon
quotas from provinces other than emission reduction provinces, while Zhejiang and Gansu
obtain more carbon quotas after the allocation and can sell on their carbon quotas. From the
regional allocation results, the southern coastal and eastern coastal regions have received
more carbon quotas, and government departments will have a more flexible capacity in
formulating emission reduction policies for the relevant regions. The Middle Yellow River
and northeast regions have seen a disproportionate decline in carbon quotas and face
greater pressure to reduce emissions than other regions with lower carbon quotas for a
single industry.
According to the above empirical results, four policy implications are proposed:
1. The Gini coefficient for carbon emissions in both primary and tertiary industries was
less than 0.3 before the allocation was made, making the allocation scheme relatively
equal. The Gini coefficient for carbon emissions in the secondary industry is 0.3835,
which is a reasonable allocation scheme, but there is still a large gap from the levels of
other industries. Policymakers should further improve the equality level of carbon
quota allocation schemes between provinces, which will make it more reasonable for
provinces to set carbon quota schemes within industries.
2. Due to the disproportionate emission abatement among and within provinces for
the three major industries after carbon quota allocation, the allocation scheme can be
implemented through carbon quota trading between provinces. Therefore, policy-
makers need to provide policies for industry emission reductions and accelerate the
establishment and improvement of provincial and municipal carbon trading markets.
3. Judging from the regional allocation results, the southern coastal and eastern coastal
regions have the same trend of industrial carbon quota changes. By contrast, the
changes in the rest of the regional industrial carbon quota changes are mixed. There-
fore, if policymakers are to fully consider industrial factors when formulating regional
carbon emission reductions and trading policies, our work suggests establishing a
regional carbon trading market in the mixed region first.
4. The centralized parallel resource allocation model proposed in this paper is applicable
to any situation that has a by-product resource allocation in a parallel state. An
example is the allocation of carbon quotas for regional enterprises.
One limitation of this paper is that the equality of the allocation among provinces is
not considered in the process of conducting the allocation of carbon quotas among the three
major industries at the provincial-level in China. In addition, for future research directions,
this paper will consider the impact of equity criteria other than the Gini coefficient on the
allocation scheme among SDMUs. Meanwhile, for any carbon quota allocation scheme,
how to effectively promote the carbon quotas market and improve the trading mechanism
is also a subsequent research direction.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, C.F.; methodology, software, formal analysis, writing—

original draft preparation and writing—review and editing, C.F. and R.Z.; data curation, validation,
R.Z.; investigation and resources, C.F., J.D., X.X. and M.P.; funding acquisition, super-vision, C.F. and
J.D. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China
(71971072; 71771074; 72188101; 71971074).
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: The data that support the findings of this study are available upon
request to the corresponding author.
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 18 of 21

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

Table A1. Specific data for the selected indicators.

Energy
Capital Stock Year-End GDP Carbon
Consumption
Industry DMU (100 Million Employment (100 Million Emissions
(10,000 Tons of
RMB) (10,000 People) RMB) (10,000 Tons)
Standard Coal)
Beijing 323.40 42.40 55.24 113.69 66.22
Tianjin 938.23 58.28 88.86 185.23 197.11
Hebei 4084.02 1331.15 491.73 3518.44 1186.49
Shanxi 2423.45 666.70 284.67 824.72 743.83
Inner
2734.12 556.80 354.96 1863.19 981.01
Mongolia
Liaoning 968.75 619.43 290.67 2177.77 631.36
Jilin 1628.23 466.20 152.71 1287.32 378.70
Heilongjiang 2139.59 564.10 591.78 3182.45 1410.22
Shanghai 45.41 40.80 41.16 103.88 84.43
Jiangsu 943.61 734.51 506.60 4296.28 1035.46
Zhejiang 849.03 406.83 352.23 2097.38 609.39
Anhui 1847.83 1346.90 219.90 2915.70 480.87
Fujian 2223.87 548.85 208.39 2596.23 371.96
Primary Jiangxi 1339.34 700.80 127.18 2057.56 288.98
industry Shandong 2952.41 1652.60 593.26 5116.44 1315.58
Henan 5471.54 2277.00 461.62 4635.40 1020.05
Hubei 1991.66 1164.00 385.94 3809.09 750.89
Hunan 2547.64 1409.24 482.56 3646.95 1201.66
Guangdong 1333.43 1300.61 553.66 4351.26 1006.37
Guangxi 2112.27 1388.00 187.02 3387.74 318.01
Hainan 122.85 586.12 98.60 1080.36 269.50
Chongqing 1607.42 451.06 84.28 1551.42 175.67
Sichuan 2243.66 1716.00 229.22 4807.24 353.63
Guizhou 1437.16 1074.91 200.89 2280.56 466.35
Yunnan 2132.48 1394.83 249.53 3037.62 482.66
Shaanxi 345.04 787.00 176.44 1990.93 385.54
Gansu 3056.46 820.80 201.00 1050.48 342.23
Qinghai 1151.28 105.40 18.62 301.90 24.03
Ningxia 257.28 148.10 71.38 279.93 195.40
Xinjiang 333.79 484.47 462.94 1781.75 1188.75
Beijing 952.54 172.50 1580.32 5715.06 2267.74
Tianjin 25,792.49 272.55 5211.09 4969.18 11,986.47
Hebei 62,275.08 1390.79 26,324.62 13,597.26 68,542.18
Shanxi 15,846.41 396.20 13,455.75 7453.09 37,598.43
Inner
29,490.71 209.30 18,643.84 6818.88 55,674.47
Mongolia
Liaoning 31,860.75 702.30 16,365.09 9531.24 41,176.28
Secondary
Jilin 33,379.44 302.30 4361.34 4134.82 12,444.33
industry
Heilongjiang 15,416.11 306.80 5028.46 3615.21 13,362.38
Shanghai 10,023.36 335.67 5910.99 10,299.16 13,124.44
Jiangsu 122,170.38 2011.96 23,511.12 44,270.51 57,531.02
Zhejiang 46,904.76 1764.27 14,586.84 26,566.60 28,782.79
Anhui 51,712.11 1261.00 8993.78 15,337.90 23,300.02
Fujian 46,728.42 909.65 9505.96 20,581.74 20,043.12
Jiangxi 36,912.06 867.30 6257.06 10,939.83 17,535.92
Shandong 110,415.25 2116.70 31,515.23 28,310.92 78,277.87
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 19 of 21

Table A1. Cont.

Energy
Capital Stock Year-End GDP Carbon
Consumption
Industry DMU (100 Million Employment (100 Million Emissions
(10,000 Tons of
RMB) (10,000 People) RMB) (10,000 Tons)
Standard Coal)
Henan 66,301.25 1919.00 12,991.97 23,605.79 34,005.57
Hubei 52,501.13 841.00 9570.16 19,098.62 19,360.87
Hunan 42,405.87 810.04 7294.89 14,946.98 16,298.45
Guangdong 61,762.01 2471.62 19,156.09 43,546.43 38,158.48
Guangxi 23,448.31 492.00 20,749.68 7077.43 51,485.34
Hainan 2211.97 223.18 1209.50 1099.03 2923.80
Chongqing 26,747.95 434.06 4745.99 9496.84 10,378.17
Secondary
Sichuan 39,316.51 1334.70 11,205.84 17,365.33 17,497.41
industry
Guizhou 9762.50 376.07 4840.01 6058.45 10,696.94
Yunnan 15,193.68 426.80 7691.57 7961.58 12,485.36
Shaanxi 1627.87 330.00 7932.42 11,980.75 19,069.25
Gansu 21,560.75 233.70 4836.17 2862.42 9500.40
Qinghai 10,015.45 67.34 2989.38 1159.75 3525.22
Ningxia 5457.16 63.50 6212.28 1584.72 17,060.94
Xinjiang 5628.07 187.23 12,639.31 4795.50 31,797.70
Beijing 3845.40 1058.10 3709.73 29,542.53 5327.54
Tianjin 14,267.74 565.73 1305.52 8949.87 2734.29
Hebei 64,126.01 1460.52 3311.05 17,988.82 7617.26
Shanxi 24,430.66 839.60 2078.66 8748.87 4934.46
Inner
29,532.47 564.90 2365.04 8530.46 6408.66
Mongolia
Liaoning 32,789.99 1152.03 3415.71 13,200.44 6971.17
Jilin 27,067.56 687.90 1365.43 6304.68 3763.80
Heilongjiang 23,487.59 905.90 2419.36 6815.03 6203.85
Shanghai 6831.78 999.73 4388.84 27,752.28 8740.16
Jiangsu 74,062.87 1998.73 4928.86 51,064.73 10,012.72
Zhejiang 33,741.37 1704.01 3753.59 33,687.76 6703.15
Anhui 43,444.86 1776.10 2248.43 18,860.38 4816.71
Fujian 29,792.69 1322.76 2309.77 19,217.03 3921.21
Tertiary Jiangxi 39,892.46 1063.80 1783.07 11,760.11 4137.22
industry Shandong 86,292.23 2218.60 4900.96 37,640.17 10,351.40
Henan 76,920.30 2365.00 3508.91 26,018.01 7850.82
Hubei 40,491.86 1543.00 3812.62 22,920.60 6558.39
Hunan 34,773.71 1447.20 3481.25 21,158.19 6839.82
Guangdong 39,301.27 3378.02 7590.27 59,773.38 13,409.46
Guangxi 30,664.27 973.00 1733.38 10,771.97 2946.38
Hainan 1461.20 69.54 657.00 3129.54 1791.42
Chongqing 18,231.52 819.42 1734.91 12,557.51 3143.89
Sichuan 30,459.09 1838.30 3332.52 24,443.25 4030.67
Guizhou 11,228.78 598.42 2770.72 8430.33 5761.27
Yunnan 12,421.51 1168.75 2162.73 12,224.55 2944.92
Shaanxi 1582.38 948.00 2119.77 11,821.49 4377.22
Gansu 22,054.19 495.00 1153.90 4805.40 1987.67
Qinghai 11,561.99 157.46 513.07 1504.30 725.24
Ningxia 4879.75 173.70 403.43 1883.83 1003.21
Xinjiang 6096.11 658.42 1457.58 7019.86 3585.35
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 20 of 21

Table A2. China regional distribution.

Region Province
Northern coastal Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong
Southern coastal Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan
Eastern coastal Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang
Middle Yangtze River Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan
Middle Yellow River Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Henan, Shaanxi
Northwest Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang
Southwest Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan
Northeast Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang

References
1. Adoption of the Paris Agreement; Report No.FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1; UNFCCC: Bonn, Germany, 2015.
2. Development of EU ETS (2005–2020). Available online: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-
eu-ets/development-eu-ets-2005-2020_en (accessed on 17 December 2022).
3. Zheng, H.; Liu, S. The First Local Carbon Market in the Yangtze River Delta Was Tried out in Yueqing, and the First Batch of
37 Carbon Assets Were Traded on Site, Totaling More Than 10,000 Tons. Available online: http://www.yueqing.gov.cn/art/2021
/9/18/art_1322069_59171764.html (accessed on 11 October 2022).
4. CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion. Available online: https://yearbook.enerdata.net/co2/emissions-co2-data-from-fuel-
combustion.html (accessed on 6 January 2023).
5. Shojaei, T.; Mokhtar, A. Carbon Mitigation by Quota Allocation. J. Environ. Manag. 2022, 304, 114097. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
6. Tian, Y.; Lin, Z. Provincial Distribution of China’s Carbon Emission Rights and Assessment of Its Emission Reduction Potential
under the Paris Agreement. J. Nat. Resour. 2021, 36, 921–933. [CrossRef]
7. Dong, F.; Long, R.; Yu, B.; Wang, Y.; Li, J.; Wang, Y.; Dai, Y.; Yang, Q.; Chen, H. How Can China Allocate CO2 Reduction Targets at
the Provincial Level Considering Both Equity and Efficiency? Evidence from Its Copenhagen Accord Pledge. Resour. Conserv.
Recycl. 2018, 130, 31–43. [CrossRef]
8. Yang, B.; Li, X.; Su, Y.; Liu, C.; Xue, F. Carbon Quota Allocation at the Provincial Level in China under Principles of Equity and
Efficiency. Carbon Manag. 2020, 11, 11–23. [CrossRef]
9. Chen, F.; Zhao, T.; Xia, H.; Cui, X.; Li, Z. Allocation of Carbon Emission Quotas in Chinese Provinces Based on Super-SBM Model
and ZSG-DEA Model. Clean Technol. Environ. Policy 2021, 23, 2285–2301. [CrossRef]
10. Chen, Y.; Wang, M.; Feng, C.; Zhou, H.; Wang, K. Total Factor Energy Efficiency in Chinese Manufacturing Industry under
Industry and Regional Heterogeneities. Resour. Conserv. Recycl. 2021, 168, 105255. [CrossRef]
11. Feng, C.; Chu, F.; Ding, J.; Bi, G.; Liang, L. Carbon Emissions Abatement (CEA) Allocation and Compensation Schemes Based on
DEA. Omega 2015, 53, 78–89. [CrossRef]
12. Baumgärtner, S.; Dyckhoff, H.; Faber, M.; Proops, J.; Schiller, J. The Concept of Joint Production and Ecological Economics. Ecol.
Econ. 2001, 36, 365–372. [CrossRef]
13. Wen, L.; Zhang, E. Regional Allocation of Carbon Emissions in China Based on Zero Sum Gains Data Envelopment Analysis
Model. Environ. Eng. Res. 2016, 21, 91–98. [CrossRef]
14. Li, F.; Emrouznejad, A.; Yang, G.; Li, Y. Carbon Emission Abatement Quota Allocation in Chinese Manufacturing Industries: An
Integrated Cooperative Game Data Envelopment Analysis Approach. J. Oper. Res. Soc. 2020, 71, 1259–1288. [CrossRef]
15. Groot, L. Carbon Lorenz Curves. Resour. Energy Econ. 2010, 32, 45–64. [CrossRef]
16. Jorgenson, A.; Schor, J.; Huang, X. Income Inequality and Carbon Emissions in the United States: A State-Level Analysis,
1997–2012. Ecol. Econ. 2017, 134, 40–48. [CrossRef]
17. Kordrostami, S. Efficiency Decomposition in Parallel Production Systems with Shared Sources on Interval Data: An Illustration of
Iranian Banks. Int. J. Biomath. 2014, 7, 1450059. [CrossRef]
18. Esmaeilzadeh, A.; Kazemi Matin, R. Multi-Period Efficiency Measurement of Network Production Systems. Measurement 2019,
134, 835–844. [CrossRef]
19. Gomes, E.G.; Lins, M.P.E. Modelling Undesirable Outputs with Zero Sum Gains Data Envelopment Analysis Models. J. Oper. Res.
Soc. 2008, 59, 616–623. [CrossRef]
20. Fang, K.; Zhang, Q.; Long, Y.; Yoshida, Y.; Sun, L.; Zhang, H.; Dou, Y.; Li, S. How Can China Achieve Its Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions by 2030? A Multi-Criteria Allocation of China’s Carbon Emission Allowance. Appl. Energy 2019, 241,
380–389. [CrossRef]
21. Yang, M.; An, Q.; Ding, T.; Yin, P.; Liang, L. Carbon Emission Allocation in China Based on Gradually Efficiency Improvement
and Emission Reduction Planning Principle. Ann. Oper. Res. 2019, 278, 123–139. [CrossRef]
22. Mahdiloo, M.; Ngwenyama, O.; Scheepers, R.; Tamaddoni, A. Managing Emissions Allowances of Electricity Producers to
Maximize CO2 Abatement: DEA Models for Analyzing Emissions and Allocating Emissions Allowances. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 2018,
205, 244–255. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2023, 15, 2632 21 of 21

23. Kong, Y.; Zhao, T.; Yuan, R.; Chen, C. Allocation of Carbon Emission Quotas in Chinese Provinces Based on Equality and
Efficiency Principles. J. Clean. Prod. 2019, 211, 222–232. [CrossRef]
24. Zhan, D. Allocation of Carbon Emission Quotas among Provinces in China: Efficiency, Fairness and Balanced Allocation. Environ.
Sci. Pollut. Res. 2022, 29, 21692–21704. [CrossRef]
25. Cheng, Y.; Gu, B.; Tan, X.; Yan, H.; Sheng, Y. Allocation of Provincial Carbon Emission Allowances under China’s 2030 Carbon
Peak Target: A Dynamic Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis Method. Sci. Total Environ. 2022, 837, 155798. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
26. Wu, J.; Zhu, Q.; Liang, L. CO2 Emissions and Energy Intensity Reduction Allocation over Provincial Industrial Sectors in China.
Appl. Energy 2016, 166, 282–291. [CrossRef]
27. Li, R.; Tang, B. Initial Carbon Quota Allocation Methods of Power Sectors: A China Case Study. Nat. Hazards 2016, 84, 1075–1089.
[CrossRef]
28. Gan, L.; Ren, H.; Cai, W.; Wu, K.; Liu, Y.; Liu, Y. Allocation of Carbon Emission Quotas for China’s Provincial Public Buildings
Based on Principles of Equity and Efficiency. Build. Environ. 2022, 216, 108994. [CrossRef]
29. Kao, C. Efficiency Measurement for Parallel Production Systems. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 2009, 196, 1107–1112. [CrossRef]
30. lo Storto, C. Measuring the Efficiency of the Urban Integrated Water Service by Parallel Network DEA: The Case of Italy. J. Clean.
Prod. 2020, 276, 123170. [CrossRef]
31. Lei, X.; Li, Y.; Xie, Q.; Liang, L. Measuring Olympics Achievements Based on a Parallel DEA Approach. Ann. Oper. Res. 2015, 226,
379–396. [CrossRef]
32. Lin, R.; Tu, C. Cross-Efficiency Evaluation and Decomposition with Directional Distance Function in Series and Parallel Systems.
Expert Syst. Appl. 2021, 177, 114933. [CrossRef]
33. Gan, L.; Wang, L.; Hu, Z.; Lev, B.; Gang, J.; Lan, H. Do Geologic Hazards Affect the Sustainability of Rural Development?
Evidence from Rural Areas in China. J. Clean. Prod. 2022, 339, 130693. [CrossRef]
34. Xiong, B.; Wu, J.; An, Q.; Chu, J.; Liang, L. Resource Allocation of a Parallel System with Interaction Consideration Using a DEA
Approach: An Application to Chinese Input–Output Table. INFOR Inf. Syst. Oper. Res. 2018, 56, 298–316. [CrossRef]
35. Liu, H.; Yang, R.; Wang, Y.; Zhu, Q. Measuring Performance of Road Transportation Industry in China in Terms of Integrated
Environmental Efficiency in View of Streaming Data. Sci. Total Environ. 2020, 727, 138675. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
36. Ang, S.; Liu, P.; Yang, F. Intra-Organizational and Inter-Organizational Resource Allocation in Two-Stage Network Systems.
Omega 2020, 91, 102009. [CrossRef]
37. Xiong, X.; Yang, G.; Zhou, D.; Wang, Z. How to Allocate Multi-Period Research Resources? Centralized Resource Allocation for
Public Universities in China Using a Parallel DEA-Based Approach. Socio-Econ. Plan. Sci. 2022, 82, 101317. [CrossRef]
38. Feng, C.; Ying, S.; Xiao, X.; Ding, J.; Liang, L. Study of Allocation and Compensation of Regional Carbon Emission Right in
Zhejiang Province. J. Syst. Eng. 2020, 35, 577–587.
39. Zhou, P.; Ang, B.W.; Poh, K.L. Measuring Environmental Performance under Different Environmental DEA Technologies. Energy
Econ. 2008, 30, 1–14. [CrossRef]
40. Fang, G.; Liu, M.; Tian, L.; Fu, M.; Zhang, Y. Optimization Analysis of Carbon Emission Rights Allocation Based on Energy
Justice—The Case of China. J. Clean. Prod. 2018, 202, 748–758. [CrossRef]
41. Berne, R.; Stiefel, L. The Measurement of Equity in School Finance: Conceptual, Methodological, and Empirical Dimensions; Johns
Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD, USA, 1984; ISBN 978-0-8018-3148-5.
42. Coulter, P.B. Measuring the Inequity of Urban Public Services Methodological Discussion with Applications. Policy Stud. J. 1980,
8, 683–698. [CrossRef]
43. Mandell, M.B. Modelling Effectiveness-Equity Trade-Offs in Public Service Delivery Systems. Manag. Sci. 1991, 37, 467–482.
[CrossRef]
44. Wu, G.; Liu, J.; Yang, L. Dynamic Evolution of China’s Agricultural Carbon Emission Intensity and Carbon Offset Potential. China
Popul. Resour. Environ. 2021, 31, 69–78.
45. Zhang, J.; Wu, G.; Zhang, J. The Estimation of China’ s Provincial Capital Stock: 1952–2000. Econ. Res. J. 2004, 10, 35–44.
46. Zong, Z.; Liao, Z. Estimates of Fixed Capital Stock by Sector and Region: 1978–2011. J. Guizhou Univ. Financ. Econ. 2014, 3, 8–16.
47. Li, R. The Calculation of China’s Capital Stock of Three Industries. Humanit. Soc. Sci. J. Hainan Univ. 2010, 28, 47–52. [CrossRef]
48. IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Available online: https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/
vol2.html (accessed on 24 November 2022).
49. GB/T 4754—2017: 2017; Industrial Classification for National Economic Activities. National Bureau of Statistics: Beijing, China,
2017.
50. Xu, X.; Zhao, T.; Liu, N.; Kang, J. Changes of Energy-Related GHG Emissions in China: An Empirical Analysis from Sectoral
Perspective. Appl. Energy 2014, 132, 298–307. [CrossRef]
51. Notice of the State Council on the Issuance of the 13th Five-Year Plan for Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Available
online: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-11/04/content_5128619.htm (accessed on 6 January 2023).

Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual
author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to
people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.