B2000632 (Chanic Suining)
B2000632 (Chanic Suining)
B2000632 (Chanic Suining)
For the longest time, the existence of tort of negligence has helped numerous
victims in getting compensation from the person who have caused them damage or
loss. The principle case for negligence under the law of tort is the 1932 case of
Donoghue v Stevenson where initially it was held that Donoghue was not able to sue
the manufacturer of the ginger beer because she was not the party who have a
contract with the company. However, this changed when the neighbour principle was
introduced by the house of lords which said that even in the absence of a written
sometimes difficult to prove under negligence which is why there are various elements
which the parties need to fulfil in order to sue under negligence and also to claim for
damages. The most important element is that the party must prove that the defendant
actually owed them a duty of care, for example, do road users owe a duty of care
towards other road users, or do medical practitioners owe a duty of care to their
patients, and so much more. The other two elements to prove are whether the
defendant have breached that duty of care and if the party incurred loss and damages
as a result of the breach. Going back to the statement given in the question, it was
said that the mental integrity of another is also crucial under duty of care, nevertheless
there are also other duties which the court find it hard to accept or to consider them
as a duty. Take psychiatric injury for instance, the court would only consider some of
the injury to be recovered if it is a really bad case of negligence. Hence, this paper will
focus on psychiatric injury under tort of negligence and under what circumstances
would the court accept them to be recovered. We will discuss the various victims whom
are able to claim damages under psychiatric injury and also the different principles
which the court consider to aid in making decisions for cases of psychiatric illnesses.
Primary Victim
classified under psychiatric injury which are primary victim and secondary victim.
Primary victims are those who were involved in the incident directly and whose safety
was put in danger whilst being in that incident. On top of that, physical event stressors
significant factor in proving whether a primary victim is within the "zone of danger" due
to an external physical stressor event, which identifies whether they would suffer from
physical harm, injury, or any mental disorder. Moreover, this primary victim have to be
of normal mental fortitude for the shock or illness to be foreseeable. This is because if
it was a victim of a not normal mental fortitude, it is very much hard to foresee whether
they would be shock or not, since the way they think is different than others. This can
be illustrated by the leading case for primary victim of Page v Smith (1996), where it
was said that it was reasonably foreseeable that Mr page would sustain physical injury
physical harm that was foreseeable, then the victim is entitled to compensation for
both of their physical injury and any recognised psychiatric disorder brought on by the
Secondary Victim
On the other hand, secondary victims are individuals who suffered a psychological
while not being directly involved in the event. This could also include rescuers or any
involuntary participants. If any of these victim were not exposed to any physical harm
then they would automatically be classified as secondary. However, it should be
highlighted that even in cases where the primary victim has not suffered any sort of
bodily or psychological harm, the victim may still be able to make a claim as a
secondary victim. The primary consideration in this matter is whether the defendant
breached their duty towards the secondary victim, ultimately causing to them to
suffer from damages. The main psychiatric injury which are recognised by the courts
However, one of the issues which the court face for cases under psychiatric injury is
that not all injury are recognised by the law, and they would only accept the harm if it
is a medically recognised condition. Consequently, this has cause the law which
governs cases for secondary cases to be inconsistent with the judgements, and the
lack of principle for this makes it incoherent, inconsistent, and produces uncertainty in
the law. Nevertheless, the reason the court do not consider all psychiatric injury to be
recovered is to avoid the society into thinking that everyone is able to sue each other
on every small matter which would lead to the court being overwhelmed by cases and
were put in place by the court to stop floodgates, in order to provide the courts some
kind of control over claims from piling up. These control mechanism will be discussed
further below.
These control mechanism which essentially acts as policy reasonings for the court
to determine which claim can be accepted under psychiatric injury. One of the control
mechanism had already been discussed under primary victim above is foreseeability
of the harm, however, it is quite different for secondary victim. It was established
that secondary victim must show the foreseeability of psychiatric illness among a
involved another party who was murdered or hurt. Similarly to primary victim
mentioned above, the injury must also be foreseeable by a person with a normal
intelligence, but the condition should be one that is recognisable. This was
Ronayne, where the court of appeal stated that the external event must be so bad or
“horrendous” that even an ordinary person would reasonably believe that they would
have suffered from the said psychiatric injury. The next control mechanism is proximity
in terms of closeness of the relationship. The leading case for this is the case of
Alcock in 1989, where over 400 people injured and 95 people died caused by
stampede and crowd crush. Here the house of lords stated that claimant and the
primary victim who has a close tie of love and affection between them are able to claim
under psychiatric injury. For example, parents, children, and rescuers too are allowed
to recover however siblings, and distant relative is not considered to have a close tie
of love and affection. The next control mechanism is proximity in time and space. The
principle under this is that the claimant must either be present when the accident
occurs or discover its immediate aftereffects within a relatively short time. The decision
in the case of McLoughlin v O’Brien set a new precedent wherein watching the
aftermath was akin to witnessing it at the same time it occurred as long as it is within
the scope of proximity of time and scope. Using the stampede case earlier, it was said
that people who witnessed it in the television would not be able to claim damages,
however you can if it was a live broadcast and nothing had been altered or edited. In
the case of Rapley v P & O European Ferries Ltd (1991), it limits the claim for
rescuers, where the claim for psychiatric injury was not accepted because the claimant
was present at the scene three days after the event. It was said that this went beyond
the scope of time which is why the claimant is unable to claim for damages. The last
control mechanism is direct perception. Here, the court decided that the claimant had
to have immediately witnessed the accident through their own "unaided sense". This
is quite similar to the proximity of time and space under the case of McLoughlin,
where the court still accept the psychiatric injury suffered by the wife after she saw the
husband’s and children’s dead body right after the accident in the hospital.
Referencing from above, it can be said that there are some uncertainty and
inconsistency in the law for psychiatric injury under tort of negligence, which is why
there have been a proposal to reform the law for psychiatric injury stated in law
commission report. In the report, it was stated that there should be a statutory duty of
care where it laid down clearly the factors, people and circumstances under which can
be accepted by the court. This way, at least there’s a clear statutory guideline on to
how the courts should manage these cases. However, the report did mention that the
rules laid down under Page v Smith for primary victims would not be change because
it is fair that the victim is able to recover if it was caused by the defendant’s breach of
duty of care and if the harm was foreseeable. However, the reform focus more on
keeping only foreseeability of the injury or death for proximity in terms of closeness in
relationships, without taking into consideration the proximity of time and space
because there had been a lot of cases where the outcome was unfair just because the
claimant was late for a few hours or days or not being near the scene of when it
happened, and because of that they were unable to claim under psychiatric injury.
Another important reform is that direct perception is no longer needed because some
people would be affected differently and just because they didn’t have first-hand
encounter with the event, or was there to witness the death, does not mean that the
relationships, where there would be categories of relationship stated in the statute that
is able to claim damages. Other than just parents, and children, siblings and those
who have lived for more than 2 years including same sex relationship is also covered
in the statute.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I strongly feel that the reform is much needed because there is too
many inconsistencies in the judgements, and the law as illustrated by the cases
mentioned above. Moreover, as stated above, this would provide the court with a
also allow everyone to be able to recover under psychiatric injury fairly without feeling