G.R. No. L-39087 April 27, 1984 APPEALED house (p. 20, tsn.

, March 21, 1974;

DECISION SI AFFIRMED pp. 38, 47, 49, tsn., April 25, 1974).

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- At about 2:00 o'clock in the

appellee, afternoon of Jan. 3, 1974, Pastora
vs. Simon went out to the field in order
ROGELIO DE JESUS y QUIZON, alias to plant palay, leaving her daughter
"ELIONG," accused-appellant. Clara Mina alone in the house. Her
husband (Clara's father), had gone
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. to a place called Soliven four days
before, while the other members of
the household had also left for the
Rafael D. Abierra Jr. for accused-appellant.
field (pp. 17, 18, 19, tsn., March 21,
1974).

That afternoon, Clara Mina was

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1 seated on top of a trunk when
Rogelio de Jesus suddenly entered
The accused, Rogelio de Jesus y Quizon appeals the house, carried her in his arms
from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, First and laid her on the floor (pp. 8, 13,
Judicial District in its Criminal Case No. CCC-1-80, tsn., March 21, 1974). Objecting to
Isabela (II-329) finding him guilty beyond reasonable what was being done to her, Clara
doubt, of the crime of rape as defined and penalized gave an outcry "Madi! Madi!" (which
under Article 335, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal translated means "I don't like! I don't
Code and sentencing him, after appreciating in his like!") Rogelio, ignoring her cries,
favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary removed her panties as well as his
surrender, to suffer the penalty of reclusion own trousers. He lay on top of her,
perpetua to indemnify the offended party Clara Mina inserted his penis into her vagina
y Simon in the amount of P10,000.00 plus another and performed the sexual act (pp. 7,
P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, 8, 9, 13,14, 15, tsn., Id.).
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. Meanwhile, Pastora Simon, who had
already walked some 150 meters
The facts are as follows: têñ.£îhqw⣠away from their house, when
sensing it was about to rain, hurried
Clara Mina, an unmarried woman of back to the house to get cellophane
28, lived with her parents in barrio with which to shield her from the rain
Amistad, Alicia, Isabela (p. 7, tsn., (p. 17, tsn., March 21, 1974). Upon
March 21, 1974). her return to the house, she found
Rogelio de Jesus naked lying on top
Clara Mina, however, is feeble- of Clara Mina whose legs were
minded. She is unable to comb her spread apart (p. 19, tsn., Id.).
hair, bathe herself and wash her Seeing them in that position, she
clothes (pp. 21, 31, 32, tsn., March rushed to the kitchen to get a club
21, 1974). Because of her mental but Rogelio spotted her and ran
condition, she just stayed in the away. (p. 20, tsn., Id.).
house, doing no household chores
(p. 31, tsn., Id.). The barrio captain, Glicerio
Guzman, to whom Pastora Simon
The accused, Rogelio de Jesus, a had immediately reported the
19-year old farmer, who lived in the incident, looked for Rogelio but
house of his sister some 15 meters failed to locate him (p. 20, tsn.,
away from the victim's house, knew March 21, 1974; pp. 10, 20, tsn.,
of Clara's mental infirmity, and has March 22, 1974).
often seen her left alone in the

Page 1 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Returning from the barrio captain's before Alicia Municipal Judge Flor
house, Pastora Simon investigated Egipto on January 5, 1974,
Clara, who revealed to her that she admitting that he had sexual
was carried away from the trunk intercourse once with Clara Mina,
where she was seated, then forcibly but denying that he raped her (p. 7,
laid on the floor to have sexual record).
intercourse with Rogelio (pp. 20, 21,
tsn., March 21, 1974). The accused denied that he had forced the
complainant to have sexual intercourse with him and
The next day — January 4, 1974 — that he only inserted his forefinger inside the
Clara Mina, accompanied by her complainant's private parts. He testified that he
parents, denounced Rogelio de admitted having sexual intercourse once with
Jesus to the police authorities (p. complainant in his affidavit 1 because of
20, tsn., March 22, 1974). Clara maltreatment employed upon him by the jail guards.
Mina was examined by Fernando
Babaran, Municipal Health Officer of While the affidavit executed by the accused is not
Echague, lsabela at the Southern admissible in evidence for lack of evidence showing
Isabela Emergency Hospital, the that the accused during the custodial investigation
municipal health officer of Alicia was apprised of his constitutional rights under Art.
being then on leave (p. 6, tsn., IV, Sec. 20, of the New Constitution, 2 still there is
March 22, 1974). The medical sufficient evidence on record that the accused had
certificate, Exhibit "C", issued by Dr. performed the sexual act to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Babaran, shows the following
findings: 1. The accused testified that he
merely inserted his forefinger into
(1) hymenal lacerations at 3 o'clock, the complainant's vagina to cure her
8 o'clock and 11 o'clock. of her mental malady. The records,
however show, from the testimony
(2) vagina admits one finger with of both the prosecution and the
ease. Two fingers with difficulty. defense, that the accused laid on
top of complainant. If appellant's
(3) fresh perineal abrasion. purpose was merely to insert his
forefinger into the complainant's
vagina, then there is no necessity of
(4) smear, not done due to lack of
lying on top of complainant.
microscope.

2. Complainant testified, contrary to

(5) contusion — left temporal area.
the testimony of the accused, that
Lesions to heal within one week. (p.
the latter brought out his penis and
3, Record).
inserted it into her vagina which
pained her a lot.
According to Dr. Babaran, the
abrasions were possibly inflicted the
3. The hymenal lacerations and the
day prior to the examination and that
fresh perineal abrasions in
the contusion on the left temporal
complainant's vagina corroborated
area of the girl's head could have
her testimony that the accused had
been caused when her head was
sexual intercourse with her.
pushed against a hard object (pp.
11, 12, tsn., March 22, 1974).
The accused assailed the competence of the
complainant as a witness on the ground that being
Subsequently, Rogelio de Jesus
feeble minded she is not a competent witness in
was surrendered by his brother-in-
contemplation of the rules and therefore her
law, a councilor to the Alicia Police
testimony should have been rejected by the lower
Department. He executed an
court.
affidavit, Exhibit "D" subscribed

Page 2 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
That the complainant was feeble-minded and had complainant had submitted to the
displayed difficulty in comprehending the questions sexual act without resistance (p. 9
propounded on her is an undisputed fact. Appellant's Brief) such cannot be
construed as consent on her part, so
However, there is no showing that she could not as to preclude it from being rape.
convey her Ideas by words or signs. It appears in Incapable of giving consent, she
the records that complainant gave sufficiently could not thus consent in
intelligent answers to the questions propounded by intelligently. 5
the court and the counsels. The court is satisfied that
the complainant can perceive and transmit in her WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED
own way her own perceptions to others. She is a in toto.
competent witness.
G.R. No. 188956               March 20, 2013
Having sexual intercourse with a feeble-minded PETITION GRANTED
woman is rape. The offense is described under
paragraph 2 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
Code, that is, the offender having carnal knowledge RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS
of a woman deprived of reason. The Court, in the SYSTEM, Petitioner,
case of People vs. Daing, 3 said: vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
The offense committed by appellant is rape
described under paragraph 2 of Article 335 of the DECISION
Revised Penal Code, that is, the offender having
carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason. VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The deprivation of reason contemplated by law does
not need to be complete. Mental abnormality or
deficiency is enough. So it was held by the Supreme Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under
Court of Spain that a man having carnal knowledge Rule 45 assailing the Orders dated February 17,
of a woman whose mental faculties are not normally 20091 and July 9, 20092 of the Regional Trial Court
developed or who is suffering from hemiplegia and (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68, in Land Registration
mentally backward or who is an Idiot commits the Case No. N-11517.
crime of rape. ...
The first Order reconsidered and recalled the
Being feeble-minded, complainant is incapable of Decision3 of the RTC dated April 21, 2008, which
thinking and reasoning like any normal human being granted the- application for land registration of
and not being able to think and reason from birth as petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines
aforesaid, and undoubtedly devoid or deficient in Retirement and Separation Benefits System. The
those instincts and other mental faculties that second Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration
characterize the average and normal mortal, she filed by the petitioner.
really has no will that is free and voluntary of her
own; hers is a defective will, which is incapable of Petitioner was "created under Presidential Decree
freely and voluntarily giving such consent so (P.D.) No. 361,4 as amended, and was designed to
necessary and essential in lifting coitus from the establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous
place of criminality. 4 In this connection, the Solicitor financial support to the Armed Forces of the
General properly stated: têñ.£îhqw⣠Philippines military retirement system as provided for
in Republic Act No. 340."5
That complainant possesses such a
low mental capacity, to the extent of Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of
being incapable of giving consent, Title6 over three parcels of land located in West
could be gleaned from the fact, as Bicutan, Taguig City, before the RTC of Pasig City.
testified to by her mother, that she is The said application was later docketed as LRC
unable to do the simple tasks of Case No. N-11517 and raffled to Branch 68 of the
combing her hair and bathing court a quo.
herself. Thus, even granting it to be
true, as counsel has insinuated, that

Page 3 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
These three parcels of land constitute a land grant As soon as this Decision shall have become final
by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, and after payment of the required fees, let the
issued by former President Fidel V. Ramos on May corresponding Decree be issued in the name of
8, 1998.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Separation Benefits System.
The application was filed by Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta
(Mr. Azcueta), the then Executive Vice President Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
and Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, who the Solicitor General, Land Registration Authority,
was duly authorized to do so by the Board of Land Management Bureau and the Registry of
Trustees of the petitioner, as evidenced by a Deeds, Taguig City, Metro Manila.
notarized Secretary’s Certificate8 dated August 18,
2003. SO ORDERED.12

After due posting and publication of the requisite In response, the Office of the Solicitor General
notices, and since no oppositor registered any (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 dated
oppositions after the petitioner met the jurisdictional May 12, 2008, wherein it argued that the petitioner
requirements, the court a quo issued an order of failed to prove that it has personality to own property
general default against the whole world, and the in its name and the petitioner failed to show that the
petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. 9 witness it presented was duly authorized to appear
for and in its behalf.
The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms.
Alma P. Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice President and On June 2, 2008, petitioner filed its
Head of its Asset Enhancement Office. She testified, Comment/Opposition.14
inter alia, that: among her main duties is to ensure
that the properties and assets of petitioner, On February 17, 2009, the court a quo issued the
especially real property, are legally titled and freed of assailed Order granting the Motion for
liens and encumbrances; the subject properties were Reconsideration of the OSG on the ground that the
acquired by the petitioner through a land grant under petitioner failed to prosecute its case. The
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218; prior to dispositive portion of the assailed Order reads:
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of
the Philippines was in open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation WHEREFORE, premises considered, the OSG’s
of the subject properties in the concept of an owner motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The
to the exclusion of the world since time immemorial; Court’s Decision of April 21, 2008 is hereby
petitioner, after the Republic of the Philippines RECONSIDERED and RECALLED, and a new one
transferred ownership of the subject properties to it, issued DISMISSING this Application for Registration
assumed open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, of Title for failure to prosecute.
and peaceful possession and occupation, and
exercised control over them in the concept of owner, SO ORDERED.15
and likewise assumed the obligations of an owner;
petitioner has been paying the real estate taxes on The Motion for Reconsideration16 of petitioner was
the subject properties; and the subject properties are denied by the court a quo in the other assailed
not mortgaged, encumbered, or tenanted.10 Order17 dated July 9, 2009. Hence, this petition.

Subsequently, petitioner submitted its Formal Offer The issue to be resolved in the present case is
of Evidence,11 following which, the court a quo whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and
granted the application in a Decision dated April 21, jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioner’s
2008. The dispositive portion of the said decision application for land registration on the ground that
reads: petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case.

WHEREFORE, finding the Petition meritorious, the We answer in the affirmative.

Court DECLARES, CONFIRMS AND ORDERS the
registration of AFPRSBS’ title thereto. The reason of the court a quo in dismissing
petitioner’s application for land registration on the

Page 4 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
ground of failure to prosecute was the lack of evidence, and as a result, the RTC rendered
authority on the part of Ms. Aban to testify on behalf judgment in its favor.
of the petitioner.
Second, the petitioner did not fail to prosecute the
However, Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of subject case considering that it appeared during trial,
Civil Procedure, as amended, provides only three presented Ms. Aban, who gave competent testimony
instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case for as regards the titling of the subject lots, and the
failure to prosecute: court a quo never held petitioner liable for any delay
in prosecuting the subject case.
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.–If,
for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to Third, a perusal of the records would demonstrate
appear on the date of the presentation of his that the petitioner did not fail to comply with the
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to Rules or any order of the court a quo, as there is no
prosecute his action for an unreasonable ruling on the part of the latter to this effect.
length of time, or to comply with these Rules
or any order of the court, the complaint may Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quo’s
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant ruling that the petitioner failed to prosecute the
or upon the court’s own motion, without subject case, because none of the grounds provided
prejudice to the right of the defendant to in the Rules for dismissing a case due to failure to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in prosecute is present. That the RTC dismissed the
a separate action. This dismissal shall have application for land registration of the petitioner for
the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, failure to prosecute after the petitioner presented all
unless otherwise declared by the court. its evidence and after said court has rendered a
decision in its favor, is highly irregular.
Jurisprudence has elucidated on this matter in De
Knecht v. CA:18 At this juncture, it would be appropriate to discuss
the basis of the court a quo in dismissing the
An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute petitioner’s application for land registration for failure
in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff to prosecute – the alleged lack of authority of the
fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to witness, Ms. Aban, to testify on behalf of the
prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of petitioner.
time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of
Court or any order of the court. Once a case is The assailed Order held as follows:
dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect
of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to With things now stand, the Court believes that
be with prejudice to the filing of another action OSG was correct in observing that indeed the
unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. AFPRSBS did not present its duly authorized
In other words, unless there be a qualification in the representative to prosecute this case. And the
order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the records support the observation since
dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on AFPRSBS presented only one witness – Mrs.
the merits and is with prejudice. (Emphasis Aban. In view of the foregoing the Court is left
supplied.) without choice than to grant OSG’s motion for
reconsideration.19
Clearly, the court a quo’s basis for pronouncing that
the petitioner failed to prosecute its case is not However, there is no substantive or procedural
among those grounds provided by the Rules. It had rule which requires a witness for a party to
no reason to conclude that the petitioner failed to present some form of authorization to testify as a
prosecute its case. First, the petitioner did not fail to
witness for the party presenting him or her.
appear at the time of the trial. In fact, the Decision of
the RTC dated April 21, 2008 ordering the
registration of petitioner’s title to the subject lots No law or jurisprudence would support the
shows that the petitioner appeared before the Court conclusion that such omission can be considered as
and was represented by counsel. Records would a failure to prosecute on the part of the party
also reveal that the petitioner was able to present its presenting such witness.

Page 5 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
All that the Rules require of a witness is that the to prosecute because petitioner’s witness did not
witness possesses all the qualifications and none of possess an authorization to testify on behalf of
the disqualifications provided therein. Rule 130 of petitioner. The court a quo also erred when it
the Rules on Evidence provides: concluded that the subject case was not prosecuted
by a duly authorized representative of the petitioner.
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.– The OSG and the court a quo did not question the
Except as provided in the next succeeding Verification/Certification21 of the application, and
section, all persons who can perceive, and neither did they question the authority of Mr. Azcueta
perceiving, can make known their perception to to file the subject application on behalf of the
others, may be witnesses. petitioner. Case records would reveal that the
application was signed and filed by Mr. Azcueta in
his capacity as the Executive Vice President and
xxxx
Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, as
authorized by petitioner’s Board of Trustees. 22 The
Cavili v. Judge Florendo20 speaks of the authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject application
disqualifications: was established by a Secretary’s
Certificate23 attached to the said application. The
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific asseveration that the subject case was not
disqualifications.1âwphi1 Section 19 disqualifies prosecuted by a duly authorized representative of
those who are mentally incapacitated and children the petitioner is thus unfounded.
whose tender age or immaturity renders them
incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides Interestingly enough, the respondent itself agrees
for disqualification based on conflicts of interest or with the petitioner that the dismissal of the subject
on relationship. Section 21 provides for application by the court a quo on the ground of
disqualifications based on privileged failure to prosecute due to lack of authority of the
communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be sole witness of the petitioner is unfounded and
a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states without legal basis.24
the grounds when a witness may be impeached by
the party against whom he was called.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court
x x x The specific enumeration of disqualified dated February 17, 2009 and July 9, 2009 are
witnesses excludes the operation of causes of REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It Regional Trial Court dated April 21, 2008, granting
is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the the Application for Registration of Title of the
construction of statutes that an express exception, petitioner is hereby REINSTATED and UPHELD.
exemption, or saving clause excludes other
exceptions. (In Re Estate of Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167)
No pronouncement as to costs.
As a general rule, where there are express
exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the
operation of a statute and no other exception will be SO ORDERED.
implied. (Sutherland on Statutory Construction,
Fourth Edition, Vol. 2A, p. 90) The Rules should not G.R. No. 209342
be interpreted to include an exception not embodied
therein. (Emphasis supplied.) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
A reading of the pertinent law and jurisprudence CRISENTE PEPAÑO NUÑEZ, Accused-Appellant
would show that Ms. Aban is qualified to testify as a
witness for the petitioner since she possesses the DECISION
qualifications of being able to perceive and being
able to make her perceptions known to others. LEONEN, J.:
Furthermore, she possesses none of the
disqualifications described above.
To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the
prosecution to present a positive identification by a
The RTC clearly erred in ordering the dismissal of witness during trial due to the frailty of human
the subject application for land registration for failure memory. It must also show that the identified person

Page 6 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
matches the original description made by that said Felix V. Regencia, Alexander C. Diaz and Byron
witness when initially reporting the crime. The G. Dimatulac on the different parts of their bodies,
unbiased character of the process of identification by thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which directly
witnesses must likewise be shown. caused their deaths.4

Criminal prosecution may result in the severe At first, only Marciales and Nabia were arrested,
consequences of deprivation of liberty, property, arraigned, and tried. In its December 9, 2005
and, where capital punishment is imposed, life. Decision,5 the Regional Trial Court found the offense
Prosecution that relies solely on eyewitness of robbery with homicide as alleged in the
identification must be approached meticulously, Information, along with Marciales and Nabia's
cognizant of the inherent frailty of human memory. conspiracy with Pobre and Jun to commit this
Eyewitnesses who have previously made offense, to have been established. Thus, it
admissions that they could not identify the pronounced Marciales and Nabia guilty beyond
perpetrators of a crime but, years later and after a reasonable doubt and sentenced them to
highly suggestive process of presenting suspects, death.6 The case against Pobrn and Jun was
contradict themselves and claim that they can archived subject to revival upon their apprehension.7
identify the perpetrator with certainty are grossly
wanting in credibility. Prosecution that relies solely On July 2, 2006, accused-appellant Nunez was
on these eyewitnesses' testimonies fails to discharge apprehended by the Philippine National Police
its burden of proving an accused's guilt beyond Regional Intelligence Office on the premise that he
reasonable doubt. was the same ''Paul Pobre" identified in the
Inforn1ation. Upon arraigru11ent, Nuñez moved that
This resolves an appeal from the assailed June 26, the case against him be dismissed as he was not the
2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. "Paul Pobre" charged in the Information. However,
CR HC No. 04474, which affirmed with modification prosecution witnesses identified him as one (1) of
the February 24, 2010 Decision 2 of Branch 67, the alleged robbers and his motion to dismiss was
Regional Trial Court, Binangonan, Rizal. This denied. The information was then atnended to state
Regional Trial Court Decision found accused- Nuñez's name in lieu of "Paul Pobre."8
appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez (Nuñez) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. During trial, the prosecution manifested that it would
be adopting the evidence already presented in the
In an Information, George Marciales (Marciales), course of Marciales and Nabia's trial. Apart from this,
Orly Nabia (Nabia), Paul Pobre (Pobre), and a it also recalled prosecution witnesses Ronalyn Cruz
certain alias "Jun'' (Jun) were charged with robbery (Cruz) and Relen Perez (Perez). In their testimonies,
with homicide, under Article 294(1) of the Revised they both positively identified Nunez as among the
Penal Code,3 as follows: perpetrators of the crime.9

That on or about the 22nd of June 2000, in the Cruz's testimony recounted that in the evening of
Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, June 22, 2000, she was working as an attendant at
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this the Caltex gasoline station mentioned in the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Infonnation. She was then sitting near the
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and g1;1,soline pumps with her co-employees, the
aiding one another, armed with handguns, by means deceased Byron G. Dimatulac (Dimatulac) and
of violence against or intimidation of the persons of prosecution witness Pierez. They noticed that the
Felix V. Regencia, Alexander C. Diaz and Byron G. station's office was being held up. There were two
Dimatulac, with intent to gain, did then and there, (2) persons poking guns at and asking for money
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry from the deceased Alex Diaz (Diaz) and Felix
away the money amounting to ₱5,000.00 belonging Regencia (Regencia). Regencia hancied money to
to the Caltex gasoline station owned by the family of one (1) of the robbers while the other robber
Felix V. Regencia to their damage and prejudice; reached for a can of oil. Regencia considered this as
that on the occasion of the said robbery and to enough of a distraction to put up a fight. Regencia
insure their purpose, the said accused, conspiring, and Diaz grappled with the robbers. In the scuffle,
confederating and mutually helping and aiding one Diaz shouted. At the sound of this, two (2) men ran
another, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, to the office. The first was identified to be Marciales
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and the second, according to Cruz, was Nunez.

Page 7 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Dimatulac also ran to the office to assist Regencia along with Marciales and Nabia robbed the Tayuman
and Oiaz. Marciales then shot Dimatulac while Caltex gas station of ₱5,000.00 and some cans of
Nunez shot Diaz. Cruz and Perez sought refuge in a oil. For such booty, he[,] along with his fellow
computer shop. About 10 to 15 minutes later, they thieves[,] shot and killed Felix Regencia, Alexander
returned to the gasoline station where they found C. Diaz and Byron G. Dimatulac. He was positively
Diaz already dead, Dimatulac gasping for breath, and unequivocally identified by Renel Cruz and
and Regencia wounded and crawling. By then, the Ronalyn Perez as [one] of the perpetrators even as
robbers were rushing towards the highway.10 he tried to hide behind another name and was
arrested later. He ran but could not hide as the long
Perez's testimony recounted that in the evening of arm of the law finally caught up with him. As a
June 22, 2000, she was working as a sales clerk in defense, he can only offer his weak alibi which
the Caltex gasoline station adverted to in the cannot offset the positive identification of the
Information. While seated with Cruz near the prosecution witnesses. His guilt was proven beyond
gasoline pumps, she saw Nuñez, who was pointing reasonable doubt.14
a gun at Diaz, and another man who was pointing a
gun at Regencia, inside the gasoline station's office. The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment, as
Diaz shouted that they were being robbed. Another follows:
man then rushed to the gasoline station's office, as
did her co-employee Dimatulac. A commotion Based on the foregoing, we find accused Crisente
ensued where the robber identified as Marciales Pepaño Nuñez
shot Dimatulac, Diaz, and Regencia. They then ran
to their employer's house.11 GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 (1) of the
Nunez testified in his own defense and recalled the Revised Penal Code and sentences (sic) him to
circumstances of his apprehension. He stated that suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and order
when he was apprehended on July 2, 2006, he was him to pay:
on his way to his aunt's fish store where he was
helping since 1999 when a man approached him. He 1. The heirs of Felix Regencia Php. 151,630.00
was then dragged and mauled. With his face expenses for the wake, burial lot and funeral service;
covered, he was boarded on a vehicle and brought Php. 75,000.00 death indemnity; Php. 5,000.00
to Camp Vicente Lim in Laguna. He further claimed money stolen from the victim; exemplary damages of
that on June 22, 2000, he was in Muzon, Taytay, Php. 50,000.00; and Php. 2,214,000.00 unearned
Rizal with his aunt at her fish store until about 5:00 income;
p.m. before going home. At home, his aunt's son
fetched him to get pails from the store and bring
them to his aunt's house.12 2. The heirs of Alexander Diaz Php. 20,000.00
expenses for funeral service; Php. 75,000.00 death
indemnity; Php. 50,000.00 exemplary damages; and
On February 24, 2010, the Regional Trial Court Php. 1,774,080.00 unearned income;
rendered a Decision13 finding Nunez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide. This four
(4)-page Decision incorporated the original Regional 3. The heirs of Byron Dimatulac Php. 18,000.00 for
Trial Court December 9, 2005 Decision and added funeral service; Php. 75,000.00 death indemnity;
the following singular paragraph in explaining Php. 50,000.00 exemplary damages; and Php.
Nunez's supposed complicity: 966,240.00 unearned income[;] and

To convict Nunez of robbery with homicide requires 4. The costs.

proof beyond reasonable doubt that he: (1) took
personal property which belongs to another; (2) the Let the case against alias "Jun" who remains at
taking is unlawful; (3) the taking is done with intent to large be archived.
gain; and (4) the taking was accomplished with the
use of violence against or intimidation of persons or SO ORDERED.15
by using force upon things. Article 294(1) of the
Revised Penal Code and (5) when by reason or on On March 5, 2010, Nuñez fifed his Notice of
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall Appeal.16
have been committed[.] The facts are simple. Nuñez

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On June 26, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered its necessity of their identification of Nunez is so
assailed Decision17 affirming Nunez's conviction, manifest that the prosecution saw it fit to recall them
with modification to the awards of moral and to the stand, even as it merely adopted the evidence
exemplary damages, as follows: already presented in the trial of Marciales and Nabia.
Cruz's and Perez's testimonies centered on their
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal supposed certainty as to how it was Nuñez himself,
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision excluding any other person, who participated in the
dated February 24, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court robbery and homicide.
of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, in Criminal Case
No. 00-473 is hereby AFFIRMED with This Court finds this supposed certainty and the
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Crisente premium placed on it by the Court of Appeals and
Pepaño Nuñez is ordered to pay ₱75,000.00 as the Regional Trial Court to be misplaced.
moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages each to the heirs of Felix Regencia, the I
heirs of Alexander Diaz and the heirs of Byron
Dimatulac. There are two (2) principal witnesses who allegedly
identified accused-appellant as the same Pobre who
SO ORDERED.18 participated in the robbery holdup. When Cruz, the
first witness, was initially put on the witness stand,
Nuñez then filed his Notice of Appeal.19 she asserted that she could not recall any of the
features of Pobre. After many years, with the police
The Court of Appeals elevated the records of this presenting her with accused-appellant, she positively
case to this Court on October 22, 2013 pursuant to identified him as the missing perpetrator. The
its Resolution dated July 23, 2013. The Resolution second principal witness' testimony on the alleged
gave due course to Nuñez's Notice of Appeal.20 participation of accused-appellant is so
fundamentally at variance with that of the other
principal witness. The prosecution did not account
In its Resolution21 dated December 4, 2013, this
for the details of the presentation of accused·
Court noted the records forwarded by the Court of
appellant to the two (2) witnesses after he was
Appeals and informed the parties that they may file
arrested. Finally, these witnesses' alleged positive
their supplemental briefs. However, both parties
identification occurred almost eight (8) years, for the
manifested that they would no longer do so.22
first witness, and almost nine (9) years, for the
second witness, from the time of the commission of
The occurrence of the robbery occasioned by the the offense.
killing of Regencia, Diaz, and Dimatulac is no longer
in issue as it has been established in the original
The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact. The
proceedings which resulted in the conviction of
danger of inordinate reliance on human memory in
Marciales and Nabia.
criminal proceedings, where conviction results in the
possible deprivation of liberty, property, and even
All that remains in issue for this Court's resolution is life, is equally established.
whether or not accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño
Nuñez is the same person, earlier identified as Paul
Human memory does not record events like a video
Pobre, who acted in conspiracy with Marciales and
recorder. In the first place, human memory is more
Nabia.
selective than a video camera. The sensory
environment contains a vast amount of information,
Contrary to the conclusions of the Court of Appeals but the memory process perceives and accurately
and Regional Trial Court, this Court finds that it has records only a very small percentage of that
not been established beyond reasonable doubt that information. Second, because the act of
accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is thy remembering is reconstructive, akin to putting puzzle
same person identified as Paul Pobre. Thus, this pieces together, human memory can change in
Court reverses the courts a quo and acquits dramatic and unexpected ways because of the
accused-appellant Crisente Pepano Nunez. passage of time or subsequent events, such as
exposure to "postevent" information like
The prosecution's case rises and falls on the conversations with other witnesses or media reports.
testimonies of eyewitnesses Cruz and Perez. The Third, memory can also be altered through the

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reconstruction process. Questioning a witness about error, and (2) observer judgments of witness
what he or she perceived and requiring the witness accuracy are likewise subject to substantial error.27
to reconstruct the experience can cause the witness
memory to change by unconsciously blending the The bifurcated difficulty of misplaced reliance on
actual fragments of memory of the event with eyewitness identification is borne not only by the
information provided during the memory retrieval intrinsic limitations of human memory as the basic
process.23 apparatus on which the entire exercise of
identification operates. It is as much the result of and
Eyewitness identification, or what our jurisprudence is exacerbated by extrinsic factors such as
commendably refers to as "positive identification," is environmental factors, flawed procedures, or the
the bedrock of many pronouncements of guilt. mere passage of time:
However, eyewitness identification is but a product
of flawed human memory. In an expansive More than 100 years of eyewitness science has
examination of 250 cases of wrongful convictions supported other conclusions as well. First, the ability
where convicts were subsequently exonerated by to match faces to photographs (even when the target
DNA testing, Professor Brandon Garett (Professor is present while the witness inspects the lineup or
Garett) noted that as much as 190 or 76% of these comparison photo) is poor and peaks at levels far
Wrongful convictions were occasioned by flawed below what might be considered reasonable doubt.
eyewitness identifications.24 Another observer has Second, eyewitness accuracy is further degraded by
more starkly characterized eyewitness identifications pervasive environmental characteristics typical · of
as ''the leading cause of wrongful convictions." 25 many criminal cases such as: suboptimal lighting;
distance; angle of view; disguise; witness distress;
Yet, even Professor Garrett's findings are not novel. and many other encoding conditions. Third, memory
The fallibility of eyewitness identification has been is subject to distortion due to a variety of influences
recognized and has been the subject of concerted not under the control of law enforcement that occur
scientific study for more than a century: between the criminal event and identification
procedures and during such procedures. Fourth, the
This seemingly staggering rate of involvement of ability of those who must assess the accuracy of
eyewitness errors in wrongful convictions is, eyewitness testimony is poor for a variety of
unfortunately, no surprise. Previous studies have reasons. Witnesses' ability to report on many issues
likewise found eyewitness errors to be implicated in affecting or reflecting accuracy is flawed and subject
the majority of cases of wrongful conviction. But to distortion (e.g., reports of duration of observation.
Garrett's analysis went farther than these previous distance, attention, confidence, and others). thereby
studies. He not only documented that eyewitness providing a flawed basis for others' judgments of
errors occurred in his cases. He also tried to accuracy.28
determine why they occurred - an issue eyewitness
science has investigated for over 100 years.26 Likewise, decision-makers such as jurists and
judges, who are experts in law, procedure, and logic,
The dangers of the misplaced primacy of eyewitness may simply not know better than what their
identification are two (2)-pronged: on one level, backgrounds and acquired inclinations permit:
eyewitness identifications are inherently prone to
error; on another level, the appreciation by Additionally, the limits and determinants of
observers, such as jurors, judges, and law performance for facial recognition are beyond the
enforcement officers of how an eyewitness identifies knowledge of attorneys, judges, and jurors. The
supposed culprits is just as prone to error: traditional safeguards such as cross-examination are
not effective and cannot be effective in the absence
The problem of eyewitness reliability could not be of accurate knowledge of the limits and determinants
more clearly documented. The painstaking work of of witness performance among both the cross-
the Innocence Project, Brandon Garrett, and others examiners and the jurors who must judge the
who have documented wrongful convictions, witness. Likewise, cross-examination cannot be
participated in the exonerations of the victims, and effective if the witness reports elicited by cross-
documented the role of flawed evidence of all sorts examination are flawed: for example, with respect to
has clearly and repeatedly revealed the two-pronged factors such as original witnessing conditions (e.g.,
problem of unreliability for eyewitness evidence: (1) duration of exposure), post-event influences (e.g.,
eyewitness identifications are subject to substantial conversations with co-witnesses), or police

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suggestion (e.g., repo1is of police comments or [T]he prior opportunity to observe the alleged
behaviors during identification procedures).29 criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy
between any pre-lineup description and the
II defendant's actual description, any identification
prior to lineup of another person, the identification by
picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to
Legal traditions in various jurisdictions have been
identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the
responsive to the scientific reality of the frailty of
lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup
eyewitness identification.
identification."36
In the United States, the Supreme Court "ruled for
Nine (9) months later, in Simmons v. United
the first time that the Constitution requires
States, the United States Supreme Court calibrated
suppression of some identification evidence" 30 in
its approach by "focusing in that case on the overall
three (3) of its decisions, all rendered on June
reliability of the identification evidence rather than
12, 1967-United States v. Wade,31 Gilbert v.
merely the flaws in the identification procedure."
California,   and Stovall
32
v.
Denno.33 Stovall emphasized that such suppression,
when appropriate, was "a matter of due process." 34 Ultimately, the Court concluded there was no due
process violation in admitting the evidence because
there was little doubt that the witnesses were
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the
actually correct in their identification of Simmons.
general rule in the United States was that any
Scholars have frequently characterized Simmons as
problems with the quality of eyewitness identification
the beginning of the Court's unraveling of the robust
evidence went to the weight, not the admissibility, of
protection it had offered
that evidence and that the jury bore the ultimate
in Stovall; while Stovall provided a per se rule of
responsibility for assessing the credibility and
exclusion for evidence derived from flawed
reliability of an eyewitness's identification. In a trilogy
procedures, Simmons rejected this categorical
of landmark cases released on the same day in
approach in favor of a reliability analysis that would
1967, however, the Supreme Court ruled for the first
often allow admission of eyewitness evidence even
time that the Constitution requires suppression of
when an identification procedure was unnecessarily
some identification evidence. In United
suggestive.37
States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California, the Court
held that a post-indictment lineup is a critical stage in
a criminal prosecution, and, unless the defendant In more recent Supreme Court decisions, the United
waives his Sixth Amendment rights, defense States has "reaffirmed its shift toward a reliability
counsel's absence from such a procedure requires analysis, as opposed to a focus merely on
suppression of evidence from the lineup. The court problematic identification procedures" beginning in
also ruled, however, that even when the lineup 1972 through Neil v. Biggers:38
evidence itself must be suppressed, a witness would
be permitted to identify the defendant in court if the The Biggers Court stated that, at least in a case in
prosecution could prove the witness had an which the confrontation and trial had taken place
independent source for his identification ... before Stovall, identification evidence would be
admissible, even if there had been an unnecessarily
…. suggestive procedure, so long as the evidence was
reliable under the totality of the circumstances. To
inform its reliability analysis, the Biggers Court
In Stovall v. Denno, the Court held that, regardless
articulated five factors it considered relevant to the
of whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
inquiry:
were in1plicated or violated, some identification
procedures are "so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" that [(l)] the opportunity of the witness to view the
eyewitness evidence must be suppressed as a criminal at the time of the crime, [(2)] the witness'
matter of due process.35 (Citations omitted) degree of attention, [(3)] the accuracy of the witness'
prior description of the criminal, [(4)] the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
In Wade, the United States Supreme Court noted
confrontation, and [(5)] the length of time between
that the factors judges should evaluate in deciding
the crime and the confrontation.
the independent source question include:

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The Biggers Court clearly proclaimed that the identifications. This Code puts in place measures
"likelihood of misidentification," rather than a advanced by the corpus of research in enhancing
suggestive procedure in and of itself, is what violates the reliability of eyewitness identification, specifically
a defendant's due process rights. However, by impairing the suggestive tendencies of
the Biggers Court left open the possibility that per se conventional procedures. Notable measures include
exclusion of evidence derived from unnecessarily having a parade of at least nine (9) people, when
suggestive confrontations might be available to one (1) suspect is included, to at least 14 people,
defendants whose confrontations and trials took when two (2) suspects are included 45 and
place after Stovall.39 forewarning the witness that he or she may or may
not actually see the suspect in the
The Biggers standard was further affirmed in 1977 lineup.46 Additionally, there should be a careful
in Manson v. Brathwaite; 40 recording of the witness' pre-identification
description of the perpetrator47 and explicit
instructions for police officers to not "direct the
The Manson Court made clear that the standard
witness' attention to any individual."48
from Biggers would govern all due process
challenges to eyewitness evidence, stating that
judges should weigh the five factors against the III
"corrupting effect of the suggestive identification."
Ultimately, the Court affirmed that "reliability is the Domestic jurisprudence recognizes that eyewitness
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification is affected by "normal human fallibilities
identification testimony." In rejecting the per se and suggestive influences."49 People v. Teehankee,
exclusionary rule, the Court acknowledged that such Jr. 50 introduced in this jurisdiction the totality of
a rule would promote greater deterrence against the circumstances test, which relies on factors already
use of suggestive procedures, and it noted a identified by the United States Supreme Court
"surprising unanimity among scholars" that the per in Neil v. Biggers:51
se approach was "essential to avoid serious risk of
miscarriage of justice." However, the Court (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at
concluded the cost to society of not being able to the time of the crime;
use reliable evidence of guilt in criminal prosecutions
would be too high. The Manson Court also made (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3)
clear that its new stm1dard would apply to both pre- the accuracy of any prior description given by the
trial and in-court identification evidence, thus witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
resulting in a unified analysis of all identification the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
evidence in the wake of suggestive procedures. In between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
contrast, the Stovall Court had not specified whether suggestiveness of the identification procedure.52
unnecessarily suggestive procedures would require
per se exclusion of both pre-trial identification
evidence and any in-court identification, or A witness' credibility is ascertained by considering
alternatively, whether witnesses who had viewed the first two factors, i.e., the witness' opportunity to
unnecessarily suggestive procedures might view the malefactor at the time of the crime and the
nonetheless be allowed to identify defendants in witness' degree of attention at that time, based on
court after an independent source determination.41 conditions of visibility and the extent of time, little
and fleeting as it may have been, for the witness to
be exposed to the perpetrators, peruse their
A 2016 article notes that Manson "remains the features, and ascertain their identity. 53 In People v.
federal constitutional standard."42 It' also notes that Pavillare: 54
"[t]he vast majority of states have also
followed Manson in interpreting the requirements of
their own constitutions."43 Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe
the kidnappers and to remember their faces. The
complainant had close contact with the kidnappers
The United Kingdom has adopted the Code of when he was abducted and beaten up, and later
Practice for the Identification of Persons by Police when the kidnappers haggled on the amount of the
Officers.44 It "concerns the principal methods used ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare face to face
by police to identify people in connection with the and actually dealt with him when he paid the ransom
investigation of offences and the keeping of accurate money. The two-hour period that the complainant
and reliable criminal records" and covers eyewitness was in close contact with his abductors was

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sufficient for him to have a recollection of their likely to be affected, although, as previous research
physical appearance. Complainant admitted in court has noted ... there is not necessarily a concordance
that he would recognize his abductors if he s[aw] between the two.61
them again and upon seeing Pavillare he
immediately recognized him as one of the Our jurisprudence has yet to give due appreciation
malefactors as he remember[ed] him as the one who to scientific; data on weapon focus. Instead, what is
blocked his way, beat him up, haggled with the prevalent is the contrary view which empirical
complainant's cousin and received the ransom studies discredit.62 For instance, in People v.
money. As an indicium of candor the private Sartagoda:
complainant admitted that he d[id] not recognize the
co-accused, Sotero Santos for which reason the [T]he most natural reaction for victims of criminal
case was dismissed against him.55 violence [is] to strive to see the looks a..11d faces of
their assailants and observe the manner in which the
Apart from extent or degree of exposure, this Court crime was committed. Most often the face of the
has also appreciated a witness' specialized skills or assailant and body movements thereof, create a
extraordinary capabilities.56 People v. lasting impression which cannot easily be erased
Sanchez57 concerned the theft of an armored car. from their memory.63
The witness, a trained guard, was taken by this
Court as being particularly alert about his Rather than a sweeping approbation of a supposed
surroundings during the attack. natural propensity for remembering the faces of
assailants, this Court now emphasizes the need for
The degree of a witness' attentiveness is the result courts to appreciate the totality of circumstances in
of many factors, among others: exposure time, the identification of perpetrators of crimes.
frequency of exposure, the criminal incident's degree
of violence, the witness' stress levels and Apart from the witness' opportunity to view the
expectations, and the witness' activity during the perpetrator during the commission of the Grime and
commission of the crime.58 the witness' degree of attention at that time, the
accuracy of any prior description given by the
The degree of the crime's violence affects a witness' witness is equally vital. Logically, a witness'
stress levels. A focal point of psychological studies credibility is enhanced by the extent to which his or
has been the effect of the presence of a weapon on her initial description of the perpetrator matches the
a witness' attentiveness. Since the 1970s, it has actual appearance of the person ultimately
been hypothesized that the presence of a weapon prosecuted for the offense.
captures a witness' attention, thereby reducing his or
her attentiveness to other details such as the Nevertheless, discrepancies, when properly
perpetrator's facial and other identifying accounted for, should not be fatal to the
features.59 Research on this has involved an prosecution's case, For instance,
enactme1'1t model involving two (2) groups: first, an in Lumanog v. People,64 this Court recognized that
enactment with a gun; and second, an enactment of age estimates cannot be made accurately:
the same incident using an implement like a pencil
or a syringe as substitute for an actual gun. Both
groups are then asked to identify the culprit in a Though his estimate of Joel's age was not precise, it
lineup. Results reveal a statistically significant was not that far from his true age, especially if we
difference in the accuracy of eyewitness consider that being a tricycle driver who was
identification between the two (2) groups:60 exposed daily to sunlight, Joel's looks may give a
first impression that he is older than his actual age.
Moreover Alejo's description of Lumanog as dark-
[T]he influence of [a weapon focus] variable on an skinned was made two (2) months prior to the dates
eyewitness's performance can only be estimated of the trial when he was again asked to identify him
post hoc. Yet the data here do offer a rather strong in court. When defense counsel posed the question
statement: To not consider a weapon's effect on of the discrepancy in Alejo's description of Lumanog
eyewitness performance is to ignore relevant who was then prese11ted as having a fair
information. The weapon effect does reliably occur, complexion and was 40 years old, the private
particularly in crin1es of short duration in which a prosecutor manifested the possible effect of
threatening wea.pon is visible. Identification Lumanog's incarceration for such length of time as to
accuracy and feature accuracy of eyewitnesses are make his appearance different at the time of trial. 65

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The totality of circumstances test also requires a Thus, the totality of circumstances test also requires
consideration of the degree of certainty a consideration of the suggestiveness of the
demonstrated by the witness at the moment of identification procedure undergone by a witness.
identification. What is most critical here is the initial Both verbal and non-verbal information might
identification made by the witness during become inappropriate cues or suggestions to a
investigation and case build-up, not identification witness:
during trial.66
A police officer may tell a witness that a suspect has
A witness' certainty is tested in court during cross- been caught and the witness should look at some
examination. In several instances, this Court has photographs or come to view a lineup and make an
considered a witness' straight and candid identification. Even if the policeman does not
recollection of the incident, undiminished by the explicitly mention a suspect, it is likely that the
rigors of cross-examination as an indicator of witness will believe he is being asked to identify a
credibility.67 good suspect who will be one of the members of the
lineup or set of photos ... If the officer should
Still, certainty on the witness stand is by no means unintentionally stare a bit longer at the suspect, or
conclusive. By the time a witness takes the stand, he change his tone of voice when he says, "Tell us
or she shall have likely made narrations to whether you think it is number one, two, THREE,
investigators, to responding police or barangay four, five, or six," the witness's opinion might be
officers, to the public prosecutor, to any possible swayed.73
private prosecutors, to the families of the victims,
other sympathizers, and even to the media. The In appraising the suggestiveness of identification
witness, then, may have established certainty, not procedures, this Court has previously considered
because of a foolproof cognitive perception and prior or contemporaneous74 actions of law enforcers,
recollection of events but because of consistent prosecutors, media, or even fellow witnesses.
reinforcement borne by becoming an experienced
narrator. Repeated narrations before different In People v. Baconguis,75 this Court acquitted the
audiences may also prepare a witness for the same accused, whose identification was tainted by an
kind of scrutiny that he or she will encounter during improper suggestion.76 There, the witness was made
cross-examination. Again, what is more crucial is to identify the suspect inside a detention cell which
certainty at the onset or on initial identification, not in contained only the suspect.77
a relatively belated stage of criminal proceedings.
People v. Escordiaz78 involved robbery with rape.
The totality of circumstances test also requires a Throughout their ordeal, the victim and her
consideration of the length of time between the companions were blindfolded.79 The victim, however,
crime and the identification made by the witness. "It felt a "rough projection''80 on the back of the
is by now a well established fact that people are less perpetrator. The perpetrator also spoke, thereby
accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts familiarizing the victim with his
after a long retention interval than after a short voice.81 Escordial recounted the investigative
one."68 Ideally then, a prosecution witness must process which resulted in bringing the alleged
identify the suspect immediately after the incident. perpetrator into custody. After several individuals
This Court has considered acceptable an were interviewed, the investigating officer had an
identification made two (2) days after the inkling of who to look for. He "found accused-
commission of a crime,69 not so one that had an appellant [in a] basketball court and 'invited' him to
interval of five and a half (5 1/2) months.70 go to the police station for questioning." 82 When the
suspect was brought to the police station, the rape
The passage of time is not the only factor that victim was already there. Upon seeing the suspect
diminishes memory. Equally jeopardizing is a enter, the rape victim requested to see the suspect's
witness' interactions with other individuals involved back. The suspect removed his shirt. When the
in the event.71 As noted by cognitive psychologist victim saw a "rough projection" on the suspect's
Elizabeth F. Loftus, "[p]ost[-]event information can back, she spoke to the police and stated that the
not only enhance existing memories but also change suspect was the perpetrator. The police then brought
a witness's memory and even cause nonexistent in the other witnesses to identify the suspect. Four
details to become incorporated into a previously (4) witnesses were taken to the cell containing the
acquired memory."72 accused and they consistently pointed to the suspect

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even as four (4) other individuals were with him in certain Totie Jacob belonged to the robbery gang of
the cell.83 Rolando Pineda (Pineda). At that time also, Pineda
and another companion were in detention for
This Court found the show-up, with respect to the another robbery. The police presented photographs
rape victim, and the lineup, with respect to the four of Pineda and his companion to the witness, who
(4) other witnesses, to have been tainted with positively identified the two (2) as among the
irregularities. It also noted that the out-of-court perpetrators.90
identification could have been the subject of
objections to its admissibility as evidence although This Court found the identification procedure
these objections were never raised during trial.84 unacceptable.91 It then articulated two (2) rules for
out-of-court identifications through photographs:
Although these objections were not timely raised,
this Court found that the prosecution failed to The first rule in proper photographic identification
establish the accused's guilt beyond reasonable procedure is that a series of photographs must be
doubt and acquitted the accused.85 It noted that the shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The
victim was blindfolded throughout her ordeal. Her second rule directs that when a witness is shown a
identification was rendered unreliable by her own group of pictures, their arrangement and display
admission that she could only recognize her should in no way suggest which one of the pictures
perpetrator through his eyes and his voice. It pertains to the suspect.92
reasoned that, given the limited exposure of the rape
victim to the perpetrator, it was difficult for her to Non-compliance with these rules suggests that any
immediately identify the perpetrator. It found the subsequent corporeal identification made by a
improper suggestion made by the police officer as witness may not actually be the result of a reliable
having possibly aided in the identification of the recollection of the criminal incident. Instead, it will
suspect.86 The Court cited with approval the simply confirm false confidence induced by the
following excerpt from an academic journal: suggestive presentation of photographs to a witness.

Social psychological influences.Various social Pineda further identified 12 danger signals that might

psychological factors also increase the danger of indicate erroneous identification. Its list is by no
suggestibility in a lh1eup confrontation. Witnesses, means exhaustive, but it identifies benchmarks
like other people, are motivated by a desire to be which may complement the application of the totality
correct and to avoid looking foolish. By arranging a of circumstances rule. These danger signals are:
lineup, the police have evidenced their belief that
they have caught the criminal; witnesses, realizing (1) the witness originally stated that he could not
this, probably will feel foolish if they cannot identify identify anyone;
anyone and therefore1 may choose someone
despite residual uncertainly. Moreover, the need to
reduce psychological discomfort often motivates the (2) the identifying witness knew the accused before
victim of a crime to find a likely target for feelings of the crime, but made no accusation against him when
hostility. questioned by the police;

Finally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave (3) a serious discrepancy exists between the
like those around them. This desire to conform identifying witness' original description and the
produces an increased need to identify someone in actual description of the accused;
order to show the police that they, too, feel that the
criminal is in the lineup, and makes the witnesses (4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the
particularly vulnerable to any clues conveyed by the witness erroneously identified some other person;
police or other witnesses as to whom they suspect of
the crime.87 (Emphasis in the original) (5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the
accused;
People v. Pineda, 88 involved six (6) perpetrators
committing robbery with homicide aboard a (6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but
passenger bus.89 A passenger recalled that one (1) fails to identify him;
of the perpetrators was referred to as "Totie" by his
companions. The police previously knew that a

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(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness circumspection applies with greater vigor when, as in
had limited opportunity to see the accused; the present case, the issue goes beyond pure
credibility into constitutional dimensions arising from
(8) the witness and the person identified are of the due process rights of the accused.
different racial groups;
….
(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator
of the crime, the witness was unaware that a crime The initial photographic identification in this case
was involved; carries serious constitutional law implications in
terms of the possible violation of the due process
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the rights of the accused as it may deny him his rights to
witness' view of the criminal and his identification of a fair trial to the extent that his in-court identification
the accused; proceeded from and was influenced by
impermissible suggestions in the earlier
photographic identification. In the context of this
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
case, the investigators might not have been fair to
Rodrigo if they themselves, purposely or unwittingly,
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial fixed in the mind of Rosita, or at least actively
identification.93 prepared her mind to, the thought that Rodrigo was
one of the robbers. Effectively, this act is no different
Pineda underscored that "[t]he more important duty from coercing a witness in identifying an accused,
of the prosecution is to prove the identity of the varying only with respect to the means used. Either
perpetrator and not to establish the existence of the way, the police investigators a.re the real actors in
crime."94 Establishing the identity of perpetrators is a the identification of the accused; evidence of
difficult task because of this jurisdiction's tendency to identification is effectively created when none really
rely more on testimonial evidence rather than on exists.99 (Emphasis supplied)
physical evidence. Unlike the latter, testimonial
evidence can be swayed by improper suggestions. IV
Legal scholar Patrick M. Wall notes that improper
suggestion "probably accounts for more
Applying these standards, this Court finds the
miscarriages of justice than any other single
identification made by prosecution witnesses Cruz
factor[.]"95 Marshall Houts, who served the Federal
and Perez unreliable. Despite their identification,
Bureau of Investigation and the American judiciary,
there remains reasonable doubt if accused-appellant
concurs and considers eyewitness identification as
Nuñez is the same Pobre who supposedly
"the most unreliable form of evidence[.]"96
committed the robbery with homicide along with
Marciales and Nabia.
People v. Rodrigo97 involved the same
circumstances as Pineda. The police presented a
The prosecution banks on the following portion of
singular photograph for the eyewitness to identify the
Cruz's testimony.100 The Court of Appeals heavily
person responsible for a robbery with homicide. The
relies on the same portion, reproducing parts of it in
witness identified the person in the photograph as
its Decision:101
among the perpetrators. This Court stated that, even
as the witness subsequently identified the suspect in
court, such identification only followed an Q: Madam Witness, where were you on June 22,
impermissible suggestion in the course of the 2000 in the afternoon?
photographic identification. This Court specifically
stated that a suggestive identification violates the A: I was on duty at Tayuman Caltex station, Ma'am.
right of the accused to due process, denying him or
her of a fair trial:98 Q: And while you were on duty, what happened if
any?
The greatest care should be taken in considering the
identification of the accused especially, when this A: While we were on duty there was a pick-up which
identification is made by a sole witness and the was getting gas and a person was in front and we
judgment in the case totally depends on the were joking baka kami mahold-up yun pala,
reliability of the identification. This level of care and hinoholdup na kami sa opisina.

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Q: You mentioned that there was already hold-up A: I saw that one of our companions, a gun was
happening? pointed to him and also to our employer.

A: Yes, Ma'am. Q: Who was your companion you saw who was
pointed with a gun?
Q: What time was that when you noticed that
holdup? A: Alex Diaz, and Kuya Alex my employer.

A: Around 8:00p.m. Q: Who were those persons who pointed guns to

your co-worker and to your employer?
Q: Where was the hold-up going on?
A: The two accused who were first arrested.
A: In the office, Ma'am.
Q: Aside from the two accused, do they have other
Q: And how far is that office from where you were at companions?
that time, how many meters?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
A: From here to the wall of the court.
Q: Who was that person who was also with the two
Court: accused?

Anyway, I have the reference. A: Paul Pobre.

Prosecutor Aragones: Q: By the way, who were those two accused you are
referring to according to you were arrested?
Q: What happened after you saw that there was [a]
hold[-up] going on inside the office of the Caltex A: George Marciales and I cannot remember the
Station? other one.

A: After that me and my companions ran to the Q: You mentioned of the name Paul Pobre, kindly
computer shop which is beside the office. look around if there is any Paul Pobre in court?

Q: By the way, why were you at the Caltex gasoline A: Yes, Ma'am, he is here.
station?
Q: Can you point to him?
A: I was an attendant, Ma'am.
A: He is that one (pointing)
Q: You mentioned that you proceeded to the
computer shop which is beside the office? INTERPRETER;

A: Yes, Ma'am. Witness is pointing to a person wearing yellow shirt

who when asked gave his name as Crisanto
Q: Where did you run, inside or outside the Pepafio.
computer shop?
PROSECUTOR ARAGONES:
A: Inside, Ma'am.
Q: Who told you that the name of that person is Paul
Q: Before you went inside, what did you witness Pobre?
after you saw that there was hold-up inside the
office? A: Kuya Rommel

Q: Who is Kuya Rommel?

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A: Brother of my employer Kuya Alex. Q: So it was the back of the accused that you saw, is
that correct?
Q: Who was apprehended in Laguna?
A: No[,] ma'am. Sa pinto po kasi yung register namin
A: He is the one, Paul Pobre. e. So andito po si Alex nakatungo po sya andito po
yung accused naka[-]ganito po sya, nakatutok pos a
(sic) kanya. (Witness was standing while
Q: What was the participation of that person you
demonstrating the incident between the accused and
pointed to as being the companion of accused
Alex inside the office) very clear po yung itsura nya
George Marciales and the other one?
nung nakita po namin sya.
A: He was the one who entered last and who shot.
Q: How far is that island from the cashier, from the
place you were seated right now?
COURT:
A: Around 4 to 5 meters[,] ma'am.
Q: Who did he shoot?
Q: Were you able to hear the conversation
A: Kuya Alex.102 considering that distance of 4 to 5 meters?

The prosecution similarly banks on the narration and A: I heard nothing[,] ma'am[,] except when Alex
identification made by Perez: shouted[,] "Byron tulong, hinoholdap tayo[.]"

Q: Madam Witness when Alex, the accused you Q: Alex was shouting while he was still inside the
pointed a while ago, the other accused Marciales office?
and your boss, all of them were inside the computer
shop, the office of Caltex?
A: Yes[,] ma'am.
A: At first no[,] ma'am[.] Nagsimula po kasi andoon
Q: And it was Byron who ran towards the office?
po kami sa labas may lalaking nakatayo po doon sa
malapit sa road, sya po yung na[] identify before as
George Marciales. Ang nakita po lang naming una A: The first one was George Marciales, Byron only
sa loob apat po sila si boss, si Alex, that man followed him.
(Nunez) and the man identified before as Orly Nabia.
Q: Where was George Marciales before he entered
Q: Where were you at that time when these four that office?
persons were inside the office?
A: He was near the road[,] ma'am.
A: We were sitting in an island near the three pumps
in front of the gas station[,] ma'am. Q: But that is not within the gas station's premises?

Q: The office in relation to that island is at the back, A: Bali eto po yung pinaka sementado, andito sya.
is that correct? (Witness referring to the place where Marciales is)

A: Yes[,] ma'am. Q: When you said the cemented area, you were
referring to the National road?
Q: There were no customers at that time?
A: Yes[,] ma'am.
A: None[,] ma'am.
Q: After Byron went inside the said office, were you
Q: The cashier were (sic) Alex is positioned is facing able to see what happened inside?
you[.] [I]s that correct?

A: Yes[,] ma'am.

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A: Yes[,] ma'am. Nakasuntok po sya ng isa kay Court of Appeals should have considered in
George tapos tinadyakan po siya sa tagiliran tsaka determining whether or not the prosecution has
binaril po sya. Tapos bumagsak napo (sic) sya. surmounted the threshold of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Lamentably, they failed to give
Q: You were still outside your office at that time? due recognition to several other factors that raise
serious doubts on the soundness of the identification
made by prosecution witnesses Cruz and Perez.
A: Yes[,] ma'am.

First and most glaringly, Cruz had previously

Q: Nobody was with you at that time aside from your
admitted to not remembering the appearance of the
co-employees, only the accused was inside at that
fourth robber, the same person she would later claim
time?
with supposed certainty as Nuñez. In the original
testimony she made in Marciales and Nabia's trial in
A: Yes[,] ma'am. 2002, she admitted to her inability to identify the
fourth robber:
Q: You did not run or ask for help considering that
that Caltex is along the National road? A: Honestly Fiscal Dela Cuesta
speaking[,] we were not able to say anything at that
time[,]ma'am.
Q: Can you describe the other holdupper during that
date and time who were the companions of George
A: After po ng pag shoot sa kanila tumakbo po kami Marciales?
ni Rona doon sa may computer shop, sa bahay po
nila. Pagkaraan po ng ilang minuto lumabas kami
Ronalyn Cruz
nakita po naming sila na nagtatakbuhan together
with Kuya Lawrence. Nakita po naming (sic) sila na
tumatakbo, yung dalawa papuntang Angono, yung A: I cannot describe them[,] ma 'am.
isa hindi ko na po alam kung [saan] nagpunta.
Nakita na lang po naming si boss na gmnagapang Q: Why can you not describe the appearance of the
asking for help.103 other holdupper?

The Court of Appeals also favorably cited the A: I cannot remember their appearances, ma 'am.
following identification made by Perez:
….
Prosecutor Aragones
Fiscal Dela Cuesta
Q : Now can you look inside the court and tell us if
there is anybody here who took part in that incident Q: At what particular point in time that the 4th
or involved in that incident? holdupper went inside the office?

Relen Perez Ronalyn Cruz

A: Him[,] ma'am. (witness pointing to the accused) A: When they were wrestling with each other,
ma'am.
Q: What was the participation of that man whom you
pointed today in that robbery with homicide incident Q: Was that before the shooting or after?
in Caltex gasoline station?
A: Before the shooting[,] ma'am.105
A: He was the one who was pointing a gun to my co-
employee Alexander Diaz[,] ma'am.104 Second, by the time Cruz and Perez stood at the
witness stand and identified Nuñez, roughly eight (8)
V years had passed since the robbery incident.

These identifications are but two (2) of a multitude of

circumstances that the Regional Trial Court and the

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Third, as the People's Appellee's Brief concedes, dismissed.108 Evidently, Nuñez's identification before
witnesses' identification of Nunez did not come until trial proper was made in a context which had
after he had been arrested. In fact, it was not until practically induced witnesses to identify Nuñez as a
the occasion of his arraigmnent, 106 Nuñez was the culprit. Not only was there no effort to countervail the
sole object of identification, in an identification likelihood of him being identified, it even seemed
process that had all but pinned him as the that the prosecution and others that had acted in its
perpetrator. behalf such as tile apprehending officers, had
actively designed a situation where there would be
VI no other possibility than for him to be identified as
the perpetrator of the crime.
Cruz's admission that she could not identify the
fourth robber anathemized any subsequent The dubiousness of Nunez's presentation for
identification. Moreover, the prosecution, the Court identification is further exacerbated by the
of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court all failed to circumstances of his apprehension. In a
account for any intervening occurrence that explains Manifestation filed with the Court of Appeals, and
why and how Cruz shifted from complete confusion which, quite notably, the prosecution never bothered
to absolute certainty. Instead, they merely took her repudiating, Nunez recounted how his apprehension
and Perez's subsequent identification as appeared to have been borne by nothing more than
unassailable and trustworthy because of a the crudeness and sloth of police officers:
demeanor apparently indicating certitude.
6). That, the truth of the matter as far as the
The conviction of an accused must hinge less on the offended charged against me, I ha[ve] no any
certainty displayed by a witness when he or she has truthfulness (sic) nor having any reality as it was
already taken the stand but more on the certainty he indeed only a mere strong manufactured, fabricated
or she displayed and the accuracy he or she and unfounded allegations against me just to get
manifested at the initial and original opportunity to even with me of my [untolerable] disciplinary actions
identify the perpetrator. Cruz had originally admitted of some individuals who had a personal grudge
to not having an iota of certainty, only to make an against me.
unexplained complete reversal and implicate Nunez
as among the perpetrators. She jeopardized her own ….
credibility.
9). That, with all due respect, I ha[ve] nothing to do
Cruz's and Perez's predicaments are not aided by with the offensed (sic) charged and it is not true that
the sheer length of time that had lapsed from the the case was done was charged against me it is
criminal incident until the time they made their Paul Borbe y Pipano it was wrong person pick-up by
identifications. By the time Cruz made the the police officer, because the said Paul Borbe y
identification, seven (7) years and eight (8) months [P]ipano was charged of several crimes, while me
had lapsed since June 22, 2000. As for Perez, eight my record has no single offense against me.
(8) years and nine (9) months had already lapsed.
10). That, with due respect, there was no
In People v. Rodrigo, 107 this Court considered a truthfulness that I was the one who committed the
lapse of five and a half (5 1/2) months as unreliable. said crime, it was a big mistake because we have
Hence, there is greater reason that this Court must the [same 1 family name they just pick up the wrong
exercise extreme caution for identifications made person which is innocent to the said crime.
many years later. This is consistent with the healthy
sense of incredulity expected of courts in criminal 11). That, with all due respect, it was not true, also
cases, where the prosecution is tasked with that it was me who committed the said crime, it was
surmounting the utmost threshold of proof beyond Paul Borbe y Pipano is the one because he was
reasonable doubt. habitual in doing crime in our community, in fact my
record is clean never been committed any crime in
It is not disputed that Nunez's identification by Cruz my life, I am a concern citizen who can help our
and Perez was borne only by Nunez's arrest on July community well.109 (Emphasis supplied)
2, 2006. The prosecution even acknowledged that
his identification was initially done only to defeat his
motion to have the case against him

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The identification made during Nunez's trial, where while the other robber was pointing a gun at
eyewitnesses vaunted certainty, was but an offshoot Regencia.
of tainted processes that preceded his trial. This
Court finds Nunez's identification prior to trial They both claim that after Diaz shouted, the first two
bothersome and his subsequent and contingent (2) robbers received assistance. Cruz, however,
identification on the stand more problematic. claims that two (2) additional robbers came to the
aid of the first two (2), while Perez claims that there
Nunez's identification, therefore, fails to withstand was only one (1) additional robber.
the rigors of the totality of circumstances test. First,
the witnesses failed to even give any prior In the scuffle that ensued in the office, Cruz claims
description of him. Second, a prosecution witness that Marciales shot Dimatulac while Nunez shot
failed to exhibit even the slightest degree of certainty Diaz. For her part, Perez claims that Marciales was
when originally given the chance to identify him as the only one who fired shots at Regencia, Diaz, and
the supposed fourth robber. Third, a significantly Dimatulac.
long amount of time had lapsed since the criminal
incident; the original witness' statement that none of Jurisprudence holds that inconsistencies in the
his features were seen as to enable his testimonies of prosecution witnesses do not
identification; and the positive identification made of necessarily jeopardize the prosecution's
him when the case was re-opened. And finally, his case.110 This, however, is on1 y true o f mm. or m.
presentation for identification before and during trial consistencies that are ultimately inconsequential or
was peculiarly, even worrisomely, suggestive as to merely incidental to the overarching narrative of
practically induce in prosecution witnesses the belief what crime was committed; how, when, and where it
that he, to the exclusion of any other person, must was committed; and who committed it. "It is well-
have been the supposed fourth robber. settled that inconsistencies on minor details do not
affect credibility as they only refer to collateral
These deficiencies and the doubts over Cruz's and matters which do not touch upon the commission of
Perez's opportunity to peruse the fourth robber's the crime itself."111
features and their degree of attentiveness during the
crime clearly show that this case does not manage The inconsistencies here between Cruz and Perez
to satisfy even one (1) of the six (6) factors that are far from trivial. At issue is precisely the
impel consideration under the totality of participation of an alleged conspirator whose name
circumstances test. the prosecution did not even know for proper
indictment. Yet, where the prosecution witnesses
VII cannot agree is also precisely how the person who
now stands accused actually participated in the
Recall that both prosecution witnesses Cruz and commission of the offense. Their divergences are so
Perez acknowledged the extreme stress and fright glaring that they demonstrate the prosecution's
that they experienced on the evening of June 22, failure to establish Nunez's complicity.
2000.1âwphi1 As both Cruz and Perez recalled, it
was enough for them to run and seek refuge in a VIII
computer shop. Their tension was so palpable that
even Cruz's and Perez's recollections of what These failings by the prosecution vis-a-vis the totality
transpired and of how Nuñez supposedly of circumstances test are also indicative of many of
participated in the crime are so glaringly different: the 12 danger signals identified in People v.
Pineda12 to be present in this case. On the first, fifth,
According to Cruz, two (2) other persons initiated the and twelfth danger signals, prosecution witness Cruz
robbery, by pointing guns at Regencia and Diaz originally made an unqualified admission that she
inside the gasoline station's office. It was supposedly could not identify the fourth robber. On the third
only later, when Diaz shouted, that a third robber, danger signal, there is not even an initial description
Marciales, and a fourth robber, allegedly Nunez, ran ·with which to match or counter-check Nuñez. On
in, to assist the first two (2) robbers. In contrast, the tenth danger signal, a considerable amount of
Perez claimed that Nuñez was one (1) of the two (2) time had passed since Cruz and Perez witnessed
robbers who were initially already in the office. the crime and their identification of Nunez. On the
Nunez was then supposedly pointing a gun at Diaz eleventh danger signal, several perpetrators
committed the crime.

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IX Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

Conviction in criminal cases demands proof beyond SO ORERED.

reasonable doubt. While this does not require
absolute certainty, it calls for moral G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979 ORDER OF
certainty.1âwphi1 It is the degree of proof that DISQUALIFICATION IS SET ASIDE
appeals to a magistrate's conscience:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
An accused has in his favor the presumption of vs.
innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge
Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt Branch III, and BENJAMIN F.
standard is demanded by the due process clause of MANALOTO, respondents.
the Constitution which protects the accused from
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable Fiscal Regidor Y Aglipay and Special Counsel
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime Vicente Macalino for petitioner.
with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on
the prosecution, and unless it discharges that
burden the accused need not even offer evidence in Moises Sevilla Ocampo for private petitioner.
his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, Cicero J. Punzalan for respondent.
mean such degree of proof as excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty
only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The SANTOS, J.:
conscience must be satisfied that the accused is
responsible for the offense charged.113
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria
M. Manaloto, herein private respondent Benjamin
This Court is unable to come to a conscientious Manaloto was charged before the Court of First
satisfaction as to Nuñez's guilt. On the contrary, this Instance of Pampanga, presided by respondent
Court finds it bothersome that a man of humble Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the
means appears to have been wrongly implicated, not crime of Falsification of Public Document committed,
least because of lackadaisical law enforcement according to the Information, as follows:
tactics, and has been made to suffer the severity
and ignominy of protracted prosecution, intervening
That on or about the 19th day of
detention, and potential conviction. Here, this Court
May, 1975, in the Municipality of
puts an end to this travesty of justice. This Court
San Fernando, province of
acquits accused-appellant.
Pampanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision Court, the above-named a
dated June 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA- BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, with
G.R. CR-HC No. 04474 is REVERSED and SET deliberate intent to commit
ASIDE. Accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez falsification, did then and there
is ACQUITTED for reasonable doubt. He is ordered willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless counterfeit, imitate and forge the
confined for any other lawful cause. signature of his spouse Victoria M.
Manaloto in a deed of sale executed
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the by said accused wherein he sold a
Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa house and lot belonging to the
City, for immediate implementation. The Director of conjugal partnership of said spouse
the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana
Court within five (5) days from receipt of this under Doc. No. 1957, Page No. 72,
Decision the action he has taken. A copy shall also Book No. LVII, Series of 1975,
be furnished to the Director General of Philippine notarized by Notary Public Abraham
National Police for his information. Pa. Gorospe, thereby making it

Page 22 of 211
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 appear that his spouse Victoria M. 30, 1977. 5 The respondents filed their Memorandum
Manaloto gave her marital consent on September 5, 1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was
to said sale when in fact and in truth considered submitted for decision. 7
she did not. 2
From the foregoing factual and procedural
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife antecedents emerges the sole issues determinative
to the witness stand but the defense moved to of the instant petition, to wit: Whether or not the
disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule criminal case for Falsification of Public Document
130 of the Revised Rules Of Court which provides: filed against herein private respondent Benjamin F.
Manaloto — who allegedly forged the signature of
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale,
of interest or relationship — The thereby making it appear that the latter gave her
following persons cannot testify as marital consent to the sale of a house and lot
to matters in which they are belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact
interested, directly or indirectly as and in truth she did not — may be considered as a
herein enumerated. criminal case for a crime committed by a husband
against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the
rule on marital disqualification.
xxx xxx xxx

We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an

(b) A husband can not be examined
exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a
for or at his wife without her
criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-
consent; nor a wife for or against her
husband against the witness-wife.
husband without his consent, except
in a civil case by one against the
other or in a criminal case for a 1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of
crime committed by one against the Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the
other. accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale,
thereby making it appear therein that said wife
consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging
The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality
to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth
on the ground that the case falls under the exception
she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the
to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a
said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's
crime committed by one against the other."
name by her husband in the deed of sale, been
Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge
made with the consent of the wife, no crime could
granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto
have been charged against said husband Clearly,
from testifying for or against her husband, in an
therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's
order dated March 31, 1977. A motion for
confidence which gave rise to the offense charged.
reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by
And it is this same breach of trust which prompted
respondent Judge in an order dated May 19, 1977.
the wife to make the necessary complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly,
Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court of
the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People of the First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that
Philippines, seeking set aside the aforesaid order of such criminal case is not one for a crime committed
the respondent Judge and praying that a preliminary by one spouse against the other is to advance a
injunction or a ternporary restraining order be issued conclusion which completely disregards the factual
by this Court enjoining said judge from further antecedents of the instant case.
proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal Case
No. 1011.
2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a
specific offense may be classified as a crime
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved — (a) to issue committed by one spouse against the other is
a temporary restraining order, and (b) to require the presented to this Court for resolution. Thus, in the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, 8 this Court, through
petitioner. 3 The Office of the Solicitor General filed Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the criterion to
its Notice of Appearance on June 27, 1977, 4 and its be followed in resolving the issue, stating that:
Memorandum in support of the Petition on August

Page 23 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted security and confidence of private life which the law
in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargill v. aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which,
State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, through their absence, merely leave a void in the
wherein the court said: unhappy home. 11 Thus, there is no reason to apply
the martial disqualification rule.
The rule that the injury must amount
to a physical wrong upon the is too 3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy
narrow; and the rule that any demand that the wife should not be disqualified from
offense remotely or indirectly testifying against her husband in the instant case.
affecting domestic within the For, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General," (t)o
exception is too broad. The better espouse the contrary view would spawn the
rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE dangerous precedent of a husband committing as
DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR many falsifications against his wife as he could
DIRECTLY AND VITALLY conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege
IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret —
RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN all with unabashed and complete impunity.
THE EXCEPTION to the statute that
one shall not be a witness against IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of
the other except in a criminal the lower court dated March 31, 1977, disqualifying
prosecution for a crime committed Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her
(by) one against the other. husband, Benjamin Manaloto, in Criminal Case No.
1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977,
Applying the foregoing criterion in said case denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby
of Ordoño v. Daquigan  this Court held that the rape SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued
committed by the husband of the witness-wife by this Court is hereby lifted and the respondent
against their daughter was a crime committed by the Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of
husband against his wife. Although the victim of the the case, allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify
crime committed by the accused in that can was not against her husband.
his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless,
applied the exception for the reason that said SO ORDERED.
criminal act "Positively undermine(d) the connubial
relationship. 9 G.R. No. L-568             July 16, 1947 APPEALED
JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED
With more reason must the exception apply to the
instant case where the victim of the crime and the THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the appellee,
falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. vs.
And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the JUAN FRANCISCO, defendant-appellant.
effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal
relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the
wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Augusto Kalaw for appellant.
Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and
insistent efforts 10 in connection with the instant Acting Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.
petition, which seeks to set aside the order
disqualified her from testifying against her husband. HILADO, J.:
Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife
underacore the fact that the martial and domestic Convicted of the crime of parricide by the Court of
relations between her and the accused-husband First Instance of Mindoro, Juan Francisco appeals to
have become so strained that there is no more this Court and asks us to reverse the decision of the
harmony to be preserved said nor peace and trial court and to acquit him of the crime charged.
tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case,
as We have occasion to point out in previous On March 4, 1945, defendant, who had been
decisions, "identity of interests disappears and the previously arrested on charges of robbery, was
consequent danger of perjury based on that Identity being held as detention prisoner in the municipal jail
is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the of Mansalay, Mindoro. On that date he requested

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permission from the chief of police, and he was Sergeant of Police Pimentel, whose veracity we find
allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel, who in the evidence no reason to doubt, declared (p. 6,
was detailed to guard him. Upon their reaching the t.s.n., Lunar) that the accused confessed to him that
house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his because he was already tired or disgusted with his
wife who was at the time in a room of said house, life "on account of the accusation of his father-in-
while said sergeant remained at the foot of the law" against him, he wanted to wipe out his family by
stairs. After a few moments, Pimentel heard the stabbing his wife, his son and himself, and killing the
scream of a woman. Running upstairs, he met three of them. The same witness also stated (p.
defendant's wife running out of the room and holding 9, ibid.) that the accused confessed to him that he
her right breast which was bleeding. Still moments stabbed his wife, his child and himself because he
later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down with his was ashamed, as his father-in-law told him that he
little son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on his should rather die than live in shame for having
breast. Pimentel also found defendant to have a dishonored the family of his wife.
wound in his belly while his child had a wound in the
back. Pimentel found the child dead. The voluntariness and spontaniety of the confession
contained in Exhibit C was testified to by the justice
The prosecution, in recommending the imposition of of the peace of Mansalay and police sergeant
the capital penalty upon the accused, relies mainly Pimentel, one Sebastian Punzalan, and the chief of
on: (1) the affidavit, Exhibit C (translation, Exhibit C- police Alfredo Iwahi; that said justice of the peace
1), which is a virtual confession of the accused; (2) had previously read the contents of the same
Exhibit D, which is the record made by the justice of affidavit to the accused and that the accused signed
the peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the without any intimidation having been exerted in the
defendant upon which the latter entered a plea of presence of said justice of the peace; that the
guilty; and (3) the rebuttal testimony of Emilia accused signed voluntarily in the session hall of the
Taladtad, wife of the appellant. justice of the peace court in Barrio Paclasan (pp. 26-
27, ibid.) Pimentel testified, upon the same point,
Exhibit C is an affidavit signed and sworn to by the that no force was exerted upon appellant to state
appellant before the justice of the peace of Mansalay what is contained in the affidavit; that he had not
on March 5, 1945,. Exhibit C-1 is its English maltreated or boxed the accused as pretended by
translation. In said affidavit appellant declares that: "I the latter; that the contents of the exhibit were read
asked permission from the chief of police so that I to the accused; that he did not threatened the
may be able to raise my bond and to indicate to me accused to shoot the latter if he would not swear to
the house of one Guillermo Gervasio, a policeman, Exhibit C before the justice of the peace, as declared
and I was consented and the sergeant of police by said accused (pp. 25-26, ibid.) In this connection
accompanied me to my house; that upon arriving at we note from the testimony of the accused himself
the house, Sgt. Pacifico Pimentel allowed me to go that on the way to the house of the justice of the
up in order that I may be able to talk to my wife and peace after the incident, he was being helped by the
the sergeant of police awaited me in the stairs of the chief of police Iwahi when, according to him,
house; when I was in the house, I remembered what Sergeant Pimentel told him that he was going to
my uncle told me to the effect that he would order swear to the contents of Exhibit C and that if he
someone to kill me because I am a shame and a would not do so Pimentel would shoot him (p.
dishonor to our family and suddenly I lost my sense 17, ibid.); that (the same accused assured the court)
and I thought to myself that if someone would kill me Iwahi treated him well (t.s.n., p. 20, ibid.); and really
it would be more preferable for me to kill myself; from the entire testimony of this accused the good
when I looked at the bed I saw a scissor near my treatment accorded him by Chief of Police Iwahi is
wife and unconsciously I picked up the said scissor clearly discernible. He was under preventive
and immediately stabbed my wife whereupon I detention in the house of Iwahi and it was Iwahi who
looked for my child on the bed and stabbed him; I suggested or told him, after he had killed and
killed my son Romeo Francisco whose age is more dressed the former's pig, that he bring a kilo of the
or less two years and after that I stabbed myself; meat to his (appellant's) wife (p. 13, ibid.) It was also
after stabbing myself, I heard a shot and the Iwahi who allowed him to go to his house on the
sergeant of police asked me if I would surrender to same occasion for the purposes of the procurement
him or not; I replied him "yes" then I lost my of his bail (p. 13, ibid.).
consciousness."

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Under these circumstances, besides the complete the fact that Pimentel gave the version which might
absence of proof of any reason or motive why place no small blame on him for allowing the
Pimentel should so threaten the accused, we find accused to go up the house alone, gives special
the accused's version incredible. On page 16 of the weight to his testimony.
same transcript, answering a question by the Court
of First Instance, the accused testified that he This case, as developed by the evidence for the
understands English and the translation Exhibit C-1 prosecution, which has not been destroyed nor
of the affidavit Exhibit C is in that language. enervated by that of the defense, presents a truly
strange happening. But the fact of the commission of
Other indications of appellant's lack of the crime of parricide appears to us to have been
trustworthiness are: While on page 14 of said established beyond reasonable doubt. As to the
transcript he testified that he was the only one who reasons impelling the commission of the act, the
went to the house of his wife because Pimentel, case is a strange one and admittedly not common.
according to him, remained in the house of Roberto But while it is not necessary even to prove motive in
Magramo, on page 13 he declared that he was case the commission of the crime is established as
accompanied by the sergeant of police of Mansalay, required by law (U.S. vs. Ricafor, 1 Phil., 173;
Pacifico Pimentel to the house of his wife and that U.S. vs. McMann, 4 Phil., 561; U.S. vs. Reyes, 18
the chief of police ordered Pimentel to so Phil., 495; U.S. vs. Balmori and Apostol, 18 Phil.,
accompany him. Contradicting the same pretension 578), here we have a case of a crime proven beyond
of his having gone alone to his wife's house is his reasonable doubt, not absolutely without a proven
own testimony on page 17 of the transcript wherein motive, but with proof of a motive testified to by the
he assured affirmatively the question of his own accused himself in his confession, strange though it
counsel whether Pimentel was the policeman who be. But at times "truth is stranger than fiction," and it
was with him to guard him on the occasion of his so happens here. The law must be applied to the
going to his wife's house; and really, while he facts.
imputed upon his wife the wounding of their child,
who died as a consequence thereof, he admitted We have scanned and searched the evidence and
that he did not tell this to the justice of the peace of the record diligently for facts and circumstances
Mansalay (p. 18, ibid.), and the reason he assigned which might sufficiently establish insanity or any
for this passive conduct on his part to the effect that allied defense, but we have failed to find them.
he was afraid of Pimentel (p. 19, ibid.) is patently
unacceptable, for no motive whatsoever has been As we construe the evidence, we believe that Exhibit
established to make us believe that the accused had C contains the truth, as narrated by the accused
reasons to be so afraid of Pimentel. Appellant's himself who, at the time of making it, must have
testimony to the effect that Pacifico Pimentel was been moved only by the determination of a repentant
testifying against him because Pimentel "being my father and husband to acknowledge his guilt for facts
guard that time he might be held responsible for which, though perhaps done under circumstances
allowing me to go alone" (p. 17, ibid.) is absolutely productive of a diminution of the exercise of will-
without merit. This testimony clearly reveals a desire power, fell short of depriving the offender of
to show that because Pimentel allowed the accused consciousness of his acts. We will have occasion to
to go up the house while the former stayed at the further consider this aspect of the case later.
foot of the stairs, said Pimentel would be responsible
for what had happened unless the accused was the
one who killed the child and wounded his wife rather Exhibit C was signed and sworn to by appellant the
than the wife having accidentally wounded the child day following the fatal event. Presumably, on making
and killed him and been stabbed by the accused, this confession appellant had not yet had time to
who also stabbed himself. As we said a moment reflect upon the consequences of such a confession
ago, we do not give any merit to this purpose in to himself — egoism was not yet allowed to operate
testifying against the accused to relieve himself of all against the promptings of his conscience. But when
responsibility for what had happened, it would have on February 23, 1946 — almost one year after —
been more conducive to this result if Pimentel had this man testified in his own defense in the Court of
testified that it was not the accused, whom he had First Instance, he already had had ample opportunity
allowed to go upstairs unguarded, who was guilty, to reflect upon those consequences. And what
but his wife, of the wounding of the child, and that happened? As in similar cases, he repudiated his
the accused wounded his wife only as the result of confession, and alleged torture and violence to have
the obfuscation produced by the child's death. And been exerted upon his person and his mind in order,

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so he now pretends, to extract it from him. As we occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such
find the confession to have been given voluntarily, evidence because its admission would lead to
we feel justified in concluding that its subsequent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and fourth,
repudiation by the accused almost a year after must because where a want of domestic tranquility exists,
have been due to his fear of its consequences to there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
himself, which he not improbably thought might cost hostile testimony of the other. This has been said in
him his own life. It was the struggle between the the case of Cargill vs. State (220 Pac., 64; 25 Okl.
noble and the ignoble in the man, and the latter, Cr., 314; 35 A.L.R., 133), thus:
aided by instinct of self-preservation, won.
The reasons given by law text-writers and
Defense counsel attacks the value of Exhibit C as courts why neither a husband nor wife shall
evidence of guilt for the reason that the statements in any case be a witness against the other
contained therein were not, counsel contends, given except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
spontaneously but through use of violence and committed by one against the other have
intimidation. He also questions the admissibility of been stated thus: First, identity of interests;
Exhibit D on the ground that it has not been properly second, the consequent danger of perjury;
identified; and, with more vigor and stronger third, the policy of the law which deems it
emphasis, he impugns the admissibility of the necessary to guard the security and
testimony of appellant's wife, invoking the provision confidences of private life even at the risk of
of section 26 (d) of Rule 123 prohibiting the wife and an occasional failure of justice, and which
the husband from testifying for or against each other. rejects such evidence because its admission
would lead to domestic disunion and
As to Exhibit C, this document was sworn to and unhappiness; and fourth, because, where a
subscribed by said accused before the justice of the want of domestic tranquility exists, there is
peace of Mansalay. This official testified that he danger of punishing one spouse through the
asked the prisoner before the latter signed said hostile testimony of the other. (70 C.J., 119.)
exhibit whether he understood the contents thereof,
and that said latter answered in the affirmative. The However, as all other general rules, this one has its
witness further declared that appellant signed the own exceptions, both in civil actions between the
exhibit voluntarily and that said appellant said that spouses and in criminal cases for offenses
the said affidavit was his (p. 10, ibid.). There is a committed by one against the other. Like the rule
total absence of evidence, besides the testimony of itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons
appellant himself, to show that his statements which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in
contained in said exhibit were extracted form him by support of the general rule. For instance, where the
the use of violence and intimidation. While we are marital and domestic relations are so strained that
not unaware of the practice resorted to by some there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace
peace officers of extracting admissions or and tranquility of interests disappears and the
confessions from persons accused of crime by the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity
employment of third-degree methods, in the present is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
case we fail to find from the evidence sufficient proof security and confidences of private life which the law
to destroy the categorical testimony of the justice of aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which,
the peace that Exhibit C was signed by appellant through their absence, merely leave a void in the
voluntarily and with a full understanding thereof. unhappy home.
Furthermore, the statements of appellant in said
Exhibit C were corroborated by the testimony of his At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not testify
wife on rebuttal. This leads us to the consideration of in the direct evidence for the prosecution but under
the admissibility of the wife's testimony. circumstances presently to be stated. It will be noted
that the wife only testified against her husband after
The rule contained in section 265 (d) of Rule 123 is the latter, testifying in his own defense, imputed
an old one. Courts and text-writers on the subject upon her the killing of their son. (p. 15, ibid.) By all
have assigned as reasons therefor the following: rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution,
First, identity of interest; second, the consequent which had theretofore refrained from presenting the
danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which wife as a witness against her husband, the right to
deems it necessary to guard the security and do so, as it did in rebuttal; and the the wife herself
confidences of private life even at the risk of an the right to so testify, at least, in self-defense, not of

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course, against being subjected to punishment in As well-settled as this rule of marital incompetency
that case in which she was not a defendant but itself is the other that it may be waived.
against any or all of various possible consequences
which might flow from her silence, namely: (1) a Waiver of incompetency. — Objections to
criminal prosecution against her which might be the competency of a husband or wife to
instituted by the corresponding authorities upon the testify in a criminal prosecution against the
basis of her husband's aforesaid testimony; (2) in the other may be waived as in the case of the
moral and social sense, her being believed by those other witnesses generally. Thus, the
who heard the testimony orally given, as well as by accused waives his or her privilege by
those who may read the same, once put in writing, to calling the other spouse as a witness for him
be the killer of her infant child. It has been aptly said or her, thereby making the spouse subject to
that the law of evidence is the law of common sense. cross-examination in the usual manner. It is
Presuming the husband who so testified against his well-established that where an accused
wife to be endowed with common sense, he must be introduces his wife as a witness in his
taken to have expected that the most natural behalf, the state is entitled to question her
reaction which the said testimony would give rise to as to all matters germane and pertinent to
on the part of the prosecution, as well as of his wife, her testimony on direct examination. It is
was to deny upon rebuttal the new matter which was also true that objection to the spouse's
involved in the same testimony, namely, the competency must be made when he or she
imputation that it was his wife who killed their little is first offered as witness, and that the
son. Upon the part of the prosecution, because he incompetency may be waived by the failure
not only limited himself to denying that he was the of the accused to make timely objection to
killer, but went further and added what was really the admission of the spouse's testimony,
a new matter consisting in the imputation of the although knowing of such incompetency,
crime upon his wife. And upon the part of the wife, and the testimony admitted, especially if the
because of the reasons already set forth above. accused has assented to the admission,
Hence, in giving such testimony, the husband must, either expressly or impliedly. Other courts
in all fairness, be held to have intended all its have held that the witness's testimony is not
aforesaid natural and necessary consequences. By admissible even with the other spouse's
his said act, the husband — himself exercising the consent. Clearly, if the statute provides that
very right which he would deny to his wife upon the a spouse shall in no case testify against the
ground of their marital relations — must be taken to other except in a prosecution for an offense
have waived all objection to the latter's testimony against the other, the failure of the accused
upon rebuttal, even considering that such objection to object does not enable the state to use
would have been available at the outset. the spouse as a witness. (3 Wharton's
Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., section 1205,
At this point, it behooves us to emphasize the all- pp. 2060-2061.)
important role of the State in this case. The State
being interested in laying the truth before the courts Wharton, in note 10 at the foot of page 2060 of the
so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent cited volume refers us to section 1149 appearing on
exonerated, must have the right to offer the rebutting page 1988 of the same volume, dealing with waiver
testimony in question, even against the objection of objection to incompetency of witnesses in general.
the accused, because it was the latter himself who We transcribe this section for convenient reference:
gave rise to its necessity.  It may be said that the
accused husband thought that he would have more Waiver of objection to incompetency. — A
chances of convincing the court of his pretended party may waive his objection to the
innocence if he pointed to his wife as having caused competency of a witness and permit him to
the death of their child, instead of simply denying testify. A party calling an incompetent
that he was the author of the fatal act. To this we witness as his own waives the
would counter by saying that if he was to be allowed, incompetency. Also, if, after such
for his convenience, to make his choice and thereby incompetency appears, there is failure to
impute the act upon his spouse, justice would be make timely objection, by a party having
partial and one-sided if both the State and the wife knowledge of the incompetency, the
were to be absolutely precluded from introducing the objection will be deemed waived, whether it
latter's rebutting testimony. is on the ground of want of mental capacity

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 or for some other reason. If the objection of appellant does not happen to be among those
could have been taken during the trial, a which were mentioned in the cases cited by Mr.
new trial will be refused and the objection Wharton, that is no reason against the existence of
will not be available on writ of error. If, said waiver.
however, the objection of a party is
overruled and the ruling has been excepted When the husband testified that it was his wife who
to, the party may thereafter examine the caused the death of their son, he could not, let us
witness upon the matters as to which he repeat, justly expect the State to keep silent and
was allowed to testify to without waiving his refrain from rebutting such new matter in his
objections to the witness's competency. testimony, through the  only  witness available,
(Ibid., section 1149, p. 1988.) namely, the wife; nor could he legitimately seal his
wife's lips and thus gravely expose her to the danger
It will be noted, as was to be expected, that in the of criminal proceedings against her being started by
last above-quoted section, the author mentions the authorities upon the strength and basis of said
certain specific cases where the courts concerned testimony of her husband, or to bear the moral and
hold that there was waiver, but for obvious reasons social stigma of being thought, believed, or even just
neither the author nor said courts have attempted to suspected, to be the killer of her own offspring. A
make an enumeration of all possible cases of decent respect and considerate regard for the
waiver. In the very nature of things, it would be feelings of an average mother will tell us that such a
impossible to make a priori such a complete moral and social stigma would be no less injurious to
enumeration and to say that it is exclusive. So long her than a criminal punishment. And if the wife
as the Legislature itself does not make its own should, in such a case and at such a juncture, be
statutory and exclusive specification of cases of allowed to testify upon rebuttal, the scope of her
such waiver — and we doubt that it ever will — no testimony should at least be the same as that of her
complete and exclusive enumeration can, nor husband. This is only simple justice and fairness
should, be attempted by the courts, for in the dictated by common sense. Since the husband had
absence of such legislation the cases of waiver will testified that it was his wife who caused the death of
be as indefinite in number as indefinite are and the little boy, she should be allowed to say that it
always will be the varying and unpredictable was really her husband who did it. We hold that it is
circumstances surrounding each particular case. not necessary, to justify such rebuttal evidence, and
to declare the existence of the waiver upon which it
To illustrate, Mr. Wharton says above that the was based, that the wife be in jeopardy of
accused waives his or her privilege by calling the punishment  in the same case by reason of such
other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby testimony of her accused husband. The rule of
making the spouse subject to cross-examination in waiver of objection to the competency of witnesses
the usual manner, the reason being that the State generally does not require this prerequisite in the
is entitled to question the spouse so presented as to case between husband and wife. Rather the rule
all matters germane and pertinent to the direct makes the determination of the question hinge
testimony. In the same way, and for a similar reason, around the consequences which by common sense,
when the herein appellant gave his testimony in in justice and in fairness, should be deemed to have
question in his defense, the State  had the right  to been expected by the spouse who first testified
rebut the new matter contained in that testimony naturally to flow from his act of giving that testimony.
consisting in the imputation upon his wife of the At any rate, the trial court not only had the power to
death of the little boy. And that rebuttal evidence, allow the State to utilize the wife as rebuttal witness,
which was rendered necessary by appellant's own but also the discretion to permit "new additional
testimony, could be furnished only by his wife who, evidence bearing upon the main issue in question."
as he fully knew, was  alone  with him and their son But even restricting the wife's testimony to merely
at the precise place and time of the event. This right contradicting her husband's version that she was the
to rebut is secured to the State, no less than to the one who killed their child, there is evidence beyond
accused, by Rule 115, section 3, paragraph (c), the reasonable doubt that appellant was the killer. With
provision further authorizing the court, in furtherance the testimony of both spouses upon the point,
of justice, to permit one or the other party to offer instead of that of the accused alone, let justice take
"new additional evidence bearing upon the main its course.
issue in question." So that if the waiver that we here
declare to flow from the above-mentioned testimony

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As to Exhibit D, this document was a part of the
record of the case in the justice of the peace of court
which was expressly presented by the prosecution G.R. No. L-25643           June 27, 1968
as evidence in the Court of First Instance. REMANDED TO COURT OF ORIGIN

But after all has been said and done, in justice to the JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA and PAQUITA
accused, we believe that, whether we are dealing LEZAMA, petitioners,
with a simpleton or an eccentric, or we have here vs.
one of those well-nigh inexplicable phenomena in HON. JESUS RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court of
human conduct where the judge finds himself at a First Instance of Iloilo,
loss to discover an adequate motivation for the JOSE DINEROS, in his capacity as Receiver of
proven acts of the accused, — indulging all the LA PAZ ICE PLANT and COLD STORAGE
reasonable intendments in favor of appellant, we are CO., INC., and THE HON. COURT OF
of opinion that when he committed the crime APPEALS, respondents.
charged against him he must have been suffering
from some illness (of the body, the mind, the nerves, Efrain B. Trenas and Sergio D. Mabunay for
or the moral faculty) as is contemplated in paragraph petitioners.
9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code as a Ricardo J. Gerochi for respondents.
mitigating circumstance, namely, "such illness of the
offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-
power of the offender without however depriving him CASTRO, J.:
of consciousness of his acts."
The issue tendered for resolution in this case is
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her
parricide by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to husband in an action, may be examined as a hostile
death. Article 63, paragraph 3, of the same code, witness by the adverse party under section 6 of Rule
provides that when the commission of the act is 132 of the Rules of Court, without infringing on her
attended by some mitigating circumstance and there marital privilege not to testify against her husband
is no aggravating circumstance, and the law under section 20 (b) of Rule 130. The trial court,
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible presided by the respondent Judge Jesus Rodriguez,
penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied; in this ruled in the affirmative and required the wife to
case, in view of the above indicated circumstance appear and testify. The petitioners sued for certiorari
and there being no aggravating circumstance, the but the Court of Appeals dismissed their
lesser penalty is reclusion perpetua, which was the petition1 and denied their motion for
penalty correctly applied by the trial court, which reconsideration.2 Hence this appeal.3
penalty, of course, carries with it the accessory
penalties provided for in article 41 of the said Code. On July 18, 1960 Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver
The accused should also be sentenced to indemnify of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo,
the heirs of the deceased Romeo Francisco in the together with C.N. Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed
sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs. an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for
the annulment of a judgment rendered against the
As above modified, the appealed judgment is La Paz Ice Plant by the Court of First Instance of
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered. Manila in civil case 39827. Named as defendants
were Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor judgment
was rendered, and the spouses Jose Manuel and
Paquita Lezama. The complaint alleged that,
because of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the La
Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership of
Dineros; that during the pendency of the
receivership, Marciano C. Roque brought an action
against the La Paz Ice Plant in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the collection of P150,000,
which sum he had supposedly lent to it; that
summons was served not on the receiver but on the
spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and
that, through the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque

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was able to obtain judgment by default against the compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the
company. It was claimed that, because the other's condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to
summons was served on Jose Manuel Lezama the humiliation of being condemned by the words of
instead of on the receiver, the Court of First Instance his intimate life partner.9
of Manila acquired no jurisdiction over the La Paz
Ice Plant and that, therefore, the decision of that Here the request for subpoena indicated that
court was void.1ªvvphi1.nêt Paquita Lezama was to do no more than testify as
an adverse party in the case and, indeed, in the light
In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein of the allegations both in the complaint and in the
petitioners), while admitting that the company was answer, the request was apparently one that could
placed under receivership, maintained that Jose reasonably be expected to be made. Thus, the
Manuel Lezama nevertheless remained president of complaint charged
the La Paz Ice Plant and that as such he had
authority to receive in behalf of the company the 13. — That in obtaining the judgment by
court summons in civil case 39827. They denied default in Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court
entering into collusion with Roque and averred that of First Instance of Manila against the La
they did not contest Roque's claim because they Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc.
knew it to be a legitimate obligation which the La defendants, in gross and evident bad faith,
Paz Ice Plant had incurred pursuant to a resolution and in fraudulent conspiracy, made it appear
of its board of directors. that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage
Co., Inc. had obtained a loan of
Issues having been joined, the case was thereupon P150,000.00 from defendant Marciano C.
heard. At the hearing Dineros asked the court to Roque thru defendant Jose Manuel Lezama
issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as "a allegedly upon an authority vested upon
witness summoned by the plaintiffs in accordance defendant Jose Manuel Lezama by the
with the Rules of Court." The request was granted alleged Board of Directors of the La Paz Ice
over the objection of the petitioners who invoked the Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. allegedly
following provision of the Rules of Court: evidenced by the minutes of the meetings of
the Board of Directors of the said
A husband cannot be examined for or corporation signed by defendant Jose
against his wife without her consent; nor a Manuel Lezama and attested to by Benjamin
wife for or against her husband without his Luis Borja and Paquita B. Lezama and that
consent, except in a civil case by one defendants spouses Jose Manuel Lezama
against the other, or in a criminal case for a and Paquita B. Lezama had manipulated the
crime committed by one against the other, or books of the corporation by making it appear
in a criminal case for a crime committed by that such fictitious loan was then in
one against the other.4 existence.

This provision deals with two different matters which On the other hand, the answer claimed
rest on different grounds of policy: the
disqualification of husband and wife to testify in each 13. That the herein defendants specifically
other's behalf, as well as their privilege not to testify deny all the allegations contained in
against each other.5 The fundamental theory of the paragraph 13 of the complaint; the truth is,
common law is said to be that relationship of the that the herein defendants have not
spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is the basis of conspired and acted in bad faith with the
the disqualification.6 Indeed section 20 of Rule 130 is plaintiff [Marciano C. Roque] in Civil Case
entitled "Disqualification by reason of ... No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of
relationship." Manila for the rendition of the said judgment
referred to therein; for the truth is, that the
On the other hand, while a shelter of emotional herein defendants, in their capacities as
reasons has been offered7 for the privilege, the "true President-Manager and Secretary of the La
explanation [which] is after all the simplest" 8 and Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc.,
which constitutes "the real and sole strength of the believing as they believe that the obligation
opposition to abolishing the privilege," is the natural sought to be enforced by said civil action
repugnance in every fair-minded person to being legitimate and the allegations of the

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
 complaint in said Civil Case No. 39827 of charging fraud against the spouses, can the wife be
the Court of First Instance of Manila are compelled to testify as an adverse party witness
true, they did not deem it wise to contest the concerning her participation in the alleged fraud
same; that the obligation of P150,000.00 of without violating section 20 (b) of Rule 130?
the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co.,
Inc., which the defendant Marciano C. It is argued that the wife may be so compelled but
Roque sought to be enforced in Civil Case her testimony would be receivable only against
No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of her.10 It is even suggested that "each may testify in
Manila was legitimately contracted in his or her own behalf, although the testimony may
accordance with law; that said obligation inure to the benefit of the other spouse, or against
was duly entered in the books of the his or her own interest, although the testimony may
corporation and that the said loan is not also militate against the other spouse."11 Upon the
fictitious; that the amount realized therefrom other hand, it is insisted that compelling Paquita
was spent for the benefit of the said Lezama to testify will transgress section 20(b) of
corporation. Rule 130, especially if her testimony will support the
plaintiff's charge.
Thus, while the petitioners denied the charge that
the loan was fictitious, they did not deny the The complaint charges "fraudulent conspiracy" on
allegation that it was Paquita Lezama who, as the part of the spouses and one Marciano C. Roque
secretary of the company, signed the minutes of the to make it appear that the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold
meeting at which Jose Manuel Lezama was Storage Co., Inc. was indebted to Roque. The wife,
allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and that it Paquita Lezama, is called upon to testify as an
was she who, likewise as secretary, made the entry adverse party witness on the basis of her following
in the books of the corporation. participation in the alleged fraudulent scheme: "that
it was Paquita Lezama who as Secretary of the
It was obviously to test the truth of the assertion that company signed the minutes of the meeting during
the loan transaction was above board that Dineros, which Manuel Lezama was allegedly authorized to
the company receiver, wanted Paquita Lezama on negotiate the loan and that it was she who, likewise
the witness stand, not as a spouse witness "for or as Secretary, made the entry in the books of the
against her husband," but rather as an adverse party corporation."
in the case.
Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to testify on
It is postulated that a party can make, as it were, what actually transpired during the meeting and will
such forays into his opponent's position on the be asked questions on the matter of the veracity or
strength of section 6 of Rule 132 which provides: falsity of the entry in the books of the corporation.
Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or
Direct examination of unwilling or hostile beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable result
witnesses. — A party may interrogate any would be to pit her against her husband. The
unwilling or hostile witness by leading interests of husband and wife in this case are
questions. A party may call an adverse party necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the
or an officer, director, or managing agent of wife's own interests would tend to show the
a public or private corporation or of a existence of collusive fraud between the spouses
partnership or association which is an and would then work havoc upon their common
adverse party, and interrogate him by defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the
leading questions and contradict and possibility, too, that the wife, in order to soften her
impeach him in all respects as if he had own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in a
been called by the adverse party and the manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the
witness thus called may be contradicted and husband.
impeached by or on behalf of the adverse
party also, and may be cross-examined by Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule
the adverse party only upon the subject- which provides merely that the wife cannot be
matter of his examination in chief. examined "for or against her husband without his
consent," it is further argued that "when husband
The basic issue may therefore be restated thus: In and wife are parties to an action, there is no reason
this case where the wife is a co-defendant in a suit why either may not be examined as a witness for or

Page 32 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
against himself or herself alone," and his or her The Case
testimony could operate only against himself or
herself.12 Before this Court is an appeal from the
Decision1 dated September 13, 1999 in Criminal
Even if such view were generally acceptable as an Case No. 94-11527 of the Regional Trial Court of
exception to the rule, or even as a separate doctrine, Antipolo City, Branch 73, convicting appellant
it would be inapplicable in this case where the main Roberto Pansensoy (appellant for brevity) of the
charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
third person, and the evident purpose of examination penalty of reclusion perpetua.  The trial court also
of the wife is to prove that charge. ordered appellant to pay the heirs of the victim
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P40,000.00 as actual
Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow one damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
spouse to be subjected to examination by the
adverse party as a hostile witness when both The Charge
spouses are parties to the action, either the interests
of the spouses are separate or separable, or the Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando L. Gonzales
spouse offered as a witness is merely a formal or filed an Information2 charging appellant with the
nominal party.13 crime of murder, committed as follows:

The final point urged upon us is that to prevent one That on or about the 8th day of May, 1994, in the
spouse from testifying would encourage alliance of Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal,
husband and wife as an instrument of fraud; for then Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
what better way would there be to prevent discovery Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
than to make a co-conspirator in fraud immune to with a handgun, with intent to kill and by means of
the most convenient mode of discovery available to treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and
the opposite party? This argument overlooks the fact there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
that section 6 of Rule 132 is a mere concession, for assault and shoot one Hilario Reyes y Inovero,
the sake of discovery, from the rule which precludes hitting him on his forehead, thereby inflicting upon
the husband or the wife from becoming the means of him a mortal gunshot wound, which directly caused
the other's condemnation. The said rule of discovery his death.
should therefore not be expanded in meaning or
scope as to allow examination of one's spouse in a CONTRARY TO LAW.
situation where this natural repugnance obtains.
Arraignment and Plea
It may not be amiss to state in passing that the
respondent Dineros has not demonstrated that there
is no evidence available to him other than the When arraigned on February 20, 1995, the
Lezamas' testimony to prove the charge recited in appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of
the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët not guilty.3 Thereafter, trial on the merits followed.

ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions appealed from are The Trial

versed, and this case is ordered remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings in accordance The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
with law. No costs. (1) Analie Pansensoy, eyewitness to the actual
shooting of the victim; (2) Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, the
[G. R. No. 140634. September 12, 2002 medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on
the victim; (3) SPO1 Reynaldo Anclote, the police
officer who conducted the investigation of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- incident; (4) Gregoria Reyes, mother of the victim;
Appellee, v. ROBERTO PANSENSOY, Accused- and (5) Rogelio Fullente, neighbor of the victim. For
Appellant. its part, the defense presented the appellant as its
lone witness.
DECISION
Version of the Prosecution
CARPIO, J.:

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Analie Pansensoy (Analie for brevity), twenty-eight was also driving. He was earning P800.00 a
years old, is the legitimate wife of appellant. She day.7cräläwvirtualibräry
testified that she had been living-in with the victim,
Hilario Reyes (Hilario for brevity), since February Rogelio Fullente (Rogelio for brevity), fifty-six years
1994. On May 8, 1994, she and Hilario were in the old, is a co-driver of Hilario in the Antipolo-Marikina
house they were renting at Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, route. He was the neighbor referred to by Gregoria
Rizal. Hilario was lying down inside the house. She in her testimony as Roger, who reported to her the
stood up when she heard a knocking on the door. As shooting incident. He has known Hilario for ten to
she opened the door, she saw appellant holding a fifteen years. In the evening of May 8, 1994, he was
gun. She embraced appellant and tried to wrest the in his home in Lumang Bayan which was about ten
gun away from him but she failed. Hilario went out of meters away from where Hilario was staying.
the house and sat on a bench. Appellant According to him, their houses were separated by a
approached Hilario and asked him if he really loves driveway which could accommodate one jeep. He
his wife. Hilario answered in the affirmative. heard several knocks and opened the door of his
Appellant next asked Hilario if he was still single. house. When he opened the door he found out that
Hilario answered yes. Appellant counted one to somebody was knocking on the door of Hilario and
three and at the count of three shot Hilario. Hilario ordering him to come out. The first time he saw the
was hit on the forehead and sprawled on the man knocking on Hilarios door, the man was not
ground.4cräläwvirtualibräry carrying anything. When he heard a gunshot, he
opened the door again and saw the man carrying
Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, physician, conducted the something before he left. Rogelio further narrated
autopsy on the victim at the St. James Funeral that when the man asked Hilario to come out, Hilario
Parlor at past midnight on May 9, 1994. He found a was standing by the door. The man asked Hilario if
single gunshot wound on the forehead which was he loved his wife and Hilario answered yes. The man
the cause of death. He opined that the entry shows then fired a shot and Hilarios head bent forward
the area of smudging which indicates that Hilario before he fell down. He does not know the caliber of
was shot at close range. The distance of the muzzle the gun but just heard the gunshot. He went to the
of the gun from the forehead could be less than parents of Hilario to report the incident. On cross-
three inches. He also opined that the person who examination, Rogelio testified that when appellant
fired the shot and Hilario were facing each knocked on the door, it was Hilario who opened the
other.5cräläwvirtualibräry door. Hilario sat on the bench by the door. When
Hilario answered yes to appellants question of
SPO1 Reynaldo Anclote, member of the Philippine whether he loved his wife, appellant immediately
National Police, conducted the investigation on the fired a shot. Rogelio testified that he watched
shooting of Hilario. He took the statements of appellant fire the shot and then left to report the
Gregoria Reyes and Analie in the police station a incident to the parents of Hilario.8
day after the incident. He did not conduct an ocular
inspection at the scene of the Version of the Defense
crime.6cräläwvirtualibräry
As expected, the defense had a different version as
Gregoria Reyes (Gregoria for brevity), mother of told by the appellant himself.
Hilario, testified that she came to know about the
death of her son through a neighbor, Roger. She Appellant, twenty-eight years old and a security
found out that her son was dead upon arrival at the guard, invoked self-defense in his testimony. He
hospital and was taken to the funeral parlor. She testified that Analie is his wife and they have three
saw the gunshot wound on the forehead of her son. children. According to him, their relationship as
On the same night of May 8, 1994, she went to the husband and wife was normal.
police station where she saw Analie give her
statement to the police. She also gave her statement On May 8, 1994, at about 6:30 p.m., a certain
to the police. As a result of the death of her son, she Amadong Bisaya (Bisaya for brevity) told him that he
incurred expenses in the amounts of P10,000.00 saw his wife with their youngest child and Tisoy,
and P30,000.00 for the funeral and the burial, referring to Hilario, board a jeep on their way to
respectively. At the time of his death, her son was Lumang Bayan. He had met Bisaya before when the
managing two passenger jeepneys, one of which he latter told him some time in April 1994 that he always
saw appellants wife with another man. He asked

Page 34 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Bisaya to accompany him to Lumang Bayan where shooting the victim was not found at the scene of the
Bisaya pointed to the room where his wife and Tisoy crime but the slug recovered was that of a .38
entered. caliber revolver. Although appellant was
subsequently acquitted of the charge, the trial court
The appellant kicked the door of the room and there considered this as evidence of a circumstance
he found his wife and Tisoy lying beside each other. connected with the crime. The trial court further
They were only clad in their underwear. He dragged noted that appellant went into hiding from the time
his wife out of the room by her hair and while doing the shooting incident happened until the case was
so, he saw Tisoy pull a gun from the table which was filed in court on August 24, 1994.
covered with clothes. He let go of his wife and
jumped on Tisoy to grab the gun. The trial court pronounced judgment thus:

While they struggled for possession of the gun he hit WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused is
the testicles of Tisoy with his knees. Tisoy fell on his hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt with
knees but was still holding the gun. Still grappling for the crime of murder and is hereby sentenced to the
possession of the gun, appellant held on to the back penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused is
portion of the gun and part of the trigger, while his hereby further ordered to pay the heirs of Hilario
other hand held Hilarios hand which was holding the Reyes y Inovero the amount of P50,000.00 as death
butt of the gun. When Hilario knelt down, appellant indemnity and P40,000.00 and P20,000.00 as actual
was able to twist Hilarios hand and to point the or compensatory and moral damages, respectively.
barrel of the gun towards the latter.
Costs against the accused.
The gun suddenly went off. At that moment, Tisoy
was holding the trigger of the gun. Tisoy was shot on SO ORDERED.10cräläwvirtualibräry
the head and fell down. It was Tisoy who was
holding the trigger when the gun fired and hit him on Hence, the instant appeal.
the head. Tisoy was still holding the gun when he fell
to the floor.
The Issues
He confronted his wife and pulled her hair and
slapped her. His wife was just seated in the corner of Appellant is before this Court raising the following
the room. He asked her where their child was. But assignment of errors:
before she could answer, their child went inside the
room and embraced her mother very tightly. He tried I
to pull their daughter away from Analie but the latter
did not let go of the child. He told Analie that he THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
would kill her too if she did not release the child. He FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
started to count one, two, which made his wife REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
release their daughter. He left the room with the CHARGED.
child and proceeded to their house. Tisoy was still
sprawled on the ground face down when he left.9 II

The Trial Courts Ruling THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN

CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF
The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the MURDER DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
testimony of Analie and rejected the version of the PROSECUTION TO PROVE ANY OF THE
appellant that he acted in self-defense. It found the QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES.
testimony of Analie credible and observed that she
remained unperturbed during the cross-examination. The Courts Ruling
The trial court also noted that appellant, who was
then a security guard, was charged by his employer
The appeal is partly meritorious.
with the crime of qualified theft for the loss of a .38
caliber revolver. Appellant allegedly committed the
theft on May 8, 1994, the very same day the First Issue: Self-Defense
shooting incident happened. The gun used in

Page 35 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Appellant insists that he acted in self-defense. Self- testimony is flawed as she insisted that she and
defense as a justifying circumstance may exempt an appellant had been separated for more than three
accused from criminal liability when the following years but this is belied by the fact that their youngest
requisites are met, namely: (1) there has been an daughter is barely a year old. He also points out that
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the appellants version that he dragged his wife outside
means employed to prevent or repel such by pulling her hair was more believable and in
aggression are reasonably necessary; and (3) the accord with human behavior rather than Analies
person defending himself has not provoked the version that appellant took time to interrogate the
victim into committing the act of aggression. 11 The victim regarding how much the latter loved his wife
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence and other personal circumstances before shooting
that the killing was justified is on the accused. 12 In him.
doing so, he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the We find no reason to reverse or alter the evaluation
prosecution.13cräläwvirtualibräry of the trial court. We reiterate the time tested
doctrine that a trial courts assessment of the
Appellant asserts that the unlawful aggressor was credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight
the victim and his death could be attributed to even conclusive and binding if not tainted with
himself alone. By his own testimony, appellant tried arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Hilario. circumstance of weight and influence. 14 The alleged
According to him, he kicked the door, and when it flaws in the testimony of Analie do not serve to
opened he saw his wife and Hilario inside the room impair her credibility or diminish the truthfulness of
clad in their underwear. He pulled the hair of his wife her remarks as to who initiated the aggression and
and dragged her outside while she was embracing fired the shot.
him. At this point, Hilario pulled a gun from the table.
He let go of his wife, jumped on Hilario and grappled The allegedly incredible statements do not pertain to
for possession of the gun. While trying to wrest the the act of killing, but rather to minor or incidental
gun from Hilario, he hit Hilarios testicles with his matters which happened before and after the fact of
knees. Hilario fell on the floor but was still holding killing. Analies testimony that she had been
the gun. When Hilario knelt down, appellant was separated from appellant for three years which, as
able to hold and twist Hilarios hand, pointing the gun pointed out by appellant, was belied by the age of
towards the latter. The gun suddenly went off and their youngest daughter, does not necessarily impair
Hilario was hit on the head. her credibility. Analies 3-year separation from
appellant does not preclude Analies still having a
On the other hand, Analie testified that when she child with appellant. As to Analies version that
opened the door to their room, she saw appellant appellant interrogated Hilario before shooting him,
holding a gun. She embraced appellant and tried to suffice it to say that it is a matter of common
wrest the gun from him but failed. Hilario went out observation that the reaction of a person when
and sat on a bench. Appellant approached him and confronted with a shocking or unusual incident
asked him questions. Appellant counted and, at the varies.15  As admitted by appellant himself, it was the
count of three, shot Hilario in the head. first time he saw his wife and Hilario together,
veritably confirming what Bisaya had told him some
The conflicting versions of the prosecution and of the time in April 1994 that Bisaya always saw his wife
defense as to who initiated the aggression was with  someone else. It was not at all strange for
settled by the trial court which gave full faith and appellant to have asked Hilario if he really loved his
credence to the testimony of Analie over that of wife. Were we to agree with the appellant and treat
appellant. The trial court, which had the opportunity each strange or unusual event in the occurrence of a
to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the crime, such as appellants interrogation of the victim,
stand, was convinced of the truthfulness of Analies as basis for reasonable doubt, no criminal
testimony and not that of appellants. prosecution would prevail.16cräläwvirtualibräry

Undeterred, appellants first assignment of error is In any event, a thorough evaluation of the transcript
focused on the sufficiency of the evidence for the of stenographic notes indicates that Analie, as
prosecution, questioning in particular the trial courts observed by the trial court, testified in a candid and
assessment of the credibility of the prosecutions straightforward manner as follows:
eyewitness, Analie. According to him, Analies

Page 36 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Q: Why do you know said Hilario Reyes? A: Hilario Reyes.

A: He is my live-in partner. Q: Before this Hilario Reyes was shot, what was he
doing?
Q: When did you start to be the live-in partner of
Hilario Reyes? A: He was already lying down.

A: February 1994. Q: Lying down where?

Q: Up to what time did you become to be the live-in A: Inside the house, sir.
partner of Hilario Reyes?
Q: How long was he lying down?
A: Three months.
A: Around fifteen minutes.
Q: What was the reason why your live-in relationship
lasted only three months? Q: After lying down for fifteen minutes, what did you
do next?
A: Because Roberto killed Hilario Reyes.
A: I stood up because Roberto knocked on the door.
Q: When was this Hilario Reyes killed?
Q: What happened next after this Roberto knocked
A: May 8, 1994. on the door?

Q: Where was he killed? A: I opened the door and I saw Roberto holding a
gun.
A: At Lumang Bayan.
Q: After you opened the door and you saw Roberto
Q: In what municipality? holding a gun, what happened next?

A: Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal. A: I embraced Roberto and tried to wrestle the gun
away from him but I did not succeed.
Q: How did you know that he was killed?
Q: When you were not able to succeed in taking the
gun away from him, what happened next?
A: He was shot by Roberto Pansensoy.

A: Hilario went out, sat on the bench and Roberto

Q: How did you know that he was shot by Roberto
approached him.
Pansensoy?

Q: And after Hilario went out and sat on the bench

A: Because Roberto went there and he was holding
and Roberto approached him, what happened next?
a gun.

A: Roberto asked Hilario; do you really love my wife?

Q: On May 8, 1994 that you said Hilario Reyes was
And Hilario said, Yes.
shot by Roberto Pansensoy, where were you?

Q: Who was this wife Roberto was referring to when

A: Inside the house, sir.
he asked Hilario?
Q: Whose is that house you are referring to?
A: Thats me.
A: We are renting that house.
Q: After Hilario answered that he really loved his
wife which is you that is being referred to, what
Q: With whom? happened next?

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
A: Roberto asked Hilario; are you still single, are you A: We are renting a house there.
not married?
Q: Who is your companion while renting that house?
Q: What was the response of Hilario if there was
any? A: Hilario Reyes.

A: He answered yes. Q: And who is this Hilario Reyes?

Q: What happened next? A: The victim.

A: Roberto counted one to three and at the count of Q: What is your relation with the victim?
3 he shot Hilario.
A: Live-in partner.
Q: Was Hilario hit by the shot that was made by
Roberto? Q: How long have you been living in together,
Madam Witness?
A: Hilario was hit on the forehead and he sprawled
on the ground.17cräläwvirtualibräry A: Three months.

Analie remained straightforward and consistent all Q: On that date May 8, 1994 you stated a while ago
throughout her cross-examination: that you were resting together with Hilario Reyes, is
that correct?
Q: Madam witness, you stated that you are the wife
of the accused Roberto Pansensoy, is that correct? A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: Inside the room of the house being rented by

Hilario Reyes?
Q: Are you legally married to accused Roberto
Pansensoy? A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: What was Hilario Reyes doing then?

Q: And if you remember, when were you married? A: He was laying (sic).

A: 1990. Q: Lying where?

Q: Where were you married? A: Inside.

A: At Negros Occidental. Q: Thereafter, what happened next while Hilario

Reyes was resting?
Q: You stated that on May 8, 1994, you were at
Lumang Bayan, Antipolo, Rizal, am I correct? A: I heard Roberto knock on the door.

A: Yes, sir. Q: After which, what happened next, Madam

Witness?
Q: In what particular place at Lumang Bayan is that?
A: I opened the door and I saw Roberto.
A: Inside the village.
Q: What did you do upon seeing Roberto on the
Q: What were you doing then inside the village? door?

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A: He was holding a gun and I embraced him, Moreover, appellants behavior after the incident runs
because I wanted to take the gun away from him. contrary to his proclaimed innocence. Appellants act
of fleeing from the scene of the crime instead of
Q: Is it not because you feel that Roberto Pansensoy reporting the incident to the police authorities are
might inflict harm on your living in partner, is that circumstances highly indicative of guilt and negate
correct? his claim of self-defense.24cräläwvirtualibräry

A: Yes, sir, I wanted to avoid Lastly, we find it unnecessary to consider as

trouble.18cräläwvirtualibräry corroborative evidence the charge of qualified theft
for the loss of a .38 caliber revolver filed against
appellant by his employer security agency. The trial
From Analies testimony, it is all too apparent that the
court discussed at length that the offense was
first requisite of self-defense is absent. The unlawful
committed on the same day the shooting incident
aggression did not come from the victim but from
happened and that the slug recovered from the
appellant himself. The aggression not having come
scene of the crime was from a .38 caliber revolver.
from the victim, appellants claim of self-defense
According to the trial court, while the gun was not
cannot prosper. The trial court relied on Analies
recovered from the scene of the crime, it was safe to
testimony to convict appellant and we find that her
assume that the accused had a gun when he went to
testimony is sufficient to support appellants
the place of the victim. While SPO1 Anclote testified
conviction.
regarding the nature of the slug, he admitted that he
never inspected the scene of the crime and that the
As the legitimate wife of appellant, Analies testimony slug was merely handed to him by SPO2 Catanyag
would have been disregarded had appellant timely who was not presented in court to testify. Hence,
objected to her competency to testify under reliance on this as evidence of a circumstance
the marital disqualification rule. Under this rule, connected with the crime rests on shaky ground and
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or is superfluous in light of Analies credible eyewitness
against the other without the consent of the affected account.
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
Second Issue: Passion and Obfuscation
one against the other or the latters direct
descendants or ascendants.19 However, objections
to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in Appellant argues for the appreciation of the
a criminal prosecution against the other may be mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
waived as in the case of other witnesses in his favor. According to appellant, when he
generally.20 The objection to the competency of the confirmed with his own two eyes that his wife was
spouse must be made when he or she is first offered cheating on him, he lost his self-control and that his
as a witness.21 In this case, the incompetency was actuation arose from a natural instinct that impels a
waived by appellants failure to make a timely husband to protect his wounded feelings. There is
objection to the admission of Analies testimony. basis for this claim.

We note that Rogelio was presented to corroborate In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance
Analies testimony, but he gave a rather confusing of passion and obfuscation, the following elements
account of what he allegedly saw or heard on the should concur: (1) there should be an act both
night of the shooting. During his direct examination, unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
he claimed that he heard a gunshot, but on cross- mind; (2) the act which produced the obfuscation
examination he claimed that he opened the door of was not far removed from the commission of the
his house and actually saw appellant shoot Hilario. crime by a considerable length of time, during which
In any event, it is well-settled that the testimony of a the perpetrator might recover his normal
lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient equanimity.25cräläwvirtualibräry
to convict an accused.22 On the other hand, a plea of
self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated, if it is Appellant was on his way home from his duty as a
not only uncorroborated by independent and security guard when he met Bisaya who told him that
competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful by he saw his wife and youngest child board a jeepney
itself23 as in the instant case. with the victim, Hilario. Appellant and Bisaya
followed them. Appellant claims that he saw his wife
and the victim lying beside each other, clad only in

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their underwear. Analie claims that they were just upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
resting inside the house at the time appellant during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a
arrived. Under any of these two circumstances, it is composed judgment.31cräläwvirtualibräry
easy to see how appellant acted with obfuscation
because of jealousy upon discovering his legitimate In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG
wife in the company of another man and the brazen for brevity) submits that evident premeditation is
admission by this man that he loved his wife. The present to qualify the killing to murder. According to
situation was aggravated by the fact that Analie the OSG, premeditation is apparent from the fact
brought their child along to her trysting place with that appellant went to the scene of the crime already
Hilario. Extreme emotional pain could result from carrying the gun which he used to shoot the victim.
such a situation and produce such passion and The OSG argues that while appellant may have
anguish in the mind of a betrayed husband as to been a security guard, he had no legal justification
deprive him of self-control. To be blinded by passion for bringing the gun to the victims residence. His act
and obfuscation is to lose self-control. 26 In this case, of bringing the gun to the crime scene is a clear
there is a clear showing that there were causes indication of his preconceived plan to kill his wifes
naturally tending to produce such powerful passion lover. The elements of evident premeditation as a
as to deprive the accused of reason and self- qualifying circumstance are: (1) the time when the
control.27cräläwvirtualibräry offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
Furthermore, the act producing the obfuscation was determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
not far removed from the commission of the crime by between the determination and execution, to allow
a considerable length of time, during which the him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and
appellant might have regained his equanimity. It to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of
appears that only a few minutes elapsed between his will.32cräläwvirtualibräry
the time appellant discovered the two in the room
and the killing. Thus, appellant can be given the Verily, a finding that there was a preconceived plan
benefit of this mitigating circumstance. to kill would negate passion and obfuscation.

Third Issue: Qualifying Circumstances However, nothing in the records shows how and
when appellant hatched his plan to kill, or how much
The Information alleges two qualifying time had elapsed before appellant carried out his
circumstances: treachery and evident premeditation. plan. On the contrary, appellant was on his way
If appreciated, any one of these will qualify the killing home from his duty as a security guard when he
to murder. However, the trial court convicted chanced upon Bisaya who told him that he saw his
appellant of murder without stating the circumstance wife and child with Hilario. The mere fact that he
which qualified the killing to murder. brought his gun along or happened to have it in his
person does not, by itself, necessarily indicate a
In view of our earlier pronouncement crediting in preconceived plan to kill. The carrying of arms, if
favor of appellant the mitigating circumstance of customary, does not indicate the existence of the
passion and obfuscation, we have to rule out second requisite. In People vs. Diokno,33 the Court
treachery and evident premeditation as qualifying held that the accused being from the province of
circumstances. Treachery cannot co-exist with Laguna and it being customary on the part of the
passion and obfuscation.28 The reason for this is that people of Laguna to carry knives, it cannot be
in passion, the offender loses his control while in inferred with certainty that the intention of the
treachery the means employed are consciously accused who carried knives was to look for the
adopted. One who loses reason and self-control deceased in order to kill him. In like manner, it
cannot deliberately employ a particular means, cannot be inferred with certainty that appellant
method or form of attack in the execution of the already had the intention to kill Hilario when
crime.29cräläwvirtualibräry appellant carried his gun on his way home after his
duty as a security guard.
Similarly, the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation cannot co-exist with the circumstance Fourth Issue: Damages and Penalty
of passion and obfuscation.30 The essence of
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act In view of the foregoing, the crime proven in this
must be preceded by calm thought and reflection case is not murder, but only homicide 34 with the

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mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. earning P800.00 daily as manager and driver of two
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the passenger jeepneys.42 This amounts to P19,200.00
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. With the monthly excluding Sundays. The defense did not
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, object to Gregorias testimony on her sons earning
the penalty which may be imposed pursuant to the capacity. The rule is that evidence not objected to is
second paragraph of Article 64 of the Revised Penal deemed admitted and may be validly considered by
Code is reclusion temporal in its minimum period. the court in arriving at its judgment. 43 It was also
Appellant is entitled to the benefit of the established that at the time of his death, Hilario was
Indeterminate Sentence Law as well, which allows thirty-six (36) years old.44 Loss of earning capacity is
the imposition of an indeterminate sentence, with the computed based on the following
minimum period within the range of the penalty next formula:45cräläwvirtualibräry
lower to that prescribed by law and the maximum
period within the range of the latter after appreciating Net = life expectancy x Gross Annual - living
any modifying circumstances. Appellant can thus be expenses
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to Earning Income (GAI) (50% of GAI)
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.35cräläwvirtualibräry
Capacity [2/3(80-age
As for damages, the trial court ordered appellant to
pay the heirs of the victim the following amounts: at death)]
P50,000.00 as indemnity; P40,000.00 as actual
damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and to x = 2(80-36) x GAI - [50%of GAI]
pay the costs.
3
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we sustain
the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Hilario. The x = 2(44) x P 230,400 - P 115,200
amount is awarded without need of proof other than
the commission of the crime 36 and the consequent 3
death of the victim.
x = 88 x P 115,200
An appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole
case open for review and it becomes the duty of this
3
Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment,
whether it is made the subject of an assignment of
error or not.37 Therefore, we delete the award of x = 29.33 x P 115,200
P40,000.00 as actual damages. To seek recovery of
actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual Net earning capacity = P 3,379,200.00
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof and on WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 73 of the
the best evidence obtainable.38 Since the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City in Criminal
prosecution did not present receipts to prove the Case No. 94-11527 is MODIFIED. Appellant
actual losses suffered, such actual damages cannot ROBERTO PANSENSOY is found guilty beyond
be awarded. We raise the award of moral damages reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE as
from P20,000.000 to P50,000.00 in line with current defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
jurisprudence39 for the pain wrought by Hilarios Revised Penal Code, instead of murder. Applying
death as testified to by Gregoria, mother of the the Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into
victim.40cräläwvirtualibräry account the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer
The trial court overlooked the award for loss of an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8)
earning capacity despite the testimony of Gregoria years of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to
on her sons daily income. The absence of Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months
documentary evidence to substantiate the claim for of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum. The
the loss will not preclude recovery of such award of actual damages of P40,000.00 is
loss.41 Gregoria testified that her son had been DELETED, but appellant is ordered to pay the heirs

Page 41 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
of the victim moral damages in the amount of Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the
P50,000.00 and loss of earning capacity in the crime being charged particularly that accused
amount of P3,379,200.00. Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in
the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-
SO ORDERED. dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned
by his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that accused
Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the
[G.R. NO. 143439 October 14, 2005]
door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set
it on fire; that the accused at the time he
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner, v. SUSAN successfully set the house on fire (sic) of Susan
RAMIREZ, Respondent. Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan
Ramirez, the members of the family as well
DECISION as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the
accused; that as a consequence of the accused in
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan
Ramirez, the door of said house was burned and
Before us is a Petition for Review together with several articles of the house, including
on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of shoes, chairs and others.
Appeals dated May 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
56154, entitled "Susan Ramirez, Petitioner, versus, COURT:
Hon. Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr., as Judge RTC,
Malabon, MM, Br. 72, and Maximo You may proceed.
Alvarez, Respondents."
xxx
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the
complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN DIRECT EXAMINATION
for arson3 pending before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo
ATTY. ALCANTARA:
Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of
Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.
xxx
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called
Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first Q: When you were able to find the source,
witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner incidentally what was the source of that scent?
and his counsel raised no objection. cralawlibrary

Esperanza testified as follows: A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man
pouring the gasoline in the house of my sister (and
witness pointing to the person of the accused inside
"ATTY. ALCANTARA:
the court room).
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the
the accused, Your Honor.
name of that person, if you know?cralawlibrary
COURT:
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.
Swear in the witness.
Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can
you identify him?cralawlibrary
xxx
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this please point him?cralawlibrary
witness for the purpose of proving that the accused

Page 42 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to The reasons given for the rule are:
stand and asked his name, he gave his name as
Maximo Alvarez."4 1. There is identity of interests between husband
and wife;
In the course of Esperanza's direct testimony against
petitioner, the latter showed "uncontrolled emotions," 2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there
prompting the trial judge to suspend the is consequent danger of perjury;
proceedings.
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
a motion5 to disqualify Esperanza from testifying occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic
against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised disunion and unhappiness; andcralawlibrary
Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there
Respondent filed an opposition6 to the motion. is danger of punishing one spouse through the
Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court hostile testimony of the other.11
directed the prosecution to proceed with the
presentation of the other witnesses. But like all other general rules, the marital
disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in
On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the civil actions between the spouses and in criminal
questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez cases for offenses committed by one against the
from further testifying and deleting her testimony other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed
from the records.7 The prosecution filed a motion for by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed outweigh those in support of the general rule. For
Order dated October 19, 1999.8 instance, where the marital and domestic relations
are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be
complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933- disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and
MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a Petition tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests
for Certiorari9 with application for preliminary disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
injunction and temporary restraining order. 10 based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in
such a situation, the security and confidences of
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be
Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed nothing but ideals, which through their absence,
Orders issued by the trial court. merely leave a void in the unhappy home.12

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari . In Ordoño v. Daquigan,13 this Court held:

The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza "We think that the correct rule, which may be
Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargil
Case No. 19933-MN. v. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314,
wherein the court said:
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: 'The rule that the injury must amount to a physical
wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule
that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.
domestic harmony comes within the exception is too
'During their marriage, neither the husband nor the
broad. The better rule is that, when an offense
wife may testify for or against the other without the
directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the
consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case
conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
statute that one shall not be a witness against the
crime committed by one against the other or the
other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
latter's direct descendants or ascendants."
committee (by) one against the other. '"

Page 43 of 211
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Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to to testify against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal
petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.
between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as
embodied in the Information for arson filed against SO ORDERED.
him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life
such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which G.R. No. L-22948             March 17, 1925
virtues the conjugal relationship survives and
flourishes.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals: vs.
FAUSTO V. CARLOS, defendant-appellant.
"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the
house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing M.H. de Joya, Jose Padilla, Vicente Sotto and
fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the Monico Mercado for appellant.
alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally Attorney-General Villa-Real and City Fiscal Guevara
alien to the harmony and confidences of marital for appellee.
relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to
protect. The criminal act complained of had the
effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal OSTRAND, J.:
relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and
domestic relations between her and the accused- This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of
husband have become so strained that there is no First Instance of the City of Manila finding the
more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. defendant Fausto V. Carlos guilty of the crime of
The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, murder and sentencing him to suffer life
identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the imprisonment, with the accessory penalties
security and confidences of private life which the law prescribed by law and with the costs.
aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy It appears from the evidence that the victim of the
home. (People v. Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, on March 3,
Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the 1924, in Mary Chiles Hospital, performed a surgical
Marital Disqualification Rule." operation upon the defendant's wife for appendicitis
and certain other ailments. She remained in the
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, hospital until the 18th of the same month, but after
prior to the commission of the offense, the her release therefrom she was required to go
relationship between petitioner and his wife was several times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar at No. 40
already strained. In fact, they were separated de Escolta, for the purpose of dressing the wounds
facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, caused by the operation. On these occasions she
the evidence and facts presented reveal that the was accompanied by her husband, the defendant.
preservation of the marriage between petitioner and The defendant states that on one of the visits, that of
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to March 20, 1924, Doctor Sityar sent him out on an
protect. errand to buy some medicine, and that while
defendant was absent on this errand Doctor Sityar
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being outraged the wife. The defendant further states that
interested in laying the truth before the courts so that his wife informed him of the outrage shortly after
the guilty may be punished and the innocent leaving the clinic. Notwithstanding this it
exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct nevertheless appears that he again went there on
testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection March 28th to consult the deceased about some
of the accused, because (as stated by this Court lung trouble from which he, the defendant, was
in Francisco14), "it was the latter himself who gave suffering.. He was given some medical treatment
rise to its necessity." and appears to have made at least one more visit to
the clinic without revealing any special resentment.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch 72, On May 12, 1924, the defendant, suffering from
Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez some stomach trouble, entered the Philippine
General Hospital where he remained until May 18,

Page 44 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
1924, and where he was under the care of two other people in the adjoining room, he again stabbed him,
physicians. While in the hospital her received a letter this time in the back.
(Exhibit 5) from Doctor Sityar asking the immediate
settlement of the account for the professional The defendant's testimony as to the struggle
services rendered his wife. Shortly after his release described is in conflict with the evidence presented
from the hospital the defendant sought an interview by the prosecution. But assuming that it is true, it is
with Doctor Sityar and went to the latter's office very evident that it fails to establish a case of self-
several times without finding him in. On one of these defense and that, in reality, the only question here to
occasions he was asked by an employee of the be determined is whether the defendant is guilty of
office, the nurse Cabañera, if he had come to settle murder or of simple homicide.
his account, to which the defendant answered that
he did not believe he owed the doctor anything. The court below found that the crime was committed
with premeditation and therefore constituted murder.
In the afternoon of May 26th the defendant again This finding can only be sustained by taking into
went to the office of the deceased and found him consideration Exhibit L, a letter written to the
there alone. According to the evidence of the defendant by his wife and siezed by the police in
prosecution, the defendant then, without any searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is
preliminary quarrel between the two, attacked the dated May 25, 1924, two days before the
deceased with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice. commission of the crime and shows that the writer
The deceased made an effort to escape but the feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to
defendant pursued him and overtaking him in the physical violence in dealing with the deceased.
hall outside the office, inflicted another wound upon
him and as a consequence if the three wounds he Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the
died within a few minutes. The defendants made his letter was a privileged communication and therefore
escape but surrendered himself to the Constabulary not admissible in evidence. The numerical weight of
at Malolos, Bulacan, in the evening of the following authority is, however, to the effect that where a
day. privileged communication from one spouse to
another comes into the hands of a third party,
The defendant admits that he killed the deceased whether legally or not, without collusion and
but maintains that he did so in self-defense. He voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the
explains that he went to Doctor Sityar's office to spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and
protest against the amount of the fee charged by the the communication, if otherwise competent,
doctor and, in any event, to ask for an extension of becomes admissible. (28 R.C.L., 530 and authorities
the time of payment; that during the conversation there cited.) Such is the view of the majority of this
upon that subject the deceased insulted him by court.
telling him that inasmuch as he could not pay the
amount demanded he could send his wife to the Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows:
office as she was the one treated, and that she could
then talk the matter over with the decease; that this
statement was made in such an insolent and For documents  of communication coming
contemptuous manner that the defendant became into the possession of a third person, a
greatly incensed and remembering the outrage distinction should obtain, analogous to that
committed upon his wife, he assumed a threatening already indicated for a client's
attitude and challenged the deceased to go communications (ante, par. 2325, 2326); i.
downstairs with him and there settle the matter; that e., if they were obtained from the addressee
the deceased thereupon took a pocket-knife from the by voluntary delivery, they should still be
center drawer of his desk and attacked the privileged (for otherwise the privilege could
defendant, endeavoring to force him out of the office; by collusion be practically nullified for written
that the defendant, making use of his knowledge of communications); but if they were obtained
fencing, succeeded in taking the knife away from the surreptitiously or otherwise without the
deceased and blinded by fury stabbed him first in the addressee's consent, the privilege should
right side of the breast and then in the epigastric cease. (5 Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd ed.,
region, and fearing that the deceased might secure par. 2339.)
some other weapon or receive assistance from the
The letter in question was obtained through a search
for which no warrant appears to have been issued

Page 45 of 211
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and counsel for the defendant cites the causes of is, nevertheless, under the decisions in the Weeks
Boyd and Boyd vs. United States (116 U.S., 616) and Silverthorne cases, inapplicable to the present
and Silverthorne Lumber Co. and Silverthorne vs. case. Here the illegality of the search and seizure
United States (251 U.S., 385) as authority for the was not "directly litigated and established by a
proposition that documents obtained by illegal motion, made before trial, for the return of the things
searches of the defendant's effects are not seized."
admissible in evidence in a criminal case. In
discussing this point we can do not better than to The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for
quote Professor Wigmore: reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter was
written by the wife of the defendant and if she had
The foregoing doctrine (i. e., that the testified at the trial the letter might have been
admissibility of evidence is not affected by admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was
the illegality of the means through which the not put on the witness-stand and the letter was
party has been enabled to obtain the therefore not offered for that purpose. If the
evidence) was never doubted until the defendant either by answer or otherwise had
appearance of the ill-starred majority opinion indicated his assent to the statements contained in
of Boyd vs. United States, in 1885, which the letter it might also have been admissible, but
has exercised unhealthy influence upon such is not the case here; the fact that he had the
subsequent judicial opinion in many States. letter in his possession is no indication of
acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is
xxx     xxx     xxx therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission
in evidence violates the constitutional right of the
defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with
The progress of this doctrine of Boyd vs.
the witnesses for the prosecution and have the
United States was as follows: (a) The Boyd
opportunity to cross-examine them. In this respect
Case remained unquestioned in its own
there can be no difference between an ordinary
Court for twenty years; meantime receiving
communication and one originally privileged.
frequent disfavor in the State Courts (ante,
par. 2183). (b) Then in Adams vs. New York,
in 1904, it was virtually repudiated in the The question is radically different from that of the
Federal Supreme Court, and the orthodox admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a
precedents recorded in the State courts conversation between a husband and wife
(ante, par. 2183) were expressly approved. overheard by the witness. Testimony of that
(c) Next, after another twenty years, in 1914 character is admissible on the ground that it relates
— moved this time, not by erroneous to a conversation in which both spouses took part
history, but by misplaced sentimentality — and on the further ground that where the defendant
the Federal Supreme Court, in Weeks vs. has the opportunity to answer a statement made to
United States, reverted to the original him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence
doctrine of the Boyd Case, but with a implies assent. That cannot apply where the
condition, viz., that the illegality of the statement is contained in an unanswered letter.
search and seizure should first have been
directly litigated and established by a The Attorney-General in support of the contrary view
motion, made before trial, for the return of quotes Wigmore, as follows:
the things seized; so that, after such a
motion, and then only, the illegality would be . . . Express communication  is always a
noticed in the main trial and the evidence proper mode of evidencing knowledge or
thus obtained would be excluded. ... (4 belief. Communication to
Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd ed., par. 2184.) a husband or wife  is always receivable to
show probable knowledge by the other
In the Silverthorne Lumber Co. case the United (except where they are living apart or are
States Supreme Court adhered to its decision in the not in good terms), because, while it is not
Weeks Case. The doctrine laid down in these cases certain that the one will tell the other, and
has been followed by some of the State courts but while the probability is less upon some
has been severely criticized and does not appear to subjects than upon others, still there is
have been generally accepted. But assuming, always some probability, — which is all that
without deciding, that it prevails in this jurisdiction it

Page 46 of 211
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 can be fairly asked for admissibility. ... (1 FISHER, J.  :
Wigmore, id., par. 261.)

This may possibly be good law, though Wigmore The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First
cites no authority in support of his assertion, but as Instance of the Province of Batangas, charged with
far as we can see it has little or nothing to do with the murder of one Fortunato Dinal. The trial court
the present case. convicted him of homicide and from that decision he
has appealed. One of the errors assigned is based
As we have already intimated, if Exhibit L is upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana
excluded, there is in our opinion not sufficient Ezpeleta, the widow of the man whom the appellant
evidence in the record to show that the crime was is accused of having murdered, to testify as a
premeditated. witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain
alleged dying declarations. The witness was called
to the stand and having stated that she is the widow
The prosecution maintains that the crime was
of Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what occasion did
committed with alevosia. This contention is based
your husband die?" To this question the fiscal
principally on the fact that one of the wounds
objected upon the following
received by the deceased showed a downward
ground:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
direction indicating that the deceased was sitting
down when the wound was inflicted. We do not think
"I object to the testimony of this witness. She has
this fact is sufficient proof. The direction of the
just testified that she is the widow of the deceased,
wound would depend largely upon the manner in
Fortunato Dinal, and that being so I believe that she
which the knife was held.
is not competent to testify under the rules of
procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it
For the reasons stated we find the defendant guilty be with the consent of her husband, and as he is
of simple homicide, without aggravating or dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that
extenuating circumstances. this witness is disqualified from testifying in this case
in which her husband is the injured party."cralaw
The sentence appealed from is therefore modified by virtua1aw library
reducing the penalty to fourteen years, eight months
and one day of reclusion temporal, with the Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was
corresponding accessory penalties and with the competent, arguing that the disqualification which
costs against the appellant. So ordered. the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases
in which a husband or wife of one of the parties to a
[G.R. No. L-13109. March 6, 1918. ] proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the
prosecution of a criminal case are the Government
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. and the accused; that, furthermore, the marriage of
DALMACIO ANTIPOLO, Defendant-Appellant. Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the
death of her husband, she is no longer his wife, and
Irureta Goyena & Recto for Appellant. therefore not subject to any disqualification arising
from the status of marriage.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for Appellee.
These propositions were rejected by the trial judge,
SYLLABUS and the objection of the fiscal as to the testimony of
the woman Ezpeleta was sustained. To this
1. HOMICIDE; DYING DECLARATIONS; objection counsel took exception and made in offer
WITNESSES; HUSBAND AND WIFE. — The to prove by the excluded witness the facts which he
window of the deceased is a competent witness, in a expected to establish by her testimony. Concerning
prosecution regarding dying declarations to her by these facts it is sufficient at this time to say some of
the deceased concerning the cause of his death. them would be both material and relevant, to such a
degree that if proven to the satisfaction of the court,
they might have lead to the acquittal of the accused,
DECISION as they purported to relate to the dying declarations
of the deceased, concerning the cause of his death,
the general purport being that his injuries were due
to a fall and not to the acts imputed to the accused.

Page 47 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads The same theory as that upon which section 58 of
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph General Orders No. 58 is based, underlies section
383, paragraph 3 of Act No. 190, which reads as
"Except with the consent of both, or except in cases follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
of crime committed by one against the other, neither
husband nor wife shall be a competent witness for or "A husband cannot be examined for or against his
against the other in a criminal action or proceeding wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against
to which one or both shall be parties."cralaw her husband without his consent; nor can either,
virtua1aw library during the marriage or afterwards, be, without the
consent of the other, examined as to any
The reasons for this rule are thus stated in communication made by one to the other during the
Underhill’s work on Criminal Evidence (second marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil
edition) on page 346:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph action or proceeding for a crime committed by one
against the other."cralaw virtua1aw library
"At common law, neither a husband nor a wife was a
competent witness for or against the other in any The only doubt which can arise from a reading of
judicial proceedings, civil or criminal, to which the this provision relates to the meaning of the words
other was a party. . . . If either were recognized as a "during the marriage or afterwards," and this doubt
competent witness against the other who was can arise only by a consideration of this doubt can
accused of crime, . . . a vey serious injury would be arise only by a consideration of this phrase
done to the harmony and happiness of husband and separately from the rest of the paragraph. Construed
wife and the confidence which should exist between as a whole it is evident that it relates only to cases in
them."cralaw virtua1aw library which the testimony of a spouse is offered for or
against the other in a proceeding to which the other
In Greenleaf’s classical work on evidence, in section is a party. The use of the word "afterwards" in the
337 [vol. I], the author says, in stating the reason for phrase "during the marriage of afterwards" was
the rule at common law:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph intended to cover cases in which a marriage has
been dissolved otherwise than by the death of one of
"The great object of the rule is to secure domestic the spouses — as, for instance, by decree of
happiness by placing the protecting seal of the law annulment or divorce.
upon all confidential communications between
husband and wife; and whatever has come to the The declarations of a deceased person while in
knowledge of either by means of the hallowed anticipation of certain impending death, concerning
confidence which that relation inspires, cannot be the circumstances leading up to the death, are
afterwards divulged in testimony even through the admissible in a prosecution of the person charged
other party be no longer living."cralaw virtua1aw with killing the declarant. (U. S. v. Gil, 13 Phil. Rep.,
library 530.) Such dying declaration are admissible in favor
of the defendant as well as against him. (Mattox v.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or U. S., 146 U. S., 140.) It has been expressly held in
the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of several jurisdictions in the United States that the
section 58 is to protect accused persons against widow of the deceased may testify regarding his
statements made in the confidence engendered by dying declarations. In the case of the State v. Rayan
the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or (30 la. Ann., 1176), cited by appellant in his brief, the
wife to whom such confidential communications court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
might have been made from the obligation of
revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. "The next bill is as to the competency of the widow
Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a of the deceased to prove his dying declarations. We
result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement see no possible reason for excluding her . . . after
regarding the manner in which he received those the husbands’s death she is no longer his wife, and
injuries, the communication so made is in no sense the rules of evidence, as between husbands and
confidential. On the contrary, such a communication wives, are no longer applicable."cralaw virtua1aw
is made for the express purpose that it may be library
communicated after the death of the declarant to the
authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of In the case of Arnett v. Commonwealth (144 Ky.,
his death. 593, 596), the testimony of the widow of the

Page 48 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
deceased as to his dying declarations made to her ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA
was objected to upon the express ground that under VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondents.
the terms of the Kentucky Code, "the wife was
incompetent to testify even after the cessation of the DECISION
marriage relation, to any communication made to her
by her husband during marriage."cralaw virtua1aw CARPIO, J.:
library

This contention was rejected, the court The Case

saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed
"On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify on 22 October 2001 by Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom
against her husband as to what came to her from ("Judge Lacurom"), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial
him confidentially or by reason of the marriage Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, against
relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty.
communication made by the husband to the wife on Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("respondents"). Complainant
the trial of the one who killed him. The declaration of charged respondents with violation of Rules
the deceased made in extremes in such cases is a 11.03,1 11.04,2 and 19.013 of the Code of
thing to be proven, and this proof may be made by Professional Responsibility.
any competent witness who heard the statement.
The wife may testify for the state in cases of this The Facts
character as to any other fact known to her. . . . It
can not be contended that the dying declaration The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for
testified to by the witness was a confidential plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion ("Veneracion") in a
communication made to her; on the contrary, it was civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant
evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the Federico Barrientos ("Barrientos"). 4 The Municipal
express purpose that it should be testified to in the Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in
prosecution of the defendant."cralaw virtua1aw favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the
library Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch
30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing
We are therefore of the opinion that the court below judge.
erred in excluding the testimony of the witness
Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a
exclusion, the accused was deprived of one of his
Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier
essential rights. That being the case, a new trial
judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion. 5 The
must be granted.
dispositive portion reads:
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court
below is hereby set aside and a new trial is granted WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its
at which the testimony of the witness Susana Decision dated December 22, 2000, as well as
Ezpeleta will be admitted, together with any REVERSES the Decision of the court a quo dated
additional evidence which may be offered on the part July 22, 1997.
of the prosecution or the defense. At the new trial
granted the accused, the testimony taken at the Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro
former hearing shall be considered. The costs of this Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from
appeal shall be de officio. So ordered. ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos
from the 1,000 square meter homelot covered by
TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller area of one
A.C. No. 5921             March 10, 2006 hundred forty-seven square meters, within the 1,000
sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house
thereon standing covered by Tax Declaration No.
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding
02006-01137, issued by the City Assessor of
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City,
Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is ordered to pay
Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch
Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by
30, Complainant,
Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137.
vs.

Page 49 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
SO ORDERED.6 THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real
BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE
Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for base this conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS
Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition)7 dated MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
30 July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"), pertinent
portions of which read: xxxx

II. PREFATORY STATEMENT 6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge

ERRED Grievously in Holding and Declaring that
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of
an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the
of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal Subject-Matter:
MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT acted as if it were the Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law
DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION Student knows that JURISDICTION is determined by
BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! the averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the
The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x averments in the answer! This is backed up by a
Litany of Cases!
xxxx
xxxx
III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the
ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As
Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular Payment for Plaintiff’s HOUSE:
RTC Presiding Judge:1awph!l.net
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING ERRORS
Reconsideration, and after a very questionable committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.
SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and
SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual xxxx
basis, the Hon. Pairing Judge simply and
peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his
of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the
suspicious, hence, this Motion for Reconsideration. ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates
the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and
xxxx ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court
Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight!8
been established and presumes FACTS not part of
the records of the case, all "loaded" in favor of the The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge
alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff a
INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in fighting chance" and (2) the Resolution be
the Judicial Process. Need we say more? reconsidered and set aside.9 Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on
xxxx behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.

4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-
ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is Entitled to Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why
a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in she should not be held in contempt of court for the
Question is That Homelot: "very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating"
contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. 10 In her
Explanation, Comments and Answer, 11 Velasco-
Jacoba claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand

Page 50 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
who actually prepared the subject Motion; records be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but
will show that the undersigned counsel did not could not sign because of his then suspension from
actually or actively participate in this the practice of law.18
case."12 Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any "conscious
or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had
integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any found her guilty of contempt without conducting any
form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring
of justice."13 She rationalized as follows: "a personal vendetta," ordering her imprisonment
despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a
contain some sardonic, strident and hard-striking grandmother many times over."19 At any rate, she
adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent argued, Judge Lacurom should have inhibited
words at random and bunch them together, side-by- himself from the case out of delicadeza because
side x x x then collectively and certainly they present "[Veneracion] had already filed against him criminal
a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. x x cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
x Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman."20

xxxx The records show that with the assistance of

counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on
did not just fire a staccato of incisive and hard-hitting 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of
remarks, machine-gun style as to be called knowingly rendering unjust judgment through
contumacious and contemptuous. They were just inexcusable negligence and ignorance 21 and
articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and violating
disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good fortune,
not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA
the Honorable Pairing judge. They must believe that 3019").22 The first charge became the subject of a
big monumental errors deserve equally big preliminary investigation23 by the City Prosecutor of
adjectives, no more no less. x x x The matters Cabanatuan City. On the second charge,
involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-
and they had to call a spade a spade. x x x14 Affidavit24 filed on 28 August 2001 with the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed
willingness to apologize "for whatever mistake [they] Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21
may have committed in a moment of unguarded September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to
discretion when [they] may have ‘stepped on the line explain why he should not be held in
and gone out of bounds’." She also agreed to have contempt.25 Jacoba complied by filing an Answer
the allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off the with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied
record.15 that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion.
Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements implicating
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in
Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized evidence.26 Judge Lacurom later rendered a
her with imprisonment for five days and a fine decision27 finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court
of P1,000.16 and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.

Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the
September 2001 order. She recounted that on her present complaint against respondents before the
way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O,
pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." Report and Recommendation of the IBP
(Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed
on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her Respondents did not file an answer and neither did
without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her they appear at the hearing set by IBP Commissioner
husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her
whole life and future."17 This pleading turned out to

Page 51 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Atty. Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP Commissioner On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacoba’s
Navarro") despite sufficient notice.28 contention that the present complaint should be
considered sub judice in view of the petition for
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and certiorari and mandatory inhibition with preliminary
Recommendation of 10 October 2002, injunction ("petition for certiorari")35 filed before the
recommended the suspension of respondents from Court of Appeals.
the practice of law for six months.29 IBP
Commissioner Navarro found that "respondents The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion
were prone to us[ing] offensive and derogatory and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October 2001, seeks to
remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom
and disrespect for authority."30 Although the remarks in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders dated 26
were not directed at Judge Lacurom personally, they September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying
were aimed at "his position as a judge, which is a respondents’ respective motions for inhibition; and
smack on the judiciary system as a whole."31 (2) the 13 September 2001 Order which found
Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners
The IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") adopted allege that Judge Lacurom acted "with grave abuse
IBP Commissioner Navarro’s Report and of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in
Recommendation, except for the length of violation of express provisions of the law and
suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three applicable decisions of the Supreme Court."36
months.32 On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board
transmitted its recommendation to this Court, Plainly, the issue before us is respondents’ liability
together with the documents pertaining to the case. under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
outcome of this case has no bearing on the
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is
reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, thus:33 neither identity of issues nor causes of action.

xxxx Neither should the Court’s dismissal of the

administrative complaint against Judge Lacurom for
being premature impel us to dismiss this complaint.
3. For the information of the Honorable
Judge Lacurom’s orders in Civil Case No. 2836
Commission, the present complaint of
could not be the subject of an administrative
Judge Lacurom is sub judice; the same
complaint against him while a petition for certiorari
issues involved in this case are raised
assailing the same orders is pending with an
before the Honorable Court of Appeals
appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither
presently pending in CA-G.R. SP No.
alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where
66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory
such review is available to the aggrieved parties and
Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary
the same has not been resolved with finality. Until
Injunction x x x;
there is a final declaration that the challenged order
or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no
4. We filed an Administrative Case against basis to conclude whether the judge is
Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court administratively liable.37
involving the same issues we raised in the
aforementioned Certiorari case, which was
The respondents are situated differently within the
dismissed by the Supreme Court for being
factual setting of this case. The corresponding
premature, in view of the pending Certiorari
implications of their actions also give rise to different
case before the Court of Appeals;
liabilities. We first examine the charge against
Velasco-Jacoba.
5. In like manner, out of respect and
deference to the Court of Appeals, the
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of
present complaint should likewise be
Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001
dismissed and/or suspended pending
motion. Velasco-Jacoba’s responsibility as counsel
resolution of the certiorari case by the Court
is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of
of Appeals.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Court:
The Court’s Ruling

Page 52 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
SEC. 3.Signature and address.—Every pleading at the errors which he perceived and believed to be
must be signed by the party or counsel representing gigantic and monumental."40
him x x x.
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her
by him that he has read the pleading, that to the reaction to the events was immediate and
best of his knowledge, information, and belief spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’s defense which was
there is good ground to support it, and that it is raised only after a considerable time had elapsed
not interposed for delay. from the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba
had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s
violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or assertion that she had not "actually participate[d]" in
indecent matter therein x x x shall be subject to the prosecution of the case.
appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis
supplied) Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case
No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding
in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to the contempt charge against him. 41 This petition for
be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the
delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacoba’s
with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere handiwork.42
scrap of paper to that of a court document.
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence,
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed may be waived by failure of the claimant to object
the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may
husband’s request but she did not know its contents be construed as implied consent. 43 This waiver
beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship
other’s pleadings is a long-standing arrangement of the 30 July 2001 motion.
between the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba,
"[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
happens all the time. Through the years, [she]
already lost count of the number of pleadings Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from
prepared by one that is signed by the other." 38 By scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
Velasco-Jacoba’s own admission, therefore, she behavior before the Courts.
violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act
of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge
ground motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent
of any other ground arising from the contents of the No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July
30 July 2001 motion.39 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of
Jacoba to defend ably his client’s cause. We recall
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. his use of the following words and
His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal
motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco- monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible
Jacoba’s statement pointing to him as the author of error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an
the motion. anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-
Jacoba acknowledged that the words created "a
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect." 44
Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition
did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate
Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the themselves by saying that every remark in the 30
motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired July 2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.

Page 53 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local
officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in Government Code.50
properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges. 45 However, In these cases, the Court sternly warned
even the most hardened judge would be scarred by respondents that a repetition of similar acts would
the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced
motion on Judge Lacurom’s Resolution. On its face, with the question of whether respondents have
the Resolution presented the facts correctly and conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor
decided the case according to supporting law and required of them as members of the bar and officers
jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s language may be of the court. We find respondents to have fallen
forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified short of the mark.
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession.46 The use of unnecessary language is WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba
proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the from the practice of law for two (2) years effective
courts and trust in judicial administration.47 upon finality of this Decision. We
also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a practice of law for two (2) months effective upon
lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified finality of this Decision.
language but also to pursue the client’s cause We STERNLY WARN respondentsthat a repetition
through fair and honest means, thus: of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more
severe sanction.
Rule 19.01.—A lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
client and shall not present, participate in presenting the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents’
or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to personal records as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of
obtain an improper advantage in any case or the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their
proceeding. information and guidance.

Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but SO ORDERED.
before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his client in
instituting two administrative cases against Judge [G.R. No. 9231. January 6, 1915. ]
Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case No.
2836 was then pending before Judge Lacurom’s UY CHICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE UNION
sala. The Court’s attention is drawn to the fact that LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET
the timing of the filing of these administrative cases AL., Defendants-Appellees.
could very well raise the suspicion that the cases
were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom. Beaumont & Tenney for Appellant.

Respondent spouses have both been the subject of Bruce, Lawrence, Ross & Block for Appellees.
administrative cases before this Court. In
Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended SYLLABUS
Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six
months because of "his failure to file an action for 1. WITNESSES; PRIVILEGED
the recovery of possession of property despite the COMMUNICATIONS; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. —
lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him Communications made by a client to his attorney for
of P550 which his client gave him as filing and the purpose of being communicated to others are
sheriff’s fees."48 In Administrative Case No. 5505, not privileged after they have been so
Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties communicated, and may be proved by the testimony
when he failed to file the appellant’s brief, resulting of the attorney. This rule applies to a compromise
in the dismissal of his client’s appeal. We imposed agreement perfected by the attorney with the
the penalty of one year suspension.49 authority and under the instructions of his client.

As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined 2. ID.; ID.; WAIVER. — AS to whether a waiver of
her P5,000 for appearing in barangay conciliation the client’s privilege personally made in open court
proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well can be withdrawn before acted upon, quaere.

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 thereof Ross v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (101 Minn.,
122; 111 N. W., 951). The case of Natlee Draft
DECISION Horse Co. v. Cripe & Co. (142 Ky., 810), also
appears to sustain their contention. But a preliminary
question suggests itself, Was the testimony in
TRENT, J. : question privileged?

Our practice Act provides: "A lawyer must strictly

maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the
An appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint
secrets of his client. He shall not be permitted in any
upon the merits, with costs.
court, without the consent of his client, given in open
court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his
The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two
client in professional consultation, or for the purpose
insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods
of obtaining advice upon legal matters." (Sec. 31,
destroyed by fire. It appears that the father of the
Act No. 190.)
plaintiff died in 1897, at which time he was
conducting a business under his own name, Uy
A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4.
Layco. The plaintiff and his brother took over the
of the same Act. It will be noted that the evidence in
business and continued it under the same name, "Uy
question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff’s
Layco." Sometime before the date of the fire, the
attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of
plaintiff purchased his brother’s interest in the
the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications
business and continued to carry on the business
made between attorney and client, is that such
under the father’s name. At the time of the fire "Uy
communications are not intended for the information
Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent thereto
of third persons or to be acted upon by them, but for
the creditors petitioned for the appointment of an
the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It
administrator of the estate of the plaintiff’s father.
is evident that a communication made by a client to
During the course of these proceedings, the
his attorney for the express purpose of its being
plaintiff’s attorney surrendered the policies of
communicated to a third person is essentially
insurance to the administrator of the estate, who
inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the
compromised with the insurance company for one-
attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions by
half their face value, or P6,000. This money was
delivering the communication to the third person for
paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff.
whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it
The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that
cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in
the policies and goods insured belong to him and not
a legal sense as a privileged communication
to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that
between the attorney and his client. It is plain that
he is not bound by the compromise effected by the
such a communication, after reaching the party for
administrator of his father’s estate.
whom it was intended at least, is a communication
between the client and a third person, and that the
The defendant insurance company sought to show
attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or
that the plaintiff had agreed to the compromise
agent. We quote from but one case among the many
settlement of the policies, and for that purpose
which may be found upon the
introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff’s
point:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
attorney had surrendered the policies to the
administrator with the understanding that such a
"The proposition advanced by the respondent and
compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was
adopted by the trial court, that one, after fully
asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any
authorizing his attorney, as his agent, to enter into
objection to his attorney’s testifying concerning the
contract with a third party, and after such authority
surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the
has been executed and relied on, may effectively
negative. The attorney was then called for that
nullify his own and his duly authorized agent’s act by
purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff
closing the attorney’s mouth as to the giving of such
formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the
authority, is most startling. A perilous facility of fraud
plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the attorney
and wrong, both upon the attorney and the third
on the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on this
party, would result. The attorney who, on his client’s
appeal, base their argument on the proposition that
authority, contracts in his behalf, pledges his
a waiver of the client’s privilege may be withdrawn at
reputation and integrity that he binds his client. The
any time before acted upon, and cite in support
third party may well rely on the assurance of a

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reputable lawyer that he has authority in fact, though G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
such assurance be given only by implication from
the doing of the act itself. It is with gratification, PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,
therefore, that we find overwhelming weight of vs.
authority, against the position assumed by the court THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF
below, both in states where the privilege protecting THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
communications with attorneys is still regulated by
the common law and in those where it is controlled  
by statute, as in Wisconsin." (Koeber v. Sommers,
108 Wis., 497; 52 L. R. A., 512.)
KAPUNAN, J.:
Other cases wherein the objection to such evidence
on the ground of privilege has been overruled are: These case touch the very cornerstone of every
Henderson v. Terry (62 Tex., 281); Shove v. Martin State's judicial system, upon which the workings of
(85 Minn., 29); In re Elliott (73 Kan., 151); Collins v. the contentious and adversarial system in the
Hoffman (62 Wash., 278); Gerhardt v. Tucker (187 Philippine legal process are based — the sanctity of
Mo., 46). These cases cover a variety of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The
communications made by an attorney in behalf of his fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what
client to third persons. And cases wherein evidence makes the law profession a unique position of trust
of the attorney as to compromises entered into by and confidence, which distinguishes it from any
him on behalf of his client were allowed to be proved other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse
by the attorney’s testimony are not wanting. but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of
(Williams v. Blumenthal, 27 Wash., 24; Koeber v. protection accorded to the confidentiality that
Sommers, supra.) proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty
to his client.
It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of
the plaintiff’s attorney as to his authority to The facts of the case are undisputed.
compromise was properly overruled. The testimony
was to the effect that when the attorney delivered The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the
the policies to the administrator, he understood that institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before
there was a compromise to be effected, and that the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the
when he informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on
policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient to Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the compromise recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes
settlement of the policies. Having agreed to the shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG
compromise, he cannot now disavow it and maintain Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled
an action for the recovery of their face value. "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al."1
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed
from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Among the dependants named in the case are
herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996 Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then
AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion,
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to
EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm
vs. performed legal services for its clients, which
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First included, among others, the organization and
Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, acquisition of business associations and/or
ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL organizations, with the correlative and incidental
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and services where its members acted as incorporators,
RAUL S. ROCO, respondents. or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the

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performance of these services, the members of the Corporation shares and its
law firm delivered to its client documents which institutionalization through
substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock presidential directives of the coconut
certificates endorsed in blank representing the monopoly. Through insidious means
shares registered in the client's name, and a blank and machinations, ACCRA, being
deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the wholly-owned investment arm,
the course of their dealings with their clients, the ACCRA Investments Corporation,
members of the law firm acquire information relative became the holder of approximately
to the assets of clients as well as their personal and fifteen million shares representing
business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding
Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul capital stock of UCPB as of 31
Roco admit that they assisted in the organization March 1987. This ranks ACCRA
and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Investments Corporation number 44
Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office among the top 100 biggest
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees- stockholders of UCPB which has
stockholders of the said corporations involved in approximately 1,400,000
sequestration proceedings.2 shareholders. On the other hand,
corporate books show the name
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Edgardo J. Angara as holding
Commission on Good Government (hereinafter approximately 3,744 shares as of
referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to February, 1984.5
Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private In their answer to the Expanded Amended
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant.3 Respondent PCGG based its exclusion 4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers'
of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on participation in the acts with which
his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the their codefendants are charged, was
principal/s for whom he acted as in furtherance of legitimate
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in lawyering.
PCGG Case No. 33.4
4.4.1 In the course
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended of rendering
Complaint on the strength of the following professional and
allegations: legal services to
clients, defendants-
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, ACCRA lawyers,
Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Concepcion,
Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Teodoro D. Regala,
Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Rogelio A. Vinluan
Hayudini and Raul Roco of the and Eduardo U.
Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala Escueta, became
and Abello law offices (ACCRA) holders of shares of
plotted, devised, schemed conspired stock in the
and confederated with each other in corporations listed
setting up, through the use of the under their
coconut levy funds, the financial and respective names in
corporate framework and structures Annex "A" of the
that led to the establishment of expanded Amended
UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, Complaint as
COCOMARK, CIC, and more than incorporating or
twenty other coconut levy funded acquiring
corporations, including the stockholders only
acquisition of San Miguel and, as such, they

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 do not claim any aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag,
proprietary interest and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21,
in the said shares of 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private
stock. respondent Roco originally requesting the
reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the
4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint
Avelino V. Cruz was one of the in PCGG Case No. 33. 10
incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid
Marketing Corporation, which was It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private
organized for legitimate business respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
purposes not related to the contention that he did actually not reveal the identity
allegations of the expanded of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had
Amended Complaint. However, he he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for
has long ago transferred any whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. 11
material interest therein and
therefore denies that the "shares" On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan
appearing in his name in Annex "A" promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
of the expanded Amended denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case
Complaint are his assets.6 No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions
required by respondent PCGG. It held:
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from
ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying xxx xxx xxx
the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the
alleged ill-gotten wealth.7 ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic
stance of not revealing the identity
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their of the client for whom they have
"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October acted, i.e. their principal, and that
8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG will be their choice. But until they do
similarly grant the same treatment to them identify their clients, considerations
(exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded of whether or not the privilege
private respondent Roco.8 The Counter-Motion for claimed by the ACCRA lawyers
dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set exists cannot even begin to be
for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with debated. The ACCRA lawyers
the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the have begun to establish the basis
following conditions precedent for the exclusion of for recognizing the privilege; the
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity existence and identity of the client.
of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) This is what appears to be the
the submission of the deeds of assignments cause for which they have been
petitioners executed in favor of its client covering impleaded by the PCGG as
their respective defendants herein.
shareholdings.9
5. The PCGG is satisfied that
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented defendant Roco has demonstrated
supposed proof to substantiate compliance by his agency and that Roco has
private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent apparently identified his principal,
to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in which revelation could show the lack
PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent of cause against him. This in turn
PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May has allowed the PCGG to exercise
24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for its power both under the rules of
reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; Agency and under Section 5 of E.O.
(b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme
private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter

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 Court's ruling in Republic similarly situated and, therefore,
v.  Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72). deserving of equal treatment.

The PCGG has apparently offered 1. There is

to the ACCRA lawyers the same absolutely no
conditions availed of by Roco; full evidence that Mr.
disclosure in exchange for exclusion Roco had revealed,
from these proceedings (par. 7, or had undertaken
PCGG's COMMENT dated to reveal, the
November 4, 1991). The ACCRA identities of the
lawyers have preferred not to make client(s) for whom
the disclosures required by the he acted as
PCGG. nominee-
stockholder.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot,
therefore, begrudge the PCGG for 2. Even assuming
keeping them as party defendants. that Mr. Roco had
In the same vein, they cannot revealed, or had
compel the PCGG to be accorded undertaken to
the same treatment accorded to reveal, the identities
Roco. of the client(s), the
disclosure does not
Neither can this Court. constitute a
substantial
distinction as would
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion
make the
dated October 8, 1991 filed by the
classification
ACCRA lawyers and joined in by
reasonable under
Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the
the equal protection
same treatment by the PCGG as
clause.
accorded to Raul S. Roco is
DENIED for lack of merit. 12
3. Respondent
Sandiganbayan
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the
sanctioned
above resolution but the same was denied by the
favoritism and
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA
undue preference in
lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as
favor of Mr. Roco in
G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:
violation of the
equal protection
I clause.

The Honorable Sandiganbayan III

gravely abused its discretion in
subjecting petitioners ACCRA
The Honorable Sandiganbayan
lawyers who undisputably acted as
committed grave abuse of discretion
lawyers in serving as nominee-
in not holding that, under the facts of
stockholders, to the strict application
this case, the attorney-client
of the law of agency.
privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the
II identity of their client(s) and the
other information requested by the
The Honorable Sandiganbayan PCGG.
committed grave abuse of discretion
in not considering petitioners 1. Under the
ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as peculiar facts of this

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 case, the attorney- documents it required (deeds of assignment)
client privilege protected, because they are evidence of nominee
includes the identity status. 13
of the client(s).
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that
2. The factual respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him
disclosures required as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed
by the PCGG are an Answer.  PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss
not limited to the Civil Case No.  0033 as to Roco 'without an order of
identity of court by filing a notice of dismissal',"  14 and he has
petitioners ACCRA undertaken to identify his principal. 15
lawyers' alleged
client(s) but extend Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
to other privileged
matters. I

IV It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded

by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to
The Honorable Sandiganbayan disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly,
committed grave abuse of discretion respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the
in not requiring that the dropping of "bigger fish" as they say in street parlance. This ploy
party-defendants by the PCGG must is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a
be based on reasonable and just deal with petitioners — the names of their clients in
grounds and with due consideration exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The
to the constitutional right of statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned
petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:
equal protection of the law.
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own stance of not revealing the identity
motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 of the client for whom they have
resolution which was denied by respondent acted, i.e, their principal, and that
Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition will be their choice. But until they do
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, identify their clients, considerations
assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on of whether or not the privilege
essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners claimed by the ACCRA lawyers
in G.R. No. 105938. exists cannot even begin to be
debated. The ACCRA lawyers
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent cannot excuse themselves from the
Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 consequences of their acts until
grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of they have begun to establish the
his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his basis for recognizing the
client, giving him an advantage over them who are in privilege; the existence and identity
the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm. of the client.
Petitioners further argue that even granting that such
an undertaking has been assumed by private This is what appears to be the
respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing cause for which they have been
the identity of their principal under their sworn impleaded by the PCGG as
mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at defendants herein. (Emphasis ours)
all times the confidentiality of information obtained
during such lawyer-client relationship. In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the
Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled "Primavera
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on
petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of Good Government" respondent PCGG, through
the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the

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December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in
establish through the ACCRA that their "so called for their clients as defendants in the complaint.
client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to of activities and services performed in the course of
those subscription payments in corporations their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners'
included in Annex "A" of the Third Amended inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely
Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds being used as leverage to compel them to name
of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG
of particular persons; some in blank. to nail these clients. Such being the case,
respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as
We quote Atty. Ongkiko: against petitioners and should exclude them from
the Third Amended Complaint.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
II
With the permission of this Hon.
Court. I propose to establish through The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised
these ACCRA lawyers that, one, on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo operarum (contract of lease of services) where one
Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. person lets his services and another hires them
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished without reference to the object of which the services
all the monies to these subscription are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may
payments of these corporations who be compensated by honorarium or for
are now the petitioners in this case. hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a
Third, that these lawyers executed friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a
deeds of trust, some in the name of contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained
a particular person, some in blank. by the contract to the person who requested
Now, these blank deeds are him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is more than
important to our claim that some of that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
the shares are actually being held
by the nominees for the late In modern day perception of the lawyer-client
President Marcos. Fourth, they also relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent
executed deeds of assignment and or servant, because he possesses special powers of
some of these assignments have trust and confidence reposed on him by his
also blank assignees. Again, this is client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent as the
important to our claim that some of judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely
the shares are for Mr. Conjuangco different from and superior to those of an ordinary
and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, agent.20 Moreover, an attorney also occupies what
that most of thes e corporations are may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since
really just paper corporations. Why he is in fact an officer of the Court 21 and exercises
do we say that? One: There are no his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be
really fixed sets of officers, no fixed taken favorable to his client.
sets of directors at the time of
incorporation and even up to 1986, Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship,
which is the crucial year. And not there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
only that, they have no permits from breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to
the municipal authorities in Makati. his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and
Next, actually all their addresses confidential character, requiring a very high degree
now are care of Villareal Law Office. of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by reason
They really have no address on of necessity and public interest 23 based on the
records. These are some of the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice
principal things that we would ask of in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
these nominees stockholders, as administration of justice. 24
they called themselves. 16
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of
a lawyer to his client that

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 distinguishes him from any other the knowledge of which has been
professional in society. This acquired in such capacity. 29
conception is entrenched and
embodies centuries of established Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
and stable tradition. 25 In Stockton
v.  Ford,26 the U. S. Supreme Court Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:
held: (e) to maintain inviolate the
confidence, and at every peril to
There are few of the business himself, to preserve the secrets of
relations of life involving a higher his client, and to accept no
trust and confidence than that of compensation in connection with his
attorney and client, or generally client's business except from him or
speaking, one more honorably and with his knowledge and approval.
faithfully discharged; few more
anxiously guarded by the law, or This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the
governed by the sterner principles of Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
morality and justice; and it is the that:
duty of the court to administer them
in a corresponding spirit, and to be
watchful and industrious, to see that Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to
confidence thus reposed shall not the cause of his client and he shall
be used to the detriment or be mindful of the trust and
prejudice of the rights of the party confidence reposed in him.
bestowing it. 27
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the The lawyers owes "entire devotion
Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority to the interest of the client, warm
of his client to reveal any communication made by zeal in the maintenance and
the client to him or his advice given thereon in the defense of his rights and the
course of professional employment." 28 Passed on exertion of his utmost learning and
into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the ability," to the end that nothing be
attorney-client privilege, as currently worded taken or be withheld from him, save
provides: by the rules of law, legally applied.
No fear of judicial disfavor or public
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason popularity should restrain him from
of privileged communication. — The the full discharge of his duty. In the
following persons cannot testify as judicial forum the client is entitled to
to matters learned in confidence in the benefit of any and every remedy
the following cases: and defense that is authorized by
the law of the land, and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every
xxx xxx xxx such remedy or defense. But it is
steadfastly to be borne in mind that
An attorney cannot, without the the great trust of the lawyer is to be
consent of his client, be examined performed within and not without the
as to any communication made by bounds of the law. The office of
the client to him, or his advice given attorney does not permit, much less
thereon in the course of, or with a does it demand of him for any client,
view to, professional employment, violation of law or any manner of
can an attorney's secretary, fraud or chicanery. He must obey
stenographer, or clerk be examined, his own conscience and not that of
without the consent of the client and his client.
his employer, concerning any fact

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Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer- The attorney-client privilege does not attach until
client relationships are many and serve several there is a client.
constitutional and policy concerns. In the
constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject
of the most sacrosanct rights available to the matter of the relationship.
accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made
to choose between legal representation without Finally, due process considerations require that the
effective communication and disclosure and legal opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
representation with all his secrets revealed then he adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know
might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt who his opponent is." 32 He cannot be obliged to
to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33
right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high,
or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of
information would be curtailed thereby rendering the Notwithstanding these considerations, the general
right practically nugatory. The threat this represents rule is however qualified by some important
against another sacrosanct individual right, the right exceptions.
to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one probability exists that revealing the client's name
seeking legal services opens the door to a whole would implicate that client in the very activity for
spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be which he sought the lawyer's advice.
circumscribed by limited information engendered by
a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed
relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the
confidence which exists between lawyer and client name of her client on the ground that the subject
which in turn requires a situation which encourages matter of the relationship was so closely related to
a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of the issue of the client's identity that the privilege
information. It necessarily follows that in order to actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified
attain effective representation, the lawyer must client, an election official, informed his attorney in
invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as confidence that he had been offered a bribe to
a matter of duty and professional responsibility. violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe
to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed
The question now arises whether or not this duty that she had advised her client to count the votes
may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of correctly, but averred that she could not remember
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The
facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to
case, the answer must be in the affirmative. reveal his client's identity before a grand jury.
Reversing the lower court's contempt orders, the
state supreme court held that under the
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions
not be shrouded in mystery 30 Under this premise, described above, even the name of the client was
the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the privileged.
United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity
of this client. 31 U .S. v.  Hodge and Zweig,35 involved the same
exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in
those instances where a strong probability exists
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well that the disclosure of the client's identity would
established. implicate the client in the very criminal activity for
which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
First, the court has a right to know that the client
whose privileged information is sought to be The Hodge case involved federal grand jury
protected is flesh and blood. proceedings inquiring into the activities of the
"Sandino Gang," a gang involved in the illegal
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the importation of drugs in the United States. The
attorney-client relationship has been established. respondents, law partners, represented key

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witnesses and suspects including the leader of the In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered
gang, Joe Sandino. injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by
respondent corporation, collided with a second
In connection with a tax investigation in November of taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff
1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig, brought action both against defendant corporation
requiring them to produce documents and and the owner of the second cab, identified in the
information regarding payment received by Sandino information only as John Doe. It turned out that
on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The when the attorney of defendant corporation
lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the
upholding non-disclosure under the facts and name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a
circumstances of the case, held: client of the insurance company, prior to the
institution of legal action, came to him and reported
that he was involved in a car accident. It was
A client's identity and the nature of
apparent under the circumstances that the man was
that client's fee arrangements may
the owner of the second cab. The state supreme
be privileged where the person
court held that the reports were clearly made to the
invoking the privilege can show that
lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:
a strong probability exists that
disclosure of such information would
implicate that client in the very That his employment came about
criminal activity for which legal through the fact that the insurance
advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, company had hired him to defend its
279 F. 2d at 680. While in Baird policyholders seems immaterial. The
Owe enunciated this rule as a attorney is such cases is clearly the
matter of California law, the rule also attorney for the policyholder when
reflects federal law. Appellants the policyholder goes to him to
contend that the Baird exception report an occurrence contemplating
applies to this case. that it would be used in an action or
claim against him. 38
The Baird exception is entirely
consonant with the principal policy xxx xxx xxx
behind the attorney-client privilege.
"In order to promote freedom of All communications made by a client
consultation of legal advisors by to his counsel, for the purpose of
clients, the apprehension of professional advice or assistance,
compelled disclosure from the legal are privileged, whether they relate to
advisors must be removed; hence, a suit pending or contemplated, or to
the law must prohibit such any other matter proper for such
disclosure except on the client's advice or aid; . . . And whenever the
consent." 8 J. Wigmore,  supra sec. communication made, relates to a
2291, at 545. In furtherance of this matter so connected with the
policy, the client's identity and the employment as attorney or counsel
nature of his fee arrangements are, as to afford presumption that it was
in exceptional cases, protected as the ground of the address by the
confidential communications. 36 client, then it is privileged from
disclosure. . .
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the It appears . . . that the name and
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass address of the owner of the second
v.  Terminal Cab Corporation,37 prompted the New cab came to the attorney in this
York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the case as a confidential
effect that he could not reveal the name of his client communication. His client is not
because this would expose the latter to civil seeking to use the courts, and his
litigation. address cannot be disclosed on that
theory, nor is the present action

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 pending against him as service of criminal charges were brought against them by the
the summons on him has not been U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
effected. The objections on which
the court reserved decision are It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous
sustained. 39 years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining about whether or not they violated tax laws and
Company,40 the lawyer involved was required by a sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical
lower court to disclose whether he represented possibility that they had. No investigation was then
certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers.
of the court's request was to determine whether the Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers
unnamed persons as interested parties were delivered to Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had
connected with the purchase of properties involved been previously assessed as the tax due, and
in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the another amount of money representing his fee for
question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the the advice given. Baird then sent a check for
lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of his clients $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a
the court held: note explaining the payment, but without naming his
clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the
If it can compel the witness to state, lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved.
as directed by the order appealed Baird refused on the ground that he did not know
from, that he represented certain their names, and declined to name the attorney and
persons in the purchase or sale of accountants because this constituted privileged
these mines, it has made progress communication. A petition was filed for the
in establishing by such evidence enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's
their version of the litigation. As repeated refusal to name his clients he was found
already suggested, such testimony guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of
by the witness would compel him to Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to
disclose not only that he was reveal the names of clients who employed him to
attorney for certain people, but that, pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in
as the result of communications settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued
made to him in the course of such on, and with no government audit or investigation
employment as such attorney, he into that client's income tax liability pending. The
knew that they were interested in court emphasized the exception that a client's name
certain transactions. We feel sure is privileged when so much has been revealed
that under such conditions no case concerning the legal services rendered that the
has ever gone to the length of disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to
compelling an attorney, at the possible investigation and sanction by government
instance of a hostile litigant, to agencies. The Court held:
disclose not only his retainer, but the
nature of the transactions to which it The facts of the instant case bring it
related, when such information squarely within that exception to the
could be made the basis of a suit general rule. Here money was
against his client. 41 received by the government, paid by
persons who thereby admitted they
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case had not paid a sufficient amount in
against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the income taxes some one or more
client's name, the said name would furnish the only years in the past. The names of the
link that would form the chain of testimony clients are useful to the government
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the for but one purpose — to ascertain
client's name is privileged. which taxpayers think they were
delinquent, so that it may check the
records for that one year or several
In Baird vs.  Korner,42 a lawyer was consulted by the
years. The voluntary nature of the
accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed
payment indicates a belief by the
taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the
taxpayers that more taxes or interest
undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case

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 or penalties are due than the sum (a) the disclosure of the identity of
previously paid, if any. It indicates a its clients;
feeling of guilt for nonpayment of
taxes, though whether it is criminal (b) submission of documents
guilt is undisclosed. But it may well substantiating the lawyer-client
be the link that could form the chain relationship; and
of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a federal crime. (c) the submission of the deeds of
Certainly the payment and the assignment petitioners executed in
feeling of guilt are the reasons the favor of their clients covering their
attorney here involved was respective shareholdings.
employed — to advise his clients
what, under the circumstances,
should be done. 43 From these conditions, particularly the third, we can
readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist the financial and corporate structure, framework and
other situations which could qualify as exceptions to set-up of the corporations in question. In turn,
the general rule. petitioners gave their professional advice in the form
of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of
For example, the content of any client assignment covering their client's shareholdings.
communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if
it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal There is no question that the preparation of the
problem on which the client seeks legal aforestated documents was part and parcel of
assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the petitioners' legal service to their clients. More
attorney-client relationship has been previously important, it constituted an integral part of their
disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
be confidential, the identity of the client has been legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
held to be privileged, since such revelation would implicate them in the very activity for which legal
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
transaction. 45 accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating
to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of Furthermore, under the third main exception,
the privilege when the client's name itself has an revelation of the client's name would obviously
independent significance, such that disclosure would provide the necessary link for the prosecution to
then reveal client confidences. 46 build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the
link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form
The circumstances involving the engagement of the chain of testimony necessary to convict the
lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly (client) of a . . . crime." 47
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of An important distinction must be made between a
the alleged client's name would lead to establish case where a client takes on the services of an
said client's connection with the very fact in issue of attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about
the case, which is privileged information, because how to go around the law for the purpose of
the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject committing illegal activities and a case where a client
matter or the substance (without which there would thinks he might have previously committed
be not attorney-client relationship). something illegal and consults his attorney about it.
The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege
The link between the alleged criminal offense and because the same cannot be invoked for purposes
the legal advice or legal service sought was duly illegal. The second case falls within the exception
establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the because whether or not the act for which the client
PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name
conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads
petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution,
accede thereto: which might lead to possible action against him.

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These cases may be readily distinguished, because which exists in the case at bench amounts to
the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors
for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the and litigants which we cannot and will not
prosecution may not have a case against the client countenance. When the nature of the transaction
in the second example and cannot use the attorney would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's
client relationship to build up a case against the retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the
latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in the
within the professional character of a lawyer to give instant case owe their client(s) a duty and an
advice on the commission of a crime. 48 The reason obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in
for the second has been stated in the cases above turn requires them to invoke the privilege.
discussed and are founded on the same policy
grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately
general, exists. hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution
has a case against their clients, the latter's case
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the should be built upon evidence painstakingly
appellate court therein stated that "under such gathered by them from their own sources  and not
conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal
compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile the name of their clients, information which
litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the
nature of the transactions to which it related, when transaction which may or may not be illegal. The
such information could be made the basis of a suit logical nexus between name and nature of
against his client." 49 "Communications made to an transaction is so intimate in this case the it would be
attorney in the course of any personal employment, difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In
relating to the subject thereof, and which may be this sense, the name is as much "communication" as
supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the information revealed directly about the transaction in
relation in which the parties stand to each other, are question itself, a communication which is clearly and
under the seal of confidence and entitled to distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such
protection as privileged communications."50 Where communication without exposing himself to charges
the communicated information, which clearly falls of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the
within the privilege, would suggest possible criminal entire attorney-client relationship.
activity but there would be not much in the
information known to the prosecution which would The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer
sustain a charge except that revealing the name of and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
the client would open up other privileged information negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing
which would substantiate the prosecution's to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty,
suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably competence, diligence as well as the responsibility
linked to the subject matter itself that it falls within to keep clients informed and protect their rights to
the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the make decisions have been zealously sustained.
instant case, is consonant with the principal policy In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy
behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of v.  Boon,54 the US Second District Court rejected the
promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its
by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's
from attorneys must be eliminated. This exception former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit
has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the
Proceedings51 and Tillotson v. Boughner.52 What transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The
these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary
exploitation of the general rule in what may amount relationship in any context comprise a special breed
to a fishing expedition by the prosecution. of cases that often loosen normally stringent
requirements of causation and damages, and found
There are, after all, alternative source of information in favor of the client.
available to the prosecutor which do not depend on
utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney,
readily available source of information in the building Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley
of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of P.A.  v. Scheller55 requiring strict obligation of
the client's name in circumstances such as the one lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent

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fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of faculties by which man is likened to
completion of his work, and sought God.
payment quantum meruit of work done. The court,
however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right
after he sought to pressure his client into signing a not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of
new fee agreement while settlement negotiations the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients,
were at a critical stage. While the client found a new because the facts of the instant case clearly fall
lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the within recognized exceptions to the rule that the
client to settle for less than what was originally client's name is not privileged information.
offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of
lawyers to clients in Meinhard v.  Salmon56 famously If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the
attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
honesty alone, but the  punctilio of an honor the most circumstances obtaining here does not cover the
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US identity of the client, then it would expose the
Court found that the lawyer involved was fired for lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their
cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all. clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility
imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of
the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033
loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the alleged that the defendants therein,
protection, which exists not only during the including herein petitioners and Eduardo
relationship, but extends even after the termination Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in
of the relationship. 57 setting up through the use of coconut levy
funds the financial and corporate framework
Such are the unrelenting duties required by and structures that led to the establishment
lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that
the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of through insidious means and machinations,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment
goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual arm, ACCRA Investment Corporation,
and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not became the holder of approximately fifteen
prepared to accept respondents' position without million shares representing roughly 3.3% of
denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31
extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise: March 1987. The PCGG wanted to establish
through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr.
Every calling is great when greatly Cojuangco is their client and it was
pursued. But what other gives such Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to
scope to realize the spontaneous the subscription payment; hence, petitioners
energy of one's soul? In what other acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents
does one plunge so deep in the by allowing themselves, among others, to be
stream of life — so share its used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten
passions its battles, its despair, its wealth through government concessions,
triumphs, both as witness and etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of
actor? . . . But that is not all. What a official position and authority, flagrant
subject is this in which we are united breach of public trust, unjust enrichment,
— this abstraction called the Law, violation of the Constitution and laws of the
wherein as in a magic mirror, we Republic of the Philippines.
see reflected, not only in our lives,
but the lives of all men that have By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal
been. When I think on this majestic the identity of their clients, but worse, to
theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to submit to the PCGG documents
speak of the law as our mistress, we substantiating the client-lawyer relationship,
who are here know that she is a as well as deeds of assignment petitioners
mistress only to be won with executed in favor of its clients covering their
sustained and lonely passion — only respective shareholdings, the PCGG would
to be won by straining all the exact from petitioners a link "that would

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inevitably form the chain of testimony documents were submitted for the purpose,
necessary to convict the (client) of a crime." two of which were mere requests for re-
investigation and one simply disclosed
III certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA
lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal.
These were clients to whom both petitioners
In response to petitioners' last assignment of
and private respondent rendered legal
error, respondents alleged that the private
services while all of them were partners at
respondent was dropped as party defendant
ACCRA, and were not the clients which the
not only because of his admission that he
PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged
acted merely as a nominee but also
questioned transactions.61
because of his undertaking to testify to such
facts and circumstances "as the interest of
truth may require, which includes . . . the To justify the dropping of the private
identity of the principal."59 respondent from the case or the filing of the
suit in the respondent court without him,
therefore, the PCGG should conclusively
First, as to the bare statement that private
show that Mr. Roco was treated as species
respondent merely acted as a lawyer and
apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on
nominee, a statement made in his out-of-
the basis of a classification which made
court settlement with the PCGG, it is
substantial distinctions based on real
sufficient to state that petitioners have
differences. No such substantial distinctions
likewise made the same claim not merely
exist from the records of the case at bench,
out-of-court but also in the Answer to
in violation of the equal protection clause.
plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint,
signed by counsel, claiming that their acts
were made in furtherance of "legitimate The equal protection clause is a guarantee
lawyering."60 Being "similarly situated" in this which provides a wall of protection against
regard, public respondents must show that uneven application of status and regulations.
there exist other conditions and In the broader sense, the guarantee
circumstances which would warrant their operates against uneven application of legal
treating the private respondent differently norms so
from petitioners in the case at bench in order that all persons under similar circumstances
to evade a violation of the equal protection would be accorded the same
clause of the Constitution. treatment. 62 Those who fall within a
particular class ought to be treated alike not
only as to privileges granted but also as to
To this end, public respondents contend that
the liabilities imposed.
the primary consideration behind their
decision to sustain the PCGG's dropping of
private respondent as a defendant was his . . . What is required under this
promise to disclose the identities of the constitutional guarantee is the
clients in question. However, respondents uniform operation of legal norms so
failed to show — and absolute nothing exists that all persons under similar
in the records of the case at bar — that circumstances would be accorded
private respondent actually revealed the the same treatment both in the
identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since privileges conferred and the
the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif liabilities imposed. As was noted in
of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco a recent decision: "Favoritism and
and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so undue preference cannot be
material as to have justified PCGG's special allowed. For the principle is that
treatment exempting the private respondent equal protection and security shall
from prosecution, respondent be given to every person under
Sandiganbayan should have required proof circumstances, which if not identical
of the undertaking more substantial than a are analogous. If law be looked
"bare assertion" that private respondent did upon in terms of burden or charges,
indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead, those that fall within a class should
as manifested by the PCGG, only three be treated in the same fashion,

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 whatever restrictions cast on some at this early opportunity would be to sanction
in the group equally binding the an unjust situation which we should not here
rest.63 countenance. The case hangs as a real and
palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of
We find that the condition precedent Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should
required by the respondent PCGG of the not be allowed to continue a day longer.
petitioners for their exclusion as parties-
defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates While we are aware of respondent PCGG's
the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth,
The condition also constitutes a we will not sanction acts which violate the
transgression by respondents equal protection guarantee and the right
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal against self-incrimination and subvert the
protection clause of the Constitution. 64 It is lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
grossly unfair to exempt one similarly
situated litigant from prosecution without WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE
allowing the same exemption to the others. FOREGOING, the Resolutions of
Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division)
touches upon the question of the identity of promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May
their clients but also on documents related 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
to the suspected transactions, not only in ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is
violation of the attorney-client privilege but further ordered to exclude petitioners
also of the constitutional right against self- Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara,
incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Victor
this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja
expense of such rights. G. Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB
Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the
An argument is advanced that the invocation Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-
client confidentiality at this stage of the SO ORDERED.
proceedings is premature and that they
should wait until they are called to testify [G.R. No. L-21237. March 22, 1924. ]
and examine as witnesses as to matters
learned in confidence before they can raise JAMES D. BARTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEYTE
their objections. But petitioners are not mere ASPHALT & MINERAL OIL CO., Defendant-
witnesses. They are co-principals in the Appellant.
case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth.
They have made their position clear from the Block, Johnston & Greenbaum and Ross,
very beginning that they are not willing to Lawrence & Selph for Appellant.
testify and they cannot be compelled to
testify in view of their constitutional right Frank B. Ingersoll for Appellee.
against self-incrimination and of their
fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate SYLLABUS
the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
1. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT; AUTHORITY OF
It is clear then that the case against SELLING AGENT; SALES TO SUBAGENT. — An
petitioners should never be allowed to take agent who is clothed with authority to sell a given
its full course in the Sandiganbayan. commodity cannot bind the principle by selling to
Petitioners should not be made to suffer the himself, either directly or indirectly. It results that the
effects of further litigation when it is obvious principal is not obligated to fill orders taken by the
that their inclusion in the complaint arose agent from his own subagent, unless the principal
from a privileged attorney-client relationship ratifies such sale with full knowledge of the facts.
and as a means of coercing them to disclose
the identities of their clients. To allow the 2. EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGE OF ATTORNEY AND
case to continue with respect to them when CLIENT; LOSS OF PRIVILEGE. — The privilege
this Court could nip the problem in the bud which protects communications between attorney

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and client does not extend to a copy of a letter demonstrating the products of the defendant and
written by the client to his attorney which comes to expended large sums of money in visiting various
the hands of the adverse party. Where the parts of the world for the purpose of carrying on said
authenticity of such a document is admitted, the advertising and demonstrations, in shipping to
court will take no notice of the manner in which it various parts of the world samples of the products of
was obtained. the defendant, and in otherwise carrying on
advertising work. For these services and
expenditures the plaintiff sought, in said third cause
DECISION of action, to recover the sum of $16,563.80, United
States currency. The court, however, absolved the
defendant from all liability on this cause of action
STREET, J. : and the plaintiff did not appeal, with the result that
we are not now concerned with this phase of the
case. Besides, the authority contained in said Exhibit
B was admitted superseded by the authority
This action was instituted in the Court of First
expressed in a later letter, Exhibit A, dated October
Instance of the City of Manila by James D. Barton, to
1, 1920. This document bears the approval of the
recover of the Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co., Ltd.,
board of directors of the defendant company and
as damages for breach of contract, the sum of
was formally accepted by the plaintiff. As it supplies
$318,563.30, United States currency, and further to
the principle basis of the action, it will be quoted in
secure a judicial pronouncement to the effect that
its entirety.
the plaintiff is entitled to an extension of the terms of
the sales agencies specified in the contract Exhibit
"(Exhibit A)
A. The defendant answered with a general denial,
and the cause was heard upon the proof, both
"Cebu, Cebu, P. I.,
documentary and oral, after which the trial judge
entered a judgment absolving the defendant
"October 1, 1920.
corporation from four of the six causes of action set
forth in the complain and giving judgment for the
"JAMES D. BARTON, Esq.,
plaintiff to recover of said defendant, upon the first
and fourth causes of action, the sum of $202,500,
"Cebu Hotel City.
United States currency, equivalent to P405,000,
Philippine currency, with legal interest from June 2,
"DEAR SIR: — You are hereby given the sole and
1921, and with costs. From this judgment the
exclusive sales agency for our bituminous limestone
defendant company appealed.
and other asphalt, Ltd., until May first, 1922, in the
following territory:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, resident
in the City of Manila, while the defendant is a
Australia Saigon Java
corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands with its principal office in the City
New Zealand India China
of Cebu, Province of Cebu, Philippine Islands. Said
company appears to be the owner of a valuable
Tasmania Sumatra Hongkong
deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt
products, located on the Island of Leyte and known
"Siam and the Straits Settlements, also in the United
as the Lucio mine. On April 21,1920, one William
States of America until May 1, 1921.
Anderson, as president and general manager of the
defendant company, addressed a letter Exhibit B, to
"As regards bituminous limestone mined from the
the plaintiff Barton, authorizing the latter to sell the
Lucio property . No orders for less than one
products of the Lucio mine in the Commonwealth of
thousand (1,000) tons will be accepted except under
Australia and New Zealand upon a scale of prices
special agreement with us. All orders for said
indicated in said letter.
products are to be billed to you as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the third cause of action stated in the complaint
the plaintiff alleges that during the life of the agency
Per ton
indicated in Exhibit B, he rendered services to the
defendant company in the way of advertising and
In 1,000 ton lots P15

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
 twenty-four hours after March 1, 1921, unless we so
In 2,000 ton lots 14 notify you specifically prior to that date what we are
prepared to load at that rate, and it is also stipulated
In 5,000 ton lots 12 that we shall not be required to ship orders of 5,000
tons except on 30 days notice and 10,000 tons
In 10,000 ton lots 10 except on 60 days notice.

with the understanding, however, that, should the "If your sales in the United States reach five
sales in the above territory equal or exceed ten thousand tons on or before May 1, 1921, you are to
thousand (10,000) tons in the year ending October have sole rights for this territory also for one year
1, 1921, then in that event the price of all shipments additional and should your sales in the second year
made during the above period shall be ten pesos reach or exceed ten thousand tons you are to have
(P10) per ton, and any sum charged to any of your the option to renew the agreement for this territory
customers or buyers in the aforesaid territory in on the same terms for an additional two years.
excess of ten pesos (P10) per ton, shall be rebated
to you. Said rebate to be due and payable when the "Should your sales equal or exceed ten thousand
gross sales have equaled or exceeded ten thousand (10,000) tons in the year ending October 1, 1921, or
(10,000) tons in the twelve months period as twenty thousand (20,000) tons by May 1, 1922, then
hereinbefore described. Rebates on lesser sales to this contract is to be continued automatically for an
apply as per above price list. additional three years ending April 30, 1925, under
the same terms and conditions as above stipulated.
"You are to have full authority to sell said product of
the sum Lucio mine for any sum you see fit in "The products of the other mines can be sold by you
excess of the prices quoted above and such excess in the aforesaid territories under the same terms and
in price shall be your extra and additional profit and conditions as the products of the Lucio mine; scale
commission. Should we make any collections in of prices to be mutually agreed upon between us.
excess of the prices quoted, we agree to remit same
to you within ten (10) days of the date of such "LEYTE ASPHALT & MINERAL OIL CO.,LTD.
collections or payments.
"By (Sgd.) WM. ANDERSON
"All contracts taken with municipal governments will
be subject to inspection before shipping, by any "President
authorized representative of such governments at
whatever price may be contracted for by you and we (Sgd. "W.C.A. PALMER
agree to accept such contracts subject to draft
attached to bill of lading in full payment of such "Secretary
shipment.
"Approved by Board of Directors,
"It is understood that the purchasers of the products
of the Lucio mine are to pay freight from the mine "October 1, 1920.
carriers to destination and are to be responsible for
all freight, insurance and other charges, providing (Sgd.) "WM. ANDERSON
said shipment has been accepted by their
inspectors. "President

"All contracts taken with responsible firms are to be "Accepted.

under the same conditions as with municipal
governments. (Sgd.) "JAMES D. BARTON

"All contracts will be subject to delays caused by the "Witness D. G. McVean

acts of God, over which the parties hereto have no
control. Upon careful perusal of the fourth paragraph from
the end of this letter it is apparent that some
"It is understood and agreed that we agree to load all negative word has been inadvertently omitted before
ships, steamers, boats or other carriers promptly and "prepared" so that the full expression should be
without delay and load not less than 1,000 tons each "unless we should notify you specifically prior to that

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
we are unprepared to load at that rate," or "not Hotel, in the course of which the plaintiff informed
prepared to load at that rate."cralaw virtua1aw library Anderson of the San Francisco order. Anderson
thereupon said that, owing to lack of capita,
Very soon after the aforesaid contract became adequate facilities had not been provide by the
effective, the plaintiff requested the defendant company for filling large orders and suggested that
company to give him a similar selling agency for the plaintiff had better hold up in the matter of taking
Japan. To this request the defendant company, orders. The plaintiff expressed surprise at this and
through its president, Wm. Anderson, replied, under told Anderson that he had not only the San
date of November 27,1920, as Francisco order (which he says he exhibited to
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Anderson) but other orders for large quantities of
bituminuos limestone to be shipped to Australia and
"In your request for Japanese agency, will say, that Shanghai. In another interview on the same day
we are willing to give you, the same commission on Anderson definitely informed the plaintiff that the
all sales made by you in Japan, on the same basis contracts which he claimed to have procured would
as your Australian sales, but we do not feel like not be filled.
giving you a regular agency for Japan until you can
make some large sized sales there, because some Three days later the plaintiff addressed a letter
other people have given us assurances that they can (Exhibit Y) to the defendant company in Cebu, in
handle our Japanese sales, therefore we have which he notified the company to prepared to ship
decided to leave this agency open for a time."cralaw five thousand tons of bituminuos limestone to John
virtua1aw library Chapman Co., San Francisco, loading to commence
on May 1, and to proceed at the rate of one
Meanwhile the plaintiff had embarked for San thousand tons per day of each twenty-four hours,
Francisco and upon arriving at that port he entered weather permitting.
into an agreement with Ludvigsen & McCurdy, of
that city, whereby said firm was constituted a On March 5, 1921, Frank B. Smith, of Sydney, had
subagent and given the sole selling rights for the cabled the plaintiff an order for five thousand tons of
bituminous limestone products of the defendant bituminuos limestone; and in his letter of March 15 to
company for the period of one year from November the defendant, the plaintiff advised the defendant
11,1920, on terms stated in the letter Exhibit K. The company to be prepared to ship another five
territory assigned to Ludvigsen & McCurdy included thousand tons of bituminuos limestone, on or about
San Francisco and all territory in California north of may 6, 1921, in addition to the intended
said city. Upon an earlier voyage during the same consignment for San Francisco. the name Henry E.
year to Australia, the plaintiff had already made an White was indicated as the name of the person
agreement with Frank B. Smith, of Sydney, whereby through whom this contract had been made and it
the latter was to act as the plaintiff’s sales agent for was stated that the consignee would be named later,
bituminous limestone mined at the defendant’s no destination for the shipment being given. The
quarry in Leyte, until February 12, 1921. Later the plaintiff explains that the name white, as used in this
same agreement was extended for the period of one letter, was based on an inference which he had
year from January 1, 1921. (Exhibit Q.) erroneously drawn from the cable sent by Frank B.
Smith, and his intention was to have the second
On February 5, 1921, Ludvigsen & McCurdy, of San shipment consigned to Australia in response to
Francisco, addressed a letter to the plaintiff, then in Smith’s order.
San Francisco, advising him that he might enter an
order for six thousand tons of bituminous limestone It will be noted in connection with this letter of the
to be loaded at Leyte not later than May 5, 1921, plaintiff, of March 15, 1921, that no mention was
upon terms stated in the letter Exhibit G. Upon this made of the names of the person, or firm, for whom
letter the plaintiff immediately indorsed his the shipments were really intended. The obvious
acceptance. explanation that occurs in connection with this is that
the plaintiff did not then care to reveal the fact that
The plaintiff them returned to Manila; and on March the two orders had originated from his own
2, 1929, Anderson wrote to him from Cebu, to the subagents in San Francisco and Sydney.
effect that the company was behind with
construction and was not then able to handle big To the plaintiff’s letter of March 15, the assistant
contracts. (Exhibit FF.) On March 12, Anderson was manager of the defendant company replied on
in Manila and the two had an interview in the Manila March 25, 1921, acknowledging the receipt of an

Page 73 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
order for five thousand tons of bituminous limestone
to be consigned to John Chapman Co., of San In a later letter, Exhibit X, of May 16,1921, Hiwatari
Francisco, and the further amount of five thousand informs the plaintiff that he had shown the contract,
tons of the same material to be consigned to Henry signed by himself, to the submanager of the Taiwan
E. White; and it was stated that "no orders can be Bank who had given it as his opinion that he would
entertained unless cash has been actually deposited be able to issue, upon request of Hiwatari, a credit
with either the International Banking Corporation or note for the contracted amount, but he added that
the Chartered bank of India, Australia and China, the submanager was not personally able to place his
Cebu." (Exhibit Z.) approval on the contract as that was a matter
beyond his authority. Accordingly Hiwatari advised
To this letter the plaintiff in turn replied from Manila, that he was intending to make further arrangements
under date of March 29,1921, questioning the right when the manager of the bank should return from
of the defendant to insist upon a cash deposit in Formosa.
Cebu prior to the filling of the orders. In conclusion
the plaintiff gave orders for shipment to Australia of In the letter of May 5, 1921, containing Hiwatari’s
five thousand tons, or more, about May 22, 1921, order for one thousand tons of bituminous limestone,
and ten thousand tons, or more, about June 1, 1921. it was stated that if the material should prove
In conclusion the plaintiff said "I have arranged for satisfactory after being thoroughly tested by the
deposits to be made on these additional shipments if Paving Department of the City of Tokyo, he would
you will signify your ability to fulfill these orders on contract with the plaintiff for a minimum quantity of
the dates mentioned." No name was mentioned as ten thousand additional tons, to be used within a
the purchaser, or purchasers, of these intended year from September 1, 1921, and that in this event
Australian consignments. the contract was to be automatically extended for an
additional four years. The contents of the letter of
Soon after writing the letter last above-mentioned, May 5 seems to have been conveyed, though
the plaintiff embarked for China and Japan. With his imperfectly, by the plaintiff to his attorney, Mr. Frank
activities in China we are not here concerned, but B. Ingersoll, of Manila; and on May 17,1921,
we note that in Tokyo, Japan, he came in contact Ingersoll addressed a note to the defendant
with one H. Hiwatari, who appears to have been a company in Cebu in which he stated that he had
suitable person for handling bituminous limestone for been requested by the plaintiff to notify the
construction work in Japan. In the letter Exhibit X, defendant that the plaintiff had accepted an order
Hiwatari speaks of himself as if he had been from Hiwatari , of Tokyo, approved by the Bank of
appointed exclusive sales agent for the plaintiff in Taiwan, for a minimum for a period of five years, the
Japan, but no document expressly appointing him first shipment of one thousand tons to be made as
such is in evidence. early after July 1 as possible. It will be noted that this
communication did not truly reflect the contents of
While the plaintiff was Tokyo he procured the letter Hiwatari’s letter, which called unconditionally for only
Exhibit W, addressed to himself, to be signed by one thousand tons, the taking of the remainder being
Hiwatari. This letter, edited by the plaintiff himself, contingent upon future eventualities.
contains an order for one thousand tons of
bituminous limestone from the quarries of the It will be noted that the only written communications
defendant company, to be delivered as soon after between the plaintiff and the defendant company in
July 1, 1921, as possible. In this letter Hiwatari which the former gave notice of having any orders
states, "on receipt of the cable from you, notifying for the sale of bituminous limestone are the four
me of date you will be ready to ship, and also letters Exhibits Y, AA, BB, and II. In the first of these
tonnage rate, i will agree to transfer through the letters, dated March 15,1921, the plaintiff advises
Bank of Taiwan, of Tokyo, to the Asia Banking the defendant company to be prepared to ship five
Corporation, of Manila, P. I., the entire payment of thousand tons of bituminous limestone, to be
$16,000 gold, to be subject to your order on delivery consigned to John Chapman Co., of San Francisco
of documents covering bill of lading of shipment, the to be loaded by May 5, and a further consignment of
customs report of weight, and prepaid export tax five thousand tons, through a contract with Henry E.
receipt. I will arrange in advance a confirmed or White, consignees to be named later. In the letter
irrevocable letter of credit for the above amount so Exhibit BB dated May 17, 1921, the plaintiff of an
that payment can be ordered by cable, in reply to order from Hiwatari, of Tokyo, approved by the Bank
your cable advising shipping date."cralaw virtua1aw of Taiwan, for a minimum of ten thousand tons
library annually for a period of five years, first shipment of a

Page 74 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
thousand tons to be as early after July 1 as possible. prepared to obligate themselves to take the quantity
In the letter Exhibit II the plaintiff gives notice of an of bituminous limestone contracted for upon terms
"additional" (?) order from H.E. White, Sydney, for consistent with the contract. These conditions were
two lots of bituminous limestone of five thousand not met by the taking of these orders from the
tons each, one for shipment not later than June 30, plaintiff’s own subagents, which was as if the plaintiff
1921, and the other by July 20,1921. In the same had bought for himself the commodity which he was
letter the plaintiff reports for the first time an order for authorized to sell to others. Article 267 of the Code
five thousand tons from F.B. Smith, to be shipped to of Commerce declares that no agent shall purchase
Brisbane, Australia, by June 30, and a similar for himself or for another that which he has been
amount within thirty days later. ordered to sell. The law has placed its ban upon a
broker’s purchasing from his principal unless the
After the suit was brought, the plaintiff filed an latter with full knowledge of all the facts and
amendment to his complaint in which he set out, in circumstances acquiesces in such course; and even
tabulated form, the orders which he claims to have then the broker’s action must be characterized by
received and upon which his letters of notification to the utmost good faith. A sale made by a broker to
the defendant company were based. In this himself without the consent of the principal is
amended answer the name of Ludvigsen & McCurdy ineffectual whether the broker has been guilty of
appears for the first time; and the name of Frank B. fraudulent conduct or not. (4 R. C. L., 276-277.) We
Smith, of Sydney, is used for the first time as the think, therefore, that the position of the defendant
source of the intended consignments of May 1, May company is indubitably sound in so far as it rests
22, and June 1. We note, furthermore, that the upon the contention that the plaintiff has not in fact
letters, Exhibits G, L, M, and W, containing the found any bona fide purchasers ready and able to
orders from Ludvigsen & McCurdy, Frank B, Smith take the commodity contracted for upon terms
and H. Hiwatari were at no time submitted for compatible with the contract which is the basis of the
inspection to any officer of the defendant company, action.
except possibly the Exhibit G, which the plaintiff
claims to have shown to Anderson in Manila on It will be observed that the contract set out at the
March 12, 1921. beginning of this opinion contains provisions under
which the period of the contract might be extended.
The different items comprising the award which the That privilege was probably considered a highly
trial judge gave in favor of the plaintiff are all based important incident of the contract; and it will be seen
upon the orders given by Ludvigsen & McCurdy that the sale of five thousand tons which the plaintiff
(Exhibit G), by Frank B. Smith (Exhibits L and M), reported for shipment to San Francisco was
and by Hiwatari in Exhibit W; and the appeal does precisely adjusted to the purpose of the extension of
not involve an order which came from Shanghai, the contract for the United States for the period of an
China. We therefore now address ourselves to the additional year; and the sales reported for shipment
question whether or not the orders contained in to Australia were likewise adjusted to the
Exhibits G, L, M, and W, in connection with the requirements for the extension of the contract in that
subsequent notification thereof given by the plaintiff territory. Given the circumstances surrounding these
to the defendant, are sufficient to support the contracts as they were reported to the defendant
judgment rendered by the trial court. company and the concealment by the plaintiff of the
names of the authors of the orders, — who after all
The transaction indicated in the orders from were merely the plaintiff’s subagents, — the officers
Ludvigsen & McCurdy and from Frank B. Smith of the defendant company might justly have
must, in our opinion, be at once excluded from entertained the suspicion that the real and only
consideration as emanating from persons who had person behind those contracts was the plaintiff
been constituted mere agents of the plaintiff. The himself. Such at least turns out to have been the
San Francisco order and the Australian orders are case.
the same in legal effect as if they were orders signed
by the plaintiff and drawn upon himself; and it cannot Much energy has been expended in the briefs upon
be pretended that those orders represent sales to this appeal over the contention whether the
bona fide purchasers found by the plaintiff. The defendant was justified in laying down the condition
original contract by which the plaintiff was appointed mentioned in the letter of March 26, 1921, to the
sales agent for a limited period of time in Australia effect that no order would be entertained unless
and the United States contemplated that he should cash should be deposited with either the
find reliable and solvent buyers who should be International Banking Corporation or the Chartered

Page 75 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Bank of India, Australia and China, in Cebu. In this Exhibits 7, 8, 9 and 10 comprise correspondence
connection the plaintiff points to the stipulation of the which passed between the parties by mail or
contract which provides that contracts with telegraph during the first part of the year 1921. The
responsible parties are to be accepted "subject to subject-matter of this correspondence relates to
draft attached to bill of lading in full payment of such efforts that were being made by Anderson to dispose
shipment." What passed between the parties upon of the controlling interest in the defendant
this point appears to have the character of mere corporation, and Exhibit 9 in particular contains an
diplomatic parrying, as the plaintiff had no contract offer from the plaintiff, representing certain
from any responsible purchaser other than his own associates, to buy out Anderson’s interest for a fixed
subagents and the defendant company could not sum. While these exhibits perhaps shed some light
probably have filled the contracts even if they had upon the relations of the parties during the time this
been backed by the Bank of England. controversy was brewing, the bearing of the matter
upon the litigation before us is too remote to exert
Upon inspection of the plaintiff’s letters (Exhibits Y any definitive influence on the case. The trial court
and AA), there will be found ample assurance that was not in error in our opinion in excluding these
deposits for the amount of each shipment would be documents.
made with a bank in Manila provided the defendant
would indicate its ability to fill the orders; but these Exhibit E is a letter from Anderson to the plaintiff,
assurances rested upon no other basis than the dated April 21, 1920, in which information is given
financial responsibility of the plaintiff himself, and concerning the property of the defendant company.
this circumstance doubtless did not escape the It is stated in this letter that the output of the Lucio
discernment of the defendant’s officers. mine (quarry) during the coming year would probably
be at the rate of about five tons for twenty-four
With respect to the order from H. Hiwatari, we hours, with the equipment then on hand, but that
observe that while he intimates that he had been with the installation of a model cable-way which was
promised the exclusive agency under the plaintiff for under contemplation, the company would be able to
Japan, nevertheless it does not affirmatively appear handle two thousand tons in twenty-four hours. We
that he had been in fact appointed to be such at the see no legitimate reason for rejecting this document,
time he signed the order Exhibit W at the request of although of slight probative value; and the error
the plaintiff. It may be assumed, therefore, that he imputed to the court in admitting the same was not
was at that time a stranger to the contract of agency. committed.
It clearly appears, however, that he did not expect to
purchase the thousand tons of bituminous limestone Exhibit 14, which was offered in evidence by the
referred to in his order without banking assistance; defendant, consists of a carbon copy of a letter
and although the submanager of the Bank of Taiwan dated June 13, 1921, written by the plaintiff to his
had said something encouraging in respect to the attorney, Frank B. Ingersoll, Esq., of Manila, and in
matter, nevertheless that official had refrained from which plaintiff states, among other things, that his
giving his approval to the order Exhibit W. It is profits from the San Francisco contract would have
therefore not shown affirmatively that this order been at the rate of eighty-five cents (gold) per ton.
proceeds from a responsible source. The authenticity of this document is admitted, and
when it was offered in evidence by the attorney for
The first assignment of error in the appellant’s brief the defendant the counsel for the plaintiff announced
is directed to the action of the trial judge in refusing that he had no objection to the introduction of this
to admit Exhibits 2, 7, 8, 9 and 10, offered by the carbon copy in evidence if counsel for the defendant
defendant, and in admitting Exhibit E, offered by the would explain where this copy was secured. Upon
plaintiff. The Exhibit 2 is a letter dated June 25, this the attorney for the defendant informed the court
1921, or more than three weeks after the action was that he received the letter from the former attorneys
instituted, in which the defendant’s assistant general of the defendant without explanation of the manner
manager undertakes to reply to the plaintiff’s letter of in which the document had come into their
March 29 preceding. It was evidently intended as an possession. Upon this the attorney for the plaintiff
argumentative presentation of the plaintiff’s point of made this announcement: "We hereby give notice at
view in the litigation then pending, and its probative this time that unless such an explanation is made,
value is so slight, even if admissible at all, that there explaining fully how this carbon copy came into the
was no error on the part of the trial court in excluding possession of the defendant company, or any one
it. representing it, we propose to object to its admission
on the ground that it is a confidential communication

Page 76 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
between client and lawyer." No further information G.R. No. 34098           September 17, 1930
was then given by the attorney for the defendant as
to the manner in which the letter had come to his ORIENT INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,
hands and the trial judge thereupon excluded the vs.
document, on the ground that it was a privileged E. P. REVILLA, Judge of First Instance of Manila,
communication between client and attorney. and TEAL MOTOR CO., INC., respondents.

We are of the opinion that this ruling was erroneous; Gibbs and McDonough for petitioner.
for even supposing that the letter was within the Guevara, Francisco and Recto for respondents.
privilege which protects communications between
attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the
letter came to the hands of the adverse party. And it STREET, J.:
makes no difference how the adversary acquired
possession. The law protects the client from the This is an original petition for writs of certiorari
effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in and mandamus filed in this court by the Orient
the confidence of the legal relation, but when such a Insurance Company against the respondent judge of
document, containing admissions of the client, the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Teal
comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the Motor Co., Inc. The object of the petition is to obtain
adversary, it is admissible in evidence. In this an order requiring the respondent judge to permit the
connection Mr. Wigmore attorney for the petitioner to examine a letter
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph (Exhibits 49 and 49-Act) part of which has been read
into the record in the course of the examination of
"The law provides subjective freedom for the client one of the witnesses testifying for the plaintiff in the
by assuring him of exemption from its processes of case of Teal Motor Co., Inc. vs. Orient Insurance
disclosure against himself or the attorney or their Company, now pending in the Court of First Instance
agents of communication. This much, but not a whit of the City of Manila, civil case No. 35825, with
more, is necessary for the maintenance of the which, for purposes of trial, have been consolidated
privilege. Since the means of preserving secrecy of several other cases of similar character. The cause
communication are entirely in the client’s hands, and is now before us for resolution upon the complaint
since the privilege is derogation from the general and answer interposed by the two respondents.
testimonial duty and should be strictly construed, it
would be improper to extend its prohibition to third The respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. is plaintiff in a
persons who obtain knowledge of the civil action instituted in the Court of First Instance of
communications. One who overhears the Manila (civil case No. 35825) for the purpose of
communications, whether with or without the client’s recovering upon two fire insurance policies issued by
knowledge, is not within the protection of the the Orient Insurance Company, aggregating
privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who P60,000, upon a stock of merchandise alleged to be
surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a of the value of P414,513.56, which, with the
document in original or copy." (5 Wigmore on exception of salvage valued at about P50,000, was
Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2326.) destroyed by a fire on or about January 6, 1929. In
one of the clauses of the policies sued upon is a
Although the precedents are somewhat confusing, stipulation to the effect that all benefit under the
the better doctrine is to the effect that when papers policy would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim
are offered in evidence a court will take no notice of should be rejected by the insurer and action or suit
how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally, should not be commenced within three months after
properly or improperly; nor will it from a collateral such rejection. In the answer of the Orient Insurance
issue to try that question. (10 R. C. L., 931; 1 Greenl. Company, interposed in the civil case mentioned, it
Evid., sec. 254a; State v. Mathers, 15 L. R. A., 268; is alleged, by way of defense, that the company
Gross v. State, 33 L. R. A., [N. S. ], 477, note.) rejected the claim on April 15, 1929, that notice of
such rejection was given to the plaintiff by letter on
Our conclusion upon the entire record is that the the same day, and that suit was not instituted on the
judgment appealed from must be reversed; and the policy until August 3, 1929, which was more than
defendant will be absolved from the complaint. It is three months after the rejection of the claim.
so ordered, without special pronouncement as to
costs of either instance. In a replication to the answer of the defendant,
containing the foregoing and other defenses, the

Page 77 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
plaintiff admitted that the adjusters of the defendant suggested that he would like to have the letter
company had, on April 15, 1929, notified the plaintiff marked without his reading it, and it was accordingly
that the Orient Insurance Company would not pay marked as Exhibit 49. The attorney then said: "In
the claim, basing refusal upon alleged incendiarism view of the production of the letter, I withdraw the
and fraud on the part of the plaintiff; and by way of objection to the statement of the witness as to its
avoidance, it was alleged in the replication that, after contents," and he added: "I now ask the permission
notification of denial of liability by the insurance of the court to read the letter for my information."
company, one E. E. Elser, as representative of the The court thereupon inquired of the attorney for the
company, expressly requested the plaintiff to defer Teal Motor Co., Inc., whether he had any objection,
judicial action until after the following July 31, stating and the attorney observed that he would have no
that three were great possibilities that an objection to the disclosing of that part of the letter
extrajudicial compromise might be arranged in the which referred exactly to the point of the urging of
matter; and it was further asserted, in the replication, the filing of the complaints, and he added:
that the plaintiff had deferred action, relying upon "Unfortunately, the other part of the letter being a
this request. communication between a client and attorney, I don't
think, if your Honor please, it can be disclosed
It will thus be seen that the reason for the admitted without the consent of both."
delay in the institution of the action is an important
issue in the case, or case, now in course of trial. In the course of the colloquy which thereupon
unsued between the attorney for the plaintiff and the
It further appears that while case No. 35825 was in attorney for the defendant, it was stated by the
course of trial, as it still is, before the respondent attorney for the plaintiff that only a part of the letter
judge, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the had anything to do with the urging of the
witness E. M. Bachrach, president of the Teal Motor presentation of the complaints in the cases to which
Co., Inc., while being examined in chief by the the witness had testified, and that the other part of
attorneys for the plaintiff, and speaking of the the letter referred to the contract of fees, or retaining
circumstances surrounding the institution of the of the services of plaintiff's attorneys in connection
action, said that he had reported certain with said cases, a matter, so the attorney suggested,
conversations to plaintiff's attorneys, and he added: entirely distinct from the urging of the presentation of
"I waited for about a week longer and not having the cases. The attorney for the defendant thereupon
heard anything about it, in the meantime, on the 13th insisted before the court that, inasmuch as all the
of July, I received a letter from our attorneys, letter refers to the case then in court, the entire
Guevara, Francisco & Recto, urging me to file these document should be exhibited, in conformity with the
cases." The attorney for the defendant, Orient rule that when part of a document is offered in
Insurance Company, thereupon interposed, saying: evidence, the entire document must be presented.
"I ask that the witness be required to produce the
letter referred to from Mr. Guevara, or else his Upon this the respondent judge ruled as follows:
answer be stricken out. (To the witness) Have you "Objection of the counsel for the plaintiff and the
got the letter there?" The witness replied that he had witness, Mr. Barchrach, to the showing or reading of
the letter with him and that he had no objection to the whole letter in the record is sustained, and it is
show that part of the letter in which Guevara urged ordered that only that part of the letter which has
him to proceed with the cases. Upon being asked been referred to by Mr. Bachrach in his testimony be
about the other part of the letter, the witness said read and transcribed into the record." To this ruling
that the other part contained private matter, the attorney for the defendant excepted and the
"between the attorney and ourselves," meaning respondent judge then said: "Let that part of the
between the Teal Motor Co., Inc., and its attorneys. letter pointed out by Mr. Bachrach be transcribed in
Thereupon the attorney for the defendant, Orient the record;" whereupon the following part of the
Insurance Company, said he would like to see the letter was read out in court and incorporated in the
letter, inquiring as to its date. The witness replied transcript.
that it bore date of July 13, 1929; and upon the court
inquiring whether the witness had any objection to July 13, 1929                       
the reading of the letter by the attorney for the
defendant, the witness replied that he wished to DEAR SIR: As you know, your attorney Mr.
consult with his attorney. Upon this the attorney for Basilio Francisco has turned over to us, prior
the adversary party, the Orient Insurance Company, to his departure, all the papers in connection

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 with the insurance claim of the Teal Motor The essential character of this incident, which we
Co., Inc., on destroyed or burned have perhaps narrated with unnecessary prolixity, is
merchandise, and everything is now ready readily discernible. A witness for the plaintiff made
for filing of the corresponding complaints in an oral statement as to the substance of part of a
the Court of First Instance. letter which had been received by the plaintiff from
its attorney, and when the fact was revealed that the
When the matter above quoted had been thus read communication had been made by letter, the
into the record, the attorney for the defendant made attorney for the defendant requested that the witness
the following observation: "In view of the fact that be required to produce the letter in court, and if not,
counsel for the plaintiff has just now read into the that his answer should be stricken out. This in legal
record and presented as evidence a part of the letter effect was a demand for the production of "the best
of July 13, I now request that the entire letter be evidence," it being a well-known rule of law that a
produced." This request was overruled by the court, witness cannot be permitted to give oral testimony
and the attorney for the defendant excepted. After as to the contents of a paper writing which can be
further discussion, upon the suggestion of the produced in court. In response to this request that
attorney for the defendant and by agreement of the portion of the letter to which the witness had
counsel for both parties, the second page of the supposedly referred was read into the record.
letter was marked 49-A by the clerk court.
The respondent judge appears to have considered
The incident was renewed when it came at turn of that the excerpt from the letter thus incorporated in
the attorney for the defendant to cross-examine the the record was either proof of the defendant, its
same witness E. M. Bachrach, when the attorney for production having been demanded by defendant's
the defendant, having ascertained from the witness counsel, or that at least the legal responsibility for
that he still had the letter in his possession, and that the incorporation of said excerpt into the record was
he had not answered it in writing, formally offered attributable to the defendant. We are unable to
the letter in evidence. The attorney for the plaintiff accept this view. The incorporation of this excerpt
again objected, on the ground that the letter was of a from the letter was a necessary support of the oral
privileged nature and that it was the personal statement which the witness had made, and if this
property of the witness. Thereupon the court, basis for such statement had not been laid by the
receiving the letter in hand from the witness, incorporation of the excerpt into the record, the oral
observed that he had already ruled upon it, and after statement of the witness concerning the tenor of the
further discussion, the court sustained the objection letter should properly have been stricken out. But
of the attorney for the plaintiff and refused to admit in instead of withdrawing the oral statement of the
evidence so much of the letter as had not already witness concerning the nature of the written
been read into the record. The attorney for the communication, the witness produced the letter and
defendant again excepted. the part of it already quoted was read into the
record. The excerpt in question must therefore be
considered as proof submitted by the plaintiff; and
At a later stage of the trial the attorney interposed a
there can be no question that, part of the letter
formal motion for reconsideration of the ruling of the
having been introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, the
court in refusing to admit the letter in evidence, or
whole of the letter could properly be examined by
the part of it not already incorporated in the record.
the other party, in accordance with the express
The court, however, adhered to its original ruling,
provision of section 283 of the Code of Civil
and the attorney for the defendant excepted.
Procedure.
Another incident that might be noted, though not
alleged as a ground of relief in the petition before us,
but set forth in the answer of the respondents, is that It was stated in the court by the attorney for the
the attorney for the defendant procured a plaintiff, in opposing the introduction of other
subpoena duces tecum to be issued by the clerk of portions of the letter in proof, that the other parts
court requiring the attorneys for the plaintiff to were privileged, because they related to the terms of
produce in court certain papers including the letter employment between attorney and client, or to the
which gave rise to the present controversy. The fee to be paid to the attorney. With respect to this
court, on motion of the attorneys for the plaintiff, point it is difficult to see how a contract for fees could
quashed said subpoena. be considered privileged. Irrelevant it might, under
certain circumstances, certainly be, but not
privileged. Of course contracts between attorneys

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and clients are inherently personal and private of proofs for final hearing the defendant
matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, sought to introduce in evidence the original
and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of communications, extracts from which were
privileged nature. Privilege primarily refers to used by the complainant upon the motion for
communications from client to attorney, an idea an injunction, on the ground that the parts of
which of course includes communications from the communication which were not disclosed
attorney to client relative to privileged matters. had an important bearing upon the history of
the application for a reissue, and indicated
But, even supposing that the matter contained in the that it was not made for any legitimate
letter and withheld from the inspection of the purpose. The complainant resisted the
adversary was originally of a privileged nature, the efforts of the defendant to have the original
privilege was waived by the introduction in evidence communications admitted, on the ground
of part of the letter. The provision in section 283 of that they were privileged as made to its
the Code of Civil Procedure making the whole of a officers by its attorney, but it was held that
declaration, conversation, or writing admissible when the defendant was entitled to introduce them
part has been given in evidence by one party, makes in evidence, the court saying: "The question,
no exception as to privileged matter; and the then, is whether the complainant can shelter
jurisprudence on the subject does not recognize any itself behind its privilege to insist upon the
exception. Practically every feature of the question privacy of the communications between its
now under consideration was involved in the case of attorney and its other officers as confidential
Western Union Tel. Co. vs. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. communications, when it has itself produced
Co. (26 Fed., 55), which in 1885 came before fragmentary part of them, and sought to use
Wallace, J., a distinguished jurist presiding in the them as a weapon against the defendant to
Federal Circuit Court of the Southern District of New obtain the stringent remedy of a preliminary
York. The substance of the case is well stated in the injunction. Assuming that the
note to Kelly vs. Cummens (20 Am. & Eng. Ann. communications addressed to the president
Cases, 1283, 1287), from which we quote as follows: and vice-president of the complainant by Mr.
Buckingham were communications made to
the complainant by its attorney, and as such
In Western Union Tel. Co. vs. Baltimore,
privileged at the option of the complainant, it
etc., Tel. Co. (26 Fed., 55), it appeared that
was competent for the complainant to waive
upon a motion in the cause, which was in
its privilege. It would hardly be contended
equity for a preliminary injunction, one of the
that the complainant could introduce
questions involved was whether a reissued
extracts from these communications as
patent upon which the suit was founded was
evidence in its own behalf for the purpose of
obtained for the legitimate purpose of
a final hearing, and yet withhold the other
correcting mistake or inadvertence in the
parts if their production were required by the
specification and claims of the original, or
defendant. A party cannot waive such a
whether it was obtained merely for the
privilege partially. He cannot remove the
purpose of expanding the claims of the
seal of secrecy from so much of the
original in order to subordinate to the reissue
privileged communications as makes for his
certain improvements or inventions made by
advantage, and insist that it shall not be
others after the grant of the original patent
removed as to so much as makes to the
and before the application for the reissue.
advantage of his adversary, or may
To fortify its theory of the true reasons for
neutralize the effect of such as has been
obtaining the reissue, the complainant upon
introduced. Upon the principle it would seem
that motion embodied in affidavits extracts
that it cannot be material at what stage of
from communications made by a patent
the proceedings in a suit a party waives his
expert and attorney in the office of the
right to maintain the secrecy of privileged
solicitor general of the complainant, to the
communication. All the proceedings in the
president and the vice-president of the
cause are constituent parts of the
complainant, when the subject of applying
controversy, and it is not obvious how any
for a reissue was under consideration by the
distinction can obtain as to the effect of
officers of the complainant, and while the
waiver when made by a party for the
proceedings for a reissue were pending.
purpose of obtaining temporary relief and
After the cause had proceeded to the taking
when made by him to obtain final relief."

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From the foregoing decision and other cases the present application will either be conductive to
contained in the note referred to, we are led to the the speedy determination of case, or at least will not
conclusion that the attorney for the defendant in the appreciably extend the proceedings.
court below was entitled to examine the whole of the
letter (Exhibit 49 and 49-A), with a view to the It goes without saying that the subject matter of the
introduction in evidence of such parts thereof as may contention is of a nature which makes the use of the
be relevant to the case on trial, and the respondent writ of mandamus appropriate, since the right from
judge was in error in refusing to permit the the exercise of which the petitioner is excluded is
inspection of the letter by said attorney. one to which it is entitled under the law and the duty
to be performed is one pertaining to the respondent
It is suggested in the argument for the respondents judge in his official capacity.
that the question of the admissibility in evidence of
the parts of the letter not already read into the record From what has been said it follows that the writ
was prematurely raised, and that the attorney for the of mandamus prayed for will be granted, and the
defendant should have waited until it became his respondent judge is directed to permit the attorney
turn to present evidence in chief, when, as is for the defendant (petitioner here) to inspect the
supposed, the question could have been properly letter (Exhibit 49 and 49-A) with a view to the
raised. We are of the opinion, however, that if the introduction in evidence of such parts thereof as may
attorney for the defendant had a right to examine the be relevant to the issues made by the pleadings in
letter, it should have been produced when he asked civil case No. 35825 and other cases which have
for it on the cross-examination of the witness who been consolidated with it for trial. So ordered, with
had the letter in his possession. Besides, in the costs against the respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc.
lengthy discussions between court and attorneys,
occuring at different times, there was not the G.R. No. 132081           November 26, 2002
slightest suggestion from the court that the parts of
the letter which were held inadmissible would be
admitted at any time. Furthermore, the action of the JOEL M. SANVICENTE, petitioner,
court in quashing the subpoena duces tecum for the vs.
production of the letter shows that the court meant to PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
rule that the letter could not be inspected at all by
the attorney for the defendant. DECISION

Objection is also here made by the attorney for the YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

respondents to the use of the writ of mandamus for
the purpose of correcting the error which is Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing
supposed to have been committed. The situation of one Dennis Wong y Chua. On June 11, 1995, at
presented is, however, one where the herein around 5:30 p.m., petitioner fatally shot the victim
petitioner has no other remedy. The letter which the outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan Avenue,
petitioner seeks to examine has been ruled Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly
inadmissible, as to the parts not introduced in attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash
evidence by the defendant in the court below, and which he had just withdrawn from the automatic
the respondent judge had not permitted the teller machine.1
document to become a part of the record in such a
way that the petitioner could take advantage of the Responding policemen found the lifeless body of the
error upon appeal to this court. It is idle to discuss victim at the parking space in front of the Far East
whether other remedy would be speedy or adequate Bank and Trust Company Branch along Katipunan
when there is no remedy at all. This court is loath, of Road, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Recovered at
course, to interfere in course of the trial of a case in the scene were five empty caliber .45 shells, two live
a Court of First Instance, as such interference might caliber .45 bullets and an ATM card in the name of
frequently prolong unduly the litigation in that court. Violeta Sanvicente.2
But this case has been pending before the
respondent judge for a considerable period of time,
On June 13, 1995, police authorities located
and undoubtedly the probatory period will be
petitioner’s car in Barrio Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva
necessarily extended much longer. Under these
Ecija and took custody thereof.
circumstances, the action of this court in entertaining

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Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, genuineness of the medico-legal report. After trial,
turned over to Police Station 9 petitioner’s .45 caliber the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of
Mark IV pistol bearing Serial No. 5504095. He also Exhibits,6 which included the above-quoted letter of
wrote a letter addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz, petitioner’s counsel to P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, marked
Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC, as Exhibit LL. The trial court admitted all the
Anonas Road, Quezon City which reads as follows: prosecution’s exhibits in its Order dated August 27,
1996.7
This is in connection with the alleged death of one
Dennis Wong that occurred in Katipunan Ave., Q.C., Meanwhile, petitioner begged leave to file a
in the afternoon of June 11, 1995. demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the trial
court.8 Hence, on August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a
According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, on said Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to
date, place and hour above he just withdrew from Evidence),9 based on the following grounds: (1) the
the Far East Bank and Trust Co., Katipunan branch lack of positive identification of the accused is a fatal
a large amount of cash. On his way out of the bank, omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution’s
said victim immediately attacked him to grab the evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent, hence,
money he has just withdrew (sic). My said client inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was not
pulled out his gun (duly licensed with Permit to proven by positive evidence beyond reasonable
Carry) and fired a warning shot upwards. Still the doubt.
deceased continued his attack and grabbed his gun.
After a brief struggle, my client was forced to shoot On October 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order
the deceased in the defense of his person and dismissing the case together with the civil aspect
money. My client will submit a formal statement thereof for insufficiency of evidence.10
during the proper preliminary investigation, if
needed. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration,11 which was denied on the ground,
On June 13, 1995, my client’s car (Mercedes Benz among others, that with the dismissal of the case
with plate no. TFU 736) was taken by your double jeopardy had set in.12
operatives led by Capt. Alejandro Casanova and [is]
now in your custody. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
In view of the untoward incident, my client suffered 43697. In a Decision dated July 25, 1997, 13 the
serious anxiety and depression and was advised to appellate court nullified the October 7, 1996 Order of
undergo medical treatment and confinement at the the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for
Delos Santos Hospital in Rodriguez Ave., Q. C. My reconsideration14 was likewise denied in a
client would have no objection if you assigned police Resolution dated January 2, 1998.15
escort/guard under your supervision pending his
confinement. Hence, the instant petition.

For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall In reversing the trial court’s Order dismissing the
serve as a voluntary surrender, without admission of criminal case against petitioner, the Court of Appeals
guilt on the part of my client.3 found that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in preventing the prosecution from
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. 4 establishing the due execution and authenticity of
Exhibit LL which, it claimed, "positively identified
During the trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged." 16
Report No. B-046-95, stating that slugs recovered
from the crime scene, on the one hand, and Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of
cartridge cases fired from petitioner’s caliber .45 Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may
Mark IV pistol, on the other hand, were fired from the dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
same firearm.5 The Medico-Legal Officer who evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the
conducted the autopsy on the deceased failed to accused with or without leave of court. In resolving
appear at the trial. In order to dispense with her accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely
testimony, petitioner admitted the due execution and required to ascertain whether there is competent or

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sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
support a verdict of guilt.17 jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case, 28 or where
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left the trial was a sham.29 However, while certiorari may
to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the
on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must
of a grave abuse of discretion.18 Significantly, once clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive
to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the it of its very power to dispense justice.30
accused would violate the constitutional proscription
on double jeopardy.19 This constitutes an exception In the instant case, petitioner filed a demurrer to
to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made evidence after the prosecution adduced its evidence
with the express consent of the accused or upon his and rested its case. The trial court subsequently
own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. 20 The dismissed the case after finding that the evidence
finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People presented by the prosecution was insufficient to
v. Velasco:21 support the charge against petitioner. The
prosecution, which relied primarily on Exhibit LL as
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality the basis for the indictment against petitioner,
of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the however, contested the dismissal of the case
"humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness allegedly because the trial court prevented it from
over the rights of the citizens, when brought in further identifying the genuineness and due
unequal contest with the State xxx." 22 Thus Green execution of said document "in the manner that it
expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, wanted."31
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State The crux of the problem lies in the confusion
with all its resources and power should not be between the due execution of a piece of
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an documentary evidence vis-à-vis the truth of its
individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting contents. Likewise at the core of the dilemma is the
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and fundamental distinction between an admission and a
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety confession. The prosecution maintains that the
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility letter, Exhibit LL, constituted a confession and
that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."23 argues thus: "What better evidence is there to
positively identify the perpetrator of the crime than
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness the confession of the petitioner himself, freely and
and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the voluntarily given, assisted by counsel?"32 According
right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality to the prosecution, this "extrajudicial confession
of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule constitutes the strongest evidence of guilt."33
establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part
of the paramount importance criminal justice system An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26
attaches to the protection of the innocent against of the Rules of Court as the act, declaration or
wrongful conviction."24 The interest in the finality-of- omission of a party as to a relevant fact. A
acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130,
guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for Section 33 is the declaration of an accused
"repose", a desire to know the exact extent of one’s acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged or
liability.25 With this right of repose, the criminal any offense necessarily included therein.
justice system has built in a protection to insure that
the innocent, even those whose innocence rests More particularly, a confession "is a declaration
upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a made at any time by a person, voluntarily and
subsequent proceeding.26 without compulsion or inducement stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or participated
Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right in the commission of a crime. The term admission,
against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on on the other hand, is usually applied in criminal
an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not cases to statements of fact by the accused which do
lie.27 The only instance when double jeopardy will not directly involve an acknowledgment of the guilt of
not attach is when the trial court acted with grave

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the accused or of criminal intent to commit the Pertinent to this is Section 24 (b) of Rule 130 of the
offense with which he is charged."34 Rules of Court, to wit:

In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged

his guilt; while there is no such acknowledgment of communication. – The following persons cannot
guilt in an admission.35 Only recently in People v. testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
Licayan,36 the Court distinguished "confession" and following cases:
"admission" in this wise:
xxxxxxxxx
A confession is an acknowledgment in express
terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the (b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by client, be examined as to any communication made
the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in
the issue, and tending, in connection with proof the course of, or with a view to, professional
of other  facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an employment nor can an attorney’s secretary,
admission is something less than a stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some consent of the client and his employer, concerning
fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired
authorize a conviction, and which tends only to in such capacity; x x x.
establish the ultimate fact of guilt. (Emphasis ours) 37
It is worthy to note that the prosecution did not
There is no question that the letter dated June 14, summon petitioner himself to testify although he too
1995 is an admission, not a confession, because of was a signatory of Exhibit LL. Apparently, it was
the unmistakable qualification in its last paragraph aware that petitioner could well invoke his right
that – against self-incrimination and refuse to answer its
questions. The prosecution then attempted to draw
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall out what it could not constitutionally extract from his
serve as a voluntary surrender, without admission of lawyer. Yet, and as stated previously, said Exhibit LL
guilt on the part of my client. . . (Emphasis and italics had earlier been admitted in evidence by the trial
supplied). court in its Order dated August 27, 1996. What was
objectionable was the prosecution’s sole reliance on
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, the trial court the document without proof of other facts to
correctly rejected the prosecution’s motion to have establish its case against petitioner because of its
Exhibit LL further identified "in the manner that it mistaken assumption that the same was a
wanted,"38 i.e., through the proposed testimony of confession.
petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who incidentally
refused to testify. Aside from covering a subject Significantly, the prosecution was neither barred nor
which squarely falls within the scope of "privileged prevented by the trial court from establishing the
communication", it would, more importantly, be genuineness and due execution of the document
tantamount to converting the admission into a through other means. Rule 132, Section 20of the
confession. Rules of Court provides the following means of
authenticating the document:
It can not be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL,
particularly with regard to the details of the shooting SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any
communicated by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is private document offered as authentic is received in
privileged because it is connected with the business evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
for which petitioner retained the services of the proved either:
latter.39 More specifically, said communication was
relayed by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte in order to (a) By anyone who saw the document
seek his professional advice or assistance in relation executed or written; or
to the subject matter of the employment, or to
explain something in connection with it, so as to (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the
enable him to better advice his client or manage the signature or handwriting of the maker.
litigation.40

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Any other private document need only be identified accused should not be prejudiced for the failure of
as that which it is claimed to be. the prosecution to discharge its burden of
overcoming the constitutional presumption of
Thus, the due execution of a document can be innocence and to establish the guilt of the accused
proved through the testimony of: (1) the person/s beyond reasonable doubt.45 Indeed, if the
who executed it; (2) the person before whom its prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is
execution was acknowledged; or (3) any person who not only the accused’s right to be freed, it is even
was present and saw it executed and delivered or more the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him. 46
who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and
recognized the signatures therein or by a person to If at all, the foregoing acts of the prosecution
whom the parties to the instrument previously underscores just how careless and haphazard it had
confirmed the execution thereof.41 been in building up a case against the petitioner. For
such, it has nothing but itself to blame if the trial
Thus, respondent could have called to the witness court in assaying the proof it adduced found the
stand P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, the addressee of Exhibit same wanting. It will neither be allowed to sweep its
LL, to identify the said document since it was procedural miscues under the rug, so to speak, on
supposedly delivered to him personally. Samples of the pretext that it was denied due process when the
the signatures appearing on the document which trial court supposedly prevented it from presenting
can be readily obtained or witnesses who are Exhibit LL. To be more precise, the trial court had
familiar with them could have also been presented. admitted Exhibit LL in evidence but rejected the
The prosecution did not. Neither did it subpoena further admission of the document "in the manner
P/Senior Inspector Alejandro M. Casanova, who that it wanted." Verily, the prosecution can not have
prepared the detailed Police Report of the incident its cake and eat it too.
used as the basis of the inquest proceedings, nor
were any eyewitnesses presented, notwithstanding Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the letter
that there appeared to be at least two eyewitnesses marked as Exhibit LL is hearsay inasmuch as its
to the incident. probative force depends in whole or in part on the
competency and credibility of some person other
It must be borne in mind that in a criminal trial, it is than the witness by whom it is sought to produce
the prosecution that determines the charges to be it.47 The term as used in the law of evidence
filed and how the legal and factual elements in the "signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the
case shall be utilized as components of the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is
information.42 Stated differently, the determination of elicited, and which consequently does not depend
what evidence to adduce to bolster a successful wholly for its credibility and weight upon the
prosecution of a criminal offense is the exclusive confidence which the court may have in him. Its
domain of prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, courts value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to
generally can not interfere with the prosecutor’s some third persons not sworn as witnesses to that
discretion as to control over criminal fact and consequently not subject to cross-
prosecutions.43 However, it is the court which examination."48 In short, it is "the evidence not of
ultimately determines whether such evidence is what the witness knows himself but of what he has
sufficient to sustain an indictment, thus, the care with heard from others."49 Thus, in one case we stated
which the prosecution must build up its case against that "[w]hen evidence is based on what was
the accused can not be gainsaid because, as has supposedly told the witness, the same is without any
been stated time and again, in any criminal evidentiary weight being patently hearsay." 50 In the
prosecution, the State must rely on the strength of its case at bar, it is noteworthy that the statements in
own evidence and not on the weakness of the the letter were made by petitioner’s counsel, who
evidence of the defense.44 even began his narration of the events with the
phrase: "According to my client."51
Viewed vis-a-vis the foregoing lapses detailed
above, the prosecution’s insistence to have Exhibit In holding that petitioner was identified as the person
LL admitted "in the manner it wanted" shows only who committed the offense, the appellate court
too clearly a subtle but shrewd scheme to cover up relied on the following circumstances: (1) he
for the foregoing procedural missteps and to cut admitted responsibility therefor through Exhibit LL,
evidentiary corners to build its case at the expense which was signed by him and his counsel; (2) he
of the defense. This cannot be countenanced. An surrendered even before the issuance of the warrant

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of arrest; (3) his gun was also surrendered to the G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997
police authorities by his counsel; (4) empty shells
recovered at the scene of the crime matched his PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
gun; and (5) the letter-referral of P/Senior Inspector vs.
Alejandro Casanova to Quezon City Prosecutor HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V.
indicated that petitioner was under the custody of the HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and
policeman on detail supposedly to guard him at the GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
hospital.52

With regard to the first circumstance, suffice it to

state that, as has lengthily been discussed earlier, REGALADO, J.:
Exhibit LL is merely an admission and not a
confession. In fact, petitioner specifically denied
criminal intent therein. By and of itself it is insufficient Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar,
to support a conviction unless it is considered in petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of
connection with other proof to establish the ultimate respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on
fact of guilt. December 22, 1993, which denied petitioner's
motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S.
Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its
The second and third incidents actually support resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for
petitioner’s innocence because were he indeed reconsideration of its preceding disposition.1
guilty of the felony, he would not likely have
surrendered even before the warrant was issued for
his arrest. Courts go by the biblical truism that the The records show that during the dates material to
"the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of
righteous are as bold as a lion."53 Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario
in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was
The fourth event merely proves the fact that the successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del
empty shells recovered from the crime scene were Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at
fired from the surrendered gun. It, however, does not present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was
answer the penultimate question of who actually a practicing attorney who served as counsel for
pulled the trigger of the firearm. Paredes in several instances pertinent to the
criminal charges involved in the present recourse.
Lastly, the appellate court’s reading of the letter-
referral,54 mentioning that petitioner had been placed The same records also represent that sometime in
under the custody of a policeman, was inaccurate. 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free patent
As explained by Atty. Valmonte in Exhibit LL, the over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public
policeman was actually requested for petitioner’s Land Subdivision Survey. His application was
personal safety owing to the untoward incident which approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to
caused petitioner serious anxiety and depression, him, an original certificate of title was issued in his
and for which he had to undergo treatment and favor for that lot which is situated in the  poblacion of
confinement.55 San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.

All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of the However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an
trial court in dismissing the charges against action2 for the cancellation of respondent Paredes'
petitioner. patent and certificate of title since the land had been
designated and reserved as a school site in the
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court
petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of rendered judgment3 nullifying said patent and title
Appeals dated July 25, 1997 and the Resolution after finding that respondent Paredes had obtained
dated January 2, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43697 are the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. his application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet
served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.4
SO ORDERED.

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Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial the defense was later granted in respondent court's
court, upon the subsequent complaint of the resolution of August 1, 1991 11 and the case was
Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary dismissed on the ground of prescription.
investigation conducted thereon, an information for
perjury5 was filed against respondent Paredes in the On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.6 On November 27, taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft
1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to
by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the
dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of three respondents herein for falsification of public
prescription, hence the proceedings were documents. 12 He claimed that respondent Honrada,
terminated.7 In this criminal case, respondent in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents,
Paredes was likewise represented by respondent simulated and certified as true copies certain
Sansaet as counsel. documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment,
dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic
Nonetheless, respondent Sansaet was thereafter notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of
haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary Paredes on the perjury charge. 13 These falsified
investigation on the charge that, by using his former documents were annexed to respondent Paredes'
position as Provincial Attorney to influence and motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan
induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him,
on his application for free patent, he had violated in order to support his contention that the same
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. would constitute double jeopardy.
For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes'
counsel of record therein. In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter
a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
resolution8 recommending the criminal prosecution Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury case;
of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ariño
his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for that said perjury case in his court did not reach the
reconsideration and, because of its legal significance arraignment stage since action thereon was
in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that suspended pending the review of the case by the
motion: Department of Justice. 14

. . . respondent had been charged Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits,

already by the complainants before but Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated
the Municipal Circuit Court of San the submissions he had made in his counter-
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and
jail on detention in 1984 under the Rectifications, 15 respondent Sansaet revealed that
same set of facts and the same Paredes contrived to have the graft case under
evidence . . . but said case after preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of
arraignment, was ordered dismissed double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury
by the court upon case had been dismissed by the trial court after he
recommendation of the Department had been arraigned therein.
of Justice. Copy of the dismissal
order, certificate of arraignment and For that purpose, the documents which were later
the recommendation of the filed by respondent Sansaet in the preliminary
Department of Justice are hereto investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-
attached for ready reference; thus respondents in this case in the house of respondent
the filing of this case will be a case Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own
of double jeopardy for respondent participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did
herein . . . 9 (Emphasis supplied.) so upon the instigation and inducement of
respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the way for his discharge as a government witness in
Sandiganbayan 10 charging respondent Paredes with the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor
a violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their
as amended. However, a motion to quash filed by agreement.

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Withal, in a resolution 16 dated February 24, 1992, From the evidence adduced, the
the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification opposition was able to establish that
charges against all the herein private respondents. client and lawyer relationship
The proposal for the discharge of respondent existed between Atty. Sansaet and
Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during
Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position: and after the period alleged in the
information. In view of such
. . . Taking his explanation, it is relationship, the facts surrounding
difficult to believe that a lawyer of the case, and other confidential
his stature, in the absence of matter must have been disclosed by
deliberate intent to conspire, would accused Paredes, as client, to
be unwittingly induced by another to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in
commit a crime. As counsel for the his professional capacity. Therefore,
accused in those criminal cases, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on
Atty. Sansaet had control over the the facts surrounding the offense
case theory and the evidence which charged in the information is
the defense was going to present. privileged. 19
Moreover, the testimony or
confession of Atty. Sansaet falls Reconsideration of said resolution having been
under the mantle of privileged likewise denied, 20 the controversy was elevated to
communication between the lawyer this Court by the prosecution in an original action for
and his client which may be the issuance of the extraordinary writ
objected to, if presented in the trial. of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.

The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that The principal issues on which the resolution of the
resolution 17 and, ostensibly to forestall any further petition at bar actually turns are therefore (1)
controversy, he decided to file separate informations whether or not the projected testimony of respondent
for falsification of public documents against each of Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the
the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a
cases, 18 each of which named one of the three consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to
private respondents here as the accused therein, testify as a  particeps criminis.
were filed in the graft court. However, the same were
consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled
the Sandiganbayan. that due to the lawyer-client relationship which
existed between herein respondents Paredes and
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts
People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of surrounding the case and other confidential matters
respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was must have been disclosed by respondent Paredes,
submitted that all the requisites therefor, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer.
as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Accordingly, it found "no reason to discuss it further
Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a
was concerned. The basic postulate was that, witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr.
except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent without the latter's consent." 21
Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove
the confabulated falsification of documents by The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-
respondents Honrada and Paredes. client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the
facts thereof and actuations of both respondents
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent therein constitute an exception to the rule. For a
Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will
attorney-client privilege adverted to by the first sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs
Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private in these cases.
respondents in their opposition to the prosecution's
motion, resolved to deny the desired discharge on 1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a
this ratiocination: confidential communication made by Paredes to
Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos.

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17791-93 for falsification before respondent court, The Court reprobates the last assumption which is
and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true
was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be
Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness testified to in respondent court are concerned, those
the preparation of the falsified documents by crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But
Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a for the application of the attorney-client privilege,
communication, if not more, than verbal statements however, the period to be considered is the date
being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and when the privileged communication was made by
purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to committed in the past or with respect to a crime
"any communication," without distinction or intended to be committed in the future. In other
qualification. 22 words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with
respect to a crime that the former has theretofore
In the American jurisdiction from which our present committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
evidential rule was taken, there is no particular mode confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege
by which a confidential communication shall be declares cannot be broken by the attorney without
made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not the client's consent. The same privileged
confined to verbal or written communications made confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard
by the client to his attorney but extends as well to to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter
information communicated by the client to the or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks
attorney by other means. 23 the lawyer's advice.

Nor can it be pretended that during the entire Statements and communications regarding the
process, considering their past and existing relations commission of a crime already committed, made by
as counsel and client and, further, in view of the a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted
purpose for which such falsified documents were as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily,
prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect
and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal that communications between attorney and client
act. The clincher for this conclusion is the having to do with the client's contemplated criminal
undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not
filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing
the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary in reference to communications between attorney
investigation of the graft case before the and client. 25 (Emphases supplied.)
Tanodbayan. 24 Also, the acts and words of the
parties during the period when the documents were 3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be
being falsified were necessarily confidential since elicited from Sansate as state witness are the
Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his communications made to him by physical acts
house and allowed him to witness the same except and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time
under conditions of secrecy and confidence. he and Honrada, either with the active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of the process of falsifying, the documents which were
Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the criminal later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and
act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction culminated in the criminal charges now pending in
must be made between confidential communications respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the
relating to past crimes already committed, and future confidential communications thus made by Paredes
crimes intended to be committed, by the client. to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to
Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced the crime of falsification which had not yet been
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in
within the confidences which his attorney is bound to confederacy with his present co-respondents, later
respect. Respondent court appears, however, to committed. Having been made for purposes of
believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a a future offense, those communications are outside
past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents
Paredes and Honrada that have already been 4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator
committed and consummated. in the commission of that crime of falsification which

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he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted 2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three
upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order private respondents here stand charged in three
that a communication between a lawyer and his separate informations. It will be recalled that in its
client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful resolution of February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The recommended the filing of criminal charges for
existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the falsification of public documents against all the
privilege from attaching. 26 In fact, it has also been respondents herein. That resolution was affirmed
pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the but, reportedly in order to obviate further
honorable relation of attorney and client will not be controversy, one information was filed against each
permitted under the guise of privilege, and every of the three respondents here, resulting in three
communication made to an attorney by a client for a informations for the same acts of falsification.
criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a
conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained
which the attorney under certain circumstances may away during the deliberations in this case by the
be bound to disclose at once in the interest of following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide,
justice." 27 to wit:

It is evident, therefore, that it was error for Assuming

respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such no substantive impediment exists to
unlawful communications intended for an illegal block Sansaet's discharge as state
purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless witness, he can, nevertheless, be
covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To discharged even if indicted under a
prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the separate information. I suppose the
genesis of a crime which was later committed three cases were consolidated for
pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection joint trial since they were all raffled
thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the to the Second Division of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV
in the noble profession of law. of the Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan allows consolidation
II in only one Division of cases arising
from the same incident or series of
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the incidents, or involving common
consequential inquiry as to whether respondent questions of law and fact.
Sansaet qualifies, as a  particeps criminis, for Accordingly, for all legal intents and
discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to purposes, Sansaet stood as co-
testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent accused and he could be
court, having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the discharged as state witness. It is of
preceding issue, did not pass upon this second no moment that he was charged
aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution separately from his co-accused.
which are now submitted for our resolution in the While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the
petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
likewise of some ancillary questions requiring uses the word  jointly, which was
preludial clarification. absent in the old provision, the
consolidated and joint trial has the
effect of making the three accused
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not
co-accused or joint defendants,
fully pass upon the query as to whether or not
especially considering that they are
respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state
charged for the same offense. In
witness need not prevent this Court from resolving
criminal law, persons indicted for the
that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the
same offense and tried together are
determinative facts and evidence have been
called joint defendants.
submitted to this Court such that it is in a position to
finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance
of the ends of justice and the expeditious As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice
administration thereof to resolve the case on the Francisco along the same vein, there having been a
merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court. 28 consolidation of the three cases, the several actions

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lost their separate identities and became a single However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et
action in which a single judgment is rendered, the al., 34 two conspirators charged with five others in
same as if the different causes of action involved three separate informations for multiple murder were
had originally been joined in a single action. 29 discharged and used as state witnesses against
their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 one of the co-
the situation "(w)hen two or more persons are conspirators was discharged from the information
charged with the commission of a certain offense" charging him and two others with the crime of estafa.
was too broad and indefinite; hence the word "joint" The trial court found that he was not the most guilty
was added to indicate the identity of the charge and as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily
the fact that the accused are all together charged convinced by his two co-accused to open the
therewith substantially in the same manner in point account with the bank and which led to the
of commission and time. The word "joint" means commission of the crime.
"common to two or more," as "involving the united
activity of two or more," or "done or produced by two On appeal, this Court held that the finding of
or more working together," or "shared by or affecting respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just as
two or more. 30 Had it been intended that all the guilty as his co-accused, and should not be
accused should always be indicted in one and the discharged as he did not appear to be not the most
same information, the Rules could have said so with guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took
facility, but it did not so require in consideration of into account the gravity or nature of the acts
the circumstances obtaining in the present case and committed by the accused to be discharged
the problems that may arise from amending the compared to those of his co-accused, and not
information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty
achieved by consolidation of the cases as an is imposable on all of them.
alternative mode.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a explicity articulated found expression in People
conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule vs. Ocimar, et al., 36 which we quote in extenso:
is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act
of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez
members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the does not satisfy the conditions for the discharge of a
requirements for a state witness is that he "does not co-accused to become a state witness. He argues
appear to be the most guilty." 31 not that he must be that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be
the least guilty 32 as is so often erroneously framed discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not
or submitted. The query would then be whether an one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing
accused who was held guilty by reason of not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that since
membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is
witness. equally guilty as the others.

To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. 33 we find We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity
this obiter: for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite the
presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas them could positively identify the accused except
was the real mastermind. It is Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the
believable that he persuaded the highway heist which resulted not only in the loss of
others to rob Paterno, not to kill him cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the life
for a promised fee. Although he did of Capt. Cañeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of
not actually commit any of the Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution.
stabbings, it was a mistake to Second, without his testimony, no other direct
discharge Bagispas as a state evidence was available for the prosecution to prove
witness. All the perpetrators of the the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony could
offense, including him, were bound be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its
in a conspiracy that made them material points as indicated by the trial court in its
equally guilty. well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear
to be the most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he

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was only invited to a drinking party without having Also, this is an affair of substantive law
any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway which should not be equated with the
robbery. But even assuming that he later became procedural rule on the discharge of particeps
part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the criminis. This adjective device is based on
most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most other considerations, such as the need for
guilty will be set free while his co-accused who are giving immunity to one of them in order that
less guilty will be sent to jail. And by "most guilty" we not all shall escape, and the judicial
mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of experience that the candid admission of an
participation in the commission of the offense and accused regarding his participation is a
not necessarily the severity of the penalty guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For
imposed.  While all the accused may be given the those reasons, the Rules provide for certain
same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may qualifying criteria which, again, are based on
be considered least guilty if We take into account his judicial experience distilled into a judgmental
degree of participation in the perpetration of the policy.
offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at
any time been convicted of any offense involving III
moral turpitude.
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds,
xxx xxx xxx that the other requisites for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present
Thus, We agree with the and should have been favorably appreciated by the
observations of the Solicitor General Sandiganbayan.
that the rule on the discharge of an
accused to be utilized as state Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative
witness clearly looks at his actual eyewitness to the actual commission of the
and individual participation in the falsification charged in the criminal cases pending
commission of the crime, which may before respondent court, and the prosecution is
or may not have been perpetrated in faced with the formidable task of establishing the
conspiracy with the other accused. guilt of the two other co-respondents who steadfastly
Since Bermudez was not individually deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence.
responsible for the killing committed There is thus no other direct evidence available for
on the occasion of the robbery the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute
except by reason of conspiracy, it necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose
cannot be said then that Bermudez discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Said
appears to be the most guilty. respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and
Hence, his discharge to be a has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed
witness for the government is clearly the substance of his projected testimony in his
warranted. (Emphasis ours.) Affidavit of Explanation and Rectifications.

The rule of equality in the penalty to be His testimony can be substantially corroborated on
imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a its material points by reputable witnesses, identified
criminal offense is based on the in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective
concurrence of criminal intent in their minds testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño,
and translated into concerted physical action Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco,
although of varying acts or degrees of Agusan del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and
depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A.
based on the classical school of thought, it is Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who
the identity of the mens rea which is initiated the criminal cases through his letter-
considered the predominant consideration complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang
and, therefore, warrants the imposition of Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who
the same penalty on the consequential participated in the resolution asking their Provincial
theory that the act of one is thereby the act Governor to file the appropriate case against
of all. respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who
obtained the certification of non-arraignment from
Judge Ariño.

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On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not witness, upon authority of the
appear that respondent Sansaet has at any time Honorable Supreme Court for the
been convicted of any offense involving moral issuance of the proper Resolution to
turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the that effect within fifteen (15) days
requirements for the discharge of this respondent, from notice thereof.
both the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor
General strongly urge and propose that he be WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is
allowed to testify as a state witness. hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impunged
resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and
on this procedural aspect, the prosecution may given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, to determine the merits of the SO ORDERED.
proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It
must be emphasized, however, that such discretion [A.C. NO. 5108 : May 26, 2005]
should have been exercised, and the disposition
taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues
herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue ROSA F. MERCADO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, Respondent.

This change of heart and direction respondent DECISION

Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the
retirement of two members of its Second PUNO, J.:
Division 37 and
the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative
anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment 38 dated complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his
June 14, 1995, as required by this Court in its disbarment from the practice of law. The
resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and complainant alleged that respondent maliciously
new members thereof 39 declared: instituted a criminal case for falsification of public
document against her, a former client, based on
4) That the questioned Resolutions confidential information gained from their attorney-
of December 22, 1993 and March 7, client relationship.
1994 upon which the Petition
for Certiorari filed by the prosecution Let us first hearken to the facts.
are based, was penned by
Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza Complainant is a Senior Education Program
and concurred in by the undersigned Specialist of the Standards Development Division,
and Associate Justice Augusto M. Office of Programs and Standards while respondent
Amores; is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission
on Higher Education (CHED).1
5) That while the legal issues
involved had been already Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537
discussed and passed upon by the entitled "Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco,"
Second Division in the aforesaid for annulment of their marriage with the Regional
Resolution, however, after going Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment case
over the arguments submitted by the had been dismissed by the trial court, and the
Solicitor-General and re-assessing dismissal became final and executory on July 15,
Our position on the matter, We 1992.2
respectfully beg leave of the
Honorable Supreme Court to
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel
manifest that We are amenable to
of complainant, died. On February 7, 1994,
setting aside the questioned
respondent entered his appearance before the trial
Resolutions and to grant the
court as collaborating counsel for complainant.3
prosecution's motion to discharge
accused Generoso Sansaet as state

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this
Substitution of Counsel,4 informing the RTC of Pasig action against respondent. She claims that, in filing
City that he has been appointed as counsel for the the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty
complainant, in substitution of Atty. de Leon. of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-
client relationship, and should be disbarred.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent
filed a criminal action against complainant before the Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on
Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled November 3, 1999 where he alleged that the
"Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. complaint for disbarment was all hearsay,
Mercado," and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations
for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of leveled against him are subject of separate fact-
public document) of the Revised Penal finding bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending
Code.5 Respondent alleged that complainant made cases against him are not grounds for disbarment,
false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven
children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More otherwise.10 He also states that the decision of the
specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and
Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one
certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their month without pay is on appeal with the Court of
marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of
truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado simple misconduct, which he committed in good
and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978. faith.11

Complainant denied the accusations of respondent In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the
against her. She denied using any other name than criminal complaint for falsification of public
"Rosa F. Mercado." She also insisted that she has documents against complainant does not violate the
gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978, to rule on privileged communication between attorney
Ruben G. Mercado. and client because the bases of the falsification case
are two certificates of live birth which are public
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other documents and in no way connected with the
charges against respondent that are pending before confidence taken during the engagement of
or decided upon by other tribunals - (1) libel suit respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig complainant confided to him as then counsel only
City;6 (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave matters of facts relating to the annulment case.
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of
of the service, pursuit of private business, vocation the entries in the birth certificates of her two
or profession without the permission required by daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the
Civil Service rules and regulations, and violations of Records Division of CHED and are accessible to
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," before the anyone.12
then Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption;7 (3) complaint for dishonesty, grave In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar
interest of the service before the Office of the of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of recommendation.13
misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month
suspension without pay;8 and, (4) the Information for The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates
violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, for hearing but complainant failed to appear in both.
as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials granted respondent's motion to file his
and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.9 memorandum, and the case was submitted for
resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal parties.14
complaint for falsification of public document (I.S.
No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
information relating to the civil case for annulment, approved the report of investigating commissioner
then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
rule on privileged communication between attorney glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its
and client, and recommending his suspension from client can be depended on, and that a man may
the practice of law for one (1) year. safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his
rights or supposed rights in any litigation with
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a absolute assurance that the lawyer's tongue is tied
copy of the IBP report and recommendation, wrote from ever disclosing it.21 With full disclosure of the
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of facts of the case by the client to his attorney,
desistance. She stated that after the passage of so adequate legal representation will result in the
many years, she has now found forgiveness for ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the
those who have wronged her. prosecution or defense of the client's cause.

At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege.
the merits of the various criminal and administrative Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to
cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
tribunals where these cases are pending to
determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent. (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from
a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4)
any withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure
Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the
inconsequential in disbarment proceedings. protection be waived.22

We now resolve whether respondent violated the In fine, the factors are as follows:
rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client when he filed a criminal case for (1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a
falsification of public document against his former prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by
client. reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship
between attorney and client and the rule on attorney- Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer
client privilege that is designed to protect such are protected by the rule on privileged
relation is in order. communication even if the prospective client does
not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client the employment.23 The reason for this is to make the
reposes on him special powers of trust and prospective client free to discuss whatever he
confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells
highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and
such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information
is required by necessity and public interest.15 Only by from the prospective client.24
such confidentiality and protection will a person be
encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. On the other hand, a communication from a
The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-
administration of justice.16 Thus, the preservation client relation is not privileged. Instructive is the case
and protection of that relation will encourage a client of Pfleider v. Palanca,25 where the client and his
to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare
of paramount importance to the administration of agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their
justice.17 One rule adopted to serve this purpose is contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a
the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid
inviolate his client's secrets or confidence and not to to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be
abuse them.18 Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed
his client's secrets and confidence outlasts the creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors
termination of the attorney-client relationship, 19 and which he had "confidentially" supplied counsel for
continues even after the client's death. 20 It is the the purpose of carrying out the terms of payment

Page 95 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
contained in the lease contract was disclosed by advice, the privilege does not attach to a
counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to communication disclosed for such purpose.
parties whose interests are adverse to those of the
client. As the client himself, however, states, in the Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold
execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease that the evidence on record fails to substantiate
contract between the parties, he furnished counsel complainant's allegations. We note that complainant
with the "confidential" list of his creditors. We ruled did not even specify the alleged communication in
that this indicates that client delivered the list of his confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims
creditors to counsel not because of the professional were couched in general terms and lacked
relation then existing between them, but on account specificity. She contends that respondent violated
of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation the rule on privileged communication when he
of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of instituted a criminal action against her for falsification
that list would partake more of a private and civil of public documents because the criminal complaint
wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a disclosed facts relating to the civil case for
lawyer to his client. annulment then handled by respondent. She did not,
however, spell out these facts which will determine
(2) The client made the communication in the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be
confidence. involved in a guessing game as to the existence of
facts which the complainant must prove.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not
raise a presumption of confidentiality. 26 The client Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at
must intend the communication to be confidential.27 the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant
as to the specific confidential information allegedly
A confidential communication refers to information divulged by respondent without her consent, it is
transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was
attorney and client in confidence and by means any violation of the rule on privileged
which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the communication. Such confidential information is a
information to no third person other than one crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the privileged communication between attorney and
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-
which it was given.28 client privilege.37 The burden of proving that the
privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting
the privilege.38
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent
ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by
a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against
delivered to the opposing party, 29 an offer and respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby
counter-offer for settlement,30 or a document given DISMISSED for lack of merit.
by a client to his counsel not in his professional
capacity,31 are not privileged communications, the SO ORDERED.
element of confidentiality not being present.32
[G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992.]
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the
attorney in his professional capacity.33 NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO, as
The communication made by a client to his attorney Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan,
must not be intended for mere information, but for Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, Respondents.
the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney
as to his rights or obligations. The communication Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Petitioner.
must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.34 Bince, Oficiana & Dancel for Private Respondent.

If the client seeks an accounting service, 35 or

business or personal assistance,36 and not legal SYLLABUS

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; EVIDENCE; physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; PHYSICIAN- treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to
PATIENT PRIVILEGE; RATIONAL BEHIND THE be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the
RULE. — This rule on the physician-patient privilege communication that is privileged. The mere fact of
is intended to facilitate and make safe full and making a communication, as well as the date of a
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician consultation and the number of consultations, are
of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent the subject communicated is not stated."cralaw
and enforced disclosure and publication on the virtua1aw library
witness stand, to the end that the physician may
form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND
efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public PRESUMPTIONS; ONE WHO CLAIMS
policy and is for the general interest of the PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS MUST PROVE
community. REQUISITES THEREOF. — One who claims this
privilege must prove the presence of these
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO WAIVER. — aforementioned requisites.
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the
patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS;
made to the physician’s testimony. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE; INFORMATION
GATHERED IN PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES,
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — In order NOT PRIVILEGED. — There is authority to the
that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the effect that information elicited during consultation
following requisites must concur: "1. the privilege is with a physician in the presence of third parties
claimed in a civil case; 2. the person against whom removes such information from the mantle of the
the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to privilege: "Some courts have held that the casual
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; 3. such presence of a third person destroys the confidential
person acquired the information while he was nature of the communication between doctor and
attending to the patient in his professional capacity; patient and thus destroys the privilege, and that
4. the information was necessary to enable him to under such circumstances the doctor may testify.
act in that capacity; and 5. the information was Other courts have reached a contrary result."cralaw
confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the virtua1aw library
reputation (formerly character) of the patient."cralaw
virtua1aw library 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGED, WAIVED IN
CASE AT BAR. — while it may be true that counsel
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS. — These for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the
requisites conform with the four (4) fundamental issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr.
conditions necessary for the establishment of a Acampado and filed a formal motion for the quashal
privilege against the disclosure of certain of the said subpoena a day before the witness was
communications, to wit: "1. The communications to testify, the petitioner makes no claim in any of her
must originate in a confidence that they will not be pleadings that her counsel had objected to any
disclosed. 2. This element of confidentiality must be question asked of the witness on the ground that it
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of elicited an answer that would violate the privilege,
the relation between the parties. 3. The relation must despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may
be one which in the opinion of the community ought interpose his objection to the testimony "once it
to be sedulously fostered 4. The injury that would becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be
inure to the relation by the disclosure of the elicited is covered by the privileged communication
communications must be greater than the benefit rule." The particular portions of the stenographic
thereby gained for the correct disposal of notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in
litigation."cralaw virtua1aw library the petitioner’s Petition and Memorandum, and in
the private respondent’s Memorandum, do not at all
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHYSICIAN-PATIENT show that any objections were interposed. Even
PRIVILEGE; SCOPE. — The physician may be granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr.
considered to be acting in his professional capacity Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the
when he attends to the patient for curative, failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a
preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only waiver thereof.
disclosures which would have been made to the

Page 97 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
 Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on 25
DECISION January 1989, the court heard this urgent motion.
Movant argued that having seen and examined the
petitioner in a professional capacity, Dr. Acampado
DAVIDE, JR., J.: is barred from testifying under the rule on the
confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship.
Counsel for private respondent contended, however,
that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert
This petition brings into focus the rule on the
witness and would not testify on any information
confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship.
acquired while attending to the petitioner in a
Petitioner urges this Court to strike down as being
professional capacity. The trial court, per respondent
violative thereof the resolution of public respondent
Judge, denied the motion and allowed the witness to
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991 denying
testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand,
due course to a petition to annul the order of the trial
was qualified by counsel for private respondent as
court allowing a Psychiatrist of the National Mental
an expert witness and was asked hypothetical
Hospital to testify as an expert witness and not as an
questions related to her field of expertise. She
attending physician of petitioner.
neither revealed the illness she examined and
treated the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of
The parties are in agreement as to the following
her examination and the medicines she had
facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
prescribed.
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully
Since petitioner’s counsel insisted that the ruling of
married to each other.
the court on the motion be reduced to writing,
respondent Judge issued the following Order on the
On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed with
same date:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such
"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only
marriage on the ground that petitioner has been
yesterday, January 24, 1989, petitioner seeks to
allegedly suffering from a mental illness called
prevent Dr. Lydia Acampado from testifying because
schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage
she saw and examined respondent Nelly Lim in her
and until the present." After the issues were joined
professional capacity perforce her testimony is
and the pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits
covered by the privileged (sic) communication rule.
ensued. Private respondent presented three (3)
witnesses before taking the witness stand himself to
Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being
testify on his own behalf. On 11 January 1989,
presented as an expert witness and that she will not
private respondent’s counsel announced that he
testify on any information she acquired in (sic)
would present as his next witness the Chief of the
attending to Nelly Lim in her professional capacity.
Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr.
Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who
Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel for
specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith
petitioner, the Court denied the respondent’s motion
orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad
and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to testify.
testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify on
However, the Court advised counsel for respondent
25 January 1989. Petitioner’s counsel opposed the
to interpose his objection once it becomes apparent
motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be
that the testimony sought to be elicited is covered by
elicited from the witness is privileged since the latter
the privileged communication rule.
had examined the petitioner in a professional
capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from
On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered
schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the subpoena
routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as an expert
was issued on 12 January 1989.chanrobles
in psychiatry; she was asked to render an opinion as
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
to what kind of illness (sic) are stelazine tablets
applied to; she was asked to render an opinion on a
On 24 January 1989, petitioner’s counsel filed an
(sic) hypothetical facts respecting certain behaviours
urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena and
of a person; and finally she admitted she saw and
suspend the proceedings pending resolution of the
treated Nelly Lim but she never revealed what illness
motion.
she examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the

Page 98 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic) the petitioner.
medicines she prescribed.
After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr.
WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated January Acampado’s testimony, We find no declaration that
19, 1989 is hereby DENIED." 1 touched (sic) or disclosed any information which she
has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the
On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the public period she attended her patient in a professional
respondent Court of Appeals a petition 2 capacity. Although she testified that she examined
for certiorari and prohibition, docketed therein as and interviewed the patient, she did not disclose
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991, to annul the aforesaid anything she obtained in the course of her
order of respondent Judge on the ground that the examination, interview and treatment of her patient.
same was issued with grave abuse of discretion Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit him question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion
from proceeding with the reception of Dr. regarding the history and behaviour of the fictitious
Acampado’s testimony.chanrobles.com : virtual law character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and
library conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did
not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever
On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals information or findings the doctor obtained from
promulgated a resolution 3 denying due course to attending the (sic) patient. A physician is not
the petition on the ground that "the petitioner failed in disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a
establishing the confidential nature of the testimony patient’s ailment, when he can disregard knowledge
given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she acquired in attending such patient and make answer
testified on January 25, 1989." Hence, the solely on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical
respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of question. (Butler v. Role, 242 Pac. 436; Supreme
discretion. In support thereof, the respondent Court Court of Arizona Jan. 7, 1926). Expert testimony of a
discussed the conditions which would render as physician based on hypothetical question (sic) as to
inadmissible testimonial evidence between a cause of illness of a person whom he has attended
physician and his patient under paragraph (c), is not privileged, provided the physician does not
Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court give testimony tending to disclose confidential
and made the following information related to him in his professional
findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph capacity while attending to the patient. (Crago v. City
of Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354, see Jones on
"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.).
marriage and the person whose testimony is sought
to be stopped as a privileged communication is a The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the
physician, who was summoned by the patient in her relation of physician and patient proceeds from the
professional capacity for curative remedy or fundamental assumption that the communication to
treatment. The divergence in views is whether the deserve protection must be confidential in their
information given by the physician in her testimony origin. Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from
in open court on January 25, 1989 was a privileged the mere relation of physician and patient. It might
communication. We are of the opinion that they do be implied according to circumstances of each case,
not fall within the realm of a privileged taking into consideration the nature of the ailment
communication because the information were (sic) and the occasion of the consultation. The claimant of
not obtained from the patient while attending her in the privilege has the burden of establishing in each
her professional capacity and neither were (sic) the instance all the facts necessary to create the
information necessary to enable the physician to privilege, including the confidential nature of the
prescribe or give treatment to the patient Nelly Lim. information given." 4
And neither does the information obtained from the
physician tend to blacken the character of the patient Her motion to reconsider the resolution having been
or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach. Dr. denied, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45
Acampado is a Medical Specialist II and in-charge of the Rules of Court. In her view, the respondent
(sic) of the Female Service of the National Center for Court of Appeals "seriously erred" :chanrob1es
Mental Health a fellow of the Philippine Psychiatrist virtual 1aw library
Association and a Diplomate of the Philippine Board
of Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an "I.
expert witness and not as an attending physician of

Page 99 of 211
EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
 advice or treatment given by him or any information
which he may have acquired in attending such
. . . in not finding that all the essential elements of patient in a professional capacity, which information
the rule on physician-patient privileged was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity,
communication under Section 21, Rule 130 of the and which would blacken the reputation of the
Rules of Court (Section 24, Rule 130 of the Revised patient." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Rules of Evidence) exist in the case at bar.
This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section 21,
II. Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court with
two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the inclusion of the
phrase "advice or treatment given by him," and (b)
. . . in believing that Dr. Acampado ‘was summoned substitution of the word reputation for the word
as an expert witness and not as an attending character. Said Section 21 in turn is a reproduction
physician of petitioner.’ of paragraph (f), Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940
Rules of Court with a modification consisting in the
III. change of the phrase "which would tend to blacken"
in the latter to "would blacken." 9 Verily, these
changes affected the meaning of the provision.
. . . in concluding that Dr. Acampado made ‘no Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was sufficient if the
declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any information would tend to blacken the character of
information which she has acquired from her patient, the patient. In the 1964 Rules of Court, a stricter
Nelly Lim, during the period she attended her patient requirement was imposed; it was imperative that the
in a professional capacity.’ information would blacken such character. With the
advent of the Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July
IV. 1989, the rule was relaxed once more by the
substitution of the word character with the word
reputation. There is a distinction between these two
. . . in declaring that ‘the petitioner failed in concepts." ‘Character’ is what a man is, and
establishing the confidential nature of the testimony ‘reputation’ is what he is supposed to be in what
given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado.’" 5 people say he is.’Character’ depends on attributes
possessed, and ‘reputation’ on attributes which
We gave due course to the petition and required the others believe one to possess. The former signifies
parties to submit their respective Memoranda 6 after reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be
the private respondent filed his Comment 7 and the reality at present." 10
petitioner submitted her reply 8 thereto. The parties
subsequently filed their separate Memoranda. This rule on the physician-patient privilege is
intended to facilitate and make safe full and
The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
challenged resolution. untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent
and enforced disclosure and publication on the
The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of the witness stand, to the end that the physician may
Revised Rules on Evidence which form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph efficaciously to treat his patient. 11 It rests in public
policy and is for the general interest of the
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of community. 12
privileged communication. — The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in Since the object of the privilege is to protect the
the following cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is
made to the physician’s testimony. 13
x           x          x
In order that the privilege may be successfully
claimed, the following requisites must
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, concur:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any "1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
 petitioner failed to discharge that burden. In the first
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as
is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery an expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of
or obstetrics; Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained in
the course of her examination, interview and
3. such person acquired the information while he treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and
was attending to the patient in his professional conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did
capacity; not refer to and had no bearing on whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained while
4. the information was necessary to enable him to attending to the patient. There is, as well, no
act in that capacity; and showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the
questions propounded to her relating to the
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, hypothetical problem were influenced by the
would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise
the patient." 14 stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever
information or knowledge she had about the
These requisites conform with the four (4) petitioner which was acquired by reason of the
fundamental conditions necessary for the physician-patient relationship existing between them.
establishment of a privilege against the disclosure of As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial
certain communications, to court cannot then be excluded. The rule on this point
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph is summarized as follows:chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
"1. The communications must originate in a
confidence that they will not be disclosed. "The predominating view, with some scant authority
otherwise, is that the statutory physician-patient
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the permitting a physician to give expert opinion
relation between the parties. testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical
question in a lawsuit involving the physical mental
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of condition of a patient whom he has attended
the community ought to be sedulously fostered professionally, where his opinion is based strictly
upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disregarding any personal professional knowledge
disclosure of the communications must be greater he may have concerning such patient. But in order to
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where
disposal of litigation." 15 it is asserted in such a case, the physician must
base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized
The physician may be considered to be acting in his in the question, excluding from consideration his
professional capacity when he attends to the patient personal knowledge of the patient acquired through
for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or
only disclosures which would have been made to the does not exclude from consideration his personal
physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to professional knowledge of the patient’s condition he
treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. 16 It is should not be permitted to testify as to his expert
to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the opinion." 19
communication that is privileged. The mere fact of
making a communication, as well as the date of a Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s
consultation and the number of consultations, are testimony that the petitioner was never interviewed
therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as alone. Said interviews were always conducted in the
the subject communicated is not stated." 17 presence of a third party,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
One who claims this privilege must prove the
presence of these aforementioned requisites. 18 "Q I am asking you, doctor, whom did you interview?

Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings A I interviewed the husband first, then the father and
leads Us to no other course of action but to agree after having the history, I interviewed the patient,
with the respondent Court’s observation that the Nelly.

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
 therefor.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Q How many times did Juan Sim and Nelly Lim go to
your office? Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the
petitioner opposed the oral request for the issuance
A Now, the two (2) of them came three (3) times. As of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado
I have stated before, once in the month of April of and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said
1987 and two (2) times for the month of June 1987, subpoena a day before the witness was to testify,
and after that, since July of 1987, it was the father of the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings
Nelly, Dr. Lim, who was bringing Nelly to me until that her counsel had objected to any question asked
November of 1987. of the witness on the ground that it elicited an
answer that would violate the privilege, despite the
Q Now, Dr. Lim is a fellow physician? trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose
his objection to the testimony "once it becomes
A Yes, I understand. apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is
covered by the privileged communication rule." The
Q Was there anything that he told you when he particular portions of the stenographic notes of the
visited with you in a clinic? testimony of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s
Petition 23 and Memorandum, 24 and in the private
A I would say that there was none. Even if I asked respondent’s Memorandum, 25 do not at all show
information about Nelly, I could not get anything from that any objections were interposed. Even granting
Dr. Lim. ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could
be covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably
Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to your object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.
clinic, was there any doctor who was also present
during that interview? WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit.
A No, sir, I don’t remember any." 20
Costs against petitioner.
There is authority to the effect that information
elicited during consultation with a physician in the SO ORDERED.
presence of third parties removes such information
from the mantle of the
privilege:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994
"Some courts have held that the casual presence of
MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner,
a third person destroys the confidential nature of the
vs.
communication between doctor and patient and thus
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN,
destroys the privilege, and that under such
JR., respondents.
circumstances the doctor may testify. Other courts
have reached a contrary result." 21
Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for
Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping claim — petitioner.
that" (T)he information given by Dr. Acampado
brings disgrace and invite (sic) reproach to petitioner Oscar F. Martinez for private respondent.
by falsely making it appear in the eyes of the trial
court and the public that the latter was suffering from
a mental disturbance called schizophrenia — which
caused, and continues to cause, irreparable injury to BELLOSILLO, J.:
the name and reputation of petitioner and her
family," 22 — which is based on a wrong premise,
nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that
indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado
would blacken the former’s "character" (or
"reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed any
information obtained from the petitioner regarding
the latter’s ailment and the treatment recommended

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being was objected to on the ground that it violated the
presented in evidence before the trial court in a rule on privileged communication between physician
petition for annulment of marriage grounded on and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a
psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection"
the report is the husband who initiated the to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would
annulment proceedings, not the physician who thwart the physician-patient privileged
prepared the report. communication rule," 5 and thereafter submitted a
Statement for the Record asserting among others
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for
Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity'
communication between physician and patient, to annul their marriage, such ground being
seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the completely false, fabricated and merely an
contents of the report. After failing to convince the afterthought." 6 Before leaving for Spain where she
trial court and the appellate court, she is now before has since resided after their separation, Ma. Paz
us on a petition for review on certiorari. also authorized and instructed her counsel to
oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim even
during her absence.
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz
Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de
Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to
produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl disallow the introduction of the confidential
Wilhelm and Alexandra. Their blessings psychiatric report as evidence, 7 and afterwards
notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple moved to strike out Ma. Paz' Statement for the
developed into a stormy one. In 1971, Ma. Paz Record. 8
underwent psychological testing purportedly in an
effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order
proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact. admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation
Report in evidence and ruling that —
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the
confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared . . . the Court resolves to overrule
and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and the objection and to sustain the
Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978, presenting Opposition to the respondent's
the report among others, he obtained a decree Motion; first, because the very issue
("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum in this case is whether or not the
Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage respondent had been suffering from
with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas psychological incapacity; and
assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due secondly, when the said psychiatric
discretion existent at the time of the wedding and report was referred to in the
thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree was complaint, the respondent did not
confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite." 2 object thereto on the ground of the
supposed privileged communication
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First between patient and physician.
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br. II, What was raised by the respondent
issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of was that the said psychiatric report
the conjugal partnership. was irrelevant. So, the Court feels
that in the interest of justice and for
the purpose of determining whether
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the
the respondent as alleged in the
annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the
petition was suffering from
trial court. 3 In his petition, he cited the Confidential
psychological incapacity, the said
Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely
psychiatric report is very material
denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or
and may be testified to by petitioner
irrelevant." 4
(Edgar Krohn, Jr.) without prejudice
on the part of the respondent to
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the dispute the said report or to cross-
witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of examination first the petitioner and
the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
 later the psychiatrist who prepared the relation of physician and his patient." 14 Her
the same if the latter will be thesis is that what cannot be done directly should
presented. 9 not be allowed to be done indirectly.

On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record
Motion to Reconsider Order dated June 4, 1991, and simply reiterates under oath what she asserted in
directed that the Statement for the Record filed by her Answer, which she failed to verify as she had
Ma. Paz be stricken off the record. A subsequent already left for Spain when her Answer was filed.
motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel was She maintains that her "Statement for the Record is
likewise denied. a plain and simple pleading and is not as it has
never been intended to take the place of her
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to testimony;" 15 hence, there is no factual and legal
respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision basis whatsoever to expunge it from the records.
promulgated 30 October 1992, the appellate court
dismissed the petition for certiorari. 10 On 5 February Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however
1993, the motion to reconsider the dismissal was contends that "the rules are very explicit: the
likewise denied. Hence, the instant petition for prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the
review. legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the
case at bar where the person sought to be barred
Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and from testifying on the privileged communication is
disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric report the husband and not the physician of the
and prays for the admission of her Statement for the petitioner." 16 In fact, according to him, the Rules
Record to form part of the records of the case. She sanction his testimony considering that a husband
argues that since may testify against his wife in a civil case filed by
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of one against the other.
Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying on
matters which he may have acquired in attending to Besides, private respondent submits that privileged
a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE communication may be waived by the person
REASON should be third person (like respondent- entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did
husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED when she gave her unconditional consent to the use
from testifying on privileged matters between a of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was
physician and patient or from submitting any medical presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum
report, findings or evaluation prepared by a Matrimoniale which took it into account among
physician which the latter has acquired as a result of others in deciding the case and declaring their
his confidential and privileged relation with a marriage null and void. Private respondent further
patient." 12 She says that the reason behind the argues that petitioner also gave her implied consent
prohibition is — when she failed to specifically object to the
admissibility of the report in her Answer where she
. . . to facilitate and make safe, full merely described the evaluation report as "either
and confidential disclosure by a unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate, failure to
patient to his physician of all facts, interpose a timely objection at the earliest
circumstances and symptoms, opportunity to the evidence presented on privileged
untrammeled by apprehension of matters may be construed as an implied waiver.
their subsequent and enforced
disclosure and publication on the With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by
witness stand, to the end that the petitioner, private respondent posits that this in
physician may form a correct reality is an amendment of her Answer and thus
opinion, and be enabled safely and should comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules
efficaciously to treat his patient. 13 of Court, hence, its exclusion from the records for
failure to comply with the Rules is proper.
She further argues that to allow her husband to
testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged
report "will set a very bad and dangerous precedent nature of the communication between physician and
because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not
preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to doubted. Indeed, statutes making communications

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
between physician and patient privileged are Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to
intended to inspire confidence in the patient and the testimony of private respondent on the ground
encourage him to make a full disclosure to his that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the
physician of his symptoms and trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on
condition. 17 Consequently, this prevents the privileged communications but never questioned the
physician from making public information that will testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in
result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it
the patient. 18 For, the patient should rest assured was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such
with the knowledge that the law recognizes the objection and, consequently, the evidence offered
communication as confidential, and guards against may be admitted.
the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his
reputation tarnished by their subsequent The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to
disclosure. 19 The physician-patient privilege creates merit the full attention of this Court. The allegations
a zone of privacy, intended to preclude the contained in the Statement for the Records are but
humiliation of the patient that may follow the refutations of private respondent's declarations
disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain types of which may be denied or disproved during the trial.
information communicated in the context of the
physician-patient relationship fall within the The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition
constitutionally protected zone of for annulment. Three years have already lapsed and
privacy, 20 including a patient's interest in keeping his private respondent herein, as petitioner before the
mental health records confidential. 21 Thus, it has trial court, has yet to conclude his testimony thereat.
been observed that the psychotherapist-patient We thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties'
privilege is founded upon the notion that certain respective counsel to act with deliberate speed in
forms of antisocial behavior may be prevented by resolving the main action, and avoid any and all
encouraging those in need of treatment for stratagems that may further delay this case. If all
emotional problems to secure the services of a lawyers are allowed to appeal every perceived
psychotherapist. indiscretion of a judge in the course of trial and
include in their appeals depthless issues, there will
Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however be no end to litigations, and the docket of appellate
misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals  22 clearly lays courts will forever be clogged with inconsequential
down the requisites in order that the privilege may cases. Hence, counsel should exercise prudence in
be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed appealing lower court rulings and raise only
in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the legitimate issues so as not to retard the resolution of
privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice cases. Indeed, there is no point in unreasonably
medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging
acquired the information while he was attending to the agony of the wedded couple who after coming
the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the out from a storm still have the right to a renewed
information was necessary to enable him to act in blissful life either alone or in the company of each
that capacity; and, (e) the information was other. 23
confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of
In the instant case, the person against whom the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30
privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to October 1992 is AFFIRMED.
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply
the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a SO ORDERED.
document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly
and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed
prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered G.R. No. 117740. October 30, 1998
a circumvention of the prohibition because his
testimony cannot have the force and effect of the CAROLINA ABAD
testimony of the physician who examined the patient GONZALES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
and executed the report. HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD,
MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S.
ABAD, Respondents.

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DECISION years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and
that during these period, their union had produced
ROMERO, J.: two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian
Abad Empaynado. Private respondents also
disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child
Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the
allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another
decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19,
woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the
1994, finding private respondents as the heirs of
entire estate to the surviving children to the
Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling
exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents
petitioners extra-judicial partition of the decedents
charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the
estate.
existence of said three children in order to deprive
the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo
The facts are as follows: Abad.

On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion
Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof, filed
Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia
estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar
before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. In Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents
their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator,
86792, petitioners claimed that they were the only but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to
heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or
ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners
May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by
had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671,
alleging that the real properties covered by TCT
and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially
Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein as
partitioning their mothers estate. Accordingly, on
belonging to the decedent, were actually only
October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion
administered by the latter, the true owner being their
to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by
late mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the
petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483,
trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as
and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution
administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de
of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real
Mesa Abad.
estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said
properties.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2,
mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical
1973, rendered the following judgment:
descriptions of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of
Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, follows:
TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa
Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de (1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and
Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural children
Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;
executed real estate mortgages over the real
properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of (2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children,
their counsel, Escolastico Viola. namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and
Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as such entitled
Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased,
Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside subject to the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any,
proceedings and for leave to file opposition in as co-owner of any of the property of said estate that
Special Proceedings No. 86792. In their motion, they may have been acquired thru her joint efforts with
alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the the deceased during the period they lived together
common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven as husband and wife;

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
(3) Denying the petition of decedents collateral lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding
relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M. certificate of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;
Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as
heirs and excluding them from participating in the 5. Declares as inexistent and void from the
administration and settlement of the estate of beginning the three (3) real estate mortgages
Ricardo Abad; executed on July 7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner
Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as Doc. No. 145,
(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; (b)
administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco, identified as Doc.
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and No. 146, Page 31, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; and
(c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, identified as
(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new Doc. No. 144, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of
administratrix all property or properties, monies and 1972, all of the notarial book of Ricardo P. Yap of
such papers that came into his possession by virtue Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola, and orders
of his appointment as administrator, which the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the
appointment is hereby revoked.1cräläwvirtualibräry registration or annotation thereof from the back of
the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private
respondents with respect to the latters motion for 6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law
annulment of certain documents. On November 19, associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to surrender to
1974, it rendered the following judgment: the new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT
Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484 within five (5)
days from receipt hereof.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors Motion for
Annulment, dated October 4, 1973 to be meritorious
and accordingly SO ORDERED.2cräläwvirtualibräry

1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all registered November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the trial
in the name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT court. Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on
No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, the ground that the same had been filed out of time.
TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Because of this ruling, petitioners
Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with
Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, and the the Court of Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R.
residential house situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974, the
Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the properties of appellate court granted petitioners petition and
the late Ricardo Abad; ordered the lower court to give due course to the
latters appeal. The trial court, however, again
dismissed petitioners appeal on the ground that their
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of
record on appeal was filed out of time.
the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de Mesa,
executed on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No.
86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972 of the notarial book Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their
of Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de notice of appeal of the November 19, 1974 ruling of
Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to be inexistent and void from the trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal was
the beginning; similarly denied on the ground that it had been filed
out of time.
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT
Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and issuance in lieu Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners
thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484; again instituted certiorari and mandamus
proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed
therein as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04352. The appellate
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel
court affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals,
TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa Abad; TCT No.
prompting petitioners to appeal to the Supreme
108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No.
Court. On July 9, 1985, this Court directed the trial
108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales and in
court to give due course to petitioners appeal from
the order of November 2, 1973 declaring private

Page 107 of 211

EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
respondents heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, OF PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE MESA
and the order dated November 19, 1974, annulling ABAD.
certain documents pertaining to the intestate estate
of deceased. We are not persuaded.

The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and
trial court to the appellate court. On October 19, Rosemarie Abads filiation, submits the startling
1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as theory that the husband of Honoria Empaynado,
follows: Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and
Marian Abad were born in 1948 and 1954,
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the respectively.
instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The
orders of the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit: It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with
Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to
1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in Jose Libunao, their union having produced three
substance that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie, all children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to
surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural the birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private
children and the only surviving heirs of the deceased respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943,
Ricardo Abad; petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in
1971.
2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in
substance that the six (6) parcels of land described The date of Jose Libunaos death is important, for if
in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the he was still alive in 1971, and given that he was
properties of Ricardo Abad; that the extra-judicial legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the
partition of the estate of the deceased Lucila de presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian are
Mesa executed on May 2, 1972 is inexistent and not Ricardo Abads children with the latter, but of
void from the beginning; the cancellation of the Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. Article 256,
aforementioned TCTs is null and void; the Register the applicable provision of the Civil Code, provides:
of Deeds be ordered to restore and/or issue the
corresponding Certificates of Title in the name of Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate,
Ricardo Abad; and although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal adulteress.4cräläwvirtualibräry
of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco from the latter Order, for being filed out of To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in
time, are all AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against evidence the application for enrolment at Mapua
petitioner-appellants. Institute of Technology of Angelita Libunao,
accomplished in 1956, which states:
SO ORDERED.3cräläwvirtualibräry
Fathers Name: Jose Libunao
Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing
judgment on the following grounds: Occupation: engineer (mining)

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL Mothers Name: Honoria

COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT Empaynado5cräläwvirtualibräry
RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E.
ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE as well as Cesar Libunaos 1958 application for
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE enrolment at the Mapua Institute of Technology,
DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD. which states:

II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE Fathers Name: Jose Libunao

SUBJECT ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS
OWNED BY THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA
ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE MOTHER Occupation: none

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Mothers Name: Honoria Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to
Empaynado6cräläwvirtualibräry prove the latters death at that time, being merely
secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunaos death
Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead certificate would have been the best evidence as to
during the time when said applications were when the latter died. Petitioners have, however,
accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children inexplicably failed to present the same, although
would have stated so. These not being the case, there is no showing that said death certificate has
they conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof
been alive in 1956 and 1958. of Jose Libunaos death. More telling, while the
records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain
Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit
1971, this person appears to be different from
of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos7 stating
Honoria Empaynados first husband, the latters name
that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in
being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the
1971, leaving as his widow, Honoria Empaynado,
wife is different. Jose Bautista Libunaos wife is listed
and that the former had been interred at the Loyola
as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos
Memorial Park.
Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.
Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr.
As to Dr. Arenas affidavit, the same was objected to
Pedro Arenas,8 Ricardo Abads physician, declaring
by private respondents as being privileged
that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the
found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the
Rules of Court.11 The rule on confidential
latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
communications between physician and patient
requires that: a) the action in which the advice or
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that treatment given or any information is to be used is a
Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the illegitimate civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient
children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate existed between the person claiming the privilege or
children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria his legal representative and the physician; c) the
Empaynado. advice or treatment given by him or any information
was acquired by the physician while professionally
At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are attending the patient; d) the information was
disputing the veracity of the trial courts finding of necessary for the performance of his professional
facts. It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would
findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by tend to blacken the reputation of the
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and patient.12cräläwvirtualibräry
may not be reviewed on appeal. 9 Petitioners,
however, argue that factual findings of the Court of Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the
Appeals are not binding on this Court when there first four requisites. They assert, however, that the
appears in the record of the case some fact or finding as to Ricardo Abads sterility does not
circumstance of weight and influence which has blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners
been overlooked, or the significance of which has conveniently forget that Ricardo Abads sterility arose
been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which
the result of the case.10cräläwvirtualibräry most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact,
given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this alone, without the attendant embarrassment of
exception to the case at bar. contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be
sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence.
that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the least, And the same remains inadmissible in evidence,
far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As
enrolment form that ones parent is deceased is not stated by the trial court:
necessarily proof that said parent was still living
during the time said form was being accomplished. In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance
Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: The
and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
because of death as stated in established pp. 21-36). Ricardo Abad had also deposited
precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose (money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings
of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended Bank in the name of his daughter Marian,
to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death represented by him, as father, under Savings
removed the seal of secrecy, from the Account 17348 which has (sic) a balance
communications and disclosures which a patient of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B)
should make to his physician. After one has gone to
his grave, the living are not permitted to impair his With the finding that private respondents are the
name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are
communications and disclosures made under the precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother.
seal of the statute. The applicable provisions are:

Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or
that petitioners have failed to establish their claim by ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to
the quantum of evidence required by law. On the the entire estate of the deceased.
other hand, the evidence presented by private
respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the Art. 1003. If there are noillegitimate children, or a
acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. We surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
quote with approval the trial courts decision, thus: succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (Italics
In his individual statements of income and assets for supplied)
the calendar years 1958 and 1970, and in all his
individual income tax returns for the years 1964, As to petitioners claim that the properties in the
1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, he has declared name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their
therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the
and as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by
Marian (except in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad private respondents proved that said properties in
(Exhs. 12 to 19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44). truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the
findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great
xxx weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it
being in a better position to examine the real
In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the
daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11) years old, and witnesses while testifying in the case. 13 In fact,
Marian, then (5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) year- petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their
endowment plan with the Insular Life Assurance Co., contention being that they are entitled to the subject
Ltd. and paid for their premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad
34-B to C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27, 1973, or by Lucila de Mesa.
pp. 7-20).
Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated
In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trust fund acount of P100,000.00 with the Peoples trial courts order dated March 21, 1975 denying the
Bank and Trust Company which was renewed until appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de
(sic) 1971, payable to either of them in the event of Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed
death (Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5, 1971, out of time. This affirmance is erroneous, for on July
Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund of P100,000.00 9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the same
with the same bank, payable to his daughter Marian was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the dictum
(Exh. 37-A). On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding
his sister Dolores Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate upon and may not be reversed by a lower court.
in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income
of their P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic) be paid WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
monthly to the account reserved for Cecilia, under petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court
PBTC Savings Account No. 49053 in the name of of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October
Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia Abad (Exh. 38) where 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that
the income of the trust fund intended for Cecilia was the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975
also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is February 26, 1986. A month later, on March 26,
SETASIDE. Costs against petitioners. 1986, respondents filed their "Reply to the Answer"
which petitioner traversed in a "Rejoinder to the
SO ORDERED. Reply" dated April 2, 1986.

G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986 In a normal situation, no controversy would be

expected in the matter of the payment of said back
salaries because in the instant case, the party
BANCO FILIPINO, petitioner,
praying for the same is the employer Bank. The
vs.
attendant circumstances here present have,
MONETARY BOARD, ET AL., respondents.
however, created a peculiar situation. There is
resistance to the claim because the management of
Ramon Quisumbing and Norberto Quisumbing and the assets of the Bank has been transferred to the
Emmanuel Pelaez for petitioner. Respondents' Receiver who perceived that the
directive to pay back salaries after closure of the
Inigo B. Regalado, Jr. counsel for Central Bank. Bank would be dissipation of the banks' assets to the
prejudice of its various creditors.
Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez for
respondents. There is, however, in this case a significant matter
that deserves consideration of this Court and which
RESOLUTION must be viewed from the stand-point of equity. What
stands out is that, regardless of whether the
On November 4, 1985, Petitioner Bank filed in the employees of Banco Filipino worked or not after
instant case a "Motion to Pay Back Salaries to All BF January 25, 1985, there is the uncontested
Officers and Employees from February to August 29, manifestation found in BF's Answer to the Appeal,
1985" in connection with its "Opposition to dated February 26, 1986 (Vol. IV of Case Records)
Respondents" Motion for Reconsideration or for that:
Clarification of the Resolution of the Court En Banc
of October 8, 1985." On November 7, 1985, this 2. In the fact the receiver/liquidator
Court referred said motion to pay back salaries to Carlota Valenzuela had paid Union
Branch 136 (Judge Ricardo Francisco, presiding) of employees of petitioner BF back
the Makati Regional Trial Court, which this Court had salaries for no work from January
earlier directed under our Resolution of October 8, 25, 1985 up to June, 1985. ..
1985 issued in G.R. No. 77054, to conduct hearings (Emphasis supplied)
on the matter of the closure of petitioner Bank and
its alleged pre-planned liquidation. All employees, thereto, of petitioner Banco Filipino
who have not yet received their back salaries
On January 22, 1986, said Regional Trial Court, corresponding to the period from January 25, 1985
after considering the petitioner's motion of November up to June, 1985 manifestly deserve and ought to be
4, 1985, the respondents' opposition thereto dated similarly paid by the respondent Monetary Board. It
January 15, 1986; the petitioner's Reply dated is but fair that the issue whether or not the
January 16, 1986, and the respondents' Rejoinder employees of petitioner Bank had actually worked
dated January 20, 1986, issued an order directing during said period should now be discounted
the  respondents herein "to pay all officers and considering this voluntary act of respondent
employees of petitioner their back salaries and Monetary Board which would remove by estoppel
wages corresponding to the period from February to any impediment to the receipt by all bank employees
August 29, 1985." of their back salaries from January 25, 1985 up to
June, 1985, assuming that some of them have not
On February 4, 1986, respondents herein filed with yet received the same.
this Court an "Appeal from, or Petition to Set Aside,
order to Pay Back Salaries dated 22 January 1986" As the remaining period from June, 1985 to August,
praying for the reversal and setting aside of the 1985, involves but a minimal period only of two (2)
aforestated trial court's Order dated January 22, months, and considering the unfortunate plight of the
1986. This was formally opposed by Petitioner when numerous employees who now invoke the
it filed its "Answer to Appeal (re: back salaries)" on symphathetic concern of this Court, and inasmuch

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
as the appealed Order for the payment of back G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986
salaries is only for a limited period or up to August,
1985, the appealed order of November 7, 1985 may BANCO FILIPINO, petitioner,
be sustained. vs.
MONETARY BOARD, ET AL., respondents.
Petitioner BF and its stockholders have long put on
record their consent to this patment of back salaries RESOLUTION
of its separated officers and employees. It is also
averred that BF intends to reopen its bank and Subject of this "Petition to Set Aside Order to
branches, and the payment of back salaries to its Produce Documents dated 17 February 1986" is
employees, no less would help in the preservation of the Order of Branch 136, Regional Trial Court,
its personnel which is the bank's most important Makati, granting the motion of the petitioner
assest, apart from doing justice to those aggrieved herein, based on Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules
employees. It is mentioned that the Central Bank of Court, for the production, inspection, and
Liquidator has now more than a billion pesos in cash copying of certain papers and records which are
of Banco Filipino since it continued to receive claimed as needed by the Petitioner Bank for the
payments from BF borrowers some P1.5 million a preparation of its comments, objections, and
day. It is also said that with the deposits of petitioner exceptions to the Conservator's report dated
BF with the Bank of PI, there is money sufficient to January 8, 1985, and Receiver's Report dated
allow the withdrawal of the sums needed to pay the March 19, 1985. The documents now asked to be
salaries of the employees who have been now out of produced, inspected, and copied are the
work for over a year. Apparently, no substantial following:
prejudice for the payment of the distressed
employees of the bank for only a specified limited
period until the other issues in the consolidated (1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the
consideration. Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the
closure of Banco Filipino (BF) and its meeting on
July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985;
WHEREFORE, ruling that the Order of November 7,
1985 of Judge Ricardo Francisco, granting salary to
the officers and employees of Banco Filipino for the (2) Copies of the letter and reports of first
period from February, 1985 to August 29, 1985, may conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the MB
now be deemed moot and academic insofar as it and to Central Bank Governor Jose Fernandez;
relates to the period from January 25, 1985 to June,
1985 up to August, 1985, covers but a minimal span (3) Papers showing computations of all the
of two (2) months, the Court RESOLVES, for the interests and penalties charged by the CB
reasons of equity, to allow the aforestated Order to against BF;
remain undisturbed and to DISMISS the appeal
therefrom. This Order is immediately held executory. (4) Schedule of recommended valuation of
reserves per Mr. Tiaoqui's report dated March 19,
Gutierrez Jr., J., took no part. 1985;

(5) Adjustment per Annex "C" of Mr. Tiaoqui's

report;
G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986
BANCO FILIPINO vs. MONETARY BOARD (6) Annexes"A","B",and"C"of the joint report of
Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr. Aurellano, and Mrs. Valenzuela;
Republic of the Philippines
(7) Schedule of devaluation of CB premises of
SUPREME COURT Paseo de Roxas of same report;

Manila (8) Schedule of BF's realizable assets from

P5,159.44 B to P3,909.23 B as of January 25,
1985;
EN BANC

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
(9) Documents listed in BF's letter to Mrs. Carlota resolution of any given matter,
Valenzuela dated October 25, 1985. said member shall not participate
in the discussion or resolution of
In issuing the challenged order, the court below the matter and must retire from
took the view that the Supreme Court's the meeting during the
resolution referring to it the matters relative to deliberation thereon. The subject
the bank's closure does not preclude the matter, when resolved, and the
petitioner from availing of this mode of fact that a member had a personal
discovery as an additional means of preparing interest in it, shall be made
for the hearing. It considered the documents available to the public. The
sought to be produced as not privileged because minutes of the meeting shall note
these constitute or contain evidence material to the withdrawal of the member
the issues into by the Court. These materials are concerned. (As amended by PD
said to comprise of records of the administrative No. 1827).
proceedings conducted by respondent's officials
and representatives from the inception of and Sec. 15. Responsibility. — Any
preparation of the challenged reports and the member of the Monetary Board or
resolution placing petitioner under receivership officer or employee of the Central
and thereafter under liquidation as it is the Bank who wilfully violates this
regularity and impartiality of these administrative Act or who is guilty of gross
proceedings which are being assailed by the negligence in the performance of
petitioner, the trial court saw no reason why said his duties shall be held liable for
documents should be thus concealed from it. any loss or injury suffered by the
Bank as a result of such violation
Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank or negligence.  Similar
take exception to the said order and pray in their responsibility shall apply to the
petition before this Court for the reversal and disclosure of any information of a
setting aside of the same. The grounds recited in confidential nature about the
support of their petition are the following: discussion or resolutions of the
Monetary Board, except as
required in Section 13 of this
(1) The ratiocination of the trial court is wholly in
Act, or about the operations of
error because the proceedings before it do not at
the Bank, and to the use of such
all deal with either the administrative
information for personal gain or
proceedings conducted by the respondents or
to the detriment of the
the regularity and impartiality of the CB actions
Government, the Bank or third
on BF; it does so simply upon the charge that no
parties. (As amended by
"hearing" was given BF prior to those actions of
Presidential Decree No. 72).
closure and liquidation. However, no such prior
(Italics supplied).
hearing had been called as none is required by
the law and by the Supreme Court decisions in
force to this date (Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. vs. (3) The Monetary Board deliberations were
Arca, 15 SCRA 66, and Rural Bank of Bato vs. necessarily held subsequent t the submission
IAC, G.R. 65642, Oct. 15, 1984). of the CB reports. They did not enter into the
making of those reports and can have no
materiality to any question of fact that may be
(2) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary
raised in relation to their contents.
Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to
Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.
On April 16, 1986, Petitioner Banco Filipino filed
its Comment on Respondent's petition to set
Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons
aside the order for the production of the
having a personal
documents. In said pleading, the petitioner bank
interest. Whenever any member
assails the respondent's petition on the
attending a meeting of the
following grounds:
Monetary Board has a material
personal interest, directly or
indirectly, in the discussion or

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
(1) There is no reason why Banco Filipino should On May 13, 1986, Respondent Monetary Board
not be furnished the documents, particularly filed their Reply to Petitioner Bank's Comment
Nos. 3 to 9 of its motion, when these are merely dated April 15, 1986. Respondents argue that:
attachments to the Supervision and Examination
Sector, Dept. It (SES) Reports, copies of which (1) The case of  U.S. vs. Nixon and the other
were given to it pursuant to a Supreme Court decisions cited by petitioner are inapplicable
order. because-

(2) The Supreme Court in its referral of October a) The authorities cited refer only
8, 1985 to the RTC Makati intended full evidence to a claim of privilege based only
taking of the proceeding for judicial review of on the generalized interest of
administrative action filed with the Supreme confidentiality or on an executive
Court, the trial court being better equipped for privilege that is merely
evidence taking. presumptive. On the other hand,
the so-called MB deliberations are
(3) The respondents cannot claim privilege in privileged communications
refusing to produce the Central Bank records pursuant to Section 21, Rule 130
because it is based only on the generalized of the Rules of Court because
interest in confidentiality. Petitioner cites as a statements and opinions
precedent the doctrine established in the case of expressed in the deliberation of
U.S. vs. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713, which states the members of the MB are
that "when the ground for asserting privilege as specifically vested with
to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a confidentiality under Secs. 13 and
criminal case is based only on the generalized 15 of the Central Bank Act. The
interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over "public interest" requirement for
the fundamental demands of due process of non-disclosure is evident from
law." the fact that the statute punishes
any disclosure of such
(4) The requested documents and records of the deliberations.
Central Bank are material and relevant because
BF is entitled to prove from the CB records (a) b) Petitioner has not in the least
that Governor Fernandez closed BF without a shown any relevance or need to
MB resolution and without examiner's reports on produce the alleged MB
the financial position of BF; (b) that a MB deliberations. What petitioner
resolution was later made to legalize the BF intends to prove are not "issues"
closure but it had no supporting examiner's raised in the pleadings of the
report; (c) that the earlier reports did not satisfy main petition.
respondent Governor Fernandez and he ordered
the examiners and the conservator, Gilberto (2) Petitioner is interested, not in
Teodoro, to "improve" them; and (d) that the discovering evidence, but in
reports were then fabricated. practicing oppression by the
forced publication of the MB
Petitioner adds that what respondents fear is members' confidential statements
disclosure of their proceedings because at board meetings.
petitioner has accused the CB governor of (a)
covering 51% of its stockholding, (b) encashing (3) The so-called deliberations of
BF securities in trickles as fuel a run, (c) the Monetary Board are in truth
appointing a conservator when the President merely the individual statements
ordered the MB to grant petitioner a P 3 Billion and expressions of opinion of its
credit line, (d) replacing Estanislao with Gilberto members. They are not
Teodoro when the former wanted to resume statements or opinions that can
normal operations of BF, and (e) changing the be imputed to the board itself or
conservatorship to receivership when it to the Central Bank. The
appointed Carlota Valenzuela as receiver again transcripts of stenographic notes
without hearing. on the deliberations of the MB are

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
 not official records of the CB; With respect to Items Nos. 3 to 9, these are the
they are taken merely to assist annexes to the Supervision and Examination
the Secretary of the MB in the Sector, Dept. II (SES) Reports submitted to the
preparation of the minutes of the Central Bank and Monetary Board which were
meetings. And as advertedly also, taken into consideration by said respondents in
the tape recordings are not closing petitioner bank. A copy of the SES
available as these are used over Reports was furnished to the petitioner. We,
and over again. therefore, fail to see any proper reason why the
annexes thereto should be withheld. Petitioner
The motion for the production of the subject cannot adequately study and properly analyze
documents was filed by petitioner pursuant to the report without the corresponding annexes.
Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules of Court. It has Pertinent and relevant, these could be useful and
been held that "a party is ordinarily entitled to even necessary to the preparation by petitioner
the production of books, documents and papers of its comment, objections and exceptions to the
which are material and relevant to the Conservator's reports and receiver's reports.
establishment of his cause of action or defense"
(General Electric Co. vs. Superior Court in and Regarding copies of the letter and reports of first
for Alameda County, 45 C. 2d 879, cited in Conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the
Martin, Rules of Court, 3rd edition, Vol. 2, p. 104). Monetary Board and to Central Bank Governor
"The test to be applied by the trial judge in Fernandez (Item No. 2) these appear relevant as
determining the relevancy of documents and the petitioner has asserted that the above-named
sufficiency of their description is one of Conservator had in fact wanted to resume
reasonableness and practicability" (Line Corp. of normal operations of Banco Filipino but then he
the Philippines vs. Moran, 59 Phil. 176, 180). "On was thereafter replaced by Mr. Gilberto Teodoro.
the ground of public policy, the rules providing The letter and reports could be favorable or
for production and inspection of books and adverse to the case of petitioner but whatever
papers do not authorize the production or the result may be, petitioner should be allowed
inspection of privileged matter, that is, books, to photocopy the same.
papers which because of their confidential and
privileged character could not be received in As to the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary
evidence" (27) CJS 224). "In passing on a motion Board deliberations on the closure of Banco
for discovery of documents, the courts should Filipino and its meetings on July 27, 1984, and
be liberal in determining whether or not March 22, 1985, (Item No. 1), respondents
documents are relevant to the subject matter of contend that "it is obvious from the requirement
action" (Hercules Powder Co. vs. Haas Co., U.S. (Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act) that
Dist. Ct. Oct. 26, 1944, 9 Fed. Rules Service, 659, the subject matter (of the deliberations), when
cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, resolved. . . shall be made available to the public
1979 Ed. Vol. 2, p. 102). Likewise, "any statute but the deliberations themselves are not open to
declaring in general terms that official records disclosure but are to be kept in confidence." This
are confidential should be liberally construed, to Court, however, sees it in a different light. The
have an implied exception for disclosure when deliberations may be confidential but not
needed in a court of justice" (Wigmore on necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no
Evidence, Vol. VIII, p. 801, citing the case of specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even
Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cr. 137,143). in Sections 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits
absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry
In the light of the jurisprudence above-cited, this on said deliberations when these are relevant or
Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion material to a matter subject of a suit pending
was committed by the court below in granting before it. The disclosure is here not intended to
petitioner's motion for the production of the obtain information for personal gain. There is no
documents enumerated herein. We accept the indication that such disclosure would cause
view taken by the court below that the detriment to the government, to the bank or to
documents are not privileged and that these third parties. Significantly, it is the bank itself
constitute or contain evidence material to the here that is interested in obtaining what it
issues being inquired into by the Court. considers as information useful and
indispensably needed by it to support its

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
position in the matter being inquired to by the tenuous and specious. If the respondents public
court below. officials acted rightfully and prudently in the
performance of their duties, there should be
On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, nothing at all that would provoke fear of
Rule 130, Rules of Court which states: disclosure

Section 21. Privileged On the contrary, public interests will be best

Communications. The following served by the disclosure of the documents. Not
persons cannot testify as to only the banks and its employees but also its
matters learned in confidence in numerous depositors and creditors are entitled
the following cases: to be informed as to whether or not there was a
valid and legal justification for the petitioner's
bank closure. It will be well to consider that—
xxx xxx xxx

Public interest means more than

(e) A public officer cannot be
a mere curiosity; it means
examined during his term of
something in which the public,
office or afterwards, as to
the community at large, has some
communications made to him in
pecuniary interest by which their
official confidence, when the
legal rights or liabilities are
court finds that the public interest
affected (State vs. Crocket, 206, p.
would suffer by disclosure.
816 cited in Words and Phrases,
Vol. 35, p. 229).
But this privilege, as this Court notes, is
intended not for the protection of public officers
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order to
but for the protection of public interest (Vogel
produce documents dated February 17, 1986
vs. Gruaz 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments
issued by the court below in S.C.- G.R. No.
on the Rules of Court, 1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 211).
70054, is hereby affirmed, except as to the
Where there is no public interest that would be
copies of the tapes relative to the Monetary
prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be
Board deliberations on the closure of Banco
applicable.
Filipino on January 25, 1985 and its meetings on
July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985 and only if
The rule that a public officer such tapes are actually no longer available
cannot be examined as to taking into account respondent Monetary
communications made to him in Board's manifestations that the tape recording of
official confidence does not apply the deliberations of that Board are, for purposes
when there is nothing to show of economy, used over and over again inasmuch
that the public interest would as these tapes are not required to be kept or
suffer by the disclosure question. stored. (See Respondent's Reply, dated May 12,
... ,( Agnew vs. Agnew,'52 SD 472, 1986; Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 1288-1289).
cited in Martin Rules of Court of
the Philippines, Third Edition, Vol.
SO ORDERED.
5, p. 199).

G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995

In the case at bar, the respondents have not
established that public interest would suffer by
the disclosure of the papers and documents COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR
sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA
bank was already closed as of January 25, 1985, RIVERA, petitioners,
any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, vs.
reports, and transcripts at this time pose no HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and
danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents.
trigger any bank run nor compromise state
secrets. Respondent's reason for their
resistance to the order of production are

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
MENDOZA, J.: question is, how do
they used or
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, disbursed this
and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces savings? The EIIB
tecum and orders issued by respondent has a syndicate
Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado headed by the Chief
and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record of Budget Division
custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence who is manipulating
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all funds and also the
documents relating to Personal Services Funds for brain of the so
the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers called "ghost
(salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988" and agents" or the
to enjoin him from enforcing his orders. "Emergency
Intelligence Agents"
(EIA). The
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly
Commissioner of
Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is
EIIB has a biggest
Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management
share on this.
Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by
Among his activities
the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation
are:
of an anonymous letter alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the
EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, a)
purporting to have been written by an employee of Sup
the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to port
the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished ing
several government offices, including the Office of RA
the Ombudsman. M
wh
erei
The letter reads in pertinent parts:
n
he
1 These are the is
things that I have inv
been observing. olv
During the ed.
implementation of He
E.O. 127 on May 1, giv
1988, one hundred es
ninety (190) big
personnel were am
dismissed. Before oun
that implementation, t
we had a monthly esp
savings of eci
P500,000.00 from ally
unfilled plantilla duri
position plus the ng
implementation of the
RA 6683 wherein Dec
seventy (70) regular .
employees availed Fail
a total amount of ed
P1,400,000.00 was cou
saved from the p.
government
monthly. The

Page 117 of 211

EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
b) Dir
Pay ect
me or
nt of
for NC
thirt R
y EII
five B is
(30) the
min sol
i e
UZI' ope
s. rati
ng
c) unit
Pay with
me in
nt Met
for ro
the Ma
pur nila
cha whi
sed ch
of was
Ma app
xim rov
a ed
'87 by
for no
per less
son tha
al n
use the
d of Co
the mm
Co issi
mm one
issi r
one due
r. to
ano
mal
d)
ous
Ano
acti
ther
vitie
obs
s of
erv
alm
atio
ost
n
all
was
age
the
nts
age
assi
nts
gne
und
d at
er
the
the
cen

Page 118 of 211

EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
tral Co
offi mm
ce issi
dire one
ctly r
und did
er not
the inv
Co esti
mm gat
issi e
one his
r. ow
Reti n
red me
Brig n
. inst
Ge ead
n. , he
Alm pla
ont ced
e the
as m
one und
of er
the the
Anti 15-
- 30
Gra pay
ft roll.
boa
rd e)
me Ma
mb ny
er mor
of e
the whi
De ch
part are
me per
nt son
of al.
Fin
anc 2. Sir, my question
e is this. Can your
sho good office
uld investigate EII
not intelligence funds
tole particularly
rate Personal Services
this (01) Funds? I
. wonder why the
Ho Dep't of Budget &
wev Mgmt. cannot
er, compel EIIB to
the

Page 119 of 211

EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
submit an actual agents
filled up position apprehended a
because almost half certain civilian who
of it are vacant and possesses
still they are numerous assorted
releasing it. Are high powered
EIIB plantilla firearms. Agents
position classified? plus one personnel
It is included in the from the legal
Personal Services proclaimed only five
Itemization (PSI) (5) firearms and the
and I believe it is remaining was
not classified and a pilfered by them.
ruling from Civil
Service Another observation
Commission that is almost all EIIB
EIIB is not agents collects
exempted from Civil payroll from the big
Service. Another time smuggler
info, when we had syndicate monthly
salary differential and brokers every
last Oct '88 all week for them not
money for the whole to be apprehended.
plantilla were
released and from Another observation
that alone, Millions is the commissioner
were saved and allocates funds
converted to ghost coming from the
agents of EIA. intelligence funds to
the media to sustain
3. Another thing that their good image of
I have observed the bureau.
was the Chief
Budget Division In his comment 1 on the letter-complaint, petitioner
possesses high Almonte denied that as a result of the separation of
caliber firearms personnel, the EIIB had made some savings. He
such as a mini UZI, averred that the only funds released to his agency
Armalite rifle and by the Department of Budget and Management
two (2) 45 cal. pistol (DBM) were those corresponding to 947 plantilla
issued to him by the positions which were filled. He also denied that there
Assistant were "ghost agents" in the EIIB and claimed that
Commissioner disbursements for "open" (i.e., "overt" personnel)
wherein he is not an and "closed" (i.e., "covert" personnel) plantillas of the
agent of EIIB and agency had been cleared by the Commission on
authorized as such Audit (COA); that the case of the 30 Uzis had
according to already been investigated by Congress, where it was
memorandum order shown that it was not the EIIB but an agent who had
number 283 signed spent for the firearms and they were only loaned to
by the President of the EIIB pending appropriation by Congress; that,
the Republic of the contrary to the charge that a Maxima car had been
Philippines effective purchased for his use, he was using a government
9 Jan. 1990. issued car from the NICA; that it was his prerogative
as Commissioner to "ground" agents in the EIIB
Another observation main office so that they could be given reorientation
was when EIIB and retraining; that the allegation that the EIIB

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operatives pilfered smuggled firearms was without relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year
factual basis because the firearms were the subject 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the
of seizure proceedings before the Collector of whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10)
Customs, Port of Manila; that the EIIB had been days from receipt hereof."
uncompromising toward employees found involved
in anomalous activities; and that intelligence funds Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for a
had not been used for media propaganda and if reconsideration, arguing that Rogado and Rivera
media people went to the EIIB it was because of were EIIB employees under their supervision and
newsworthy stories. Petitioner asked that the that the Ombudsman was doing indirectly what he
complaint be dismissed and the case considered could not do directly, i.e., compelling them
closed. (petitioners Almonte and Perez) to produce evidence
against themselves.
Similarly petitioner Perez, budget chief of the EIIB,
denied in his comment 2 dated April 3, 1990 that Petitioners' motion was denied in respondent
savings had been realized from the implementation Ombudsman's order dated August 6, 1990. Hence,
of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM provided allocations this petition which questions the orders of June 15,
for only the remaining 947 personnel. He said that 1990 and August 6, 1990 of respondent
the disbursement of funds for the plantilla positions Ombudsman.
for "overt" and "covert" personnel had been cleared
by the COA and that the high-powered firearms had To put this case in perspective it should be stated at
been issued for the protection of EIIB personnel the outset that it does not concern a demand by a
attending court hearings and the Finance Officer in citizen for information under the freedom of
withdrawing funds from the banks. information guarantee of the Constitution. 7 Rather it
concerns the power of the Office of the Ombudsman
The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman's to obtain evidence in connection with an
office, Jose F. Saño, found the comments investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis the claim of
unsatisfactory, being "unverified and plying only on privilege of an agency of the Government. Thus
generalizations without meeting specifically the petitioners raise the following issues: 8
points raised by complainant as constitutive of the
alleged anomalies." 3 He, therefore, asked for I. WHETHER OR
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. NOT A CASE
Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a BROUGHT ABOUT
subpoena 4 to petitioners Almonte and Perez, BY AN UNSIGNED
requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and AND UNVERIFIED
the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as a LETTER
subpoena duces tecum 5 to the Chief of the EIIB's COMPLAINT IS AN
Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all "APPROPRIATE
documents relating to Personal Services Funds for CASE" WITHIN
the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers THE CONCEPT OF
(salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988." THE
CONSTITUTION IN
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the WHICH PUBLIC
subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum. In his RESPONDENT
Order dated June 15, 1990, 6 respondent CAN OBLIGE
Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the PETITIONERS BY
subpoena in view of the fact that there were no VIRTUE OF HIS
affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied their SUBPOENA DUCE
motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. He S TECUM  TO
ruled that petitioners were not being forced to PRODUCE TO HIM
produce evidence against themselves, since the "ALL DOCUMENTS
subpoena duces tecum  was directed to the Chief RELATING TO
Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the PERSONAL
Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records a SERVICES FUNDS
Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to FOR THE YEAR
produce before the investigator "all documents 1988 AND ALL

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 EVIDENCES, Petitioners do not question the power of the
SUCH AS Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum  nor
VOUCHERS the relevancy or materiality of the documents
(SALARY) FOR required to be produced, to the pending investigation
THE WHOLE in the Ombudsman's office. Accordingly, the focus of
PLANTILLA OF discussion should be on the Government's claim of
EIIB FOR 1988." privilege.

II. WHETHER OR A.
NOT "ALL
DOCUMENTS At common law a governmental privilege against
RELATING TO disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
PERSONAL bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters.
SERVICES FUNDS This privilege is based upon public interest of such
FOR THE YEAR paramount importance as in and of itself
1988 AND ALL transcending the individual interests of a private
EVIDENCES, citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the
SUCH AS plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. 10
VOUCHERS
(SALARY) FOR In addition, in the litigation over the Watergate tape
THE WHOLE subpoena in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court
PLANTILLA OF recognized the right of the President to the
EIIB FOR 1988" confidentiality of his conversations and
ARE CLASSIFIED correspondence, which it likened to "the claim of
AND, confidentiality of judicial deliberations." Said the
THEREFORE, Court in United States v. Nixon: 11
BEYOND THE
REACH OF
PUBLIC The expectation of a President to
RESPONDENT'S the confidentiality of his
SUBPOENA DUCE conversations and correspondence,
S TECUM. like the claim of confidentiality of
judicial deliberations, for example,
has all the values to which we
I. accord deference for the privacy of
all citizens and, added to those
There are several subsidiary issues raised by values, is the necessity for
petitioners, but the principal ones revolve on the protection of the public interest in
question whether petitioners can be ordered to candid, objective, and even blunt or
produce documents relating to personal services harsh opinions in Presidential
and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea decision-making. A President and
that such documents are classified. Disclosure of the those who assist him must be free to
documents in question is resisted on the ground that explore alternatives in the process
"knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its of shaping policies and making
Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will decisions and to do so in a way
necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, many would be unwilling to express
movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the except privately. These are the
whole of its being" and this could "destroy the considerations justifying a
EIIB." 9 presumptive privilege for
Presidential communications. The
privilege is fundamental to the
operation of the government and
inextricably rooted in the separation
of powers under the
Constitution. . . .

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Thus, the Court for the first time gave executive will determine how far the court
privilege a constitutional status and a new name, should probe in satisfying itself that
although not necessarily a new birth. 12 the occasion for invoking the
privilege is appropriate. Where there
"The confidentiality of judicial deliberations" is a strong showing of necessity, the
mentioned in the opinion of the Court referred to the claim of privilege should not be
fact that Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and lightly accepted, but even the most
judges of lower federal courts have traditionally compelling necessity cannot
treated their working papers and judicial notes as overcome the claim of privilege if the
private property. A 1977 proposal in the U.S. court is ultimately satisfied that
Congress that Justices and judges of lower federal military secrets are at stake.
courts "should be encouraged to make such A fortiori, where necessity is
arrangements as will assure the preservation and dubious, a formal claim of privilege,
eventual availability of their personal papers, made under the circumstances of
especially the deposit of their papers in the same this case, will have to prevail. 16
depository they select for [their] Public
Papers" 13 was rebuffed by the Justices who, in a On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality
letter to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on does not rest on the need to protect military,
Regulation and Government Information of the U.S. diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a
Senate, referred to "difficult concerns respecting the general public interest in the confidentiality of his
appropriate separation that must be maintained conversations, courts have declined to find in the
between the legislative branch and this Court." 14 Constitution an absolute privilege of the President
against a subpoena considered essential to the
There are, in addition to such privileges, statutorily- enforcement of criminal laws. 17
created ones such as the Government's privilege to
withhold the identity of persons who furnish B.
information of violations of laws. 15
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or
With respect to the privilege based on state secret, diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
the rule was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court as production of records pertaining to the personnel of
follows: the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and information
Judicial control over the evidence in regarding "illegal activities affecting the national
a case cannot be abdicated to the economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
caprice of executive officers. Yet we sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
will not go so far as to say that the salting." 18 Consequently, while in cases which
court may automatically require a involve state secrets it may be sufficient to
complete disclosure to the judge determine from the circumstances of the case that
before the claim of privilege will be there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
accepted in any case. It may be evidence will expose military matters without
possible to satisfy the court, from all compelling production, 19 no similar excuse can be
the circumstances of the case, that made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will Nor has our attention been called to any law or
expose military matters which, in the regulation which considers personnel records of the
interest of national security, should EIIB as classified information. To the contrary, COA
not be divulged. When this is the Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners invoke to
case, the occasion for the privilege support their contention that there is adequate
is appropriate, and the court should safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides
not jeopardize the security which the that the "only  item of expenditure which should be
privilege is meant to protect by treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the
insisting upon an examination of the "purchase of information and payment of rewards."
evidence, even by the judge alone, Thus, part V, No. 7 of the Circular reads:
in chambers. . . . In each case, the
showing of necessity which is made

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 The only item of expenditure which manner  against public officials or employees of the
should be treated as strictly Government, or any subdivision, agency or
confidential because it falls under instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
the category of classified information or controlled corporation." 22
is that relating to purchase of
information and payment of rewards. His need for the documents thus outweighs the
However, reasonable records claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is more,
should be maintained and kept for while there might have been compelling reasons for
inspection of the Chairman, the claim of privilege in 1988 when it was asserted
Commission on Audit or his duly by petitioners, now, seven years later, these reasons
authorized representative. All other may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact
expenditures are to be considered ceased. The agents whose identities could not then
unclassified supported by invoices, be revealed may have ceased from the service of
receipts and other documents, and, the EIIB, while the covert missions to which they
therefore, subject to reasonable might have been deployed might either have been
inquiry by the Chairman or his duly accomplished or abandoned. On the other hand, the
authorized representative. 20 Ombudsman's duty to investigate the complaint that
there were in 1988 unfilled positions in the EIIB for
It should be noted that the regulation which continued funding was received by its officials
requires that "reasonable records" be kept and put to illegal use, remains.
justifying the confidential or privileged
character of the information relating to Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are
informers. There are no such reasonable treated as presumptively privileged, this decision
records in this case to substitute for the would only justify ordering their inspection in
records claimed to be confidential. camera but not their nonproduction. However, as
concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB
The other statutes and regulations 21 invoked by and just to be sure no information of a confidential
petitioners in support of their contention that the character is disclosed, the examination of records in
documents sought in the subpoena duces tecum  of this case should be made in strict confidence by the
the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to
confidential nature of the EIIB's functions, but they the documents in any decision or order which the
do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for Ombudsman may render or issue but only to the
its funds to the proper authorities. Indeed by denying extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the
that there were savings made from certain items in agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous
the agency and alleging that the DBM had released protection of the documents delivered.
to the EIIB only the allocations needed for the 947
personnel retained after its reorganization, With these safeguards outlined, it is believed that a
petitioners in effect invited inquiry into the veracity of satisfactory resolution of the conflicting claims of the
their claim. If, as petitioners claim, the subpoenaed parties is achieved. It is not amiss to state that even
records have been examined by the COA and found matters of national security have been inquired into
by it to be regular in all respects, there is no reason in appropriate in camera proceedings by the courts.
why they cannot be shown to another agency of the In Lansang v. Garcia 23 this Court held closed door
government which by constitutional mandate is sessions, with only the immediate parties and their
required to look into any complaint concerning public counsel present, to determine claims that because of
office. subversion there was imminent danger to public
safety warranting the suspension of the writ
On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating of habeas corpus in 1971. Again in Marcos
a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled v. Manglapus 24 the Court met behind closed doors
by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these to receive military briefings on the threat posed to
items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The national security by the return to the country of the
plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to former President and his family. In the United States,
his investigation. He and his Deputies are a similar inquiry into the danger to national security
designated by the Constitution "protectors of the as a result of the publication of classified documents
people" and as such they are required by it "to act on the Vietnam war was upheld by the U.S.
promptly on complaints in any form or Supreme Court. 25 We see no reason why similar

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safeguards cannot be made to enable an agency of Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan 27 the Court
the Government, like the Office of the Ombudsman, held that testimony given at a fact-finding
to carry out its constitutional duty to protect public investigation and charges made in a pleading in a
interests 26 while insuring the confidentiality of case in court constituted a sufficient basis for the
classified documents. Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a
formal complaint was really not necessary.
C.
Rather than referring to the form of complaints,
Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, § 13(4) the therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art.
Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate case, XI, § 12 means any case concerning official act or
and subject to such limitations as may be provided omission which is alleged to be "illegal, unjust,
by law" and that because the complaint in this case improper, or inefficient." 28 The phrase "subject to
is unsigned and unverified, the case is not an such limitations as may be provided by law" refers to
appropriate one. This contention lacks merit. As such limitations as may be provided by Congress or,
already stated, the Constitution expressly enjoins the in the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be
Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in any imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well
form or manner" concerning official acts or include a requirement that the investigation be
omissions. Thus, Art. XI, § 12 provides: concluded in camera, with the public excluded, as
exception to the general nature of the proceedings in
the Office of the Ombudsman. 29 A reconciliation is
The Ombudsman and his Deputies,
thereby made between the demands of national
as protectors of the people, shall act
security and the requirement of accountability
promptly on complaints  filed in any
enshrined in the Constitution. 30
form or manner against public
officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, What has been said above disposes of petitioners'
agency, or instrumentality thereof, contention that the anonymous letter-complaint
including government-owned or against them is nothing but a vexatious prosecution.
controlled corporations and shall It only remains to say that the general investigation
in appropriate cases, notify the in the Ombudsman' s office is precisely for the
complainants of the action taken purpose of protecting those against whom a
and the result thereof. (Emphasis complaint is filed against hasty, malicious, and
added) oppressive prosecution as much as securing the
State from useless and expensive trials. There may
also be benefit resulting from such limited in
Similarly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Rep.
camera inspection in terms of increased public
Act No. 6770) provides in § 26(2):
confidence that the privilege is not being abused and
increased likelihood that no abuse is in fact
The Office of the Ombudsman shall occurring.
receive complaints from any source
in whatever form concerning an
II.
official act or omission. It shall act
on the complaint immediately and if
it finds the same entirely baseless, it Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal
shall dismiss the same and inform protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in
the complainant of such dismissal all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . .
citing the reasons therefor. If it finds can only hale respondents via their verified
a reasonable ground to investigate complaints or sworn statements with their identities
further, it shall first furnish the fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the
respondent public officer or Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice
employee with a summary of the to start an investigation. In the first place, there can
complaint and require him to submit be no objection to this procedure because it is
a written answer within seventy-two provided in the Constitution itself. In the second
hours from receipt thereof. If the place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
answer is found satisfactory, it shall complaints "in any form and in a manner," the
dismiss the case. (Emphasis added) framers of the Constitution took into account the
well-known reticence of the people which keep them

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from complaining against official wrongdoings. As his stead and in behalf of the President of the
this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Philippines, Respondents.
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory
and prosecutory agencies of the government x-------------------------x
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public
officials who, through official pressure and influence, G.R. No. 169659             April 20, 2006
can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held
against them. 31 On the other hand complainants are
more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO
afford to hire lawyers. 32 LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep.
CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO,
Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, Rep.
III. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by
FERDINAND GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE
Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented
subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' by ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, Petitioners,
right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state vs.
that the documents required to be produced in this EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
case are public records and those to whom the Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria
subpoena duces tecum  is directed are government Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent.
officials in whose possession or custody the
documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the x-------------------------x
disbursement by the EIIB of funds for personal
service has already been cleared by the COA, there
is no reason why they should object to the G.R. No. 169660             April 20, 2006
examination of the documents by respondent
Ombudsman. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as
directed that the inspection of subpoenaed Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in
documents be made personally in camera by the his capacity as Secretary of Defense, and
Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP
this decision. Chief of Staff, Respondents.

SO ORDERED. x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 169777*             April 20, 2006 G.R. No. 169667             April 20, 2006

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC.

FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate (ALG), Petitioner,
President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as vs.
Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as
PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, Executive Secretary, Respondent.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as
Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. x-------------------------x
BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO,
JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" G.R. No. 169834             April 20, 2006
EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, PDP- LABAN, Petitioner,
ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO vs.
OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R.
ROXAS, Petitioners, ERMITA, Respondent.
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as
x-------------------------x
Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in

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G.R. No. 171246             April 20, 2006 In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of
the Philippines, through its various Senate
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in
BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON attendance of officials and employees of the
C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY executive department, bureaus, and offices including
C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO those employed in Government Owned and
V. GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
vs. (PNP).
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R.
ERMITA, Respondent. On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the
Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
DECISION officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear on September 29, 2005 as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing
a truly republican state. Even in the early history of was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan
republican thought, however, it has been recognized Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the
that the head of government may keep certain alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of
information confidential in pursuit of the public the contract covering the North Rail Project.
interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive
power in only one magistrate, a distinguished
The Senate Committee on National Defense and
delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said:
Security likewise issued invitations2 dated
"Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will
September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the
generally characterize the proceedings of one man,
AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine
in a much more eminent degree than the
Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector
proceedings of any greater number; and in
General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga;
proportion as the number is increased, these
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP
qualities will be diminished."1
Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q.
History has been witness, however, to the fact that Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine
the power to withhold information lends itself to Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V.
abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps of
Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and them to attend as resource persons in a public
prohibition proffer that the President has abused hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the
such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino
(E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled
for its declaration as null and void for being "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a
unconstitutional. Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in
the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege
In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on
with the recognition that the issuance under review July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-
has come from a co-equal branch of government, Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech
which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1,
constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found 2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4)
to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty- Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria
bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being Ana Consuelo Madrigal – Resolution Directing the
the highest expression of the sovereign will of the Committee on National Defense and Security to
Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the
the government that contravenes its mandates. National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the
So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate

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Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon – Constitutional provisions on the separation of
Resolution Directing the Committee on National powers between co-equal branches of the
Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid government, all heads of departments of the
of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
of the Philippines. consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress.
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on
September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, When the security of the State or the public interest
General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter 3 dated so requires and the President so states in writing,
September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement the appearance shall only be conducted in executive
"due to a pressing operational situation that session.
demands [his utmost personal attention" while
"some of the invited AFP officers are currently SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of
attending to other urgent operational matters." Executive Privilege. –

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin (a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality
M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary based on executive privilege is fundamental to the
Eduardo R. Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, operation of government and rooted in the
2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement separation of powers under the Constitution
of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May
which various officials of the Executive Department 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code
have been invited" in order to "afford said officials of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for and Employees provides that Public Officials and
the various issues so that they may better enlighten Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or
the Senate Committee on its investigation." classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive public to prejudice the public interest.
Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to
accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" Executive privilege covers all confidential or
and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as classified information between the President and the
notices to all resource persons were completed [the public officers covered by this executive order,
previous] week." including:

Senate President Drilon likewise received on Conversations and correspondence between the
September 28, 2005 a letter6 from the President of President and the public official covered by this
the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No.
Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates
NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the
contract agreements relative to the project had been Military, diplomatic and other national security
secured. matters which in the interest of national security
should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential
464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on 130716, 9 December 1998).
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Information between inter-government agencies
Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
thereof, took effect immediately. The salient Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December
provisions of the Order are as follows: 1998);

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments

Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the

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Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez National Defense and Security, informing him "that
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the
G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the
[AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or
Matters affecting national security and public order Congressional hearings without seeking a written
(Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. approval from the President" and "that no approval
133250, 9 July 2002). has been granted by the President to any AFP
officer to appear before the public hearing of the
Senate Committee on National Defense and
(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by
Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."
this executive order:

Despite the communications received from

Senior officials of executive departments who in the
Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the
judgment of the department heads are covered by
investigation scheduled by the Committee on
the executive privilege;
National Defense and Security pushed through, with
only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the AFP officials invited attending.
the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military
executive privilege;
personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col.
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of Balutan were relieved from their military posts and
chief superintendent or higher and such other were made to face court martial proceedings.
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP
are covered by the executive privilege;
As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on
September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita,
Senior national security officials who in the judgment citing E.O. 464, sent letter of regrets, in response to
of the National Security Adviser are covered by the the invitations sent to the following government
executive privilege; and officials: Light Railway Transit Authority
Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro Rail Transit
Such other officers as may be determined by the Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso,
President. Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief State Counsel
Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Merceditas Gutierrez, Department of Transportation
Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling
Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the Mamonding, DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza,
President prior to appearing before either House of Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose
Congress to ensure the observance of the principle Serase II, Monetary Board Member Juanita
of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority
executive privilege and respect for the rights of Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary
public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of Romulo L. Neri.10 NorthRail President Cortes sent
legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.11

Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as
Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for
copy of E.O. 464, and another letter 8 informing him certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this Court
"that officials of the Executive Department invited to challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail
project] will not be able to attend the same without In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan
the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur
and that "said officials have not secured the required Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza
consent from the President." On even date which Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, Courage,
was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the an organization of government employees, and
alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter 9 to Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL), a
Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of

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justice, democracy and peace, all claiming to have enforcement since it directly interferes with and
standing to file the suit because of the impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers
transcendental importance of the issues they posed, and functions and conceals information of great
pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null public interest and concern, filed its petition for
and void for being unconstitutional; that respondent certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No.
Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared
Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President unconstitutional.
Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening
to impose sanctions on officials who appear before On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered
Congress due to congressional summons. political party with members duly elected into the
Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes Philippine Senate and House of Representatives,
on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition,
respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges docketed as G.R. No. 169834, alleging that it is
that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a political party affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it
entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented
et al. allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights through its members in Congress, particularly in the
and duties as members of Congress to conduct conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a
oversight functions in the implementation of laws; constitutional crisis between the executive and
Courage alleges that the tenure of its members in legislative branches of the government.
public office is predicated on, and threatened by,
their submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 Meanwhile, by letter14 dated February 6, 2006,
should they be summoned by Congress; and Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen.
CODAL alleges that its members have a sworn duty Senga for him and other military officers to attend
to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to the hearing on the alleged wiretapping scheduled on
information and to transparent governance are February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga replied, however, by
threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464. letter15 dated February 8, 2006, that "[p]ursuant to
Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters
In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, requested for a clearance from the President to
claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen, allow [them] to appear before the public hearing" and
taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the that "they will attend once [their] request is approved
enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that by the President." As none of those invited
E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being appeared, the hearing on February 10, 2006 was
unconstitutional. cancelled.16

In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law In another investigation conducted jointly by the
Groups, Inc.12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the
17 legal resource non-governmental organizations Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged
engaged in developmental lawyering and work with mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under
the poor and marginalized sectors in different parts the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the
of the country, and as an organization of citizens of Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet
the Philippines and a part of the general public, it officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on
has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce October 5 and 26, November 24 and December 12,
its constitutional right to information on matters of 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA
public concern, a right which was denied to the Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA Assistant
public by E.O. 464,13 prays, that said order be Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide
declared null and void for being unconstitutional and Authority Executive Director Norlito R. Gicana, 17 and
that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be those from the Department of Budget and
ordered to cease from implementing it. Management18 having invoked E.O. 464.

On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the In the budget hearings set by the Senate on
Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and
resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye, 19 DOJ
stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez20 and Department of
has already sustained the same with its continued Interior and Local Government Undersecretary

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Marius P. Corpus21 communicated their inability to Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659,
attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the after their motion for extension to file
President pursuant to E.O. 464. During the February memorandum27 was granted, subsequently filed a
13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary Bunye manifestation28 dated March 14, 2006 that it would
was allowed to attend by Executive Secretary no longer file its memorandum in the interest of
Ermita. having the issues resolved soonest, prompting this
Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them.29
On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and
the incumbent members of the Board of Governors Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as following constitutional provisions:
taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
as the official organization of all Philippine lawyers, Art. VI, Sec. 2130
all invoking their constitutional right to be informed
on matters of public interest, filed their petition for Art. VI, Sec. 2231
certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No.
171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and
void. Art. VI, Sec. 132

All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Art. XI, Sec. 133
Restraining Order enjoining respondents from
implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464. Art. III, Sec. 734

In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on Art. III, Sec. 435
February 21, 2006, the following substantive issues
were ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed Art. XIII, Sec. 16 36
grave abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464
prior to its publication in the Official Gazette or in a Art. II, Sec. 2837
newspaper of general circulation; and (2) whether
E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the
Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on
Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III,
the other hand, pray in their consolidated
Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art. VI, Sec.
memorandum38 on March 13, 2006 for the dismissal
22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The
of the petitions for lack of merit.
procedural issue of whether there is an actual case
or controversy that calls for judicial review was not
taken up; instead, the parties were instructed to The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as
discuss it in their respective memoranda. follows:

After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the 1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power
parties were directed to submit their respective of inquiry vested in Congress;
memoranda, paying particular attention to the
following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its 2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the
face, unconstitutional; and (2) assuming that it is not, people to information on matters of public
it is unconstitutional as applied in four instances, concern; and
namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the
NorthRail investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity of 3. Whether respondents have committed
the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable grave abuse of discretion when they
contract.22 implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication
in a newspaper of general circulation.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 169660 23 and G.R. No.
16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7, 2006, Essential requisites for judicial review
while those in G.R. No. 16966725 and G.R. No.
16983426 filed theirs the next day or on March 8,
2006. Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246 did not file any
memorandum.

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Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend
constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of that Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer
whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the for the implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve
Court’s power of judicial review are present is in the exercise of taxing or spending power.41
order.
With regard to the petition filed by the Senate,
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal
the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, or direct injury by reason of the issuance of E.O.
to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or 464, the Senate and its individual members are not
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; the proper parties to assail the constitutionality of
(2) the person challenging the act must have E.O. 464.
standing to challenge the validity of the subject act
or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic
personal and substantial interest in the case such Protectionism Association v. Ongpin 42 and Valmonte
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of Office,43 respondents assert that to be considered a
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest proper party, one must have a personal and
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality substantial interest in the case, such that he has
must be the very lis mota of the case.39 sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the
enforcement of E.O. 464.44
Except with respect to the requisites of standing and
existence of an actual case or controversy where the That the Senate of the Philippines has a
disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of fundamental right essential not only for intelligent
the rest of the requisites shall be omitted. public decision-making in a democratic system, but
more especially for sound legislation45 is not
Standing disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the
ability of the members of Congress to access
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert information that is crucial to law-making. 46 Verily, the
that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 Senate, including its individual members, has a
and 169667 make it clear that they, adverting to the substantial and direct interest over the outcome of
non-appearance of several officials of the executive the controversy and is the proper party to assail the
department in the investigations called by the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have
different committees of the Senate, were brought to standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative,
vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
different committees to conduct inquiry in aid of their office and are allowed to sue to question the
legislation or in the exercise of its oversight validity of any official action which they claim
functions. They maintain that Representatives infringes their prerogatives as legislators.47
Ocampo et al. have not shown any specific
prerogative, power, and privilege of the House of In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur
Representatives which had been effectively impaired Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan
by E.O. 464, there being no mention of any Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran
investigation called by the House of Representatives (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza
or any of its committees which was aborted due to Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the
the implementation of E.O. 464. constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any
claim that an investigation called by the House of
As for Bayan Muna’s alleged interest as a party-list Representatives or any of its committees was
representing the marginalized and aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464
underrepresented, and that of the other petitioner notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is
groups and individuals who profess to have standing made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional
as advocates and defenders of the Constitution, rights and duties as members of Congress to
respondents contend that such interest falls short of conduct investigation in aid of legislation and
that required to confer standing on them as parties conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
"injured-in-fact."40 laws.

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The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific
meets the standing requirement as it obtained three interests in the resolution of the controversy,
seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its
elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its
the legislative process consonant with the declared legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at
policy underlying the party list system of affording best is only a "generalized interest" which it shares
citizens belonging to marginalized and with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury,
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable
who lack well-defined political constituencies to element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in
contribute to the formulation and enactment of a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. 55 In
legislation that will benefit the nation.48 fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as a political party
does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al.
have the standing to file their petitions, passing on Actual Case or Controversy
the standing of their co-petitioners Courage and
Codal is rendered unnecessary.49 Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they
citing the absence of the executive officials invited
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of
which claims to be an organization of citizens, and E.O. 464, particularly those on the NorthRail project
the incumbent members of the IBP Board of and the wiretapping controversy.
Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer
members,50 invoke their constitutional right to Respondents counter that there is no case or
information on matters of public concern, asserting controversy, there being no showing that President
that the right to information, curtailed and violated by Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or
E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of prohibited the appearance of the invited
other constitutional rights51 and to the maintenance officials.56 These officials, they claim, merely
of the balance of power among the three branches communicated to the Senate that they have not yet
of the government through the principle of checks secured the consent of the President, not that the
and balances.52 President prohibited their attendance. 57 Specifically
with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the the hearing on September 28, 2005, respondents
interest of the petitioner in assailing the claim that the instruction not to attend without the
constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, President’s consent was based on its role as
and other regulations, must be direct and personal. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on
In Franciso v. House of Representatives, 53 this Court E.O. 464.
held that when the proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely
satisfies the requirement of personal interest. rest on an unfounded apprehension that the
President will abuse its power of preventing the
As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is appearance of officials before Congress, and that
clothed with legal standing in view of the such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging
transcendental issues raised in its petition which this the validity of E.O. 464.
Court needs to resolve in order to avert a
constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the
on the ground of transcendental importance, President has not withheld her consent or prohibited
however, it must establish (1) the character of the the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial
funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the in determining the existence of an actual case or
case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For
a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate
respondent agency or instrumentality of the withholding of consent or an express prohibition
government, and (3) the lack of any party with a issuing from the President in order to bar officials
more direct and specific interest in raising the from appearing before Congress.
questions being raised.54 The first and last
determinants not being present as no public funds or As the implementation of the challenged order has
assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. already resulted in the absence of officials invited to

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the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the
would make no sense to wait for any further event reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista
before considering the present case ripe for and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress
adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer Administration. Arnault, who was considered a
abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain leading witness in the controversy, was called to
from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464. testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his
refusal to answer the questions of the senators on
Constitutionality of E.O. 464 an important point, he was, by resolution of the
Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the
Senate’s power to punish Arnault for contempt, this
E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of
Court held:
executive officials before Congress, deprives
Congress of the information in the possession of
these officials. To resolve the question of whether Although there is no provision in the Constitution
such withholding of information violates the expressly investing either House of Congress with
Constitution, consideration of the general power of power to make investigations and exact testimony to
Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
the power of inquiry, is in order. advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.
In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to
The power of inquiry
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the information respecting the conditions which the
Constitution which reads: legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of requisite information – which is not infrequently true
Representatives or any of its respective committees – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in Experience has shown that mere requests for such
accordance with its duly published rules of information are often unavailing, and also that
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or information which is volunteered is not always
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion
(Underscoring supplied) is essential to obtain what is needed. 59 . . .
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the officials of the executive branch may be deduced
unicameral legislature established therein – the from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court
Batasang Pambansa – and its committees. therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to
legislate.60 The matters which may be a proper
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar subject of legislation and those which may be a
provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno, 58 a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that
case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the the operation of government, being a legitimate
Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
inherent in the power to legislate. investigation.

Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation

of the government transaction involved in Arnault
was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry.
Besides being related to the expenditure of public
funds of which Congress is the guardian, the
transaction, the Court held, "also involved
government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions it is within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish."

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Since Congress has authority to inquire into the Nonetheless, there may be exceptional
operations of the executive branch, it would be circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present,
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative
not extend to executive officials who are the most power of inquiry might be established, resulting in
familiar with and informed on executive operations. palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to
members of the executive department under the Bill
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with of Rights. In such instances, depending on the
process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive
of information in the legislative process. If the Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded
information possessed by executive officials on the judicial sanction.
operation of their offices is necessary for wise
legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there
Congress has the right to that information and the are still recognized exemptions to the power of
power to compel the disclosure thereof. inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of
"executive privilege." Since this term figures
As evidenced by the American experience during the prominently in the challenged order, it being
so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of mentioned in its provisions, its preambular
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of
in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive privilege is crucial for determining the
executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected constitutionality of E.O. 464.
to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari
powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Executive privilege
Constitution.
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the
Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not properly be promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. 63 Being of
in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the American origin, it is best understood in light of how
constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could it has been defined and used in the legal literature of
not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one the United States.
possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as
occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power
the public officials concerned, or to any person for of the Government to withhold information from the
that matter, the possible needed statute which public, the courts, and the Congress." 64 Similarly,
prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and
statement in its invitations, along with the usual high-level executive branch officers to withhold
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions information from Congress, the courts, and
relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be ultimately the public."65
less room for speculation on the part of the person
invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation. Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or
unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims of
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial varying kinds.67 Tribe, in fact, comments that while it
safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of is customary to employ the phrase "executive
inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of
done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly executive privileges "since presidential refusals to
published rules of procedure, necessarily implying furnish information may be actuated by any of at
the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may
without duly published rules of procedure. Section be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the
21 also mandates that the rights of persons context of either judicial or legislative investigations."
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be
respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the
adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents,
beginning with Washington, on the ground that the
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the information is of such nature that its disclosure
courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons would subvert crucial military or diplomatic
affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege,

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or the privilege of the Government not to disclose The leading case on executive privilege in the United
the identity of persons who furnish information of States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974. In issue
violations of law to officers charged with the in that case was the validity of President Nixon’s
enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege claim of executive privilege against a subpoena
for internal deliberations has been said to attach to issued by a district court requiring the production of
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory certain tapes and documents relating to the
opinions, recommendations and deliberations Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was
comprising part of a process by which governmental based on the President’s general interest in the
decisions and policies are formulated. 68 confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while
Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re there is no explicit reference to a privilege of
Sealed Case, thus: confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is
constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to
the effective discharge of a President’s powers. The
Since the beginnings of our nation, executive
Court, nonetheless, rejected the President’s claim of
officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist
privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced
disclosure of information the confidentiality of which
against the public interest in the fair administration of
they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role
criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to
and responsibilities of the executive branch of our
clarify that it was not there addressing the issue of
government. Courts ruled early that the executive
claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against
had a right to withhold documents that might reveal
congressional demands for information.
military or state secrets. The courts have also
granted the executive a right to withhold the identity
of government informers in some circumstances and Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive
a qualified right to withhold information related to privilege against Congress are rare.73 Despite
pending investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and frequent assertion of the privilege to deny
underscoring supplied) information to Congress, beginning with President
Washington’s refusal to turn over treaty negotiation
records to the House of Representatives, the U.S.
The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive
Supreme Court has never adjudicated the
privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope
issue.74 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
of the doctrine.
District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier
in the same year as Nixon, recognized the
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of President’s privilege over his conversations against
separation of powers, exempts the executive from a congressional subpoena.75 Anticipating the
disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme
citizen or organization where such exemption is Court in Nixon, the Court of Appeals weighed the
necessary to the discharge of highly important public interest protected by the claim of privilege
executive responsibilities involved in maintaining against the interest that would be served by
governmental operations, and extends not only to disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the balance
military and diplomatic secrets but also to favored the President, the Court declined to enforce
documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the the subpoena. 76
executive’ domestic decisional and policy making
functions, that is, those documents reflecting the
In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege
frank expression necessary in intra-governmental
was recognized by this Court in Almonte v.
advisory and deliberative
Vasquez.77 Almonte used the term in reference to
communications.70 (Emphasis and underscoring
the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the
supplied)
following portion of the Nixon decision which
explains the basis for the privilege:
That a type of information is recognized as privileged
does not, however, necessarily mean that it would
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality
be considered privileged in all instances. For in
of his conversations and correspondences, like the
determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the
claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for
question that must be asked is not only whether the
example, has all the values to which we accord
requested information falls within one of the
deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to
traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege
those values, is the necessity for protection of the
should be honored in a given procedural setting.71

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public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that
harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A executive officials are exempt from the duty to
President and those who assist him must be free to disclose information by the mere fact of being
explore alternatives in the process of shaping executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary
policies and making decisions and to do so in a way character of the exemptions indicates that the
many would be unwilling to express except privately. presumption inclines heavily against executive
These are the considerations justifying a secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the Validity of Section 1
operation of government and inextricably rooted in
the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require
" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) the officials covered by them to secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before Congress.
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued There are significant differences between the two
by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It provisions, however, which constrain this Court to
did not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, discuss the validity of these provisions separately.
the right of the people to information.78 Nonetheless,
the Court recognized that there are certain types of Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It
information which the government may withhold from does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in determination by any official whether they are
name, that executive privilege may be claimed covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has,
against citizens’ demands for information. through the challenged order, made the
determination that they are. Further, unlike also
In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this Section 3, the coverage of department heads under
jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that Section 1 is not made to depend on the department
there is a "governmental privilege against public heads’ possession of any information which might be
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked
military, diplomatic and other national security contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no
matters."80 The same case held that closed-door reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the
Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded
the right to information. on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what
has been referred to as the question hour.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 81 the
Court ruled that the right to information does not SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon
extend to matters recognized as "privileged their own initiative, with the consent of the President,
information under the separation of powers," 82 by or upon the request of either House, as the rules of
which the Court meant Presidential conversations, each House shall provide, appear before and be
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on their departments. Written questions shall be
military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting submitted to the President of the Senate or the
national security, and information on investigations Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the three days before their scheduled appearance.
prosecution of the accused were exempted from the Interpellations shall not be limited to written
right to information. questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the public interest
From the above discussion on the meaning and so requires and the President so states in writing,
scope of executive privilege, both in the United the appearance shall be conducted in executive
States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle session.
emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted
against Congress, the courts, or the public, is Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an
recognized only in relation to certain types of examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article
information of a sensitive character. While executive VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour
privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which
may be valid or not depending on the ground provides for the power of either House of Congress
invoked to justify it and the context in which it is to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the

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following excerpt of the deliberations of the Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later
Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were moved the provision on question hour from its
aware that these two provisions involved distinct original position as Section 20 in the original draft
functions of Congress. down to Section 31, far from the provision on
inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section following exchange during the deliberations:
20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour]
yesterday, I noticed that members of the Cabinet MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as
cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go,
House of Representatives or before the Senate. I Mr. Presiding Officer, to the Article on Legislative
have a particular problem in this regard, Madam and may I request the chairperson of the Legislative
President, because in our experience in the Regular Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his
Batasang Pambansa – as the Gentleman himself reaction.
has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa
– one of the most competent inputs that we can put THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
in our committee deliberations, either in aid of Commissioner Davide is recognized.|avvphi|.net
legislation or in congressional investigations, is the
testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I
them, but if they do not come and it is a have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I
congressional investigation, we usually issue propose that instead of putting it as Section 31, it
subpoenas. should follow Legislative Inquiries.

I want to be clarified on a statement made by THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the
Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact committee say?
that the Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the
House of Representatives or the Senate [when
requested under Section 22] does not mean that MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to
they need not come when they are invited or reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.
subpoenaed by the committee of either House when
it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that
congressional investigation. According to previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned
Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed and their that in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is
presence can be had under Section 21. Does the actually a power of Congress in terms of its own
gentleman confirm this, Madam President? lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually
a power in terms of its own lawmaking power
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of
because Section 20 refers only to what was legislation. And so we put Question Hour as Section
originally the Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this.
would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related
be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a
contempt of the House.83 (Emphasis and complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
underscoring supplied) Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet
would be very, very essential not only in the
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid application of check and balance but also, in effect,
of legislation and the question hour. While in aid of legislation.
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the
legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez committee, we find merit in the suggestion of
bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are
amendment to make the appearance of department accepting that and so this Section 31 would now
heads discretionary in the question hour. become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner
Davide?
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the
members of the Commission that the Committee on

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MR. DAVIDE. Yes.84 (Emphasis and underscoring An essential feature of the parliamentary system of
supplied) government is the immediate accountability of the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National
Consistent with their statements earlier in the Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National
deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Assembly for the program of government and shall
Maambong proceeded from the same assumption determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in
that these provisions pertained to two different the presidential system where the tenure of office of
functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners all elected officials cannot be terminated before their
understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet
of legislation is different from the power to conduct remain in office only as long as they enjoy the
inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner confidence of the National Assembly. The moment
Davide’s only concern was that the two provisions this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the
on these distinct powers be placed closely together, Cabinet may be changed.87
they being complementary to each other. Neither
Commissioner considered them as identical The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the
functions of Congress. mandatory nature of such appearance during the
question hour in the present Constitution so as to
The foregoing opinion was not the two conform more fully to a system of separation of
Commissioners’ alone. From the above-quoted powers.88 To that extent, the question hour, as it is
exchange, Commissioner Maambong’s committee – presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from
the Committee on Style – shared the view that the the question period of the parliamentary system.
two provisions reflected distinct functions of That department heads may not be required to
Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, appear in a question hour does not, however, mean
was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit
Committee on the Legislative Department. His views information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in
may thus be presumed as representing that of his light of the absence of a mandatory question period,
Committee. the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive
information in the performance of its legislative
function becomes more imperative. As Schwartz
In the context of a parliamentary system of
observes:
government, the "question hour" has a definite
meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by
Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to
ministers accountable for their acts and the tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the
operation of the government,85 corresponding to Congress has the right to obtain information from
what is known in Britain as the question period. any source – even from officials of departments and
There was a specific provision for a question hour in agencies in the executive branch. In the United
the 1973 Constitution86 which made the appearance States there is, unlike the situation which prevails in
of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a
conformed to the parliamentary system established clear separation between the legislative and
by that Constitution, where the ministers are also executive branches. It is this very separation that
members of the legislature and are directly makes the congressional right to obtain information
accountable to it. from the executive so essential, if the functions of
the Congress as the elected representatives of the
people are adequately to be carried out. The
absence of close rapport between the legislative and
executive branches in this country, comparable to
those which exist under a parliamentary system, and
the nonexistence in the Congress of an institution
such as the British question period have perforce
made reliance by the Congress upon its right to
obtain information from the executive essential, if it
is intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless
the Congress possesses the right to obtain
executive information, its power of oversight of
administration in a system such as ours becomes a

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power devoid of most of its practical content, since it accorded to a co-equal branch of government which
depends for its effectiveness solely upon information is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
parceled out ex gratia by the executive.89 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) By the same token, members of the Supreme Court
are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial
and complementary to each other, should not be body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the
considered as pertaining to the same power of basis not only of separation of powers but also on
Congress. One specifically relates to the power to the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of independence of the judiciary. This point is not in
which is to elicit information that may be used for dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to interpellation of the Chief Justice.
obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. Having established the proper interpretation of
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on now proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of
how department heads are implementing the Section 1 of E.O. 464.
statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence
department heads must give a report of their of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, must be construed as limited in its application to
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, appearances of department heads in the question
states that Congress may only request their hour contemplated in the provision of said Section
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic
Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of rule of construction that issuances must be
legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will
mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.90 render it constitutional.

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be The requirement then to secure presidential consent
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under
consistent with the intent discerned from the Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. appearance of department heads in the question
hour is discretionary on their part.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid
the principle of separation of powers. While the of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the instances to respect the refusal of the department
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim
to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
for information. President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the Validity of Sections 2 and 3
only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials
They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of
department heads. Only one executive official may the President prior to appearing before either house
be exempted from this power — the President on of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all
whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the senior officials of executive departments, all officers
reach of Congress except through the power of of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest security officials who, in the judgment of the heads
official of the executive branch, and the due respect

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of offices designated in the same section (i.e. invocation must be construed as a declaration to
department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of Congress that the President, or a head of office
the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are authorized by the President, has determined that the
"covered by the executive privilege." requested information is privileged, and that the
President has not reversed such determination.
The enumeration also includes such other officers as Such declaration, however, even without mentioning
may be determined by the President. Given the title the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied
of Section 2 — "Nature, Scope and Coverage of claim that the information is being withheld by the
Executive Privilege" —, it is evident that under the executive branch, by authority of the President, on
rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an
President under this provision is intended to be implied claim of privilege.
based on a similar finding of coverage under
executive privilege. The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent
Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of
464 virtually states that executive privilege actually privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It reads:
covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine.
Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the
invoked in relation to specific categories of Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail
information and not to categories of persons. Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on
29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which informed that officials of the Executive Department
deals with the nature, scope and coverage of invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to
executive privilege, the reference to persons being attend the same without the consent of the
"covered by the executive privilege" may be read as President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s.
an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The
possession of information which is, in the judgment Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Adherence To
of the head of office concerned, privileged as The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For
defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed The Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In
on the assumption that this is the intention of the Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The
challenged order. Constitution, And For Other Purposes". Said officials
have not secured the required consent from the
President. (Underscoring supplied)
Upon a determination by the designated head of
office or by the President that an official is "covered
by the executive privilege," such official is subjected The letter does not explicitly invoke executive
to the requirement that he first secure the consent of privilege or that the matter on which these officials
the President prior to appearing before Congress. are being requested to be resource persons falls
This requirement effectively bars the appearance of under the recognized grounds of the privilege to
the official concerned unless the same is permitted justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that
by the President. The proviso allowing the President in view of the lack of consent from the President
to give its consent means nothing more than that the under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.
President may reverse a prohibition which already
exists by virtue of E.O. 464. Significant premises in this letter, however, are left
unstated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes that
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As
the determination by a head of office, authorized by explained earlier, however, to be covered by the
the President under E.O. 464, or by the President order means that a determination has been made,
herself, that such official is in possession of by the designated head of office or the President,
information that is covered by executive privilege. that the invited official possesses information that is
This determination then becomes the basis for the covered by executive privilege. Thus, although it is
official’s not showing up in the legislative not stated in the letter that such determination has
investigation. been made, the same must be deemed implied.
Respecting the statement that the invited officials
have not secured the consent of the President, it
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.
only means that the President has not reversed the
464 to justify his failure to be present, such

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standing prohibition against their appearance before E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific
Congress. allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the
information demanded involves military or diplomatic
Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita’s letter leads secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While
to the conclusion that the executive branch, either Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information
through the President or the heads of offices that are covered by the privilege under the
authorized under E.O. 464, has made a challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to
determination that the information required by the which among them is being referred to by the
Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of writing, executive. The enumeration is not even intended to
there has been no contrary pronouncement from the be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is
President. In fine, an implied claim of privilege has included in the phrase "confidential or classified
been made by the executive. information between the President and the public
officers covered by this executive order."
While there is no Philippine case that directly
addresses the issue of whether executive privilege Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the
may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered executive considers the requested information
from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that
possession of the executive may validly be claimed the President, or an authorized head of office, has
as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case determined that it is so, and that the President has
holds: not overturned that determination. Such declaration
leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested
information could be classified as privileged. That
There is no claim by PEA that the information
the message is couched in terms that, on first
demanded by petitioner is privileged information
impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only
rooted in the separation of powers. The information
makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make
does not cover Presidential conversations,
Congress doubly blind to the question of why the
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door
executive branch is not providing it with the
Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of
information that it has requested.
the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or
executive sessions of either house of Congress, are
recognized as confidential. This kind of information A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from
cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of an obligation to disclose information, must,
government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds
and assessments, free from the glare of publicity teaches:
and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of The privilege belongs to the government and must
those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor
and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly
instant case.91 (Emphasis and underscoring invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege,
supplied) lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter, after actual personal
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be consideration by that officer. The court itself must
dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it determine whether the circumstances are
sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so
must look further and assess the claim of privilege without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the
authorized by the Order to determine whether it is privilege is designed to protect. 92 (Underscoring
valid. supplied)

While the validity of claims of privilege must be Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a
assessed on a case to case basis, examining the claim of executive privilege, there is no way of
ground invoked therefor and the particular determining whether it falls under one of the
circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied traditional privileges, or whether, given the
claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per circumstances in which it is made, it should be
se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the respected.93 These, in substance, were the same
letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted
above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of against the Ombudsman in Almonte v.

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Vasquez94 and, more in point, against a committee of is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact
the Senate in Senate Select Committee on that a claim was made by the proper executive as
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.95 Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the
claim in the instant case because it is legally
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and
enlightening: reasonable determination as to its applicability. To
recognize such a broad claim in which the
Defendant has given no precise or compelling
[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of
reasons to shield these documents from outside
the potential harm resulting from disclosure
scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole
impossible, thereby preventing the Court from
procedure.101 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
balancing such harm against plaintiffs’ needs to
determine whether to override any claims of
privilege.96 (Underscoring supplied) Due respect for a co-equal branch of government,
moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege
clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:97
following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:102
On the present state of the record, this Court is not
We think the Court’s decision in United States v.
called upon to perform this balancing operation. In
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant
stating its objection to claimant’s interrogatories,
to these questions. For it is as true here as it was
government asserts, and nothing more, that the
there, that ‘if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for
disclosures sought by claimant would inhibit the free
failing to produce the records of the association, a
expression of opinion that non-disclosure is
decent respect for the House of Representatives, by
designed to protect. The government has not shown
whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have
– nor even alleged – that those who evaluated
required that (he) state (his) reasons for
claimant’s product were involved in internal
noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a
policymaking, generally, or in this particular instance.
statement would have given the Subcommittee an
Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim.
opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by
The facts upon which the privilege is based must be
taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records.
established. To find these interrogatories
‘To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider
objectionable, this Court would have to assume that
the objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its
the evaluation and classification of claimant’s
authority and an obstruction of its processes. His
products was a matter of internal policy formulation,
failure to make any such statement was "a patent
an assumption in which this Court is unwilling to
evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce
indulge sua sponte.98 (Emphasis and underscoring
papers before a congressional committee[, and]
supplied)
cannot be condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy99 similarly
emphasizes that "an agency must provide ‘precise
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the
and certain’ reasons for preserving the confidentiality
executive to state the reasons for the claim with
of requested information."
such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
information which the privilege is meant to
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America 100 amplifies, protect.103 A useful analogy in determining the
thus: requisite degree of particularity would be the
privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v.
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege U.S.104 declares:
requires a specific designation and description of the
documents within its scope as well as precise and The witness is not exonerated from answering
certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. merely because he declares that in so doing he
Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to would incriminate himself – his say-so does not of
analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for
thing sought to be protected. As the affidavit now the court to say whether his silence is justified, and
stands, the Court has little more than its sua sponte to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the
speculation with which to weigh the applicability of court that he is mistaken.’ However, if the witness,
the claim. An improperly asserted claim of privilege upon interposing his claim, were required to prove

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the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually Such presumptive authorization, however, is
required to be established in court, he would be contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege.
compelled to surrender the very protection which the Executive privilege, as already discussed, is
privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the recognized with respect to information the
privilege, it need only be evident from the confidential nature of which is crucial to the
implications of the question, in the setting in which it fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of
is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or the executive branch,105 or in those instances where
an explanation of why it cannot be answered might exemption from disclosure is necessary to the
be dangerous because injurious disclosure could discharge of highly important executive
result." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) responsibilities.106 The doctrine of executive privilege
is thus premised on the fact that certain informations
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential
relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being,
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement necessity must be of such high degree as to
that the President has not given her consent. It is outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
woefully insufficient for Congress to determine obligation in a particular case.
whether the withholding of information is justified
under the circumstances of each case. It severely In light of this highly exceptional nature of the
frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must of course authorize the Executive Secretary to
be invalidated. invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the
Executive Secretary must state that the authority is
"By order of the President," which means that he
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section
personally consulted with her. The privilege being an
2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on
extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the
the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on
highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other
what is covered by executive privilege. It does not
words, the President may not authorize her
purport to be conclusive on the other branches of
subordinates to exercise such power. There is even
government. It may thus be construed as a mere
less reason to uphold such authorization in the
expression of opinion by the President regarding the
instant case where the authorization is not explicit
nature and scope of executive privilege.
but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section
2(b), is further invalid on this score.
Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for
invalidating the challenged order the alleged
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being
unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of
summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his
offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the
own judgment, might be covered by executive
Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the United
privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to
States where, so it claims, only the President can
inform the President or the Executive Secretary of
assert executive privilege to withhold information
the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is
from Congress.
necessary in order to provide the President or the
Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of
that, once the head of office determines that a executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that
certain information is privileged, such determination reasonable time, neither the President nor the
is presumed to bear the President’s authority and Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress
has the effect of prohibiting the official from is no longer bound to respect the failure of the
appearing before Congress, subject only to the official to appear before Congress and may then opt
express pronouncement of the President that it is to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his
allowing the appearance of such official. These appearance.
provisions thus allow the President to authorize
claims of privilege by mere silence.
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes
for requiring officials to secure the consent of the

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President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure which they can use in formulating their own opinions
"respect for the rights of public officials appearing in on the matter before Congress — opinions which
inquiries in aid of legislation." That such rights must they can then communicate to their representatives
indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from and other government officials through the various
Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.
that "[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
by such inquiries shall be respected."
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for
In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is free political discussion be maintained to the end
clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied that the government may perceive and be
claims of executive privilege, for which reason it responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open
must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
motivated by the need to ensure respect for such citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its
officials does not change the infirm nature of the will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
authorization itself. discussion are aware of the issues and have access
to information relating thereto can such bear
Right to Information fruit.107 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of The impairment of the right of the people to
Congress for the appearance of executive officials in information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
the hearings conducted by it, and not with the therefore, in the sense explained above, just as
demands of citizens for information pursuant to their direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of
right to information on matters of public concern. inquiry.
Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that
what is involved in the present controversy is not Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication
merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right
of the people to information. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the
executive branch, it does not follow that the same is
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between exempt from the need for publication. On the need
the right of Congress to information which underlies for publishing even those statutes that do not directly
the power of inquiry and the right of the people to apply to people in general, Tañada v. Tuvera states:
information on matters of public concern. For one,
the demand of a citizen for the production of The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only
documents pursuant to his right to information does to those of general application, for strictly speaking
not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena all laws relate to the people in general albeit there
duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the are some that do not apply to them directly. An
right to information grant a citizen the power to exact example is a law granting citizenship to a particular
testimony from government officials. These powers individual, like a relative of President Marcos who
belong only to Congress and not to an individual was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot
citizen. be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to
Thus, while Congress is composed of all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of
representatives elected by the people, it does not public interest which any member of the body politic
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in may question in the political forums or, if he is a
every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are proper party, even in courts of justice. 108 (Emphasis
exercising their right to information. and underscoring supplied)

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation Although the above statement was made in
are generally conducted in public, however, any reference to statutes, logic dictates that the
executive issuance tending to unduly limit challenged order must be covered by the publication
disclosures of information in such investigations requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a
necessarily deprives the people of information direct effect on the right of the people to information
which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a
presumed to be a matter of public concern. The matter of public interest which members of the body
citizens are thereby denied access to information politic may question before this Court. Due process

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thus requires that the people should have been PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
apprised of this issuance before it was implemented. SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON
Conclusion NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, respondents.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information
from the executive branch whenever it is sought in DECISION
aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds
such information on the ground that it is privileged, it LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
why it must be respected. At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the show
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the cause Letter1 dated November 22, 2007 and
executive branch to evade congressional requests contempt Order2 dated January 30, 2008
for information without need of clearly asserting a concurrently issued by respondent
right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor.
By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, Senate Committees on Accountability of Public
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of Officers and Investigations,3 Trade and
legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For Commerce,  and
4
National Defense and
Security5 against petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former
[w]hat republican theory did accomplish…was to Director General of the National Economic and
reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, Development Authority (NEDA).
based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and
replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, The facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as
based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. follows:
(Underscoring supplied)109
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation
Resort to any means then by which officials of the and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract
executive branch could refuse to divulge information with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for
have merely nullified the power of our legislature to the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
inquire into the operations of government, but we the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
shall have given up something of much greater value (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was
– our right as a people to take part in government. to be financed by the People's Republic of China.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY In connection with this NBN Project, various
GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order Resolutions were introduced in the Senate, as
No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of follows:
the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive (1) P.S. Res. No. 127, introduced by
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., entitled
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE BLUE
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of RIBBON COMMITTEE AND THE
Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND INDUSTRY
Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF
are, however, VALID. LEGISLATION, THE CIRCUMSTANCES
LEADING TO THE APPROVAL OF THE
SO ORDERED. BROADBAND CONTRACT WITH ZTE AND
THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE OFFICIALS
G.R. No. 180643             March 25, 2008 CONCERNED IN GETTING IT
CONSUMMATED AND TO MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO HALE TO THE
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
COURTS OF LAW THE PERSONS
vs.
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ANOMALY IN
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF

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 CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9184,
PLUG THE LOOPHOLES, IF ANY IN THE OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
BOT LAW AND OTHER PERTINENT GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
LEGISLATIONS. REFORM ACT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES;
(2) P.S. Res. No. 144, introduced by
Senator Mar Roxas, entitled Á 2. Senate Bill No. 1794, introduced by
RESOLUTION URGING PRESIDENT Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO TO IMPOSING SAFEGUARDS IN
DIRECT THE CANCELLATION OF THE CONTRACTING LOANS CLASSIFIED AS
ZTE CONTRACT OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
(3) P.S. Res. No. 129, introduced by REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8182, AS AMENDED
Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, entitled BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8555,
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OFFICIAL
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF
AND SECURITY TO CONDUCT AN 1996, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; and
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION INTO
THE NATIONAL SECURITY 3. Senate Bill No. 1317, introduced by
IMPLICATIONS OF AWARDING THE Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled
NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK AN ACT MANDATING CONCURRENCE TO
CONTRACT TO THE CHINESE FIRM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND
ZHONG XING TELECOMMUNICATIONS EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS.
EQUIPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (ZTE
CORPORATION) WITH THE END IN VIEW Respondent Committees initiated the investigation
OF PROVIDING REMEDIAL LEGISLATION by sending invitations to certain personalities and
THAT WILL PROTECT OUR NATIONAL cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND Petitioner was among those invited. He was
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. summoned to appear and testify on September 18,
20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he
(4) P.S. Res. No. 136, introduced by attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled he was "out of town" during the other dates.
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER
SENATE COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman
INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC executive officials and power brokers were using
JUSTIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL their influence to push the approval of the NBN
BROADBAND NETWORK (NBN) PROJECT Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project
OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA
At the same time, the investigation was claimed to acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-
be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending government project, to be financed through a loan
bills in the Senate, to wit: from the Chinese Government.

1. Senate Bill No. 1793, introduced by On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before
Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He
SUBJECTING TREATIES, disclosed that then Commission on Elections
INTERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered
AGREEMENTS INVOLVING FUNDING IN him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the
THE PROCUREMENT OF NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, GOODS, President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that
AND CONSULTING SERVICES TO BE she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
INCLUDED IN THE SCOPE AND when probed further on what they discussed about
APPLICATION OF PHILIPPINE the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
PROCUREMENT LAWS, AMENDING FOR invoking "executive privilege". In particular, he

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refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or confidentiality of conversations of the
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN President is necessary in the exercise of her
Project,6 (b) whether or not she directed him to executive and policy decision making
prioritize it,7 and (c) whether or not she directed him process. The expectation of a President to
to approve.8 the confidentiality of her conversations and
correspondences, like the value which we
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued accord deference for the privacy of all
a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring citizens, is the necessity for protection of the
him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. public interest in candid, objective, and even
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision-making. Disclosure of
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007,
conversations of the President will have a
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested
chilling effect on the President, and will
respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner's
hamper her in the effective discharge of her
testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The
duties and responsibilities, if she is not
pertinent portion of the letter reads:
protected by the confidentiality of her
conversations.
With reference to the subpoena ad
testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo
The context in which executive privilege is
Neri to appear and testify again on 20
being invoked is that the information sought
November 2007 before the Joint
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic
Committees you chair, it will be recalled that
as well as economic relations with the
Sec. Neri had already testified and
People's Republic of China. Given the
exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN
confidential nature in which these
project, including his conversation with the
information were conveyed to the President,
President thereon last 26 September 2007.
he cannot provide the Committee any further
details of these conversations, without
Asked to elaborate further on his disclosing the very thing the privilege is
conversation with the President, Sec. Neri designed to protect.
asked for time to consult with his superiors
in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court
In light of the above considerations, this
in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006).
Office is constrained to invoke the settled
doctrine of executive privilege as refined
Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised
the possible invocation of executive privilege Secretary Neri accordingly.
on the following questions, to wit:
Considering that Sec. Neri has been
a) Whether the President followed lengthily interrogated on the subject in an
up the (NBN) project? unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he
has answered all questions propounded to
b) Were you dictated to prioritize him except the foregoing questions involving
the ZTE? executive privilege, we therefore request
that his testimony on 20 November 2007 on
c) Whether the President said to the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed with.
go ahead and approve the project
after being told about the alleged On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear
bribe? before respondent Committees. Thus, on November
22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the requiring him to explain why he should not be cited
foregoing questions fall under conversations in contempt. The Letter reads:
and correspondence between the President
and public officials which are considered Since you have failed to appear in the said
executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, hearing, the Committees on Accountability
G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue
G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining the Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National

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 Defense and Security require you to show In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by
cause why you should not be cited in his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating,
contempt under Section 6, Article 6 of the among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-
Rules of the Committee on Accountability of appearance was upon the order of the President;
Public Officers and Investigations (Blue and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt
Ribbon). with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the
The Senate expects your explanation on or bribery scandal involving high government officials
before 2 December 2007. and the possible loss of confidence of foreign
investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter
ended with a reiteration of petitioner's request that
On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to
he "be furnished in advance" as to what else he
respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not
needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare
his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that
for the hearing.
he thought the only remaining questions were those
he claimed to be covered by executive privilege,
thus: In the interim, on December 7, 2007, petitioner filed
with this Court the present petition
for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated
It was not my intention to snub the last
November 22, 2007.
Senate hearing. In fact, I have cooperated
with the task of the Senate in its inquiry in
aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11 Respondent Committees found petitioner's
hours stay during the hearing on 26 explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to
September 2007. During said hearing, I his request for advance notice of the matters that he
answered all the questions that were asked should still clarify, they issued the Order dated
of me, save for those which I thought was January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of
covered by executive privilege, and which respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and
was confirmed by the Executive Secretary in detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-
his Letter 15 November 2007. In good faith, Arms until such time that he would appear and give
after that exhaustive testimony, I thought his testimony. The said Order states:
that what remained were only the three
questions, where the Executive Secretary ORDER
claimed executive privilege. Hence, his
request that my presence be dispensed For failure to appear and testify in the
with. Committee's hearing on Tuesday,
September 18, 2007; Thursday, September
Be that as it may, should there be new 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and
matters that were not yet taken up during Tuesday, November 20, 2007, despite
the 26 September 2007 hearing, may I be personal notice and Subpoenas Ad
furnished in advance as to what else I need Testificandum sent to and received by him,
to clarify, so that as a resource person, I which thereby delays, impedes and
may adequately prepare myself. obstructs, as it has in fact delayed, impeded
and obstructed the inquiry into the subject
reported irregularities, AND for failure to
explain satisfactorily why he should not be
cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29
November 2007), herein
attached) ROMULO L. NERI is hereby
cited in contempt of this (sic)
Committees and ordered arrested and
detained in the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he
will appear and give his testimony.

The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to

carry out and implement this Order and

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 make a return hereof within twenty four (24) and Employees, and Section 2413 (e) of Rule 130 of
hours from its enforcement. the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED. Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They

argue that (1) petitioner's testimony is material and
On the same date, petitioner moved for the pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of
reconsideration of the above Order.9 He insisted that legislation; (2) there is no valid justification for
he has not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no
of contempt and arrest." He emphasized his abuse of their authority to order petitioner's arrest;
willingness to testify on new matters, however, and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean
respondent Committees did not respond to his hands.
request for advance notice of questions. He also
mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on In the oral argument held last March 4, 2008, the
December 7, 2007. According to him, this should following issues were ventilated:
restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the
show cause Letter "through the issuance of 1. What communications between the
declaration of contempt" and arrest. President and petitioner Neri are covered by
the principle of 'executive privilege'?
In view of respondent Committees' issuance of the
contempt Order, petitioner filed on February 1, 2008 1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita
a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent correctly invoke the principle of
Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking executive privilege, by order of the
to restrain the implementation of the said contempt President, to cover (i) conversations
Order. of the President in the exercise of
her executive and policy decision-
On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo making and (ii) information, which
Ante Order (a) enjoining respondent Committees might impair our diplomatic as well
from implementing their contempt Order, (b) as economic relations with the
requiring the parties to observe the status quo People's Republic of China?
prevailing prior to the issuance of the assailed order,
and (c) requiring respondent Committees to file their 1.b. Did petitioner Neri
comment. correctly invoke executive privilege
to avoid testifying on his
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees' conversations with the President on
show cause Letter and contempt Order were issued the NBN contract on his assertions
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or that the said conversations "dealt
excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his with delicate and sensitive
conversations with President Arroyo are "candid national security and diplomatic
discussions meant to explore options in making matters relating to the impact of
policy decisions." According to him, these bribery scandal involving high
discussions "dwelt on the impact of the bribery government officials and the
scandal involving high government officials on possible loss of confidence of
the country's diplomatic relations and economic foreign investors and lenders in
and military affairs and the possible loss of the Philippines" x x x within the
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in principles laid down in Senate v.
the Philippines." He also emphasizes that his claim Ermita (488 SCRA 1 [2006])?
of executive privilege is upon the order of the
President and within the parameters laid down 1.c Will the claim of executive
in Senate v. Ermita10 and United States v. privilege in this case violate the
Reynolds.  Lastly, he argues that he is precluded
11
following provisions of the
from disclosing communications made Constitution:

to him in official confidence under Section 7 12 of

Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials

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 Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public On March 17, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor
disclosure of all transactions General (OSG) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene
involving public interest) and to Admit Attached Memorandum, founded on
the following arguments:
Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of
the people to information on (1) The communications between petitioner
matters of public concern) and the President are covered by the
principle of "executive privilege."
Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office
is a public trust) (2) Petitioner was not summoned by
respondent Senate Committees in
Sec. 17, Art. VII (The accordance with the law-making body's
President shall ensure that power to conduct inquiries in aid of
the laws be faithfully legislation as laid down in Section 21, Article
executed) VI of the Constitution and Senate v. Ermita.

and the due process clause and the (3) Respondent Senate Committees gravely
principle of separation of powers? abused its discretion for alleged non-
compliance with the Subpoena dated
November 13, 2007.
2. What is the proper procedure to be
followed in invoking executive privilege?
The Court granted the OSG's motion the next day,
March 18, 2008.
3. Did the Senate Committees gravely
abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest
of petitioner for non-compliance with the As the foregoing facts unfold, related events
subpoena? transpired.

After the oral argument, the parties were directed to On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued
manifest to the Court within twenty-four (24) hours if Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive
they are amenable to the Court's proposal of Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108.
allowing petitioner to immediately resume his She advised executive officials and employees to
testimony before the Senate Committees to answer follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
the other questions of the Senators without prejudice and jurisprudence, including, among others, the
to the decision on the merits of this pending petition. case of Senate v. Ermita17 when they are invited to
It was understood that petitioner may invoke legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.
executive privilege in the course of the Senate
Committees proceedings, and if the respondent At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial
Committees disagree thereto, the unanswered queries, to wit:
questions will be the subject of a supplemental
pleading to be resolved along with the three (3) First, are the communications elicited by the
questions subject of the present petition.14 At the subject three (3) questions covered by
same time, respondent Committees were directed to executive privilege?
submit several pertinent documents.15
And second, did respondent Committees
The Senate did not agree with the proposal for the commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
reasons stated in the Manifestation dated March 5, the contempt Order?
2008. As to the required documents, the Senate and
respondent Committees manifested that they would We grant the petition.
not be able to submit the latter's "Minutes of all
meetings" and the "Minute Book" because it has
never been the "historical and traditional legislative At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case
practice to keep them."16 They instead submitted the of Senate v. Ermita18 becomes
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of respondent imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the
Committees' joint public hearings. distinction between

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the legislative and oversight powers of the as Chief Executive, such department heads
Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and 22, must give a report of their performance as a
respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: matter of duty. In such instances, Section
22, in keeping with the separation of powers,
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of states that Congress may only request their
Representatives or any of its respective appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of in which Congress requires their
legislation in accordance with its duly appearance is 'in aid of legislation' under
published rules of procedure. The rights of Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
persons appearing in or affected by such the same reasons stated in Arnault.
inquiries shall be respected.
In fine, the oversight function of
SECTION 22. The heads of department may Congress may be facilitated by
upon their own initiative, with the consent of compulsory process only to the extent
the President, or upon the request of either that it is performed in pursuit of
House, or as the rules of each House shall legislation. This is consistent with the intent
provide, appear before and be heard by discerned from the deliberations of the
such House on any matter pertaining to their Constitutional Commission
departments. Written questions shall be
submitted to the President of the Senate or Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel
the Speaker of the House of the appearance of executive officials under
Representatives at least three days before section 21 and the lack of it under Section
their scheduled appearance. Interpellations 22 find their basis in the principle of
shall not be limited to written questions, but separation of powers. While the executive
may cover matters related thereto. When the branch is a co-equal branch of the
security of the state or the public interest so legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
requires and the President so states in Congress to legislate by refusing to comply
writing, the appearance shall be conducted with its demands for information. (Emphasis
in executive session. supplied.)

Senate cautions that while the above provisions are The availability of the power of judicial review to
closely related and complementary to each other, resolve the issues raised in this case has also been
they should not be considered as pertaining to the settled in Senate v. Ermita, when it held:
same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its As evidenced by the American experience
aim is to elicit information that may be used for during the so-called "McCarthy era,"
legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to however, the right of Congress to conduct
the power to conduct a question hour, the objective inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no
of which is to obtain information in pursuit of less susceptible to abuse than executive or
Congress' oversight function.19 Simply stated, while judicial power. It may thus be subjected to
both powers allow Congress or any of its committees judicial review pursuant to the Court's
to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different. certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with
regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in Hence, this decision.
Section 21, Congress cannot compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 22. I
The Court's pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita20 is
clear:
The Communications Elicited by the Three (3)
Questions are Covered by Executive Privilege
When Congress merely seeks to be
informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has We start with the basic premises where the parties
issued, its right to such information is not as have conceded.
imperative as that of the President to whom,

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The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of conversations that take place in the President's
legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition performance of his official duties." It thus
that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or considered presidential communications as
effectively in the absence of information respecting "presumptively privileged." Apparently, the
the conditions which the legislation is intended to presumption is founded on the "President's
affect or change.21 Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the generalized interest in confidentiality." The
compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the
broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is candor of presidential advisors and to provide "the
imperative that it is done in accordance with the President and those who assist him… with
Senate or House duly published rules of procedure freedom to explore alternatives in the process of
and that the rights of the persons appearing in or shaping policies and making decisions and to do
affected by such inquiries be respected. so in a way many would be unwilling to express
except privately."
The power extends even to executive officials and
the only way for them to be exempted is through a In In Re: Sealed Case,30 the U.S. Court of Appeals
valid claim of executive privilege. 22 This directs us to delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of
the consideration of the question -- is there a executive privilege; one is the presidential
recognized claim of executive privilege despite communications privilege and, the other is the
the revocation of E.O. 464? deliberative process privilege. The former pertains
to "communications, documents or other
A- There is a Recognized Claim materials that reflect presidential decision-
of Executive Privilege Despite the making and deliberations and that the President
Revocation of E.O. 464 believes should remain confidential." The latter
includes 'advisory opinions, recommendations
and deliberations comprising part of a process
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the
by which governmental decisions and policies
revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish
are formulated."
our concept of executive privilege. This is because
this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
Unlike the United States which has further accorded Accordingly, they are characterized by marked
the concept with statutory status by enacting distinctions. Presidential communications
the Freedom of Information Act23 and the Federal privilege applies to decision-making of the
Advisory Committee Act,24 the Philippines has President while, the deliberative process
retained its constitutional origination, occasionally privilege, to decision-making of executive
interpreted only by this Court in various cases. The officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional
most recent of these is the case of Senate v. principle of separation of power and the President's
Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional unique constitutional role; the second on common
substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this regard, it is law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process
worthy to note that Executive Ermita's Letter dated privilege, the presidential communications
November 15, 2007 limits its bases for the claim of privilege applies to documents in their entirety,
executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. and covers final and post-decisional materials as
Vasquez,25 and Chavez v. PEA.26 There was never a well as pre-deliberative ones31 As a consequence,
mention of E.O. 464. congressional or judicial negation of
the presidential communications privilege is
always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of
While these cases, especially Senate v.
the deliberative process privilege.
Ermita,27 have comprehensively discussed the
concept of executive privilege, we deem it imperative
to explore it once more in view of the clamor for this Turning on who are the officials covered by
Court to clearly define the communications covered the presidential communications privilege, In Re:
by executive privilege. Sealed Case confines the privilege only to White
House Staff that has "operational proximity" to direct
presidential decision-making. Thus, the privilege is
The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established
meant to encompass only those functions that form
the broad contours of the presidential
the core of presidential authority, involving what the
communications privilege.28 In United States v.
court characterized as "quintessential and non-
Nixon,29 the U.S. Court recognized a great public
delegable Presidential power," such as commander-
interest in preserving "the confidentiality of

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in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the was formed confining it to a small number of
power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole- members. To admit, then, a right in the
authority to receive ambassadors and other public House of Representatives to demand and to
officers, the power to negotiate treaties, etc.32 have as a matter of course all the papers
respecting a negotiation with a foreign
The situation in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of power would be to establish a dangerous
Justice33 tested the In Re: Sealed Case principles. precedent.
There, while the presidential decision involved is the
exercise of the President's pardon power, a non- Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their
delegable, core-presidential function, the Deputy way in our jurisdiction. In Chavez v. PCGG38, this
Attorney General and the Pardon Attorney were Court held that there is a "governmental privilege
deemed to be too remote from the President and his against public disclosure with respect to state
senior White House advisors to be protected. The secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
Court conceded that security matters." In Chavez v. PEA,39 there is also a
recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential
functionally those officials were performing a task conversations, correspondences, and discussions in
directly related to the President's pardon power, but closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita,
concluded that an organizational test was more the concept of presidential communications
appropriate for confining the potentially broad sweep privilege is fully discussed.
that would result from the In Re: Sealed
Case's functional test. The majority concluded that, As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the
the lesser protections of the deliberative process claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
privilege would suffice. That privilege was, however, cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
found insufficient to justify the confidentiality of the textually committed by the Constitution to the
4,341 withheld documents. President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is
But more specific classifications of communications the repository of the commander-in-
covered by executive privilege are made in older chief,40 appointing,41 pardoning,42 and
cases. Courts ruled early that the Executive has a diplomatic43 powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
right to withhold documents that might separation of powers, the information relating to
reveal military or state secrets,34 identity of these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
government informers in some others.
circumstances,,35 and information related to
pending investigations.36 An area where the The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed
privilege is highly revered is in foreign relations. Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.37 the elements of presidential communications
U.S. Court, citing President George Washington, privilege, to wit:
pronounced:
1) The protected communication must relate
The nature of foreign negotiations requires to a "quintessential and non-delegable
caution, and their success must often presidential power."
depend on secrecy, and even when brought
to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the 2) The communication must be authored or
measures, demands, or eventual "solicited and received" by a close advisor of
concessions which may have been the President or the President himself. The
proposed or contemplated would be judicial test is that an advisor must be in
extremely impolitic, for this might have a "operational proximity" with the President.
pernicious influence on future negotiations
or produce immediate inconveniences,
perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to
other powers. The necessity of such caution
and secrecy was one cogent reason for
vesting the power of making treaties in the
President, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, the principle on which the body

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 3) The presidential communications Presidential privilege of immunity from
privilege remains a qualified privilege that judicial process under all circumstances.
may be overcome by a showing of adequate
need, such that the information sought The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case
"likely contains important evidence" and by of Nixon v. Sirica,46 where it was held
the unavailability of the information that presidential communications are
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating presumptively privileged and that the presumption
authority.44 can be overcome only by mere showing of public
need by the branch seeking access to
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve
premised his claim of executive privilege on the the competing interests of the political branches of
ground that the communications elicited by the three the government "in the manner that preserves the
(3) questions "fall under conversation and essential functions of each Branch."47 Here, the
correspondence between the President and public record is bereft of any categorical explanation from
officials" necessary in "her executive and policy respondent Committees to show a compelling or
decision-making process" and, that "the information citical need for the answers to the three (3)
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the
as well as economic relations with the People's questions veer more towards the exercise of the
Republic of China." Simply put, the bases legislative oversight function under Section 22 of
are presidential communications privilege and Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same
executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the "the
or foreign relations. oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, extent that it is performed in pursuit of
indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) legislation." It is conceded that it is difficult to draw
questions are covered by the presidential the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and
communications privilege. First, the an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of
communications relate to a "quintessential and non- Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the
delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to content of the questions and the manner the inquiry
enter into an executive agreement with other is conducted.
countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence Respondent Committees argue that a claim of
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized executive privilege does not guard against a
in Philippine jurisprudence.45 Second, the possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We
communications are "received" by a close advisor of see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States
the President. Under the "operational proximity" test, v. Nixon48 that "demonstrated, specific need for
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a evidence in pending criminal trial" outweighs the
member of President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, President's "generalized interest in confidentiality."
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need However, the present case's distinction with
that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon, there is a
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by pending criminal proceeding where the information is
an appropriate investigating authority. requested and it is the demands of due process of
law and the fair administration of criminal justice that
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion. the information be disclosed. This is the reason why
the U.S. Court was quick to "limit the scope of its
decision." It stressed that it is "not concerned here
United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive
with the balance between the President's
privilege is subject to balancing against other
generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and
interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive
congressional demands for information." Unlike
privilege is not absolutely protected by the
in Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a
Constitution. The U.S. Court held:
criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In
this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the
[N]either the doctrine of separation of validity of the claim of executive privilege depends
powers, nor the need for confidentiality of not only on the ground invoked but, also, on
high-level communications, without more, the procedural setting or the context in which the
can sustain an absolute, unqualified

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claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President responsible fulfillment of the
did not interpose any claim of need to protect Committee's functions.
military, diplomatic or sensitive national security
secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary In its initial briefs here, the Committee
Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the argued that it has shown exactly this. It
grounds of presidential communications contended that resolution, on the basis of
privilege in relation to her executive and policy the subpoenaed tapes, of the conflicts in the
decision-making process and diplomatic secrets. testimony before it 'would aid in a
determination whether legislative
The respondent Committees should cautiously tread involvement in political campaigns is
into the investigation of matters which may present a necessary' and 'could help engender the
conflict of interest that may provide a ground to public support needed for basic reforms in
inhibit the Senators participating in the inquiry if later our electoral system.' Moreover, Congress
on an impeachment proceeding is initiated on the has, according to the Committee, power to
same subject matter of the present Senate inquiry. oversee the operations of the executive
Pertinently, in Senate Select Committee on branch, to investigate instances of possible
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,49 it was corruption and malfeasance in office, and to
held that since an impeachment proceeding had expose the results of its investigations to
been initiated by a House Committee, the Senate public view. The Committee says that with
Select Committee's immediate oversight need for respect to Watergate-related matters, this
five presidential tapes should give way to the House power has been delegated to it by the
Judiciary Committee which has the constitutional Senate, and that to exercise its power
authority to inquire into presidential impeachment. responsibly, it must have access to the
The Court expounded on this issue in this wise: subpoenaed tapes.

It is true, of course, that the Executive We turn first to the latter contention. In the
cannot, any more than the other branches of circumstances of this case, we need neither
government, invoke a general confidentiality deny that the Congress may have, quite
privilege to shield its officials and employees apart from its legislative responsibilities, a
from investigations by the proper general oversight power, nor explore what
governmental institutions into possible the lawful reach of that power might be
criminal wrongdoing. The Congress learned under the Committee's constituent
this as to its own privileges in Gravel v. resolution. Since passage of that resolution,
United States, as did the judicial branch, in a the House Committee on the Judiciary has
sense, in Clark v. United States, and the begun an inquiry into presidential
executive branch itself in Nixon v. impeachment. The investigative authority of
Sirica. But under Nixon v. Sirica, the the Judiciary Committee with respect to
showing required to overcome the presidential conduct has an express
presumption favoring confidentiality constitutional source. x x x We have been
turned, not on the nature of the presidential shown no evidence indicating that
conduct that the subpoenaed material might Congress itself attaches any particular
reveal, but, instead, on the nature and value to this interest. In these
appropriateness of the function in the circumstances, we think the need for the
performance of which the material was tapes premised solely on an asserted
sought, and the degree to which the power to investigate and inform cannot
material was necessary to its fulfillment. justify enforcement of the Committee's
Here also our task requires and our subpoena.
decision implies no judgment whatever
concerning possible presidential The sufficiency of the Committee's showing
involvement in culpable activity. On the of need has come to depend, therefore,
contrary, we think the sufficiency of the entirely on whether the subpoenaed
Committee's showing must depend materials are critical to the performance of
solely on whether the subpoenaed its legislative functions. There is a clear
evidence is demonstrably critical to the difference between Congress' legislative
tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury,

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 or any institution engaged in like The right of the people to information on
functions. While fact-finding by a matters of public concern shall be
legislative committee is undeniably a part recognized. Access to official records, and
of its task, legislative judgments to documents, and papers pertaining to
normally depend more on the predicted official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
consequences of proposed legislative well as to government research data used
actions and their political acceptability, as basis for policy development, shall be
than on precise reconstruction of past afforded the citizen, subject to such
events; Congress frequently legislates on limitations as may be provided by law.
the basis of conflicting information provided
in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility The provision itself expressly provides the limitation,
of the grand jury turns entirely on its ability i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these
to determine whether there is probable laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
cause to believe that certain named 6713,51 Article 22952 of the Revised Penal Code,
individuals did or did not commit specific Section 3 (k)53 of R.A. No. 3019, and Section
crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica, 24(e)54 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These are
one of those crimes is perjury concerning in addition to what our body of jurisprudence
the content of certain conversations, the classifies as confidential55 and what our Constitution
grand jury's need for the most precise considers as belonging to the larger concept of
evidence, the exact text of oral statements executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized
recorded in their original form, is public interest in the confidentiality of certain
undeniable. We see no comparable need information. We find the information subject of this
in the legislative process, at least not in case belonging to such kind.
the circumstances of this case. Indeed,
whatever force there might once have been More than anything else, though, the right of
in the Committee's argument that the Congress or any of its Committees to obtain
subpoenaed materials are necessary to its information in aid of legislation cannot be equated
legislative judgments has been substantially with the people's right to public information. The
undermined by subsequent events. former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is
(Emphasis supplied) an exercise of the people's right to information. The
distinction between such rights is laid down
Respondent Committees further contend that the in Senate v. Ermita:
grant of petitioner's claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions
the people to information on matters of public between the right of Congress to information
concern.50 We might have agreed with such which underlies the power of inquiry and the
contention if petitioner did not appear before them at right of people to information on matters of
all. But petitioner made himself available to them public concern. For one, the demand of a
during the September 26 hearing, where he was citizen for the production of documents
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he pursuant to his right to information does not
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more have the same obligatory force as
questions from the Senators, with the exception only a subpoena duces tecum issued by
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege. Congress. Neither does the right to
information grant a citizen the power to
The right to public information, like any other right, is exact testimony from government officials.
subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides: These powers belong only to Congress, not
to an individual citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of

representatives elected by the people, it
does not follow, except in a highly
qualified sense, that in every exercise of
its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.

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The members of respondent Committees should not People's Republic of China. Given the
invoke as justification in their exercise of power a confidential nature in which these
right properly belonging to the people in general. information were conveyed to the President,
This is because when they discharge their power, he cannot provide the Committee any further
they do so as public officials and members of details of these conversations, without
Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information disclosing the very thing the privilege is
must be balanced with and should give way, in designed to protect.
appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts
particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, 59 the
executive-legislative powers and privileges which is Congress must not require the executive to state the
the subject of careful review by numerous decided reasons for the claim with such particularity as to
cases. compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of
B- The Claim of Executive Privilege respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.
is Properly Invoked
II
We now proceed to the issue -- whether the claim
is properly invoked by the Respondent Committees Committed Grave
President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim Abuse of Discretion
to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim in Issuing the Contempt Order
of privilege, lodged by the head of the department
which has control over the matter." 56 A formal and Grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious
proper claim of executive privilege requires a and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
"precise and certain reason" for preserving their to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the
confidentiality.57 power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to
Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
states that "this Office is constrained to invoke contemplation of law."60
the settled doctrine of executive privilege as
refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised
Secretary Neri accordingly." Obviously, he is
referring to the Office of the President. That is more
than enough compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less
categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.

With regard to the existence of "precise and certain

reason," we find the grounds relied upon by
Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as
not "to leave respondent Committees in the dark on
how the requested information could be classified as
privileged." The case of Senate v. Ermita only
requires that an allegation be made "whether the
information demanded involves military or diplomatic
secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc." The
particular ground must only be specified. The
enumeration is not even intended to be
comprehensive."58 The following statement of
grounds satisfies the requirement:

The context in which executive privilege is

being invoked is that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic
as well as economic relations with the

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It must be reiterated that when respondent deliberation. 61 Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure
Committees issued the show cause Letter dated Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides
November 22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately, that:
manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the
Senate hearing and that he thought the only "The Committee, by a vote of majority of
remaining questions were the three (3) questions he all its members, may punish for contempt
claimed to be covered by executive privilege. In any witness before it who disobeys any
addition thereto, he submitted Atty. Bautista's letter, order of the Committee or refuses to be
stating that his non-appearance was upon the order sworn or to testify or to answer proper
of the President and specifying the reasons why his questions by the Committee or any of its
conversations with President Arroyo are covered by members."
executive privilege. Both correspondences
include an expression of his willingness to Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the
testify again, provided he "be furnished in members of the Committee. Apparently, members
advance" copies of the questions. Without who did not actually participate in the deliberation
responding to his request for advance list of were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there
questions, respondent Committees issued the Order is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt
dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of Order dated January 30, 2008. We quote the
respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and pertinent portion of the transcript, thus:
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-
Arms until such time that he would appear and give
his testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A).
for reconsideration, informing respondent For clarification. x x x The Chair will call
Committees that he had filed the present petition either a caucus or will ask the Committee
for certiorari. on Rules if there is a problem. Meaning, if
we do not have the sufficient numbers.
But if we have a sufficient number, we
Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of will just hold a caucus to be able to
discretion in issuing the contempt Order in view of implement that right away because…
five (5) reasons. Again, our Rules provide that any one
held in contempt and ordered arrested,
First, there being a legitimate claim of executive need the concurrence of a majority of all
privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers members of the said committee and we
from constitutional infirmity. have three committees conducting this.

Second, respondent Committees did not comply So thank you very much to the members…
with the requirement laid down in Senate v.
Ermita that the invitations should contain the SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman.
"possible needed statute which prompted the need
for the inquiry," along with "the usual indication of
the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO,A).
and in furtherance thereof." Compliance with this May I recognize the Minority Leader and
requirement is imperative, both under Sections 21 give him the floor, Senator Pimentel.
and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be
so to ensure that the rights of both SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, there is
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry no problem, I think, with consulting the
are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and other committees. But I am of the opinion
by virtue of the express language of Section 22. that the Blue Ribbon Committee is the
Unfortunately, despite petitioner's repeated lead committee, and therefore, it should
demands, respondent Committees did not send him have preference in enforcing its own
an advance list of questions. decisions. Meaning to say, it is not
something that is subject to consultation
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent with other committees. I am not sure that
Committees' January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals is the right interpretation. I think that
that only a minority of the members of the Senate once we decide here, we enforce what we
Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the decide, because otherwise, before we

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know it, our determination is watered signatures that will follow by the additional
down by delay and, you know, the so- members will only tend to strengthen the
called "consultation" that inevitably will determination of this Committee to put its
have to take place if we follow the foot forward – put down on what is
premise that has been explained. happening in this country, Mr. Chairman,
because it really looks terrible if the primary
So my suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is the Blue Committee of the Senate, which is the Blue
Ribbon Committee should not forget it's the Ribbon Committee, cannot even sanction
lead committee here, and therefore, the will people who openly defy, you know, the
of the lead committee prevails over all the summons of this Committee. I know that the
other, you, know reservations that other Chair is going through an agonizing moment
committees might have who are only here. I know that. But nonetheless, I think
secondary or even tertiary committees, Mr. we have to uphold, you know, the institution
Chairman. that we are representing because the
alternative will be a disaster for all of us, Mr.
Chairman. So having said that, I'd like to
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO,
reiterate my point.
A.) Thank you very much to the Minority
Leader. And I agree with the wisdom of his
statements. I was merely mentioning that THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO,
under Section 6 of the Rules of the A.) First of all, I agree 100 percent with the
Committee and under Section 6, "The intentions of the Minority Leader. But let me
Committee by a vote of a majority of all its very respectfully disagree with the legal
members may punish for contempt any requirements. Because, yes, we can have
witness before it who disobeys any order of a hearing if we are only two but both
the Committee." under Section 18 of the Rules of the
Senate and under Section 6 of the Rules
of the Blue Ribbon Committee, there is a
So the Blue Ribbon Committee is more than
need for a majority of all members if it is
willing to take that responsibility. But we
a case of contempt and arrest. So, I am
only have six members here today, I am
simply trying to avoid the court rebuking the
the seventh as chair and so we have not
Committee, which will instead of
met that number. So I am merely stating
strengthening will weaken us. But I do
that, sir, that when we will prepare the
agree, Mr. Minority Leader, that we should
documentation, if a majority of all members
push for this and show the executive branch
sign and I am following the Sabio v. Gordon
that the well-decided – the issue has been
rule wherein I do believe, if I am not
decided upon the Sabio versus Gordon
mistaken, Chairman Gordon prepared the
case. And it's very clear that we are all
documentation and then either in caucus or
allowed to call witnesses. And if they refure
in session asked the other members to sign.
or they disobey not only can we cite them in
And once the signatures are obtained, solely
contempt and have them arrested. x x x 62
for the purpose that Secretary Neri or Mr.
Lozada will not be able to legally question
our subpoena as being insufficient in Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG
accordance with law. that respondent Committees likewise violated
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring
that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly
SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, the caution
published rules of procedure." We quote the
that the chair is suggesting is very well-
OSG's explanation:
taken. But I'd like to advert to the fact that
the quorum of the committee is only two as
far as I remember. Any two-member The phrase 'duly published rules of
senators attending a Senate committee procedure' requires the Senate of every
hearing provide that quorum, and therefore Congress to publish its rules of procedure
there is more than a quorum demanded by governing inquiries in aid of legislation
our Rules as far as we are concerned now, because every Senate is distinct from the
and acting as Blue Ribbon Committee, as one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
Senator Enrile pointed out. In any event, the elections are held every three (3) years for

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 one-half of the Senate's membership, the separation of powers is the mandate to observe
composition of the Senate also changes by respect to a co-equal branch of the government.
the end of each term. Each Senate may thus
enact a different set of rules as it may deem One last word.
fit. Not having published its Rules of
Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of The Court was accused of attempting to abandon its
legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, constitutional duty when it required the parties to
are therefore, procedurally infirm. consider a proposal that would lead to a possible
compromise. The accusation is far from the truth.
And fifth, respondent Committees' issuance of the The Court did so, only to test a tool that other
contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must jurisdictions find to be effective in settling similar
be pointed out that respondent Committees did cases, to avoid a piecemeal consideration of the
not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege questions for review and to avert a constitutional
and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they crisis between the executive and legislative
curtly dismissed his explanation as "unsatisfactory" branches of government.
and simultaneously issued the Order citing him in
contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and In United States v. American Tel. & Tel Co.,64 the
detention. court refrained from deciding the case because of its
desire to avoid a resolution that might disturb the
A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an balance of power between the two branches and
unwilling witness. He manifested several times his inaccurately reflect their true needs. Instead, it
readiness to testify before respondent Committees. remanded the record to the District Court for further
He refused to answer the three (3) questions proceedings during which the parties are required to
because he was ordered by the President to claim negotiate a settlement. In the subsequent case
executive privilege. It behooves respondent of United States v. American Tel. &Tel Co.,65 it was
Committees to first rule on the claim of executive held that "much of this spirit of compromise is
privilege and inform petitioner of their finding reflected in the generality of language found in the
thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing his Constitution." It proceeded to state:
explanation as "unsatisfactory." Undoubtedly,
respondent Committees' actions constitute grave Under this view, the coordinate branches do
abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for not exist in an exclusively adversary
denying petitioner due process of law. The same relationship to one another when a conflict in
quality afflicted their conduct when they (a) authority arises. Rather each branch should
disregarded petitioner's motion for reconsideration take cognizance of an implicit constitutional
alleging that he had filed the present petition before mandate to seek optimal accommodation
this Court and (b) ignored petitioner's repeated through a realistic evaluation of the needs of
request for an advance list of questions, if there be the conflicting branches in the particular fact
any aside from the three (3) questions as to which situation.
he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.
It thereafter concluded that: "The Separation of
Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of
the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with dispatch and the immediate functioning of
utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing government. It is the long-term staying power of
the same for correction and preservation of the government that is enhanced by the mutual
dignity of the court, not for retaliation or accommodation required by the separation of
vindication.63 Respondent Committees should have powers."
exercised the same restraint, after all petitioner is
not even an ordinary witness. He holds a high
position in a co-equal branch of government. In rendering this decision, the Court emphasizes
once more that the basic principles of constitutional
law cannot be subordinated to the needs of a
In this regard, it is important to mention that many particular situation. As magistrates, our mandate is
incidents of judicial review could have been avoided to rule objectively and dispassionately, always
if powers are discharged with circumspection and mindful of Mr. Justice Holmes' warning on the
deference. Concomitant with the doctrine of dangers inherent in cases of this nature, thus:

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 "some accident of immediate and
overwhelming interest…appeals to the -versus-
feelings and distorts the judgment. These TEMPORA
immediate interests exercise a kind of
Hon. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her
hydraulic pressure which makes what
ORDER
previously was clear seem doubtful, and
before which even well settled principles of capacity as Secretary, Department of
law will bend."66
Justice, RICARDO V. PARAS III, in
In this present crusade to "search for truth," we
should turn to the fundamental constitutional his capacity as Chief State Counsel,
principles which underlie our tripartite system of
government, where the Legislature enacts the law, Department of Justice and RICARDO
the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive
implements it. They are considered separate, co- A. DAVID, JR., in his capacity as
equal, coordinate and supreme within their
respective spheres but, imbued with a system of
checks and balances to prevent unwarranted Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration,
exercise of power. The Court's mandate is to
preserve these constitutional principles at all times to Respondents.
keep the political branches of government within
constitutional bounds in the exercise of their X- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -X
respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in TO: Hon. LEILA M. DE LIMASecretary  
the search for truth. This is the only way we can
preserve the stability of our democratic institutions RICARDO V. PARAS III
and uphold the Rule of Law.
Chief State Counsel
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The subject Order dated January 30,
Department of Justice (DOJ)
2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of
the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and
detention, is hereby nullified. Padre Faura St., Ermita, Manila

SO ORDERED. RICARDO A. DAVID, JR.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,Petitioner, Commissioner

G.R. No. 199034

-versus- Bureau of Immigration (BOI)

Hon. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her 2nd Floor BOI Building

capacity as Secretary of the Department Magallanes Drive, Intramuros, Manila

of Justice and RICARDO A. DAVID, GREETINGS:

JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, on November 15,
2011, adopted a resolution in the above-entitled
cases, to wit:
the Bureau of Immigration,

G.R. No. 199034 (Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs. Hon.

Respondents.
Leila M. De Lima, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice and Ricardo A. David, Jr., in
X- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -X his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO,Petitioner, G.R. No. 199046
Immigration) and G.R. No. 199046 (Jose Miguel T.

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Arroyo vs. Hon. Leila M. de Lima, in her capacity as The Court further Resolved to NOTE the
Secretary, Department of Justice, Ricardo V. Paras
III, in his capacity as Chief State Counsel, (a) Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion dated
Department of Justice and Ricardo A. David, Jr., in November 9, 2011 filed by the Office of the Solicitor
his capacity as Commissioner, Bureau of General (OSG) for respondents Hon. Leila M. De
Immigration).- Acting on the Special Civil Actions for Lima, in her official capacity as Secretary of the
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Department of Justice and Ricardo A. David, Jr., in
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and mindful of the Immigration in G.R. No. 199034;
underlying issues in the cases—the right to life
(which is the highest right under the Constitution) (b) Manifestation and Motion dated November 10,
and its supporting rights, including the right to travel 2011 filed by the OSG for respondents Hon. Leila M.
—the Court Resolved to De Lima and Ricardo A. David, Jr. in G.R. No.
199034;
(a) CONSOLIDATE the above-entitled cases;
(c) Supplemental Petition dated November 13, 2011
(b) REQUIRE the respondents to COMMENT on the filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 199034;
consolidated petitions NOT LATER THAN
NOVEMBER 18, 2011; (d) Comment/Opposition (on/to the Very Urgent
Manifestation and Motion dated November 9, 2011)
(c) ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING dated November 14, 2011 filed by counsel for
ORDER in the consolidated petitions, enjoining the petitioner in G.R. No. 199034;
respondents from enforcing or implementing DOJ
Department Circular No. 41 and Watchlist Order (e) Very Urgent Manifestation and Motion dated
Nos. ASM-11-237 dated August 9, 2011, 2011-422 November 9, 2011 filed by the OSG for respondents
dated September 6, 2011 and 2011-573 dated Hon. Leila M. de Lima, in her capacity as Secretary
October 27, 2011, subject to the following of the Department of Justice, Ricardo V. Paras III, in
conditions: his capacity as Chief State Counsel and Ricardo A.
David, Jr., in his capacity as Commissioner of the
(i) The petitioners shall post a cash bond of Two Bureau of Immigration in G.R. No. 199046; and
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) payable to this Court
within five (5) days from notice hereof. Failure to (f) Urgent Manifestation filed by counsel for
post the bond within the aforesaid period will result petitioner in G.R. No. 199046.
in the automatic lifting of the temporary restraining
order;
The temporary restraining order shall be immediately
executory. Justices Antonio T. Carpio and
(ii) The petitioners shall appoint a legal Bienvenido L. Reyes have reserved the right to
representative common to both of them who will submit their dissenting opinions. Leonardo-De
receive subpoena, orders and other legal processes Castro, J., on official business. Del Castillo, J., on
on their behalf during their absence. The petitioners official leave. (adv156 & 157)
shall submit the name of the legal representative,
also within five (5) days from notice hereof; and
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court, You,
(iii) If there is a Philippine embassy or consulate in Respondents, your agents, representatives, or
the place where they will be traveling, the petitioners persons acting in your place or stead, are
shall inform said embassy or consulate by personal hereby ENJOINED from enforcing or implementing
appearance or by phone of their whereabouts at all DOJ Department Circular No. 41 and Watchlist
times; and Order Nos. ASM-11-237 dated August 9, 2011,
2011-422 dated September 6, 2011 and 2011-573
(d) SET the consolidated cases for ORAL dated October 27, 2011.
ARGUMENTS on November 22, 2011, Tuesday, at
2:00 p.m. at the New Session Hall, New Supreme GIVEN by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, this
Court Building, Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila. 15th day of November 2011.

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ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL There are also restrictions on the right to travel
imposed on government officials and employees.
Clerk of Court For example, Office of the Court Administrator
Circular No. 49-2003(B) requires judges and court
personnel “to secure a travel authority from the
By:
Office of the Court Administrator” before they can
travel abroad even during their approved leave of
FELIPA B. ANAMA absence or free time. This restriction to travel abroad
is imposed even in the absence of a law.
Deputy Clerk of Court En Banc
In the present case, petitioners are already
——————————————————————— undergoing preliminary investigation in several
————————————————– criminal cases, and charges may be filed before the
courts while petitioners are abroad. In fairness to the
EN BANC Government which is tasked with the prosecution of
crimes, this Court must hear first the Government in
G.R. No. 199034 — GLORIA MACAPAGAL- oral argument before deciding on the temporary
ARROYO, Petitioner, v. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, restraining order which if issued could frustrate the
in her capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET Government’s right to prosecute. The Government
AL., Respondents. must be heard on how the charges against
petitioners could proceed while petitioners are
abroad.
G.R. No. 199046 — JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO,
Petitioner, v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, in
her capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET Accordingly, I vote to (1) defer action on petitioners’
AL., Respondents. prayer for a temporary restraining order, (2) require
respondents to file their Comments on or before 21
November 2011, (3) hold oral arguments on 22
Promulgated:
November 2011 at 2 o’clock in the afternoon, and (4)
decide whether to issue a temporary restraining
November 15, 2011 order immediately upon the conclusion of the oral
arguments.
x
——————————————————————— ANTONIO T. CARPIO
——————–x
Associate Justice
DISSENTING OPINION
———————————————————————
CARPIO, J.: ————————————————–

I vote to defer  action on petitioners’ prayer for a EN BANC

temporary restraining order until after the
Government files its Comment and after oral
G.R. No. 199034 – GLORIA MACAPAGAL –
arguments are heard on the matter. This should take
ARROYO, Petitioner, v. HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA,
not more than five working days, which is brief
in her capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET
enough so as not to prejudice petitioners in any way.
AL., Respondents.
While the right to travel is a constitutional right that
may be impaired only “in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, as may be G.R. No. 199046 – JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO,
provided by law,” there are recognized exceptions Petitioner, v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, in
other than those created by law. Foremost is the her capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET
restriction on the right to travel of persons charged of AL., Respondents.
crimes before the courts. Another is the restriction
on persons subpoenaed or ordered arrested by the Promulgated:
Senate or House of Representatives pursuant to
their power of legislative inquiry. November 15, 2011

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x nullity of the ordinance. If the court should issue the
——————————————————————— desired writ, premised on that sole justification
——————–x therefor of [the] petitioner, it would be a virtual
acceptance of his claim that the imposition is
DISSENTING OPINION patently invalid or, at the very least, that the
ordinance is of doubtful validity. There would, in
effect, be a prejudgment of the main case and a
REYES, J.:
reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it
would assume the proposition which the petitioner is
I DISAGREE with the majority’s decision to issue a inceptively duty bound to prove.
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the
enforcement of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)
Furthermore, such action will run counter to the well
Department Circular No. 411, Watchlist Order2 dated
settled rule that laws are presumed to be valid
August 9, 2011, Amended Order 3 dated September
unless and until the courts declare the contrary in
6, 2011, and Watchlist Order4 dated October 27,
clear and unequivocal terms. A court should issue a
2011.
writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner
assailing a statute has made out a case of
It is well-settled, to the point of being axiomatic, that unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to
any injunctive relief will not be issued if it will result overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption
to a premature disposition or a prejudgment of the of validity, aside from a showing of a clear legal right
case on its merits. Also, any application for the to the remedy sought.8 x x x.
restraint on the performance of an act will not be
given due course if it will presume the validity of
In ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. v. Hon.
petitioners’ claims, relieving them of the burden of
Purisima, et al.,9 this Court extended the
proving the same. In Boncodin v. National Power
presumption of validity accorded to legislative
Corporation,5 this Court reversed the trial court’s
issuances to rules and regulations issued by
issuance of an injunctive writ that caused the burden
administrative agencies:
of proof to shift from the claimant to the defendant:

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative

By issuing a writ premised on that sole justification,
agencies to implement and interpret the law which
the trial court in effect sustained respondent’s claim
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
that [the] petitioner and Auditor Dissenting Opinion 2
and are entitled to respect. Such rules and
G.R. No. 199034 & 199046 Cabibihan had exceeded
regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are
their authority in ordering the suspension of the
just as binding as if they have been written in the
implementation of the step increments; and that the
statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect
suspension was patently invalid or, at the very least,
of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality
that the memorandum and circular were of doubtful
and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
validity. Thus, the lower court prejudged the main
appropriate case by a competent court.10 (citations
case and reversed the rule on the burden of proof,
omitted)
because it assumed to be true the very proposition
that respondent-complainant in the RTC was
dutybound to prove in the first place.6 Consistent with the foregoing, the assailed
Department Circular No. 41 and the Watchlist
Orders issued thereunder enjoy such presumption of
Similarly, in Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First
constitutionality and regularity; the Watchlist Orders
Instance of Isabela, Branch II, et al.7, this Court
were in accordance with the provisions of
observed the same principle and emphatically stated
Department Circular No. 41 which, itself, was issued
that an injunctive relief will not issue if the applicant’s
in the performance of the DOJ’s mandate under
allegations fall short of overcoming the presumption
Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section 1, Chapter
of validity in favor of the law:
I, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292,
otherwise known as the “Administrative Code of
Equally pertinent is the rule that courts should avoid 1987” to “administer the criminal justice system in
issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which, in accordance with the accepted processes thereof.”
effect, would dispose of the main case without trial. (See Department Circular Nos. 17 and 18, the
In the present case, it is evident that the only ground predecessors of Department Circular No. 41). It is
relied upon for injunction relief is the alleged patent incumbent upon the petitioners to prove that the

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assailed issuances are unconstitutional: that The contrary clearly obtains in this case. The
Department Circular No. 41 was issued outside the petitioner Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) is subject
confines of the Administrative Code, or the of a preliminary investigation in three (3) cases
Administrative Code does not authorize the DOJ to pending before the DOJ: (a) Danilo Lihayhay v.
issue such a Circular, or that the performance of its Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Docket No. XVI-INV-10H-
functions under the Administrative Code does not 00251);  (b) Francisco I. Chavez v. Gloria
justify the imposition of such a restraint. Regrettably, Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. (Docket No. XVIX-INV-
by issuing the TRO, thus, restraining the 11D-00170); and (c) Francisco I. Chavez v. Gloria
enforcement of the assailed issuances, this Court Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. (Docket No. XVI-INV-11F-
had effectively given credence to the petitioner’s 00238). She is likewise subject of a preliminary
claims against their validity, which, at this stage of investigation by DOJ-Commission on Elections
the proceedings, are mere allegations and no other. (COMELEC) Fact-Finding Committee for electoral
sabotage and violation of the Omnibus Election
I would likewise call the attention of the majority to Code in DOJ-COMELEC Fact Finding Committee v.
the August 23, 2011 Order issued by this Court in Abalos, Sr., et al. (DOJ-COMELEC Case No. 001-
G.R. No. 197854 entitled Jose Miguel T. Arroyo v. 2011) and Aquilino Pimentel III v. Gloria Macapagal-
Sec. Leila M. De Lima, etc., et al.  where Jose Miguel Arroyo, et al. (DOJ-COMELEC Case No. 002-2011).
Arroyo’s (MR. ARROYO) application for a TRO Mr. Arroyo, on the other hand, is also being
against Department Circular No. 41 and Watchlist investigated by the DOJ-COMELEC Fact-Finding
Order No. 2011-410 issued by the DOJ on August 4, Committee for the electoral sabotage complaint filed
2011. Therein, the Court’s primordial consideration by Sen. Aquilino Pimentel III. A cursory reading of
in issuing the TRO was the fact that “the petitioner is Sections 2 (c) of Department Circular No. 41 shows
not an accused in a criminal case, nor is a that the issuance of a Watchlist Order is allowed
respondent in any preliminary investigation, and is under such circumstances, suggesting that the
not subject of any warrant of arrest in the on-going Secretary of Justice acted within the confines
Senate investigation on the purchase by the thereof, and this, in turn, supports the observance of
Philippine National Police of helicopters.” This, to the rule on the presumption of regularity.
me, is an unequivocal testimony to the presumption
of validity accorded to Department Circular No. 41 Also, this is a petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 of
and the Watchlist Order issued pursuant to its the Rules of Court, an exercise of the remedy
provisions, considering that the TRO was issued not against grave abuse of discretion or lack of
because of the supposed infringement on Mr. jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as
Arroyo’s right to travel but because of the DOJ’s the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
clear deviation from the provisions of Department as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
Circular No. 41. Under Section 2 of the Circular, it is discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
only in the following instances that a Watchlist Order discretion as when the power is exercised in an
can be issued against any person: (a) there is a arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
criminal case pending against him before any court personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
within this jurisdiction; (b) there is a criminal case gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
against him pending preliminary investigation, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
petition for review or motion for reconsideration to act at all in contemplation of law.11 The burden of
before the DOJ or any of its prosecution offices; and proof is on the petitioners’ part to demonstrate that
(c) the Secretary of Justice deems it proper motu the assailed issuances were issued with grave
proprio or upon the request submitted by any abuse of discretion or without jurisdiction. The grant
government agency, commission, task force or of the petitioners’ prayer for TRO presupposed that
similar offices created by the Office of the President the DOJ had indeed acted capriciously, whimsically
under Republic Act No. 9208 in connection with an or outside the boundaries of its vested jurisdiction on
investigation it is conducting and/or in the interest of the basis of mere allegations.
national security, public safety or public health.
Evidently, that there was a restraint on Mr. Arroyo’s A cursory examination of the Petition and the
right to travel per se  is insufficient to overcome the attachments thereto easily reveals that she failed to
presumption of constitutionality against the Circular demonstrate the existence of the following requisites
such that what moved the Court to rule in Mr. for the issuance of an injunctive writ: (a) the
Arroyo’s favor was the dubiety of whether an applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right
investigation conducted by the Senate may be a to be protected, that is, a right in esse; (b) there is a
ground to issue a Watchlist Order.

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material and substantial invasion of such right; (c) continue taking her calcium, magnesium and vitamin
there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent D supplements.14
irreparable injury to the applicant; and (d) there is no
other ordinary, speedy and adequate remedy to From the foregoing, it appears that the medical
prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. Even on attention being received by GMA is adequate as she
the assumption that GMA has a clear and is out of danger and her condition is continuously
unmistakable right to be protected, the documents improving. Her claim of “urgency” and life-
attached to her Petition belie her claim of urgency for threatening conditions is, at the very least, debatable
the issuance of a TRO. and this should have militated against the issuance
of a TRO. Prudence and to avoid prejudging the
There is nothing in the medical certificate, dated case on its merits, giving the Government an
October 1, 2011 issued by Dr. Juliet Gope- opportunity to be heard is definitely not much too
Cervantes and dated October 24, 2011 issued by Dr. ask.
Mario R. Ver, which would indicate that GMA would
suffer irreparable injury in the event she is On the other hand, if it was the petitioners’ right to
disallowed from seeking medical treatment abroad. life and the threat posed thereto by the assailed
Thus: issuances that was foremost in the majority’s mind
when they decided to issue the TRO, there would
Ms. Macapagal-Arroyo has metabolic bone disease have been no basis to issue a TRO in Mr. Arroyo’s
and osteoporosis due to Hypoparathyroidism with favor as there is nothing in his Petition where it was
electrolyte imbalance and Vitamin D deficiency. The alleged that his right to life was being threatened or
Minerva Brace should remain in place for at least endangered. In his earlier Petition, Mr. Arroyo was
three months, and barring any complications she invoking for his right to travel in his earlier Petition. It
should be fully recovered from her spine surgery in is no different in this present Petition; only that, the
six to eight months. Her metabolic bone disease Watchlist Order he is now attacking as
needs lifetime maintenance treatment.12 x x x unconstitutional is based on his being preliminarily
investigated by the DOJ-COMELEC Fact Finding
Her last follow-up on October 20, 2011 showed Committee. However, the issuance of a Watchlist
better evidence on X Ray of bone growth taking Order on this ground is allowed under the Circular;
place in the anterior column such that the head band thus, the basis for the Court’s issuance of a TRO in
part of Lehrman Minerva brace was removed. Mr. Arroyo’s first Petition does not exist in this case.
Immobilization is now down to SOMI (Sterno- If the infringement of his right to travel was not
Mandibular-Occipito Immobilization) brace. She has enough for this Court to issue a TRO in Mr. Arroyo’s
continued her Physical therapy as out patient. Her first Petition, it is certainly confounding as to why it is
serum Ca and Vitamin D were normal with the different in this case.
maintenance medication given but the parathyroid
hormone remain deficient. Finally, in Ermita v. Hon. Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-
Delorina, et al.,15  this Court, emphatically stated that
The SOMI brace is planned to be shifted to Miami J the judicial power to enjoin the implementation of an
collar on her next follow up on November 8, 2011, official issuance, which enjoys the presumption of
that is 11 to 12 weeks post-anterior column validity, must be wielded and exercised with extreme
reconstruction.13 caution, thus:

The medical certificate dated October 22, 2011 It is well to emphasize that the grant or denial of a
issued by Dr. Roberto Mirasol is also of the same writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests
tenor: on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance thereof. In the present case, however,
where it is the Government which is being enjoined
Once she was metabolically stable she underwent
from implementing an issuance which enjoys the
another surgery – anterior fusion with titanium mesh
presumption of validity, such discretion must be
and bone grafts. She gradually improved. Repeated
exercised with utmost caution. Executive Secretary
calcium and magnesium determinations were done
v. Court of Appeals,  enlightens:
and corrected. Repeated iPTH determinations were
consistently suppressed. She was discharged
improved with advice to keep a high calcium diet, In Social Security Commission v. Judge Bayona, we
ruled that a law is presumed constitutional until

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otherwise declared by judicial interpretation. The Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal
suspension of the operation of the law is a Case No. 9375, finding accused-appellant Artemio
matter of extreme delicacy because it is an Invencion y Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt
interference with the official acts not only of the of the crime of rape committed against his 16-year-
duly elected representatives of the people but old daughter Cynthia P. Invencion, and sentencing
also of the highest magistrate of the land. him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay Cynthia
the sum of P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000
xxx as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.

The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court
its face, does not of itself justify an injunction of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape in separate
against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless complaints docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9363
there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or to 9375, all dated 17 October 1996. The cases were
any other unusual circumstance that would call consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment
for equitable relief. The “on its face” invalidation of Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.
statutes has been described as “manifestly strong
medicine,” to be employed “sparingly and only as a The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its
last resort,” and is generally disfavored. evidence in chief were Elven Invencion, Eddie Sicat,
Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty. Florencio
I believe that this Court should have exercised the Canlas. Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria
same circumspection and caution. It may be argued Pagala and Celestino Navarro.
that the constitutionality of the assailed issuances
had not been prematurely determined by the Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of
majority’s decision to issue the TRO. However, Sapang Tagalog Elementary School in Tarlac,
common sense dictates that granting the TRO and Tarlac, testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia
granting this Petition lead to the same result: the and son of Artemio with his second common-law
petitioners may leave the country anytime they wish wife. Sometime before the end of the school year in
and a cloud is cast over the constitutionality and 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his
validity of the assailed issuances. father Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger
brothers, he was awakened by Cynthia’s loud cries.
In conclusion, and in view of the foregoing, it is my Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of
position that it is best to require the respondents to Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two
file a comment on the petitions, and hear them out in minutes, his father put on his short pants.3
oral argument, instead of issuing a TRO ex parte.
Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict
IN VIEW THEREOF, I vote to: (a) defer action on the and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily
prayer for a TRO; (b) order the public respondents to prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her
Comment on the consolidated Petitions on or before suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul
November 21, 2011; and (c) set the case for oral Elven and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino
arguments on November 22, 2011 at 2:00 p.m.; and Navarro.4
(d) immediately after the conduct and conclusion of
the oral arguments, resolve the issue of whether or Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of
not a temporary restraining order may be issued. Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac,
Tarlac, testified that on the second week of March
G.R. No. 131636            March 5, 2003 1996, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was
passing by the house of Artemio on his way to the
field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
then peeped through a small opening in the
vs.
destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemio’s
ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant.
house. He saw Cynthia lying on her back and crying,
while her father was on top of her, doing a pumping
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: motion. Eddie observed them for about fifteen
seconds, and then he left and proceeded to the field
Before us for automatic review1 is the to catch fish.5 He reported what he had witnessed to
Decision  dated 22 September 1997 of the Regional
2
Artemio’s stepfather, Celestino, later that morning. 6

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Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former morning sometime on the second week of March
common-law wife of Artemio, testified that she and 1996.
Artemio started living together in Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, in February 1969. Out of their common-law On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house
relationship, they had six children, one of whom was where Artemio used to live was a small hut with
Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted some destroyed portions in its sawali walls. When
ways permanently. Later, Gloria and her children she went there to visit her children sometime in
lived in Pura, Tarlac. When Artemio’s mother died December 1995, there was a hole in front and at the
sometime in 1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot where people
small one-room dwelling owned by Celestino and passed by to fish in a nearby brook. 13 When she
located in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, went to the place again sometime in September
Tarlac.7 On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told 1996 after she was informed of Cynthia’s pregnancy,
her that Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to she noticed that the destroyed portions of the hut’s
the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her sawali walls were not yet repaired.14
condition. The latter confessed that she had been
sexually abused by her father. Gloria then went to The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro,
the office of the National Bureau of Investigation stepfather of Artemio, testified that he is the owner of
(NBI) in Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done the small house where Artemio and his children
to their daughter Cynthia.8 used to reside. At the time that Artemio and his
children, including Cynthia, were living in that house,
Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital the hut’s old sawali walls had some small holes in
testified that she examined Cynthia on 16 them, thus confirming the testimony of Eddie Sicat.
September 1996. She found Cynthia to be five to six After Artemio was arrested on the basis of Cynthia’s
months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed complaint before the NBI, Celestino made some
hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8 o’clock positions, repairs in the hut by, among other things, placing
which could have been caused by sexual intercourse galvanized iron sheets to cover the holes at the
or any foreign body inserted in her private part.9 destroyed portions of the sawali walls. Thereafter, a
person named Alvin occupied the house.15
Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that
on 18 September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied by In its Decision of 22 September 1997, the trial court
her mother, complained before him and NBI convicted Artemio in Criminal Case No. 9375. It,
Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was however, acquitted him in all the other twelve cases
raped by her father Artemio. She then executed a for lack of evidence.
written statement,10 which she subscribed and sworn
to before Atty. Canlas.11 In his Appellant’s Brief, Artemio contends that the
trial court erred in
The defense did not present Artemio as a witness.
Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo I
Salamida, took the witness stand and testified for the
defense. He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the
same day when he testified before the court), x x x BELIEVING THE TESTIMONIES OF
between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
went to the house of Artemio in Barangay Sapang
Tagalog. The hut was made of sawali. Its door was II
padlocked, and its windows were shut. When he
went around the house and tried to peep through the x x xNOT DISMISSING THIS CASE FOR
old sawali walls on the front and left and right sides FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
of the hut, he could not see anything inside the room PROVE [HIS] GUILT x x x BEYOND
where Artemio and his children used to sleep. REASONABLE DOUBT.
Although it was then about noontime, it was dark
inside.12 Atty. Salamida then concluded that Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of
prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his
truth when he declared having seen what Artemio son, should have been disqualified as a witness
did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the
opening in the sawali wall of the house in the early Rules of Court.16 Besides, Elven’s testimony appears

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not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to pallor of a discovered lie, the tremulous mutter of a
say, as the questions asked were mostly leading reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply,
questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the
testifying against him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of
him. it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an
oath, or the carriage and mien. 17 This rule, however,
In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of admits of exceptions, as where there exists a fact or
the prosecution witnesses, Artemio points to the circumstance of weight and influence that has been
following inconsistencies in their testimonies: (1) as ignored or misconstrued by the court, or where the
to the time of the commission of the crime, Elven trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of
testified having seen Artemio on top of his sister one the facts.18 We do not find any of these exceptions in
night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat testified the case at bar.
having seen them in the same position between 6:00
and 7:00 a.m. in the second week of March 1996; (2) As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that
as to the residence of Cynthia in 1996, Gloria such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the
testified that the former was living with her in Rules of Court,19 otherwise known as the rule on
Guimba from November 1995 to September 1996, "filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule on
while Elven and Eddie declared that she was in disqualification because a descendant is not
Sapang Tagalog in March 1996; and (3) as to the incompetent or disqualified to testify against an
residence of Artemio, Jr., Gloria stated that he was ascendant.20 The rule refers to a privilege not to
living with the appellant, but later she declared that testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
he was living with her in Pura. privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court,
Elven was not compelled to testify against his father;
Artemio also argues that since his house had no he chose to waive that filial privilege when he
electricity and was dark even at daytime, it was voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared
impossible for Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly that he was testifying as a witness against his father
doing pumping motion on top of Cynthia. In his of his own accord and only "to tell the truth." 21
Reply Brief, he likewise urges us to disregard the
testimonies of rebuttal witnesses Celestino and Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecution’s act
Gloria. According to him, Celestino had an ax to of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section
grind against him (Artemio) because he had been 10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 22 expressly
badgering Celestino for his share of the lot where allows leading questions when the witness is a child
the hut stands, which was owned by Artemio’s of tender years like Elven.
deceased mother. On the other hand, Gloria wanted
to get rid of Artemio because she was already The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying
cohabiting with another man. against his father also deserves scant consideration.
Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy.
In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender
General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of Artemio’s age, could not have subjected himself to the ordeal
conviction and sentence, but recommends that a of a public trial had he not been compelled by a
civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000 be awarded motive other than to bring to justice the despoiler of
in addition to the awards of moral and exemplary his sister’s virtue. There is no indication that Elven
damages. testified because of anger or any ill-motive against
his father, nor is there any showing that he was
We find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by
the trial court on the culpability of Artemio. anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that
where there is no evidence that the principal witness
for the prosecution was actuated by improper
It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the
motive, the presumption is that he was not so
trial court, especially on the credibility of the
actuated and his testimony is entitled to full
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect
credence.23
and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so
because the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or
indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the difference in the time that the rape was committed,
angry flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden i.e., during the night as testified to by Elven, or

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between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. per the testimony of even without Celestino’s testimony, Artemio’s
Eddie. The exact time or date of the commission of conviction would stand.
rape is not an element of the crime. What is decisive
in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape The remaining issue for our resolution is the
by the accused has been sufficiently proved. correctness of the penalty of death imposed by the
Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor trial court. The death penalty was imposed because
matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime of the trial court’s appreciation of the special
cannot be considered grounds for acquittal. 24 In this qualifying circumstances that Artemio is the father of
case, we believe that the crime of rape was, indeed, the victim and the latter was less than 18 years old
committed as testified to by Elven and Eddie. at the time the crime was committed.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
both Elven and Gloria do not impair the credibility of by R.A. No. 7659, which is the governing law in this
these witnesses. We agree with the trial court that case, pertinently reads:
they are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect
the credibility of the witnesses. We have held in a Article 335. When and how rape is
number of cases that inconsistencies in the committed. –
testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor and
insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses’
credibility.25 On the contrary, they may even be The crime of rape shall be punished by
considered badges of veracity or manifestations of reclusion perpetua.
truthfulness on the material points in the testimonies.
What is important is that the testimonies agree on xxx
essential facts and substantially corroborate a
consistent and coherent whole.26 The death penalty shall also be imposed if
the crime of rape is committed with any of
Artemio’s allegation that it was impossible for both the following circumstances:
Elven and Eddie to have seen and witnessed the
crime because the room was dark even at daytime 1. when the victim is under eighteen
was convincingly disputed by rebuttal witnesses (18) years of age and the offender is
Gloria Pagala and Celestino Navarro. Furthermore, a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
as observed by the OSG, even if the hut was without guardian, relative by consanguinity
electricity, Elven could not have been mistaken in his or affinity within the third civil
identification of Artemio because he had known the degree, or the common-law spouse
latter for a long time. Moreover, Elven was at the of the parent of the victim.
time only two meters away from Cynthia and
Artemio. Even without sufficient illumination, Elven, To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a
who was jostled out of his sleep by Cynthia’s loud rape committed by a father on a daughter, the
cry, could observe the pumping motion made by his minority of the victim and her relationship with the
father.27 offender, which are special qualifying circumstances,
must be alleged in the complaint or information and
The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and proved by the prosecution during the trial by the
Celestino were not sufficiently proved. Nothing in the quantum of proof required for conviction. The
records suggests any reason that would motivate accusatory portion of the complaint in Criminal Case
Gloria to testify falsely against Artemio, who is the No. 9375 reads as follows:
father of her other children. Moreover, we have
repeatedly held that no mother would subject her That on or about the month of March 1996
child to the humiliation, disgrace, and trauma at Sapang Tagalog, Municipality of Tarlac,
attendant to the prosecution for rape if she were not Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within
motivated solely by the desire to have the person the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
responsible for her child’s defilement said accused Artemio S. Invencion did then
incarcerated.28 As for Celestino, he testified that the and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
lot where the hut stands is owned by his daughter by using force and intimidation have carnal
Erlinda, and not by Artemio’s mother. 29 At any rate, knowledge of his daughter Cynthia P.

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 Invencion who was sixteen (16) years old, in 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
their house. authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the
CONTRARY TO LAW.30 victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father
Artemio was alleged in the complaint and duly
established by evidence during trial, the allegation in 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of
the complaint regarding her age was not clearly proving the age of the offended party. The
proved. failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him.
In the very recent case of People v. Pruna,31 we set
the guidelines in appreciating age either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance: 6. The trial court should always make a
categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the
offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar
party. authentic document was presented and offered in
evidence to prove Cynthia’s age. The statement in
the medical certificate showing Cynthia’s age is not
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
proof thereof, since a medical certificate does not
similar authentic documents such as
authenticate the date of birth of the victim. Moreover,
baptismal certificate and school records
pursuant to Pruna, Gloria’s testimony regarding
which show the date of birth of the victim
Cynthia’s age was insufficient, since Cynthia was
would suffice to prove age.
alleged to be 16 years old already at the time of the
rape and what is sought to be proved is that she was
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic then 18 years old. Moreover, the trial court did not
document is shown to have been lost or even make a categorical finding on Cynthia’s
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the minority. Finally, the silence of Artemio or his failure
testimony, if clear and credible, of the to object to the testimonial evidence regarding
victim’s mother or a member of the family Cynthia’s age could not be taken against him.
either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting
It must be stressed that the severity of death
pedigree such as the exact age or date of
penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature
birth of the offended party pursuant to
once carried out, makes the decision-making
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most
Evidence shall be sufficient under the
exacting rules of procedure and
following circumstances:
evidence.32 Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient
proof of Cynthia’s minority, Artemio cannot be
a. If the victim is alleged to be below convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer
3 years of age and what is sought to the death penalty. He should only be convicted of
be proved is that she is less than 7 simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion
years old; perpetua.

b. If the victim is alleged to be below As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of
7 years of age and what is sought to moral damages in the amount of P50,000 and
be proved is that she is less than 12 exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 are
years old; insufficient. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon
the finding of the fact of rape,33 should also be
c. If the victim is alleged to be below awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the
12 years of age and what is sought victim shall not be less than P50,000.
to be proved is that she is less than
18 years old. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, in Criminal Case

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
No. 9375 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification into another property of Lee nearby, and had a
that that accused Artemio Invencion y Soriano is relation with him.
held guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the
victim Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as Lee’s other children) claimed that they, too, were
indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh
as exemplary damages. children to request the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After
Costs de oficio. conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded
in its report:
SO ORDERED.
[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8
G.R. No. 177861               July 13, 2010 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a
much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN.
Upon further evaluation and analysis by these
IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND
Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a quandary in fixing
CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF
the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform
BIRTH,
with his grand design of making his 8 children as
their own legitimate children, consequently elevating
EMMA K. LEE, Petitioner, the status of his second family and secure their
vs. future. The doctor lamented that this complaint
COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. would not have been necessary had not the father
LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, and his second family kept on insisting that the 8
MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK
MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD CHENG.1
LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and
THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, as
The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital
Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.
records, the eldest of the Lee’s other children,
Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of
DECISION Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother,
when Keh was already 38 years old at the time.
ABAD, J.: Another of the Lee’s other children, Mariano Lee,
was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was
This case is about the grounds for quashing a then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other
subpoena ad testificandum and a parent’s right not words, by the hospital records of the Lee’s other
to testify in a case against his children. children, Keh’s declared age did not coincide with
her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to
The Facts and the Case such other children, numbering eight.

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh
Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as children filed two separate petitions, one of them
immigrants from China. They had 11 children, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee- City2 in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion
Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee- from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner
Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name
Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to
Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children). indicate her true mother’s name.

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC
named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as an ex parte request for the issuance of a
housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma
believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. The
RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the
subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4,
the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus
stepmother.3 On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed provides:
the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and
oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court
and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion
badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee’s promptly made and, in any event, at or before the
mother. time specified therein if it is unreasonable and
oppressive, or the relevancy of the books,
Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh children’s documents or things does not appear, or if the
motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails
action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) to advance the reasonable cost of the production
in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the thereof.
CA rendered a decision,4 setting aside the RTC’s
August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that only a Notably, the Court previously decided in the related
subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad case of Lee v. Court of Appeals6 that the Lee-Keh
testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive children have the right to file the action for correction
or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the of entries in the certificates of birth of Lee’s other
Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tiu’s children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized
advanced age alone does not render her incapable that the ultimate object of the suit was to establish
of testifying. The party seeking to quash the the fact that Lee’s other children were not children of
subpoena for that reason must prove that she would Keh. Thus:
be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something
that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do. It is precisely the province of a special proceeding
such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the
Since the CA denied Emma Lee’s motion for Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or
reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007, 5 she right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions
filed the present petition with this Court. filed by private respondents for the correction of
entries in the petitioners' records of birth were
The Question Presented intended to establish that for physical and/or
biological reasons it was impossible for Keh
The only question presented in this case is whether Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth
or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may to the petitioners as shown in their birth records.
compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case Contrary to petitioners' contention that the
that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the petitions before the lower courts were actually
correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein
Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh’s daughter. is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate
children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish
that the former are not the latter's children. There
The Ruling of the Court
is nothing to impugn as there is no blood
relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly petitioners.7 (Underscoring supplied)
quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued
against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh
and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter
children’s action, obviously, they would want Tiu to
would be badgered on oral examination concerning
testify or admit that she is the mother of Lee’s other
the Lee-Keh children’s theory that she had illicit
children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had
relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee
died and so could not give testimony that Lee’s other
children.
children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have,
therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tiu’s
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited— testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive
unreasonable and oppressive—are proper for them of their right to compel the attendance of such
subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of a material witness.
documents and things in the possession of the
witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections a family tie connected by a common
to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) ancestry.1avvphi1 A stepdaughter has no common
considering her advance age, testifying in court ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus
would subject her to harsh physical and emotional provides:
stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right
not to be compelled to testify against her Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
stepdaughter. ascending. The former unites the head of the family
with those who descend from him. The latter binds a
1. Regarding the physical and emotional person with those from whom he descends.
punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if
she were compelled at her age and Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify
condition to come to court to testify, against petitioner Emma Lee.
petitioner Emma Lee must establish this
claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and
About five years have passed from the time AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of
the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92555.
a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial
court. The RTC would have to update itself
and determine if Tiu’s current physical SO ORDERED.
condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal
of coming to court and being questioned. If G.R. No. 169895               March 23, 2011
she is fit, she must obey the subpoena
issued to her. ISAGANI M. YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-
MAGSANOC, JOSE MA. D. NOLASCO, ARTEMIO
Tiu has no need to worry that the oral T. ENGRACIA, JR. and VOLT
examination might subject her to badgering CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
by adverse counsel. The trial court’s duty is vs.
to protect every witness against oppressive Hon. ARTEMIO TUQUERO in his capacity as
behavior of an examiner and this is Secretary of Justice, and ESCOLASTICO U.
especially true where the witness is of CRUZ, JR., Respondents.
advanced age.8
DECISION
2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right
not to testify against her stepdaughter, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari (under
reads: Rule 45 of the Rules of Court), assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No 62479 dated July 8, 2005 and its Resolution 2 dated
person may be compelled to testify against his September 29, 2005 in the same case.
parents, other direct ascendants, children or other
direct descendants. The antecedents of this case are as follows:

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision On May 26, 1996, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI)
in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in printed an article3 headlined Judge mauled me, says
criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of court employee, carrying the by-line of petitioner Volt
Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all Contreras (Contreras). The article reported an
kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or alleged mauling incident that took place between
administrative, filed against parents and other direct respondent Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge
ascendants or descendants. Escolastico U. Cruz, Jr. (Judge Cruz) and Robert
Mendoza (Mendoza), an administrative officer
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims assigned at the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. Makati RTC.
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants,

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
Reckoning the article to be false and malicious, against Mendoza and six PDI officers and
Judge Cruz initiated a Complaint4 for libel with the employees, namely: Contreras, Isagani Yambot,
City Prosecutor of Makati. In particular, Judge Cruz Letty Jimenez-Magsanoc, Jose Ma. Nolasco,
protested the following sentence in said article: Artemio Engracia, Jr. and Carlos Hidalgo (the PDI
Staff). On February 21, 1997, the City Prosecutor
According to Mendoza, Cruz still has a pending case filed an Information10 for libel against Mendoza and
of sexual harassment filed with the Supreme Court the PDI Staff. Thereafter, the PDI Staff filed a Motion
by Fiscal Maria Lourdes Garcia, also of the Makati with the trial court for the deferment of the
RTC.5 arraignment to allow them to appeal to the Secretary
of the Department of Justice.
Rebutting the statement, Judge Cruz alleged that
there was no suit for sexual harassment pending On March 3, 2000, then Secretary of Justice Artemio
against him before this Court, and attached a Tuquero (Secretary Tuquero) dismissed the PDI
certification dated July 16, 1996 6 of the Deputy Court Staff’s Petition for Review of the Resolution of the
Administrator attesting to the pendency of only two City Prosecutor.11 Secretary Tuquero rejected the
administrative cases against him, namely RTJ-96- argument of therein petitioners that the complaint
1352 (Re: Mauling incident) and OCA IPI No. 96- should be dismissed on the ground of lack of
185-RTJ (For gross ignorance of the law, Partiality supporting affidavits from third persons. According to
and Rendering an unjust judgment). Secretary Tuquero, affidavits of third persons are not
essential for a libel complaint to prosper, as it is
enough that the person defamed can be
For his part, Contreras filed a counter-affidavit 7 with
identified.12 As regards the factual basis presented
the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, explaining the
by Contreras, Secretary Tuquero noted it cannot be
supposed factual basis for his article. It appeared
said that Judge Cruz was indeed facing a sexual
that Atty. Maria Lourdes Paredes-Garcia (Paredes-
harassment suit in this Court.13 The Motion for
Garcia) had filed with this Court a Petition for Review
Reconsideration14 was denied in a
to question a contempt order issued against her by
Resolution15 dated October 12, 2000.
Judge Cruz. In connection with said Petition for
Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 120654,
Paredes-Garcia filed a Reply dated February 5, The PDI Staff with the exception of Hidalgo (herein
1996 asking this Court to look deeply into allegations petitioners) filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
of one Enrina Talag-Pascual (Talag-Pascual) that Court of Appeals to challenge the aforementioned
Judge Cruz made sexual advances to her while she Resolutions of Secretary Tuquero. The Petition was
was a member of his staff at the Metropolitan Trial docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62479.
Court (MeTC) of Manila. Paredes-Garcia claimed
that she suffered similar indignities from Judge Cruz, On July 8, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the
and prayed that her Petition be treated as an assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for
administrative case against said judge. Paredes- Certiorari. Applying our ruling in Advincula v. Court
Garcia appended a January 29, 1996 affidavit of Appeals,16 the appellate court held that since the
executed by Talag-Pascual to purportedly show the Information had already been filed with the trial
proclivity of Judge Cruz for seducing women who court, the primary determination of probable cause is
became objects of his fancy. Contreras claimed that now with the latter.17 The Court of Appeals denied
the statement in his news article constituted a fair the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration in the
and true report of a matter of grave public interest as assailed Resolution dated September 29, 2005.
it involved the conduct of a regional trial court judge.
Hence, petitioners filed this Petition for Review with
In the meantime, on September 11, 1996, this Court this Court, raising the following issues:
rendered its Decision8 on the Petition of Paredes-
Garcia, granting her prayer to set aside Judge (A) WHETHER OR NOT A CRIMINAL
Cruz’s contempt order. The prayer in Paredes- COMPLAINT FOR LIBEL IS FATALLY
Garcia’s Reply that the Petition be treated as an DEFECTIVE OR DEFICIENT IF IT IS NOT
administrative case against Judge Cruz was not SUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVITS OF THIRD
passed upon by the Court. PERSONS.

Subsequently, the City Prosecutor of Makati (B) WHETHER OR NOT A NEWS REPORT
approved a Resolution9 finding probable cause ON THE ACTUATIONS OF A PUBLIC

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
 OFFICIAL IS PRIVILEGED IN NATURE appeal of the prosecutor’s ruling on probable cause)
AND HENCE, THE PRESUMPTION OF may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an
MALICE IS DESTROYED. information with the trial court.

(C) WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVILEGED In Ching v. Secretary of Justice, 20 petitioner filed a
NATURE OF A PUBLICATION IS A Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
GROUND FOR DISMISSAL AND THAT assailing the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
THE RESPONDENT NEED NOT WAIT finding probable cause for violation of Presidential
UNTIL TRIAL TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF Decree No. 115, otherwise known as the Trust
PRIVILEGE. Receipts Law. Conformably with said Resolution, the
City Prosecutor filed 13 Informations against
(D) WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLISHER petitioner. Upon denial of the Motion for
AND EDITORS ARE JOINTLY LIABLE Reconsideration, petitioner filed a petition for
WITH THE AUTHOR OF THE ALLEGEDLY certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court
OFFENDING NEWS REPORT EVEN IF of Appeals assailing the Resolution of the Secretary
THEY DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE of Justice. While this Court ultimately affirmed the
WRITING AND EDITING OF SAID NEWS Court of Appeals’ ruling denying the Petition for
REPORT.18 Certiorari, the discussion affirming the resort to said
extraordinary writ is enlightening:
In raising the above issues, petitioners essentially
questioned the Makati City Prosecutors Office’s In Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman
finding of probable cause to charge them with libel, (Visayas), this Court held that the acts of a quasi-
as affirmed by the Secretary of Justice. As stated judicial officer may be assailed by the aggrieved
above, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition party via a petition for certiorari and enjoined (a)
for Certiorari by applying the procedural doctrine laid when necessary to afford adequate protection to the
down in Advincula. constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when
necessary for the orderly administration of justice;
(c) when the acts of the officer are without or in
Similar to the present case, in Advincula,
excess of authority; (d) where the charges are
respondents Amando and Isagani Ocampo filed a
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court
vengeance; and (e) when there is clearly no prima
of Appeals questioning the Resolution of the
facie case against the accused. The Court also
Secretary of Justice which had earlier led to the filing
declared that, if the officer conducting a preliminary
of Informations against them in court. The Court of
investigation (in that case, the Office of the
Appeals granted the Petition and set aside the
Ombudsman) acts without or in excess of his
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. In reversing
authority and resolves to file an Information despite
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, we applied the
the absence of probable cause, such act may be
rule that certiorari, being an extraordinary writ,
nullified by a writ of certiorari.
cannot be resorted to when other remedies are
available. The Court observed that respondents had
other remedies available to them, such as the filing Indeed, under Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules
of a Motion to Quash the Information under Rule 117 of Criminal Procedure, the Information shall be
of the Rules of Court, or allowing the trial to proceed prepared by the Investigating Prosecutor against the
where they could either file a demurrer to evidence respondent only if he or she finds probable cause to
or present their evidence to disprove the charges hold such respondent for trial. The Investigating
against them.19 Prosecutor acts without or in excess of his authority
under the Rule if the Information is filed against the
respondent despite absence of evidence showing
At the outset, it should be made clear that the Court
probable cause therefor. If the Secretary of Justice
is not abandoning the foregoing ruling in Advincula.
reverses the Resolution of the Investigating
However, Advincula cannot be read to completely
Prosecutor who found no probable cause to hold the
disallow the institution of certiorari proceedings
respondent for trial, and orders such prosecutor to
against the Secretary of Justice’s determination of
file the Information despite the absence of probable
probable cause when the criminal information has
cause, the Secretary of Justice acts contrary to law,
already been filed in court. Under exceptional
without authority and/or in excess of authority. Such
circumstances, a petition for certiorari assailing the
resolution may likewise be nullified in a petition for
resolution of the Secretary of Justice (involving an

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil author, not having any legal training, cannot be
Procedure.21 expected to make the fine distinction between a
sexual harassment suit and a suit where there was
In light of the particular factual context of the present an allegation of sexual harassment. In fact, three
controversy, we find that the need to uphold the other newspapers reporting the same incident
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press and committed the same mistake: the Manila Times
crystal clear absence of a prima facie case against article was headlined "Judge in sex case now in
the PDI staff justify the resort to the extraordinary physical injury rap";26 the Philippine Star article
writ of certiorari. described Judge Cruz as "(a) Makati judge who was
previously charged with sexual harassment by a lady
prosecutor";27 and the Manila Standard Article
Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation
referred to him as "(a) Makati judge who was
of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary,
reportedly charged with sexual harassment by a lady
or any act, omission, condition, status or
fiscal."28
circumstance tending to discredit or cause the
dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person,
or to blacken the memory of one who is The questioned portion of the news article, while
dead.22 Consequently, the following elements unfortunately not quite accurate, on its own, is
constitute libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act insufficient to establish the element of malice in libel
or condition to another; (b) publication of the cases. We have held that malice connotes ill will or
imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely
(d) existence of malice.23 The glaring absence of to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and
maliciousness in the assailed portion of the news implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
article subject of this case negates the existence of harm.29 Malice is present when it is shown that the
probable cause that libel has been committed by the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks
PDI staff. with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.30
As previously stated, Judge Cruz initiated the
complaint for libel, asserting the falsity and The lack of malice on the part of the PDI Staff in the
maliciousness of the statement in a news report that quoting of Mendoza’s allegation of a sexual
"(a)ccording to Mendoza, Cruz still has a pending harassment suit is furthermore patent in the tenor of
case of sexual harassment filed with the Supreme the article: it was a straightforward narration, without
Court by Fiscal Maria Lourdes Garcia, also of the any comment from the reporter, of the alleged
Makati RTC."24 It can be easily discerned that the mauling incident involving Judge Cruz. The subject
article merely reported the statement of Mendoza article was, in fact, replete with other allegations by
that there was allegedly a pending case of sexual Mendoza of purported misconduct on the part of
harassment against Judge Cruz and that said article Judge Cruz. Except for the above-quoted statement,
did not report the existence of the alleged sexual Judge Cruz did not find the other assertions by
harassment suit as a confirmed fact. Judge Cruz Mendoza as reported by the PDI article to be
never alleged, much less proved, that Mendoza did libelous:
not utter such statement. Nevertheless, Judge Cruz
concludes that there was malice on the part of the At around 2 p.m., Mendoza said, an employee at
PDI Staff by asserting that they did not check the Cruz’s court fetched him to the judge’s
facts. He claimed that the report got its facts wrong, chamber.1âwphi1
pointing to a certification from the Deputy Court
Administrator attesting to the pendency of only two He was walking along the corridor when Cruz looked
administrative cases against him, both of which bear out, saw him, and yelled, "Mendoza, halika nga rito
captions not mentioning sexual harassment. (come here)."

A newspaper should not be held to account to a "He dragged me to his chamber and locked the door.
point of suppression for honest mistakes, or Tatlo kami doon, kasama ang sheriff niya na si Nory
imperfection in the choice of words. 25 While, indeed, Santos," Mendoza said.
the allegation of inappropriate sexual advances in an
appeal of a contempt ruling does not turn such case Inside, Mendoza said Cruz began taunting him,
into one for sexual harassment, we agree with asking him, "Matigas ba ang dibdib mo, ha? (Do you
petitioners’ proposition that the subject news article’s have a strong chest?)" Mendoza said, (h)e was

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
made to sit in a guest’s chair in front of Cruz’s desk. SO ORDERED.
He recalled seeing placed on top of a side table
a .99mm and a .45 caliber pistol which he presumed G.R. No. 137348             June 21, 2004
to belong to the judge.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
While standing, Mendoza said the judge began vs.
punching him, at the same time subjecting him to WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @
verbal abuse. The first punch was at the left side of ROBERT TIU, appellants.
his chest, the second at the right. The third was at
his left knee, then last was at the right knee, DECISION
Mendoza said.
PUNO, J.:
His right knee was still swollen as of yesterday.
"… the allowance of the privilege to withhold
"Hinamon pa niya ako, square daw kami," he said. evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal
"At hindi daw niya ako titigilan at ipapatanggal pa trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due
daw niya ako (He even dared me to a fight. He process of law and gravely impair the basic function
threatened me that he would not stop until I am fired of the courts." 1
from my job)," Mendoza said.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
"Kung anak pa daw niya ang nakalaban ko, babarilin
na lang daw niya ako sa sentido at babayaran na
lang ako (He said if it was his son with whom I The case at bar involves the clash of two classic
quarreled, he would have simply put a bullet to my values - - - the need for the State to stop crimes and
head and paid for my life)."31 preserve the peace against the right of an individual
to confront material witnesses to establish his
innocence. In balancing the two values, we shall
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals,32 we held that "[a] scrutinize and set the parameters that ought to guide
newspaper especially one national in reach and prosecution when to disclose the identity of
coverage, should be free to report on events and confidential informers.
developments in which the public has a legitimate
interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court
by one group or another on criminal or civil charges On July 27, 1998 accused William Ong y Li and
for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu were charged with
keeps within the standards of morality and civility violation of Section 15, Article III, in relation to
prevailing within the general community." 33 Like fair Section 2, Article I, of Republic Act No. 6425,
commentaries on matters of public interest,34 fair otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of
reports on the same should thus be included under 1972, as amended. The Information2 reads:
the protective mantle of privileged communications,
and should not be subjected to microscopic That on or about the 24th day of July, 1998
examination to discover grounds of malice or in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
falsity.35 The concept of privileged communication is accused, conspiring together, confederating
implicit in the constitutionally protected freedom of with and mutually helping each other not
the press,36 which would be threatened when having been authorized by law to sell,
criminal suits are unscrupulously leveled by persons dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
wishing to silence the media on account of regulated drug, did then and there willfully
unfounded claims of inaccuracies in news reports. and unlawfully sell or offer for
sale 980.50 grams of Methyl
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Amphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a
Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of regulated drug.
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62479 dated July 8,
2005 and its Resolution dated September 29, 2005 CONTRARY TO LAW.
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Upon arraignment, the two (2) accused, who are
No pronouncement as to costs. Chinese nationals, pled not guilty. The records do

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not show whether they had sufficient knowledge of him a gift-wrapped package. SPO1 Gonzales
the English language. Their trial proceeded. In the opened it and inside was one (1) sealed plastic bag
course of the trial, the two (2) accused were given with a white crystalline substance. After its
the services of a Chinese interpreter. inspection, accused Ong demanded for its payment.
SPO1 Gonzales gave to accused Ong the boodle
The prosecution, through the testimony of SPO1 money placed in a "W. Brown" plastic bag.
Rodolfo S. Gonzales, sought to establish that on Thereafter, SPO1 Gonzales signaled his back-up
July 23, 1998 at around 5:00 P.M., a confidential team by turning on the hazard lights of the car.
informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division SPO1 Gonzales himself arrested accused Ong while
(SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief the CI and the back-up agents arrested accused De
Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged Ming.
illicit drug activities of a certain William Ong and an
unidentified Chinese male partner. After an The officers brought the two (2) accused to their
evaluation of the confidential information, Chief office where the corresponding booking sheets and
Inspector Ferro decided to conduct a buy-bust arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag
operation. He constituted a team of eight (8) with containing the white crystalline substance was
Police Inspector Medel N. Poñe as team leader, referred to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
SPO1 Gonzales as poseur-buyer and the rest as examination. The two (2) accused were subjected to
back-up support. a physical and mental examination as required. They
were found to be free from any external signs of
According to SPO1 Gonzales, the CI called up the trauma.
alleged pusher, placed an order for one (1) kilo
of shabu and agreed to a ₱600,000.00 Police Inspector Grace M. Eustaquio, Forensic
consideration. The CI likewise agreed to meet with Chemist, PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that the
his contact on July 24, 1998 at 6th Street corner specimen she examined had a net weight of 980.50
Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, between grams and manifested "positive results for methyl
4:00 and 5:00 A.M. The boodle money was prepared amphetamine hydrochloride"3 or what is commonly
consisting of six (6) bundles of cut bond paper with a known as shabu, a regulated drug. Her testimony
marked ₱1,000.00 peso bill on top of each bundle. was supported by her Physical Sciences Report.4

On July 24, 2004 at 3:00 A.M., the CI received a call Appellants denied the story of the prosecution.
from the drug dealer changing the meeting time Accused William Ong, a Chinese citizen from the
between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M. on the same day. The People’s Republic of China, claimed that he came to
team, together with the CI, proceeded to the meeting the Philippines in 1997 to look for a job. Upon the
place and arrived there at around 1:30 P.M. The CI recommendation of a friend, he was able to work in
rode with SPO1 Gonzales. They parked their car a pancit canton factory in Quezon City. In June
along 6th Street corner Gilmore Avenue. The rest of 1998, he stopped working at the factory and hunted
the team posted themselves at their back and their for another job. Two (2) weeks prior to his arrest,
right side. accused Ong was introduced by his friend Kian Ling
to Ong Sin for a possible job as technician in a bihon
A little while, accused Ong approached their car. factory owned by Ong Sin.
The CI introduced him to SPO1 Gonzales who told
accused Ong in broken Tagalog to get in the car. On July 22, 1998, Ong Sin called up and set a
When Ong inquired about the money in payment of meeting with accused Ong at the Tayuman branch
the shabu, SPO1 Gonzales showed him the slightly of Jollibee the next day. While waiting at Jollibee,
opened plastic bag containing the boodle money. accused Ong received a call from Ong Sin that he
SPO1 Gonzales then demanded to see the shabu. could not personally meet him. Instead, his two (2)
Accused Ong excused himself, went out of the car, co-workers would meet accused Ong as instructed.
walked a few steps and then waved his right hand to Subsequently, two (2) men answering to Ong Sin’s
somebody. While accused Ong was walking back to description approached accused Ong. He joined
the car, SPO1 Gonzales and the CI saw a green them inside a yellow car. When they reached a
Toyota Corolla coming. The Corolla parked in front certain place, the driver reached for his cellular
of their car and a Chinese-looking male, later phone and called up someone. After a brief
identified as accused Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu conversation, the driver handed the phone to him.
alighted, approached accused Ong and handed to Ong Sin was on the line and informed him that the

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driver would accompany him to the bihon factory. I
The driver got out of the car and accused Ong
followed him. After walking two (2) blocks, the driver Rule 116, Section 1 (a) of the Revised Rules of
picked up something from the place. They returned Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
to the car. Suddenly, the companion of the driver
poked a gun at him. He was arrested, blindfolded SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how
and brought to an undisclosed place. Several hours made.-
later, he was taken to the police station. There he
met the other accused Ching De Ming for the first
time. He maintained innocence to the crime charged. (a) The accused must be arraigned
before the court where the complaint
or information was filed or assigned
On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he for trial. The arraignment shall be
is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW made in open court by the judge or
business. He claimed that he gets his products from clerk by furnishing the accused with
Baclaran and sells them to customers in the cities of a copy of the complaint or
Naga and Daet in Bicol. information, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him,
On July 23, 1998 at around 4:30 and 5:00 P.M., and asking him whether he pleads
while waiting inside his car for his girlfriend and her guilty or not guilty. The prosecution
mother who just went in a townhouse at 8th Street, may call at the trial witnesses other
New Manila, Quezon City, he was approached by than those named in the complaint
persons unknown to him. They asked him what he or information. (Underscoring and
was doing there. One of them went to the car parked emphasis supplied.)
at his back, ordered somebody inside to get out and
take a good look at him. The person pointed at him The arraignment of appellants violates the above
saying "maybe he is the one." He was then dragged rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals.
out of his car and brought to the other car. They took Their Certificate of Arraignment6 states that they
his clutch bag. They blindfolded and brought him to were informed of the accusations against them. It
a place. After a few hours, at Camp Crame, Quezon does not, however, indicate whether the Information
City, they removed his blindfold. He denied knowing was read in the language or dialect known to them. It
accused Ong and the charge of conspiring with him merely states:
to deliver shabu in New Manila, Quezon City.
This 4th day of Aug., 1998, the undersigns
Avelina Cardoz, the mother of his girlfriend, and a (sic) states:
divine healer, corroborated his story. She testified
that she requested accused De Ming to drive her to
a townhouse at 8th Street, New Manila, to cure a That, in open court, and in the
patient. She declared that the officers of the presence of Trial Prosecutor Ruben
People’s Journal publication could attest to her Catubay, the following accused
profession. She asked accused De Ming to wait for William Ong and Ching De Ming
her and her daughter inside his car. When they AKA Robert Tiu was/were called
returned to the car, accused De Ming was nowhere and, having been informed of the
to be found. They saw him next at the Quezon City nature of the accusation filed
Jail. against him/her/them, furnishing
him/her/them a copy of the
complaint or information with the
On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted list of witnesses, the said accused
appellants as charged and imposed on them the in answer to the question of the
penalty of death. It likewise ordered each of them to Court, pleaded Not Guilty to the
pay a fine of P1 million pesos.5 crime as charged.

The case is with us on automatic review. Appellants TO WHICH I CERTIFY.

insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Sgd
.
We agree.

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 Mar to translate for us and for them if the
y questions are difficult to understand, sir.
Rut
h Q: Now that Chinese interpreter that is also
Mil an accused?
o-
Fer A: Yes sir.9
rer
After arraignment and in the course of the trial, the
Bra lower court had to secure the services of a certain
nch Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter. This appears
Cle in the Order of August 28, 1998 of Judge
rk Peralta, viz:
of
Co
urt Considering that the counsel of the two (2)
accused has still a lot of questions to ask on
cross-examination x x x x From hereon, Mr.
Sgd. William Ong Richard Ng Lee, a businessman and a
part time interpreter, is hereby
ACCUSED WILLIAM ONG designated by the Court as interpreter in
this case considering that there is no
Sgd. Ching de Ming official interpreter of the Court who is
knowledgeable in the Chinese language
ACCUSED CHING DE MING @ or any Chinese dialect whatsoever. The
ROBERT TIU appointment of Mr. Richard Ng Lee is
without the objection of counsel of the
accused and the public prosecutor and
Neither does the August 4,
considering that the court is convinced
1998 Order of Judge Diosdado M.
that he indeed possesses the
Peralta of RTC-Br. 95, Quezon City,
qualifications of an interpreter of a
disclose compliance with the rule on
Chinese language or any other Chinese
arraignment. It merely stated in part
dialect known and spoken by the two (2)
that "[w]hen both accused William
accused.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @
Robert Tiu were arraigned, assisted
by counsel de parte, both accused What leaps from the records of the case is the
entered a plea of not guilty."7 inability of appellants to fully or sufficiently
comprehend any other language than Chinese and
any of its dialect. Despite this inability, however, the
From the records, it is clear that appellants only
appellants were arraigned on an Information written
knew the Chinese language. Thus, the services of a
in the English language.
Chinese interpreter were used in investigating
appellants. SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales revealed in
his testimony, viz:8 We again emphasize that the requirement that the
information should be read in a language or dialect
known to the accused is mandatory. It must be
Q: Now, is it not a fact that you had the
strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the
difficulty of investigating the two accused
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
because of communication problem from
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
your informant?
The constitutional protection is part of due process.
Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the
A: We did not encounter such problem when arraignment.11
we investigated them sir. We also asked
question and we have another Chinese
II
who was arrested who can speak
Tagalog and we used that Chinese man

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More important than the invalid arraignment of the Q: So after that, do you know what happen?
appellants, we find that the prosecution evidence
failed to prove that appellants willfully and A: The CI informed us that the price of
unlawfully sold or offered to sell shabu. that shabu which we’re supposed to buy
from them amounts to 600,000.00 pesos,
Appellants’ conviction is based on the lone testimony ma’am.
of SPO1 Gonzales. He was the designated poseur-
buyer in the team formed for the buy-bust operation. Q: Where did you come to know about this
But a careful reading of his testimony will reveal information that the amount is already
that he was not privy to the sale transaction that 600,000.00 pesos?
transpired between the CI and appellant William
Ong, the alleged pusher. It is beyond contention that ATTY. TRINIDAD to the COURT
a contract of sale is perfected upon a meeting of the
minds of the parties on the object and its price. 12 Not
all elements of the sale were established by the Already answered, Your Honor.
testimony of SPO1 Gonzales, viz:
COURT:
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
In other words what he say is that, there was
Q: After you have prepared the boodle a telephone conversation but he has no
money and you had made the proper personal knowledge. Your question then
marking which you presented before this was what happened.
Honorable Court, what happen?
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
A: Out CI make a couple of call and he
contacted William Ong thru a Q: After the CI informed you that the price of
broken tagalog conversation. the shabu is 600,000.00 pesos?

Q: When your CI contacted with William Ong A: We prepared this boodle money and the
in broken tagalog? 6,000 by our Chief SOD.

A: I have a conversation with William Ong in COURT to SPO1 GONZALES

broken tagalog the deal of one kilo gram
of shabu was initially closed. Q: After the informant told you that there
was an agreement to sell 600,000.00 pesos
Q: When you say "closed", what do you and that you have already prepared the
mean by that? boodle money as you have stated, what
happened after that?
A: They agreed to the sale of the shabu.
A: The CI told us that the transaction is
ATTY. TRINIDAD (counsel of accused) to 600,000.00 pesos and venue is at 6th
the COURT Street, corner Gilmore Avenue, New
Manila, Quezon City, between 4 o’clock to
5 o’clock in the morning of July 24, 1998,
We object to the line of questioning, Your ma’am.
Honor that would be hearsay.
Q: So when the CI informed you that they
COURT: will meet at 6th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, what transpired next?
I think what you were asking is what
happened he said it was the CI who A: On or about 3 o’clock in the morning
talked. William Ong made a call to our CI informing
him that the sale of the delivery of shabu
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES was reset to another time.13

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 xxxx July 23, 1998 and through a broken Tagalog
conversation, a drug deal/sale was initially
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES closed in the agreed amount of six
hundred thousand pesos
(P600,000.00) and the agreed venue is at
Q: And when you were informed that there
the corner of 6th Street and Gilmore
was a resetting of this deal?
Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City between
4:00 and 5:00 o’clock in the morning of July
COURT to SPO1 GONZALES 24, 1998 through "Kaliwaan or Abutan"
(Cash upon Delivery);
Q: How did you come to know that there
was a resetting because he has no That said information was relayed to our
participation in the conversation and it was Deputy Chief, who upon learning said
the CI according to him and the alleged report, immediately grouped and briefed the
poseur-buyer. team for the said operation;

A: The CI told our Chief Deputy. xxxx

ATTY. TRINIDAD to the COURT That on or about 3:00 o’clock in the morning
of July 24, 1998, WILLIAM ONG made a
That would be hearsay, Your Honor, and call to our CI informing him (CI) to reset
that would be a double hearsay. the time of the drug deal/sale of one (1)
kilogram of SHABU and it was scheduled
COURT again between 2:00 to 3:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of same date and same place;
Put on record that the counsel
manifested that his answer is again It is therefore understandable that in his account of
hearsay and that a double hearsay his meeting with appellant William Ong, SPO1
evidence. Gonzales made no reference to any further
discussion of the price and the quantity of the shabu.
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES When they met, they just proceeded with the
exchange of money and shabu, viz:
Q: And what did the CI do?
PROSECUTOR to SPO1 GONZALES
A: The CI informed us that the time will
be at about 2 to 3 o’clock in the afternoon Q: And when you were there stationed at the
of that same day and the place.14 venue at 6th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, what happened?
It is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made
the initial contact, albeit only through the A: I and the CI parked our car at 6th Street
telephone, with the pusher. The CI was likewise the corner Gilmore Avenue and then we saw
one who closed the deal with appellant Ong as to William Ong emerged from Gilmore Avenue
the quantity of shabu to be purchased and its price. and approached me and our CI, ma’am.16
He also set the venue and time of the
meeting when the sale would take place. The Joint xxxx
Affidavit of Arrest15 executed by SPO1 Gonzales,
PO2 Elmer N. Sarampote and PO1 Noli Jingo G. Q: And when he approached you what did
Rivel fortifies these facts, viz: you do if any?

xxxx A: Our CI introduced me to William Ong as

an interested buyer of one kilo gram of
That after couple of calls made by our shabu and afterwards I asked William Ong
CI, suspect WILLIAM ONG was finally in broken tagalog to get inside the car.17
contacted on or about 9:30 in the evening of

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xxxx A: William Ong walked towards to me and
suddenly a green Toyota appeared and
Q: And while inside the car, what happened parked in front of our car.
next?
Q: When a green Toyota corolla was parked
A: While inside the car William Ong asked in front of the car, what happened next?
me about the payment of the stuff and I got
the paper bag and slightly opened. So that I A: Chinese looking male person alighted
get the plastic bag and show to William Ong from the car and he went to William Ong and
the boodle money. handed to William Ong something that was
gift wrapped.18
Q: When you showed the boodle money to
William Ong what did he do if there was xxxx
any?
Q: When that thing was handed to William
A: He looked at it, ma’am. Ong which identified in Court and which was
marked, what did William Ong do?
Q: And when he looked at it what happened
next? A: William Ong took it from Ching De Ming,
ma’am.
A: I told him that I should look at the stuff
before I give the money. Q: When this Exhibit was given to by William
Ong what did you do in return?
Q: What stuff are you referring to?
A: I opened that something which was gift
A: The shabu, ma’am. wrapped and I saw one sealed plastic bag
containing white crystalline substance
suspected to be a shabu.19
Q: And what did you do after expecting the
boodle money or the bag where the boodle
money was placed, if there was any? xxxx

A: He excused himself and alighted from our Q: When you saw this Exhibit C-2 crystalline
car and told me to wait for his companion. substance which was opened according to
you. What did you do?
Q: And where you able to wait for that male
companion he is referring to? A: The companion of William Ong
demanded to me the money and I gave to
him the boodle money.
A: He walked a distance and waved at his
companion as if somebody will come to him.
Q: When you gave the boodle money to him,
what did he do if any these person who
Q: How did he do that?
secured the money?
A: (put on record that the witness when
A: He took the money inside the bag.20
answering the question he stood up and
then used his right hand in waving as if he is
calling for somebody) Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the
offer to purchase shabu, the acceptance of the offer
and the consideration for the offer, we hold that
Q: When William Ong waved his right hand
SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the "poseur-
to his companion what happened?
buyer" but merely the deliveryman. His testimony
therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is
hearsay and standing alone cannot be the basis of
the conviction of the appellants.21

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III In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence
about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The
We further hold that the prosecution failed to confidential informant who had sole knowledge of
establish its claim of entrapment. how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and
how it was perfected was not presented as a
witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which
Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the
in recent years has been accepted as a valid means
same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales’ testimony is
of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs
hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it
Law.22 It is commonly employed by police officers as
can be shown that the same falls within the
an effective way of apprehending law offenders in
exception to the hearsay rule.33 To impart probative
the act of committing a crime.23 In a buy-bust
value to these hearsay statements and convict the
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from
appellant solely on this basis would be to render
the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding
nugatory his constitutional right to confront the
him to commit the offense.24 Its opposite is
witness against him, in this case the informant, and
instigation or inducement, wherein the police or its
to examine him for his truthfulness.34 As the
agent lures the accused into committing the offense
prosecution failed to prove all the material details of
in order to prosecute him.25 Instigation is deemed
the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a
contrary to public policy and considered an
valid entrapment of the appellants must fail.
absolutory cause.26

IV
To determine whether there was a valid entrapment
or whether proper procedures were undertaken in
effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent The Court is sharply aware of the compelling
upon the courts to make sure that the details of the considerations why confidential informants are
operation are clearly and adequately laid out through usually not presented by the prosecution. One is the
relevant, material and competent evidence. For, the need to hide their identity and preserve their
courts could not merely rely on but must apply with invaluable service to the police.35 Another is the
studied restraint the presumption of regularity in the necessity to protect them from being objects or
performance of official duty by law enforcement targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate
agents. This presumption should not by itself prevail once they become known. All these considerations,
over the presumption of innocence and the however, have to be balanced with the right of an
constitutionally protected rights of the individual. 27 It accused to a fair trial.
is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their
own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law The ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roviaro v.
through lawless enforcement.28 Courts should not U.S.36 on informer’s privilege is instructive. In said
allow themselves to be used as instruments of case, the principal issue on certiorari is whether the
abuse and injustice lest innocent persons are made United States District Court committed reversible
to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug error when it allowed the Government not to disclose
offenses.29 the identity of an undercover employee who had
played a material part in bringing about the
In People v. Doria,30 we stressed the "objective" possession of certain drugs by the accused, had
test in buy-bust operations. We ruled that in such been present with the accused at the occurrence of
operations, the prosecution must present the alleged crime, and might be a material
a complete picture detailing the transaction, which witness to whether the accused knowingly
"must start from the initial contact between the transported the drugs as charged.37 The Court,
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, through Mr. Justice Burton, granted certiorari in
the promise or payment of the consideration until the order to pass upon the propriety of disclosure of the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the informer’s identity.
illegal drug subject of the sale.31 We emphasized
that the manner by which the initial contact was Mr. Justice Burton explained that what is usually
made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of referred to as the informer’s privilege is in reality the
the 'buy-bust' money, and the delivery of the illegal Government’s privilege to withhold from disclosure
drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts the identity of persons who furnish information of
to insure that law-abiding citizens are not violations of law to officers charged with
unlawfully induced to commit an offense."32 enforcement of that law.38 The purpose of the

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privilege is the furtherance and protection of the Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of
public interest in effective law enforcement. The the alleged confiscated methyl amphetamine
privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to hydrochloride or shabu further shattered the case of
communicate their knowledge of the commission of the prosecution. There is no crime of illegal sale of
crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on
preserving their anonymity, encourages them to whether the substance confiscated was the same
perform that obligation. specimen examined and established to be regulated
drug.
It was held that the scope of the privilege is
limited by its underlying purpose. Thus, where After the arrest of the appellants, the records show
the disclosure of the contents of the communication that the substance allegedly taken from them was
will not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
contents are not privileged.39 Likewise, once the examination upon request of the Chief of the SOD
identity of the informer has been disclosed to Narcotics Group, Quezon City.44 Police Inspector
those who would have cause to resent the Grace M. Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist, PNP Crime
communication, the privilege is no longer Laboratory, testified that the qualitative examination
applicable.40 she conducted manifested "positive results for
methyl amphetamine hydrochloride" with net weight
A further limitation on the applicability of the of 980.50 grams.45 This is not in dispute. The issue is
privilege, which arises from the fundamental whether the substance examined was the same as
requirements of fairness was emphasized. Where that allegedly confiscated from appellants.
the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or the
contents of his communication, is relevant and The Joint Affidavit of Arrest46 merely states that the
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is evidence confiscated was submitted to the "PNP
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the Crime Laboratory Group for qualitative examination."
privilege must give way.41 In these situations, the SPO1 Gonzales testified on direct examination that:
trial court may require disclosure and dismiss the
action if the Government withholds the information. 42 Q: When you arrested them according to
you, what other steps did you take if any?
In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to
disclosure of the identity of an informer. The problem A: We brought them to our office and we
has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls requested the crime laboratory Camp Crame
for balancing the state interest in protecting people to test the suspected shabu that we
from crimes against the individual’s right to prepare recovered from both of them.47
his defense. The balance must be adjusted by giving
due weight to the following factors, among others: On cross-examination, the defense only got this
(1) the crime charged, (2) the possible defenses, (3) statement from SPO1 Gonzales regarding the
the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, evidence allegedly confiscated:
and (4) other relevant factors.43
Q: And you immediately brought him to your
In the case at bar, the crime charged against the office at Camp Aguinaldo?
appellants is capital in character and can result in
the imposition of the death penalty. They have
foisted the defense of instigation which is in sharp A: After we gathered the evidences we
contrast to the claim of entrapment by the turned them over to our office, sir. 48
prosecution. The prosecution has to prove all the
material elements of the alleged sale of shabu  and Clearly, there was no reference to the person who
the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the submitted it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
testimony of the informer is indispensable, it should examination. It is the Memorandum-Request for
be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person Laboratory Examination49 which indicates that a
enjoy high importance in our scale of values. It certain SPO4 Castro submitted the specimen for
cannot be diminished except by a value of higher examination. However, the rest of the records of the
significance. case failed to show the role of SPO4 Castro in the
buy-bust operation, if any. In the Joint Affidavit of
V Arrest, the only participants in the operation were

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enumerated as SPO1 Gonzales as the poseur- uncorroborated story of SPO1 Gonzales that their
buyer, Police Inspector Medel M. Poñe as the team team entrapped the appellants in a buy-bust
leader with PO2 Elmer N. Sarampote and PO1 Noli operation on July 24, 1998. Our minds rest uneasy
Jingo G. Rivel as back-up support. 50 Other members on the lone testimony of SPO1 Gonzales.
of the team who acted as perimeter security were
not identified. In fact, when SPO1 Gonzales was WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a
asked during the trial as to their identities, he was quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants
only able to name another member of the team: WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @
ROBERT TIU, are ACQUITTED of the crime of
Q: When you say "team," who compose the violation of Section 15, Article III, in relation to
team? Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise
known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
A: I and more or less eight (8) person, amended, and are ordered immediately released
ma’am. from custody unless held for some other lawful
cause.
Q: Can you name the member of the team?
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement
this decision immediately and to inform this Court
A: Our team led by Inspector Medel Poñe, I
within five (5) days from receipt of this decision of
myself, PO2 Elmer Sarampote, PO1 Noli
the date the appellants are actually released from
Jingo G. Rivel, SPO3 Ronaldo Sayson, and
confinement. Costs de officio.
I can not remember the others, ma’am.51

SO ORDERED.
These are questions which cannot be met with a
lockjaw. Since SPO4 Castro appears not to be a
part of the buy-bust team, how and when did he 52 get G.R. No. 172835               December 13, 2007
hold of the specimen examined by Police Inspector
Eustaquio? Who entrusted the substance to him and AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
requested him to submit it for examination? For how vs.
long was he in possession of the evidence before he PENNSWELL, INC. Respondent.
turned it over to the PNP Crime Laboratory? Who
else had access to the specimen from the time it DECISION
was allegedly taken from appellants when arrested?
These questions should be answered satisfactorily CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
to determine whether the integrity of the evidence
was compromised in any way. Otherwise, the
prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation seeks, via the
the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the nullification of the 16 February
2006 Decision1 and the 25 May 2006 Resolution2 of
VI the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86329,
which affirmed the Order3 dated 30 June 2004 of the
Finally, the denials and proffered explanations of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 64,
appellants assume significance in light of the in Civil Case No. 00-561.
insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution.
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic
Appellant Ong testified that he was arrested on July corporation engaged in the business of air
23, 1998 when he was scheduled to meet with a transportation services. On the other hand,
certain Ong Sin for a possible job as technician in a respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to
bihon factory. On his part, appellant De Ming engage in the business of manufacturing and selling
claimed that when he was arrested on July 23, industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.
1998, he was in the area waiting for his girlfriend and
her mother who just went inside a townhouse at 8th On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to
Street, New Manila, Quezon City. His girlfriend’s petitioner sundry goods in trade, covered by Sales
mother, Avelina Cardoz, confirmed his explanation. Invoices No. 8846,4 9105,5 8962,6 and 8963,7 which
The prosecution tells a different story, the correspond to Purchase Orders No. 6433, 6684,

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6634 and 6633, respectively. Under the contracts,
)
petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to
₱449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until
the amount would be fully paid. For failure of the
3. a. EPC 81,876. 458 01/29/
petitioner to comply with its obligation under said
Trixo EPC 96 2 99
contracts, respondent filed a Complaint8 for a Sum of
htro #2 81,876. 544 04/21/
Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.
pic 96 6 99
Grea
In its Answer,9 petitioner contended that its refusal to se
pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. In b.
particular, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in Di-
the amount of ₱592,000.00 by respondent for its Elect
previous sale of four items, covered by Purchase ric
Order No. 6626. Said items were misrepresented by Stre
respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in ngth
truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner Prot
had previously purchased from respondent. ectiv
Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by e
respondent which merely altered the names and Coat
labels of such goods. Petitioner specifically identified ing
the items in question, as follows: (fake
)
Label/ Item Amount P.O Date
Description No. .
4. a. ASC- 87,346. 571 05/20/
1. a. MPL- 153,941 571 05/20/ Dry EP 52 2 99
Anti- 800 .40 4 99 Lubri ASC- 124,108 476 02/16/
Fricti MPL- 155,496 588 06/20/ cant EP .10 3 & 99 &
on 008 .00 8 99 b. 2000 589 06/24/
Fluid Anti- 0 99
b. Seiz
Exce e
llent Com
Rust poun
Corr d
osio (fake
n )
(fake
)
According to petitioner, respondent’s products,
2. a. COG 115,236 554 04/26/ namely Excellent Rust Corrosion, Connector
Cont #2 .00 0 99 Grease, Electric Strength Protective Coating, and
act CG 230,519 632 08/05/ Anti-Seize Compound, are identical with its Anti-
Grea .52 7 99 Friction Fluid, Contact Grease, Thixohtropic Grease,
se and Dry Lubricant, respectively. Petitioner
b. asseverated that had respondent been forthright
Con about the identical character of the products, it would
nect not have purchased the items complained of.
or Moreover, petitioner alleged that when the purported
Grea fraud was discovered, a conference was held
se between petitioner and respondent on 13 January
(fake 2000, whereby the parties agreed that respondent
would return to petitioner the amount it previously
paid. However, petitioner was surprised when it

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received a letter from the respondent, demanding The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning,
payment of the amount of ₱449,864.94, which later and reversed itself. It issued an Order dated 30 June
became the subject of respondent’s Complaint for 2004, finding that the chemical components are
Collection of a Sum of Money against petitioner. respondent’s trade secrets and are privileged in
character. A priori, it rationalized:
During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a
Motion to Compel10 respondent to give a detailed list The Supreme Court held in the case of Chavez vs.
of the ingredients and chemical components of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299
following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and SCRA 744, p. 764, that "the drafters of the
Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di- Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that aside
Electric Strength Protective Coating; and (c) Dry from national security matters and intelligence
Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound.11 It appears information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to
that petitioner had earlier requested the Philippine the Intellectual Property Code and other related
Institute of Pure and Applied Chemistry (PIPAC) for laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to
the latter to conduct a comparison of respondent’s the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act) are also exempted
goods. from compulsory disclosure."

On 15 March 2004, the RTC rendered an Order Trade secrets may not be the subject of compulsory
granting the petitioner’s motion. It disposed, thus: disclosure. By reason of [their] confidential and
privileged character, ingredients or chemical
The Court directs [herein respondent] Pennswell, components of the products ordered by this Court to
Inc. to give [herein petitioner] Air Philippines be disclosed constitute trade secrets lest [herein
Corporation[,] a detailed list of the ingredients or respondent] would eventually be exposed to
chemical components of the following chemical unwarranted business competition with others who
products: may imitate and market the same kinds of products
in violation of [respondent’s] proprietary rights. Being
privileged, the detailed list of ingredients or chemical
a. Contact Grease to be compared with
components may not be the subject of mode of
Connector Grease;
discovery under Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, which expressly makes privileged information
b. Thixohtropic Grease to be compared with an exception from its coverage.13
Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
c. Dry Lubricant to be compared with Anti- RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Seize Compound[.] Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the
[Respondent] Pennswell, Inc. is given fifteen (15) Order dated 30 June 2004 of the RTC.
days from receipt of this Order to submit to
[petitioner] Air Philippines Corporation the chemical The Court of Appeals ruled that to compel
components of all the above-mentioned products for respondent to reveal in detail the list of ingredients of
chemical comparison/analysis.12 its lubricants is to disregard respondent’s rights over
its trade secrets. It was categorical in declaring that
Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing the chemical formulation of respondent’s products
Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to and their ingredients are embraced within the
disclose the chemical components sought because meaning of "trade secrets." In disallowing the
the matter is confidential. It argued that what disclosure, the Court of Appeals expounded, thus:
petitioner endeavored to inquire upon constituted a
trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to The Supreme Court in Garcia v. Board of
divulge. Respondent maintained that its products are Investments (177 SCRA 374 [1989]) held that trade
specialized lubricants, and if their components were secrets and confidential, commercial and financial
revealed, its business competitors may easily imitate information are exempt from public scrutiny. This is
and market the same types of products, in violation reiterated in Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
of its proprietary rights and to its serious damage Good Government (299 SCRA 744 [1998]) where
and prejudice. the Supreme Court enumerated the kinds of
information and transactions that are recognized as

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restrictions on or privileges against compulsory All told, We find no grave abuse of discretion
disclosure. There, the Supreme Court explicitly amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
stated that: part of public respondent Judge in finding that the
detailed list of ingredients or composition of the
"The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally subject lubricant products which petitioner [Air
affirmed that, aside from national security matters Philippines Corporation] seeks to be disclosed are
and intelligence information, trade or industrial trade secrets of [respondent] Pennswell; hence,
secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code privileged against compulsory disclosure.14
and other related laws) as well as banking
transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Deposits Act) re also exempt from compulsory
disclosure." Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant Petition
before us, on the sole issue of:
It is thus clear from the foregoing that a party cannot
be compelled to produce, release or disclose WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED IN
documents, papers, or any object which are ACCORDANCE WITH PREVAILING LAWS AND
considered trade secrets. JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
In the instant case, petitioner [Air Philippines CHEMICAL COMPONENTS OR INGREDIENTS OF
Corporation] would have [respondent] Pennswell RESPONDENT’S PRODUCTS ARE TRADE
produce a detailed list of ingredients or composition SECRETS OR INDUSTRIAL SECRETS THAT ARE
of the latter’s lubricant products so that a chemical NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY
comparison and analysis thereof can be obtained. DISCLOSURE.15
On this note, We believe and so hold that the
ingredients or composition of [respondent] Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that it has a
Pennswell’s lubricants are trade secrets which it right to obtain the chemical composition and
cannot be compelled to disclose. ingredients of respondent’s products to conduct a
comparative analysis of its products. Petitioner
[Respondent] Pennswell has a proprietary or assails the conclusion reached by the Court of
economic right over the ingredients or components Appeals that the matters are trade secrets which are
of its lubricant products. The formulation thereof is protected by law and beyond public scrutiny. Relying
not known to the general public and is peculiar only on Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court,
to [respondent] Pennswell. The legitimate and petitioner argues that the use of modes of discovery
economic interests of business enterprises in operates with desirable flexibility under the
protecting their manufacturing and business secrets discretionary control of the trial court. Furthermore,
are well-recognized in our system. petitioner posits that its request is not done in bad
faith or in any manner as to annoy, embarrass, or
[Respondent] Pennswell has a right to guard its oppress respondent.
trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool,
information against the public. Otherwise, such mechanism or compound known only to its owner
information can be illegally and unfairly utilized by and those of his employees to whom it is necessary
business competitors who, through their access to to confide it.16 The definition also extends to a secret
[respondent] Pennswell’s business secrets, may use formula or process not patented, but known only to
the same for their own private gain and to the certain individuals using it in compounding some
irreparable prejudice of the latter. article of trade having a commercial value.17 A trade
secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device,
xxxx or compilation of information that: (1) is used in one's
business; and (2) gives the employer an opportunity
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
In the case before Us, the alleged trade secrets
possess the information.18 Generally, a trade secret
have a factual basis, i.e., it comprises of the
is a process or device intended for continuous use in
ingredients and formulation of [respondent]
the operation of the business, for example, a
Pennswell’s lubricant products which are unknown to
machine or formula, but can be a price list or
the public and peculiar only to Pennswell.
catalogue or specialized customer list.19 It is

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indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary were set to be such substantial factual basis that can
rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a withstand judicial scrutiny.
trade secret or similar innovation has rights therein
which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an The chemical composition, formulation, and
injunction will be granted to prevent the disclosure of ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants are
the trade secret by one who obtained the information trade secrets within the contemplation of the law.
"in confidence" or through a "confidential Respondent was established to engage in the
relationship."20 American jurisprudence has utilized business of general manufacturing and selling of,
the following factors21 to determine if an information and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of
is a trade secret, to wit: goods, wares, merchandise, products, including but
not limited to industrial chemicals, solvents,
(1) the extent to which the information is lubricants, acids, alkalies, salts, paints, oils,
known outside of the employer's business; varnishes, colors, pigments and similar preparations,
among others. It is unmistakable to our minds that
(2) the extent to which the information is the manufacture and production of respondent’s
known by employees and others involved in products proceed from a formulation of a secret list
the business; of ingredients. In the creation of its lubricants,
respondent expended efforts, skills, research, and
resources. What it had achieved by virtue of its
(3) the extent of measures taken by the
investments may not be wrested from respondent on
employer to guard the secrecy of the
the mere pretext that it is necessary for petitioner’s
information;
defense against a collection for a sum of money. By
and large, the value of the information to respondent
(4) the value of the information to the is crystal clear. The ingredients constitute the very
employer and to competitors; fabric of respondent’s production and business. No
doubt, the information is also valuable to
(5) the amount of effort or money expended respondent’s competitors. To compel its disclosure
by the company in developing the is to cripple respondent’s business, and to place it at
information; and an undue disadvantage. If the chemical composition
of respondent’s lubricants are opened to public
(6) the extent to which the information could scrutiny, it will stand to lose the backbone on which
be easily or readily obtained through an its business is founded. This would result in nothing
independent source.22 less than the probable demise of respondent’s
business. Respondent’s proprietary interest over the
In Cocoland Development Corporation v. National ingredients which it had developed and expended
Labor Relations Commission,23 the issue was the money and effort on is incontrovertible. Our
legality of an employee’s termination on the ground conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought to
of unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets. The be revealed have a commercial value to respondent.
Court laid down the rule that any determination by Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the
management as to the confidential nature of information grants it a competitive advantage; we
technologies, processes, formulae or other so-called also find that there is clearly a glaring intent on the
trade secrets must have a substantial factual basis part of respondent to keep the information
which can pass judicial scrutiny. The Court rejected confidential and not available to the prying public.
the employer’s naked contention that its own
determination as to what constitutes a trade secret We now take a look at Section 1, Rule 27 of the
should be binding and conclusive upon the NLRC. Rules of Court, which permits parties to inspect
As a caveat, the Court said that to rule otherwise documents or things upon a showing of good cause
would be to permit an employer to label almost before the court in which an action is pending. Its
anything a trade secret, and thereby create a entire provision reads:
weapon with which he/it may arbitrarily dismiss an
employee on the pretext that the latter somehow SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection
disclosed a trade secret, even if in fact there be order. – Upon motion of any party showing good
none at all to speak of. 24 Hence, in Cocoland, the cause therefore, the court in which an action is
parameters in the determination of trade secrets pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing,

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by or on behalf of the moving party, of any attorney and client; (c) communication between
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, physician and patient; (d) communication between
letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence interest. There are, however, other privileged
material to any matter involved in the action and matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among
which are in his possession, custody or control; or them are the following: (a) editors may not be
(b) order any party to permit entry upon designated compelled to disclose the source of published news;
land or other property in his possession or control for (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for
the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information
photographing the property or any designated contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank
relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall deposits. 30
specify the time, place and manner of making the
inspection and taking copies and photographs, and We, thus, rule against the petitioner. We affirm the
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the
finding of the RTC that there is substantial basis for
A more than cursory glance at the above text would respondent to seek protection of the law for its
show that the production or inspection of documents proprietary rights over the detailed chemical
or things as a mode of discovery sanctioned by the composition of its products.
Rules of Court may be availed of by any party upon
a showing of good cause therefor before the court in That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is
which an action is pending. The court may order any beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction
party: a) to produce and permit the inspection and affords to trade secrets is evident in our laws. The
copying or photographing of any designated Interim Rules of Procedure on Government
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, Rehabilitation, effective 15 December 2000, which
photographs, objects or tangible things, which are applies to: (1) petitions for rehabilitation filed by
not privileged;25 which constitute or contain evidence corporations, partnerships, and associations
material to any matter involved in the action; and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, 31 as
which are in his possession, custody or control; or b) amended; and (2) cases for rehabilitation transferred
to permit entry upon designated land or other from the Securities and Exchange Commission to
property in his possession or control for the purpose the RTCs pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799,
of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or otherwise known as The Securities Regulation
photographing the property or any designated Code, expressly provides that the court may issue
relevant object or operation thereon. an order to protect trade secrets or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the belonging to the debtor. 32 Moreover, the Securities
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, Regulation Code is explicit that the Securities and
photographs, objects or tangible things that may be Exchange Commission is not required or authorized
produced and inspected should not be to require the revelation of trade secrets or
privileged.26 The documents must not be privileged processes in any application, report or document
against disclosure.27 On the ground of public policy, filed with the Commission.33 This confidentiality is
the rules providing for production and inspection of made paramount as a limitation to the right of any
books and papers do not authorize the production or member of the general public, upon request, to have
inspection of privileged matter; that is, books and access to all information filed with the Commission.34
papers which, because of their confidential and
privileged character, could not be received in Furthermore, the Revised Penal Code endows a
evidence.28 Such a condition is in addition to the cloak of protection to trade secrets under the
requisite that the items be specifically described, and following articles:
must constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in the Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. —
party’s possession, custody or control. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any
Section 2429 of Rule 130 draws the types of manager, employee or servant who, in such
disqualification by reason of privileged capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal or
communication, to wit: (a) communication between master and shall reveal such secrets.
husband and wife; (b) communication between

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Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. — The property rights cases are not simple property
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and cases.36 Without limiting such industrial property
medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos rights to trademarks and trade names, this Court has
shall be imposed upon the person in charge, ruled that all agreements concerning intellectual
employee or workman of any manufacturing or property are intimately connected with economic
industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the development.37 The protection of industrial property
owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the encourages investments in new ideas and inventions
industry of and stimulates creative efforts for the satisfaction of
the latter. human needs. It speeds up transfer of technology
and industrialization, and thereby bring about social
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known and economic progress.38 Verily, the protection of
as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, has industrial secrets is inextricably linked to the
a restrictive provision on trade secrets, penalizing advancement of our economy and fosters healthy
the revelation thereof by internal revenue officers or competition in trade.
employees, to wit:
Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the
SECTION 278. Procuring Unlawful Divulgence of private character of trade secrets.1âwphi1 There is a
Trade Secrets. - Any person who causes or procures privilege not to disclose one’s trade
an officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal secrets.39 Foremost, this Court has declared that
Revenue to divulge any confidential information trade secrets and banking transactions are among
regarding the business, income or inheritance of any the recognized restrictions to the right of the people
taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him to information as embodied in the Constitution. 40 We
in the discharge of his official duties, and which it is said that the drafters of the Constitution also
unlawful for him to reveal, and any person who unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national
publishes or prints in any manner whatever, not security matters and intelligence information, trade
provided by law, any income, profit, loss or or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual
expenditure appearing in any income tax return, Property Code and other related laws) as well as
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of
thousand pesos (₱2,000), or suffer imprisonment of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from
not less than six (6) months nor more than five (5) compulsory disclosure.41
years, or both.
Significantly, our cases on labor are replete with
Republic Act No. 6969, or the Toxic Substances and examples of a protectionist stance towards the trade
Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, secrets of employers. For instance, this Court upheld
enacted to implement the policy of the state to the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical
regulate, restrict or prohibit the importation, company prohibiting its employees from marrying
manufacture, processing, sale, distribution, use and employees of any competitor company, on the
disposal of chemical substances and mixtures that rationalization that the company has a right to guard
present unreasonable risk and/or injury to health or its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
the environment, also contains a provision that strategies and other confidential programs and
limits the right of the public to have access to information from competitors.42 Notably, it was in a
records, reports or information concerning labor-related case that this Court made a stark ruling
chemical substances and mixtures including on the proper determination of trade secrets.
safety data submitted and data on emission or
discharge into the environment, if the matter is In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section
confidential such that it would divulge trade 7743 of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of
secrets, production or sales figures; or methods, the Philippines, in order to compel respondent to
production or processes unique to such reveal the chemical components of its products.
manufacturer, processor or distributor; or would While it is true that all consumer products
otherwise tend to affect adversely the domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or
competitive position of such manufacturer, imported, shall indicate their general make or active
processor or distributor.35 ingredients in their respective labels of packaging,
the law does not apply to respondent. Respondent’s
Clearly, in accordance with our statutory laws, this specialized lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease,
Court has declared that intellectual and industrial Connector Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric

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Strength Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti- position of such manufacturer, processor or
Seize Compound -- are not consumer products. distributor. It is true that under the same Act, the
"Consumer products," as it is defined in Article Department of Environment and Natural Resources
4(q),44 refers to goods, services and credits, debts or may release information; however, the clear import
obligations which are primarily for personal, family, of the law is that said authority is limited by the right
household or agricultural purposes, which shall to confidentiality of the manufacturer, processor or
include, but not be limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, distributor, which information may be released only
and devices. This is not the nature of respondent’s to a medical research or scientific institution where
products. Its products are not intended for personal, the information is needed for the purpose of medical
family, household or agricultural purposes. Rather, diagnosis or treatment of a person exposed to the
they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of chemical substance or mixture. The right to
aircraft propellers and engines. confidentiality is recognized by said Act as
primordial. Petitioner has not made the slightest
Petitioner’s argument that Republic Act No. 8203, or attempt to show that these circumstances are
the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs, requires the availing in the case at bar.
disclosure of the active ingredients of a drug is also
on faulty ground.45 Respondent’s products are Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court
outside the scope of the cited law. They do not come may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for
within the purview of a drug 46 which, as defined doing justice.51 We do not, however, find reason to
therein, refers to any chemical compound or except respondent’s trade secrets from the
biological substance, other than food, that is application of the rule on privilege. The revelation of
intended for use in the treatment, prevention or respondent’s trade secrets serves no better purpose
diagnosis of disease in man or animals. Again, such to the disposition of the main case pending with the
are not the characteristics of respondent’s products. RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money.
As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner received
What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC respondent’s goods in trade in the normal course of
and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical business. To be sure, there are defenses under the
formulation of respondent’s products is not known to laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner.
the general public and is unique only to it. Both On the other hand, the greater interest of justice
courts uniformly ruled that these ingredients are not ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade
within the knowledge of the public. Since such secrets. If we were to weigh the conflicting interests
factual findings are generally not reviewable by this between the parties, we rule in favor of the greater
Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all interest of respondent. Trade secrets should receive
over again the evidence already considered in the greater protection from discovery, because they
proceedings below.47 We need not delve into the derive economic value from being generally
factual bases of such findings as questions of fact unknown and not readily ascertainable by the
are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. public.52 To the mind of this Court, petitioner was not
Factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by able to show a compelling reason for us to lift the
the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on veil of confidentiality which shields respondent’s
the Supreme Court.48 trade secrets.

We do not find merit or applicability in petitioner’s WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The

invocation of Section 1249 of the Toxic Substances Decision dated 16 February 2006, and the
and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of Resolution dated 25 May 2006, of the Court of
1990, which grants the public access to records, Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86329 are AFFIRMED.
reports or information concerning chemical No costs.
substances and mixtures, including safety data
submitted, and data on emission or discharge into SO ORDERED.
the environment. To reiterate, Section 1250 of said
Act deems as confidential matters, which may not be G.R. Nos. 164368-69               April 2, 2009
made public, those that would divulge trade secrets,
including production or sales figures or methods; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
production or processes unique to such vs.
manufacturer, processor or distributor, or would JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE
otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive

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HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents. warrant of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued.

DECISION On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a

Special Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear,
BRION, J.: and decide the charges of plunder and related cases
(illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent
Estrada.3
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 to seek the
reversal of the Sandiganbayan’s Joint Resolution At the trial, the People presented testimonial and
dated July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph documentary evidence to prove the allegations of
Ejercito Estrada’s (Estrada) demurrer to evidence in the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and
Crim. Case No. 26565.2 perjury. The People’s evidence for the illegal alias
charge, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan,
consisted of:
THE FACTS

A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial

On April 4, 2001, an Information
and Industrial Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa
for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558)
G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel
was filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Curato (Curato) who commonly declared
respondent Estrada, among other accused. A
that on February 4, 2000, Estrada opened a
separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed
numbered trust account (Trust Account C-
as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against
163) with PCIB and signed as "Jose
Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case
Velarde" in the account opening documents;
No. 26565 reads:
both Ocampo and Curato also testified that
Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando Chua
That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime were present on that occasion;
prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan, who
then President of the Republic of the Philippines,
declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza
without having been duly authorized, judicially or
(Ortaliza) transacted several times with her;
administratively, taking advantage of his position and
that Ortaliza deposited several checks in
committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in
PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5
order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE
under the account name "Jose Velarde" on
ACQUIRED during his tenure and his true identity as
the following dates (as evidenced by deposit
THE President of the Republic of the Philippines, did
receipts duly marked in evidence):
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN
SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ a. 20 October 1999 (Exh.
the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his "MMMMM")
registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in
signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or b. 8 November 1999 (Exh.
other corporate entities. "LLLLL")

CONTRARY TO LAW. c. 22 November 1999 (Exh.

"NNNNN")
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were
subsequently consolidated for joint trial. Still another d. 24 November 1999 (Exh.
Information, this time for perjury and docketed as "OOOOO")
Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later e. 25 November 1999 (Exh.
consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and "PPPPP")
26565.

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
 f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. 1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented
"QQQQQ") by the prosecution, only two (2) witnesses,
Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel
g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. Curato, testified that on one occasion (4
"RRRRR") February 2000), they saw movant use the
name "Jose Velarde";
h. 29 December 1999 (Exh.
"SSSSS") 2. The use of numbered accounts and the
like was legal and was prohibited only in late
2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko
i. 4 January 2000 (Exh.
Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001,
"TTTTT")
dated 11 October 2001;
j. 10 May 2000 (Exh.
3. There is no proof of public and habitual
"UUUUU")
use of alias as the documents offered by the
prosecution are banking documents which,
k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. by their nature, are confidential and cannot
"VVVVV") be revealed without following proper
procedures; and
l. 25 July 2000 (Exh.
"WWWWW") 4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses The People opposed the demurrers through a
showing that Lucena Ortaliza was employed Consolidated Opposition that presented the following
in the Office of the Vice President and, later arguments:12
on, in the Office of the President when
Estrada occupied these positions and when
1. That the use of fictitious names in bank
deposits were made to the Jose Velarde
transaction was not expressly prohibited
Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5.
until BSP No. 302 is of no moment
considering that as early as Commonwealth
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the Act No. 142, the use of alias was already
consolidated cases, which the Sandiganbayan prohibited. Movant is being prosecuted for
admitted into evidence in a Resolution dated violation of C.A. No. 142 and not BSP
October 13, 2003.4 The accused separately moved Circular No. 302;
to reconsider the Sandiganbayan Resolution; 5 the
People, on the other hand, filed its Consolidated
2. Movant’s reliance on Ursua vs. Court of
Comment/Opposition to the motions.6 The
Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]) is
Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution
misplaced;
dated November 17, 2003.7

3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as

After the People rested in all three cases, the
amended, requires publication of the alias
defense moved to be allowed to file a demurrer to
and the habitual use thereof, the prosecution
evidence in these cases.8 In its Joint Resolution
has presented more than sufficient evidence
dated March 10, 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan only
in this regard to convict movant for illegal
granted the defense leave to file demurrers in Crim.
use of alias; and
Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and 26905
(perjury).
4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the
instant case of illegal use of alias is not
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for
absorbed in plunder.
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26905.10 His demurrer
to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of
alias) was anchored on the following grounds11: Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition
through a Consolidated Reply Opposition.

THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYAN’S RULING

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the committed on February 4, 2000 only.
Resolution now assailed in this petition. The salient Additionally, the phrase, "Estrada did …
points of the assailed resolution are: represent himself as ‘Jose Velarde’ in
several transactions," standing alone,
First – the coverage of Estrada’s indictment. The violates Estrada’s right to be informed of the
Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant nature and the cause of the accusation,
evidence for the indictment are those relating to because it is very general and vague. This
what is described in the Information – i.e., the phrase is qualified and explained by the
testimonies and documents on the opening of Trust succeeding phrase – "and use and employ
Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The the said alias ‘Jose Velarde’" – which "is
Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use of the neither his registered name at birth nor his
disjunctive "or" between "on or about 04 February baptismal name, in signing documents with
2000" and "sometime prior or subsequent thereto" Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
means that the act/s allegedly committed on entities." Thus, Estrada’s representations
February 4, 2000 could have actually taken place before persons other than those mentioned
prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of the in the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza
conjunctive was simply the prosecution’s procedural and Dichavez do not fall within the
tool to guard against any variance between the date "Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
stated in the Information and that proved during the entities" specified in the Information.
trial in a situation in which time was not a material Estrada’s representations with Ortaliza and
ingredient of the offense; it does not mean and Dichavez are not therefore covered by the
cannot be read as a roving commission that includes indictment.
acts and/or events separate and distinct from those
that took place on the single date "on or about 04 b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the
February 2000 or sometime prior or subsequent application of the principle in the law of libel
thereto." The Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of that mere communication to a third person is
the disjunctive "or" prevented it from interpreting the publicity; it reasoned out that that the
Information any other way. definition of publicity is not limited to the way
it is defined under the law on libel;
Second – the People’s failure to present evidence additionally, the application of the libel law
that proved Estrada’s commission of the offense. definition is onerous to the accused and is
The Sandiganbayan found that the People failed to precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA No.
present evidence that Estrada committed the crime 142, as a penal statute, should be construed
punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as strictly against the State and favorably for
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), the accused. It ruled that the definition under
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. the law on libel, even if it applies, considers
Court of Appeals.13 It ruled that there is an illegal use a communication to a third person covered
of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use by the privileged communication rule to be
of the alias is public and habitual. In Estrada’s case, non-actionable. Estrada’s use of the alias in
the Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the front of Ocampo and Curato is one such
principles was not as simple because of the privileged communication under R.A. No.
complications resulting from the nature of the 1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan
transaction involved – the alias was used in said:
connection with the opening of a numbered trust
account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, Movant’s act of signing "Jose Velarde" in
as amended,14 and prior to the enactment of bank documents being absolutely
Republic R.A. No. 9160.15 confidential, the witnessing thereof by bank
officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy
Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde": by the same law cannot be considered as
‘public’ as to fall within the ambit of CA 142
as amended. On account of the absolute
a. Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde"
confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be
in his dealings with Dichavez and Ortaliza
said that movant intended to be known by
after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light
this name in addition to his real name.
of the conclusion that the acts imputed to
Estrada under the Information were the act/s

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 Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity. account made before bank officers) is protected by
Ursua instructs: the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus
outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until the
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.
different name belonging to another person
in a single instance without any sign or THE PETITION
indication that the user intends to be known
by this name in addition to his real name The People filed this petition raising the following
from that day forth does not fall within the issues:
prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as amended.
1. Whether the court a quo  gravely erred
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim.
intention not to be publicly known by the Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use
name "Jose Velarde" is shown by the nature by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias
of a numbered account – a perfectly valid "Jose Velarde" was not public despite the
banking transaction at the time Trust presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and
Account C-163 was opened. The opening, Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000;
too, of a numbered trust account, the
Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not impose 2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred
on Estrada the obligation to disclose his real and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim.
identity – the obligation R.A. No. 6713 Case No. 26565 and in holding that the use
imposes is to file under oath a statement of by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias
assets and liabilities.16 Reading CA No. 142, "Jose Velarde" was allowable under banking
R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, rules, despite the clear prohibition under
Estrada had the absolute obligation to Commonwealth Act No. 142;
disclose his assets including the amount of
his bank deposits, but he was under no
obligation at all to disclose the other 3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred
particulars of the bank account (such as the and abused its discretion in dismissing Crim.
name he used to open it). Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No.
1405 as an exception to the illegal use of
alias punishable under Commonwealth Act
Third – the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. No. 142;
9160.17 The Sandiganbayan said that the absolute
prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against the use of
anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious 4. Whether the alleged harmonization and
names, and all other similar accounts, is a legislative application made by the court a quo of R.A.
acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously No.1405 and Commonwealth Act No. 142
existed in our laws that allowed depositors to hide were proper;
their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that
the prohibition was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng 5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred
Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 and abused its discretion in limiting the
– another confirmation that the opening of a coverage of the amended Information in
numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias
was opened on February 4, 2000. "Jose Velarde" by respondent Joseph
Estrada on February 4, 2000;
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA
No. 142, as interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily 6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred
be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and abused its discretion in departing from
and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every its earlier final finding on the non-
statute should be construed in a way that will applicability of Ursua v. Court of
harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable Appeals and forcing its application to the
scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws instant case.
in relation to the present case, led it to conclude that
the use of an alias within the context of a bank THE COURT’S RULING
transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
The petition has no merit. within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as
amended."18
The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua
Ruling Ursua further relates the historical background and
rationale that led to the enactment of CA No. 142, as
Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read: follows:

Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily
cinema, television, radio or other entertainment to curb the common practice among the Chinese of
purposes and in athletic events where the use of adopting scores of different names and aliases
pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no which created tremendous confusion in the field of
person shall use any name different from the one trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime
with which he was registered at birth in the office of of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons
the local civil registry or with which he was baptized could not be successfully maintained against the
for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they
was registered in the bureau of immigration upon possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No.
entry; or such substitute name as may have been 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name,
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That unless such alias was duly authorized by proper
persons whose births have not been registered in judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil
any local civil registry and who have not been register.19
baptized, have one year from the approval of this act
within which to register their names in the civil Following the doctrine of stare decisis, 20 we are
registry of their residence. The name shall comprise guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime
the patronymic name and one or two surnames. punished under CA No. 142 may be committed.
Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall unavoidable in the application of and the
apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a
change of name and no person shall be allowed to Among the many grounds the People invokes to
secure such judicial authority for more than one avoid the application of the Ursua ruling proceeds
alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the from Estrada’s position in the government; at the
person's baptismal and family name and the name time of the commission of the offense, he was the
recorded in the civil registry, if different, his President of the Republic who is required by law to
immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if disclose his true name. We do not find this argument
he has such names other than his original or real sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the the street, on one hand, and the President of the
desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA
alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's No. 142. In the first place, the law does not make
name shall be recorded in the proper local civil any distinction, expressly or impliedly, that would
registry, and no person shall use any name or justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied
names other than his original or real name unless to Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or
the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has
civil registry. used even when he was already the President of the
Philippines. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to
How this law is violated has been answered by the the use of the screen name of the accused, as
Ursua definition of an alias – "a name or names shown by the title of the present petition.
used by a person or intended to be used by him Additionally, any distinction we make based on the
publicly and habitually usually in business People’s claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is
transactions in addition to his real name by which he proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as
is registered at birth or baptized the first time or a penal statute, should be construed strictly against
substitute name authorized by a competent the State and in favor of the accused. 21 The mode of
authority." There must be, in the words of Ursua, a violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever
"sign or indication that the user intends to be known the accused may be.
by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name
from that day forth … [for the use of alias to] fall

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The People also calls our attention to an earlier time before final judgment.26 Perez v. Court of
Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated February 6, Appeals,27 albeit a civil case, instructively teaches
2002) denying Estrada’s motion to quash the that an interlocutory order carries no res adjudicata
Information. This earlier Resolution effectively effects. Says Perez:
rejected the application of Ursua under the following
tenor: The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved
only an interlocutory matter, the principle of res
The use of the term "alias" in the Amended judicata cannot be applied in this case. There can
Information in itself serves to bring this case outside be no res judicata where the previous order in
the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court question was not an order or judgment determinative
of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the of an issue of fact pending before the court but was
accused heavily relies in his motion to quash. The only an interlocutory order because it required the
term "alias" means "otherwise known as" (Webster parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication.
Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved
The charge of using an "alias" logically implies that the way for the possession of the fishpond on the
another name has been used publicly and habitually. part of petitioners and/or their representatives
Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In pending the resolution of the main action for
any case, the amended information adverts to injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether
"several transactions" and signing of documents with or not private respondent may be considered a
the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to
entities where the above-mentioned alias was possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the
allegedly employed by the accused. case had yet to be resolved when the restraining
order was lifted.28
The facts alleged in the information are distinctly
different from facts established in the Ursua case Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the
where another name was used by the accused in a Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of
single instance without any sign or indication that the Information to determine the sufficiency of these
that [sic] he intended to be known from that day by allegations and did not consider any evidence
this name in addition to his real name.22 aliunde. This is far different from the present
demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely a fuller view of the prosecution’s case, and was
abused its discretion in applying Ursua faced with the issue of whether the prosecution’s
notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on its non- evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of
applicability – a ruling that binds the parties in the the Information. Under these differing views, the
present case. The People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion
Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing on the application of Ursua, the leading case in the
its discretion when it resurrected the application of application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not
Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final per se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That
ruling. there is no error of law is strengthened by our
consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the
application of Ursua.
We find no merit in this argument for two
reasons. First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is
a mere interlocutory order – a ruling denying a In an exercise of caution given Ursua’s
motion to quash23 – that cannot be given the jurisprudential binding effect, the People also argues
attributes of finality and immutability that are in its petition that Estrada’s case is different from
generally accorded to judgments or orders that Ursua’s for the following reasons: (1) respondent
finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters Estrada used and intended to continually use the
in, a case.24 The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere alias "Jose Velarde" in addition to the name "Joseph
interlocutory order because its effects would only be Estrada"; (2) Estrada’s use of the alias was not
provisional in character, and would still require the isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the
issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings in use of the alias "Jose Velarde" was designed to
order to put the controversy to rest. 25 It is basic cause and did cause "confusion and fraud in
remedial law that an interlocutory order is always business transactions" which the anti-alias law and
under the control of the court and may be modified its related statutes seek to prevent. The People also
or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any argues that the evidence it presented more than

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as shaped the time-tested rule that when the "time"
amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or given in the complaint is not of the essence of the
established that Estrada’s use of the alias was offense, the time of the commission of the offense
public. does not need to be proven as alleged, and that the
complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that
In light of our above conclusions and based on the the offense was committed at any time within the
parties’ expressed positions, we shall now examine period of the statute of limitations and before the
within the Ursua framework the assailed commencement of the action (citing People v.
Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US
evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of
to show that the evidence it presented with the the commission of an offense are liberally
Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, interpreted, the People posits that the
particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
in the use of an alias. disregarding the additional clause "prior to or
subsequent thereto"; under the liberality principle,
the allegations of the acts constitutive of the offense
What is the coverage of the indictment?
finally determine the sufficiency of the allegations of
time. The People thus claims that no surprise could
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely have taken place that would prevent Estrada from
erred and abused its discretion in limiting the properly defending himself; the information fully
coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case notified him that he was being accused of using the
No. 26565 to Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance.
Velarde" on February 4, 2000. It posits that there
was a main transaction – one that took place on
We see no merit in these arguments.
February 4, 2000 – but there were other transactions
covered by the phrase "prior to or subsequent
thereto; the Information specifically referred to At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature – the
"several transactions" … "with Equitable PCI Bank right of Estrada to be informed of the nature and
and/or other corporate entities." To the People, the cause of the accusation against him. Under the
restrictive finding – that the phrase "prior to or provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this
subsequent thereto" is absorbed by the phrase "on constitutional right, a complaint or information is
or about 04 February 2000" – drastically amends the sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
succeeding main allegations on the constitutive designation of the offense given by the statute; the
criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
transactions involved and the documents signed with offense in the name of the offended party; the
various entities; there is the undeniable essential approximate date of the commission of the offense;
relationship between the allegations of the and the place where the offense was
multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the committed.29 As to the cause of accusation, the acts
additional antecedent of "prior to or subsequent or omissions complained of as constituting the
thereto," on the other. It argues that the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase "prior to or circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
subsequent thereto" into a useless appendage, concise language and not necessarily in the
providing Estrada with a convenient and totally language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient
unwarranted escape route. to enable a person of common understanding to
know the offense charged and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances, and for the court to
The People further argues that the allegation of time
pronounce judgment.30 The date of the commission
is the least exacting in satisfying the constitutional
of the offense need not be precisely stated in the
requirement that the accused has to be informed of
complaint or information except when the precise
the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule 110 of
date is a material ingredient of the offense. The
the Revised Rules of Court provides that an
offense may be alleged to have been committed on
allegation of the approximate date of the commission
a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the
commission.31
same Rule provides that it is not necessary to state
in the complaint or information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material The information must at all times embody the
ingredient of the crime. This liberality allegedly essential elements of the crime charged by setting

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EVIDENCE: Feb 04, 2023
forth the facts and circumstances that bear on the very different (and would have been clearly in accord
culpability and liability of the accused so that he can with the People’s present interpretation) had the
properly prepare for and undertake his defense. 32 In Information simply used "AND" instead of "OR" to
short, the allegations in the complaint or information, separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various
as written, must fully inform or acquaint the accused transactions occurring on various dates and
– the primary reader of and the party directly occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could
affected by the complaint or information – of the not be disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the
charge/s laid. imprecision in the use of "OR" is the reality the case
has to live with. To act contrary to this reality would
The heretofore cited Information states that "… on or violate Estrada’s right to be informed of the nature
about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or and cause of accusation against him; the multiple
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines transactions on several separate days that the
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, People claims would result in surprise and denial of
the above-named accused [did] … willfully, an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a
unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS right to rely on the single day mentioned in the
‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS Information.
AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde"
which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his Separately from the constitutional dimension of the
baptismal name, in signing documents with allegation of time in the Information, another issue
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." that the allegation of time and our above conclusion
raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a
We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan’s violation of the offense charged, were actually
reading of the Information, as this was how the alleged in the Information.1avvphi1
accused might have similarly read and understood
the allegations in the Information and, on this basis, The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on
prepared his defense. Broken down into its the People’s case, as it deals a fatal blow on the
component parts, the allegation of time in the People’s claim that Estrada habitually used the Jose
Information plainly states that (1) ON February 4, Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated use of
2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR an alias within a single day cannot be deemed
sometime prior or subsequent to February 4, 2000, "habitual," as it does not amount to a customary
in the City of Manila, Estrada represented himself as practice or use. This reason alone dictates the
"Jose Velarde" in several transactions in signing dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other terms of Ursua.
corporate entities.
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and
Under this analysis, the several transactions the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
involving the signing of documents with Equitable and R.A. No. 9160.
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their
reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.
on or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus
plainly implying that all these transactions took place The People claims that even on the assumption that
only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date Ocampo and Curato are bank officers sworn to
sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be secrecy under the law, the presence of two other
sure, the Information could have simply said "on or persons who are not bank officers – Aprodicio
about February 4, 2000" to capture all the alternative Laquian and Fernando Chua – when Estrada’s
approximate dates, so that the phrase "sometime signed the bank documents as "Jose Velarde"
prior or subsequent thereto" would effectively be a amounted to a "public" use of an alias that violates
surplusage that has no meaning separately from the CA No. 142.
"on or about" already expressed. This consequent
uselessness of the "prior or subsequent thereto"
phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and On the issue of numbered accounts, the People
necessary consequence of the use of the "OR" argues that to premise the validity of Estrada’s
between the two phrases and the "THERETO" that prosecution for violation of CA No. 142 on a mere
referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and
phrase. Of course, the reading would have been constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no banking
law provision allowing the use of aliases in the

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opening of bank accounts existed; at most, it was The People further argues that the Sandiganbayan’s
allowed by mere convention or industry practice, but conclusion that the transaction or communication
not by a statute enacted by the legislature. was privileged in nature was erroneous – a
Additionally, that Estrada’s prosecution was congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No.
supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated 1405 shows that a person who signs in a public or
October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as private transaction a name or alias, other than his
Estrada stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, original name or the alias he is authorized to use,
penalized since 1936, and not with a violation of a shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while
mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank the bank employees are bound by the confidentiality
transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed of bank transactions except in the circumstances
is inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, enumerated in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the People
the use of an alias (except for certain purposes argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank
which do not include banking) was already employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the
prohibited. Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use law does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and
of aliases in banking transactions, since the law did making public his use of an alias to other people,
not distinguish or limit its application; it was therefore including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he
grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have done so. made a public exhibit and use of the alias before
Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.
issuances cannot amend, modify or prevail over the
effective, subsisting and enforceable provision of CA Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan
No. 142. ruling that the use of an alias before bank officers
does not violate CA No. 142 effectively encourages
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 the commission of wrongdoing and the concealment
and its relationship with CA No. 142, that since of ill-gotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an
nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of an alias, anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion silence bank officials and employees from reporting
when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to the commission of crimes. The People contends that
CA No. 142’s coverage. Harmonization of laws, the the law – R.A. No. 1405 – was not intended by the
People posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or
be harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or camouflage for the commission of crimes and cannot
are at least related with one another. The three laws be so interpreted; the law can only be interpreted,
which the Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not understood and applied so that right and justice
remotely related to one another; they each deal with would prevail.
a different subject matter, prohibits a different act,
governs a different conduct, and covers a different We see no merit in these arguments.
class of persons,33 and there was no need to force
their application to one another. Harmonization of We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the
laws, the People adds, presupposes the existence of Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of
conflict or incongruence between or among the libel – that mere communication to a third person is
provisions of various laws, a situation not obtaining publicity – does not apply to violations of CA No.
in the present case. 142. Our close reading of Ursua – particularly, the
requirement that there be intention by the user to be
The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not culpable and the historical reasons we cited above –
apply to trust transactions, such as Trust Account tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias
No. C-163, as it applies only to traditional deposits is more than mere communication to a third person;
(simple loans). A trust account, according to the the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be
People, may not be considered a deposit because it made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to
does not create the juridical relation of creditor and cause it to become generally known. In order to be
debtor; trust and deposit operations are treated held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of
separately and are different in legal contemplation; the alias must have held himself out as a person
trust operation is separate and distinct from banking who shall publicly be known under that other name.
and requires a grant of separate authority, and trust In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias
funds are not covered by deposit insurance under must be manifest.
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation law
(R.A. No. 3591, as amended).

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To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua If the money deposited under an account may be
when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened used by bank for authorized loans to third persons,
Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily then such account, regardless of whether it creates
indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor
as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and the bank, falls under the category of accounts
and Chua were not part of the public who had no which the law precisely seeks to protect for the
access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential purpose of boosting the economic development of
matters that transpired in Malacañan where he sat the country.
as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with
whom he shared matters of the highest and strictest Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such
confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound account. The Trust Agreement between petitioner
by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and Urban Bank provides that the trust account
and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. covers "deposit, placement or investment of
Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his funds" by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner.
signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption The money deposited under Trust Account No. 858,
by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with
inside the room at that time. The same holds true for the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold
Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and that this type of account is not protected by R.A.
Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these 1405 would encourage private hoarding of funds that
representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s could otherwise be invested by bank in other
representations to these people were made in ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.
privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of
publicity. Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly
shows that the term "deposits" was intended to be
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the understood broadly:
indictment rests, affords Estrada a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as the alleged criminal act SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with
related to the opening of a trust account – a bank or banking institutions in the Philippines
transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely including investments in bonds issued by the
confidential in nature.34 We previously rejected, in Government of the Philippines, its political
Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,35 the People’s nitpicking subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank considered as of an absolutely confidential nature
deposits and trust transactions, when we said: and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by
any person, government official, bureau or
The contention that trust accounts are not covered office, except upon written permission of the
by the term "deposits," as used in R.A. 1405, by the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon
mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
relationship between the trustor and the bank, does dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
not lie. An examination of the law shows that the cases where the money deposited or invested is
term "deposits" used therein is to be understood the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and
broadly and not limited only to accounts which give underscoring supplied)1avvphi1
rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the
depositor and the bank. The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any
restrictive interpretation of "deposits." Moreover, it is
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1: clear from the immediately quoted provision that,
generally, the law applies not only to money which is
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of deposited but also to those which are invested. This
the Government to give encouragement to the further shows that the law was not intended to apply
people to deposit their money in banking institutions only to "deposits" in the strict sense of the
and to discourage private hoarding so that the same word.lawphil.net Otherwise, there would have been
may be properly utilized by banks in authorized no need to add the phrase "or invested.
loans to assist in the economic development of the
country. (Underscoring supplied) Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to
cover Trust Account No. 858.36

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We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under occupied the highest executive position in the land
R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) was valid and legal; we simply determined, as the
are statutorily protected or recognized zones of Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable
privacy.37 Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of for the offense charged based on the evidence the
signing the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to People presented. As with any other accused, his
the opening of the trust account, the People cannot guilt must be based on the evidence and proof
claim that there was already a public use of alias beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal
when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this
We need not even consider here the impact of the burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law
obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank requires that we so declare. We do so now in this
officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy review and accordingly find no reversible error of law
situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of in the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.
transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and
secrecy effectively negate a conclusion that the WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the
transaction was done publicly or with the intent to petition for lack of merit.
use the alias publicly.
SO ORDERED.
The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand,
is a significant development only because it clearly G.R. No. 174141               June 26, 2009
manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered
accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted
banking transactions, whether they be allowed by PENTAGON STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an vs.
indictment against Estrada using this relatively COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR
recent law cannot be maintained without violating RELATIONS COMMISSION and PERFECTO
the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and BALOGO, Respondents.
use of ex post facto laws.38
DECISION
We hasten to add that this holistic application and
interpretation of these various laws is not an attempt Before this Court is the Petition for Review on
to harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
the offense punished under CA No. 142 must by Pentagon Steel Corporation (the petitioner). It
necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for seeks to set aside:
culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application of
R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because Estrada’s (a) the Decision of the Court of Appeals
use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that (CA) dated June 28, 20062 modifying the
the law considers private or, at the very least, where Decision of the National Labor Relations
the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of Commission (NLRC) dated January 31,
privacy to the parties to the transactions; it is at this 2005;3 and
point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially interfaces with
an indictment under CA 142. In this light, there is no (b) the Resolution of the CA dated August
actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. 15, 2006,4 denying the motion for
No. 1405 that requires harmonization. Each reconsideration that the petitioner
operates within its own sphere, but must necessarily subsequently filed.
be read together when these spheres interface with
one another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
recent vintage in relation to the indictment against
Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing factor
in his indictment. The petitioner, a corporation engaged in the
manufacture of G.I. wire and nails, employed
respondent Perfecto Balogo (the respondent) since
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we
September 1, 1979 in its wire drawing department.
simply looked at the totality of the circumstances
The petitioner alleged that the respondent absented
obtaining in Estrada’s use of the alias "Jose Velarde"
himself from work on August 7, 2002 without giving
vis-à-vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide
prior notice of his absence. As a result, the petitioner
here whether Estrada’s use of an alias when he
sent him a letter by registered mail dated August 12,

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2002, written in Filipino, requiring an explanation for On October 27, 2003, the labor arbiter rendered his
his absence. The petitioner sent another letter to the decision dismissing the illegal dismissal charge, but
respondent on August 21, 2002, also by registered directed the petitioner "to pay the complainant his
mail, informing him that he had been absent without SIL and 13th month pay in the amount of Five
official leave (AWOL) from August 7, 2002 to August Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Six Pesos and 66/100
21, 2002. Other letters were sent to the respondent (₱5,166.66)."8
by registered mail, all pointing out his absences;
however, the respondent failed to respond. Thus, the In dismissing the respondent’s claim of illegal
petitioner considered him on AWOL from August 7, dismissal, the labor arbiter found that no dismissal
2002.5 took place; thus, the petitioner never carried the
burden of proving the legality of a dismissal. The
On September 13, 2002, the respondent filed a labor arbiter noted that the respondent’s allegation
complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC that he reported for work is not reliable for lack of
for underpayment/nonpayment of salaries and corroborating evidence, as the respondent in fact
wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive failed to respond to the petitioner’s memoranda.
leave, 13th month pay, separation pay, and ECOLA. Thus, the decision was confined to the directive to
The respondent alleged that on August 6, 2002, he pay service incentive leave and 13th month pay.
contracted flu associated with diarrhea and suffered
loose bowel movement due to the infection. The The NLRC Ruling
respondent maintained that his illness had prevented
him from reporting for work for ten (10) days. When The respondent appealed the labor arbiter’s decision
the respondent finally reported for work on August to the NLRC on November 14, 2003, specifically
17, 2002, the petitioner refused to take him back questioning the ruling that no illegal dismissal took
despite the medical certificate he submitted. On place. On January 31, 2005, the NLRC Third
August 19, 2002, the respondent again reported for Division vacated and set aside the decision of the
work, exhibiting a note from his doctor indicating that labor arbiter.9 The decision directed the company to
he was fit to work. The petitioner, however, did not pay the respondent separation pay, backwages,
allow him to resume work on the same date. 13th month pay, and service incentive leave.10
Subsequently, the respondent again reported for
work on August 21 and 23, 2002 and October 10
and 18, 2002, to no avail. He was thus driven to file The NLRC ruled that the petitioner’s defense of
a complaint against the petitioner.6 abandonment has no legal basis since there was no
clear intent on the respondent’s part to sever the
employer-employee relationship. The NLRC found it
During the conciliation proceedings on October 9, difficult to accept the petitioner’s allegation that the
2002, the respondent presented the medical respondent absented himself for unknown reasons;
certificate covering his period of absence. The this kind of action is inconsistent with the
petitioner required him, however, to submit himself respondent’s twenty-three (23) years of service and
to the company physician to determine whether he lack of derogatory record during these years. As a
was fit to return to work in accordance with existing consequence, the NLRC held that the respondent
policies. On October 22, 2002, still during the was illegally dismissed. Together with this
conciliation proceedings, the respondent presented conclusion, however, the NLRC also considered the
a medical certificate issued by the company strained relationship existing between the parties
physician; according to the petitioner, the and, for this reason, awarded separation pay in lieu
respondent refused to return to work and insisted of reinstatement, in addition to backwages. On
that he be paid his separation pay. The petitioner March 31, 2005, the NLRC denied the petitioner’s
refused the respondent’s demand for separation pay motion for reconsideration.
for lack of basis.
The CA Ruling
On January 20, 2003, the respondent formally
amended his complaint to include his claim of illegal
dismissal.7 On May 6, 2006, the petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari11 with the CA, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling
The Labor Arbiter Ruling that illegal dismissal took place, and in awarding the
respondent separation pay and backwages.

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In a Decision dated June 28, 2006, the CA affirmed 2) in declaring that respondent was illegally
the NLRC’s finding that the dismissal was illegal, but dismissed by the petitioner; and
modified the challenged decision by adding
reinstatement and the payment of "full backwages, 3) in ordering that respondent be reinstated
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their to his former position with backwages.
monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time THE COURT’S RULING
of his actual reinstatement."12
We do not find the petition meritorious.
The CA held that the respondent was constructively
dismissed when the petitioner repeatedly refused to
accept the respondent back to work despite the valid Before going into the substantive merits of the
medical reason that justified his absence from work. controversy, we shall first resolve the propriety of the
The CA concluded that the respondent complied CA’s consideration of the proceedings that
with the petitioner’s directive to submit a written transpired during the mandatory preliminary
explanation when the former presented the medical conference of the case.
certificate to explain his absences.
Statements and/or agreements made at conciliation
The CA also disregarded the petitioner’s charge of proceedings are privileged and cannot be used as
abandonment against the respondent. The appellate evidence
court ruled that the petitioner failed to prove a clear
and deliberate intent on the respondent’s part to The petitioner contends that the CA cannot use the
discontinue working with no intention of returning. parties’ actions and/or agreements during the
The CA took note of the respondent’s eagerness to negotiation for a compromise agreement as basis for
return to work when he obtained a note from his the conclusion that the respondent was illegally
doctor about his fitness to return to work. The CA dismissed because an offer of compromise is not
also ruled that the respondent’s filing of a complaint admissible in evidence under Section 27, Rule 130
for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement of the Rules of Court.14
manifested his desire to return to his job, thus
negating the petitioner’s charge of abandonment. We agree with the petitioner, but for a different
reason. The correct reason for the CA’s error in
The CA, however, disagreed with the NLRC’s considering the actions and agreements during the
application of the doctrine of "strained relations," conciliation proceedings before the labor arbiter is
citing jurisprudence that the doctrine should be Article 233 of the Labor Code which states that
strictly applied in order not to deprive an illegally "[i]nformation and statements made at conciliation
dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. proceedings shall be treated as privileged
The CA also held that to deny the respondent the communication and shall not be used as evidence in
benefits due from his long service with the company the Commission. Conciliators and similar officials
would be very harsh since his long service would not shall not testify in any court or body regarding any
be amply compensated by giving him only matters taken up at conciliation proceedings
separation pay. conducted by them." This was the provision we cited
in Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision, Labor15 when we pointedly disallowed the award
but the CA denied the motion for lack of merit in the made by the public respondent Secretary; the award
Resolution dated August 15, 2006.13 was based on the information NCMB Administrator
Olalia secured from the confidential position given
him by the company during conciliation.
In this present petition, the petitioner imputes grave
abuse of discretion against the CA:
In the present case, we find that the CA did indeed
consider the statements the parties made during
1) in basing its decision on the proceedings conciliation; thus, the CA erred by considering
that transpired when the parties were excluded materials in arriving at its conclusion. The
negotiating for a compromise agreement reasons behind the exclusion are two-fold.
during the preliminary conference of the
case;

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First, since the law favors the settlement of of intention that cannot be lightly presumed from
controversies out of court, a person is entitled to equivocal acts.21 To constitute abandonment, two
"buy his or her peace" without danger of being elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for
prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any work or absence without valid or justifiable reason,
communication made toward that end will be and (2) a clear intent, manifested through overt acts,
regarded as privileged.16 Indeed, if every offer to buy to sever the employer-employee relationship. The
peace could be used as evidence against a person employer bears the burden of showing a deliberate
who presents it, many settlements would be and unjustified refusal by the employee to resume
prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, his employment without any intention of returning. 22
since no prudent person would dare offer or
entertain a compromise if his or her compromise We agree with the CA that the petitioner failed to
position could be exploited as a confession of prove the charge of abandonment.
weakness.17
First, the respondent had a valid reason for
Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant absenting himself from work. The respondent
because they are not intended as admissions by the presented a medical certificate from his doctor
parties making them.18 A true offer of compromise attesting to the fact that he was sick with flu
does not, in legal contemplation, involve an associated with diarrhea or loose bowel movement
admission on the part of a defendant that he or she which prevented him from reporting for work for 10
is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that his or days. The petitioner never effectively refuted the
her claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it is respondent’s reason for his absence. We thus
made with a view to avoid controversy and save the concur with the CA’s view that the respondent
expense of litigation. It is the distinguishing mark of submitted a valid reason for his absence and
an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively, thereby substantially complied with the petitioner’s
hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual requirement of a written explanation. We quote with
concessions.19 approval the following discussion in the CA’s
decision:
While we agree with the petitioner that the CA
should not have considered the agreements and/or In his case, Balogo should be judged as having fully
statements made by the parties during the complied with the petitioner’s directive by his
conciliation proceedings, the CA’s conclusion on presenting of the medical certificate to justify or
illegal dismissal, however, was not grounded solely explain his absences because the medical certificate
on the parties’ statements during conciliation, but already constituted the required "written
was amply supported by other evidence on record, explanation." Another written explanation from him
which we discuss below. Based on these other would be superfluous and even redundant if the
pieces of evidence, the respondent was illegally facts already appearing in the medical certificate
dismissed; hence, our ruling regarding the statement would inevitably be stated again in that other written
made during conciliation has no effect at all on our explanation.
final conclusion.
Why the petitioner persistently refused to accept
Respondent did not abandon his job Balogo back despite his presentation of the medical
certificate and the doctor’s note about his fitness to
The rule is that the burden of proof lies with the work was not credibly explained by the petitioner.
employer to show that the dismissal was for a just The refusal is indicative of the petitioner’s ill motive
cause.20 In the present case, the petitioner claims towards him, using the lack of written explanation as
that there was no illegal dismissal since the a clever ruse to terminate Balogo’s employment.
respondent abandoned his job. The petitioner points
out that it wrote the respondent various memoranda Second, there was no clear intention on the
requiring him to explain why he incurred absences respondent’s part to sever the employer-employee
without leave, and requiring him as well to report for relationship. Considering that "intention" is a mental
work; the respondent, however, never bothered to state, the petitioner must show that the respondent’s
reply in writing. overt acts point unerringly to his intent not to work
anymore.23 In this case, we see no reason to depart
In evaluating a charge of abandonment, the from the unanimous factual findings of the NLRC
jurisprudential rule is that abandonment is a matter and the CA that the respondent’s actions after his

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absence from work for ten (10) days due to illness accept the employee back despite his having a valid
showed his willingness to return to work. Both reason for his absence from work, illegal dismissal
tribunals found that after the respondent presented results because the employee is thus prevented
his medical certificate to the petitioner to explain his from returning to work under the façade of a violation
absence, he even went back to his doctor for a of a company directive.
certification that he was already fit to return to work.
These findings of fact we duly accept as findings that A dismissal effected through the fig leaf of an
we must not only respect, but consider as final, since alleged violation of a company directive is no less
they are supported by substantial evidence.24 than an actual illegal dismissal that jurisprudence
has labeled as a constructive dismissal. Hyatt Taxi
In addition, the respondent’s filing of the amended Services, Inc. v. Catinoy27 describes this type of
complaint for illegal dismissal on January 20, 2003 company action when it ruled that "[c]onstructive
strongly speaks against the petitioner’s charge of dismissal does not always involve forthright
abandonment, for it is illogical for an employee to dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation,
abandon his employment and, thereafter, file a benefit and privileges – there may be constructive
complaint for illegal dismissal. dismissal if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so
That abandonment is negated finds support in a long unbearable on the part of the employee that it could
line of cases where the immediate filing of a foreclose any choice by him except to forego his
complaint for illegal dismissal was coupled with a continued employment."
prayer for reinstatement; the filing of the complaint
for illegal dismissal is proof enough of the desire to The respondent’s situation is no different from what
return to work.25 The prayer for reinstatement, as in Hyatt defined, given the result of the petitioner’s
this case, speaks against any intent to sever the action and the attendant insensibility and disdain the
employer-employee relationship.26 employer exhibited. We significantly note that by
reporting for work repeatedly, the respondent
We additionally take note of the undisputed fact that manifested his willingness to comply with the
the respondent had been in the petitioner’s employ petitioner’s rules and regulations and his desire to
for 23 years. Prior to his dismissal, the respondent’s continue working for the latter. The petitioner,
service record was unblemished having had no however, barred him from resuming his work under
record of infraction of company rules. As the NLRC the pretext that he had violated a company directive.
correctly held, we find it difficult to accept the This is a clear manifestation of the petitioner’s lack
petitioner’s allegation that the respondent absented of respect and consideration for the respondent who
himself for unjustifiable reasons with the intent to had long served the company without blemish, but
abandon his job. To our mind, abandonment after who had to absent himself because of
the respondent’s long years of service and the illness.1avvphi1 The petitioner’s actions, under
consequent surrender of benefits earned from years these circumstances, constitute constructive
of hard work are highly unlikely. Under the given dismissal.28
facts, no basis in reason exists for the petitioner’s
theory that the respondent abandoned his job. The respondent’s illegal dismissal carries the legal
consequence defined under Article 279 of the Labor
Respondent was constructively dismissed Code: the illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive
The above conclusion necessarily leads us to
of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
sustain the NLRC’s finding, as affirmed by the CA,
equivalent, computed from the time his
that the respondent was dismissed without just
compensation was withheld from him up to the time
cause. Again, we quote with approval the CA’s
of his actual reinstatement.29 The imposition of this
disquisition:
legal consequence is a matter of law that allows no
discretion on the part of the decision maker, except
That Balogo was dismissed in contravention of the only to the extent recognized by the law itself as
letter and spirit of the Constitution and the Labor expressed in jurisprudence.
Code on the security of tenure guaranteed to him as
employee is clear for us. A dismissal need not be
Respondent is entitled to reinstatement not
expressed orally or in writing, for it can also be
separation pay
implied. When the employer continuously refuses to

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As the CA correctly ruled, the NLRC erred when it respondent’s past years of service, but will deprive
awarded separation pay instead of reinstatement. the respondent of compensation for the future
The circumstances in this case do not warrant an productive years that his security of tenure protects.
exception to the rule that reinstatement is the We take note, too, that the respondent, after 23
consequence of an illegal dismissal. years of service, shall in a few years retire; any
separation pay paid at this point cannot equal the
First. The existence of strained relations between retirement pay due the respondent upon retirement.
the parties was not clearly established. We have
consistently ruled that the doctrine of strained For all these reasons, we uphold the CA ruling that
relations cannot be used recklessly or applied the respondent should be reinstated to his former
loosely to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of position or to a substantially equivalent position
his means of livelihood and deny him reinstatement. without loss of seniority rights.
Since the application of this doctrine will result in the
deprivation of employment despite the absence of WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby
just cause, the implementation of the doctrine of DENY the petition, and, consequently, AFFIRM the
strained relationship must be supplemented by the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 28,
rule that the existence of a strained relationship is for 2006 and its Resolution dated August 15, 2006 in
the employer to clearly establish and prove in the CA-G.R. SP No. 89587.
manner it is called upon to prove the existence of a
just cause; the degree of hostility attendant to a SO ORDERED.
litigation is not, by itself, sufficient proof of the
existence of strained relations that would rule out the
possibility of reinstatement.30 Indeed, labor disputes
almost always result in "strained relations," and the
phrase cannot be given an overarching
interpretation; otherwise, an unjustly dismissed
employee can never be reinstated.31

In the present case, we find no evidentiary support

for the conclusion that strained relations existed
between the parties. To be sure, the petitioner did
not raise the defense of strained relationship with the
respondent before the labor arbiter. Consequently,
this issue – factual in nature – was not the subject of
evidence on the part of both the petitioner and the
respondent. There thus exists no competent
evidence on which to base the conclusion that the
relationship between the petitioner and the
respondent has reached the point where their
relationship is now best severed. 32 We agree with
the CA’s specific finding that the conflict, if any,
occasioned by the respondent’s filing of an illegal
dismissal case, does not merit the severance of the
employee-employer relationship between the
parties.

Second. The records disclose that respondent has

been in the petitioner’s employ for 23 years and has
no previous record of inefficiency or infraction of
company rules prior to his illegal dismissal from
service. We significantly note that payment of
separation pay in lieu of respondent’s reinstatement
will work injustice to the latter when considered with
his long and devoted years in the petitioner’s
service. Separation pay may take into account the

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