25 - Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L-18727, August 31, 1964

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Title (with GR Cui v. Cui, G.R. No.

L-18727, August 31, 1964


No. and Date)

Ponente MAKALINTAL, J.:

Doctrine The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed
and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license
officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence

Facts Pedro and Benigna Cui died and Administration of Hospicio was left to Mauricio Cui and
Dioniso Jakosalem, and upon death of latter passed to Dr. Teodorico Cui (only son of
Mauricio)

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of
Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui
(Funder of Hospicio de Barili).

On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in
favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and
embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his
oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or
of his brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a
letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13
September 1960, the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the
complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same
office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the
founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications
to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal
circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation.
However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the
one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que
posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta
de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado."

Contentions Petitioner [Jose Ma] Respondent [Antonio]

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
Bachelor of Laws from the University of member of the Bar and although disbarred
Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a by this Court on 29 March 1957
member of the Bar, not having passed (administrative case No. 141), was
the examinations to qualify him as one reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10
February 1960, about two weeks before he
assumed the position of administrator of
the Hospicio de Barili.
Lower Courts "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used
in the deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it
should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law
degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. Thus in favor of the plaintiff.

Appellate Court

Issue/s 1 .What is “Titulo de Abogado”

2. Who among the plaintiff and Defendant is entitled to administer the foundation?

SC Ruling 1.

titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of


Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as
"testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion". A
Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain
academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The
English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and
general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license
officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority
of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar
examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of
Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as
evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations
has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university,
officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however,
possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed
courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly
under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through
any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to
qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary
qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such
persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.

2.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing
test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the
administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or
failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise
qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of
the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b);
shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute
persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act;
and shall administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be
presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession
would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as
against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that
although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of
paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be
removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or
lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the
defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and
unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10
February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less
than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.

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