1. G.R. No.

L-3757 July 12, 1951

Facts:

This is a petition for a certiorari with preliminary injunction.

An information having was filed against Carlos M. Molina for homicide, the case was
set for March 15, 1950. When it was called, the Provincial Fiscal appeared but not
the accused nor any attorney in his behalf. Upon motion of the prosecution,
Honorable Francisco Arellano, the Judge presiding, ordered the defendant arrested
and his bond confiscated. Immediately after that order was dictated, the accused
appeared with his counsel, Attorney Remigio M. Peña who explained that he and his
client had come from the town of Isabela and the road was muddy, in answer to the
court's question why the defendant had arrived late. Attorney Peña having moved
for the reconsideration of the order of arrest and confiscation of the bond, Judge
Arellano set aside said order and in its place fined the accused P5.00.

When the Judge Arellano asked Atty. Peña if the accused is ready for trial, Atty.
Peña insisted that they were not yet ready due to time constraints, he was engaged
by the accused a few days before the trial and was not able to carefully study the
case to be ablet to cross examine the witness of the prosecution which is a doctor.
Another reason presented by Atty. Peña is that he was cited in the sala of another
judge to be a witness to another criminal case.

The prosecution opposed due to the fact that their witness came from Iloilo and it
would prejudice him if the trial will be postponed due the unpreparedness on the
part of the accused. Atty. Peña insisted that they were not ready for trial and that
he would rather withdraw from the case than go to trial unprepared. Judge Arellano
denied the withdrawal of Atty. Peña and continued with the trial.

Issue: Whether certiorari and not appeal was the proper remedy?

Ruling:

The proper remedy for the case was an appeal and not certiorari.

Section 7 of the Rule 114 provides that "After a plea of not guilty, except when the
case is on appeal from the justice of the peace, the defendant is entitled to at least
two days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause shown shall allow
further time.

Under this rule, accused is entitled as for right to at least two days to prepare for
trial and a denial of this right is a reversible error and a ground for a new trial.
(People vs. Mejares et al., 85 Phil., 727; People vs. Valte, 43 Phil., 907;
McMicking vs. Schields, 41 Phil., 971, reversed by the United States Supreme
Court, 238 U. S. 99, 59 Law ed. 1220, on the ground that the defendant's remedy
was by appeal and not in a proceeding in habeas corpus.)

"The refusal of a trial court to give to the defendant in a criminal action, when
demanded by him, the two days in which to prepare for trial . . ., such provision
being mandatory and imperative, leaving no discretion the court, deprives the
accused of a constitutional right, namely, a right to trial by due process of Law,
and habeas corpus will lie release him from imprisonment imposed under a
judgment of conviction in such case. A trial without opportunity to prepare for it
given by the law of the land in a statute whose terms are mandatory and
imperative, is no trial at all, and a conviction based upon such trial is without
anything to sustain it.
The Court is unanimous in the opinion that the court erred in allowing over the
objection of the defendant the taking of Dr. Caram's testimony, for it thereby
violated the defendant constitutional right to due process. But an overwhelming
majority also holds the view that the court acted within its jurisdiction and for this
reason, the error can only be attacked by appeal.

If the parties wish the charges and counter-charges preferred against each other in
the pleadings acted upon, they are advised to make said charges in separate
complaints in the form provided by the Rules of Court.

2. JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, assailing alleged refusal by the Court of First
Instance of Manila to grant the petitioner, who is confined in the Bilibid Prison for contempt of the
Senate, ample opportunity to prepare his defense in criminal case No. 12821 of that court, in which he is
charged with income tax evasion. In his prayer the petitioner asks that Judge Pecson, the respondent
judge, be commanded to allow him to go out of Bilibid Prison under guard to take papers from his office
in the Trade and Commerce Building on Calle J. Luna, Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused judge committed an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error in not granting
the defendant's motion?

Ruling:

Yes.

One of the most vital and precious rights accorded accused by the Constitution is due process, which
includes a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense. While the
Constitution and the law of the land do not specify what this opportunity is to consist of, beyond stating
that accused shall have not less than two days to prepare for trial (section 7, Rule 114), it is by necessary
implication within the court's sound discretion in exceptional cases to allow him, besides time, adequate
freedom of action, if the courts are to give form and substance to this guaranty. Other judges conscious
of this principle have allowed prisoners with proper safeguards to leave the prison walls with the object
of securing evidence, without in so doing exceeding the bounds of their authority, of propriety, or legal
procedure. Leave to go under guard outside the prison or the courtroom would not, as feared, set
dangerous precedent, for the matter is always subject to the control and discretion of the court to be
judged according to its merits.

In the light of these circumstances, it would seem that the defendant has made a sufficient showing to
merit a favorable action on his request as a measure of necessity for an adequate preparation for trial.

The respondent judge committed an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error in not granting the
defendant's motion. By this refusal the defendant would be denied his fundamental right to a fair and
impartial hearing which the constitution assures him. When a request by a defendant charged with
crime for a chance to make his defense is reasonable and made in good faith and not for delay, it is good
policy to veer towards the liberal side avoiding refinements of argument that may serve only to hide the
substance of the issue. It is even greater importance to the cause of justice for courts to deviate from
the stereotyped technical rules of practice and lose a few hours than to run the risk of depriving accused
of the requisite opportunity to present this side of the controversy.
 3. G.R. No. 92447 October 17, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

VENERANDO NEBREJA Y ORALE, ROMEO GUIRALDO Y ADLAWAN, JOHN DOE, MARK DOE AND PETER
DOE, accused. ROMEO GUIRALDO Y ADLAWAN, accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 which finds the
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of Violation of Section 3
(b) in relation to Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment (reclusion perpetua), to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased for the
damages.

That on or about the 22nd day of March, 1988 in Pasay, Metro Manila the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, being armed with handgun
and bladed weapons, with intent to gain, by means of violence and intimidation on the person of
Paquito Duenas y Manalaysay and Romeo Duenas y de Guzman while both were on board an owner-
type jeep cruising F. Cruz, St., Malibay, a public highway, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and divest cash amount of P50,000.00 belonging to the complainants, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforesaid amount of P50,000.00. Due to the incident,
Paquito Duenas y Manalaysay sustained mortal wounds which caused his death, while Romeo Duenas
sustained serious physical injuries.

Upon arraignment, Guiraldo and Nebreja assisted by their counsel pleaded not guilty while the other
accused's true names and present whereabouts are still unknown.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in the application of the continuous trial system in too strict and
unbending manner that the rights of the accused had been prejudiced

Ruling:

No, the trial court did not erred in the application of the continuous trial system in too strict and
unbending manner that the rights of the accused had been prejudiced

The purpose of the continuous trial system is to expedite the decision or resolution of cases in the trial
court. Circular No. 1-89 (January 19, 1989) which laid down the guidelines in the conduct of the
continuous trial, states that "a strict policy on postponements shall be observed" and "the judge shall
conduct the trial with utmost dispatch, with judicious exercise of the court's power to control the trial to
avoid delay."

The non-appearance of the counsel de parte of both the accused during the hearings after his request
for postponement, and the fact that he could not present their witnesses were the reason for the lower
courts order to consider the case submitted for decision. The appellant has not shown any meritorious
reason for an extension of the proceedings. Also, the claim that he was not assisted by counsel will not
lie as the appellant was still represented by counsel as of that date despite his counsel's non-
appearance.