Coon Ot Tax Appeals: Second Division

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Coon ot Tax Appeals


QUEZON CITY

SECOND DIVISION

INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE C.T.A. CASE NO. 7343


BANK,
Petitioner,
Members:

CASTANEDA, JR., Chairperson


-versus- UY, and
PALANCA-ENRIQUEZ, JJ.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL Promulgated:


REVENUE, n/
Respondent. OCT 1 8 20f!r
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~- - - - - - - - - - - X

DECISION
CASTANEDA, JR., d_.:

This is a Petition for Review filed by petitioner International Exchange

Bank due to the denial by respondent Commissioner of International Revenue

of its request for reconsideration of the decision denying its administrative

protest against the demand for payment of deficiency interest and surcharge

for alleged late payment of creditable/expanded withholding and documentary

stamp taxes , relative to the foreclosure sale of a real property in year 2000,

V''hich was later redeemed by its mortgagor/owner. ?-


DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 2 of I7

The facts as admitted by the parties and borne by the records of the

case are as follows :

International Exchange Bank (petitioner) is a commercial banking

t orporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with principal

office address at 142 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village , Makati City.1

Commissioner of International Revenue (respondent) is the official

authorized under Section 4 of the National International Revenue Code of

1997 (1997 Tax Code) to assess and collect internal revenue taxes , as well

as the power to decide disputed assessments, among others, subject to the

exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court.2

On January 27, 1997, Lippa Incorporated (Lippa), as security for the

loan of Mr. William Siy and/or Willsan Plastic and Printing Manufacturing in

the sum of Ten Million (P1 0,000,000.00) , mortgaged in favor of petitioner its

real property covered by TCT No. 221251 of the Register of Deeds in Manila,

as evidenced by a real estate mortgage contract between them. 3

Due to the failure of Lippa to pay the aforesaid loan, petitioner extra-

judicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. Petitioner, as the highest

bidder, purchased the same at the public auction sale held on March 8, 1999,

for which petitioner was issued a Certificate of Sale.4

The Certificate of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on

April15 , 1999.5 ~

1
Paragraph 2, Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues, Docket, page 156.
2
Paragraph 3, Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues (JSFI), Docket, page 156.
3
Paragraph 4, JSFI, Docket, page 156.
4
Paragraph 5, JSFI, Docket, page 156; B1R Records, pages 183-184.
5
Paragraph 6, JSFI , Docket, page 157.
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 3 of 17

On March 22 , 2000, before the lapse of the redemption period , Lippa

filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of foreclosure sale (with

application for writ of preliminary injunction) before the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Manila , Branch 26.6

On April 26, 2000, after the redemption period lapsed , petitioner

consolidated its title over the subject property. Consequently, the Registry of

Deeds of Quezon City issued a new title (Transfer Certificate Title N-212412)

in petitioner's name.7

On May 17, 2000, the RTC of Manila granted Lippa's petition for

preliminary injunction and ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary

injunction.8

On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed with the BIR the appropriate

returns and pa id the expanded withhold ing tax (EWT) in the amount of

P712,500.00 and documentary stamp tax (DST) in the amount of

P142,500.00 due from the foreclosure sale.9

On October 28, 2002 , Regional Director Ruperta Somera of the BIR

Revenue Region No. 6 of Manila issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice

(PAN) requiring petitioner to pay the amounts of P521 ,905.00 and

P11 0,054.01 , representing alleged increments for late payment of EWT and

DST, respectively, in connection with the extra-jud icial foreclosure sale.10

In a letter dated January 21 , 2003 addressed to Director Somera ,

petitioner requested for the recall and/or cancellation of the aforesaid PAN 9z---
6 Docketed as Civil Case No. 00-96863; paragraph 7, JSFI , Docket, page 157.
7
RTC Judgment in Civil Case No . 00-96863 , March I I, 2003 , page 2; BIR Records, pages 23-24, and
174.
8
Paragraph 8, JSFI, Docket, page 157; BIR Records, pages 51-5 2.
9
Paragraph 9, JSF I, Docket, page 157; BIR Records, pages . 28-36.
10
Paragraph 10, JSFI, Docket, page 157; BIR Records, page 168.
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 4 of 17

and posited the view that petitioner is not liable for any tax in connection with

the foreclosure sale on the ground that the transfer of beneficial ownership

over the foreclosed property was never effected or consummated . It also

c:rgued that by reason of the injunction issued , petitioner was prohibited and

prevented from consolidating title over the foreclosed property. Besides , by

virtue of the redemption by Lippe of the subject property, there is no

transaction that is subject to tax.11

In its Decision dated March 11 , 2003, based on the Compromise

Agreement executed between the parties, the RTC of Manila allowed Lippe to

redeem the subject property after payment of the redemption price, or the

amount equivalent to the outstanding balance of the loan secured by the

subject property. 12

Pursuant to the order of the RTC of Manila dated March 11 , 2003, a

Certificate of Redemption was executed by petitioner in favor of Lippe on

March 14, 2003.13

In reply to petitioner's letter dated January 21 , 2003, Regional Director

Somera wrote petitioner a letter dated July 4, 2003 , reiterating the BIR

position that the imposition of penalties and interest for late payment of taxes

was proper. The Regional Director also requested petitioner to immediately

settle its tax liabilities.14

On August 4, 2003, petitioner filed an administrative protest with

respondent, who indorsed the same to the ROO of Manila. Subsequently, on fc-

11
Paragraph II , JSFI, Docket, page 158.
12
Paragraph 12, JSFI, Docket, page 158.
13
Paragraph 13, JSFI, Docket, page 158.
14
BIR Records, page 163 .
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 5 of 17

October 22, 2003, the Regional Director of BIR Revenue Region No. 6,

Manila sent petitioner a letter and informed the latter that its protest was

teferred to the Chief of BIR Legal Division , who rendered an opinion in favor

of the imposition of the deficiency taxes, penalty and surcharge. Again , the

Regional Director requested petitioner to settle its tax liability.15

On January 20, 2004, petitioner filed with the BIR Appellate Division a

Motion for Reconsideration. However, in a Decision promulgated on August

31 , 2005, respondent denied petitioner's request for reconsideration of the

qenial by the ROO of Manila of its protest and ordered petitioner to pay the

deficiency interest and surcharge for late payment of expanded withholding

and documentary stamp taxes due on the foreclosure sale of the subject

property, plus increments that have accrued until the actual date of

payment. 16

Hence, on October 18, 2005, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition

for Review.

The parties agreed to submit the following issues 17 for this Court's

resolution :

"1. Whether or not petitioner realized any profit or gain


arising from the foreclosure sale and the subsequent
redemption of the property by 'Lippo', that would result to
the payment of expanded withholding tax and
documentary stamp taxes?

2. Whether or not there was a valid foreclosure sale,


exchange or disposition of the property in favor of
petitioner that is subject to expanded withholding tax and
documentary stamp tax, notwithstanding that there are
legal issues raised before the Regional Trial Court of ?-'
15
BIR Records, page 162.
16
Paragraph. 16, JSFI, Docket, page 159; BIR Records, pages 229-233.
17
Joint Stipu lation of Facts and Issues, Docket, page 160.
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 6 of 17

Manila assailing the validity of the foreclosure sale itself


and the presence of legal impediments (writ of
Preliminary Injunction was issued by the said court)
prohibiting petitioner from consolidating title over the
foreclosed property.

3. Whether or not petitioner should be made liable for


payment of the expanded withholding tax and
documentary stamp tax in the instant case, despite an
express provision in the Judgment based on Compromise
Agreement requiring 'Lippe' to assume the taxes
attendant to the redemption of the Subject Property?

4. Whether or not the institution of an action for the


annulment of the foreclosure sale will stop the running of
the one year period of redemption.

5. Whether or not revenue regulations no. 4-99 is applicable


in the case at bar."

Inasmuch as first and third issues are interrelated, they will be

discussed jointly.

Petitioner's arguments that it has no income or gain from the sale of

the foreclosed property and as such , should not be made liable to pay the

expanded withholding tax and documentary stamp tax, is untenable. Capital

gains tax is a tax on the presumed gain . This is affirmed by the High Tribunal

in the case of Vive Eagle Land, Inc. and Virgilio 0. Cervantes vs. Court of

Appeals and Genuine Ice Co., lnc. 18 , declaring that "A capital gains tax is a

final tax assessed on the presumed gain derived by citizens and resident

aliens, as well as estates and trusts, from the sale or exchange of real

property. " And there is presumed gain realized from the extra-judicial

foreclosure sale. In foreclosure sale of mortgage, the consideration would be ;jt-

18
G.R. No. 150308, November 26, 2004.
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 7 of 17

the satisfaction fully or partly of the pre-existing indebtedness secured by the

mortgage.19

Based on the facts of the case , the Certificate of Sale covering the

foreclosed property was registered with the concerned Register of Deeds on

April15, 1999, as required by Act 3135. Section 3(1) of Revenue Regulations

No. 4-99 specifically provides that the mortgagor should exercise his

redemption right within one year from the issuance of the Certificate of Sale

with the Register of Deeds. It likewise states the instance where no capital

gains tax shall be imposed , which is only if the mortgagor redeems the

foreclosed property within one year from the issuance of the Certificate of

Sale.

Equally significant to the issue of the exercise of the right of redemption

in extra-judicial sales are Section 6 of Act 3135,20 as amended by Act 4118

and Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Section 6 of Act 3135 states that:

"SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is


made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the
debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or
judgment creditor, or any person having a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the
property is sold , may redeem the same at any time within the
term of one year from and after the date of the sale; and such
redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four
hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive,
of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. " ~

19
Vitug and Acosta, Tax Law and Jurisprudence, 2"d Ed. , page 138-140.
20
"An Act To Regu late the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted In or An nexed To Real-
Estate Mortgages."
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 8 of 17

It should be noted that the above-mentioned Section 464 to 466 of the

Code of Civil Procedure became part of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 21

Pertinent to the case is Section 33 of Rule 39, which reads:

"SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at


expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or
given.- If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the
date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is
entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so
redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other
redemption has been made, and notice thereof given , and the
time for redemption has expired , the last redemptioner is entitled
to the conveyance and possession ; but in all cases the judgment
obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the date
of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed
shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his
successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same
validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in
office and executed it.

Upon the expiration of the right of redemption , the


purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire
all the rights , title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to
the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the
property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by
the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor."

From the foregoing , redemption may be made within one year from the

registration of the Certificate of Sale with the Register of Deeds. Here, the

registration of the Certificate of Sale of the foreclosure in favor of petitioner

was made on April 15, 1999, the period of redemption is considered to have

expired on April 15, 2000. Accord ingly, petitioner's liability to pay the

corresponding taxes on the foreclosed property attached and became due

long before the alleged subsequent redemption by Lippe. Clearly, petitioner is

21
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-60208, December 5, 1985.
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 9 of 17

liable for the payment of the capital gains tax on the presumed gain and the

documentary stamp tax under the aforesaid provisions.

As regards the issue of the effect of the Compromise Agreement on the

transaction , it must be pointed out that the Compromise Agreement actually

has no bearing on the redemption period . Since the redemption period lapsed

without Lippa exercising its redemption rights , petitioner is deemed to have

~~onsolidated ownership over the subject property.

Moreover, even though one of the terms of the Compromise Judgment

in allowing Lippa to redeem the subject property was that the latter should

bear all costs attendant to the redemption of the property, including applicable

taxes , the taxes referred to are taxes incidental to the redemption of the

property and not those which became due and were paid before the

Compromise Judgment was rendered .

The second and fourth issues will be resolved together since the

matters covered are closely related .

The Compromise Judgment of Manila RTC Branch 26, dated March

11 , 2003, was based on the Compromise Agreement of Lippa and petitioner.

The said Comprom ise Judgment is a judgment on the merits as the parties

have val idly entered into stipulations and the evidence was duly considered

by the trial court that approved the agreement. 22 Inasmuch as it never

mentioned nor hinted that the foreclosure sale is void , this Court will not

venture to render a different opinion doubting its validity in the absence of

evidence to the contrary. r


22
Spouses Aromin v. Floresca, et a/. , G.R. No. 160994, Jul y 27, 2006.
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 10 of 17

Anent the question of whether the institution of an action for the

annulment of the foreclosure sale and preliminary injunction stopped the

running of the period of redemption and/or prohibited petitioner from

consolidating title over the foreclosed property; the answer is "No."

As earlier stated , the mortgagor may redeem the property within one

~:'ear from the time of the foreclosure sale. Failure to exercise such right of

redemption , ownership of the foreclosed property is transferred upon the

expiration of the redemption period. Hence, considering that no redemption

was made, the tax liability (particularly, EWT and DST) legally accrued as of

that moment, regardless of whether the creditor (petitioner) was prevented at

a later date by the court to consolidate its title over the foreclosed property.

In the case of People's Financing Corporation et a/. vs. Court of

Appeals, et a/. 23 , the High Tribunal explained that the one year redemption

period is not suspended by the institution of an action to annul a foreclosure

sale. The pertinent portions of the Decision are hereunder quoted for ready

reference , to wit:

"It is not correct to say that the restraining order


issued on February 11, 1980 by the trial court (which
ultimately dismissed the complaint four years later) had
the effect of suspending the running of the redemption
period. As we held through chief Justice Concepcion in
Sumerariz vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 'there is
no statute or decision which supports plaintiff's
contention that the period of one year to redeem land sold
at the sheriff's sale was suspended by the institution of an
action to annul the foreclosure sale." (Emphasis supplied) Jlt--

2J
G.R. No. 80791, December 4, 1990.
DECIS ION
C.T.A . CASE NO 7343
Page II of 17

The Supreme Court likewise held in the case of Spouses Antonio S.

?ahang and Lolita T. Pahang vs. Honorable Agustine A. Vesti/24 that the

filing of an action by the redemptioner to enforce his right to redeem does not

suspend the running of the statutory period to redeem the foreclosed property.

The High Court explained , thus:

"xxx. In fine, the filing of an action by the


redemptioner to enforce his right to redeem does not
suspend the running of the statutory period to redeem the
property, nor bar the purchaser at public auction from
procuring a writ of possession after the statutory period
of redemption had lapsed, without prejudice to the final
outcome of such complaint to enforce the right of redemption ."
(Emphasis supplied)

Based on the aforequoted jurisprudence, neither the action to annul the

foreclosure sale with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or the

granting of the injunction prevented the expiration of the one-year period to

redeem the foreclosed property. Ergo, after the lapse of the one-year

redemption period , the mortgagor's right to redeem is barred , and the

mortgagor is divested of its rights to the mortgaged property sold regardless

of any separate pending case filed by the parties before the courts. Here, the

fact that the subject property was later "redeemed" pursuant to the

Compromise Agreement is irrelevant. The "redemption" was made long after

April 15, 2000, which is the expiration date of the redemption period .

Petitioner became entitled to both the transfer and possession of the

subject property as a matter of right from the time of the expiration of the

period of redemption . Consequently, it also became liable for the payment of

taxes relative to the foreclosure. When petitioner paid taxes in the amounts of 7t--
24
G.R. No. 148595, July 12, 2004.
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 12 of 17

P712,500.00 and P142,500 .00 as EWT and DST, respectively, due on the

foreclosure sale of March 8, 1999; it indicated petitioner's knowledge or

recognition of its tax liability. As correctly pointed out by respondent, if

petitioner did not in fact consolidate ownership on said property, it would have

nothing to alienate on the Compromise Agreement it entered into with Lippe.

Nemo dat quod non habet. One cannot alienate things which one does not

own.

Although the RTC of Manila eventually issued a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction, the same was issued long after the expiration of the redemption

period , specifically, on May 17, 2000 or a month and two days after the

deadline. Petitioner had no legal impediment in consolidating its title over the

subject property. In fact, consolidation of the title after the expiration of the

redemption period is a matter of right and the issuance of a Certificate of Title

in favor of the purchaser (petitioner) becomes ministerial upon the Register of

Deeds.25

Regarding the last issue, it is well-settled that the power to promulgate

rules is necessary to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted , subject

to the limitation that such rules and regulations cannot amend or expand the

statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. 26 A

perusal of Revenue Regulations No. 4-99 shows that it is merely interpretative

in nature and gives no real consequence more than what the Tax Code has

already prescribed .27 Thus , petitioner's obligation to file returns and pay taxes fk--

25
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals eta/. , G. R. No. 133366, August 5, 1999.
26
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et a/. , G.R. No. 118712 and 118745, July 5, 1996.
27
Commissioner of internal Revenue v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119761, August 29, 1996.
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page I3 of 17

within the prescribed period pursuant to the Tax Code and RR 4-99 must be

complied .

Records indicate that petitioner filed tax returns and paid taxes on

October 25, 2000; more than a year after the foreclosure sale and after the

expiration of the redemption period. However, in the case of DST, Section

200(b) of the Tax Code requires the filing of return and , at the same time ,

payment of tax within ten (1 0) days after the close of the month when the

taxable document was made, signed , issued , accepted , or transferred . With

respect to final withholding tax, Sec. 2.58 of RR 02-98 requires that "the

withholding tax return , whether creditable or final , shall be filed and payments

should be made within ten (1 0) days after the end of each month except for

taxes withheld for December which shall be filed on or before January 25 of

the following year." Hence, albeit petitioner filed its tax returns and paid the

due taxes , it is still liable for increments as provided under Sections 248 and

249 of the 1997 Tax Code for failure to file returns and pay taxes within the

prescribed period. Sections 248 and 249 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that:

"SEC. 248. Civil Penalties. -

(A) There shall be imposed , in addition to the tax


required to be paid , a penalty equivalent to twenty-five percent
(25%) of the amount due, in the following cases:

(1) Failure to file any return and pay the tax due thereon
as required under the provisions of this Code or rules
and regulations on the date prescribed ; or
(2) Unless otherwise authorized by the Commissioner,
filing a return with an internal revenue officer other
than those with whom the return is required to be
filed ; or
(3) Failure to pay the deficiency tax within the time
prescribed for its payment in the notice of
assessment; or ~
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 14 of 17

(4) Failure to pay the full or part of the amount of tax


shown on any return required to be filed under the
provisions of this Code or rules and regulations , or the
full amount of tax due for which no return is required
to be filed , on or before the date prescribed for its
payment.

(B) In case of willful neglect to file the return within the


period prescribed by this Code or by rules and regulations , or in
case a false or fraudulent return is willfully made, the penalty to
be imposed shall be fifty percent (50%) of the tax or of the
deficiency tax, in case any payment has been made on the
basis of such return before the discovery of the falsity or fraud :
Provided , That a substantial under declaration of taxable sales,
receipts or income, or a substantial overstatement of
deductions, as determined by the Commissioner pursuant to the
rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of
Finance, shall constitute prima facie evidence of a false or
fraudulent return : Provided , further, That failure to report sales,
receipts or income in an amount exceeding thirty percent (30%)
of that declared per return , and a claim of deductions in an
amount exceeding thirty percent (30%) of actual deductions,
shall render the taxpayer liable for substantial underdeclaration
of sales, receipts or income or for overstatement of deductions,
as mentioned herein .

SEC. 249. Interest.-

(A) In General. - There shall be assessed and


collected on any unpaid amount of tax, interest at the rate of
twenty percent (20%) per annum , or such higher rate as may be
prescribed by rules and regulations , from the date prescribed for
payment until the amount is fully paid .

(B) Deficiency Interest. - Any deficiency in the tax


due, as the term is defined in this Code, shall be subject to the
interest prescribed in Subsection (A) hereof, which interest shall
be assessed and collected from the date prescribed for its
payment until the full payment thereof.

(C) Delinquency Interest. - In case of failure to pay:


(1) The amount of the tax due on any return
required to be filed , or
(2) The amount of the tax due for which no return
is required , or
(3) A deficiency tax, or any surcharge or interest
thereon on the due date appearing in the
notice and demand of the Commissioner, there ~
shall be assessed and collected on the unpaid t'
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 15 of 17

amount, interest at the rate prescribed in


Subsection (A) hereof until the amount is fully
paid , which interest shall form part of the tax.

(D) Interest on Extended Payment. - If any person


required to pay the tax is qualified and elects to pay the tax on
installment under the provisions of this Code, but fails to pay the
tax or any installment hereof, or any part of such amount or
installment on or before the date prescribed for its payment, or
where the Commissioner has authorized an extension of time
within which to pay a tax or a deficiency tax or any part thereof,
there shall be assessed and collected interest at the rate
hereinabove prescribed on the tax or deficiency tax or any part
thereof unpaid from the date of notice and demand until it is
paid. "

In the absence of proof to the contrary, this Court shall apply the rule

that tax assessments are presumed correct and made in good faith in the

absence of evidence contrariwise.28

WHEREFORE , the Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED for lack

of merit. Accordingly , respondent's August 31 , 2005 Decision is hereby

AFFIRMED with modifications and petitioner is hereby ORDERED to PAY

surcharges and interests, computed as follows :29

DST EWT
Surcharge (Sec. 248) p 35 ,625 .00 p 178,125.00
Interest 5/11 /00-4/30/02 64 429 .01 318 ,780.00
Amount Due P 100,054.01 P496 ,905.00

The compromise penalty, in the amounts of P10,000 for DST and

P25,000 for EWT, are cancelled in the absence of a mutual agreement by the

parties. 30 Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to PAY 20% delinquency interest 9t--

28
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Construction Resources of Asia and the Court of Tax Appeals,
G.R. No. L-68230, November 25, 1986.
29
BIR Records, page 244.
30
Rightfield Property Ventures, Inc. (now known as Universal Rightfield Property Holdings, Inc.) v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 5972, October 16, 2003 .
DECIS ION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 16 of 17

from October 7, 2005, until fully paid pursuant to Section 249 of the Tax

Code.31

SO ORDERED.

w~~a..au--~/SL
iOANITO C. CASTANEDA, Jfi. . ~
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

E~ UY
A~s~~stice
~E:.:IkAssociate Justice

ATTESTATION

attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the

Court's Division .

~<2.~~~/;}.:, .
JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

31
BIR Records, page 244.
DECISION
C.T.A. CASE NO 7343
Page 17 of 17

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII , Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division

Chairperson's Attestation , it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the

above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to

the writer of the opinion of the Court.

~~.to.. c.~
ERNESTO D. ACOSTA
Presiding Justice

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