11 - Wunder Et Al (2020) - Local REDD Lessons For Jurisdictional

ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 21 February 2020

doi: 10.3389/ffgc.2020.00011
REDD+ in Theory and Practice: How

Lessons From Local Projects Can
Inform Jurisdictional Approaches
Sven Wunder 1,2*, Amy E. Duchelle 3 , Claudio de Sassi 4 , Erin O. Sills 3,5 , Gabriela Simonet 3
and William D. Sunderlin 3
1
Center for International Forestry Research, Lima, Peru, 2 European Forest Institute, Barcelona, Spain, 3 Center for
International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia, 4 Federal Office for the Environment, Ittigen, Switzerland, 5 Department of
Forestry and Environmental Resources, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, United States
Local projects for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
(REDD+) were frequently designed as pilot actions to inform future upscaled initiatives.
Drawing lessons from these project experiences may thus help improve the design
of jurisdictional programs, which is the focus of REDD+ implementation in the Paris
Edited by: Agreement. Here we first scrutinize how REDD+ was historically conceptualized,
Alejandro Lopez-Feldman, the most prominent model being that of a multitier payments for environmental
Monterrey Institute of Technology and
Higher Education (ITESM), Mexico services (PES) scheme of “passing on” carbon mitigation responsibilities and credits
Reviewed by: across scales, from international buyers to forestland owners. Then we analyze two
Emi Uchida, REDD+ project databases, ID-RECCO and GCS-REDD, using principal component
University of Rhode Island,
and regression analysis. Among 226 conservation-oriented REDD+ projects, only
United States
Marjanneke Vijge, 88 had planned conditional incentives to landowners—the key feature of PES.
Utrecht University, Netherlands Intentions to apply PES rose after 2007, and correlate strongly with efforts to
*Correspondence: seek certification, including as a benefit-sharing strategy, and with carbon sales.
Sven Wunder
[email protected] Zooming closer into a portfolio of 23 local REDD+ projects that were actually
implemented on the ground, we found project implementers reported conditional
Specialty section: incentives as potentially being both the most promising and effective intervention.
This article was submitted to
People and Forests,
Likewise, treated households identified conditional incentives as comparatively effective
a section of the journal in changing their land-use plans, while also providing above-average welfare returns.
Frontiers in Forests and Global
Still, these conditional incentives remained underutilized in implementation, with only
Change
one-third of the treatment intensity compared to non-conditional incentives. Project
Received: 21 September 2019
Accepted: 27 January 2020 implementers cited insecure land tenure and uncertain REDD+ financial flows as key
Published: 21 February 2020 impediments to using conditional incentives. The original vision of a multitier PES
Citation: model for REDD+ thus ran into both supply and demand side problems, jointly
Wunder S, Duchelle AE, Sassi Cd,
Sills EO, Simonet G and Sunderlin WD
explaining the discrepancy between REDD+ theory and practice. Since jurisdictional
(2020) REDD+ in Theory and Practice: approaches to REDD+ so far also receive only hesitant and slow climate financing
How Lessons From Local Projects flows, coming mostly in non-conditional form, and operate under forest-frontier
Can Inform Jurisdictional Approaches.
Front. For. Glob. Change 3:11. governance with similar tenure restrictions, jurisdictions would seem well-advised to
doi: 10.3389/ffgc.2020.00011 plan for conditional landowner incentives only in scenarios where the preconditions
Frontiers in Forests and Global Change | www.frontiersin.org 1 February 2020 | Volume 3 | Article 11
Wunder et al. REDD+ in Theory and Practice
for PES are met. Implementers of jurisidictional approaches may also want to avoid
conceptualizing their new model too narrowly and prescriptively, as was arguably the
case with the conceptualization of REDD+ as a multitier PES scheme.
Keywords: deforestation, climate change mitigation, payments for environmental services, carbon markets,
certification
INTRODUCTION Forest Initiative (NICFI) launched in 2007 (Angelsen, 2017),

and later Germany’s REDD Early Movers programme (Pistorius
Forest-based emissions reductions in developing countries came and Kiff, 2015), the Green Climate Fund’s recent results-based
to figure prominently in the 2015 Paris Agreement of the payment pilot program for REDD+, and the Carbon Fund (i.e.,
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change results-based payment) phase of the Forest Carbon Partnership
(UNFCCC, 2015), known under the heading of REDD+ Facility (FCPF).
(reduced emissions from deforestation, forest degradation and Given the evolution of REDD+ finance and accounting
the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and to the jurisdictional scale through the Paris Agreement,
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries). REDD+ project implementers can no longer expect direct
In addition, a global effort to begin restoring 350 million participation in international transactions with Paris-compliant
hectares of degraded forest landscapes, known as the Bonn carbon markets1 . Yet, there is an opportunity to “nest” existing
Challenge, was launched in 2011 (Verdone and Seidl, 2017). REDD+ projects into jurisdictional programs to contribute to
These two forest-based solutions have emerged as potential higher-level emission reduction targets through local actions
contributors to the objective of mitigating climate change to (Lee et al., 2018). Moreover, experiences from local initiatives
a temperature rise of well below 2◦ C (Griscom et al., 2017). on the ground can potentially become building blocks of a
However, so far, the sources and quantities of global funding for regional-to-national approach to REDD+, as one layer of a new
implementation of forest-based climate actions have been limited polycentric approach to mitigating climate change. To realize
(Atmadja et al., 2018). this potential, a better characterization of these projects and
As enshrined in the Paris Agreement, REDD+ their outcomes is needed, so as to understand what lessons
implementation focuses on jurisdictional scales (national may be relevant for the design of future NDCs and market-
with subnational in the interim) as part of countries’ based mechanisms. Rigorous evaluations of early project-scale
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for climate REDD+ interventions, including incentives, can help inform
change mitigation. While national REDD+ programs have the design and implementation of jurisdictional-scale policies,
progressed over the last decade (Thuy et al., 2018), there was an programs, and initiatives (Duchelle et al., 2019). While we can
early explosion of local (non-jurisdictional) REDD+ projects only speculate about how well-financed national or subnational
in response to the UNFCCC 2007 call for “demonstration jurisdictional REDD+ schemes might function, one prudent
activities” (Sills et al., 2014; Simonet et al., 2014; Duchelle prior step is to systematically scrutinize the de facto pre-existing
et al., 2019). Simultaneously, subnational governments began REDD+ projects.
to take leadership through developing so-called jurisdictional In the following, we aim to help fill this knowledge gap
approaches to REDD+ and low-emissions development (JA) by empirically characterizing the landscape of the existing
that more holistically combine policies and market-related local REDD+ projects on the ground, describing how this
measures (e.g., zero-deforestation commitments) into broader landscape and the concept of REDD+ have evolved since
low-emission development strategies (e.g., Boyd et al., 2018). the inception of the concept, and draw lessons for upscaled
This new JA paradigm of comprehensive government-led jurisdictional programs moving forward. In doing so, we focus
approaches to regulating land use across entire jurisdictions on the broader-scale architecture of relations among key actors:
builds on the REDD+ experience, but is partly also a reaction to carbon markets/ donors, project implementers, and forestland
widespread criticism of the “project-ification” of early REDD+ stewards/communities on the ground. Two research questions
activities (Nepstad et al., 2013). emerge. First, to what extent were specific theoretically informed
A central element for successful JA is incentives for multiple a priori models of REDD+ implementation de facto applied, or
land use actors to engage in sustainable landscape management did they transform when they hit the ground? Second, to what
(Ros-Tonen et al., 2018; Stickler et al., 2018). Such incentives— extent can we link the de facto adoption of REDD+ models
in the case of REDD+, payments for reducing forest-based to different implementation contexts, such as for instance the
emissions at jurisdictional scales—can be conceptualized as a type of implementer, the length of financing horizons, or donor
multitier payments for environmental services (PES) scheme preferences for specific pilot actions?
of “passing on” carbon mitigation responsibilities and credits
across scales, from international buyers to forestland owners. 1 See Article 6, which governs the international transfer or sale of emission
In practice, results-based payments for jurisdictional REDD+
reduction units. Outside of the Paris Agreement, there remain other possibilities
programs have been limited to a few bilateral and multilateral for sale of carbon credits by projects, such as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction
initiatives, such as notably Norway’s International Climate and Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After 2013/2014, shortly after most projects began implementation2 .
describing our data and methods (section Data and Methods), The more detailed data on the in-field realities of projects
we will give a short history of REDD+ theory and action across six countries will supplement the broader yet shallower
(section From Compensated Reduction Toward a REDD+ analysis of ID-RECCO. Notably, GCS REDD+ includes six
Model). In section Exploring Empirical Characteristics of Local subnational jurisdictional REDD+ programs that cover entire
REDD Initiatives, we will open-endedly explore the universe political jurisdictions (i.e., states, provinces, municipalities or
of REDD+ initiatives of the ID-RECCO database (Simonet districts), and are implemented across different land-use types
et al., 2018a), using principal component analysis (PCA). Section and included diverse stakeholders (Fishbein and Lee, 2015):
Multilevel Conditionality in REDD Design? will test for possible
• In Brazil, Acre’s State System of Incentives for Environmental
linkages between project implementers’ conditional access to
Services, the Sustainable Landscapes Pilot Program in São
financing flows (certification, carbon sales) and their own use
Félix do Xingu (Pará State), and Cotriguaçu Sempre Verde
of conditional incentives vis-à-vis landowners. Based on these
(Mato Grosso State).
findings, section A Closer Look at Implementation of REDD+
• In Indonesia, the Berau Forest Carbon Program and Ulu
Projects zooms in to the implementer and household level, using
Masen REDD+ initiative in Aceh.
the Global Comparative Study (GCS) on REDD+ data of the
• In Vietnam, the Pro-Poor REDD+ initiative in Cat Tien.
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). Section
Conclusions and Perspectives for Jurisdictional Approaches While all six programs were characterized by active local
summarizes the findings, and discusses the implications, governmental engagement, which is a core component of JA, all
including for JA. but Acre were initiated by NGOs, which had variable success in
cultivating government leadership for co-implementation.
DATA AND METHODS Methods

We performed all statistical analyses in R, V3.5.2 (The R
Data Foundation for Statistical Computing, 2018). For PCA analysis,
Our empirical stocktaking of REDD+ projects will draw on we used the PCAmix package (Chavent et al., 2014), since we
two databases. included both numerical and categorical data. Score dimensions
First, the International Database on REDD+ projects were exported and plotted using the ggplot2 package (Wickham,
and programs, linking Economic, Carbon and Communities 2016). We selected a mix of simple project-descriptive variables
data (ID-RECCO) has been put together jointly by the and some that might be of particular interest vis-à-vis upscaled
Climate Economics Chair at Paris-Dauphine University (France), JA initiatives: size (area), implementer type (public, private
the French Agricultural Research Center for International for-profit, non-profit), continental dummy, early vs. late start
Development (CIRAD), the International Forestry Resources of project (before 2007), relation to protected area (yes/no—
and Institutions (IFRI, University of Michigan, United States), y/n), project stage (planned implemented vs. terminated),
and more recently CIFOR. It is a centralized repository of denominated pilot stage of implementation (y/n), certification
data on REDD+ projects and programs, with up to 110 (y/n), sale of carbon credit (y/n), main objective (REDD vs.
variables registered per initiative. By May 2018, it contained non-REDD), plans to use conditional local incentives (y/n),
467 projects and programs in 57 countries. Three hundred and jurisdictional status (y/n). The interpretation of the PCA
fifty-nine initiatives were registered as active, sixty-seven were is supported by qualitative and quantitative analyses of the
completed before 2018, and forty-one had either not yet underlying data, which are discussed but not shown. The
started, or were discontinued (Simonet et al., 2018a). ID- scores of the two highest-ranked dimensions are used to
RECCO is mostly based on a desk assessment of secondary test for the homogeneity of multivariate dispersion with the
data, such as project development and certification documents. “betadisper” function in the vegan package (Oksanen et al.,
Notably, at the time of our analysis the most recently 2007), performing graphical and permutational F-tests of the
consolidated version of the ID-RECCO data (2018) included multivariate homogeneity of group dispersion (Anderson, 2006).
jurisdictional REDD+ programs that have emerged from To test the relationship between project characteristics and the
REDD+ projects. We also selectively compare with the ID- intention to use conditional payments (Table 2), we performed a
RECCO 2016 version, so as to illustrate the most recent trends in general linear model regression with binomial distribution and
certain variables. logit-link using the glm function in the base package of R. We
Second, CIFOR’s GCS REDD+ has been running since 2009 initially tested each variable included in the PCA (see above) in
and includes a research component that collects data at the isolation, but then fitted a multiple regression, having excluded
project, village and household scale on 23 REDD+ projects the variables “objectives” and “sales of carbon credits” that
in Brazil, Peru, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia, and Vietnam caused problems of overfitting, and either were not significant in
(Sills et al., 2014). The projects were planned and implemented isolation (objective) or decreased model fit (carbon sales) due to
by different types of implementers (government, NGO, private collinearity with certification.
sector). They also range widely in size (from 28 to 160,000
km2 ) and forest contexts (from dense primary rainforest to dry 2 In
2018, a new round of GCS data were collected, in a subset of the 23 initiatives.
miombo woodlands). We draw primarily on data collected in We prioritized here the broader REDD+ project coverage in the 2013/14 data.
FROM COMPENSATED REDUCTION Furthermore, compensated reduction and REDD+ were

TOWARD A REDD+ MODEL being discussed with national-level foci, thus allegedly differing
from the CDM’s project-based approach. Advantages associated
At the UNFCCC’s 9th Conference of the Parties (COP9) with a national-level focus were lower leakage and other
in Milan in 2003, a group of researchers introduced the spatial spillover effects, lower transaction costs and greater
concept of “compensated reduction”: tropical countries reducing control for developing country governments to integrate with
national deforestation below an agreed-upon baseline were their forest-based mitigation strategies (Skutsch et al., 2007).
to receive ex-post compensation, thus providing them with Limitations to a purely national-level accounting were the costs
additional incentives to curb forest loss (Santilli et al., 2005; and capacities needed for developing country governments to
Schwartzman and Moutinho, 2008). The proposal that gained change historic deforestation patterns, and thus be eligible for
traction in the UNFCCC featured rewards for deforestation- credits—along with widespread private sector reluctance to
reducing interventions, carbon market financing, a national-level invest in these governments (Streck et al., 2008). Proposals for a
approach, and voluntary participation (Skutsch et al., 2007). “nested approach” emerged in response, envisaging simultaneous
The UNFCCC reviewed options for including reduced emissions national and subnational implementation (Streck et al., 2008;
from deforestation (RED) as a climate change mitigation option Pedroni et al., 2009). Indeed, the demonstration activities called
in the post-Kyoto commitment period, stimulated further by a for under the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2007) largely consisted
2005 joint action proposal from Papua New Guinea and Costa of local initiatives: hundreds of REDD+ projects have been
Rica (UNFCCC, 2005). Likewise, the Stern Review estimated that implemented since 2007 (Simonet et al., 2014).
ending deforestation in eight countries responsible for 70% of Compensated reduction was thus based on rewarding
global deforestation would cost only US$5–10 billon, calling it demonstrated reductions in deforestation vis-à-vis agreed-upon
one of the most cost-effective ways to reduce global greenhouse baselines. Conditional quid pro quo payments held the promise,
gas emissions (Stern, 2006). derived from experiences in multiple sectors, to be more
Notably, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol had already included the effective than non-conditional transfers (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002;
RED objective of “forest preservation” in industrialized countries Rawlings and Rubio, 2005; Wong, 2014). This performance-
(o’Sullivan, 2008), and there were also a few RED focused based aspect of REDD+ ever since appeared attractive vis-à-vis
carbon projects in developing countries prior to 20073 . The other conservation efforts (Angelsen, 2017).
compensated-reduction proposal had pointed to various possible In furtherance of the nested approach, a conceptual model for
deforestation-reducing strategies on the ground: enforcing REDD+ as a multilevel system of Payments for Environmental
environmental legislation, providing economic alternatives, Services (PES) was proposed (Figure 1): international private
capacity building, and improving protected-area systems could or public buyers of carbon credits would pay national
all be tools that sovereign tropical nations could select government institutions for measured emissions reductions, who
(Santilli et al., 2005). A subsequent proposal by the EU Joint in turn would pay subnational governments, communities and
Research Center further related national baselines to potential local landowners for demonstrated reductions on the ground
compensations between countries (Mollicone et al., 2007). Also, (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008, Wertz-Kanounnikoff
given the importance of emissions from forest degradation due and Angelsen, 2009). Hence, performance-based principles
to e.g., logging, fuelwood harvest, and forest fires (Skutsch would be applied not only at the level of international exchanges,
et al., 2007), a second “D” for degradation was officially added but also throughout the national architecture of REDD+
(“REDD”) in 2007 at the UNFCCC COP13 in Bali (UNFCCC, (Sunderlin and Atmadja, 2009; Vatn and Angelsen, 2009).
2007). Bali negotiations acknowledged the mitigation potential Not only was it thus often expected that REDD+ would
of enhancement of forest carbon stocks, eventually leading to the become an international system of conditional transfers
REDD+ acronym (UNFCCC, 2007). between countries (Farley et al., 2010), but many observers
One key REDD+ feature was the promise of access to carbon had the idea that “REDD+ can be conceptualized as the
markets for large-scale financing of forest-based mitigation. world’s largest experiment in payments for ecosystem services”
The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Corbera, 2012, p. 612). PES would, among several on-the-
had demonstrated that unprecedented levels of funding for ground implementation potential tools, become the preferred
climate change mitigation could be generated. Market-based mechanism in a “national REDD-PES scheme” (Wertz-
financing would be needed to cover REDD+ implementation Kanounnikoff and Angelsen, 2009). An entire new branch of
costs, although public sector multilateral funding was called for to literature thus started to look into how REDD+ could allegedly
support the enabling conditions for REDD+ (Streck et al., 2008). “learn” from past PES experiences (Bond et al., 2009; Wunder,
2009; Martin, 2010; Pagiola, 2011; FONAFIFO, 2012; Mahanty
et al., 2013; Pham et al., 2014; Wong, 2014), while other studies
3 Caplow et al. (2011) found 20 pre-REDD+ projects that: (a) were projected REDD+ national implementation costs based on
launched between UNFCCC COP-1 and COP-13; (b) were located in developing PES covering landowner opportunity costs (e.g., Olsen and
(non-Annex I) country; (c) aimed primarily to reduce deforestation and forest Bishop, 2009; Börner et al., 2010). Some scholars made caveats
degradation; (d) estimated net impact on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. These
included projects on avoided deforestation, avoided degradation and sustainable
about the multilevel PES model’s feasibility depending on key
forest management, but not those delivering carbon credits solely through ex ante preconditions—notably forestland stewards’ land tenure
afforestation/ reforestation (A/R). being able to exclude third parties from access (Wunder, 2009)
FIGURE 1 | Conceptual model of REDD+ as a multi-level PES scheme. Source: Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff (2008, p. 12).
and the existence of long-term, stable REDD+ financing flows subnational jurisdictions gained importance (e.g., Fishbein and
(Pagiola, 2011). Lee, 2015). Finally, REDD+ action generally lagged expectations
The compensated reduction proposal had already drawn by moving only hesitantly from local to jurisdictional-scale
attention to potential side-benefits for biodiversity associated actions (Sills et al., 2014; Duchelle et al., 2019).
with forest-based mitigation (Santilli et al., 2005). Subsequently, Two points stand out in this condensed conceptual history of
this attention broadened toward potential environmental and REDD+. First, academic thinking and research actually played
social risks and co-benefits associated with REDD+ and the an important role in giving birth to REDD+ and its predecessor
sharing of benefits from it (e.g., Griffiths, 2007; Luttrell et al., acronyms. REDD+ development went hand in hand with a quest
2013), eventually consolidated in Cancun (COP16 in 2010) into for incentive-based models of conditional forest conservation,
a series of REDD+ safeguards (UNFCCC, 2010). such as PES and forest certification, where local land users would
Returning to our first research question, i.e., to what extent be compensated proportionally to their accomplishments.
theoretical a priori models of forest-based mitigation were de Second, parallel to the REDD+ term—understood directly
facto implemented, we could thus already observe an incipient as the objective of reducing emissions from deforestation and
transformation: the originally simple concept of compensated forest degradation (by whatever means)—REDD+ was also seen
reductions became a complex REDD+ model, with multiple prescriptively as a particular advocated model of conditional
implementation levels, sources of forest-based emissions, side- conservation with a multilevel PES architecture.
objectives and safeguards. Nevertheless, financing flows fell
severely short of expectations: the scale of forest carbon markets
remained minor (e.g., still lacking acceptance on the large EXPLORING EMPIRICAL
European carbon market) (Norman and Nakhooda, 2014), with CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL REDD
REDD+ finance relying much more on overseas development INITIATIVES
assistance (ODA) type of unconditional transfers (Angelsen
and McNeill, 2012), including because REDD+ credits were In this section, we will scrutinize different empirical
being only incipiently accepted in the UNFCCC negotiations characteristics of REDD+ projects, with a view to the on-
(Turnhout et al., 2017). Multi-level REDD+ models rolled the-ground implementation models sketched in the previous
out more multifacetedly than expected, including because section: are there project clusters emerging around key structures
TABLE 1 | REDD+ project types in the 2018 ID-RECCO database, by management, have lower incidence of local direct payments,
implementer typology and activity focus. and are less likely to be certified. A qualitative analysis of the
Activity focus Predominantly Predominantly Total
underlying data also shows that jurisdictional programs tend
implementer type conservation/ REDD A/R to have more overall objectives, in keeping with their more
holistic nature.
NGO/ private 47.3% 37.3% 42.7% However, zooming in on the six jurisdictional REDD+
not-for-profit programs in the GCS REDD database also reveals that their
Private for-profit 24.6% 50.2% 36.4% clustering in Figure 2 is not uniform: the three Brazilian
Public 28.1% 12.4% 20.9% cases (Cotriguaçu, Acre, and São Felix do Xingu) cluster
Total % 100.0% 99.9% 100.0% together with the newer jurisdictional programs (left-hand
Total 226 241 467 side), whereas the two Indonesian (Berau, Ulu Masen)
A/R, Afforestation/ reforestation.
and the Vietnamese case (Cat Tien) cluster together with
Source: ID-RECCO database (Simonet et al., 2018a). the traditional REDD projects on the right-hand side—at
least when using the above specified variables in the PCA
analysis. This may serve us as a note of caution that moving
of context or design? And, to what extent can we link the de to administrative units and jurisdictional boundaries may
facto adoption of REDD+ models to different implementation eventually achieve a more holistic approach (e.g., involving
contexts (our second research question)? more stakeholders and land uses), but might not per se
For this exploratory purpose, we use the aforementioned immediately change all structural characteristics of the
ID-RECCO database, containing data on 467 projects and implied interventions.
programs in 57 countries (Simonet et al., 2018a). We want Having noted this line of division in the full sample,
to look at projects featuring the original primary goal of we now turn to a more detailed analysis of the much
avoided deforestation and forest degradation (i.e., REDD larger right-hand side PCA cluster, comprised of 214
without the “+” sign). Selecting only projects and programs REDD projects (including three former projects that
with this primary goal screens out more than half of are now jurisdictional initiatives). Similarly to Ezzine-
the ID-RECCO projects: only 226 projects have an either de-Blas et al. (2016), we found in the permutational
full or predominant focus on avoided deforestation and homogeneity of dispersion plot presented in Figure 3
degradation (48.4%)4 . The others focus instead on afforestation/ a marked sample clustering tendency toward the three
reforestation (A/R) activities (the “plus” element of REDD+), types of project implementers: NGO/ private not-for-
i.e., absorbing carbon instead of preventing emissions. Their profit, private for-profit, and public implementers.
economic rationale also differs: just like in past CDM projects, While there are overlaps between the clusters, the
asset-building investments, such as tree planting dominate; mass of projects cluster well around their three
in contrast, conservation-focused REDD+ interventions are respective centers.
activity-reducing, so that “the costs of inaction,” i.e., the We can thus juxtapose the Euclidean distance between
opportunity costs of limiting landowner activities, dominate. the respective implementer-class centers with the loadings
To steer free of this functional divide, we concentrated only plot for the two PCA dimensions, in order to decode
on REDD projects proper—i.e., without the “plus” from here in what way the three clusters differ, recognizing intuitive
onwards (Table 1). patterns: NGO-led REDD projects tend to be smaller, more
Figure 2 shows a principal component analysis (PCA) (Jolliffe, linked to protected areas and to be certified, while relatively
2002) of these 226 projects and programs in ID-RECCO, notably fewer of them plan for conditional cash payments6 to local
including programs that take a jurisdictional approach as defined landowners. Private for-profits tend to have fewer project
in this Special Issue. objectives than public or NGO-led ones, as one might
Not surprisingly, about a dozen jurisdictional REDD expect in commercially oriented initiatives. Public initiatives—
programs (left-hand side of figure) formed a distinct cluster the most likely to have common ground with evolving
of their own, compared to the REDD project cluster (right- JA—tend to be of a larger size, are less often linked
hand side), with still wide variation within clusters in to protected areas and, interestingly for our purposes, are
the 2nd plotted dimension (y axis)5 . Loadings of the two more inclined to plan for conditional incentives than private
dimensions (1st dim = 13.8%, 2nd dim = 12.1%) also or NGO initiatives. Noteworthy is also the significantly
underline the significant difference between jurisdictional different dispersion within groups (F = 4.84, P < 0.003). A
and project-level REDD: beyond the trivial factors of larger pairwise comparison confirms a significant wider dispersion
size, more recent start-up and still ongoing, jurisdictional of the NGO and the public groups, in comparison to the
REDD programs are also less linked to protected area private for-profit group. This arguably reflects the narrower
4 Criteria here include project implementers’ self-denomination as A/R vs REDD, 6 Unfortunately, the ID-RECCO database did not separate out plans for in-kind
as well as the activity distribution of budgets, hectares, and/or beneficiaries. conditional transfers. However, as we know from PES cross-section studies, cash
5 We retained the scores of the first two dimensions of the PCA, as only these transfers are the clearly dominating vehicle for imposing local-level conditionality
accounted for at least 10% of the variation. (Ezzine-de-Blas et al., 2016).
FIGURE 2 | Principal component analysis for REDD projects and jurisdictional initiatives in ID-RECCO database. Data source: ID-RECCO database, 2018.
size and scope of for-profit projects, compared to a wider 96 projects (42%). In 2016, 133 projects, or almost two thirds
range of project origins and objectives, in particular in the of the total, planned to sell carbon—including the vast majority
NGO group. (82) of the certified ones. Yet, only 47 projects (23%) had already
sold carbon credits in 2016; 91% of these were certified. This
panorama shifted somewhat in 2018. Markedly more projects, 66
MULTILEVEL CONDITIONALITY IN REDD (29%), had now sold carbon credits, 88% of which were certified;
DESIGN? the number of non-certified carbon sales also jumped from 4 to
8 cases. But the amount and share of projects still planning to
To what extent, then, were conditionality principles applied in sell carbon dropped markedly, from the previous 133 (65%) to
the architecture of early REDD projects, specifically vis-à-vis our 112 (49%).
second research question? Scrutinizing the ID-RECCO database The implication of this marked clustering trend seems to be
(2016 and 2018 versions), we explore the relationship among that certification was a necessary, yet not sufficient precondition
three factors: for intentions, and especially de facto success in selling carbon.
Certification and actual sales of carbon credits were strongly
• Certification by either the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) or
correlated (for 2018: R2 = 0.35, t = 10.9, p < 0.001). While the
the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity (CCB) standards,
certification of REDD projects as a process had already reached
as pre-steps to market entry;
its climax in 2016, the diversification process of would-be sellers
• Planned and actual carbon sales, respectively (on voluntary
advanced further: more projects reached their carbon-sale goal
markets, or bilateral transactions), and
by 2018—mostly within, but some also outside the marketplace.
• Planned use of conditional incentives vis-à-vis on-the-ground
Yet, even more projects dropped their earlier intentions to sell
land stewards.
carbon. We might conjecture that increasingly faint carbon
Figure 4 shows that the number of ID-RECCO registered REDD market prospects overwhelmed these projects.
projects, whether ongoing or ended, rose between 2016 and 2018 What about the corresponding supply-side design, i.e., paying
from 204 to 226, i.e., by 10.8%. The number of projects that were people on the ground? Figure 5 simplifies the distribution
certified (or in the process of becoming certified), either through in Figure 4 and relates it to plans for conditional and
VCS or CCB, only rose marginally, from 94 (46% of total) to non-conditional on-the-ground payments in 2016 and 2018,
FIGURE 3 | Principal component analysis for REDD projects, excluding jurisdictional initiatives: multivariate homogeneity of group dispersions (variances) by
implementer type. Data source: ID-RECCO database, 2018.
FIGURE 4 | Certification, willingness and ability of REDD projects to sell carbon credits: status in 2016 and 2018 compared. Numbers for each category are
symbolized by the area of their relative rectangles, allowing for intersection between the different conditions (e.g., not all projects seeking certification are also seeking
carbon sales, while not all projects selling carbon are certified).
FIGURE 5 | Certification, carbon sales and types of incentive payments planned in REDD projects: status in 2016 and 2018 compared.
respectively. Non-conditional incentives (orange-colored) were linear regression model (Table 2). As we can see, in this model,
in 2016 only foreseen in 17% of the 204 REDD projects, whether projects were certified or not has one of the largest
but this share rises continuously as we move toward the estimated coefficients, and the only one significant at the 1%
inner core of closer carbon-sale involvement, i.e., interest level, as predictor for local payment plans. Additionally, we
in sales (23%), certification (28%) and actual sales (39%). note slight geographical differences, with projects in Asia and
For 2018, the picture is similar, but the progression is Latin America (both significant only at 10% level) less likely
less accentuated (21, 25, and 27%). Thus, the relationship to plan conditional payments at the local level compared to
is similar in 2016 and 2018, but starts at a much higher projects in Africa—perhaps somewhat surprisingly so, since for
level in 2018, when 39% of all projects planned conditional watershed PES at least Africa was found to lag behind these
local payments. Furthermore, the progression continues just continents in implementation (Ferraro, 2009). Finally, early-bird
until the point of certification (55% planned conditional projects (begun before 2006) were significantly less inclined to
payments), while projects with actual carbon transactions were plan for conditional payments (significant at 5% level). This
less likely to be planning conditional payments to local land makes good intuitive sense, since projects later transforming into
stewards (42%). REDD would in their original setup have been unaffected by the
Notably, many REDD projects thus followed the theoretical compensated-reduction currents that spread in the wake of the
conceptualization sketched in section From Compensated 2007 UNFCCC Conference in Bali.
Reduction Toward a REDD+ Model, by planning more for
conditional than non-conditional local incentives. Both payment A CLOSER LOOK AT IMPLEMENTATION
types became more popular among projects more involved with
carbon markets. This intuitively makes good sense: the more
OF REDD+ PROJECTS
likely projects were to count on sustainable carbon incomes, the Implementer Perspectives
more inclined they were to commit to continuous local payment In the quest to discern patterns of interventions used in actual
contracts. However, this correlation between intention to employ REDD project implementation, we use CIFOR’s GCS REDD+
conditional payments to local land stewards and intention to database of 23 REDD projects in six countries (Brazil, Peru,
sell carbon credits holds only through the certification stage. Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia, and Vietnam) with two data
We speculate that this is because an equitably designed local points (2010/2011 and 2013/2014) available for all but one
benefit-sharing mechanism has had particular importance for initiative (Bolsa Floresta) (Figure 6). In the PCA in Figure 2, the
project chances of getting certified, because it helps demonstrate scores of the GCS sample (marked as triangles) appear randomly
commitment to social safeguards. scattered, thus not pointing a priori to a biased sample vis-à-
This key role of certification is also confirmed in our vis the ID-RECCO data. Furthermore, a general comparison has
multivariate analysis of whether or not projects were planning confirmed that the GCS sample can be considered a reasonable
conditional local payments, using the project descriptors from if imperfect subsample of the wider universe of REDD projects
the PCA analysis in section Exploring Empirical Characteristics as represented in the ID-RECCO database (Sunderlin et al., 2016,
of Local REDD Initiatives as explanatory variables in a multiple p. 145–154). Our specific interest is in the (potential and actual)
TABLE 2 | To pay or not to pay conditionally: REDD project plans for local given current shortages of REDD funding, and large insecurities
implementation. about future funding flows: with multi-year contracts clearly
Estimate Std. error z-value Pr(>|z|)
came a set of mutual expectations for continuous responsibilities.
Consequently, some project managers also saw conditional
(Intercept) −0.14 0.54 −0.26 0.792 incentives as more experimental in nature: only nine, or half
In Asia −0.88 0.44 −1.98 0.047** of the (actual or potential) 18 implementers of conditional
In Oceania −0.17 1.62 −0.02 0.991 incentives also believed that these tools would in the future come
In South America −0.76 0.42 −1.81 0.0695* to constitute their single-most important land-use management
Protected area included (y/n) −0.24 0.35 −0.70 0.483 instrument to reduce carbon emissions (Sunderlin et al., 2014).
Pilot project (y/n) 0.10 0.36 0.26 0.792
Planned project (y/n) 0.06 0.63 0.11 0.913 Household Perspectives
Ongoing project (y/n) −0.11 0.42 −0.24 0.807 We can zoom in further to examine the “incidence” of
Certified (y/n) 1.18 0.40 2.96 0.003*** different types of interventions within project boundaries, or
Project start pre-2006 (y/n) −1.84 0.85 −2.18 0.029** how many households were affected by different types of
Project area −0.01 <0.01 −0.25 0.797 REDD interventions in the villages in the intervention areas
of projects in each country9 . In Figure 7, we can read the
Regression coefficients for a general linear model on the 2018 data.
Binary response variable: “Does the project plan to make land- or resource-use specific household-reported “intervention counts” as a crude measure
conditional cash payments to local land stewards (households, communities, etc.)? of the treatment intensity (or “score”) for different types
yes = 1/no = 0. of interventions.
Significance levels of explanatory variables: 10%*, 5%**, and 1%***.
Source: ID-RECCO database (Simonet et al., 2018a).
The last, right-hand side column gives us the global
total of counted interventions, and their relative distribution.
Conditional incentives score around 10%, or about the same
application of conditional on-the-ground incentives, as a key part as forest enhancements and environmental education. Yet, this
of the vision of REDD as a multi-level PES scheme (cf. section constitutes only half the score of the command-and-control
From Compensated Reduction Toward a REDD+ Model). category “restrictions on forest access & conversion,” and only
The GCS research protocol included detailed interviews with about one third of the non-conditional incentive category. That
implementers. In these interviews, 18 of the 23 implementers said, the geographical variation is large: in Vietnam, Tanzania,
stated that they either planned to, or had already begun to and Cameroon, the score for conditional incentives approaches
use conditional payments to households or communities, or one fourth to one third (in the former two cases, exceeding
other conditional (cash or in-kind) livelihood enhancements, the non-conditional category)—although precisely in those
while the remaining five had ruled out this instrument countries, the share of eventually abandoned REDD projects was
(Sunderlin et al., 2014)7 . also large, implying that payments may in some cases have been
Most projects and programs in the GCS sample used short-lived. In Brazil and Indonesia, the share of conditional
highly diversified interventions, thus resembling integrated incentives is well below 10%; in Peru, it is zero.
conservation and development projects (ICDP) (Sunderlin et al., We might see this aggregate imbalance in implementation
2014)8 . When implementers were asked to internally compare toward non-conditional incentives as particularly surprising:
conditional incentives to other instruments in their complex section Multilevel Conditionality in REDD Design? had
intervention mix, conditional incentives were singled out as clearly shown us from the ID-RECCO data a converse bias
the potentially most promising intervention of all, and also as toward conditional incentives in project plans. However, many
the one with which they were most satisfied when evaluating conditional payment schemes were introduced as pilots only in
project outcomes so far. However, two key obstacles were a few villages, and did not gain much traction in terms of the
also cited in the interviews. First, insecure land tenure and overall impact on all households.
overlapping land claims often made it impossible for the What were the impacts of the different types of interventions
implementers to contract with land users in ways that also (or instruments) as perceived by the involved households?
could secure desired REDD outcomes. Second, implementers Figure 8 gives us a picture from the GCS REDD household
were reluctant to promise continuous incentives to local people survey questions about perceived effects on both land use and
well-being. In other words, households were asked to what
7 This number was 50% higher than the 12 planning cash payments registered in
extent they thought a certain intervention had affected their
natural resource management decisions, and likewise vis-à-vis
the ID-RECCO desk-based dataset for the same projects (Simonet et al., 2018a).
The large difference is likely due to two factors. First, ID-RECCO data refer only to their household welfare—and, in which direction.
cash payments, not other conditional instruments. In GCS projects in Indonesia, Starting with the land use/environmental side (Figure 8A),
for instance, some REDD+ support for rubber cultivation and chicken raising was the household-perceived effectiveness of any given instrument in
contingent upon villages complying with annual goals for deforestation reduction changing land- and resource-use decisions was on average 35.9%
agreed between the implementers and the communities (Duchelle et al., 2017).
Second, the direct GCS interviews with implementers elicited more detailed
(bottom corner). Forest enhancements topped the ranked list
information, especially about future plans that may not have been fully formalized
in project development documents or certification reports. 9 This household analysis draws on 17 of the 23 GCS sites where household surveys
8 See Sunderlin et al. (2016) for detailed descriptions of intervention types. were conducted.
FIGURE 6 | CIFOR’s 23 subnational GCS-REDD sites. Source: GCS database, CIFOR.
FIGURE 7 | Household-reported involvement in tools of subnational REDD+ interventions. Includes only cases where the household is actually involved in the
intervention (“involved” = “yes”). Source: GCS-REDD M2 data, household surveys, 2013–2014.
(59%), followed by access and conversion restrictions (42.8%). whenever disincentive elements came to dominate the portfolios
Third are conditional incentives (39.8%), exceeding inter alia of interventions. Duchelle et al. (2017) find for the same GCS
non-conditional incentives (28.5%). sample that households exposed to disincentives alone suffered
Looking at the perceived household well-being effects a decrease in perceived tenure security and in their overall
(Figure 8B), we note initially that in fact all interventions had perceived well-being; adding incentives into the intervention mix
a net positive balance—i.e., the aggregate positive (“positive” helped to alleviate these negative effects on well-being.
plus “very positive”) exceeded the aggregate negative (“negative”
plus “very negative”). For a close-up view, the ranking of
“positive” and “very positive” impacts combined was led by CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR
forest enhancements (70.7%), followed closely by conditional JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES
incentives and environmental education (both 63.2%), non-
conditional incentives (57.9%), and land-tenure clarification REDD Project Components: Plans and
(57%). Hence, conditional incentives held the second-highest net Implementation Patterns
positive rate of all interventions, but not by a wide margin. Above we examined how REDD+ was originally conceptualized,
Yet, this crude instrument ranking alone says little about emerging from the concept of compensated reductions in
the total welfare impacts of these REDD projects, especially deforestation, and developing toward an envisaged multitier
FIGURE 8 | Household-reported REDD+ partial tool impacts on land use and well-being: did the treatment component affect households? (A) Land use. (B)
Well-being. Includes only cases where the household is actually involved in the intervention (“involved” = “yes”). Source: GCS-REDD M2 data, household surveys,
2013–2014.
scheme of international payments for environmental services conditional payments to landowners, the key feature of PES,
(PES) that aimed to capitalize on the promise of enhanced were registered for 88 projects. Geographic region, certification
effectiveness of conditionality. Using the ID-RECCO database, and post-2006 project starts are the only statistically significant
we analyzed the design of 226 conservation-oriented REDD covariates explaining plans for conditional incentives. This points
projects, comparing the empirical pattern of planned project to the importance of REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms
components to the theoretical conceptualization of REDD+. for certification.
From the PCA, we identified three well-defined clusters: public, We thus identified an empirical nexus between project
private-commercial and NGO-type of REDD initiatives. One carbon sales, certification, and PES payments: the three factors
hundred twelve of these where planning to sell carbon from seem to positively reinforce each other. As a next step, we
the outset, but by 2018 only 66 had succeeded. Most of those zoomed closer in to the 23 projects CIFOR’s GCS REDD
were certified by at least one standard. Actual or planned data (six of them either began as or later converted into
jurisdictional REDD+ programs), drawing on both implementer changing their land-use plans, while also providing above-
and household surveys. This databased reveals that some projects average welfare returns to households.
originally planning to use PES mechanisms failed to do so in the In spite of this apparent popularity on both the implementer
end; others piloted payments only in tiny subareas (e.g., single and recipient ends, conditional incentives remained
villages), thus exhibiting overall low treatment intensities. underutilized in REDD implementation, registering only one-
On aggregate, we can in the GCS sample distinguish three third of the treatment intensity of non-conditional incentives,
different types of local REDD experiences with conditional clearly the implementation instrument most often employed.
payments10 . The first category refers to trial-like, short-term Only nine out of 23 (39%) project implementers believed that
pilot payments, done either in about half of the project conditional incentives could become their single-most important
villages (the Tanzanian cases of Shinyanga, Kigoma, Lindi, tool, citing its two perceived key restrictions: first, insecure
Kilosa), with the rest being even more punctual (Zanzibar, land tenure impeding effective contracting of land stewards,
Berau—Indonesia). Some payments here were just conditional and second, the insecurity in financial flows for REDD+
upon villages adopting sustainable land-use plans, not (yet) jeopardizing longer-term contractual arrangements. There is
on monitored land-use compliance. Conditionality on land- an understandable fear among implementers to raise, and later
use compliance was often spurred by donors (e.g., NICFI, frustrate expectations when PES can only be sustained in the
DFID). In some cases, these donors actively persuaded the short-term, as recipients build expectations for a continued
implementer11 , to try out conditional payments to learn more delivery of subsidies.
about benefit-sharing mechanisms, rather than to primarily test Returning to our two research questions from section
the environmental effectiveness. Introduction, we can thus first conclude that the original vision
Second, the conditional payments in SE Cameroon and of a multitier PES model for REDD was significantly transformed
the Transamazon were longer-term experiments with well- when implemented in forested developing countries. Command-
conceptualized, systematic PES components, and with a clear and-control policies and non-conditional incentives came to play
interest in conservation effectiveness. Yet, they remained small- a much larger role than PES. Implementation of conditional
scale and in early-stage development, before eventually being payments ran into both a supply- and a demand-side problem,
abandoned. For the Cameroonian project, there was at least a which jointly seems to explain the discrepancy between REDD
plan to make the funding flow for PES sustainable (Plan Vivo theory and practice. This outcome was predicted by literature
certification), while the Transamazon project relied on time- on PES that identified secure tenure and secure funding flows as
limited funding from the Amazon Fund. key preconditions for PES implementation in general (Wunder,
Finally, both the Brazilian initiatives of Acre’s SISA program 2013; Engel, 2016), as leading to failure of PES in specific
(which became the world’s first jurisdictional REDD+ program) cases lacking those preconditions (Wunder et al., 2008), and as
and the Bolsa Floresta program (Amazonas), with their large- caveats for using conditional landowner payments in REDD+
scale public-sector involvement, had a different nature, with strategies (Wunder, 2009; Pagiola, 2011). In the murky waters
larger treatment intensity: higher percentages of households of forest frontier governance and irregular funding flows,
were/ are being covered over multiyear periods. However, both REDD+ practices thus mutated into a heterogeneous mix of
programs applied PES in complex policy mixes together with opportunistically customized interventions.
command-and-control and ICDP type of interventions. For Acre Secondly, we asked what factors favor adoption of a multitier
and especially Bolsa Floresta, the funding models generally draw PES model. The answers clearly mirror the observed problems
on a diversity of sources, and appear more consolidated than identified in response to the first research question: projects
for any other GCS initiatives. In both of these cases, monitoring with clear and secure land tenure situations, with long-term
systems for the land-use conditions underlying PES contracts financing sources, and with carbon market certification and
are in place, and have been tested, although sanctioning of sales are generally be more likely to adopt (and be able to
non-compliant recipients rarely occurs. stick to) conditional incentive payments to landowners. Only
Interestingly, among the GCS REDD implementers, we in a small subset of scenarios were those conditions satisfied.
found support for the promise of conditionality’s effectiveness. These institutionally and financially demanding requirements for
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, project implementers reported conditional incentives constitute a lesson from our analysis that
conditional incentives as being both the potentially most goes beyond REDD+ and JA.
promising, and so far also de facto most effective land-use
management tool, whenever this tool could actually be applied.
For REDD-treated households, the situation is similar: they Perspectives for Jurisdictional Approaches
identified conditional incentives as comparatively effective in to REDD and Low Emissions Development
Clearly jurisdictional approaches to REDD+ and low emissions
development intend to take a giant step forward vis-à-
10 This classification draws on the case description in Sills et al. (2014) and the vis REDD projects, inter alia by being more holistic in
GCS database. actions, more policy-integrated, and operating at larger scale.
11 In the case of the Transamazon project (Brazil), for instance, the Amazon Fund
played a key role in persuading the implementer (the NGO IPAM) to engage in a
There is sound evidence that national (and subnational)
PES scheme, as part of the REDD+ project (Erika P.P. Pinto, pers.comm., April policies are more important than local projects in reducing
2015). deforestation, although these national policies are typically
also shaped by social priorities—such as national income, Conversely, what alternative incentives could be used in JA
employment, or price stability (e.g., Angelsen and Kaimowitz, and other upscaled initiatives in lieu of large-scale performance-
1999, Busch and Ferretti-Gallon, 2017). Nonetheless, REDD based PES schemes, whenever the conditions are not apt for
projects remain arguably one of their “closest relatives,” and these output-based distribution systems, such as carbon credits?
family ties are hard to completely escape: the opportunities A series of incentives may still be possible, such as rewards for
and problems revealed by attempts to implement the REDD+ certain discrete management activities (input-based rewards) or
model are likely to re-appear in efforts to implement the as governance support for the implementation of jurisdictional
JA model. anti-deforestation policies, such as tax distributions systems that
For instance, jurisdictional REDD+ programs have so far reward states or municipalities for the size and/or quality of their
also received only hesitant and slow climate financing flows, protected area management (e.g., Ring, 2008).
making it difficult to plan for the future. Just as for REDD More broadly, should we expect JA implementers to be
projects, these financial flows have been coming mostly in non- more at ease with policy influence than REDD practitioners?
conditional forms, rather than being based on performance. The de Sassi et al. (2014, p. 426–428) and Ravikumar et al. (2015)
major struggles for jurisdictional initiatives against forest loss also both compared the perceptions among jurisdictional and project
occur typically at the same forest margins/ agricultural frontiers, implementers at the 23 GCS sites. de Sassi et al. found no
characterized notoriously by deficient institutions—and the same support for the ex ante hypothesis that subnational policies
land-tenure insecurities that REDD has been exposed to. While would be perceived as less challenging by JA implementers than
JA at higher implementation scales are closer to the policy- by project proponents. Specifically, jurisdictional approaches
making, they will also have to balance more concerns. However, were found to suffer from the swing of the pendulum
many key implementation bottlenecks of JA and REDD are likely from pro-climate mitigation to anti-mitigation policies. Having
to be quite similar. Jurisdictions would seem well-advised to multiple stakeholders in a jurisdictional approach thus required
only rely significantly on conditional landowner incentives in “navigating conflict and collaboration among actors with very
scenarios where the preconditions for PES are met. different interests and degrees of power” (de Sassi et al., 2014, p.
Yet, jurisdictional programs also share with REDD projects 428). “Multilevel governance challenges were not automatically
an urgent strategic necessity: to develop effective and cost- resolved” [by JA implementation] (Ravikumar et al., 2015, p.
efficient incentives for local stakeholders including landowners, 931); instead the success of subnational jurisdictional programs
so as to balance the typically negative effects of government- would become highly context-specific, depending specifically on
led command-and-control policies (Duchelle et al., 2017). This political negotiations in the jurisdiction vis-à-vis the nexus of
is a key shared challenge in making local allies favor a forest agricultural, investment, and trade-related policies (Ravikumar
conservation agenda. Currently, in many tropical forest frontiers, et al., 2015, Figure 1).
this challenge has not been well-addressed: the incentives remain In sum, probably most new policy initiatives will produce
insufficient and/ or ineffective. some unexpected obstacles to implementation when they hit the
On the positive side, the results above imply that, whenever ground – in the face of which active learning from previous, even
the right preconditions exist, or can be created, land-use remotely similar types of policy implementation can become a
conditional incentives can be an important component in strong asset.
complex policy mixes. The sample features cases where
conditional incentives were applied quite successfully with Conceptual Development Patterns
respect to environmental impacts (e.g., Simonet et al., 2018b). Finally, we see interesting parallels between REDD and JA
The use of conditional incentives was endorsed as both in the historical process of conceptualization: compensated
well-performing and promising by project implementers reductions and RED were originally coined as mere objectives,
and households alike. Whereas non-conditional, ICDP-like yet quickly morphed into a dominant REDD+ model of
incentives typically need to be customized to regions, villages, or multitier conditional payments—thought at the time to be the
even individual landowners, conditional incentives can arguably most logical, politically implementable, and ethically desirable
better be applied on larger scales—such as in the Brazilian cases architecture—yet arguably also underestimating along the way
of Acre (SISA) and Amazonas states (Bolsa Floresta): conditional some key preconditional obstacles. As shown above, the reality of
incentives may also provide a pathway of keeping transaction REDD+ implementation came to look quite different from the
costs at bay. dominant expectations.
Hence, jurisdictional REDD+ programs should not shy away Similarly, today JA corresponds to the objective of taking
from these opportunities. However, once larger-scale incentives emission reductions to higher scales where carbon leakage is
schemes have been adopted, close attention needs to be paid reduced, policy synergies can be better exploited, and cost
to the design of such initiatives: many large-scale public- efficiency likely be boosted. The currently used definitions
sector PES schemes tend to adopt multiple side-objectives in of JA belong to the family of descriptive, deliberately vague
conflictive ways that typically reduce, sometimes dramatically, definitions that can be advantageous at early stages of conceptual
their environmental efficiency (Engel, 2016; Wunder et al., 2018). development (Strunz, 2012). However, it arguably also contains
Since landscape approach interventions in general and JA in strong prescriptive elements (multi-stakeholder, multi-sectoral,
specific are multi-objective and holistic by design, they will have landscape-level, policy-market coordination, holistic action) that
to carefully consider tradeoffs between objectives. JA proponents believe to best address experiences with REDD+,
while also being in line with current political winds (e.g., a too narrowly framed, pre-conceived conceptual model, which
NDC implementation). is overly dismissive of the previous paradigm that they seek to
In other words, beyond merely constituting a new objective, improve on. This may help avoid not only exacerbated cycles of
JA is being framed as a new paradigm or model, in ways that in “fads, funding, and forgetting” (Redford et al., 2013, p. 437), but
real time also prescribe how to design and implement emerging also the kind of misaligned functional expectations that arguably
interventions. Just as previously REDD+ was conceived as came to be generated around the REDD+ model.
a multitier PES system that never actually pre-existed on
any significant scale, JA is arguably based on what its key DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
implementers think should become mainstream implementation:
a government-led, multi-stakeholder, integrated public-private, The datasets generated for this study are available on request to
comprehensive approach to forest and land use. the corresponding author.
Political science suggests that it is generally not unusual for
new ideas to shift the way a policy problem is conceived and ETHICS STATEMENT
discussed, well before (or alternatively without) any actual policy
change (Hall, 1993). A genuine policy paradigm shift would thus The studies involving human participants were reviewed and
have taken place only once the objectives and instruments of approved by Center for International Forestry Research. Written
policy have been replaced by new ones. It is open to question informed consent for participation was not required for this
though just how directionally prescriptive the new ideal framing study in accordance with the national legislation and the
should be—and, conversely, how quickly the old paradigm institutional requirements.
should be written off.
In our particular case, should a narrowly forest-focused AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
REDD+ approach be dismissed? For instance, a recent impact
evaluation confirmed that Norway’s NICFI program had indeed SW formulated the research idea, analyzed data, and wrote
had a significantly positive environmental impact on Guyana’s the manuscript. CS and GS analyzed data. AD, ES, and WS
forest cover, as compared to a business-as-usual scenario contributed to the research idea and wrote the manuscript.
(Roopsind et al., 2019). These REDD+ national-level rigorous
impact evaluations are extremely scarce (Duchelle et al., 2019), FUNDING
but could it be that REDD+ can be made to work, after all?
Notably, NICFI interventions would qualify as jurisdictional This research is part of CIFOR’s Global Comparative Study on
REDD+ programs, but would not necessarily exhibit the full REDD+ (www.cifor.org/gcs). The funding partners that have
JA suite of hoped-for holistic attributes of being landscape-level, supported this research include the Norwegian Agency for
multi-stakeholder, and market-policy integrated. And what if, Development Cooperation (Norad), the Australian Department
conversely, the emerging holistic JA paradigm, just like REDD+, of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the European Commission
also ran into key implementation obstacles—say, in failing to nest (EC), the International Climate Initiative (IKI) of the German
actions and credits across jurisdictional sublevels, or in losing Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation,
a GHG mitigation focus in favor of increasingly vague multi- Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB), the United Kingdom
objective policy mixes—thus eventually calling for the approach Department for International Development (UKAID), and the
to be modified? CGIAR Research Program on Forests, Trees and Agroforestry
In other words, based on the above analysis we argue that (CRP-FTA), with financial support from the donors contributing
JA implementers may be well-advised to not get caught up with to the CGIAR Fund.
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et al. (2018). “Strategic alignment: integrating REDD+ in NDCs and national provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the
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Angelsen, C. Martius, V. De Sy, A. E. Duchelle, A. M. Larson, and T. T. Pham practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
(Bogor: CIFOR), 69–80. with these terms.

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ORIGINAL RESEARCH

published: 21 February 2020

REDD+ in Theory and Practice: How

INTRODUCTION Forest Initiative (NICFI) launched in 2007 (Angelsen, 2017),

DATA AND METHODS Methods

FROM COMPENSATED REDUCTION Furthermore, compensated reduction and REDD+ were

FIGURE 6 | CIFOR’s 23 subnational GCS-REDD sites. Source: GCS database, CIFOR.

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