REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

First Judicial Region

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
Baguio City
Branch 426-A

People of the Philippines, Crim. Case No. 8441-21

Complainant

-versus- For Reckless Imprudence

Resulting in Damage to
Property

Harry James Caballero,

Accused.

x---------------------------------x

COMMENT/OPPOSITION TO THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

COMES NOW, the Prosecution, by and through the undersigned

Prosecutors, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully avers that:

1. The undersigned prosecutors received the Demurrer to Evidence of

the accused, Harry James Caballero, on March 11, 2023, thus giving
the prosecution until March 21, 2023 to file its Comment.

2. In the said Demurrer to Evidence, the accused alleged that the instant
case should be dismissed on the ground that the Prosecution did not
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that his
Constitutional right to presumption of innocence was not overcome.

3. It is respectfully submitted that the arguments of the accused are

without merit.

The version of the incident by the defendant

is inconsistent with the physical evidence

4. The accused claims that he was 2-3 meters ahead of the vehicle of the
private complainant when the private complainant bumped the rear
right side of the armored van. However, the documentary exhibit of
the defense marked as Exhibit “4”, found on page 8 of the attached
exhibits, shows the damage sustained to the right headlight and right
front bumper of the armored van (V2), which is being presented to
prove the counterclaim of the defendant against the private
complainant. Accused’s own evidence belies his version of the

1
 incident. Were it true that it was the private complainant who bumped
the armored van at the rear, it would have been impossible for the
armored van to sustain damages on its headlight and front bumper.

5. Documentary evidence marked as Exhibit “1” and series of the

defense, purportedly showing the moment that the private complainant
bumped the armored van are also inconsistent with the damages
sustained by the Hyundai Elantra (V1) driven by the private
complainant. Documentary evidence marked as Exhibits “C-4”-“C-8”
inclusive, by the prosecution shows that the V1 sustained damages
from the rear left fender all the way to the left front fender. What is
evident from these images is that the directions of the scratches clearly
indicate that they were inflicted beginning from the rear to the front of
the V1.

6. Documentary evidence marked as Exhibit “C-5” show that the side

mirror of the V1 folded outward instead of inward. If it were true that
it is the private complainant who bumped the armored van, the side
mirror of V1 would have folded inward instead of outward.

7. In Go v. Court of Appeals1 the Court ruled that, “In the weighing of

evidence, documentary evidence prevails over testimonial evidence”.
Applying the foregoing, as between the self-serving testimonial
evidence by the defendant and the overwhelming and clear pieces of
documentary evidence taken by competent authorities, the latter
should prevail.

The elements of the crime have been properly

established from the evidence presented and
admitted during the pre-trial.

In Senit v. People2, the Supreme Court enumerated the elements of

reckless imprudence defined and penalized under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) as follows:

These are the elements of reckless imprudence, to wit:

(1) that the offender does or fails to do an act;

(2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
(3) that it be without malice;
(4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence;
and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
offender, taking into consideration his employment or

1
751 Phil 218 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
2
776 Phil. 372, 385 (2016)

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 occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other
circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

In relation to these elements, SECTION 35 of R.A. 4136 states

that, Restriction as to Speed. – (a) Any person driving a motor
vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent
speed, not greater or less than is reasonable and proper, having due
regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other
condition then and there existing…” Moreover, the same section of
R.A. 4136 sets a maximum allowable speed of 20 kilometer per
hour (km/h) “Through crowded streets, approaching intersections at
"blind corners," passing school zones, passing other vehicles which
are stationary, or for similar dangerous circumstances.”

In the case of Caminos v. People of the Philippines3, the

Supreme Court ruled that the rate of speed may be used as a basis
indicative of reckless driving, including the extent of damage
incurred, to wit:

Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of

the principal considerations in determining whether a motorist
has been reckless in driving an automobile, and evidence of the
extent of the damage caused may show the force of the impact
from which the rate of speed of the vehicle may be modestly
inferred.

The accused claims that he was not speeding while driving as

there was moderate traffic in the area. However, the photographs of
the collision as presented by the prosecution, particularly Exhibit “C”
and series have shown the damages inflicted upon the car of the
private complainant from the rear left bumper up to the front left side
fender which may be considered as evidence of the extent of the
damage caused by the accused. The extent of the damage will indicate
that the defendant was speeding contrary to his claim that he was not
speeding. The version of the private complainant as contained in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay marked as Exhibit “A” narrating how the
accused sideswiped the vehicle of the private complainant is
consistent with the pieces of physical evidence taken by the
investigating officers from the scene right after the incident as shown
in Exhibits “C and series”. Were it true that the accused was driving at
a legal speed, which is at a maximum of 20 kp/h, it would have been
unlikely that the V1 would sustain damages from the left rear fender
all the way to the front fender while the V2 stopped only at about 3
meters ahead of V1.

3
Caminos v. People G.R. No. 147437, May 8, 2009

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 Clearly, the totality of the pieces of evidence particularly
Exhibit “C” and series presented by the prosecution clearly
established the fourth element of the crime which is the material
damage sustained by the private complainant resulting from the
reckless act of the accused in operating the armored van. Had he not
been speeding or had he been not consciously indifferent to the safety
of other road users, the extent of the damages sustained by V1 would
not have been as worse as it is.

The prosecution sufficiently established

the inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the accused

8. The defense also argues that even assuming that the accused is
negligent, it does not mean that his negligence amounts to criminal
negligence. The defense quoted Gonzaga v. People4 which states that
“mere negligence in driving a vehicle is not enough to constitute
reckless driving. Rather, it must be shown that the motorist acted
willfully and wantonly, in utter disregard of the consequence of his or
her action as it is the "inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious
indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the
criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence
under the operation of the penal law.”

In this case, the pieces of documentary evidence clearly show

the conscious indifference by the defendant to the consequences of his
conduct which elevated his mere negligence and imprudence to
criminal liability. A prudent driver, holding a professional driving
license no less, would have immediately stepped on the break upon
the point of impact which, in this case, when he bumped the left rear
fender of the Vehicle 2. Instead, he continued and only stopped when
he was about 3 meters in front of Vehicle 2, thereby causing more
damage to the private complainant’s car.

The defendant justifies his conscious indifference in insisting

that he was in the right lane and thus has the right of way. Section 43
(c) of Republic Act 4136 provides for exceptions to the right of way
and by analogy may be made applicable to this case. It states,
“Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall be construed as
relieving the driver of any vehicle being operated on a "through
highway" from the duty of driving with due regard for the safety
of vehicles entering such "through highway" nor as protecting the
said driver from the consequence of an arbitrary exercise of such
right of way (emphasis supplied)”. Clearly the said provision does not

4
Go v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112550, February 5, 2001.

4
 relieve the defendant from the duty of driving with due regard for the
safety of other vehicles just because he has the right of way. Simply
put, just because a driver has the right of way does not mean that he
can just proceed arbitrarily without regard to the safety of other
vehicles and road users.

The compromise agreement voluntarily

entered into by the parties is binding as
between them

9. Moreover, the fault of the accused is strengthened by the accused own

act when he himself entered into a compromise agreement with the
private complainant in the presence of PO1 Mark Ordinario5.

Section 26 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: “The act,

declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.” Moreover, in the case of Municipal Board of
Cabanatuan City v. Samahang Magsasaka, Inc.6 A compromise
agreement is a contract between the parties, which if not contrary to
law, morals or public policy, is valid and enforceable between them.
In addition, the case of Rovero v. Amparo7 states that, as a contract, a
compromise agreement is perfected by mutual consent.

Pursuant to the foregoing rule and jurisprudence, the act of the

accused in entering into a compromise agreement may be given in
evidence against him. It must be emphasized that the accused did not
merely make an offer of compromise but actually executed and
entered into a compromise agreement with the private complainant
which the latter relied upon in good faith. As the contract between the
parties, the same must be enforceable between them pursuant to the
well established doctrine of pacta sunt servanda.

10.Based on the above discussion, the accused clearly does not have any
basis to state that the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

11. Contrary to the claim of the accused, the Prosecution was able to
present enough evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It is now the turn of the accused to prove their side
on the matter.

5
Exhibit “B-1” page 12 of the PTB and JA of PO1 Mark Ordinario Page 39-42 of the PTB
6
Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City v. Samahang Magsasaka, Inc., 62 SCRA 435 [1975]
7
Rovero v. Amparo, 91 Phil. 228 [1952]

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 PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Prosecution prays that the

Demurrer to Evidence of the accused be denied for lack of merit.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed
for.
Baguio City, Philippines, March 11, 2023.

Nernanie G. Fronda
Associate City Prosecutor
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