TRANSMISSION

SECURITY
(TRANSEC)
Introduction

We at ST Engineering iDirect recognize the critical need to protect the flow

of communications to wherever the military and government agencies may
operate. Wherever this may be, threat actors readily stand by to monitor, exploit
or intercept communications for malicious intent. To mitigate this threat, we
have been providing Transmission Security (TRANSEC) capabilities since the
initial release of the Evolution software. With the release of 4.2, we have further
enhanced our TRANSEC capabilities by extending protection to cover both
one-way and two-way networks.

In combatant situations, where even a small “spike” in traffic can be a critical

piece of intelligence, the need to mask any communications activity becomes
apparent. The National Security Agency (NSA) has outlined the following
vulnerabilities inherent in an IP-based TDMA transmission that must be
addressed in order to provide true TRANSEC:

Channel Activity – The ability to secure transmission energy to conceal

traffic volumes.

Control Channel Information – Disguise traffic volumes to secure traffic

source and destination.

Hub and Remote Unit Validation – Ensure remote terminals connected to

the network are authorized users.

What is TRANSEC?

TRANSEC prevents an adversary from exploiting information available in a

communications channel without necessarily having defeated encryption.

TRANSEC requires all network control channels and Management & Control
(M&C) data to be encrypted, and that any and all traffic engineering information
be obfuscated from an adversary. For example, TRANSEC requires a
communications channel to appear completely full to an adversary even if little
or no actual data is flowing. This is contrasted with communications security
(COMSEC); the actual communication (e.g. voice, video or data stream) is
encrypted, but certain header information is sent in the clear. While the
encryption is virtually impenetrable, the information in the IP header including
the source address, destination address and, most importantly, the Type of
Service (ToS) field are in the clear. With the IP header of an encrypted packet in
the clear, an adversary can determine how much of the traffic stream is voice,
video or data. More significantly, an adversary could determine when high-
priority flash-override traffic has been initiated and from which location.

In a traditional SCPC (single channel per carrier) satellite network topology,

achieving TRANSEC compliance is relatively straight forward. For SCPC
connections, a bulk encryptor is employed to encrypt any data and control
information traversing the network. The IP header of the Solution
packet would be encrypted by the bulk encryptor prior to We have implemented free slot allocation in our TDMA
being transmitted to the satellite. In addition, since an SCPC bandwidth distribution algorithm. With free slot allocation,
link is static, always on and no control information needs to an adversary snooping for satellite transponder energies will
be exchanged between the SCPC modems, all of the see a constant“wall of data”regardless of traffic profiles. As the
TRANSEC requirements are met. name implies, free slot allocation keeps the in-routes active
regardless of actual traffic flows. Free slot allocation preserves
In a TDMA network, TRANSEC compliance is more difficult. the efficiencies of a TDMA system while obfuscating actual
A TDMA network dynamically allocates bandwidth to remotes; traffic volumes, negating the risk of using transmission activity
therefore, there must be some type of control information as an intelligence gathering mechanism.
transmitted to each device in the network. This control data
containing traffic engineering information, as well as inform- Obfuscating Acquisition Activity
ation available from an encrypted IP packet header, can be
exploited by an adversary. For example, anomalous traffic Challenge
volume to a specific remote can indicate new activity in that The rate at which remotes acquire into a network can provide
area while varying ratios of voice-to-data traffic can denote critical information to an adversary about troop activities. All
the distribution of intelligence (data) compared to lower TDMA networks provide a dedicated channel for remote
priority voice traffic. acquisition activity. If adversaries monitor the activity in this
channel, they will be alerted to troop movements by a flurry
ST Engineering iDirect has implemented the following of acquisition activity.
solutions in response to the security vulnerabilities of a
TDMA Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) network. Solution
We exceed TRANSEC requirements by addressing acquisition
Masking Channel Activity activity vulnerability. The ST Engineering iDirect acquisition
algorithm inserts dummy bursts from remotes already in the
Challenge network and intentionally skips acquisition bursts at times of
The first vulnerability that exists in a TDMA network is the high activity, ensuring an adversary sees only a random
availability of traffic engineering information. In an SCPC distribution of acquisition activity. Our acquisition algorithm
network, the link is static with no variation in transmission goes a step further by randomly varying the dummy burst’s
characteristics based on end user communications. An frequency, timing and power. This randomization makes sure
adversary looking at a satellite transponder with a spectrum an adversary cannot distinguish between a dummy burst and
analyzer will see a constant RF signal. This is contrasted actual acquisition activity.
with a TDMA network. A TDMA in-route carrier energizes and
de-energizes as traffic flows and stops. The on-and-off nature Control Channel Information
of a TDMA in-route is the natural extension of the ability
to allocate satellite transponder space to remotes that have Challenge
transient demands. While this characteristic makes TDMA A great deal of traffic volume and priority information can
networks much more bandwidth efficient, it allows an adversary be gleaned by examining the in-band or out-of-band control
to determine peak periods of activity, identify unusual or information within an encryptedTime Division Multiple Access
unexpected activity spikes, and identify locations of remotes (TDMA) network. As previously discussed, the IP header of a
that have remained quiet for a period of time and suddenly packet contains source, destination and priority information.
experience increased traffic volumes. The obvious risk in In order for a TDMA network to provide the quality of service
having this information in the hands of an adversary is the (QoS) needed to support real-time traffic, data quantities and
potential to extrapolate timing, location and scale of a prioritization information must be gathered. This
strategic activity. information could be more useful to an adversary than
channel activity data because it is specific enough to delineate between general
communications like email and web traffic, versus tactical communications like
voice and video.

Solution
The only solution for this vulnerability is to completely encrypt all Layer 2
information as well as any control information disseminated to the remotes. The
encryption methodology must be secure enough to thwart an adversary long
enough that the data becomes old and unusable. We have implemented
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 certified 256-bit keyed
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for all Layer 2 and control information. The
encryption of the Layer 2 frames has a side benefit of re-encrypting the data
payload. Therefore, the transmitted IP header itself is AES-encrypted.
Additionally, the ST Engineering iDirect TRANSEC TDMA slot is a fixed size, again
to obfuscate any traffic characteristics. This Layer 2 encryption solution solves all
existing control channel vulnerabilities. Our Layer 2 encryption method goes a
step beyond to feature over-the-air (OTA) key updates and a unique Layer 2
frame format, including an Initialization Vector that ensures randomization of
repetitive data streams. The net result is that adversaries are precluded from
detecting any repetitive pattern, which can aid in deciphering encryption
algorithms.

Hub and Remote Authentication

Challenge
Another vulnerability of a TDMA VSAT system is the concept of Hub and Remote
validation. In traditional SCPC architectures, a link remains active for very long
periods of time when it is established. Because these connections are fixed, and
there is a significant level of coordination between personnel commissioning the
SCPC, a high degree of confidence exists that an adversary is not trying to assume
the identity of a trusted entity. In TDMA networks, remotes are routinely coming
into and dropping out of the network. This is especially true of networks with
mobile or itinerant terminals where terminals are located in moving vehicles,
aircraft or maritime vessels. This type of dynamic environment gives an adversary
a greater opportunity to obtain a VSAT remote through licit or illicit channels, spoof
the device ID and insert a rogue remote into a secure network. Equally feasible is
an adversary acquiring a VSAT hub terminal and coaxing a blue force remote into
the adversary’s network.

Solution
To mitigate this risk, we have implemented X.509 digital certificates on TRANSEC
remotes. An X.509 certificate utilizes RSA public key cryptosystem. With this
cryptosystem, two related keys are generated: one private key and one public
key. The functionality of these keys is so that anything encrypted with the public
key can only be decrypted with the private key, and anything encrypted with
the private key can only be decrypted with the public key. In the ST Engineering
iDirect system, X.509 certificates can be generated via the NMS server.
Certificates are placed on all TRANSEC line cards and acquisition passphrases, a single, dynamic passphrase can
Protocol Processors as well as on the remotes. The hub be utilized across global networks.
system keeps the public keys of each remote configured to
operate on the hub, and the remotes have the public keys Additional Security Measures
of each hub device. During network acquisition, the remote
encrypts its X.509 certificate with its private key, and the FIPS 140-2
hub verifies by decrypting the certificate with the remote’s The FIPS 140-2 is a U.S. government security standard for
public key and vice versa. This process ensures a remote is accrediting cryptographic modules. The standard is
not only authorized to operate in the network, but that the published by the National Institute of Standards and
hub is a trusted entity. Technology (NIST).

Operational Implementation FIPS 140-2 provides stringent third-party assurance of

security claims on any product containing cryptography
Challenge that may be used by a government agency. FIPS 140-2
Implementing security and ensuring all security policies establishes the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
are followed can be a burden to the soldier in the field. (CMVP) as a joint effort between NIST and Canada’s
Implementing TRANSEC and performing key management Communications Security Establishment (CSE).
is no exception. Challenges one would face in operating a
TRANSEC network include creation, distribution and revo- FIPS 140-2 specifies four levels of security when it comes to
cation of X.509 certificates; ACQ and Data Channel key the design and implementation of cryptographic modules.
generation, distribution and management; and zeroizing As described by NIST, the following is a high-level overview
modems. A robust TRANSEC network also requires the use of of these security levels:
at least two network-wide keys: The ACC Key for acquisition,
and the DCC Key for the data channel. A long-lived, user- Security Level 1 is the basic level of security. No specific
generated passphrase is used to protect the keys during physical security features are required, and only one approved
initial commissioning. The use of front panel displays to enter security function algorithm is required.
the passphrase and external key fill mechanisms places an
undue burden on the warfighter and introduces security Security Level 2 requires tamper-evident coatings or seals
vulnerabilities. that must be broken to gain access to the cryptographic keys
and critical security parameters.
Solution
We have implemented a FIPS-approved software method Security Level 3, in addition to the requirements of Level 2,
of key generation and automatic, OTA key distribution physical security mechanisms are required to be able to detect
protocol. Not only does the software-based key generation and respond to attempts at physical access or modification of
and key distribution mechanism make TRANSEC operation the cryptographic module.
simpler and more convenient for the warfighter, it makes
the system much more secure by removing a human from Security Level 4 requires a complete envelope of protection
key distribution. around the cryptographic module with the ability to detect
and respond to all unauthorized attempts at access.
Another advantage of automatic key generation and
distribution is that it seamlessly enables a global In addition to the hardware requirements described above,
communications-on-the-move (COTM) TRANSEC network. FIPS validation applies to the cryptographic solution as a
By automatically generating and distributing new whole, including the operating system and software.
Enhancing TRANSEC and Security with the 9-Series and DLCs

With the release of our 9-Series Satellite Routers and Defense Line Cards, we have expanded our existing FIPS 140-2 certification from
Level 2 to Level 3 from our previous line of products. As part of the effort, we developed a TRANSEC module designed to meet the
stringent FIPS 140-2 Level 3 requirements as defined by NIST. Through hardware and software development, the embedded, and yet
independent, TRANSEC module on the 9-Series and DLCs operates through a separate and trusted path from all other interfaces on
the product. The module also features a strong physical security measure for tamper prevention and the capability to zeroize the
security keys or critical security parameters (CSPs) stored on the module itself. If required, the revocation or zeroization of the keys
can be accomplished either OTA by the hub operator or locally on the remote by authorized personnel.

One-Way Networks

We have further enhanced our TRANSEC capabilities by securing one-way broadcast transmissions. Based on their encapsulation
method, LEGS, the ST Engineering iDirect platform can provide the same level of security for one-way networks to that of two-way
networks as described earlier. The 900 and 9350, with its dual-demodulator support, are capable of dual-domain TRANSEC; the
ability to establish two independent chains of trust (sets of X.509s) between two different CAs.An example use case of this feature
would be one demodulator on a two-way TRANSEC network while the second demodulator receives a separate one-way
TRANSEC-secured broadcast. Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) is used for key generation along with X.509 certificates for
authentication in each security domain.

ST Engineering iDirect | www.idirect.net 01/23