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way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.In an action in personam,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case.Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court,
jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which state:

Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.

Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies
of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.

HENRY S. OAMINAL, PETITIONER, VS. PABLITO M. CASTILLO AND GUIA S. CASTILLO,

RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 152776, THIRD DIVISION, October 08, 2003, PANGANIBAN, J.

Verily, respondents did not raise in their Motion to Dismiss the issue of jurisdiction over their persons;
they raised only improper venue an litis pendentia. Hence, whatever defect there was in the manner of
service should be deemed waived.

Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such Law was cured and respondents
are deemed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an
Omnibus Motion to Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim, an Answer with
Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea to Reset Pre-trial. The
filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief — to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration —
are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

FACTS:

Petitioner Henry Oaminal Filed a complaint for collection against Respondents Pablito and Guia
Castillo.

The summons together with the complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal, secretary of
Respondent Mrs. Castillo.

Respondents filed their 'Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally
Defective' alleging that the Sheriff's Return has failed to comply with Section (1), Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court or substituted service of summons.

Scheduled hearing of the Motion took place.

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Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Declare Respondents in Default and to Render Judgment
because no answer was filed by the latter.

Respondents forthwith filed the following:

(a) Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory
Counter-claim
(b) Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the premise that . . . petitioner's complaint was barred by
improper venue and litis pendentia;
(c) Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim

RTC. (1) denied the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2) declared respondents in
default; and (3) ordered petitioner to present evidence ex-parte within ten days from receipt of the
order, [failing] which, the case will be dismissed. RTC. Rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.

Respondents filed with the CA a Petition for certiorari prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO). In the main, they raised the
issue of whether the trial court had validly acquired jurisdiction over them.

The CA ruled that the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over respondents, because the
summons had been improperly served on them. It based its finding on the Sheriffs Return, which
did not contain any averment that effort had been exerted to personally serve the summons on
them before substituted service was resorted to. Thus, the appellate court set aside the trial court's
Decision and dismissed, without prejudice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondents.

RULING:

YES. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondents.

In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the
service of summons or by the latter's voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the
former.

Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the summons shall be

served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and
sign for it, by tendering it to him.

Sec. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)

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by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. Resort to the latter is permitted
when the summons cannot be promptly served on the defendant in person and after stringent
formal and substantive requirements have been complied with.

For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is necessary to establish the following

circumstances:

(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;

(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the
party's residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's office or regular place
of business.

In the present case, the Sheriff's Return failed to state that efforts had been made to personally
serve the summons on respondents. Neither did the Return indicate that it was impossible to do so
within a reasonable time.
Nonetheless, nothing in the records shows that respondents denied actual receipt of the summons
through their secretary, Ester Fraginal. Their "Urgent Motion to Declare Service of Summons
Improper and Legally Defective" did not deny receipt thereof; it merely assailed the manner of its
service. In fact, they admitted in their Motion that the "summons, together with the complaint, was
served by the Sheriff on Ester Fraginal, secretary of the defendants at No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City on 30 May 2000."

That the defendants' actual receipt of the summons satisfied the requirements of procedural due
process. There is likewise no showing that respondents had heretofore pursued the issue of lack of
jurisdiction; neither did they reserve their right to invoke it in their subsequent pleadings. If at all,
what they avoided forfeiting and waiving — both in their Omnibus Motion ad Cautelam to Admit
Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory CounterClaim and in their Motion to Dismiss —
was their right to invoke the grounds of improper venue and litis pendentia.

Verily, respondents did not raise in their Motion to Dismiss the issue of jurisdiction over their
persons; they raised only improper venue an litis pendentia. Hence, whatever defect there was in
the manner of service should be deemed waived.

Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such Law was cured and
respondents are deemed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when
they filed an Omnibus Motion to Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim, an
Answer with Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea to Reset
Pre-trial. The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief — to admit answer, for additional time to

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file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration — are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 183035, FIRST DIVISION, January 09, 2013, SERENO, J.

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of
legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition,
one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by
reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default
with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This,
however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special
appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered
to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be
explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in
instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court
for resolution.

FACTS:

Petitioner Optima is engaged in the business of leasing and renting out commercial spaces and
buildings to its tenants. On December 12, 2002, Optima and Respondent Hertz entered into a
Contract of Lease over an office unit and parking slot in the Optima Bulding for a period of 3 years.
However, the lease agreement was amended by shortening the lease period ot 2 years and 5
months. The lease period was from October 1, 2003 to February 28, 2006.

Hertz requested Optima a 50% discount on its rent for the months of Maty to August 2005 since
Hertz suffered 50% drop in its monthly sales and significant decrease in its personnel’s
productivity due to the commencement of renovations in the building.

However, Hertz failed to pay its rentals from August to December 2005 and January to February
2006 notwithstanding the fact that Optima granted the former’s request. It also failed to pa y its
utility bills.

Optima sent a letter to Hertz, reminding the latter if it will renew its contract by a new negotiation
between them and upon written notice by the lessee to the less or at least 90 days before the
termination of the lease period. Since Hertz failed to send written notice renewing its contract and
it’s desire to negotiate, Optima did not renew the lease.

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Hertz filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Injunction, Damages and Sum of money and
prayed for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary Injunction against Optima. It sought the
issuance of a TRO to enjoin Optima from committing acts which would tend to disrupt it’s peaceful
use and possession of the leased premises and wit of preliminary injunction to order Optima to
reconnect its utilities.

Thereafter, Optima demanded Hertz to surrender and vacate the leased premises and pay
P420,967.28

covering rental arrearages, unpaid utility bills and other charges. Due to Hertz’s refusal to vacate
the leased premises, Optima filed an action before the MeTC for Unlawful Detainer and Damages
with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Hertz.

MeTC rendered judgment in favor of Optima and ordered Hertz to vacate the leased premises and
to oder the amount of P420,967.28 representing its rentals arrearages and utility charger as well as
the payment for the monthly use and occupancy of the premises from March 2006 until possession
is restored to the plaintiff in the amount of P54,200 per month.

RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC. CA ruled that, due to the improper service of summons, the MeTC
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz.

Optima then filed Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC.

ISSUE:

1st issue: Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz.
2nd issue: Whether the unlawful detainer case is barred by litis pendentia.

RULING:

1st issue:

Yes. The MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by
the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.

In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the
latter’s voluntary appearance in court. In spite of the defective service of summons, the defendant
opted to file an Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court. Furthermore, it never raised the
defense of improper service of summons in its answer with counterclaim.

2nd issue:

No. The unlawful detainer case is not barred by litis pendentia.

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The Court ruled that while there is identity of parties in both cases, the rights asserted and the
reliefs prayed for under the Complaint for Specific Performance and those under the present
Unlawful Detainer Complaint are different.The Complaint for Specific Performance seeks to compel
Optima to: (1) renegotiate the contract of lease; (2) reconnect the utilities at the leased premises;
and (3) pay damages. On the other hand, the unlawful detainer case sought the ejectment of
defendant-appellant Hertz from the leased premises and to collect arrears in rentals and utility
bills. Rights asserted and the reliefs sought in the two cases are different.

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, PETITIONER, VS. JULIE CHANDUMAL, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 195619, FIRST DIVISION, September 05, 2012, REYES, J.

The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through
service of summons or through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. If a
defendant has not been properly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over its person, and a
judgment rendered against it is null and void.

Where the action is in personamand the defendant is in the Philippines, service of summons may be
made through personal service, that is, summons shall be served by handing to the defendant in person
a copy thereof, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.If the defendant cannot
be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, it is then that substituted service may be
made. Personal service of summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said
summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted
service.

FACTS:

PDB filed an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession
against Chandumal. Summons was issued and served by deputy sheriff. According to his return, the
Sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on three separate instances
but it was unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff caused
substituted service of summons by serving the same through Chandumal’s mother who
acknowledged receipt thereof.

For her failure to file an answer within the prescribed period, Chandumal was declared in default.
Chandumal then filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached
Answer. The RTC denied Motion and rendered a Judgment against Chandumal. On appeal,
Chandumal claimed, among others, that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over her person.

ISSUES:

1st issue: Whether or not there was a valid substituted service of summons.
2nd issue: Whether or not Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

RULING:

1st issue:

No. There was no valid substituted service of summons

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The sheriff’s return failed to justify a resort to substituted service of summons. The Return of
Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any
positive step taken by the officer or process server in attempting to serve the summons personally
to the defendant. The return merely states the alleged whereabouts of the defendant without
indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Indeed,
the sheriff’s return shows a mere perfunctory attempt to cause personal service of the summons on
Chandumal. There was no indication if he even asked Chandumal’s mother as to her specific
whereabouts except that she was "out of the house", where she can be reached or whether he even
tried to await her return. The "efforts" exerted by the sheriff clearly do not suffice to justify
substituted service and his failure to comply with the requisites renders such service ineffective.

2nd issue:

Yes. Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court

Despite that there was no valid substituted service of summons, the Court, nevertheless, finds that
Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. When Chandumal filed an
Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer, she effectively
submitted her person to the jurisdiction of the trial court as the filing of a pleading where one seeks
an affirmative relief is equivalent to service of summons and vests the trial court with jurisdiction
over the defendant’s person.

MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, PETITIONER

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of
ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 130974, THIRD DIVISION, August 16, 2006, VELASCO, JR., J.

The court’s jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service of summons. Without a valid
service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily
submits to it. The defendant must be properly apprised of a pending action against him and assured of
the opportunity to present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used to protect one’s
right to due process.

FACTS:

In the case of Trajano vs. Manotoc for wrongful death of the deceased Archimedes Trajano
committed by Military Intelligence under the command of Ma. Imelda M. Manotoc. Based upon the
complaint the Regional Trial Court issued a summons at the house of Manotoc. The said Mackey
dela Cruz (caretaker) received the summons. Manotoc was declared in default for failure to answer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC acquire a valid jurisdiction for the service of summons over the
petitioner.

HELD:

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No. The RTC did not acquire a valid jurisdiction for the service of summons over the
petitioner.

The Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner, because the
substituted service of summons was defective in nature or invalid at the first place. The main fact
that the summons was not sent in the petitioner’s dwelling, the said caretaker was not a person of
suitable age and discretion and was not resided in the said address. Hence the requisites of
substituted summons was not followed, therefore the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
petitioner at the first place.

REMELITA M. ROBINSON, PETITIONER, VS. CELITA B. MIRALLES, RESPONDENT

G.R. No. 163584, SECOND DIVISION, December 12, 2006, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Although the SC have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is
considered ineffective, the Court frowns upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit,
rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs.

FACTS:

Respondent Celita Miralles filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Remelita Robinson, alleging that $20,054 was borrowed by Robinson, as shown in the MOA they
both executed.

Summons was served on Robinson at her given address. However, per return of service of the
Sheriif, petitioner no longer resides there. Thus, the trial court issued an alias summons to be
served at Muntinlupa City, petitioner’s new address.

Again, the Sheriff reported twice thereafter that the summons could not be served on petitioner.
Sheriff Pontente, who was to serve the summons interposed that he was stopped by the Security
Guard of Alabang Hills Village because they were allegedly told by Robinson not to let anyone
proceed to her house if she is not around. Despite the explanations of the Sheriff, the guards didn’t
let him in. Thereafter, the Sheriff just left a copy of the complaint to a guard, who refused to affix his
signature on the original copy, so he will be the one to give the summons to petitioner Robinson.

Eventually, petitioner Robinson was declared in default for her failure to file an answer seasonably
despite service of summons. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Miralles ordering
Robinson to pay her obligations plus cost of damages. A copy of the court Order was sent to
petitioner by registered mail at her new address and a writ of execution was also issued.

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Robinson filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default. She claimed that summons was
improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its
proceedings are void. Petitioner Robinson contends that the service of the summons upon the
subdivision guard is not in compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her or
staying at her residence, as required by the rule.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the substituted service of summons effected is valid.

RULING:

Yes. The substituted service of summons effected is valid.

Although the SC have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed
strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is
considered ineffective, the Court frowns upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the
spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs.

Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons
upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor did she deny
having received the summons through the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the
security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons
has been properly served upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.

Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons
may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in Sections 6 and
7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended.

Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over substituted service, the
latter mode of service being a method extraordinary in character. For substituted service to be
justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established:

(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;

(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of business.
Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

SIXTO N. CHU, PETITIONER, VS. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 184333, THIRD DIVISION, April 01, 2013, PERALTA, J.

The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and full.

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FACTS:

Mach Asia Trading Corp. (MATC) filed a complaint before the RTC of Cebu City for sum of money,
replevin, attorney’s fees and damages against Sixto N, Chu. Sheriff Doroteo P. Cortes failed to serve
the summons personally upon Chu, since the latter was not there. The Sheriff then resorted to
substituted service by having the summons and the complaint received by Rolando Bonayon, a
security guard of Chu. Chu failed to file any responsive pleading and was declared in default upon
motion of MATC. RTC ruled in favor of MATC and was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid substituted service of summons.

RULING:

No. There was no valid substituted service of summons

As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot
be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to.

It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the
person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant had
a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons. Also,
impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to
find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in
character, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute.
The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and
any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective.

Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the
petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely
receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the
security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of
substituted service.

CARSON REALTY & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. RED ROBIN SECURITY
AGENCY AND MONINA C. SANTOS, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 225035, THIRD DIVISION, February 08, 2017, VELASCO, JR., J.

Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility of
personal service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the

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defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business of the
defendant.

FACTS:

On March 23, 2007, respondent Monina C. Santos (Santos) filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages against petitioner Carson Realty & Management Corp. (Carson) with the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court (RTC). As per the Officer's Return dated April 12, 2007 of Process Server
Jechonias F. Pajila, Jr. (Process Server Pajila), a copy of the Summons dated April 11, 2007, together
with the Complaint and its annexes, was served upon Carson at its business address at Unit 601
Prestige Tower Condominium, Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, through its "corporate
secretary," Precilla S. Serrano. Thereafter, the appointed Corporate Secretary and legal counsel of
Carson, Atty. Tomas Z. Roxas, Jr. (Atty. Roxas), filed an Appearance and Motion dated April 25, 2007
with the court wherein the latter entered his appearance and acknowledged that the Summons was
served and received by one of the staff assistants of Carson. Atty. Roxas prayed for an extension of
fifteen (15) days from April 27, 2007 within which to file a responsive pleading. Instead of filing a
responsive pleading, Atty. Roxas moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Summons dated
April 11, 2007 was not served on any of the officers and personnel authorized to receive summons
under the Rules of Court.

The RTC denied Carson's Motion to Dismiss and directed the issuance of an alias summons to be
served anew upon the corporation. On November 9, 2007, Process Server Pajila submitted his
Officer's Report stating in essence that he attempted to serve the alias Summons dated September
24, 2007 on the President and General Manager of Carson, as well as on the Board of Directors and
Corporate Secretary, but they were not around. Hence, he was advised by a certain Lorie
Fernandez, the "secretary" of the company, to bring the alias Summons to the law office of Atty.
Roxas. Process Server Pajila attempted to serve the alias Summons at the law office of Atty. Roxas
twice, but to no avail. This prompted him to resort to substituted service of the alias Summons by
leaving a copy thereof with a certain Mr. JR Taganila, but the latter also refused to acknowledge
receipt of the alias Summons.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Carson.

RULING:

Yes. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Carson.

In actions in personam, such as the present case, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons. However, because substituted
service is in derogation of the usual method of service and personal service of summons is

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preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted
service of summons. Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must: (a)
indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the
efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of
sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or
regular place of business of the defendant.

Given the circumstances in the case at bench, We find that resort to substituted service was
warranted since the impossibility of personal service is clearly apparent. A perusal of the Officer's
Return dated October 28, 2008 detailing the circumstances surrounding the service of the second
alias Summons dated September 9, 2008 shows that the foregoing requirements for a valid
substituted service of summons were substantially complied with.

Indeed, the Return established the impossibility of personal service to Carson's officers, as shown
by the efforts made by Process Server Pajila to serve the September 8, 2008 alias Summons on
Carson's President/General Manager. In particular, several attempts to serve the summons on these
officers were made on four separate occasions: October 2, 2008, October 16, 2008, October 27,
2008, and October 28, 2008, but to no avail.

On his fourth and final attempt, Process Server Pajila served the summons on Fernandez, Carson's
receptionist, due to the unavailability and difficulty to locate the company's corporate officers. The
pertinent portion of the Return states: [S]ubstituted service of summons was resorted to by leaving
the copy of the Alias Summons at the company's office through its employee, MS. LORIE
FERNANDEZ, however, she refused to acknowledge receipt of the process.

Based on the facts, there was a deliberate plan of Carson's for its officers not to receive the
Summons. It is a legal maneuver that is in derogation of the rules on Summons. We cannot tolerate
that. The facts now show that the responsible officers did not intend to receive the alias Summons
through substituted service. The Summons is considered validly served.

In any event, even if We concede the invalidity of the substituted service, such is of little
significance in view of the fact that the RTC had already acquired jurisdiction over Carson early on
due to its voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Carson voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed, through Atty. Roxas, the Appearance and Motion dated April
25, 2007 acknowledging Carson's receipt of the Summons dated April 11, 2007 and seeking
additional time to file its responsive pleading. As noted by the CA, Carson failed to indicate therein
that the Appearance and Motion was being filed by way of a conditional appearance to question the
regularity of the service of summons. Thus, by securing the affirmative relief of additional time to
file its responsive pleading, Carson effectively voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC.

CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN, PETITIONER, VS. BANCO DE ORO (FORMERLY EQUITABLE PCI

BANK), RESPONDENT.

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ELISEO C. BORLONGAN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. BDO UNIBANK, INC. (FORMERLY EQUITABLE PCI
BANK), RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 217617 & 218450, SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION, April 05, 2017, VELASCO, JR., J.

"Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition,
the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can
be confirmed or accepted.

FACTS:

Upon requesting a copy of their TCT, Eliseo and Carmelita Borlongan, learned that their title
contained an annotation that the property was the subject of an execution sale. Apparently, BDO
filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho Corporation (Tancho) and Carmelita supposedly
signed 4 security agreements to guarantee the obligation of Tancho. It appears that the RTC
directed the service of summons to all the defendants at the business address of Tancho in Pasig.

BDO filed an ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against the defendants,
including Carmelita and subsequently, a motion to conduct an auction where BDO was the highest
bidder of the subject property. Eliseo filed an action for annulment of the surety agreements and
notice of levy on attachment, while Carmelita filed a petition for annulment of judgement with TRO
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction claiming that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person for failure to serve the summons. The TRO, however, was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over Carmelita’s person.

RULING:

No.The RTC has no jurisdiction over Carmelita’s person.

The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process and compliance with
the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of
jurisdiction.As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When summons
cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted service may be
resorted to. Service of summons by publication can be resorted to only if the defendant's
"whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. For substituted service
of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at
least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is
only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

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In the case now before us, the summons was served on the petitioner by publication. Yet, the
circumstances surrounding the case do not justify the resort. Immediately after this single
attempt at personal service, the respondent bank moved for leave to serve the summons by
publication (and not even substituted service), which motion the RTC granted. Clearly, there was no
diligent effort made to find the petitioner and properly serve her the summons before the service
by publication was allowed. Neither was it impossible to locate the residence of petitioner and her
whereabouts.

i. Extraterritorial service, when allowed

MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS, PETITIONER, VS. ABELARDO B. LICAROS, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 150656, FIRST DIVISION, April 29, 2003, CARPIO, J.

As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts
cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person
unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in
rem enumerated in Section 15,Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction
over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.

Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be
served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3)
when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines.

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1)
by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the
summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last known address, also with
leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.

FACTS:

Abelardo commenced a civil case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Margarita, based
on psychological incapacity. As Margarita was then residing at California, U.S.A., Abelardo initially
moved that summons be served through the International Express Courier Service. The court a
quo denied the motion. Instead, it ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation once a week for three consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing
respondent a copy of the order, as well as the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at
the given address in the United States through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense
of Abelardo. Respondent was given sixty (60) days after publication to file a responsive pleading.

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Process Server, Maximo Dela Rosa, submitted his Officer’s Return essentially indicating compliance
with the court’s order.

After a negative report of collusion between the parties, respondent was allowed to present
evidence ex-parte.

RTC: The RTC handed down its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void.

Almost 9 years later, petitioner commenced the instant petition on the ground that the trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over her person in the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
since she was never validly served with summons.

CA: The CA held that there was a proper service of summons. The CA held the case involves the
marital status of the parties, which is an action in rem or quasi in rem. In such an action the purpose
of service of summons is not to vest the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but “only” to comply with due process. The Court of Appeals concluded that any
irregularity in the service of summons involves due process which does not destroy the trial court’s
jurisdiction over the res which is the parties’ marital status. Neither does such irregularity
invalidate the judgment rendered in the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with Abelardo.

HELD:

Yes. Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Abelardo.

At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in
the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial court
considered Margarita a non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the
petition affects the personal status of the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service
of summons under Section 15, Rule 14. The term “personal status” includes family relations,
particularly the relations between husband and wife.

Applying the Section 14, Rule 15, the trial court required extraterritorial service of summons to be
effected on Margarita this manner:

The summons was to be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week
for three consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as
the corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States
through the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo.

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The trial court’s prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the first or second
mode specified in Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to “any other means
that the judge may consider sufficient.”

The Process Server’s Return shows that the summons addressed to Margarita together with the
complaint and its annexes were sent by mail to the Department of Foreign Affairs with
acknowledgment of receipt. The Process Server’s certificate of service of summons is prima
facie evidence of the facts as set out in the certificate.

Before proceeding to declare the marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the trial
court stated in its Decision that “compliance with the jurisdictional requirements have been duly
established.”

We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient compliance with the rule.
After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect service of
summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14.

STEVEN R. PAVLOW, PETITIONER, VS. CHERRY L. MENDENILLA, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 181489, SECOND DIVISION, April 19, 2017, LEONEN, J.

Jurisprudence has long settled that, with respect to residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the
availability of extra-territorial services does not preclude substituted service

FACTS:

Petitioner, an American citizen, married Maria Sheila, a Filipino. Barely 3 months into their
marriage, Sheila filed a complaint for slight physical injuries including maltreatment in relation to
Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act (VAWC). Makati Assistant City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint for failure to substantiate the allegations. The mother of Petitioner, Cherry
Mendenilla (Mendenilla), filed a Petition praying for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order(TPO)or Permanent Protection Order (PPO) against the Petitioner. When the service of
summons with the TPO was served, Petitioner was out of the country, hence, it was served to one of
his employees who was also residing in the same building.

ISSUE/S:

1st issue:Whether or not Mendenilla had the personality to file the Petition.
2nd issue:Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s person.
3rd issue: Whether or not there was forum shopping.

RULING:

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1st issue:

Yes. Mendenilla had the personality to file the Petition.

The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly given
personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b) of the Anti-VAWC
Law. However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a
petition is suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this case,
respondent Mendenilla filed her petition after her daughter's complaint-affidavit had already been
dismissed.

2nd issue:

Yes. The Court acquired jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s person

We see no reason for holding as ineffectual the substituted service of Summons. Jurisprudence has
long settled that, with respect to residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the availability of
extraterritorial services does not preclude substituted service. Resort to substituted service has
long been held to be fair, reasonable and just. This Court has noted that a contrary, restrictive view
is that which defeats the ends of justice. It has been emphasized that residents who temporarily
leave their residence are responsible for ensuring that their affairs are in order, and that, upon their
return, they shall attend to exigencies that may have arisen. Rule 14, Section 7 stipulates that
substituted service may be resorted to "if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally
served within a reasonable time."

Time was of the essence. The exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of justifiable causes and how,
by the convenience of petitioner Steven Pavlow's temporary absence, immediate personal service
was rendered impossible. These exigencies justified substituted service of summons upon
petitioner during his temporary absence through Monette Tolentino, a person of suitable age and
discretion, who also resided at petitioner's own residence. Jurisdiction over petitioner's person was
then validly acquired, and the dismissal of respondent Cherry L. Mendenilla's petition on this score
was correctly held by Judge Natividad Giron-Dizon to be unwarranted.

3rd issue:

No. There was no forum shopping

The filing of Maria Sheila's complaint-affidavit did not even commence proceedings on her own
petition for the issuance of a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the level
of the prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the issuance
of a protection order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of Maria Sheila's Complaint-

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Affidavit did not engender the risk of either litis pendentia or res judicata, which would serve the
basis of a finding of forum shopping by her mother.

EXPRESS PADALA (ITALIA) S.P.A., NOW BDO REMITTANCE (ITALIA) S.P.A., PETITIONER, VS.
HELEN M. OCAMPO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 202505, FIRST DIVISION, September 06, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.

Defendant permanently residing in a foreign country must be summoned through publication or

extraterritorial service, which require leave of court. Substituted service to a defendant who
permanently resides abroad is ineffective and renders the court without jurisdiction over him or her.

FACTS:

Helen Ocampo was dismissed as remittance processor for BDO in September 2002 for
misappropriating €24,035.60 by falsifying invoices of money payments relating to customers’
money transfer orders. She was found criminally liable by the Court of Turin, Italy, which
convicted and sentenced her to suffer imprisonment of six months and a penalty of €300, but
granted her the benefit of suspension of the enforcement of sentence after pleading guilty.

On September 22, 2008, petitioner filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgment and
cancellation or restriction of Ocampo’s Philippine passport with the Mandaluyong RTC. On
November 21, 2008, the sheriff tried to personally serve summons in her local address in Tanuan,
Batangas, but no one lived therein; he was directed to the house of Ocampo’s father, where her
uncle resided. The uncle informed the sheriff Ocampo and family were already in Italy but the
sheriff proceeded to serve summons upon him. After Ocampo failed to file an answer, petitioner
filed a motion to declare her in default which the RTC granted.

After Ocampo received a copy of the RTC decision through her mother, she filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. The CA set aside the RTC decision, saying
summons should have been served pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The CA decided the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Ocampo, rendering the
decision null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not summons was properly served on Ocampo.

RULING:

No. Summons was not properly served on Ocampo

The general rule is that summons must be served personally. For justifiable reasons, other modes of
serving summons may be resorted to. Substituted service may be resorted to when defendant

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cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him or her have failed.
This is effected by leaving copies of the summons at defendant’s residence with a person of suitable
age and discretion, or leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.

When defendant’s whereabouts are unknown, the rules allow service of summons by publication. It
may only be resorted to when the whereabouts of the defendant are not only unknown but cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry. The diligence requirement means there must be prior resort to
personal service under Section 7 and substituted service under Section 8, and proof these modes
were ineffective before summons by publication may be allowed. Summons by publication also
requires plaintiff to file a written motion for leave of court to effect service of summons by
publication, supported by an affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf, setting forth the
grounds for the application.

The Court held substituted service was improper because the place where the summons is being
served must be the defendant’s current residence or office/regular place of business. Her father’s
house is neither her office or her current residence. Further, Ocampo’s residence in Italy is not
temporary, rendering the service ineffective.

E. B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD., PETITIONER, VS. HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 132, MAKATI CITY AND IMPERIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 136426, THIRD DIVISION, August 06, 1999, GONZAGA-REYES, J.

Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has
been held as improper.

FACTS:

Petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal office at Davao
City and with branch offices at Parañaque, Metro Manila and Cagayan de Oro City.

Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein
the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro
belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units.
They agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, venue shall be in the
proper courts of Makati.

Private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against
petitioner, as defendant, before RTC of Makati allegedly for failure of latter to comply with its
contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no
substantial developments therein.

Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its Branch
Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City
but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.B.

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Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998
at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on
the face of the original copy of the summons.

Defendant filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss alleging that on May 6, 1998,
"summons intended for defendant" was served upon Engr. Wendell Sabulbero, an employee of
defendant at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City.

o Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper
service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
o Trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was
improperly served upon its employee who is not one of those persons named in
Section 11, Rule 14 RoC upon whom service of summons may be made.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default alleging that defendant has failed to file an
Answer despite its receipt allegedly of the summons and the complaint, as shown in the Sheriffs
Return.

Plaintiff then filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss alleging that the records show
that:

o Defendant, through its branch manager, Engr. Wendell Sabulbero actually received
the summons and the complaint as evidenced by the signature appearing on the
copy of the summons
o Defendant has transferred its office from Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro to its
new office address at Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro; and
o Purpose of the rule is to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the
action.

TC issued an Order denying defendant's MTD as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default. Defendant was given ten (10) days within which to file a responsive pleading. The trial
court stated that since the summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the
corporation through its branch manager Wendell Sabulbero, there was substantial compliance with
the rule on service of summons and consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.

Defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a MR alleging that:

o Section 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary,
restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and
o New provision is very specific and clear in that the word "manager" was changed to
"general manager", "secretary" to "corporate secretary", and excluding therefrom
agent and director.

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to defendant's MR. Defendant filed a Reply contending that the changes
in the new rules are substantial and not just general semantics. Defendant's MR was denied hence,
this present petition.

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Private respondent filed its Comment to the petition citing the cases Kanlaon Construction
Enterprises Co., Inc. vs. NLRC wherein it was held that service upon a construction project manager
is valid and in Gesulgon vs. NLRC which held that a corporation is bound by the service of summons
upon its assistant manager.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of
summons on its Branch Manager.

RULING:

No. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of
summons on its Branch Manager.

Service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro,
instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper

When the complaint was filed by Petitioner on April 3, 1998, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was
already in force. Sec. 11, Rule 14 revised the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which
provided that:

“Sec. 13.Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the defendant is a

corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service
may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. “

Petitioner contends that the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is
"restricted, limited and exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction and argues that if the
Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise language. We agree with petitioner.

Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon "agents" within the contemplation of the old
rule. Notably, under new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer
authorized.

The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager";
"corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase
"agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

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The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired Supreme Court Justice
Florenz Regalado, thus:

“… the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to "be made on the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors." The aforesaid terms were
obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially
the word "agent" of the corporation. The Filoil case, involving the litigation lawyer of the
corporation who precisely appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons but whose very
appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective service, is an illustration of
the need for this revised section with limited scope and specific terminology. Thus the absurd result
in the Filoil case necessitated the amendment permitting service only on the in-house counsel of the
corporation who is in effect an employee of the corporation, as distinguished from an independent
practitioner.”

Retired Justice Oscar Herrera, who is also a consultant of the Rules of Court Revision Committee,
stated that "The rule must be strictly observed. Service must be made to one named in statute

It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, strict
compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In the case of Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs.
Mangosing, the Court held:

“A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a
corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute;
otherwise the service is insufficient.”

The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper
notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so
integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served
on him. In other words, "to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action."

The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal
requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation.

Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule)
has been held as improper. Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a firm's
branch office has been held as improper as summons should have been served at the firm's
principal office.

Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its
branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao

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City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.

G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., PETITIONER, V. TIARA COMMERCIAL CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 201378, FIRST DIVISION, October 18, 2017, JARDELEZA, J.

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the issuance of summons to a
domestic private juridical entity. This enumeration is exclusive. Section 11 of Rule 14 changed the old
rules pertaining to the service of summons on corporations.

While the former rule allowed service on an agent of a corporation, the current rule has provided for a
list of specific persons to whom service of summons must be made.

FACTS:

The bus company Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) filed an action for damages against GV Florida and its bus
driver Arnold Vizquera (Vizquera) before the RTC.

a. This action arose out of a vehicle collision between the buses of VLI and GV Florida
along Capirpiwan, Cordon, Isabela on May 1, 2007.

VLI claimed that Vizquera's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and GV Florida
failed to exercise due diligence in supervising its employee.

GV Florida alleged that the Michelin tires of its bus had factory and mechanical defects which
caused a tire blow-out. This, it claimed, was the proximate cause of the vehicle collision.

GV Florida instituted a third-party complaint against Tiara Commercial Corporation (TCC).

b. According to GV Florida, it purchased from TCC 50 brand new Michelin tires, 4 of

which were installed into the bus that figured in the collision.
c. It claimed that though Vizquera exerted all efforts humanly possible to avoid the
accident, the bus nevertheless swerved to the oncoming south-bound lane and into
the VLI bus.

GV Florida maintains that the "proximate cause of the accident is the tire blow out which was
brought about by factory and mechanical defects in the Michelin tires which third-party plaintiff GV
Florida absolutely and totally had no control over."

The RTC ordered the service of summons on TCC.

a. In the return of summons, it appears that the sheriff served the summons to a certain
Cherry Gino-gino (Gino-gino) who represented herself as an accounting manager
authorized by TCC to receive summons on its behalf.

TCC filed a Special Entry of Appearance with an Ex-parte Motion for Extension of Time to File

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Responsive Pleading and/or Motion to Dismiss.

a. RTC granted TCC's prayer for extension of time to file a responsive pleading or a
motion to dismiss.

TCC eventually filed a motion to dismiss GV Florida's third-party complaint.

TCC argues, among others, that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over it due to improper service
of summons. Under Section 11 of Rule 14, there is an exclusive list of the persons upon whom
service of summons on domestic juridical entities may be made. As the summons in this case was
not served on any of the persons listed in Section 11 of Rule 14, there was no proper service of
summons on TCC that would vest the RTC with jurisdiction over it.

The RTC denied TCC’s motion to dismiss. The MR also denied.

The CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA argued that the Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court is exclusive, the CA found that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over TCC because of the
improper service of summons upon a person not named in the enumeration.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over Tiara Commercial Corporation.

RULING:

Yes. The court acquired jurisdiction over Tiara Commercial Corporation.

The SC ruled that summons were improperly served but courts should not automatically dismiss
the complaint. Moreover, TCC voluntarily appeared.

Service of summons is the main mode through which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant in a civil case. Through it, the defendant is informed of the action against him or
her and he or she is able to adequately prepare his or her course of action.

Rules governing the proper service of summons are not mere matters of procedure. They go into a
defendant's right to due process.

Strict compliance with the rules on service of summons is mandatory.

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the issuance of summons to a
domestic private juridical entity.

a. Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines
with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

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This enumeration is exclusive. Section 11 of Rule 14 changed the old rules pertaining to the service
of summons on corporations.

While the former rule allowed service on an agent of a corporation, the current rule has provided
for a list of specific persons to whom service of summons must be made.

The purpose of this rule is "to [e]nsure that the summons be served on a representative so
integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served
on him."

a. This rule requires strict compliance; the old doctrine that substantial compliance is
sufficient no longer applies.

Service of summons, however, is not the only mode through which a court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states:

a. Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.

There is voluntary appearance when

a. a party, without directly assailing the court's lack of jurisdiction, seeks affirmative
relief from the court.

b. a party appears before the court without qualification, he or she is deemed to have
waived his or her objection regarding lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of
summons.

In contrast, Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that so long as a defendant raises
the issue of lack of jurisdiction, he or she is allowed to include other grounds of objection. In such
case, there is no voluntary appearance.

Still, improper service of summons and lack of voluntary appearance do not automatically warrant
the dismissal of the complaint.

a. A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully
served.
b. An alias summons can be actually served on said defendant.

In this case, the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of TCC. While she is not
one of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14, SC finds that TCC has voluntarily appeared
before (and submitted itself to) the RTC

a. It filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation as to the court's jurisdiction over it.
b. At no point in its pre-trial brief did TCC raise the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over it.
c. It even asked the RTC that it be allowed to reserve the presentation of additional
evidence through documents and witnesses.

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TCC waived any objection raised therein as to the jurisdiction of the court when it
subsequently filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation and even prayed to be allowed to
present additional evidence.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

AND HIGHWAYS, THROUGH THE HON. SECRETARY, HERMOGENES EBDANE, PETITIONER, VS.
ALBERTO A. DOMINGO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 175299, FIRST DIVISION, September 14, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General;
in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its
executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.

Facts:

Domingo entered into seven contracts for the lease of his construction equipment to implement the
projects of the DPWH to control the flow of lahar from Mt. Pinatubo. Domingo claimed that the
unpaid rentals amounted to P6,320,163.05 but DPWH Region III failed to pay its obligations despite
demands. Hence, Domingo filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against DPWH,
Region III. Summons was issued by the RTC with the Proof of Service of the Sheriff. Domingo filed a
Motion to Declare Defendant in Default for failure of the DPWH Region III to file a responsive
pleading within the reglementary period. The RTC declared the DPWH Region III in default and set
the date for the reception of Domingo's evidence ex parte and later decided that Domingo is entitled
to the reliefs prayed for. Domingo filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution which was
granted. The Republic, represented by the OSG, filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with
Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction arguing that it was not
impleaded as an indispensable party and that since no summons was issued to its representatives,
the court never acquired jurisdiction over the Republic.

Issue:

Whether or not the service of summons upon the DPWH Region III alone was sufficient.

Ruling:

No. The service of summons upon the DPWH Region III alone was insufficient.

Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that: When the defendant is the Republic of the
Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or
municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such
other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct. Jurisprudence further instructs that
when a suit is directed against an unincorporated government agency, which, because it is
unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency's
principal, i.e., the State.

In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Domingo
specifically named as defendant the DPWH Region III. As correctly argued by the Republic, the
DPWH and its regional office are merely the agents of the former (the Republic), which is the real

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party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Thus, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, the summons in this case should have been served on the OSG.

Quite inexplicably, the Court of Appeals failed to apply, nay, to even consider, the provisions of
Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in rendering its assailed Decision. A perusal of the
Decision dated May 19, 2006 shows that the appellate court mainly dissertated regarding the
functions and organizational structures of the DPWH and the OSG, as provided for in the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, in an attempt to demonstrate the relationship between the DPWH and
its regional offices, as well as to refute the claim that the service of summons upon the Republic
should be made exclusively upon the OSG. Such an oversight on the part of the Court of Appeals is
most unfortunate given the relevance and materiality of Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to
the instant case, in addition to the fact that the Republic itself quoted the aforesaid provision in its
petition before the appellate court.

UNITED PULP AND PAPER CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. ACROPOLIS CENTRAL GUARANTY
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 171750, THIRD DIVISION, January 25, 2012, MENDOZA, J.

The law is clear that it intends for the other party to receive a copy of the written motion at least three
days before the date set for its hearing. The purpose of the three (3)-day notice requirement, which
was established not for the benefit of the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises
upon the latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the
arguments interposed therein. It is not, however, a hard and fast rule. Where a party has been given
the opportunity to be heard, the time to study the motion and oppose it, there is compliance with the
rule.

FACTS:

On May 14, 2002, United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. (UPPC) filed a civil case for collection of the
amount of P42,844,353.14 against Unibox Packaging Corporation (Unibox) and Vicente Ortega
(Ortega) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 148 (RTC). UPPC also prayed for a Writ
of Preliminary Attachment against the properties of Unibox and Ortega for the reason that the latter
were on the verge of insolvency and were transferring assets in fraud of creditors. On August 29,
2002, the RTC issued the Writ of Attachment after UPPC posted a bond in the same amount of its
claim. By virtue of the said writ, several properties and assets of Unibox and Ortega were attached.
On October 10, 2002, Unibox and Ortega filed their Motion for the Discharge of Attachment, praying
that they be allowed to file a counter-bond in the amount of P42,844,353.14 and that the writ of
preliminary attachment be discharged after the filing of such bond. Although this was opposed by
UPPC, the RTC, in its Order dated October 25, 2002, granted the said motion for the discharge of the
writ of attachment subject to the condition that Unibox and Ortega file a counter-bond. Thus, on
November 21, 2002, respondent Acropolis Central Guaranty Corporation (Acropolis) issued the
Defendant’s Bond for Dissolution of Attachment in the amount of P42,844,353.14 in favor of
Unibox.

On September 29, 2003, Unibox, Ortega and UPPC executed a compromise agreement, wherein
Unibox and Ortega acknowledged their obligation to UPPC in the amount of P35,089,544.00 as of
August 31, 2003, inclusive of the principal and the accrued interest, and bound themselves to pay
the said amount in accordance with a schedule of payments agreed upon by the parties.
Consequently, the RTC promulgated its Judgment dated October 2, 2003 approving the compromise

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