G.R. No. 171914. July 23, 2014.

*
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES
LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA, respondents.

Civil Law; Conflict of Laws; Nationality Rule; The Civil Code

continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although
living abroad.—The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both
Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The
law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code,
which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to
the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both
Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty.
Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Divorce; The nonrecognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either
or both of the spouses are residing abroad.—From the time of the
celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The nonrecognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has
remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses
are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions
under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The nonrecognition of absolute divorce in
the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanc-

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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 Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

tity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens.—It is true that
on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first
marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality rule,
however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve
the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the
Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution, and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. The
nonrecognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of
the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino
citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be
grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided by law. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them
can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership of
Gains; Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any
marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed
their property relations.—Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September
10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code,
the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the
property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered into
any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of
the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit: Article 119. The future spouses
may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community
of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are
void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.

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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

Same; Same; Same; Marriages; In the Philippines, marriages that are

bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void.—In the Philippines,
marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71
of the Civil Code clearly states: Article 71. All marriages performed outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.
Same; Same; Property Relations; Co-Ownership; Due to the second
marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by
virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with
Article 144 of the Civil Code.—Due to the second marriage between Atty.
Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous,
the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
(n) In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of
proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became
imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Arnulfo F. Dumadag for petitioner.

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  Renato G. De la Cruz Law Office for respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of
property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country
lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against
the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
 The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna,
appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11, 2005,1
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the
decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her
right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a
condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired
during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the

prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano
Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein
intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA),

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1 Rollo, pp. 34-51; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justices
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (later Presiding Justice) and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 198-210.

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380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

whom he initially married in a civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of

the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized
in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on
September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot
seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli
Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna,
Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2)
decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to
live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of
property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled
“AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT”
dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his
marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the
First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the
same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with
SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named:
Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA
was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased
from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-
Ledesma Condominium Project (condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati
City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on
installment basis for 36 months starting on April 15, 1978. Said
condominium unit was to be used as law office of LUPSICON. After full
payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was
executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on Au-

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gust 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
“JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO
E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R.
PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x”
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty.
Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E.
Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992
in the following names:
“JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO
E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ
SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x”
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit
was partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered in common
under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY.
LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with
Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium
unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN
on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit
including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were
taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage.
Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium
unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established
his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

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 The 25/100 pro indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit
as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject
of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties
were acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA
and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children,
SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of
ATTY. LUNA to the extent of 3/4 pro indiviso share consisting of her 1/2
share in the said properties plus her 1/2 share in the net estate of ATTY.
LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament;
and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded
SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed
that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the 3/4 portion of the subject
properties; that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on
the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted;
that a receiver be appointed to preserve and administer the subject
properties; and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s
fees and costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3

Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial
upon the aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(a) The 24/100 pro indiviso share in the condominium unit located at
the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM
PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE

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3 Id., at pp. 37-39.

4 Id., at pp. 198-210.

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METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through

his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from “JUAN LUCES LUNA married
to Soledad L. Luna” to “JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna”;
 (c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme
Court Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to
deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been
made for transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5

Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the
RTC, namely:

I.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE
INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

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5 Id., at p. 210.
6 Id., at pp. 211-214.

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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

III.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO

PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS
NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT,
BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE
TO THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY
DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
 VII.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER
ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN
BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING
THE INTERVENTION FOR 

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FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7

In contrast, the respondents attributed the following errors to the

trial court, to wit:

I.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN

FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE
BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;
II.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF
PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER)
THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S
LAW OFFICE; and
III.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT,
ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND
BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed

modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY.
LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce
decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not
terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign
divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our
jurisdiction. x x x10
x x x x

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7  Id., at pp. 217-219.

8  Id., at p. 283.
9  Supra note 1.
10 Rollo, p. 44.

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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27,

2001 Decision of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro indiviso share in the condominium unit at
the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM
PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic)
SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants,
the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole
industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and
valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or
under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry
in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of
Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna
should be changed from “JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad
L. Luna” to “JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna”;
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) are hereby declared to be
the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found
in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11

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11 Id., at pp. 50-51.

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On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on
certiorari that:
A.  The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement executed by Luna
and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal
partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the
Dominican Republic court’s approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner
failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the
acquisition of purchase of the subject condominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner
was not entitled to the subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the
contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share
in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to
ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had
validly dissolved the first marriage; and, sec-

_______________

12 Id., at pp. 52-53.

13 Id., at pp. 54-65.
14 Id., at p. 17.

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ondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty.
Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

1.
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both

Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947.
The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish
Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code
continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality
rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna
and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna
on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between
Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The
nonrecognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code,16 even if either

_______________

15 Article 15, Civil Code, which is a revision of Article 9.1, Spanish Civil Code,
states:
Article  15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad. (9a)
16 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas (G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 266,
277), the Court declares:

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or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two
types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void
and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of
the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the
Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the
Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and
family life.20 The nonrecognition of absolute divorce in the
Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the
marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the
death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law.
For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos
exists, no divorce decree

_______________
 The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages — void and
voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage.
Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens.
17 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 446.
18 Rollo, p. 37.
19 Article XV, Section 2, 1987 CONSTITUTION.
20 Article 1, FAMILY CODE.

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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or

judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2.
The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void
for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the
divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA
committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any
marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil
Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not
specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had
not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the
marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree

upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

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 Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a conjugal partnership

of gains thusly:

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the

husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally,
upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for

any of various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of
the Civil Code, viz.:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

 
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia
did not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still
required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as
follows:

Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage

settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage
shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of
property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been
sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been

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declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

x x x x
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the
creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval or the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors
may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
 After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of Articles
214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect
of partition stated in Articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)

But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that
the approval took place only as an incident of the action for divorce
instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications
for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds
raised in the action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself
valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to
Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under
Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of
Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.

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21 Id., at pp. 74, 81-82.

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3.
Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void;
properties acquired during their marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage
between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage
to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on
the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had
not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the
death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by
Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second

or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24

_______________

22 Id., at p. 48.
23 Article 83, Civil Code; Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454, June
14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155, 158.
24 The Civil Code relevantly states:

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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the

petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the
properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by
the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil
Code, viz.:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and

wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning,
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. (n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden

of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it
became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of
co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would
warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v.
Court of Appeals:25

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which

involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were
parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they
failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the
purchase of the disputed properties. Also in
_______________

Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

x x x x
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;
x x x x
25 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.

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Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted
property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is
not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must
be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as
in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law
gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still
prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only
after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant
such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and
a mere allegation is not evidence.26

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her

actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the
aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of P159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna
had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling
P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of P306,572.00
corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase
of the condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the unit’s
purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28
The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for
solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna

_______________

26 Id., at pp. 686-687.

27 Rollo, pp. 23-24.
28 Id., at p. 25.

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Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

had even sent her a “thank you” note;29 that she had the financial
capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty.
Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due to the
meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-
ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the
petitioner’s assertions on her actual contributions through the
following findings and conclusions, namely:

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her

own independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and
the law books subject matter in contention in this case — proof that was
required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the
Family Code to apply — as to cases where properties were acquired by a
man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or
under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New
Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not
readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first
because it applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or
were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or
absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was
filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the
property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and
in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However, for
this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The
same rule and presumption was to apply to joint de-

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29 Id., at p. 27.

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posits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly
married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.
If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or
her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of
the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in
bad faith.
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was
the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and
divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the
Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, No. L-19671,
November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
x x x x
As to the 25/100 pro indiviso share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium
unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to
purchase the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks
that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of
ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the
Decision of the trial court, viz.:
“x  x  x The first check, Exhibit “M” for P55,000.00 payable to Atty.
Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen
(13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit “7” was
signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of
P97,588.89, Exhibit “P” was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the
plaintiff, this was in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check
which was for P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979,
also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit “M,”
for P4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove
that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were

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398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was
simply not established. x x x”
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of P100,000.00 is
unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-
ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial
court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry
of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
“The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit “9,” covering the condominium
unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the law
firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of
Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty.
Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and
Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does
not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x”
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in
the name of “JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna” was no
proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition
of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well-settled that
registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
The phrase “married to” preceding “Soledad L. Luna” is merely descriptive
of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical
that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase of
books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to
contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was
ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and the law books from his
earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrass-

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ingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he
headed.30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the

CA both because they were substantiated by the records and because
we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them.
Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did
not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her
contributions, not being evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In
contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the
properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It
should then be justly concluded that the properties in litis legally
pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his
death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso
share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the law books
pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr.

and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Notes.—Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on

Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage. (Fujiki vs. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69
[2013])
 _______________

30 Id., at pp. 45-50.

31 Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 593,
602.

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400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage

between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy; If the
foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino
spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry
while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry. (Id.)
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