Subsea Control System SPC 18030e05
Subsea Control System SPC 18030e05
Subsea Control System SPC 18030e05
FUN
Rev 05 – March 2016
Page 3 of 39
REVISION TRACKING
Rev 03: total pages 38, technical revision of the document and implementation of the
comments collected from latest ITT processes,
December 2015
March 2016
INFORMATION REQUEST
Per informazioni relative ai contenuti tecnici del documento si può fare riferimento alle persone
indicate come responsible e accountable nella precedente tabella RACIE oppure al Technical
Authority coordinator (COETA).
For information about the content of this standard, please refer to responsible and accountable
person as per above RACIE table or to Technical Authority coordinator (COETA).
3.1. RESPONSIBILITY........................................................................................... 9
3.2. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ............................................................................... 9
5. INTERFACES ................................................................................................ 33
6. MARKING, PACKAGING, STORAGE AND HANDLING ..................................... 34
1. DOCUMENT SCOPE
This specification is based on the ISO 13628 - Petroleum and natural gas industries - Design
and operation of Subsea Production Systems.
The purpose of this document is to specify the minimum additional requirements and
amendments thereof for the design, fabrication, installation, testing, commissioning and
operation of the Subsea Control System.
2. ACRONYMS
CIU Chemical Injection Unit
DCS Distributed Control System
DCV Directional Control Valve
EFAT Extended Factory Acceptance Test
EPU Electrical Power Unit
ESD Emergency Shutdown
ESS Environmental Stress Screening
EUT Equipment Under Test
FAT Factory Acceptance Test
HIPPS High Integrity Pipeline Protection System
HPU Hydraulic Power Unit
LSD Local Shutdown
MCC Motor Control Centre
MCS Master Control Station
MTTF Mean Time To Failure
MTTR Mean Time To Restoration
NDT Non Destructive Test
NPT National Pipe Taper
PCS Process Control System (equivalent to DCS)
PFD Probability of Failure on Demand
PSD Process Shutdown
PTFE Polytetrafluoroethylene
PTT Pressure and Temperature Transmitter
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis
RAM Reliability Availability Maintainability
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
SCM Subsea Control Module
3. INTRODUCTION
3.1. RESPONSIBILITY
It is the responsibility of anyone who supplies equipment to this specification to ensure and
document compliance with the requirements defined by this specification, other relevant
standards and statutory requirements. Any deviation from any of the requirements defined
herein shall be clearly indicated and treated as a non-conformance.
In the event of any conflicts between the provisions of the industry standards the following
order of priority shall be observed:
• ISO
• API
• EN
• Norsok/DNV
• Others
4. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
4.1. GENERAL
The SCS shall be a multiplexed electro-hydraulic closed loop type with direct-hydraulic control
of the SSIVs (if present). Hydraulic fluid shall be in compliance with requirements of paragraph
4.3.2.
1. provide for individual or multiple operation of all remotely controlled subsea valves;
2. provide operation for SSIV(s);
3. provide sufficient data read-back information (including generation and management of
alarms and warnings) to operate the system safely and to react promptly to emergency
conditions;
4. interfacing through dual hardwired connections with the host facility SIS for production
and emergency shutdowns execution;
5. monitoring of subsea located sensors: this shall include data read-back, diagnostic
services and sensor parameters set-up where applicable;
6. interfacing with intelligent well applications (where present): in case of smart well
completion, the SCS shall interface with downhole valves and instrumentation providing
valves control, data retrieval, computational support and communication pathways to
the downhole equipment;
7. interfacing with the host facility control system and utilities;
8. performing operator access control and identification;
9. performing real-time diagnostic and data read-back of all the components (both topside
and subsea);
10. interfacing with intervention and installation tools.
Typically the topside section of the SCS consists of the following functional building blocks:
Typically the subsea section consists of the following functional building blocks:
For final configuration, interconnection and quantity of building blocks required for the selected
project CONTRACTOR shall refer to the project specific documentation.
CONTRACTOR may propose new technologies, new design solutions and/or new materials not
yet field proven, provided that improvement in design, operability, reliability or cost can be
demonstrated and that successful qualification tests have already been carried out (in
accordance with the applicable standards, regulations and COMPANY requirements) in
simulated environments similar to the specific project application.
The results of the qualification tests shall be submitted to COMPANY which shall reserve the
right to finally approve or discard such proposals.
If, during the execution phase of the project, any equipment or design area undergoes
substantial changes in fit, form, function or material with respect to a qualified or field proven
design, CONTRACTOR shall document such changes and their impact in terms of overall
performance, availability and reliability of the product, for COMPANY to evaluate if a re-
qualification is necessary.
As general guidelines, design of the SCS shall be flexible and optimized with reference to
following areas.
CONTRACTOR shall demonstrate during testing phase of the project the full interchangeability
of SCS equipment having identical design and functionality: a dedicated test program shall be
developed by CONTRACTOR and submitted for COMPANY review and approval.
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝐴𝐴% = 𝑥𝑥 100
(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)
Where MTTF is Mean Time To Failure and MTTR is Mean Time To Restoration.
The MTTF is commonly used as measure of Reliability.
The topside part of the SCS shall have a target MTTR not exceeding 2 hours.
The overall SCS shall be designed to provide high production availability, therefore each
equipment shall be of high integrity. The number of production shutdowns caused by SCS
failures shall be kept to a minimum and the effect of any system failure shall be selective to
minimize economic impacts, while not impairing safety.
CONTRACTOR shall make clear at time of tender the necessary spares required to be held
locally to achieve the desired MTTR.
CONTRACTOR shall perform a RAM analysis of the SCS to demonstrate compliance with the
project specific availability target. CONTRACTOR shall include in the analysis equipment not
part of the CONTRACTOR SCS scope of supply but integral part of the subsea production system
(e.g. umbilicals, downhole equipment).
Particular care shall be taken by CONTRACTOR in the reliability of the communication system
implementing a design that ensures high immunity to electromagnetic interference and noise,
minimisation of cross talk, minimisation of diffuse reflections and dispersion for optical
communications.
4.1.2.4. Redundancy
The level of redundancy depends on system complexity, target availability and reliability of the
equipment used.
The redundancy philosophy shall be based on the following guidelines:
a) redundancy shall be implemented for components difficult to replace: SEM in the SCMs
shall be dual redundant, both sensor element and electronics in non-retrievable PTTs
shall be redundant (“dual” type instruments). For other redundancy requirements on
subsea instrumentation, CONTRACTOR shall refer to the project specific documentation;
b) redundancy shall be used where significant production availability and unit operating
capability is lost through single component failure:
• HPU pumps (excluding recirculation pump), filters and regulators (if used) shall
be redundant;
• electronic microprocessor equipment of the MCS involved in the management of
subsea field logics during operating life shall be dual redundant;
• subsea communication modems within the modem unit shall be redundant;
c) redundancy shall be implemented for all the interfaces between the SCS and the host
facility topside safety system: details of the logics shall be project specific;
d) data communication links and network between the MCS and any other topside
equipment part and not part of the SCS shall be dual redundant;
e) in multiplexed controls, subsea electrical power supplies, data communication and
hydraulic power supplies shall be dual redundant using independent lines within the
umbilicals and within the subsea distribution system;
f) consideration for spare lines that can be configured to replace failed lines, shall be
addressed on project basis, as well as redundancy and spare lines for chemical
distribution system;
g) automatic changeover upon loss of one hydraulic supply shall be implemented for dual
redundant subsea hydraulic distribution system;
h) all redundant logic-processing units shall be acting either in parallel or in hot standby
configuration, with automatic and manual bump-less changeover system. Each logic-
processing unit shall be kept synchronized with its corresponding redundant unit. The
reliability of the changeover system shall be considered in the overall system availability
and reliability analysis;
i) wherever practical, maintenance and repair of a faulty part of redundant equipment
shall be possible without affecting its normal operation.
In addition to the guidelines listed above, CONTRACTOR shall also identify critical parts of the
system which could be made more reliable by implementing redundancy: the results of the
analysis shall be submitted to COMPANY for review and approval.
For electro-hydraulic type control systems, system fail safe state upon loss of electrical power
shall be addressed on project specific basis.
For all electric-type control systems, all subsea valves shall fail to close position upon loss of
electrical power, unless otherwise stated.
No matter the type of control system, the following valves shall remain in the last commanded
position upon loss of their actuating energy:
• choke valves;
• downhole flow control valves;
• chemical injection throttle valves;
Any project specific fail safe requirement deviating from above philosophies shall be specified
in the project specific documentation.
For SIL requirements on safety functions involving the SCS, CONTRACTOR shall refer to section
4.1.2.11.
The subsea equipment shall be designed with the aim of having zero maintenance during the
life of the equipment.
Subsea components, that may require repair shall be designed to be retrievable/reinstallable
with the use of dedicated intervention tools and shall be located such that they may be removed
and replaced without disruption to the rest of the system, or minimise loss of production.
Usage of diagnostic equipment and diagnostic logics shall be maximized in order to provide
early warning of equipment failure and assist the operators in fault finding.
CONTRACTOR shall optimize the design of the subsea intervention interfaces in order to
minimize the risks, the quantity of activities and the quantity of tools required to complete the
associated intervention tasks. This shall include, but shall not be limited to:
For the selected project CONTRACTOR shall provide an intervention task list detailing, step by
step, all the subsea intervention operations foreseen during installation, operation and retrieval
of the SCS subsea equipment by means of the project appointed intervention tools.
In case of intervention by ROV, the task list shall be accompanied by a 3-D software simulation
demonstrating ROV accessibility to the subsea equipment intervention interfaces.
On the basis of this task list CONTRACTOR shall demonstrate during the testing phase of the
project that all the intervention tasks are possible with the use of project intervention tools in
a safe way considered operationally acceptable by COMPANY.
In order to fulfil this scope, CONTRACTOR shall liaise with COMPANY and other project
appointed organizations (e.g. Installation CONTRACTOR) to review all the issues related to
logistics, involved items, key responsibilities and test scope as specified in the project specific
scope of work.
4.1.2.8. Expandability
The SCS shall be equipped with all the topside equipment necessary to control the entire field
development defined in the project specific documentation including any future expansion
described therein.
In addition, 20% of spare capacity for each type of I/O (inclusive of slave modules, termination
modules, barriers and terminals) shall be included.
If future expansions of the field are defined for the project, then the following conditions shall
be satisfied:
• the topside part of the SCS shall be designed such that inclusion of the future expansions
shall be possible exclusively by reconfiguration/extension of the software of the existing
system;
• the subsea part of the SCS shall be designed with all the hardware components
necessary to accommodate, in future, all the subsea equipment part of the expansion
without extensive marine operations and without affecting the operability and the
integrity of the existing subsea units;
• the entire SCS shall be designed in order to avoid production downtime during field
expansion.
All the subsea components containing software programmable logics shall allow to be uploaded
with new application and/or configuration software from the topside located SCS equipment.
4.1.2.9. Installability
The SCS equipment shall be designed to fulfill, as a minimum, the following requirements:
4.1.2.10. Performance
The SCS shall operate such that all topside and subsea data is retrieved and presented to the
operators over a period not exceeding 15 seconds: within this period CONTRACTOR shall
prioritize the update rate according to the type/urgency of data, with target update rates
specified in the project specific documentation.
All subsea valves shall start to shift less than 2 seconds after the operator confirms the
command.
Target valve closing shift time shall be equal or better than 30 seconds for each valve mounted
on manifold’s branches and on tree production/injection bore.
The maximum hydraulic full vent down time for the SPS shall be optimized by CONTRACTOR,
from maximum working pressure to ambient pressure in order to get a reasonable full vent
down time as much as possible less than or equal 15 minutes. CONTRACTOR shall highlight
during bidding phase if the specified timing cannot be guaranteed for the project layout.
CONTRACTOR shall confirm the capability of the SCS communication system and hydraulic
system to comply with the above requirements considering the used technology and the
architecture of the distribution system.
The actual performance of the SCS shall be demonstrated by CONTRACTOR during design
phase by running detailed system analyses.
For safety functions in which the SCS is only part of such loop, CONTRACTOR shall meet or
exceed the SIL requirements provided in this section for the part of the loop included in its
scope of supply, but it must be clear that the final overall SIL verification shall be assessed by
a global analysis comprising also the rest of the loop.
In order to have a preliminary evaluation of the overall SIL for a specific safety function,
CONTRACTOR shall perform a SIL analysis of the entire associated loop using the following
data:
• for parts of the loop not within CONTRACTOR’s scope of supply (such as umbilicals, ESD
and PSD nodes): PFD data taken from international databases (e.g. OREDA);
• for parts of the loop within CONTRACTOR’s scope (such as SCS components): PFD data
taken from CONTRACTOR’s internal database. CONTRACTOR shall use values which
include average field performance of the components (e.g. failures due to inappropriate
maintenance, failures due to misuse, design related systemic failures, wear out).
Subsea ESD, triggered by the topside SIS, means the closure of all subsea valves and hydraulic
depressurization of the umbilical performed via a dump valve located in the HPU.
If required, HIPPS refers to an independent subsea system installed to protect pipelines from
overpressure originating in the well.
Subsea PSD and LSD, originated from topside SIS, mean closure of all the valves of all or some
of the wells
If required, this function shall be rated SIL2. In order to reach this target, different solutions
can be proposed:
For all these functions, a SIL analysis shall be submitted to COMPANY for review and approval.
For details on the safety functions required by the project and interfaces between the SCS and
the host facility SIS, reference is made to the project specific Cause and Effect Block Diagram.
The tubing shall be as a minimum of AISI 316L stainless steel, unless otherwise specified for
the project.
All subsea hydraulic control tubing interconnections and branches shall be welded, NDT tested,
pickled and passivated.
Usage of NPT fittings and PTFE tape should be avoided throughout the entire hydraulic system,
any amendments shall be expressly agreed by COMPANY.
The tubing shall be designed and routed to avoid creation of spaces that cannot be readily
flushed clean.
The tubing shall be routed in such a way as to avoid damage during fabrication, transportation,
installation and operation. CONTRACTOR shall provide suitably robust protection covers over
susceptible areas.
CONTRACTOR shall use suitable mechanical supports (tube clamps or trays) to limit vibration
stresses to the tubing.
All free spanning tubing shall be tied back to trays fixed and grounded to the host structure.
Electrical continuity shall be ensured between subsea tubing and host structure cathodic
protection system, unless CRA material is utilised, which will then be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis.
If not clearly specified by COMPANY, the choice of the type of water based control fluid shall
be under CONTRACTOR’s responsibility, who shall be compliant with the following points:
1. compatibility with any combination of temperatures and pressures to which the control
fluid will be exposed to in the project;
2. compatibility with all the materials that will or could come into contact with the control
fluid;
3. compatibility with fluids (completion fluids, seawater, other control fluids and
operational fluids) that will or could come into contact with the control fluid;
4. inclusion of the control fluid in the OSPAR list of substances that are considered to Pose
Little or No Risk (PLONOR) to the environment;
5. compatibility with response times of the hydraulic system requested by project specifics;
6. compatible with any ancillary equipment relating to the SPS (i.e the IWOCS).
CONTRACTOR shall indicate which control fluid they intend to use and shall document the
reason for that choice: the final decision on which control fluid to use is subject to COMPANY
approval.
It is CONTRACTOR’s responsibility to identify in the project any material and/or fluid that will
come into contact with the selected control fluid but that is not covered by the control fluid
qualification process: for such materials and fluids, CONTRACTOR shall develop a dedicated
compatibility qualification procedure on the basis of ISO 13628-6 Annex C requirements which
shall be submitted to COMPANY for approval.
Once the control fluid has been approved by COMPANY, CONTRACTOR shall provide COMPANY
with the results of all the qualification tests required by ISO 13628-6 Annex C.
All the control fluid-wetted components of the SCS shall be assembled, tested and maintained
with the selected control fluid. Exception to this can be represented by level-component testing
of small or static components (such as connectors, SCM manifold etc.) for which control fluid
properties are not relevant to the test; these components could be tested before assembly with
deionised water and then flushed with hydraulic fluid during testing of the assembled product.
CONTRACTOR shall provide COMPANY with storage and preservation procedure of the selected
fluid.
a) a minimum of 2 consecutive samples have to meet, or better, SAE AS 4059 class 6B-F
to confirm cleanliness level;
b) assembly of the hydraulic components shall take place in areas where the environment
is controlled and keep clean such that subsequent flushing operations are simplified;
c) the design shall take due account of the flushing requirements avoiding blind holes,
ensuring that turbulent flow can be achieved for cleaning the system and avoiding
accumulation of contamination;
d) all the flushing operations shall be performed with the selected control fluid clean to the
required cleanliness level;
e) for each hydraulic test, CONTRACTOR shall verify the cleanliness of the relevant test
equipment before connection/hook up to the SCS equipment under test: the test rigging
shall be flushed with the selected control fluid until the specified cleanliness requirement
is achieved;
f) every time an amount of the selected control fluid is added to the hydraulic system, it
shall have previously been tested to meet the specified cleanliness requirement;
g) a system to achieve and maintain the required cleanliness level shall be included in the
HPU;
h) welding or grinding on assembled components shall be avoided after filling with clean
fluid.
CONTRACTOR shall provide COMPANY with a procedure for routine treatment and fluid
management to keep the specified cleanliness requirement of the control fluid while operating
the SCS.
CONTRACTOR shall supply provisions to protect all the hydraulic couplings and connections
that can be left exposed at any time during storage, shipment, deployment, use and
maintenance in order to avoid accidental contamination of the hydraulic system, and to prevent
calcareous build up and marine growth. Such provisions shall be of two types:
1. protections to be used during storage and shipment (i.e. not for subsea use): these
provisions shall take the form of plugs/caps for both topside and subsea equipment;
2. protections to be used during subsea operations: these provisions shall apply for the
subsea equipment only and shall take the form of long term protective covers and
parking plates suitable for direct exposure to seawater.
All the hydraulic couplings and connections shall be delivered by CONTRACTOR already fitted
with their relevant storage and shipment protections.
a) the subsea distribution system shall minimize the total quantity of hydraulic couplings
in series;
b) ingress of hydrocarbons into vulnerable parts of the system (e.g. SCM) shall be avoided;
c) special considerations shall be made, wherever applicable, for compensating the
hydraulic system during standalone deployment and retrieval of hydraulic components;
d) subsea accumulators shall be mounted on subsea retrievable and re-installable
modules, in order to allow maintenance/replacement over the life of the system;
e) for closed loop hydraulic systems, provision shall be included in the system for
exhausting the fluid in the return circuit to sea in the event that the return line becomes
plugged.
f) SDU shall be fitted with logic caps to accommodate possible spare lines. Logic caps are
dedicated MQC plates, which provide the ability to redirect services by replacing an
outboard MQC plate by ROV or diver. Logic caps provide the flexibility to modify
distribution of hydraulic or chemical services due to circuit failures or changes in system
requirements. The logic cap consists of stab plate mounted hydraulic couplers connected
to HFL tubing and plumbed accordingly to suit the application.
The hydraulic flying lead jumpers shall be designed to be subsea installable and retrievable
accordingly with the project specific intervention philosophy (either by ROV or by diver).
Where feasible, CONTRACTOR shall standardise the design of the hydraulic flying lead jumpers
to minimise the quantity of different items, thereby maximising interchangeability and
minimising the spares inventory.
CONTRACTOR shall refer to the project specific documentation for the type of hydraulic flying
leads required for the project.
Each line shall comply with the requirements of ISO 13628-5, and shall be qualified for the
project specific working environment, for the selected hydraulic control fluid and for direct
contact with sea water.
Thermoplastic hoses (if used) shall be designed to withstand the minimum value of external
pressure dictated by ISO 13628-5 without collapsing, with following additional specification:
the hose internal pressure value used for the qualification process shall be in accordance with
the worst case scenario experienced by the hose either during installation or in-service
condition. The worst case scenario shall be representative of both fluid density (test fluid for
the installation case and actual fluid for the in-service condition case, at the respective
temperature conditions) and hose internal pressure (CONTRACTOR’s recommended
pressurisation level for the installation case and static head for the in-service condition case).
Where required, CONTRACTOR shall use thermoplastic hoses of high collapse resistant type.
Each line shall have at least the same pressure rating of the corresponding umbilical line to
which it will be connected.
The hydraulic flying lead jumpers shall incorporate a suitable bend limiter around their end
terminations to prevent overbending and damage during handling and installation.
The locking mechanism to the MQC stabplate shall be designed such that weight and stiffness
of the flying termination do not cause disengagement from the fixed mating half. The design
of the locking mechanism shall be such that engagement shall be permitted only after correct
orientation and alignment of the mating halves.
In the unlocked condition, the primary alignment feature shall allow the flying termination to
be supported by the fixed mating half without any assistance.
A contingency mechanism for demating the flying lead jumper from the fixed mating half shall
be included in the design of the flying termination, to be used in the event of failure of the
primary locking system: the locking system of the fixed half shall not be functionally affected
by the actuation of the contingency release.
CONTRACTOR shall verify the on-bottom stability of the hydraulic flying leads using the DNV
RP F109: if the design is found un-stable, CONTRACTOR shall identify all possible mitigating
measures/solutions for stabilizing the flying lead jumpers on the seabed and submit them for
COMPANY review and approval.
CONTRACTOR shall design the hydraulic flying lead jumpers to be liftable by a single point. The
lifting point shall be identified and designed by CONTRACTOR to:
With reference to multiple way flying lead jumpers, CONTRACTOR shall design the jumper
taking into consideration the following aspects:
• the terminations of the jumpers shall be designed within the weight handling capability
of either the ROV or the diver (accordingly to the project specific intervention
philosophy). As a general guideline, for diverless fly to place application the weight in
water of each flying lead jumper termination (intended as the multiple way stabplate
plus the suspended bundle) shall not exceed 80kg; if this value cannot be respected,
CONTRACTOR shall also supply an integrated buoyancy module to make ROV installation
possible;
• for the given quantity and type of bundled lines CONTRACTOR shall verify the minimum
bending radius and stiffness of the entire assembly: the design of the jumpers shall
allow handling during packing, onshore tests and coiling of the jumper in a deployment
basket (if required by the project);
• the design shall allow transfer the loads experienced during service life to the stabplate
structure, relieving the hydraulic bundled lines from any load acting on any of their parts
other than their own weight;
• a protective outersheath shall be applied over the bundle of lines. The outersheath shall
be of free-flooding design;
• after recovery, each flying lead jumper shall be manually reconfigurable at the rear of
the stabplates to allow swapping between different lines in case of contingency
operations. For steel tubes, reconfiguration by welding is acceptable provided that NDT
checks are performed afterwards.
CONTRACTOR shall identify and detail to COMPANY, any limitation/problem affecting the
performance of the communication and electrical power distribution systems, such as:
1. limitation on quantity of subsea modems that can be connected to the same topside
modem for a certain step out distance;
2. any SNR and/or signal attenuation issues.
Dual electrical power supply for topside control equipment (MCS, EPU, modem unit, HPU
mounted control/communication unit) shall be supplied from a UPS unit to ensure continued
operation in the absence of primary power.
Unless otherwise stated, the topside equipment of the SCS shall be powered by the host facility
UPS.
The MCS, EPU, modem unit and the HPU mounted control/communication unit, shall be
designed to accept non-synchronized dual supplies and be capable of implementing a bump-
less changeover between the two supplies in the event one fails: loss of one feeder shall not
have any effect on the unit which shall remain fully powered by the remaining power supply.
CONTRACTOR shall refer to the following list, detailing the electrical features common to every
topside unit of the SCS:
1. Each topside unit of the SCS shall be supplied with all the cable glands (plus 10%,
rounded to next integer, of spares) required for cabling it with the external equipment.
Where applicable, CONTRACTOR shall refer to Ref./13/;
2. all field interface terminal strips shall have at least 20% spare capacity for each type of
terminal;
3. all terminals and earth bars shall be easily accessible for probing and connection;
4. all terminal strips carrying potential hazardous voltages shall be marked with rated
voltage level and covered to prevent accidental contact;
5. spare cores (if present) shall not hang free and shall be terminated;
6. earthing shall be in accordance with Ref./14/ and in general with IEC 60364 and IEC
62305.
Unless otherwise stated, all topside cables external to the SCS topside units shall not be
supplied by CONTRACTOR. However, CONTRACTOR shall provide all the necessary technical
assistance to COMPANY’s appointed cable purchasing organization in order to issue the
purchase order. As a minimum the following details shall be provided by CONTRACTOR for the
topside cables: cable type, voltage rating, number of cores, core size and screening
requirements.
a) shall be terminated into an oil-filled hose (containing electrical cables and/or fibres).
The back end of the connector shall be designed to terminate both the cables/fibres and
hose assembly as one unit. The entire assembly (hose and connector) shall be pressure
compensated and filled with dielectric oil.
b) Shall have a minimum of dual sealing barriers between seawater and electrical
conductors. Both barriers shall be designed for continuous operation in seawater and
the selected dielectric fluid. At least one barrier shall be testable during FAT of the
product, the other barrier shall be testable during qualification program;
c) Where applicable, they shall be capable of installation/retrieval at subsea depth by diver
or ROV accordingly to the project specific intervention philosophy. The type of connector
handling interface shall be project specific: in case of intervention by ROV, the design
of the connector shall avoid any interference between the ROV manipulator fingers and
the body of the connector itself, regardless of the type of handle.
d) Shall ensure electrical and optical contact between the two connector halves. The
contact shall take place in an insulating fluid filled environment.
e) Shall be maintenance-free over the connectors’ design life and when used within its
rated number of mate/demate cycles. The electrical connectors shall be qualified for a
minimum of 1000 connections (100 for optical connectors) and disconnections without
degradation of their performance.
f) In case of diverless intervention, the connectors shall be robust to withstand the stresses
and strains normally experienced during subsea handling and installation by ROV.
g) A bend stiffener shall be fitted at the entry point of the connector to prevent overbending
of the cables/fibres at the back end of the connector.
h) In case of diverless intervention, a compliant rubber element shall be mounted between
the handle and the connector body to increase maneuverability of the assembly during
subsea operations.
i) In case of intervention by ROV or diver, the connectors shall have a latch mechanism
provided with visual indications: there shall be an indication of correct alignment prior
to engagement and an indication that the connector is fully engaged. The connectors
shall have provision to prevent misconnection and consequential damage. Where
connector orientation is obtained via keyways within the connector body, prevention of
jamming shall be catered for.
j) Marking shall be present to univocally identify each core.
k) All connectors that can remain powered after disconnection shall have contacts
protected (i.e. of “female” gender) to prevent exposure of live parts.
l) All connectors shall be designed to eliminate the possibility of debris accumulation being
trapped between the two halves during final make-up.
m) The connector materials shall be compatible with their service requirements.
n) The connector shall be capable of both vertical and horizontal operation. In both cases
the connector shall not disengage because of the load resulting from its own weight and
the weight of hose, and the hose stiffness.
o) Subsea mateable connectors shall be designed to withstand insulation resistance test
when subsea.
CONTRACTOR shall supply provisions to protect all the connectors that can be left unmated at
any time during storage, shipment, deployment, use and maintenance. Such provisions shall
be of two types:
• protections to be used during storage and shipment (i.e. not for subsea use): these
provisions shall take the form of short term plugs/caps;
• protections to be used during subsea operations: these shall take the form of subsea
long term protective caps/covers and subsea parking positions, and shall be suitable for
the design life of the system.
All the electrical connectors shall be delivered by CONTRACTOR already fitted with their relevant
storage and shipment protections.
The connectors shall be designed for subsea operation at full rated voltage in the unmated
condition, provided that they are fitted with the protective provisions above described.
All the materials utilised within the connector and flying lead assemblies shall be compatible
with both seawater and the selected dielectric fluid filling the hose. In applications where the
connector could become in contact with hydraulic control fluid or any other fluid, CONTRACTOR
shall verify the respective compatibility.
Such assemblies shall be pre-charged in order to maintain net positive internal pressure under
all conditions of surface and subsea environmental temperature and pressure (including during
deployment). The pre-charge pressure shall be defined by CONTRACTOR but in any case it shall
not cause strain in the hose material.
Sufficient over length of electrical wires and optical fibres shall be provided to accommodate
for maximum elongation of the hose.
Where feasible, CONTRACTOR shall standardize the design of the subsea electrical/optical cable
harness to reduce the quantity of different items, maximize interchangeability and minimize
the required spares.
The conductor material of the electrical cores shall be copper, multi stranded with a minimum
of 7 strands. The electrical and the optical cores shall have electro-optical characteristics equal
or better than those of the umbilical system.
The following requirements shall apply with relation to the type of subsea electrical/optical
cable harness.
CONTRACTOR shall verify the on-bottom stability of the flying lead jumpers using DNV
RP F109: if the design is found un-stable, CONTRACTOR shall identify all possible
mitigating measures/solutions for stabilizing the flying lead jumpers on the seabed and
submit them for COMPANY review and approval.
The flying leads jumpers shall be marked as a minimum with:
In the event that some chemical fluids are not already defined, CONTRACTOR shall provide to
COMPANY during tender phase the chemical compatibility test records for the materials that he
intends to use in the chemical distribution system. The list shall include the names of all the
fluids that have been deemed to have failed the compatibility tests as well as those considered
to have passed.
CONTRACTOR shall make special material considerations for the lines carrying operational
fluids (such as annulus bleed lines): compatibility, permeability and corrosion resistance issues
must be addressed and proper qualification data shall be provided to COMPANY.
The design of the chemical injection system shall minimize the diffusion of chemicals by using
low-permeability materials for liner of the hoses (if any). CONTRACTOR shall provide hose
permeability qualification test records between the specific hose material and the injected
chemical fluids and ensure that any diffused chemical do not contaminate the hydraulic control
fluid through either leakage or secondary diffusion.
All the components of the SCS part of the chemical injection system shall be assembled and
tested using a water-glycol based fluid.
If not clearly specified by COMPANY, CONTRACTOR shall indicate in the tender which water-
glycol based fluid he intends to use and shall document the reason for that choice. Decision on
which fluid to use is subject to COMPANY approval.
CONTRACTOR shall verify the compatibility of the approved water-glycol based fluid with:
4.5.3. Cleanliness
The minimum cleanliness level for the SCS equipment part of the chemical injection system
shall be SAE AS 4059 class 8B-F.
This cleanliness level shall be confirmed by CONTRACTOR during tender phase.
CONTRACTOR shall guarantee and verify the cleanliness of the SCS equipment during all
manufacturing, assembly, testing, pre-commissioning and commissioning stages in order to
ensure that the entire chemical distribution system is kept clean until field start-up.
a) assembly of components shall take place in areas where the environment is controlled
and keep clean such that subsequent flushing operations are simplified;
b) the design shall take due note of the flushing requirements, avoiding blind holes,
avoiding welding or grinding on assembled components, ensuring that system allow
turbulent flow and avoiding accumulation of contamination;
c) all the flushing operations shall be performed with the selected water-glycol based fluid
of the required cleanliness;
d) for every test CONTRACTOR shall verify the cleanliness of the relevant test equipment
before connection/hook up to the SCS equipment under test. The test rig shall be
flushed with the selected water-glycol based fluid until the specified cleanliness
requirement is achieved.
CONTRACTOR shall supply provisions to protect all couplings and connections which can be left
exposed at any time during storage, shipment, deployment, use and maintenance in order to
avoid accidental contamination of the chemical distribution system, prevent calcareous build
up and marine growth. Such provisions shall be of two types:
1. protections to be used during storage and shipment (i.e. not for subsea use): these
provisions shall take the form of plugs/caps for both topside and subsea equipment;
2. protections to be used during subsea operations: these provisions shall apply for the
subsea equipment only and shall take the form of long term protective covers and
parking plates suitable for direct exposure to seawater.
All the hydraulic couplings and connections shall be delivered by CONTRACTOR already fitted
with their relevant storage and shipment protections.
1. any redundancy requirement for chemical injection lines shall be project specific;
2. the chemical couplings shall comply with the requirements set out in section 4.3.6.1with
any required modifications due to the different fluids that the chemical couplings may
come in contact with;
3. where required by the project, CONTRACTOR shall incorporate chemical and hydraulic
lines in the same flying lead jumper (so having a hydraulic-chemical flying lead jumper)
in order minimize the quantity of subsea connections. The requirements set out in
section 4.3.6.2 apply for both chemical and hydraulic-chemical flying lead jumpers.
The loads acting on the umbilical shall be transmitted to the umbilical termination assembly
structure (by means of the subsea umbilical termination interface) without stressing the
umbilical inner components and the equipment inside the subsea umbilical termination
assembly, such as cables, hoses, tubing, connectors, fittings and couplings.
To ensure a robust design of both the subsea umbilical termination interface and the subsea
umbilical termination assembly, the following interfaces shall be considered as minimum during
the design of these two units:
The foundations and the protective structures (if required) of the subsea umbilical termination
assemblies shall be designed in accordance with all the applicable parts of Ref./1/.
The design of the umbilical subsea termination assemblies shall take into account of all the
following aspects:
Subsea wet mateable shorting connectors (electric and/or optical) shall be provided together
with the subsea umbilical termination assemblies to allow umbilical integrity monitoring during
laying.
The design of the umbilical subsea termination assembly and all the related structures shall be
focused on maximum modularity, in order to ease the installation operations.
5. INTERFACES
The equipment with which the SCS needs to interface is typically the following:
CONTRACTOR shall refer to the individual project specific functional building block data sheets
for the interface description.
CONTRACTOR shall manage all SCS external equipment interfaces and formally liaise with the
other appointed organizations of the project in order to exchange all the characteristics and
data necessary to design and ensure compatibility of SCS supplied equipment with other parties
work.
CONTRACTOR shall be responsible for obtaining from the other project contractors, all drawings
and technical documentation necessary for the completion of the work.
6.1. MARKING
CONTRACTOR shall refer to Ref./1/ for the marking requirements of SCS major assemblies.
In addition, the following information shall be included in the nameplates of the major
assemblies of the SCS (where applicable):
6.2. PACKAGING
CONTRACTOR shall refer to Ref./1/ for the packaging requirements of SCS equipment.
The major assemblies of the SCS shall be supplied with certified lifting aids for balanced
onshore and offshore handling.
All the components used in the SCS shall be qualified either by being field proven or by
COMPANY approved qualification testing.
The selection of materials shall be consistent with the service conditions and the design life.
Selected materials for use in control system parts wetted by hydraulic fluid or chemicals shall
be capable of being cleaned to the specified cleanliness level by flushing.
All the parts and components of the subsea control system shall be clean before and during
assembly.
PED 97/23/EC certification is required for pressure equipment and assemblies of pressure
equipment.
7.2. WELDING
All pressure-containing welds shall be in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code, Section IX.
Structural, load bearing welds shall be treated as non pressure-containing welds and shall
comply with AWS D1.1 or ISO15614 or ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX.
Welders for structural, load bearing welds shall be qualified in accordance with EN 287 or
EN1418. Welders for pressure containing welds shall be qualified in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX.
8. TESTING REQUIREMENTS
All Units and Systems shall be subjected to a verification and acceptance testing programme
in order to demonstrate to COMPANY that the design of the equipment, whether it be field
proven or not, will satisfy all specific requirements and will perform satisfactorily in service,
and that all Units and Systems have been completed in accordance with the specifications prior
to delivery. Dependent on equipment status, qualification tests of Units may also be required.
A comprehensive test programme, covering the whole range from component and Unit integrity
testing through functional and performance verification of all Units and Systems, shall be
implemented. The test programme shall be structured in such a manner that field installed and
commissioning operations are simulated. The programme shall as a minimum include the
following types of tests.
The Unit FAT shall be performed for each manufactured Unit. The number of System FAT/EFAT,
System Tests and Integration Tests is to be defined in conjunction with delivery contractual
schedules.
All such test procedures and programs shall be subjected to COMPANY approval prior to
commencing the tests. For all new designs, including new sizes and ratings of an existing
design, completion of a successful qualification test program is required. CONTRACTOR shall
comply with the requirements dictated by ISO 13628-6.
8.2. FAT
A Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) of a Unit is the set of tests required to prove that the
components of a Unit and the Unit itself, satisfy all specified functional and performance
requirements. All Factory Acceptance Tests for Units shall be performed in accordance with the
requirements defined in ISO 13628-6 and other relevant specifications.
Prior to a multi-component FAT (HPU, SCM, MCS etc.) individual component FAT, Certificates
of Conformity, Cleanliness Certificates, Leak and Pressure Test certificates or Material
certificates etc. must be available and submitted to COMPANY for review.
The FAT program shall demonstrate but shall not be limited to, and document that the following
special requirements are met:
a) Environmental Stress Screening (ESS) shall be applied to all subsea instruments and
electronics as per ISO 13628-6 with two 5-minutes random vibration segments before
and after the thermal cycling. If, in normal service, the EUT is mounted into a canister
or other type of housing, the ESS shall be performed without the housing.
b) All the pressure seals of subsea one-atmosphere enclosures shall be pressure tested
with gas respecting one of the following sets of requirements:
- using Nitrogen, a pressure of at least 50 bar shall be locked in; acceptance
criteria shall be a pressure drop lower than 0.1bar in 15 minutes;
- using Helium, a differential pressure of at least 1 bar shall be created; leaks can
be checked either with a Helium sniffer or by verifying that the pressure decay,
that shall be lower than 0.1bar in 15 minutes
After gas testing, purge the relevant parts of the system. Subsequent re-opening
of the enclosure would invalidate the test.
c) All subsea one-atmosphere enclosures containing electronic equipment shall be
hyperbaric tested at 1.1 x design water depth for a minimum of 1 hour after final
closure: subsequent re-opening of the enclosure would invalidate the test. Such
enclosures shall be designed with permanently installed provisions for measuring water
ingress (this for monitoring during service life and during hyperbaric test itself).
d) Flushing operations and fluid cleanliness verification shall be performed at the end of
unit FAT, in order to make sure that the unit is delivered from FAT clean to specification.
In the case of the HPU control fluid filters and Y strainers should be replaced.
e) All the valves part of the SCS acting as ”barrier” valves, all the DCVs (in all positions)
and all the subsea hydraulic/chemical couplings (in un-mated condition) shall be leak
tested at 1.1 x maximum working pressure for at least 10 minutes.
f) All the loose part of the main unit under test shall take part to the FAT and shall mate
correctly with the main unit.
g) The FAT shall verify that the equipment under test is fully compliant with the latest
revision of the relevant engineering documents such as interface drawings, general
assembly drawings, hydraulic schematics, electrical/optical schematics, tag/label
schedules, software release notes;
h) Equipment with self-alignment features shall intentionally be misaligned to verify its
alignment capability;
i) All the main assemblies of the SCS shall be trial lifted during their FAT to check that the
lifting is balanced, and also to confirm weights;
j) If applicable, interface testing between the subsea umbilical termination assemblies and
their foundations shall be undertaken to demonstrate compliance with the project
umbilical installation methodology;
k) Unit power consumption and System charge up times in all operating conditions shall
be recorded during FAT and compared with the design figures for acceptance;
Retrievable Units shall be installed and retrieved using running tools and tested on two different
mounting bases.
The EFAT programme shall demonstrate and document that the specified requirements are met
with respect to:
• Interface capabilities
• Operational envelope
• Interfaces between Units and loose items
• Control and communication system sensitivity and nose immunity
• Fluid and system cleanliness
• ROV Access where applicable
• ETU functionality and operational aspects
• Electro-hydraulic directional control valve performance
• Software download and revision control.
• The capability of the SCS to interface with the host facility PCS.
• The capability of the SCS to interface with the host facility SIS.
• The system’s capability of controlling and monitoring all the foreseen subsea
installations.
• The SCS acts as an integrated system in all operating conditions in compliance with the
project specifications.
These verifications shall include interface checks with all components including all handling,
intervention and test tools.
The SCM shall be interface checked on at least two X-mas trees, MCM and SAM shall be interface
checked on at least two templates/manifolds.
Retrievable equipment on SDU shall be interface checked on at least two SDU.
Integrated system tests should be carried out for all modes of operation and, if applicable, in
fully redundant and non-redundant configurations. Separate tests should be conducted for
minimum, normal, and maximum loadings.
Integrated system tests typically include end devices and interconnecting jumpers, umbilicals,
stabplates, as well as the non-control system components to which they interface, and any
running tools that are used during installation. Function tests verify the final result of all input
signals, overrides, and resets. Key set points should be rechecked. A primary benefit during
integrated testing is the familiarization of operating personnel with the location of the
adjustable devices and the methods used to verify or change the set points.
In addition, performance tests should record actuation times for actuators, accumulator bank
discharge
volumes, recovery times for pumping systems, power consumption for electrical circuits,
delivery rates for chemical injection circuits, expansion volumes for long hoses, and the
accuracy of read back monitors.
Reference should be made to ISO 13628-1 for additional discussion on system testing.