Cassandra Claire A.
Palermo JD1-A
GR Nos. L-50581-50617
Rufino V. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines
January 30, 1982
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proceeding assailing the validity of
the Presidential Decree No. 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan
Petitioner, together with other co-accused, all public officials, was accused before
Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds,
Sandiganbayan denied such motion including the motion for reconsideration
The premise underlying petitioner’s contention on this point is set forth in his
memorandum thus: “1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner’s right to
equal protection, because – appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a
mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to
questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and – there is
only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of
the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as
a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to
the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court.”
Issue:
WON the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals are
concerned
Ruling:
According to the Supreme Court, the petitioner’s contention is hardly convincing,
considering the classification satisfies the test announced by the SC in People v. Vera
requiring that it “must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. To
repeat, the Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court,
the Sandiganbayan 4 precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who
may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as
January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a
public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court in
Co Chiong v. Cuaderno 28 a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, included among which are the due process of law and equal protection
clauses must "give way to [a] specific provision, " in that decision, one reserving to
"Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or utilities." The scope of such a
principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the instant
situation.
GR No. 139043
Mayor Alvin B. Garcia v. Hon. Arturo C. Mojica, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas, Virginia Palanca-Santiago, in his capacity as Director, Office of the
Ombudsman ?(VIsayas), Alan Francisco S. Garciano, in his capacity as Graft
Investigating Officer I, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), and Jesus Rodrigo T.
Tagaan
September 10, 1999
Facts:
This case involves a preventive suspension order against Cebu City Mayor Alvin B.
Garcia and eight other city officials
Suspension without pay for the maximum period of six months and told to cease and
desist from holding office immediately
Garcia signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city for the
year 1998-2001, commencing on the month of September
Tagaan was assigned as special prosecution officer to conduct the inquiry, he
recommended the it to be upgraded to criminal and administrative case.
Garciano, the graft investigating officer, recommended the preventive suspension of
Mayor Garcia and others.
The Ombudsman issued the questioned preventive suspension order. Garcia then
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Garcia came to the Supreme Court assailing the validity of the preventive
suspension order and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
Issues:
Which law should apply to the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman,
the Local Government Code (RA 7160) or the Ombudsman Law (RA 6770)? Was the
procedure in the law properly observed?
Ruling:
Both laws shall be applicable.
Under the Local Government Code, preventive suspension may only be imposed
after the issues are joined, and only for a maximum period of sixty days. Here,
petitioner was suspended without having had the chance to refute first the charges
against him, and for the maximum period of six months provided by the
Ombudsman Law.
In contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of preventive
suspension, is not likely to be similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body.
The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our view, of whether there has been
grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension.
In Hagad v. Gozo-Dagole, the Supreme Court said:
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so
inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike
down the other.
It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month preventive suspension under the
Ombudsman Law is "much too repugnant" to the 60-day period that may be
imposed under the Local Government Code. But per J. Vitug, "the two provisions
govern differently. “
GR No. 1128055
Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, Francis E. Garchitorena, Jose S.
Balajadia and Minita v. Chico-Nazario, as Presiding Justice and members of the First
Division
April 18, 2001
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari with prohibition and preliminary injunction filed by
Santiago before the Court against Sandiganbayan and others.
A criminal case was filed against Santiago for legalizing the stay of disqualified
aliens in the Philippines when she was CID Commissioner
Two other criminal cases were filed against the petitioner
Santiago’s intention to accept Harvard’s invitation for a fellowship. Hence, the order
issued by the Sandiganbayan to prohibit her from leaving the country.
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner
and fixed bail at PHP 15,000.00
Santiago was granted provisional liberty by the Sandiganbayan until her physical
condition improves as she was recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident.
Issue:
WON the Sandiganbayan has the authority to impose a 90-day preventive
suspension against a member of the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
Ruling:
Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not exclude
from its coverage the members of Congress
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of RA No. 3019
has both legal and jurisprudential support.
It is a ministerial duty of the Court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information
is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order
of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.”
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely
adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before
it. Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot
vs. Sandiganbayan observed: "x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a
result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension."
GR No. 160261
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., petitioner, Nagmamalasakit Na Mga Manananggol ng Mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., its officers and members, petitioner-in-intervention, vs.
The House of Representatives, represented by Speaker Jose G. De Venecia, The
Senate, represented by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, Representative Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Representative Felix William B. Fuentebella, respondents, Jaime
N. Soriano, respondent-in-intervention, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, respondent-in-
intervention.
November 10, 2003
Facts:
Former President Ejercito Estrada moved to impeach C.J. Davide, Jr. and others
The House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the said complaint for lacking
substance
Another impeachment complaint was filed, only nearly 5 months after the first
Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus were filed against the House of
Representatives et al
Respondents contended that the second impeachment complaint was constitutional
as it have not been initiated
“Initiate” could not possibly mean “to file”
The House of Representatives, as a collective body is yet to act on the first
impeachment complaint, the first complaint could not have been “initiated”
Issues:
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) of Article
XI of the Constitution
Ruling:
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within
a one-year period.
GR No. 217126-27
Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals
(sixth division) and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.
November 10, 2015
Facts:
Carpio filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in her capacity as the
Ombudsman, through the OSG assailing the Resolution of CA, which granted Jejomar
Erwin S. Binay, Jr.’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO against the implementation of
Joint Order dated March 10, 2015 of the Ombudsman preventively suspending him
and several other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati
and the Resolution dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to
comment on Binay, Jr.’s, petition for contempt.
Binay, Jr., et al were charged with six administrative cases for Grave Misconduct,
Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct rejudicial to the Best Interest of te Service, and six
criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public
Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents.
Issues:
WON the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in
CA-GR SP No. 139453
WON the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the
WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine
Ruling:
With the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the
Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject
matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. That being said,
the Court now examines the objections of the Ombudsman, this time against the
CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO and WPI against the implementation of the
preventive suspension order, incidental to that main case.
GR No. 158187
Marilyn Geduspan and Dra. Evangelyn Farahmand v. People of the Philippines and
Sandiganbayan
February 11, 2005
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of a temporary restraining order,
Geduspan seeks to annul and set aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division which denied her motion to quash and motion for reconsideration,
respectively.
Geduspan, in the course of her performance of her official function as the Philhealth
Regional Manager/Director had given unwarranted benefits to Tong Bi, Inc.,
represented by Dr. Evangeline C. Farahmand, involving the sale of West Negros
College, Inc. to the latter.
Issue:
WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over regional director/manager of
government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under
the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act?
Ruling:
The Court ruled that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over regional
director/manager of GOCCs organized and incorporated under the Corporation
Code
The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the
case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position
that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al.4 ruled:
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten
wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law
on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986
(sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b),
(c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated
in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
