ARTICLE 19

INTRODUCTION: Clauses (a) to (g) of Art. 19(1) guarantee to the citizens of India six freedoms, viz.,
of ‘speech and expression’, ‘peaceable assembly’ ‘association’, ‘free movement’, ‘residence’, and
‘practising any profession and carrying on any business’.

These various freedoms are necessary not only to promote certain basic rights of the citizens but
also certain democratic values in, and the oneness and unity of, the country.

Rights under Art 19 are available only citizens.

However, the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19(1) are not absolute as no right can be. Each of these
rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by Parliament
or the State Legislatures. Accordingly, clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19 lay down the grounds and the
purposes for which a legislature can impose ‘reasonable restrictions’ on the rights guaranteed by
Arts. 19(1)(a) to (g).

FREEDOMS AREN’T ABSOLUTE- SUBJECT TO REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS

 There is no definite test to adjudge reasonableness of a restriction.

 Court in various cases has said that for the restrictions to be reasonable there is to be balance
between the rights of the society and rights of the individual
 There can’t be strait jacket formula to tell what is reasonable. However, the Courts have laid
down a few broad propositions in this respect.
 State of Madras v. V.G. Row: For adjudging reasonableness of a restriction, the Courts consider
such factors as: the duration and the extent of the restrictions; the circumstances under which,
and the manner in which, that imposition has been authorised. The nature of the right infringed,
the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and the urgency of the evil
sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at
the time, all these considerations enter into the judicial verdict.

REASONABLENESS OF RESTRICTIONS-GUIDELINES

In Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Ltd., the SC has laid following guidelines for
determining the reasonableness of restrictions:

 It is the court and not the Legislature which is the final judge to determine whether a
restriction is reasonable or not
 The restriction must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the
requirement of felt need of the society and object sought to be achieved
 There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection between the
restriction imposed and the object sought to be achieved.
 No abstract or fixed principle can be laid down which may have universal application in all
cases.
 The court must determine the reasonableness of a restriction by objective standard and not
by subjective one.
 It is imperative that for consideration of reasonableness of restriction imposed by a statute,
the Court should examine whether the social control as envisaged in Art. 19 is being
effectuated by the restriction imposed on the Fundamental Right.
  The freedoms guaranteed under Art 19 are subjected to restrictions. It is necessary to
examine which such restriction is meant to protect social welfare satisfying the need of
prevailing social values.
 The reasonableness has got to be tested both from the procedural and substantive aspects.
 Ordinarily, any restriction so imposed which has the effect of promoting or effectuating a
Directive Principle can be presumed to be reasonable restriction in public interest.

EFFECT V. SUBJECT-MATTER TEST

What is the test to be applied to ascertain whether a law violates Art. 19(1)(a), or any other
Fundamental Right?

In Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, the Central Government argued in support of the
newsprint policy that its subject-matter was rationing of imported commodity and not freedom
of speech, and the test to adjudge the validity of a regulatory provision should be its subject-
matter, its pith and substance, and not its effect or result. The Court rejected this approach and
enunciated the test: What is the ‘direct’ or ‘inevitable’ consequence or effect of the impugned
state action on the Fundamental Right of the petitioner? “The true test is whether the effect of
the impugned action is to take away or abridge Fundamental Rights.”

In A.K. Gopalan v State of Madras, the Supreme Court had applied the test of subject-matter in
order to uphold the validity of the Preventive Detention Act against a challenge under Art. 19(1)
(a).

In course of time, the Bennett Coleman approach has been accepted and the Gopalan approach
discarded.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND CONSTITUTION: ARTICLES 19(1)(A) AND 19(2)

Freedom of speech is the bulwark of democratic government. The freedom of speech and
expression is regarded as the first condition of liberty.

Article 19(1)(a) of the constitution

The freedom of speech and expression, guaranteed under Art 19(1)(a) means the right to speak
and to express one’s opinions or to air grievances by words of mouth, writing, printing, pictures
or in any other manner.

The freedom of speech under Art. 19(1)(a) includes the right to express one’s views and opinions
at any issue through any medium, e.g., by words of mouth, writing, printing, picture, film, movie,
etc

“Expression” naturally presupposes a second party to whom the ideas are expressed or
communication. The freedom of expression, thus, includes the freedom of the propagation of
ideas, their publication and circulation.

Scope and content of the freedom

a) right to know and to obtain information

 The right to info is indisputably a FR, a facet of “speech and expression” as contained in Art 19(1)
(a)
 The concept of an open govt. is said to be the direct emanation from the right to know ir right to
acquire info and dissent it
 With a view to provide for freedom to every citizen to secure access to official info, in order to
promote openness, transparency and accountability in administration and in relation to matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto, the Freedom of Information Act, 2002, has been
passed.
 In Prabhu Dutt v UOI, petitioner was chief reporter of HT and wanted to interview to inmates of
Tihar jail but wasn’t allowed to do so. The SC held that people had a right to know about the
current affairs and Press had a right to publish what it wants

b) Right of the Citizens/Voters to know the Antecedents of the Candidates at Election

 Art 19(1)(a) includes the voter’s speech and expression, in case of elections
 UOI v Association for Democratic Reforms: the court ruled that voter’s right to know
antecedents including criminal past of his candidate contesting election for M.P or M.L.A. was
fundamental and bas is for survival of democracy. Such a right is covered under freedom of
speech and expression as voter speaks out or expresses by casting vote.

c). Right to reply or answer the criticism against one’s views

 In LIC v Prof Manubhai D. shah, the respondent executive trustee of CERC, Ahmedabad, after
taking research on working of LIC, published a paper. The study paper showed discriminatory
practices adopted by LIC. A member of LIC replied to this paper. The respondent prepared a
rejoinder to the reply. LIC published the respondent’s paper and reply by LIC member in its in-
house magazine. Respondent demanded the publication of his rejoinder as well and LIC refused
on the ground that it was an in-house magazine. SC held that LIC is state within the meaning of
Art 12 and bound to publish reply even in in-house magazine. SC held that right to get one’s
reply published in the same news media in which something was published against or in relation
to a citizen, was covered under Art 19(1)(a).

d) Freedom of the Press-Included

 Unlike the American constitution, Art 19(1) doesn’t specifically provide for the liberty of the
press.
 It is a settled law that the right to freedom of speech and expression in Art 19(1)(a) includes the
liberty of the press.
 The various aspects of freedom of press are discussed below:
1. No pre-Censorship on Press: freedom of the press means the right to print and publish
what one pleases, without any previous permission. Case Brij Bhushan v State of Delhi:
Under East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, petitioner was required to submit his weekly
magazine ‘Organiser’ to Commissioner of Delhi before it was out in the market if it included
communal matters. SC held that Pre-censorship violates Freedom of press and struck down
such an order of Police as being violative of Art 19(1)(A).
2. Freedom of circulation: in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, the court held that the
freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to propagate ideas which is ensured by
freedom of circulation of a publication, as a publication is of little value without circulation.
Therefore, imposition of a ban upon entry and circulation of a journal within a State is
restriction of Art. 19(1)(a).
3. Freedom in volume of news or views: in Sakal Papers v. Union of India, An Act and a
government order thereunder sought to regulate the number of pages according to the
 price charged, prescribed the number of supplements to be published, and regulate the size
and area of advertisements in relation to other matter contained in a newspaper. Thus, the
number of pages published by a newspaper depended upon the price charged to the
readers. The Supreme Court ruled it invalid for its purpose was to reduce circulation of
some newspapers by making their price unattractively high for their readers. Reduction in
the area for advertisements would reduce revenues forcing the newspapers to raise their
prices which was also bound to affect circulation. This directly affected the freedom of
speech and expression because inherent in this freedom is the right to publish and circulate
the publication.
4. No excise taxes on Press: Indian Express v. Union of India: In this, the petitioners
challenged the validity of the imposition of import duty, on newsprint under the Customs
Act. SC held that the newspaper industry had not been granted exemption from taxation.
However, govt should be more cautious while levying taxes on matters concerning
newspaper industry than while levying taxes on other matters.
5. Commercial advertisements-Included: Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India: In instant
case, the Drug and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 was passed
with a view to the prevention of self-medication and self-treatment by prohibiting the
publication of ads pf drugs having magic qualities for curing diseases. SC held the rule valid
and held that its true nature and character, wasn’t interference with right to freedom of
speech but it dealt with trade and business which might be restricted in the interests of the
general public under Art 19(6). It was held that commercial ads aren’t covered under
freedom of speech and expression.
Tata Press Ltd. v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd.: “commercial speech” cannot be
denied the protection of Art. 19(1)(a) merely because the same is issued by businessmen.
“Commercial speech” is a part of freedom of speech guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a). The
public at large has a right to receive the “commercial speech

e) Telephone tapping: When a person is talking on telephone, he is exercising his right to freedom of
speech and expression. In PUCL v UOI, Under Sec 5(2) of Indian Telegraph Act, Govt. could tap any
phone. Petitioner claimed it to be violation of Art 21 and 19(1)(a). court said that govt. has interest in
public security and that can’t be done away with. But court said the phone tapping should be
regulated: order must come from home secretary, should be subject to review of review committee,
should be the last resort and records should be deleted after use.

f) Right to exhibit films- telecast on Doordarshan

 Providing entertainment has been held to be a form of exercise of freedom of speech and
expression.
 In Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lok Vidyayan Sanghatana, case involving the
Doordarshan, arose on appeal against a stay order issued by the Bombay High Court
restraining telecasting of certain episodes of the serial Honi Anhonee as they were believed
to further superstitious beliefs. Supreme Court ruled that the right of a citizen to exhibit
films on the Doordarshan, subject to the terms and conditions imposed by Doordarshan, is a
part of the Fundamental Right of freedom of expression guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a)
which can be curtailed only under circumstances set out in Art. 19(2)
 In respect to right of exhibit films, the following aspects may be noticed:
1. Art 19(1)(a) forbids state monopoly either in Print or Electronic Media: Secretary,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Assn. of Bengal: In the case, cricket
association asked DD to make necessary arrangement for telecasting of all matches of 6-
 nation Int cricket tournament, which DD refused. Court held that govt had no monopoly
on electronic media and that a citizen had under Art 19(1)(a), a right to telecast and
broadcast to the viewrs/ listeners through electronic media, TV and Radio, any imp event.
2. Pre-censorship of films: In K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has upheld
censorship of films under Art. 19(1)(a) on the ground that films have to be treated
separately from other forms of art and expression because a motion picture is able to stir
up emotions more deeply than any other product of art. A film can therefore be censored
on the grounds mentioned in Art. 19(2).

g) Right to Post Info on the internet

 SC in Shreya Singhal V UOI, holding Sec 66A of IT Act,2002 violative of freedom of speech and
expression under art 19(1)(a) struck it down. This section empowered the police to arrest
persons for posting offensive info on the internet including social media sites that causes
hatred, intimidation and host of other problems.

h) Demonstrating, picketing, strikes

 Demonstrations or picketing are visible manifestation of the feelings or sentiments of an

individual or a group in effect a form of speech or expression. However, in order to be
protected under Art 19(1)(a), the demonstration or picketing should not be violent and
disorderly.
 The right to go on a strike hasn’t been held to be included within the scope and ambit of “the
freedom of speech and expression.”
 In T.K. Rangrajan v Govt. of Tamil Nadu: the service rule included that if govt employees did
some strike or formed an association, their service would be terminated. Some of employees
got themselves involved in a strike and their services were terminated. Court held that such
an action of govt employees affected society as a whole and brought adm. to a grinding halt
and also ruled that govt employees have no FR or legal right to strike.
 Kameshwar Prasad. v. State of Bihar: A rule made by the Bihar Government prohibited
government servants from participating in any demonstration or strike in connection with
any matter pertaining to their conditions of service. The rule was challenged. The Supreme
Court said that a government servant does not, by accepting government service, lose his
Fundamental Rights under Art. 19

i) No right to call or enforce Bandh

 Bharat Kumar K. Palicha v. State of Kerala: a full Bench of the Kerala High Court has declared
“Bandhs” organised by political parties from time to time as unconstitutional being violative of
the Fundamental Rights of the people. The Court refused to accept it as an exercise of the
freedom of speech and expression.
A call for bandh is clearly different from a call for general strike or hartal. There is
destruction of public property during a bandh. Accordingly, the High Court has directed
that a call for a bandh by any association, organisation or political party and enforcing of
that call by it, is illegal and unconstitutional.
RESTRICTIONS UNDER ART. 19(2)

(a) Grounds Of Restrictions

 While it is necessary to maintain and preserve freedom of speech and expression in a

democracy, so also it is necessary to place some curbs on this freedom for the maintenance of
social order. No freedom can be absolute or completely unrestricted.
 Accordingly, under Art. 19(2), the state may make a law imposing ‘reasonable restrictions’ on
the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression ‘in the interests of’ the security of
the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, morality, sovereignty and
integrity of India, or ‘in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence’.
 The expression used in Art. 19(2) “in the interests of” give a wide amplitude to the permissible
law which can be enacted to impose reasonable restrictions on the right guaranteed by Art.
19(1)(a) under one of the heads mentioned in Art. 19(2).

b) Security Of State And Public Order

 Article 19(2) uses two concepts: ‘public order’ and ‘security of state’. The concept of ‘public
order’ is wider than ‘security of state’.
 Security of state: It refers to serious and aggravated forms of public disorder, such as
rebellion, waging war against the State, insurrection. Endangering the security of a part of
the state, would involve a threat to the security of state.
An aggravated form of disturbance of peace which threatens the foundations of, or
threatens to overthrow, the state will fall within the scope of the phrase ‘security of state’.
 Public order: the expression public order is virtually synonymous with public peace, safety
and tranquillity. But ‘public order’ and ‘public tranquillity’ may not always be synonymous.
For example, a man playing loud music in his home at night may disturb public tranquillity,
but not public order.
Public order implies absence of violence and an orderly state of affairs in which citizens can
peacefully pursue their normal avocation of life. It thus includes public safety.
In Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the constitutional validity of the provision was
challenged on the ground that the section was wide enough to cover even trifling forms of
religious insults which may not involve any question of public order. It was thus argued that
S. 295A, IPC, be declared void. But the Supreme Court did not do so. The Court ruled that S.
295A makes criminal only graver types of conduct involving insults to religion or religious
beliefs which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the
religious feelings of a class of citizens. The calculated tendency of such an aggravated form
of insult is clearly to disrupt public order and hence the provision is valid.
Though, restrictions can be imposed on utterances that have the tendency to lead to
disorder but it is necessary that there must be reasonable and proper nexus or relationship
between the restriction and the public order.

c) Friendly Relations with Foreign states

 The idea behind imposing restrictions on the freedom of speech in the interests of friendly
relations with a foreign country is that persistent and malicious propaganda against a foreign
power having friendly relations with India may cause considerable embarrassment to India,
and, accordingly, indulging in such a propaganda may be prohibited.
d) Sovereignty and Integrity of India

 Section 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1961, makes penal the questioning of the
“territorial integrity or frontiers of India” in a manner which is, or is likely to be, prejudicial
to the interests of the safety or security of India.

e) Incitement to an offence

 According to the general theories of criminal law, incitement and abutment of a crime is
punishable.
 Incitement to serious and aggravated offences, like murder, may be punished as involving
the security of the State. Incitement to many other offences may be made punishable as
affecting the public order.
 It has been held that incitement to an offence didn’t refer to incitement to break a law.
Thus, an incitement to a breach of every civil law is not contemplated by Art 19(2).

f) Contempt of court

 While the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression, it also lays down that
in exercising that right, contempt of Court may not be committed. The underlying idea is
that authority of Courts be preserved and obstructions to the due administration of justice
removed.
 Power has been specifically conferred on the Supreme Court [Art. 129] as well as each High
Court [Art. 215] to punish its contempt. The freedom of speech and expression guaranteed
by Art. 19(1)(a) is thus subject to Arts. 19(2), 129 and 215.
 Contempt of other Courts can be punished by the High Courts under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1952. A challenge to the Act as imposing an unreasonable restriction on the right under
Art. 19(1)(a), because it provides no definition of the expression ‘contempt of Court’, has
been rejected on the ground that the expression has a well-recognised judicial
interpretation.

g) Defamation

 the freedom of speech and expression can’t be used to transgress the law relating to
defamation.
 Defamation is both a crime as well as a tort. As a crime, Defamation is defined in S. 499,
I.P.C. The law seeks to protect a person in his reputation as in his person or property.
 In Subranamiam Swamy v UOI, SC rejected the plea of Subraminian Swamy, facing criminal
defamation case, that the British era provision (S. 499, I.P.C.) was an outdated idea that
undermined speech. The court, thus ruled that the criminal defamation would continue to
stay in India.

h) Decency or Morality

 These are terms of variable content having no fixed meaning for ideas about decency or
morality vary from society to society and time to time depending on the standards of morals
prevailing in the contemporary society.
 Restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression can be imposed in the interests of
decency or morality. The purpose is to restricting speeches and publications which tend to
undermine public morals
  The word decency connotes the same as lack of obscenity. The word obscenity is identical
with the word indecency.
 The Indian Penal Code in Ss. 292 to 294 lists some of the offences like selling obscene books,
selling obscene things to young persons, committing an obscene act, or singing an obscene
song in a public place. S. 292, I.P.C., has been held valid because the law against obscenity
seeks no more than to promote public decency and morality
 In Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, A book seller in Bombay, was prosecuted and
convicted under Sec 292 IPC for selling and keeping the book “Lady Chatterley’s Lover”. The
SC applied the Hicklian test and upheld the conviction of appellant. The test of obscenity is
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprive and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of
this sort is likely to fall.
 In Aveek Sarkar v state of W.B., SC held applied the contemporary community test and
ruled that the factum of obscenity had to be judged from the point view of average person.
 In R.Y Prabhoo v P.K.Kunte, the Supreme Court has given somewhat wider meaning to the
term ‘decency’ and ‘morality’. The Court has maintained that ‘decency’ or ‘morality’ is not
confined to sexual morality alone. The ordinary dictionary meaning of ‘decency’ indicates
that the action must be in conformity with the current standards of behaviour or propriety.

FREEDOM TO ASSEMBLE: ARTS. 19(1)(b) AND 19(3)

 Art 19(1)(b) guarantees to all citizens “the right to assemble peaceably and without terms.

Scope of the right to Assemble

 The right of assembly guaranteed by Art 19(1)(b) is a corollary of the right to freedom of
speech and expression guaranteed under Art 19(1)(a), for the very purpose of holding an
assembly is, to hold consultations, to express one’s views, in respect of public affairs.
 The right to assembly thus includes the right to hold public meeting and to take out
processions and right to hold demonstrations.
 Shanmugraj v Deputy Supt. Of Police, Tenkast: Art 19(1)(b) has been held to cover the right
to hold hunger strike, so long as it is assured to be peaceful without arms and not against
any individual or group

Reasonable Restrictions on Freedom of Assembly

 the assembly must be peaceful

 it must be unarmed
 the state can impose reasonable restriction under Art 19(3) in the interests of public order or
sovereignty and integrity of India

Public order: the expression public order is virtually synonymous with public peace, safety and
tranquillity. But ‘public order’ and ‘public tranquillity’ may not always be synonymous. For example,
a man playing loud music in his home at night may disturb public tranquillity, but not public order.

Public order implies absence of violence and an orderly state of affairs in which citizens can
peacefully pursue their normal avocation of life. It thus includes public safety.
Though, restrictions can be imposed on utterances that have the tendency to lead to disorder but it
is necessary that there must be reasonable and proper nexus or relationship between the restriction
and the public order.

Restrictions must be regulatory and not prohibitive in nature

 It is not valid to confer uncontrolled discretion on administrative officers to regulate the

freedom of assembly.
 A rule completely banning holding of public meetings on public streets without police permission
has been held bad in Himmat Lal v. Police Commissioner. The court held that the state could
make regulations in aid of the right of assembly of citizens and could impose reasonable
restriction in the interest of public order. However, no rule could be prescribed prohibiting all
meetings or processions.

No right to hold assembly on private property

 The right of assembly cannot be exercised on the property of somebody.

 Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh: Railways are entitled to enjoy their properties in the same
manner as any private individual subject to such restrictions as may be placed on them by law or
usage. Therefore, Railways can validly prohibit holding of meetings in their premises either
within or outside office hours.

FREEDOM TO FORM ASSOCIATION: ARTS. (19)(1)(c) AND 19(4)

19(1)(c) guarantees to the citizens of India, the freedom to form associations or unions or
cooperative societies.

Scope of the right to form associations or unions

 An association means “a collection of persons who have joined together for a certain object,
which may be for the benefit of the members or the improvement, welfare or advantage of the
public or some scientific, charitable or similar purpose.”
 The right to form associations or union guaranteed by Art 19(1)(c) includes the right to form
companies, societies, partnership firms, trade unions, clubs, political parties and the like body of
persons.

Right to be a member voluntarily

 The right to form association means the right voluntarily to be a member of an association. It
includes the right not to be a member or the right to continue to be or not to continue to be
a member of the association.
 Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India: The law in question did not merely regulate the affairs
of the society; it altered its composition. Any law altering the composition of the association
compulsorily will be a breach of the right to form the association of the original members
guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c). Such a law is not protected under Art. 19(4). The court held
that the right to form association is not restricted only to the initial stage of forming an
association. It also protects the right to continue the association with its own composition as
voluntarily agreed upon by the persons forming the association.

Right subjected to reasonable restrictions [Art 19(4)]

  Under Art. 19(4), reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order or morality or
sovereignty and integrity of India may be imposed on this right by law.
 The prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 was enacted, inter alia, to protect sovereignty and
integrity of India from the menace of terrorism. Declaring any organisation as a terrorist
organisation, under the act, was permissible.

Right not to be a member of an association

 Sitharamachary v. Deputy Inspector of Schools: A High Court has held that the right to form
an association necessarily implies that a person is free to refuse to be a member of an
association if he so desires, and, therefore, a rule making it compulsory for every teacher to
become a member of a government sponsored association at the risk of suffering
disciplinary action in case a teacher absents from two consecutive meetings infringes Art.
19(1)(c).
 The right to form association implies the right not to form an association. But it doesn’t
follow that the negative right must also be regarded as FR.

No right or right to continue in Govt service

 P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India: the services of appellant were terminated under the Services
rules for him being a member of Communist Party and a trade unionist. The appellants,
however, submitted that their dismissal from service amounted in substance to a denial to them
of the freedom to form association. The Supreme Court rejected the plea saying that the
impugned order was not in contravention of his right guaranteed under Art 19(1)(c). The
appellants, no doubt, enjoyed a Fundamental Right to form associations under Art. 19(1)(c), but
they had no Fundamental Right to remain in government service.
 M.H. Devendrappa v. Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corpn.: the Supreme
Court has dissented from the Balakotaiah ruling entailing freedom v. service. SC held that a
person who legitimately seeks to exercise his rights under Art. 19 cannot be told that you are
free to exercise the rights, but the consequences will be so serious and so damaging, that you
will not, in effect, be able to exercise your freedom to continue in govt service.

No prior restraint to right to form association

 O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph: The Supreme Court invalidated a rule which provided that no
government servant could join or continue to be a member of any services association which the
government did not recognise or in respect of which recognition has been refused or withdrawn
by it. The Court held that the rule imposed a restriction on the undoubted right of a government
servant under Art. 19(1)(c). The rule in question was neither reasonable nor in the interest of
“public order”

No right to achieve the objectives of Association

 All India Bank Employees’ Ass. v. The National Industrial Tribunal: SC held that the right under
Art. 19(1)(c) extends only to the formation of an association or union and insofar as the activities
of the association or union are concerned, or as regards the steps which the union might take to
achieve its object, they are subject to such laws as may be framed and such laws cannot be
tested under Art. 19(4)as these are right concomitant to FR. The Court has held that even a very
liberal interpretation of Art. 19(1)(c) cannot mean that the trade unions have a guaranteed right
to strike. The right to strike may be controlled by appropriate industrial legislation.
 L.N. Mishra Institute of E.D. & Social Change v. State of Bihar: State Government took over an
educational institution run by a society. The Court ruled that Art. 19(1)(c) had not been violated
since the institute was taken over and the rights of the society remained unimpaired and
uninterfered. Merely because of the taking over or acquisition of the Institute, which was the
only property or activity of the society, the Fundamental Right of the society to form association
is not infringed. Art. 19(1)(c) does not extend to, or embrace within it, the objects or purposes or
the activities of an association.

No right to recognition by state

The Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(c) can be claimed by government servants as well.
A government servant may not lose his right under Art. 19(1)(c) by joining government service. But
the right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(c) to form association does not involve a guaranteed right to
recognition thereof as well. (Delhi Police Non-Gazetted Karmchari Sangh v. Union of India)

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

 The Act authorises the Central Government to declare by notification in official gazette an
association as unlawful on certain grounds mentioned in S. 2(f) of the Act.
 To keep control over the government power, provision has been made for appointment of a
tribunal consisting of a sitting High Court Judge. A notification declaring an association unlawful
is not to be effective until it is confirmed by the tribunal.
 Further appeal against the tribunal’s decision can be done in the Supreme court.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND RESIDENCE: ARTS. 19(1)(d), (19)(1)(e) AND 19(5)

Freedom of movement [Art 19(1)(d)]

Article 19(1)(d) guarantees to every citizen the right to move freely throughout the territory of India.

Scope of Art 19(1)(d)

The right to move freely throughout the territory of India means the right of locomotion which
connotes the right to motive wherever one likes, whenever one likes and however one likes.

The right isn’t absolute in the sense that 19(5) enables the state to impose reasonable restrictions on
the freedom on the following grounds:

i) in the interest of general public or

for the protection of the interests of any ST

Rights to use highways

 The right to move freely secured under Art 19(1)(d) includes the right to use roads or highways.
Therefore, road blockades, which obstruct free flow of traffic on roads amount to infringement
of the FR to move freely.
 In the case of CPI (M) v Bharat Kumar, the court said that road blockades not only put the
general public to untold harassment but also caused immense loss to the state economy.
 In Anita Thakur v Govt of j&k, SC held that police powers, included the right to use reasonable
force, for dispersing unlawful assembly and maintain public order.
 In Karam Singh v Hardayal Singh, the following requisites were laid down that were to be
satisfied before a magistrate in order to disperse the crowd, by use of force, by police:

a) that there should be an unlawful assembly with the object of committing violence or an assembly
of 5 or more persons, likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace

b) that, an Executive Magistrate should order the assembly to disperse

c) that, in spite of such orders, the people don’t move away

Wearing Helmets

Ajay Canu v. Union of India: A rule was made under the Motor Vehicles Act requiring compulsory
wearing of helmet by a person driving a scooter or a motor cycle. The rule was challenged as
infringing the free movement of the driver of a two-wheeler guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(d), but the
Court refused to accept the argument. The Court maintained that the rule has been framed for the
benefit and welfare of, and safe journey by, a person driving a two-wheeler vehicle.

Police Surveillance

Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh: The Court ruled by a majority that no aspect of police
surveillance fell within the scope of Art. 19(1)(d). The purpose of secret picketing was only to identify
the visitors to the suspect so that police might have some idea of his activities and this did not affect
his right of movement in any material form. Shadowing of the suspect’s movements and domiciliary
visits are also valid to see that he isn’t involved in any crime.

The flaw of Kharak Singh has been removed by the Supreme Court by its pronouncement in Govind
v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court has now held that police surveillance will have to be
restricted to such persons only against whom reasonable materials exist to induce the opinion that
they show ‘a determination to lead a life of crime’—’crime in this context being confined to such as
involve public peace or security only and if they are dangerous to security risks.’ Similarly domiciliary
visits and secret picketing by the police should be restricted to clearest cases of danger to
community security and should not be resorted to as routine follow-up at the end of a conviction or
release from prison or at the whim of a police officer.

Freedom of residence [Art 19(1)(e)]

Art 19(1)(e) guarantees to every citizen of India, the right to reside and settle in any part of the
territory of India

This right subjected to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by the state, by law, under Art
19(5)

Object of Art 19(1)(d) and 19(1)(e)

The object behind the guarantee contained in Art 19(1)(d) and Art 19(1)(e) is to make Indian citizens
national minded. It is put to an end to petty and parochial considerations.

These provisions are thus complementary to Art 5 which provides a single citizenship.

Right to shelter included

UP Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v Friends Co-op Housing Society Ltd.: SC held that the right to
residence assured in Art 19(1)(e) and right to life under Art 21 included the right to shelter and to
construct houses for that purpose, subject however, to building rules.
Externment

Articles 19(1)(d) and 19(1)(e) have been invoked frequently to challenge the validity of an
externment order served by the executive on a citizen requiring him to leave a State or a district.

N.B. Khare v. Delhi: The district magistrate of Delhi, empowered by the East Punjab Safety Act, 1949,
served an externment order on Khare asking him to immediately remove himself from Delhi and not
to return there for three months. The Act in question empowered the State Government, or the
district magistrate, to make an order of externment on being satisfied that such an order was
necessary to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to public safety or maintenance
of public order. Supreme Court held the above-mentioned provision valid.

Deportation

Article 19(1)(e) has also been used to challenge deportation of Indian citizens out of the country and,
in this area, the Supreme Court has limited the powers of the executive a great deal.

A Central law authorised the Central Government to direct the removal from India of any person
against whom a reasonable suspicion existed of having entered India without a permit, or on an
invalid permit, or committing a breach of a condition of the permit. The Supreme Court held the
provision invalid in its relation to the Indian citizens.

Abdul Rahim v. State of Bombay: According to a Passport rule, no person could enter India without
a valid passport. An Indian citizen entered the country without a passport and he was fined for
committing the offence. Holding the rule valid, the Supreme Court stated that it is a proper
restriction upon entry of an Indian citizen returning from a foreign country to require him to produce
a passport. But it will be a different matter to say that if he enters India without a passport he may
be deported from India. Such an order will be bad under the Ebrahim Vazir ruling

FREEDOM TO CARRY ON TRADE AND COMMERCE: ARTS. 19(1)(g) AND 19(6)