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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR.,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY
JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-
GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL);
FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF
THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and
prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on
Justice (public respondent).

Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in
accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents
Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed
an impeachment complaint1 against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives
Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.2

A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary
General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.3 who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to
include it in the Order of Business.4

On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo
Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment
complaint5 against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri
Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and
Emerenciana de Jesus.6 On even date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date,7 the
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 Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by
Memorandum of August 9, 2010,8 also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business.

On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on
Rules,9 instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty.
Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two complaints in the
Order of Business,10 which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the
following day, August 11, 2010.

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives
simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.11

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient
in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.

Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published
on September 2, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution
of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity;
instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing
petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which
both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,12 sufficient in substance.
The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which
assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to
impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice
directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.13

Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with
this Court the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September
14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order14 and to
require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently, by Resolution of
September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment
on the petition

The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint,
and public respondent (through the OSG and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on
September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.

Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court granted
by Resolution of October 5, 2010.

Under an Advisory15 issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010,
followed by petitioner’s filing of a Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties
of Memoranda within the given 15-day period.

The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve.

Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public
respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of
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 the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature,16
and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.17

These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives.18 The argument that
impeachment proceedings are beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme
Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as
expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,
our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in
Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required
vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and
may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to
exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the
judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and
pride."

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in
the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to
the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of
Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review.

xxxx

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tañada
v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null
and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In
Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that although
under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract
from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v.
:
 Electoral Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect
may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.19 (citations omitted; italics in
the original; underscoring supplied)

Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari
jurisdiction20 of this Court reflects, includes the power to "determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."21

In the present case, petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to
determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its
discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of
jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.

Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply
upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.22

Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as
they only assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at
her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public
respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition23 on September
13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two
complaints.

An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of ripeness.24 The question of

ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged
conduct.25 In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the
simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present
constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents
a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted
prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment
proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.

And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue ─ whether public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed
Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art.
III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.

Due process of law

Petitioner alleges that public respondent’s chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is
:
 the subject of an investigation she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr.,
had been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father
influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness
played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against
her.

The Court finds petitioner’s allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any
indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice.26

The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR,
Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.27 teaches:

First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three
members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the
vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar,
absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at
least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.

Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone
does not speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. 28

In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided
over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.29

Even petitioner’s counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the
inhibition of Rep. Tupas.

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the charges that
the Ombudsman filed. In addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another case. How can he be
expected to act with impartiality, in fairness and in accordance with law under that matter, he is only human we grant
him that benefit.

JUSTICE MORALES:

Is he a one-man committee?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.

JUSTICE MORALES:

Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted)

JUSTICE MORALES:

So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does that mean
that your client will be deprived of due process of law?
:
 JUSTICE CUEVAS:

No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the Ombudsman, which goes with the
element of due process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of him.

JUSTICE MORALES:

But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MORALES:

So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as in this
case there were objections relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard, there was
objection made by Congressman Golez to the effect that this may give rise to a constitutional crisis.

JUSTICE MORALES:

That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which makes it mandatory for
the chair of the committee to inhibit given that he had previously been found liable for violation of a
law[?]
JUSTICE CUEVAS:

There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby with that
background as the material or pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the right of the
petitioner to due process. What is the effect of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come from an
impartial adjudicator.30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner contends that the "indecent and precipitate haste" of public respondent in finding the two
complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took
public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat. lawphi1

An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So
Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice31 holds:

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly
attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s
undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant
consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all phases of work.
Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence
other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The
swift completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without
discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.32 (italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and
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 substance was indispensable. As mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact,
conceded by petitioner’s counsel, the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an
answer.

JUSTICE MORALES:

Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in form and substance before
she is asked to file her answer (interrupted)

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MORALES:

During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the proceedings and related
irregularities?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your Honor, because it is only after a
determination that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without
that but it may be asked, how is not your action premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other
violations involved and that is (interrupted).33 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the
Committee-level, particularly Section 534 which denotes that petitioner’s initial participation in the
impeachment proceedings – the opportunity to file an Answer – starts after the Committee on Justice
finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused to accept petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is
apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance
of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment
Rules.35

The claim fails.

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of

the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which
committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the
exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and
substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the
compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.

Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible
standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in
echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint or
resolution,"36 and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee."37

Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency
of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not
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 explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely
requires a "hearing."38 In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of
sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the
impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis her
submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.

This the Court cannot do.

Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes
an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.]"39 Worse, petitioner urges the Court
to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the facts
alleged in the complaints, which involve matters of defense.

In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or, more
accurately, delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules.

To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public
respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter
published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of
the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.40

Citing Tañada v. Tuvera,41 petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the
Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on
the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of
the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section."

Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in any
medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation."42

Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations43 which
held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative
inquiries, public respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable
Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution.

Black’s Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as

To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of
announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or
regulation to become known or obligatory.44 (emphasis supplied)

While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their
usage.

The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times.45 A number of those instances involves
the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the
Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.
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 To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the case of
the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the
publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned,
however, promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication."46

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to "promulgate
its rules for the canvassing of the certificates" in the presidential and vice presidential elections.
Notably, when Congress approved its canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May
25, 2010,47 it did not require the publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather, Congress made the
canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.

In the case of administrative agencies, "promulgation" and "publication" likewise take on different
meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case,48
the publication of implementing rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption.

Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make
known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally
understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail
unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.49

Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former should
be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to
determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court
for filing and publication.

It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution
itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a
mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.

Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress
to make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that

x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of
respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of
the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. In the words
of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms
and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.50 (italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as
categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than
"promulgate," there is no other single formal term in the English language to appropriately refer to an
issuance without need of it being published.

IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical
directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to
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 the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitution’s directive, without any
reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Tañada v. Tuvera.51 Tañada naturally could neither have
interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitution’s intentions as
expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the
issuances.

From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired Associate
Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the
gaps in the impeachment process.

MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section because, for
instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any
citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is
just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose that this procedural requirement, like
indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could very well be
taken up in a new section 4 which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS
RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all
these other procedural requirements could be taken care of by the Rules of Congress.52 (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing.
Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism
which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its details.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.
That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.53 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken
prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing
provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start
of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already
run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity
of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on
the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement.

Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at
"effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the
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 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the "effective"
implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional
adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate
its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.

Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or
supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given
retroactive application to pending actions. "It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural
laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws."54 In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of
vested rights.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses
are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the
punishment of the offender.55

Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void
in its entirety. Rather,

x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void,
considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered
valid and effective.56 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even availed
of and invoked certain provisions57 of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed
the motion for reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus finds no violation of
the due process clause.

The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint
against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress.
She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be
accepted and referred to public respondent.

On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that
the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the
Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends somewhere
between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to
the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the
prevailing doctrine or the parties’ interpretation, its impeachment complaint could withstand
constitutional scrutiny.

Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco58 states that the term "initiate" means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it.59 The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must
be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the
House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
:
 Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that "no second verified
impeachment may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action"60 which
contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas and
Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the
act of taking initial action on the complaint.

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third61 of
the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.62
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress’ Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings ─ Sections 1663 and 1764 of Rule V thereof ─ "clearly
contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term ‘initiate’ a meaning different from filing
and referral."65

Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the
Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner Maambong’s statements66 that the initiation
starts with the filing of the complaint.

Petitioner fails to consider the verb "starts" as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all
too keen to stress that the filing of the complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the House’s action
on the committee report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase.

Commissioner Maambong saw the need "to be very technical about this,"67 for certain exchanges in
the Constitutional Commission deliberations loosely used the term, as shown in the following
exchanges.

MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment proceedings still
requires a vote of one-fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935 Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate proceedings.

MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the membership of
the House is required; for conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is required.

xxxx

MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a report of
the committee, we have here Section 3 (4) which reads:

No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.

So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the members of
the National Assembly to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary Member.
:
 MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a very liberal
impeachment proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where we are faced
with just a verified complaint rather than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the
Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the Committee to report, whether we should not
allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some of the questions we would like to
be discussed.

MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can be
overturned by, say, one-half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and that such
overturning will not amount to a refiling which is prohibited under Section 3 (4).

Another point, Madam President. x x x68 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

An apparent effort to clarify the term "initiate" was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:

MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?

MR. BENGZON. One-third.

MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to convict. To
impeach means to file the case before the Senate.

MR. REGALADO. When we speak of "initiative," we refer here to the Articles of Impeachment.

MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are charging
him with the Articles of Impeachment. That is my understanding.69 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong delivered
on at least two occasions:

[I]

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the
amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do
not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed
out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the
floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the
body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the
initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment
proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging the words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House
of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case
of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.70 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

[II]
:
 MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact formulation
of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2,
Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE
ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so
that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of impeachment OF the committee or
to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the
United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to
impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified complaint of one-
third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will
not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress.

Thank you, Madam President.71 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and
Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the
Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any
clearer in pointing out the material dates.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3
(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.72
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered
irrelevant in Francisco. She submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because
"something prior to that had already been done,"73 apparently citing Bernas’ discussion.

The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.

What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the House’s action on the committee report
initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely
nothing prior to it must be done. Following petitioner’s line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint
or the endorsement by a member of the House – steps done prior to the filing – would already initiate
the impeachment proceedings.
:
 Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is
impeachment "proceedings." Her reliance on the singular tense of the word "complaint"74 to denote the
limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word
covers its enlarged and plural sense.75

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the
matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment
complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the
candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the
proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple
complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important
is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts
burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.

A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.

For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioner’s stance suggests that whoever files the first
impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional
once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective complainant,
regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process by
the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts
to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to
buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.

Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable
purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending to
catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to effectively weed out "worms" in high offices
which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultra-limited season.

Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured
party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a
first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the
impeachment process.

Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of
Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaints against the same
impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since they would have already initiated a
second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a second or third
impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment complaints. Without any public
notice that could charge them with knowledge, even members of the House of Representatives could
not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at the time of committing
their endorsement.

The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been
initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As
gathered from Commissioner Bernas’ disquisition76 in Francisco, a proceeding which "takes place not
in the Senate but in the House"77 precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact,
petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute
control of the House of Representatives.78 Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in
taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding,
subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress
alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes.
:
 The Constitution did not place the power of the "final say" on the lips of the House Secretary General
who would otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint.
Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which
explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It is the House of
Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own chamber into special
operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a second
impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided
without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule.79 Moreover, it is
common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be
debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral.80 With respect to
complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment
complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an
impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the
said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in
perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical,
before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact,
grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral.

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with
deadlines. The Constitution states that "[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred
to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter."

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly "belated"
referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint
was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on
July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session period started to run.
When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to
include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period.81

There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is filed.
Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body
politic) of reasonable access to the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the
collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable officer. It
shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer through the
mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.

But neither does the Court find merit in respondents’ alternative contention that the initiation of the
impeachment proceedings, which sets into motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the
earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should
refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the
House.82 To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to
the Senate.83 To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the Committee on Justice’s recommendation
to the House plenary.84

The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the
therein assailed provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The present case involving
an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to deviate
:
 from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment proceeding against the then Chief
Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to accommodate the socio-
political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law.

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which
is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then
another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. This
doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial
decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial
Process:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way
between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It
would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided
against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff.
To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an
infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather
than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the
courts.85

As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated "when the House deliberates
on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been
done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning.
Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
follow."86

Allowing an expansive construction of the term "initiate" beyond the act of referral allows the
unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of
disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the
disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the
overriding87 of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the
Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group),88 or the Committee on Justice concludes
its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-
intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally
imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in
unison under one proceeding.

The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in
a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcuna’s separate opinion that concurred with the
Francisco ruling.89 Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: "to prevent
undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation,"
with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:

MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, in
this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its
work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple
impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else but
that.90 (underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and
not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment
:
 proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly,
Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to
its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means filing and referral
remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision.

Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of
multiple impeachment complaints during the intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days
between the date of the filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of referral.

As pointed out during the oral arguments91 by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of
privilege and layers of protection for an impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of
a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member, and a
finding of sufficiency of form and substance – all these must be met before bothering a respondent to
answer – already weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer.

Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a
complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the number of
complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after the Committee decides once and for all on the
sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioner’s fear, a complaint will not last
the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites.

To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad
publicity are enough oppression.

Petitioner’s claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs
directly proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What the Constitution
assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on
the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of
complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not
promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave issues.
The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with the media tolerance level or internal
disposition of an impeachable officer when they deliberated on the impairment of performance of official
functions. The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is
made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is
called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full
year. This is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.

Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it
disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, the same rules she earlier chastised.

In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules "to effectively carry out" the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which
provides that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable,
apply to impeachment proceedings before the House."

Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective rules that
Congress may consider in effectively carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two
procedural devices.

First is on the "one offense, one complaint" rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment
Rules, petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
:
 which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law
prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints
are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public respondent gravely abused its
discretion when it disregarded its own rules.

Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her
defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly political nature of the impeachment process;
constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as
that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report within the deadline.

Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment
complaint must charge only one offense, and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the
application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with
the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds for
impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as
non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a
criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or information referred
thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the
People of the Philippines.

The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions92 outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure that
are more relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of
Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioner’s case falls under the exception since impeachment prescribes a
single punishment – removal from office and disqualification to hold any public office – even for various
offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on
pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.
Petitioner’s claim deserves scant consideration.

Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in
carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on
Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the application of the one offense per complaint
rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the House93 which has yet to pass upon the
question, the Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does
not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses,
with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles
of Impeachment."94 It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.

The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation,
petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within
one year.

Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson
Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[;
c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and
substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to
consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate."95 Petitioner’s petition, in fact, initially describes
the consolidation as merely "contemplated."96

Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the
:
 Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or
anticipatory.97

Even if the Court assumes petitioner’s change of stance that the two impeachment complaints were
deemed consolidated,98 her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner’s theory
obviously springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court already brushed aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and
September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14, 2010
is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

(No Part)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
:
 Footnotes
*
No part.
1 Rollo, pp. 93-111.

2 Id. at 91-92.

3 Id. at 561.

4 Id. at 562.

5 Id. at 136-169.

6 Id. at 133-135.

7 Id. at 563.

8 Id. at 564.

9 Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule IX, Sec. 27, par. (ss).

10 Rollo, p. 565.

11 Journal of the House of Representatives (15th Congress), Journal No. 9, August 11, 2010
(rollo, p. 576).
12 As gathered from the pleadings, the two impeachment complaints are summarized as follows:

First Complaint Second Complaint

A. Betrayal of Public Trust:

1. The dismal and unconscionable 1. gross inexcusable delay in

low conviction rate of the investigating and failure in
Ombudsman from 2008 onwards prosecuting those involved in the
anomalous Fertilizer Fund Scam
despite the COA & Senate findings
and the complaints filed against
them.

2. The failure to take prompt and 2. she did not prosecute Gen.
immediate action against PGMA Eliseo de la Paz for violating BSP
and FG with regard to the NBN- rules[12] that prohibit the taking
ZTE Broadband project out of the country of currency in
excess of US$10,000 without
declaring the same to the Phil.
Customs, despite his admission
under oath before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee
:
 3. The delay in conducting and 3. gross inexcusable delay or
concluding an investigation on the inaction by acting in deliberate
death of Ensign Andrew Pestaño disregard of the Court’s findings
aboard a Philippine Navy vessel and directive in Information
Technology Foundation of the
Philippines v. Comelec

4. The decision upholding the

legality of the arrest and detention
of Rep. Hontiveros -Baraquel by
the PNP in March 2006.

5. The failure to conduct an

investigation regarding the ₱1M
dinner at Le Cirque Restaurant in
New York

B. Culpable Violation of the Constitution:

6. The repeated delays and failure 4. through her repeated failure and
to take action on cases impressed inexcusable delay in acting upon
with public interest matters, she violated Sec. 12 and
Sec. 13, pars. 1-3 of Art. XI and
Sec. 16 of Art. III of the
Constitution which mandates
prompt action and speedy
disposition of cases

7. The refusal to grant ready

access to public records like
SALNW

13 Rollo, p. 261.

14 Id. at 262-263. Justices Carpio, Carpio Morales, and Sereno dissented; Justices Nachura,
Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, and Mendoza were on official business.

15Id. at 623-625.

16 Reyes Group’s Memorandum, pp. 5-8 (rollo, pp. 1064-1067).

17 The Committee’s Memorandum, pp. 22-25 (id. at 915-918).

18 460 Phil. 830 (2003).

19 Id. at 889-892.
:
 20 Id. at 883, which reads: "To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave
abuse of discretion by ‘any branch or instrumentalities of government,’ the afore-quoted
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter
law the so-called ‘expanded certiorari jurisdiction’ of this Court[.]"

21 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.

22 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

23 The Committee’s Memorandum, p. 28 (rollo, p. 921).

24 Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 356, 358.

25 Guingona Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 427-428 (1998).

26 Casimiro v. Tandog, 498 Phil. 660, 667 (2005).

27 G.R. No. 126496, April 30, 1997, 271 SCRA 790.

28 Id. at 804.

29 The Committee’s Memorandum, p. 36 (rollo, p. 929).

30 Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), Oral Arguments, October 5, 2010, pp. 47-50.

31 G. R. No. 175057, January 29, 2008, 543 SCRA 70.

32 Id. at 89-90.

33 TSN, Oral Arguments, October 5, 2010, pp. 54-55.

34 Section 5. Notice to Respondents and Time to Plead.– If the committee finds the complaint
sufficient in form and substance, it shall immediately furnish the respondent(s) with a copy of the
resolution and/or verified complaint, as the case may be, with written notice that he/she shall
answer the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice thereof and serve a copy of the
answer to the complainant(s). No motion to dismiss shall be allowed within the period to answer
the complaint.

The answer, which shall be under oath, may include affirmative defenses. If the
respondent fails or refuses to file an answer within the reglementary period, he/she is
deemed to have interposed a general denial to the complaint. Within three (3) days
from receipt of the answer, the complainant may file a reply, serving a copy thereof to
the respondent who may file a rejoinder within three (3) days from receipt of the reply,
serving a copy thereof to the complainant. If the complainant fails to file a reply, all the
material allegations in the answer are deemed controverted. Together with their
pleadings, the parties shall file their affidavits or counter-affidavits, as the case may
be, with their documentary evidence. Such affidavits or counter-affidavits shall be
subscribed before the Chairperson of the Committee on Justice or the Secretary
General. Notwithstanding all the foregoing, failure presenting evidence in support of
his/her defenses.

When there are more than one respondent, each shall be furnished with copy of the
verified complaint from a Member of the House or a copy of the verified complaint
:
 from a private citizen together with the resolution of endorsement by a Member of the
House of Representatives and a written notice to answer and in that case, reference
to respondent in these Rules shall be understood as respondents. (underscoring
supplied)

35 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 66-73 (rollo, pp. 829-836).

36 Vide Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3 (2).

37 Vide Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, Rule III, Sec. 4.

38 A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from
such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

39 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra at 913.

40 Philippine Daily Inquirer and Philippine Star.

41 230 Phil. 528 (1986).

42 The Committee’s Memorandum, p. 58 (rollo, p. 951).

43 G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77; and September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152,
230, where the Court resolved: "The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is
categorical. (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied).
44 Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 1214.

45 The words "promulgate" and "promulgated" appear in the following sections: a) Preamble; b)
Section 2 of Article V; c) Section 4 of Article VII (twice); d) Section 18 of Article VII; e) Section 5 of
Article VIII; f) Section 6 of Article IX-A; g) Section 3 of Article IX-C; h) Section 2 of Article IX-D; i)
Section 3 (8) of Article XI; j) Section 13 (8) of Article XI; and k) Section 8 of Article XIV.
46 Heritage Park Management Corp. v. CIAC, G.R. No. 148133, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 108,
120, citing Neria v. Commissioner on Immigration, 23 SCRA 806, 812.

47 <http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/elections2010/acr.signed.05262010.pdf> [Last visited November

22, 2010].

48 National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reform v. Energy Regulatory Commission,

G.R. No. 163935, February 2, 2006, 481 SCRA 480, 522.

49 Marcos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil. 239 (1951).

50 Sen. Defensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276, 300 (1998).
:
 51 Supra note 41.

52 II Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 372 (July 28, 1986).

53 Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 335 Phil. 82, 102 (1997).

54 Cheng v. Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 155, 164-165.

55 De Leon And De Leon, Jr., The Law On Public Officers And Election Law (2003 ed.), p. 467,
citing SINCO, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed. (1962), p. 374.
56 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, supra at 231.

57 1) Rule III, Section 4 thereof, on the finding of insufficiency in form, where petitioner prayed
that the complaint be returned to the Secretary General within three session days with a written
explanation of the insufficiency, who shall, in turn, return the same to the complainants together
with the written explanation within three session days from receipt of the committee resolution.

2) Rule VII, Sec. 16 thereof, on the applicability of the rules of criminal procedure, where
petitioner invokes the rule against duplicity of offense under Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court.

58 460 Phil. 830 (2003).

59 Id. at 927.

60 Francisco, supra at 932.

61 In case of a direct filing by at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House of
Representatives under paragraph (4), Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, there occurs an
abbreviated mode of initiation wherein the filing of the complaint and the taking of initial action are
merged into a single act.

62 Francisco, supra at 932-933.

63 Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. ─ In cases where a Member of the
House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is
endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an
impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the
day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and or resolution against such
official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn
or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and or resolution, as the
case may be, is not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as

the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General. (emphasis, underscoring and italics
supplied)

64 Section 17. Bar Against Initiation of Impeachment Proceedings. −Within a period of one (1)
year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16
:
 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.
(emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied)

65 Francisco, supra at 933.

66 Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 30-36 (rollo, pp. 793-799).

67 II Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 376 (July 28, 1986).

68 Id. at 279-280.

69 Id. at 374-375.

70 Id. at 375-376.

71 Id. at 416.

72 Francisco, supra at 940.

73 Francisco, supra at 931.

74 Section 3. x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and
by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

xxxx

75 Vide Gatchalian, etc. v. COMELEC, 146 Phil. 435, 442-443 (1970).

76 x x x An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate.
Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members,
can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate
all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate
a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. x x x (Francisco,
supra at 930-931).
77 Francisco, supra at 931.

78 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 55 (rollo, p. 818).

79 Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XIII, Sec. 96.

80 <http://www.rulesonline.com/rror-05.htm> (visited: November 12, 2010), which further explains:

"The Object of the motion to refer to a standing or special committee is usually to enable a
question to be more carefully investigated and put into better shape for the assembly to
consider, than can be done in the assembly itself. Where an assembly is large and has a
:
 very large amount of business it is safer to have every main question go to a committee
before final action on it is taken." (underscoring supplied).

81 Vide Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, Rule II, Sec. 2. Note also that Section
3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution did not use the terms "calendar days" or "working days."

82 Respondent Committee’s Memorandum, p. 78 (rollo, p. 971).

83 Respondent Reyes group’s Memorandum, p. 26 (id. at 1085).

84 Respondent-Intervenor’s Memorandum, p. 22 (id. at 1131).

85 Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.

86 Francisco, supra at 931.

87 It was made of record that "whenever the body will override the resolution of impeachment of
the Committee, it is understood that the body itself will prepare the Articles of Impeachment." [II
Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 416 (July 29, 1986)].

88 To respondents Committee and Reyes Group, any House action of dismissal of the complaint
would not set in the one-year bar rule.

89 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 38 (rollo, p. 801), citing the Separate Opinion of Justice Adolf
Azcuna in Francisco.
90 II Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 282 (July 26, 1986).

91 TSN, October 12, 2010, p. 212.

92 Citing Rules of Court, Rule 2, Sec. 5 & Rule 140, Sec. 1.

93 Or by the Committee if the question is first raised therein.

94 This is not to say, however, that it must always contain two or more charges. In Santillon v.
Miranda, et al, [121 Phil. 1351, 1355 (1965)], it was held that the plural can be understood to
include the singular.
95 Petitioner cites that the Committee stated that "although two complaints were filed against
petitioner, the two were in effect merged in one proceeding by their referral on the same day to
the Committee." (TSN, Committee Hearing, September 1, 2010; rollo, p. 528-529).
96 Id. at 48.

97 Vide San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 345, 367.

98 The Committee’s Comment, p. 29 (rollo, p. 430).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:
:
 On 22 July 2010, Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo D. Lim, Felipe Pestaño and Evelyn Pestaño
(Baraquel, et al.) filed an impeachment complaint (First Complaint) against Ombudsman Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner) based on the following grounds:

I. Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez betrayed the public trust.

i. The dismal and unconscionably low conviction rates achieved by the Office of the Ombudsman
from 2008 onward indicate a criminal level of incompetence amounting to grave dereliction of duty
which constitutes a clear betrayal of public trust.

ii. The unreasonable failure of the Ombudsman to take prompt and immediate action, in violation
of its own rules of procedure, on the complaints filed against various public officials including
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and her husband Jose Miguel T. Arroyo with regard to
the NBN-ZTE Broadband Project constitutes betrayal of public trust.

iii. The inexcusable delay of the Ombudsman in conducting and concluding its investigation into
the wrongful death of Ensign Philip Andrew Pestaño aboard a Philippine Navy vessel constitutes
a betrayal of public trust.

iii. The decision of the Ombudsman upholding the "legality" of the arrest and involuntary detention
of then Representative Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel by the Philippine National Police in March 2006
in violation of the explicit rules provided in the Revised Penal Code and as established by
jurisprudence constitutes a betrayal of public trust.

iv. The failure of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation into the possible wrongdoing or
impropriety with regard to the ₱1,000,000.00 dinner for the Presidential Party at Le Cirque
Restaurant in New York in August 2009 despite widespread media coverage and media clamor,
and a formal letter from Representative Walden F. Bello calling for an inquiry constitutes betrayal
of public trust.

II. Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez performed acts amounting to culpable violation of
the Constitution.

vi. The repeated failure of the Ombudsman to take prompt action on a wide variety of cases
involving official abuse and corruption violates Article XI, Section 12 and Article III, Section 16 of
the Constitution, which mandate prompt action and speedy disposition of cases.

vii. The refusal of the Ombudsman to grant ready access to public records such as the Statement
of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) required of all public officers under Republic Act
No. 6713 constitutes a culpable violation of Article XI, Section 13(6) and Article III, Section 7 of
the Constitution.

The First Complaint was endorsed by AKBAYAN Party-list Representatives Kaka Bag-ao and Walden
Bello.

On 3 August 2010, Renato Reyes, Secretary General of BAYAN, Mo. Mary John Mananzan of
PAGBABAGO, Danilo Ramos, Secretary General of Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, Atty. Edre
Olalia, Acting Secretary General of National Union of People's Lawyers, Ferdinand Gaite, Chairperson
of COURAGE, and James Terry Ridon, Chairperson of League of Filipino Students (Reyes, et al.) filed
a Verified Impeachment Complaint (Second Complaint) against petitioner on the following grounds:

I. Betrayal of Public Trust

1. Ombudsman Gutierrez committed betrayal of public trust through her gross inexcusable delay
:
 in investigating and failure in prosecuting any one of [those] involved on the anomalous
transactions arising from the Fertilizer Fund Scam despite the blatant anomalous transactions
revealed in the COA findings, Senate Committee Report 54 and the complaints filed with
respondent on the "Fertilizer Scam."

(2) Ombudsman Gutierrez committed betrayal of public trust when she did not prosecute Gen.
Eliseo De la Paz for violating BSP Circular 98 (1995), as amended by BSP Circular 507 (2006), in
relation to Republic Act 6713, which prohibits the taking out of the country of currency in excess
of US $10,000.00 without declaring the same to the Philippine customs, despite the fact that Gen.
Eliseo De la Paz publicly admitted under oath before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee that he
took out of the country currency in excess of US $ 10,000.00 without declaring the same with the
Philippine Customs.

(3) Ombudsman Gutierrez betrayed the public trust through her gross inexcusable delay or
inaction by acting in deliberate disregard of the Supreme Court's findings and directive in its
decision and resolution in Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, et al. v.
Commission on Elections, et al.

II. Culpable violation of the Constitution

The Second Complaint was endorsed by Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro A. Casiño,
Rafael V. Mariano, Luzviminda C. Ilagan, Raymond V. Palatino, Antonio L. Tinio, and Emerenciana A.
De Jesus.

On 3 August 2010, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (Committee on Justice)

provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the Fourteenth Congress
(Rules of Procedure).

On 11 August 2010, the First and Second Complaints were referred by the Plenary to the Committee
on Justice.

On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First and Second Complaints sufficient in
form by a vote of 39 in favor and 1 against, and 31 in favor and 9 against, respectively.

On 2 September 2010, the Rules of Procedure was published.

On 7 September 2010, the Committee on Justice, voting 40 in favor and 10 against, affirmed that the
First and Second Complaints were sufficient in form. Thereafter, the Committee on Justice found the
First and Second Complaints sufficient in substance, by a vote of 41 in favor and 14 against and 41 in
favor and 16 against, respectively. Petitioner was directed to file an answer to the complaints within 10
days from receipt of notice.

On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 before this Court
seeking to enjoin the Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment proceedings. The
petition prayed for a temporary restraining order. The petition is based on the following grounds:

I. In gross and wanton disregard of the rudimentary requirements of due process of law, the Committee
acted with indecent and precipitate haste in issuing its assailed Resolutions, dated 1 September 2010
and 7 September 2010 which found the two (2) impeachment complaints filed against petitioner
Ombudsman sufficient in form and substance.

II. The Rules of Procedure in impeachment proceedings lack comprehensive standards in determining
as to what amounts to sufficiency in form of an impeachment complaint and gives the members of the
Committee unfettered discretion in carrying out its provisions. Thus, it contravenes the Constitution and
:
 violates petitioner Ombudsman's cardinal and primary right to due process, thereby tainting the hearing
conducted before the Committee on 1 September 2010 in relation to the sufficiency in form of the two
(2) impeachment complaints with illegality and nullity.

III. The Committee's finding that the two (2) impeachment complaints filed against petitioner
Ombudsman are sufficient in form violate Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one (1) year. In the Francisco case, the Honorable Court reckoned the start of the
one (1) year bar on the impeachment of an impeachable officer from the date of the filing of the
complaint. In the instant case, the first complaint was filed on 22 July 2010. Thus, the filing of the
second complaint on 3 August 2010, a mere twelve (12) days after the filing of the first complaint,
violates the one (1) year bar under the 1987 Constitution. The second complaint should, therefore, not
have been accepted and referred to the Committee for action.

IV. The contemplated consolidation of the two (2) impeachment complaints constitutes a contravention
of the one (1) year bar. If the Committee would follow through on such course of action, it would be
arrogating unto itself the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum, a power denied to it by the 1987 Constitution and its very own rules. The Committee would
also be allowed to to wantonly exercise unbridled discretion in carrying out the letter and spirit of the
Constitution and to arbitrarily wield the two (2) impeachment complaints as instruments of harassment
and oppression against petitioner Ombudsman.

V. The Rules of Procedure in impeachable proceedings do not prescribe the form or standards in order
for an impeachment complaint to be deemed sufficient in form. However, Section 16, Rule VII of the
same rules provides that the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as
practicable, apply to the impeachment proceedings before the House. In this regard, Section 13, Rule
110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates that a complaint must charge only one (1)
offense. The Committee, in finding that the two (2) impeachable complaints charging petitioner
Ombudsman with the offenses of culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust
sufficient in form, violated the cardinal rule that a complaint must charge only one (1) offense. Thus, the
two (2) impeachment complaints cannot be sufficient in form.

VI. The two (2) impeachment complaints filed against petitioner Ombudsman do not meet the
standards laid down by the Committee itself for the determination of "sufficiency of substance."

A. Assuming as true the allegations of the two (2) impeachment complaints, none of them can be
deemed of the same nature as the other grounds for impeachment under the Constitution.

B. There is no legal right on the part of the complainants to compel petitioner Ombudsman to file
and prosecute offenses committed by public officials and employees. On the other hand, there is
no legal duty on the part of petitioner Ombudsman to file an Information when she believes that
there is no prima facie evidence to do so. Thus, there can be no "violation of any legal right of the
complainants" to speak of that can be the basis of a finding of "sufficiency in substance" of the
two (2) impeachment complaints.

The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14 September 2010, over the objections of
Justices Carpio, Carpio Morales and Sereno who asked for time to read the petition, the majority of this
Court voted to issue a status quo ante order suspending the impeachment proceedings against
petitioner. The petition, with Urgent Motion for Immediate Raffle, was filed at 9:01 a.m. of 13 September
2010. I received a copy of the petition only in the afternoon of 14 September 2010, after the en banc
morning session of that day. The petition consists of 60 pages, excluding the annexes. All the Justices
should have been given time, at least an hour or two as is the practice in such urgent cases, to read the
:
 petition before voting on the issuance of the status quo ante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.

Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." There are two
impeachment complaints filed against petitioner, filed within days from each other. The First Complaint
was filed on 22 July 2010 while the Second Complaint was filed on 3 August 2010.

In Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives,2 the Court had the occasion to discuss the meaning of
the term "to initiate" as applied to impeachment proceedings. The Court ruled:

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

x x x the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of
the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House x x x.3 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, there are two components of the act of initiating the complaint: the filing of the impeachment
complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. The Court ruled that
once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.4

On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the House Plenary to the Committee on
Justice at the same time. The Committee on Justice acted on the two complaints, ruling on the
sufficiency of form, and later of substance, at the same time. The prohibition against filing of another
impeachment complaint within a one year period would apply if the First Complaint was referred by the
House Plenary to the Committee on Justice ahead of the Second Complaint. There is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the consolidation of the First and Second Complaints since they were
referred by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice at the same time. Neither the First nor the
Second Complaint is prior to the other in terms of action of the House Plenary in referring the two
complaints to the Committee on Justice. The Constitutional bar, therefore, will not apply in this case.

Petitioner alleges that the Rules of Procedure lack comprehensible standards as to what amounts to
sufficiency in form. Petitioner asserts that the determination of the sufficiency in form must rest on
something more substantial than a mere ascertainment of whether the complaint was verified by the
complainants and whether it was properly referred to the Committee for action.

Section 4, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure provides:

Section 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form and Substance. - Upon due referral, the Committee on
Justice shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and substance. If the committee finds
that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return the same to the Secretary General within three
(3) session days with a written explanation of the insufficiency. The Secretary General shall return the
same to the complainant(s) together with the committee's written explanation within three (3) session
days from receipt of the committee resolution finding the complaint insufficient in form.

Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in form, it shall then determine if the complaint is
sufficient in substance. The requirement of substance is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. If the committee finds that the
complaint is not sufficient in substance, it shall dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as
provided hereunder.
:
 Section 4 is not vague as petitioner asserts. The Rules of Procedure provides that "[t]he Rules of
Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment
proceedings before the House."5 Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states, among other things, the name of the
accused and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. Following Section 16 of
the Rules of Procedure, Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure suppletorily
applies to the Rules of Procedure to determine whether the impeachment complaints are sufficient in
form. The fact that the acts complained of are enumerated in the impeachment complaints, coupled
with the fact that they were verified and endorsed, is enough to determine whether the complaints were
sufficient in form.

Petitioner also asserts that the complaints violate Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure6 which provides that a complaint or information must charge only one offense. Petitioner
alleges that the Committee on Justice found the impeachment complaints sufficient in form although
the impeachment complaints charge petitioner with the offenses of culpable violation of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust. Petitioner argues that the impeachment complaints allege duplicitous
offenses.

The argument has no merit.

The impeachment procedure is analogous to a criminal trial but is not a criminal prosecution per se.7
While the Rules of Procedure provide for the suppletory application of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
in an impeachment proceedings, a strict application of the Rules of Criminal Procedure is not required
in impeachment proceedings, as can be gleaned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, thus:

MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to a bottom-line question then. When the Senate acting as body will now
try the impeachment case, will it conduct the proceeding using principles of criminal procedure?

MR. ROMULO. I do not think so, strictly speaking, that it need be criminal procedures. The important
thing, I believe, is that the involved party should know the charges and the proceedings must be, in
total, fair and impartial. I do not think we have to go to the minutiae of a criminal proceeding because
that is not the intention. This is not a criminal proceeding per se.

MR. MAAMBONG. In the matter of presentation for example, of evidence, when it comes to treason
and bribery, would the rules on criminal procedure be applied, considering that I am no particularizing
on the ground which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code, like treason or bribery?

MR. ROMULO. Yes, but we will notice that, strictly speaking for the crime of treason under the Revised
Penal Code, he is answerable for that crime somewhere else. So my conclusion is that obviously, it is
in the criminal court where we will apply all the minutiae of evidence and proceedings and all these due
processes. But we can be more liberal when it comes to the impeachment proceedings, for instance, in
the Senate, because we are after the removal of that fellow, and conviction in that case really amounts
to his removal from office. The courts of justice will take care of the criminal and civil aspects.8

Further, the impeachment complaint is not the same as the Articles of Impeachment. The impeachment
complaint is analogous to the affidavit-complaint of the private complainant filed before the prosecutor
for purposes of the preliminary investigation. Such affidavit-complaint, prepared by the complainant,
may allege several offenses. On the other hand, Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure refers to the formal complaint or information prepared by the prosecutor and filed before the
court after the preliminary investigation. Such formal complaint or information must charge only one
offense against an accused. The Articles of Impeachment is prepared by the Committee after it votes to
:
 recommend to the House Plenary the filing of impeachment charges. The only requirement in preparing
the Articles of Impeachment is that there is only one specific charge for each article. The Articles of
Impeachment, as its name imply, may have several articles, each charging one specific offense. The
proceedings before the Committee on Justice is like a preliminary investigation in a criminal case where
there is no complaint or information yet.

As pointed out in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the impeachment proceeding is
not a criminal prosecution. The impeachment proceeding covers not only criminal acts but also
non-criminal acts, such as betrayal of public trust, which is the main charge against petitioner
in both the First and Second Complaints. In Francisco, the Court noted that the framers of the
Constitution could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust than by
alluding to positive and negative examples.9 Thus:

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.

MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madam President.

I have a series of questions here, some for clarifications, some for the cogitative and reading pleasure
of the members of the Committee over a happy weekend without prejudice later to proposing
amendments at the proper stage.

First, this is with respect to Section 2, on the grounds for impeachment , and I quote:

. . . culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, graft and corruption or
betrayal of public trust.

Just for the record, what would the Committee envision as a betrayal of public trust which is not
otherwise covered by by other terms antecedent thereto?

MR. ROMULO. I think, if I may speak for the Committee and subject to further comments of
Commissioner de los Reyes, the concept is that this is a catchall phrase. Really, it refers to his oath of
office, in the end that the idea of public trust is connected with the oath of office of the officer, and if he
violates that oath of office, then he has betrayed the trust.

MR. REGALADO. Thank you.

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, may I ask Commissioner de los Reyes to perhaps add to those
remarks.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de los Reyes is recognized.

MR. DE LOS REYES. The reason I proposed this amendment is that during the Regular Batasang
Pambansa where there was a move to impeach then President Marcos, there were arguments to the
effect that there is no ground for impeachment because there is no proof that President Marcos
committed criminal acts which are punishable, or considered penal offenses. And so the term
"betrayal of public trust," as explained by Commissioner Romulo, is a catchall phrase to include
all acts which are not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the
officer unfit to continue in office. It includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence
of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance,
cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice of public interest and which tend to bring the office
into disrepute. That is the purpose, Madam President.

Thank you.
:
 MR. ROMULO. If I may add another example, because Commissioner Regalado asked a very good
question. This concept would include, I think, obstruction of justice since in his oath he swears to do
justice to every man; so if he does anything that obstructs justice, it could be construed as a betrayal of
public trust.

Thank you.

MR. NOLLEDO. In pursuing that statement of Commissioner Romulo, Madam President, we will notice
that in the presidential oath of then President Marcos, he stated that he will do justice to every man. If
he appoints a Minister of Justice and orders him to issue or to prepare repressive decrees denying
justice to a common man without the President being held liable, I think this act will not fall near the
category of treason, nor will it fall under bribery of other high crimes, neither will it fall under graft and
corruption. And so when the President tolerates violations of human rights through the repressive
decrees authored by his Minister of Justice, the President betrays the public trust.10

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution recognized that an impeachment proceeding covers non-
criminal offenses. They included betrayal of public trust as a catchall provision to cover non-criminal
acts. The framers of the Constitution intended to leave it to the members of the House of
Representatives to determine what would constitute betrayal of public trust as a ground for
impeachment.

Even the United States Senate recognizes that the Articles of Impeachment can contain various
offenses. On 20 October 1989, the United States Senate impeached Judge Alcee Hastings
(Hastings).11 Hastings was charged with 17 Articles of Impeachment ranging from corrupt conspiracy,
knowingly making a false statement intended to mislead the trier of fact, fabrication of false documents,
and improper disclosure by revealing highly confidential information that he learned as a supervising
judge in a wiretap.12 Hastings was convicted in 8 of the Articles of Impeachment and was removed
from office. Hence, there is nothing that would prevent the impeachment of petitioner for various
offenses contained in the Articles of Impeachment.

Moreover, the Court cannot review the sufficiency of the substance of the impeachment complaints.
The sufficiency of the substance will delve into the merits of the impeachment complaints over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.13 The Court can only rule on whether there is a gross violation of the
Constitution in filing the impeachment complaint, in particular, whether the complaint was filed in
violation of the one-year ban. The Court cannot review the decision of the Committee on Justice to
impeach. The Court ruled in Francisco:

The first issue14 goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has
no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.15

Impeachment is a political process. Thus, the decision to impeach lies exclusively on Congress. The
most important thing in an impeachment proceeding is the vote by the House Plenary. Section 10 of the
Rules of Procedure states that "[a] vote of at least one-third (⅓) of all Members of the House is
necessary for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment. If the resolution is
approved by the required vote, it shall then be endorsed to the Senate for its trial." The Rule is based
on Section 3 (4), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which states:

Sec. 3. x x x
:
 (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.

The Constitution is clear. After the vote of one-third of all the Members of the House is achieved, the
Articles of Impeachment will automatically be forwarded to the Senate for trial. The Constitution only
requires the vote of one-third of all the Members of the House for the Articles of Impeachment to be
forwarded to the Senate whether or not the complaint is sufficient in form and substance.

Finally, there is no violation of petitioner's right to due process. Nobody can claim a vested right to
public office. A public office is not a property right, and no one has a vested right to any public office.16
Thus:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would necessary to consider
an office a "property." It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the
sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The
basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the officers being
mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or
contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law
and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents.17

Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition and the lifting of the status quo ante order issued by
this Court against the House of Representatives.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 460 Phil. 830 (2003).

3 Id. at 932. Emphasis supplied.

4 Supra, note 2.

5 Section 16.

6 Section 13. Duplicity of the offense.—A complaint or information must charge only one offense,
except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.

7 2 Record of the Constitutional Proceedings and Debates, 277.

8 Id.

9 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra note 2.

10 2 Record of the Constitutional Proceedings and Debates, 272.

11
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Senate_Impeachment_Role.htm#4.
:
 12 http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Impeachment_Hastings.htm.

13 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra note 2.

14 Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offense under the Constitution.
15 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra note 2, at 913.

16 Montesclaros v. Comelec, 433 Phil. 620 (2002).

17 Id. at 637-638, citing Cornejo v. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188 (1920). Emphasis in the original text.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION

SERENO, J.:

"No point is of more importance than that right of impeachment should be continued. Shall
any man be above justice? Above all, shall that man be above it who can commit the most
extensive injustice."

– George Mason, Delegate from Virginia1

I concur with the ponencia of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales particularly with respect to the following
rulings:

1. The expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Court allows it to review the acts of Congress and
measure them against standards expressed in the Constitution. The power to arrive at a
determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Legislature in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives under the Constitution is vested in the
Court.

2. The instant Petition is not premature; it raises issues that are ripe for adjudication. The Court is
presented with "constitutional vagaries" that must be resolved forthwith – with respect to the legal
meaning of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to its Committee on Justice (public respondent Committee), and the
extent of the legal need to publish the House Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings.

3. There was no violation of petitioner Merciditas Gutierrez’s right to due process of law.

4. The "one offense, one complaint" rule in ordinary rules of criminal procedure cannot work to
bar multiple complaints in impeachment proceedings, as the Constitution allows indictment for
multiple impeachment offenses.

5. The determination of the permissibility of the consolidation of impeachment complaints is at the

moment premature, conjectural or anticipatory; public respondent Committee has yet to rule on
the consolidation.

I diverge however, from the ponencia of the highly-respected Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, on the
reckoning point of the one-year time bar on subsequent impeachment proceedings under the
Constitution. I believe this Court, despite its several decisions on impeachment, has not paid sufficient
:
 attention to the full implication of the inherently discretionary character of the power of impeachment.

The Court has straitjacketed its interpretation of the one-year bar by failing to go beyond the records of
the deliberations of the Commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It has a duty to look
beyond, when the records demonstrate that the Commissioners were so inordinately pressed to
declare a starting point for "initiation of impeachment proceedings" during the deliberations to the
unfortunate extent that they appear to have forgotten the nature of the power of impeachment. I refer to
the deliberations during which Commissioner Maambong attempted to define the "initiation of
impeachment proceedings." The Commissioners were unable to recognize during the deliberations that
the entirety of steps involved in the process of impeachment is a mix of clerical/ministerial and
discretionary acts, even while the power of impeachment itself is wholly discretionary. The apparent
failure of one of the Commissioners to remember the inherently discretionary nature of the power of
impeachment while being interpellated, such that he reckons the "initiation" to start with the filing of an
impeachment complaint, however, should not be followed by this Court’s own failure to look at the right
place for an answer – at the essential character of the power of impeachment. Reason is the
foundation of all legal interpretation, including that of constitutional interpretation. And the most
powerful tool of reason is reflecting on the essence of things. This is most especially needed when the
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission failed at an important time to articulate an
interpretation of the constitution that is founded on reason; rather, they chose an interpretation that on
the surface seemed reasonable, but on examination, turns out to have been arbitrary and highly
problematic.

The Constitution provides: "No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year."2

The impeachment proceedings in the House of Representatives3 are constitutionally defined to consist
of the following steps:

A. Filing of the Verified Complaint. A verified complaint for impeachment is filed by either: (a) a
Member of the House of Representatives; or (b) any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof.4

B. Inclusion in the Order of Business. After filing, the complaint shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days.5

C. Referral to the Committee. During the House Session when the complaint is calendared to be
taken up, the Speaker of the House shall refer the complaint for impeachment to the proper
committee within three session days.6

D. Committee Report. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members
shall submit its report to the House within sixty (60) session days from the referral, together with
the corresponding resolution.7 The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.8

E. House Plenary Vote. A vote of a least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution.9

F. Transmittal of Articles of Impeachment. In case the verified complaint or resolution of

impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.10
:
 Since these are the only constitutionally described steps in the process of impeachment in the House of
Representatives, the starting point for the one-year bar must be among these steps; the question is,
where? Note that none of these steps is constitutionally described as the "initiation of the impeachment
proceedings." The parties to the case have advocated their positions on this issue in their respective
Memoranda.11

Petitioner Gutierrez espouses the view that the very "act of filing the complaint is the actual initiation –
beginning or commencement – of impeachment proceedings" that would commence the one-year time-
bar.12

On the other hand, public respondent Committee, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
argues that the "impeachment is a process beginning with the filing of a complaint and terminating in its
disposition by the vote of at least one-third of all the members of the House"; and that the one-year
period should be counted from the plenary action of the House on the Committee’s report.13

Meanwhile, private respondents Renato Reyes, Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Atty.
Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (private respondents Reyes) claim that the "term
‘initiated’ therein takes place by the act of the House of Representatives of transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate for the conduct of the impeachment trial proceedings"; and, thus, the one-
year period should commence from the transmittal by the House of Representatives of the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.14

Finally, respondent-intervenor Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., as Speaker of the House, theorizes that the
better interpretation of the constitutional time bar should be reckoned from the recommendation of the
Committee to the House of Representatives.15

All the parties to the case, and the Court, are keenly aware of the latter’s ruling in Francisco v.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.16 That ruling was
categorical in stating that the impeachment proceeding is "initiated or begins, when a verified complaint
is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action."17 Considering the factual circumstances of
the instant case, and the experiences of the country with impeachment proceedings in the House since
the Francisco ruling, the Court is faced with a good opportunity to reexamine its earlier disposition.

Petitioner Gutierrez’s argument that the one-year time bar on a second impeachment complaint should
be counted from the mechanical act of filing the complaint alone18 is pregnant with a multitude of
problems. Congress’ exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases would be effectively rendered
inutile. This country’s experience with impeachment in the past decade has shown that pegging the
time bar to the mechanical act of filing has transformed impeachment into a race on who gets to file a
complaint the fastest – regardless of whether such a first complaint is valid, proper, substantial or
supported by evidence. Enterprising yet unscrupulous individuals have filed patently sham, frivolous or
defective complaints in the House in order to commence the one-year period and thus bar the
subsequent filing of "legitimate" complaints against the same impeachable officer. In embracing the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution, the Filipino people certainly did not countenance a technical
loophole that would be misused to negate the only available and effective mechanism against abuse of
power by impeachable officers.

The opposite extreme propounded by private respondents Reyes that the period of the time bar starts
from the filing of the Articles of Impeachment in the Senate is likewise untenable. Following their
proposition, the one-year period will only commence when the report of the Committee favoring
impeachment is approved by the required vote of the House, and the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to the Senate. Consequently, if there is no transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment, then
:
 there is no one-year time bar. As a result, multiple parties may continue to file numerous complaints,
until Articles of Impeachment are transmitted by the House to the Senate.

This scenario of persistent filing until there is a transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment is equally
abhorrent to the constitutional prohibition on multiple, successive and never-ending impeachment
proceedings (not complaints). The machine-gun approach to the filing of an impeachment complaint
until there is a successful transmittal to the Senate will greatly impede the discharge of functions of
impeachable officers, who are not given any refuge from such repetitive proceedings. Justice and the
efficient administration of government would be defeated, if the impeachment time bar is made to
commence solely from the favorable transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment. The time consumed by
impeachable officers fending off impeachment proceedings is the same, regardless of the result – the
time bar, therefore, must equally apply to unsuccessful impeachment attempts voted down by the
House.

Finally, the Court is confronted with the positions of public respondent Committee and respondent-
intervenor Belmonte as opposed to the Court’s ruling in Francisco. In Francisco, the time bar is counted
from the acts of filing the impeachment complaint and its referral to a Committee,19 where the latter is a
purely ministerial act of the Speaker of the House. On the other hand, both public respondent
Committee and respondent-intervenor Belmonte propose that the period of one year begin from
discretionary acts, namely, from the submission of the Committee report on the complaint according to
the Speaker, and from the one-third House plenary action on the report according to the public
respondent Committee. With all due respect to the Court’s ruling in Francisco, I uphold the position of
the public respondent Committee. The doctrine of separation of powers in our theory of government
pertains to the apportionment of state powers among coequal branches; namely, the Executive, the
Legislature and the Judiciary. In establishing the structures of government, the ideal that the
Constitution seeks to achieve is one of balance among the three great departments of government —
with each department undertaking its constitutionally assigned task as a check against the exercise of
power by the others, while all three departments move forward in working for the progress of the
nation.20 The system of checks and balances has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to
temper the official acts of each of these three branches.21

The power of impeachment is the Legislature’s check against the abuses of the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman.22 Having been elected or appointed for fixed terms, these impeachable officers enjoy
security of tenure, which is intended to enhance their capability to perform their governmental functions
efficiently and independently. However, their tenure, arising from either direct election by the people or
indirect appointment by the people’s representatives, is not carte blanche authority for them to abuse
their powers. In the face of gross governmental abuse, the people have not been made so powerless
by the Constitution as to suffer until the impeachable officer’s term or appointment expires. The
Legislature’s impeachment power is the very solution provided by the fundamental law to remove, in
the interim, public officers who have failed to uphold the public’s trust. The Ombudsman is the public
official constitutionally tasked to investigate and prosecute complaints against other public officials23
except for impeachable officers and members of the national legislature. She is continually required by
the Constitution to be of recognized probity and independence, 24 and must maintain this public trust
during her term of office. Avoidance of the prospect of impeachment is the negative incentive for the
Ombudsman, and all other impeachable officers, to keep that public trust.

Within the limitations set forth in the Constitution, impeachment is inarguably a political act exercised by
the Legislature, a political body elected by and directly accountable to the people. This power "is
lodged in those who represent the great body of the people, because the occasion for its exercise will
arise from acts of great injury to the community, and the objects of it may be such as cannot easily be
:
 reached by an ordinary tribunal."25

Full discretion is vested in Congress, both the House and the Senate, to determine whether or not an
officer should be impeached, subject only to constitutionally provided limits. Even if the expanded
certiorari jurisdiction allows the Court to review legislative acts that contravene the express provisions
of the Constitution, the Court cannot supplant with its own determination, that of Congress in finding
whether a public officer has performed acts that are grounds for impeachment. The political character
of the process is underscored by a degree of imprecision in the offenses subject of impeachment,26
thus allowing Congress sufficient leeway to describe the acts as impeachable or not.27

Since the power of impeachment is inherently discretionary, owing to its political character, then the
time bar limitation imposed by the Constitution on this legislative discretion must likewise be counted
from a discretionary, and not a ministerial, act. The one-year period was meant to be a restraint on the
discretionary power of impeachment; otherwise, the Legislature would have been allowed to exercise
that discretion at will repeatedly and continuously, to the detriment of the discharge of functions of
impeachable officers. It is counterintuitive and illogical to place a limitation on discretionary powers,
which is triggered not by the exercise of the discretion sought to be limited, but by a mere ministerial,
ceremonial act perfunctorily performed preparatory to such exercise.

We observe that the Constitution has placed time conditions on the performance of acts (both
discretionary and ministerial in nature) in pursuit of the House’s exclusive power to initiate
impeachment proceedings.28 These specific time conditions in the form of session days, however,
have primarily been imposed for the purpose of avoiding delays or filibusters, which members of the
House may resort to in order to prolong or even defeat the impeachment process. Whether the step is
discretionary or ministerial, the constitutional deadlines for the execution of impeachment steps
regulate only the speed at which the proceeding is to take place.

In contrast, the rule against the initiation of more than one impeachment proceeding against the same
impeachable officer in a span of one year is a time constraint on the frequency with which the
discretionary act of impeachment is to be exercised. The time bar regulates how often this power can
be exercised by the House of Representatives. The rationale is that the extreme measure of removal of
an impeachable officer cannot be used as Congress’ perennial bargaining chip to intimidate and
undermine the impeachable officer’s independence.

While each chamber of Congress is constitutionally empowered to determine its rules of proceedings, it
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights.29 Further, there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result that is sought to be attained.30

I respectfully differ from my colleagues when in effect they rule that the one-year limitation on a
discretionary power is to begin from the ministerial act of the Speaker in referring the impeachment
complaint to the appropriate committee of the House of Representatives. I cannot reconcile the
incongruity between the constitutional largeness of the power of impeachment – an inherently
discretionary power lodged in the entire Congress – and the controlling effect that a small act of the
Speaker in referring a complaint to the Committee has, over this large power of impeachment. Retired
Justice Serafin Cuevas, counsel for petitioner Gutierrez, goes so far as to characterize the Speaker’s
ministerial referral of the complaint as merely "ceremonial in character":

JUSTICE SERENO:

And you are basically … your contention if [I] understand it is that this is the initiation? This is the act of
initiating an impeachment complaint?
:
 RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Yes, we subscribed to the view or we uphold the view that upon the filing thereof, it was already
initiated because the referral to the Committee on Justice is only ceremonial in character. The
Secretary of Justice cannot do anything with it except to refer or not. Why did it take him twenty two
(22) days?31 (Emphasis supplied)

Even on the part of the Speaker of the House, there is no exercise of discretion over the referral of the
complaint to the Committee on Justice.32 The Speaker simply performs a ministerial function under the
Constitution.33 The Speaker cannot evaluate the complaint as to its sufficiency in form and substance.
And even if there is a technical defect in the impeachment complaint, the Speaker is duty-bound to
refer the matter to the committee within three session days from its inclusion in the Order of Business.
Moreover, as pointed out by Justice Carpio Morales, members of the House cannot even raise issues
against the propriety or substance of the impeachment complaint during the referral, as in fact the only
objection that can be entertained is the propriety of the committee to which the complaint is referred.
There is a dissonance on how the House Speaker’s clerical/ministerial act of referring the complaint
can commence the time bar on the discretionary power of the entire House to initiate an impeachment
proceeding.

The stark incompatibility between a small ministerial act controlling the substantive right of the House to
initiate impeachment proceedings is viewed with concern by no less than retired Justice Cuevas,
counsel for petitioner Gutierrez, who agrees with me in this wise:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SERENO:

I am sure, sir. But let us now go to the real question of the constitutional right of the House on
impeachment and the clerical act of receiving impeachment complaints. Which is superior and which
should be given more weight, the substantive right of the House to exercise its right to initiate
impeachment complaints or is it the mere clerical act of finding out which complaint on its face bears
the stamp, the first the earliest of stamp?

RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

I am not aware of any law, Your Honor, that authorizes a mere clerk to do what you are trying to tell us,
Your Honor. It is the House, that is the responsibility of the House.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SERENO:

Yes, thank you.

RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

If they were designated by the Secretary General, the physical acceptance of the complaint lies there.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SERENO:

Correct.

RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

But that acceptance does not automatically …

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SERENO:

Correct.
:
 RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

... initiate the impeachment proceedings.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SERENO:

Thank you very much, that is exactly what I wanted to hear viz-a-viz the substantive right of the House
to initiate impeachment proceedings, this cannot be defeated by the clerical act of accepting an
impeachment complaint.

RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

I agree, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)34

Proceedings, as understood in law, include "any and all of the steps or measures adopted or taken, or
required to be taken in the prosecution or defense of an action, from the commencement of the action
to its termination, such as to the execution of the judgment."35 "Proceedings, both in common parlance
and in legal acception, imply action, procedure, prosecution. If it is a progressive course, it must be
advancing; and cannot be satisfied by remaining at rest."36

In Macondray & Co., Inc., v. Bernabe,37 the Court ordered the payment of fees by the custodian of the
attached properties, since the plaintiff’s recovery of the costs includes any lawful fees paid by him or
her for the "service of the summons and other process in the action." The Court defined the word
"process" in this wise:

As a legal term, process is a generic word of very comprehensive signification and many meanings. In
its broadest sense process, it is equivalent to, or synonymous with, ‘proceedings’ or procedure and
embraces all steps and proceedings in a cause from its commencement to its conclusion. Sometimes
the term is also broadly defined as the means whereby a court compels a compliance with its
demands.38 (Emphasis supplied.)

Therefore, the term "impeachment proceedings" should include the entire gamut of the impeachment
process in the House – from the filing of the verified complaint, to its referral to the appropriate
committee, to the committee’s deliberations and report, up to the very vote of the House in plenary on
the same report. It is only at the time that the House of Representatives as a whole either affirms
or overrides the Report, by a vote of one third of all the members, that the initiation of the
impeachment proceedings in the House is completed and the one-year bar rule commences. This
is because the plenary House vote is the first discretionary act exercised by the House in whom the
power of initiating impeachment proceedings repose.

When the Court pegged, in Francisco, the time bar on the initiation of impeachment proceedings to the
filing of the complaint and its referral to the appropriate committee, it may have failed to anticipate the
actions of parties who would subvert the impeachment process by racing to be the first to file sham and
frivolous impeachment complaints. These unintended consequences, which make a mockery of the
power of impeachment, justify a second look at the premises considered in Francisco.

Reckoning the beginning of the time bar from a ministerial and preparatory act, instead of the exercise
of the discretionary power of impeachment, tends to focus attention on the procedural loopholes. Thus,
impeachable officers subject of the proceedings, as well as their counsel, abuse these technical gaps in
the legal framework of impeachment. Their purpose is to escape removal or perpetual disqualification
despite the serious and grave charges leveled against them. Questions on the number of complaints
filed, the date or even the time of filing, and whether the complaints have been consolidated or even
simultaneously referred become monkey wrenches that impede the entire process and frustrate the
:
 mechanism of impeachment to the point of infeasibility.

As argued by public respondent Committee through retired Justice Vicente Mendoza during oral
argument,39 these technical loopholes can be cured by rendering the plenary vote of the entire House
on the report of the committee as the starting point of the one-year ban. The intensity of legal wrangling
over the definition of the words "proceedings" and "initiate" diminishes in significance if the Court is to
focus its attention on the sole, discretionary and exclusive power granted to the House as a whole body
to initiate all impeachment cases. Aside from the fact that the plenary vote pertains to the very
discretionary act of impeachment, which requires the vote of one-third of its members, the difficulties
inherent in pegging the period to ministerial acts are lessened, if not eliminated. Let us look at some
problems that this approach eliminates.

First, whether there is a single complaint or multiple complaints filed before the House or taken up by
the committee, the House in plenary will only vote once, in one impeachment proceeding, on whether
to approve or disapprove the committee’s resolution.

Second, the proposal also removes the undesired proclivity of parties to be the first to file or the first to
be referred, since the ban regulates not the speed of filing, but the frequency of the exercise by the
House plenary of voting on the impeachment complaint/s.

Third, it makes no difference whether the complaint is filed and/or referred successively or
simultaneously, as was being deliberated upon in the public respondent Committee.40 The excessive
emphasis on the physical time and date of filing or referral becomes inconsequential, if not absurd.

Finally, the time limitation is reckoned from a discretionary act, which embraces a deliberate, informed
and debated process, and not from the ministerial act of a single public officer. The one-year period
from the plenary vote of the House on the committee report eliminates even the possibility, however
remote, that the Speaker of the House and/or the Majority Floor Leader would include a sham
impeachment complaint in the Order of Business and refer the complaint to the Committee on Justice
in just a single session day, in order to bar any other subsequent impeachment complaint/s.

The plenary vote by the House on the committee report is definite, determinable, and not ministerial; it
is precisely the discretionary exercise of the power to initiate impeachments. As elucidated by retired
Justice Mendoza during the oral argument:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NACHURA:

Justice Mendoza, just two things, I agree with you that the impeachment proceeding is really a process,
is really a process. And I am open, my mind is at least open, to your suggestion that the initiation
should be the entire proceedings in the House of Representatives. This would mean of course that the
Committee would have prepared its report and submitted the report to the House of representatives in
plenary. That would end the initiation, is that your position?

RET. JUSTICE MENDOZA:

Yes, Sir.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NACHURA:

Irrespective of the action taken by plenary do we have to await the action of the plenary on the report of
the Committee on Justice before we say that these (sic) have been initiation on the impeachment?

RET. JUSTICE MENDOZA:

:
 It is actually the action on the House because the power to initiate is vested in the House not to the
Committee of the House. Up to the submission of the report there is only action by the Committee.
Action by the House to initiate the proceedings is the action on the Committee report. The point Mr.
Justice is this, the House delegates the task of screening good from bad complaints so that its time will
not be wasted to a Committee also and to protect the public officials from unnecessarily being made to
face impeachment proceedings. So what is given to the Committee is the task of investigating and
recommending action on the complaints. So unless action is taken therefore finally by the House, the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment proceedings has not been discharged. (Emphasis supplied)41

Of course, there still exists the possibility that the complaining parties would file multiple complaints at
the 11th hour before the entire House votes on the committee report. This last minute maneuver is
presumably intended to delay the voting, until the belated complaint is referred and deliberated upon by
the committee within the number of session days enumerated under the Constitution. However, the
deadlines for the committee report and the subsequent voting by the plenary should be counted from
the date of the complaint/s first referred, regardless of any subsequent complaints. Any pending
impeachment complaint will be immediately barred once the House votes on the committee report. This
rule will prevent the filing of subsequent complaints (albeit sham or frivolous), which would continually
reset the sixty-session day period and, thus, result in the circumvention of the constitutional deadlines.

A party who has a legitimate grievance supported by evidence against an impeachable officer will
ordinarily not wait until the last minute to lodge the complaint. Ordinary diligence and good faith dictate
that a person who has sufficient proof of wrongdoing and abuse against an impeachable officer will join
and lend support to an impeachment complaint that is already being deliberated upon by the House
committee, at the soonest possible time. Hence, it is natural that all complaints with valid grounds and
sufficient evidence will be collectively or separately raised at the first opportunity, in order that the
committee and eventually the House will be able to perform its deliberative function and exercise
discretion within the specified number of session days.

Contrary to the position of respondent-intervenor Belmonte,42 the mere submission of the committee
report to the plenary is not a good reckoning point for the one-year period. Undoubtedly, while the
committee exercises a degree of discretion in deciding upon and coming up with the report, as when it
determines whether the impeachment complaint/s is/are sufficient in form and substance,43 this
discretion is exercised by a mere subset of the entire House, however, and is but preliminary. Although
of persuasive value, the recommendations of the committee, which is composed of approximately fifty-
five (55) members,44 are not binding on the entire House in plenary, which counts two hundred eighty-
three (283) members.45

The power to initiate all cases of impeachment is an extraordinary exercise of the sovereign people
through its elected representatives to immediately remove those found to have committed impeachable
offenses.46 Therefore, the power to initiate impeachment proceedings is a power that is reposed upon
the House of Representatives as a whole body, in representation of the sovereign, and this power
cannot be taken over by a mere Committee.

Irrespective of the Committee’s findings, the impeachment proceeding will rise or fall or continue up to
the impeachment case in the Senate on the basis of the one-third vote of the House. Hence, the one-
year period is a limitation on the discretionary power of the entire House to initiate impeachment
proceedings, and not on the committee’s deliberations or recommendations with respect to the
impeachment complaint/s.

In summary, the following principles support the position that the time bar should be counted from the
House of Representative’s plenary action on the report of the Committee on Justice:
:
 1. The time bar on impeachment proceedings cannot be counted from the filing of the complaint;
otherwise the absurdity of individuals racing to file the first complaint would ensue, regardless of
the complaint’s propriety or substance.

2. The time bar must equally apply, whether the impeachment complaint is successful or not.

3. The time bar, which is a limitation on the House’s exclusive power to initiate impeachment,
must be counted from a discretionary act, not from a mechanical or ministerial act, especially not
from acts that trivialize the impeachment process.

4. The time bar can only be reckoned from the plenary action of the House on the report of the
committee (regardless of the outcome), since such action is done by the constitutional body in
which the power is vested, and not by a mere subset that makes a preliminary finding that has
only persuasive value.

Judicial review serves an affirmative function vital to a government of limited powers – the function of
maintaining a satisfactorily high public feeling that the government has obeyed the law of its own
Constitution and stands ready to obey it as it may be declared by a tribunal of independence.47

In this instance, in exercising the power of judicial review over the exclusive and sole power of the
House to initiate impeachment cases, the Court must remember that it is also performing a legitimating
function – validating how the House exercises its power in the light of constitutional limitations. The
Court in the present constitutional dilemma is tasked with doing what has been described as a
"balancing act,"48 in determining the appropriate operation of the one-year time bar on the initiation of
subsequent impeachment proceedings vis-à-vis the need to allow Congress to exercise its
constitutional prerogatives in the matter of impeachment proceedings.

On the one hand, the undisputed raison d’être of the time bar is to prevent the continuous and undue
harassment of impeachable officers, such as petitioner Gutierrez, in a way that prevents them from
performing their offices’ functions effectively. On the other hand, the protection afforded to petitioner
and other impeachable officers against harassment is not a blanket mechanical safety device that
would defeat altogether any complaint of wrongdoing, of which she and other impeachable officers may
be accused. Therefore, the power to initiate impeachment proceedings should not be so effortlessly
and expeditiously achieved by disgruntled politicians to pressure impeachable officers to submission
and undermine the latter’s institutional independence. But neither should the power of impeachment be
too unreasonably restrictive or filled with technical loopholes as to defeat legitimate and substantiated
claims of gross wrongdoing.

I submit that a balance of these two interests is better achieved if the time bar for the initiation of
impeachment proceedings commences from the voting of the House on the committee report. Briefly, a
subsequent impeachment proceeding against the same officer cannot be initiated until and unless one
year lapses from the time the House in plenary votes either to approve or to disapprove the
recommendations of the committee on impeachment complaint/s.

What the Court is deciding herein is merely the scope of the constitutional limits on the power to initiate
impeachment proceedings, and how the delineation of that scope would affect the second
Impeachment Complaint filed by private respondent Reyes. This Court does not arrogate unto itself the
power to determine the innocence or guilt of petitioner Gutierrez with respect to the allegations
contained in the impeachment complaints of private respondents. Congress, the political branch of
government, was entrusted with the power of impeachment, specifically, "because the objectives and
the questions to be resolved are political."49 In the Constitution, the impeachment power is an
extraordinary political tool to oust a public officer. It must, therefore, be exercised by those whose
:
 functions are most directly and immediately responsive to the broad spectrum of the Filipino people,
rather than by the Courts.

In expounding on the rationale for excluding the power of impeachment from the courts, Alexander
Hamilton succinctly wrote:

… The awful discretion, which a court of impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to
infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community, forbids the
commitment of the trust to a small number of persons.

These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorise a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would
have been an improper substitute for the Senate, as a court of impeachments. … 50

On a final note, the issuance of the Status Quo Ante Order in this case was most unfortunate. It was
issued over the objections of Justices Antonio Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and myself. I believed
then, as I believe now, that the Court, in issuing the said order, was overly intrusive with respect to a
power that does not belong to it by restraining without hearing a co-equal branch of Government. This
belief was made more acute by the fact that the order was voted upon in the morning of 14 September
2010, without the benefit of a genuinely informed debate, since several members of the Court, myself
included, had not yet then received a copy of the Petition. No one should henceforth presume to tell the
House of Representatives that any form of restraining order is still in effect and thereby seek to extend
the effectivity of the Status Quo Ante Order. This is the legal import of the majority Decision.

Premises considered, I vote to DISMISS the Petition in its entirety, and, consequently, the Status Quo
Ante Order is immediately lifted.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 which Framed the Constitution of the United
States of America, Reported by James Madison (International Edition), Gaillard Hunt and James
Brown N. Scott (ed.) 1970 reprint, at 290.

2 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3 (4).

3 Id, Sec. 3 (1).

4 Id, Sec. 3 (2). The verified complaint is filed with the Office of the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives. (15th Congress Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
Rule II, Section 3)

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 3 (3).

:
 10 Id. Sec. 3 (4).

11 Private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo D. Lim, Felipe Pestaño and Evelyn
Pestaño (private respondents Baraquel) argue that the one-year time-bar rule under the
Constitution is inapplicable to the first Impeachment Complaint that they filed against petitioner
Gutierrez. (Private respondent Baraquel’s Memorandum dated 27 October 2010, at 5-6)
12 Petitioner Gutierrez’s Memorandum dated 21 October 2010, at 27-40.

13 Public respondent’s Memorandum dated 26 October 2010, at 61-85. See also public
respondent’ Reply Memorandum dated 15 November 2010, at 21-34.

14 Private respondents Reyes’s Memorandum dated 26 October 2010, at 26-44.

15 Respondent-intervenor Belmonte’s Memorandum for the Intervenor Ex Abundanti Cautela

dated 27 October 2010, at 19-25.
16 G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262-63, 160277, 160292, 160295, 160310, 160318, 160342-43,
160360, 160365, 160370, 160376, 160392, 160397, 160403, 160405, 10 November 2003, 415
SCRA 44.

17 Id. at 169.

18 "The filing of an impeachment complaint constitutes the only true and actual initiation of
impeachment proceedings. This operative and immutable fact cannot be downplayed or trivialized
as being the mere solitary act which ‘begins the initiation process.’ That the filing of the complaint
admittedly ‘begins the process of initiation’ only underscores the plain and inescapable fact that it
is the very start, the very inception, the very origin of an impeachment proceeding." (Petitioner
Gutierrez’s Consolidated Reply dated 15 October 2010, at 15)
19 "Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-
third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period." (Francisco, supra note 15, at 169)
20 Carpio Morales, Dissenting Opinion, De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002,
191032, 191057, 191149, 191342, 191420 & A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, 20 April 2010.

21 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No.
180643, 04 September 2008, 549 SCRA 77.
22Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 2.

23 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 12.

24 Id, Sec. 8.

25 Labovitz, John R., Presidential Impeachment, 20 (1978).

26 The grounds for impeachment are culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. (Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 2)
:
 27 Although some of the grounds for impeachment are specifically defined under penal laws
(treason, bribery, graft and corruption), those laws and their concomitant jurisprudence are mere
guides for the members of Congress and are not exactly bound to these definitions, given the
discretionary power vested in them.

28 The Constitution provides a specific time conditions for several acts in the impeachment
process, namely: (a) inclusion of the impeachment complaint in the Order of Business (ten
session days); (b) referral to the Committee (three session days); (c) report of the Committee
(sixty session days); and (d) calendar of the Committee report to the plenary (ten session days).
29 Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R No. 127255, 14 August 1997, 277 SCRA 268 citing U.S. v. Ballin,
Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5.36 L.Ed. at 324-25.

30 Id.

31 TSN, 05 October 2010, at 119-120.

32 "aa. Justice, 55 Members. All matters directly and principally relating to the administration of
justice, the Judiciary, the practice of law and integration of the Bar, legal aid, penitentiaries and
reform schools, adult probation, impeachment proceedings, registration of land titles, immigration,
deporation, naturalization, and the definition of crimes and other offenses punishable by law and
their penalties." (House Rules of Procedure, Rule IX The Committees, Sec. 27 [aa])
33 "A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to
or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done." (Callejo,
Concurring Opinion, Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153 & 174299, 25 October 2006, 505
SCRA 160, citing Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, 10 December 2002, 393 SCRA
639)

34 TSN, 05 October 2010, at 142-143.

35 1 C.J.S. Actions § 1(h)(1)(a), at 955.

36 34 Words and Phrases 142 (1957), citing Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. 329, 368, 9 Pet. 329,
368, 9 L.Ed. 145.

37 G. R. No. L-45410, 67 Phil. 661(1939).

38 Macondray & Co., Inc., v. Bernabe, 67 Phil. 661 (1939), citing 50 C.J., 441; cf. Philippine Law
Dictionary, 748 (Federico B. Moreno ed., 3rd ed. 1988).

39 TSN, 12 October 2010, at 88-90.

40 "Rep. Datumanong raised again the issue of having two impeachment complaint referred to
the Committee. According to him, the journal of the House on August 11 reflects the successive,
and not simultaneous, referral to the two complaints to the Committee. This position was later
reiterated by Re. Rufus Rodriguez, who stated that it is a physical impossibility to refer two
complaints to the Committee at exactly the same time. Rep. Neptali Gonzales II answered Rep.
Datumanong’s query, and maintained that in the same journal, both complaints were referred to
the Committee on Justice at exactly the same time, which shows the intention of the House to
refer the complaints simultaneously and not successively. Rep. Gonzales also stated that there is
:
 nothing in the Constitution or the Rules on Impeachment that prevents the Committee from
consolidating the two complaints against an impeachable officer." (Minutes of the Meeting of the
Committee on Justice, 07 September 2010 at 5; cf. petitioner Gutierrez’s Compliance and
Manifestation dated 30 September 2010)

41 TSN, 12 October 2010, at 133-135.

42 "102. The moment when an impeachment is ‘initiated’ therefore is a process that starts from
the filing up until the recommendation of the House Committee on Justice to the House of
Representatives. It is still a process and a continuum, but it is a process that allows
democratically elected forums to weigh in." (Respondent-intervenor Belmonte’s Memorandum
dated 27 October 2010, at 22)

43 "Section 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form and Substance. - Upon due referral, the
Committee on Justice shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in from and substance. If
the committee finds that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return the same to the
Secretary General within three (3) session days with a written explanation of the insufficiency.
The Secretary General shall return the same to the complaint(s) together with the committee's
written explanation within three (3) session days from receipt of the committee resolution finding
the complaint insufficient in form."

"Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in form, it shall then determine if the
complaint is sufficient in substance. The requirement of substance is met if there is a recital
of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee. If the committee finds that the complaint is not sufficient in substance, it shall
dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder." (House Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, Sec. 4)

44 House Rules of Procedure, Rule IX (The Committees), Sec. 27 (aa).

45 <http://www.congress.gov.ph/members/> (Last accessed on 24 January 2011)

46 "On a more fundamental level, the impeachment power is, in fact, an exercise of sovereignty. It
is a choice by the representatives of the people to immediately remove those unfit for public
service. Impeachment involves conviction and removal of government officers of the highest level
and, hence, is an extreme measure. So, it is but appropriate that it is the Congress – the direct
representatives of the people – which should wield the power of impeachment. Therefore, the
power to ‘initiate’ impeachment proceedings may not be exercised by a lone congressman or by a
citizen by the sheer act of filing an impeachment complaint." (Tamano, Adel A., Handbook on
Impeachment under the 1987 Constitution [1st Ed., 2004], at 21)
47 Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy, 86 (1960).

48 "… So, that is why I am saying now that we should not only consider the rights of the accused
we should also consider the rights of the State. We should try to do a balancing act such that we
will come out with a favorable decision which is fair to both parties." (Justice Carpio Morales,
TSN, 05 October 2010, at 335)
49 John R. Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment 251 (1978).

50 Federalist No. 65, at 439-45 (07 March 1788).

:
 The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

NACHURA, J.:

Justice Conchita Carpio Morales once again impresses with her incisive and tightly written ponencia.
While I agree with the defenestration1 of the petition, I am constrained to express my views on the
ripeness of the issues posed by petitioner.

Before anything else, however, the antecedents.

Taking the cue from "matuwid na landas," the theme of President Benigno C. Aquino III’s inaugural
address, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn
Pestaño filed an impeachment complaint (Baraquel Complaint) on July 22, 2010, against petitioner
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez.

On July 26, 2010, the 15th Congress opened its first session, and representative Feliciano Belmonte
was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives. The very next day, or on July 27, 2010, Atty.
Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment
complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte. In a Memorandum dated August 2, 2010, Speaker
Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in the Order of Business.

On August 3, 2010, the House of Representatives received yet another impeachment complaint against
petitioner, which was filed by private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan,
Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite, and James Terry Ridon (Reyes Complaint). On even date,
the Secretary-General transmitted the Reyes Complaint to Speaker Belmonte. In turn, as he had done
with the previous complaint, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the Reyes
Complaint in the Order of Business. Further, on even date, the House of Representatives provisionally
adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress.

Parenthetically, both the Baraquel2 and Reyes3 Complaints were endorsed by Members of the House
of Representatives, as mandated in the Constitution.4 The two complaints separately alleged betrayal
of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution, to wit:

1. Baraquel Complaint

I.

OMBUDSMAN MA. MERCEDITA[S] NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ BETRAYED THE PUBLIC

TRUST.

i.

THE DISMAL AND UNCONSCIONABLY LOW CONVICTION RATES ACHIEVED BY THE

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FROM 2008 ONWARD INDICATE A CRIMINAL LEVEL
OF INCOMPETENCE AMOUNTING TO GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY x x x.

ii.

THE UNREASONABLE FAILURE OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO TAKE PROMPT AND

IMMEDIATE ACTION, IN VIOLATION OF ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE, ON THE
COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST VARIOUS PUBLIC OFFICIALS INCLUDING FORMER
:
 PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL T.
ARROYO WITH REGARD TO THE NBN-ZTE BROADBAND PROJECT x x x.

iii.

THE INEXCUSABLE DELAY OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN CONDUCTING AND

CONCLUDING ITS INVESTIGATION INTO THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF ENSIGN PHILIP
ANDREW PESTAÑO ABOARD A PHILIPPINE NAVY VESSEL x x x.

iv.

THE DECISION OF THE OMBUDSMAN UPHOLDING THE "LEGALITY" OF THE ARREST

AND INVOLUNTARY DETENTION OF THEN REPRESENTATIVE RISA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL BY THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE IN MARCH 2006 IN VIOLATION OF
THE EXPLICIT RULES PROVIDED IN THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND AS
ESTABLISHED BY JURISPRUDENCE x x x.

v.

THE FAILURE OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION INTO

POSSIBLE WRONGDOING OR IMPROPRIETY WITH REGARD TO THE ₱1,000,000.00
DINNER FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY AT LE CIRQUE RESTAURANT IN NEW YORK
IN AUGUST 2009 DESPITE WIDESPREAD MEDIA COVERAGE AND PUBLIC CLAMOR,
AND A FORMAL LETTER FROM REPRESENTATIVE WALDEN F. BELLO CALLING FOR
AN INQUIRY CONSTITUTES BETRAYAL OF THE PUBLIC TRUST.

II.

OMBUDSMAN MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ PERFORMED ACTS

AMOUNTING TO CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

vi.

THE REPEATED FAILURES OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO TAKE PROMPT ACTION ON A

WIDE VARIETY OF CASES INVOLVING OFFICIAL ABUSE AND CORRUPTION
VIOLATES (sic) ARTICLE XI, SECTION 12 AND ARTICLE III, SECTION 16 OF THE
CONSTITUTION, WHICH MANDATE PROMPT ACTION AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
CASES.

vii.

THE REFUSAL OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO GRANT READY ACCESS TO PUBLIC

RECORDS SUCH AS THE STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AND NET
WORTH (SALN) REQUIRED OF ALL PUBLIC OFFICERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO.
6713 CONSTITUTES A CULPABLE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE XI, SECTION 13(6) AND
ARTICLE III, SECTION 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION.5

2. Reyes Complaint

I. BETRAYAL OF TRUST

(1) OMBUDSMAN GUTIERREZ COMMITTED BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST

THROUGH HER GROSS INEXCUSABLE DELAY IN INVESTIGATING AND FAILURE
IN PROSECUTING ANY ONE OF THOSE INVOLVED [I]N THE ANOMALOUS
TRANSACTIONS ARISING FROM THE FERTILIZER FUND SCAM DESPITE THE
:
 BLATANT ANOMALOUS TRANSACTIONS REVEALED IN THE COA FINDINGS,
SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT 54 AND THE COMPLAINTS FILED WITH
[PETITIONER] ON THE "FERTILIZER SCAM."

(2) OMBUDSMAN GUTIERREZ COMMITTED BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST

WHEN SHE DID NOT PROSECUTE GEN. ELISEO DE LA PAZ FOR VIOLATING
BSP CIRCULAR 98 (1995), AS AMENDED BY BSP CIRCULAR 507 (2006), IN
RELATION TO REPUBLIC ACT 6713, WHICH PROHIBITS THE TAKING OUT OF
THE COUNTRY OF CURRENCY IN EXCESS OF US$10,000.00 WITHOUT
DECLARING THE SAME TO THE PHILIPPINE CUSTOMS, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT GEN. ELISEO DE LA PAZ PUBLICLY ADMITTED UNDER OATH BEFORE
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE THAT HE TOOK OUT OF THE
COUNTRY CURRENCY IN EXCESS OF US$10,000.00 WITHOUT DECLARING THE
SAME [TO] THE PHILIPPINES CUSTOMS.

(3) OMBUDSMAN GUTIERREZ BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HER

GROSS INEXCUSABLE DELAY OR INACTION BY ACTING IN DELIBERATE
DISREGARD OF THE SUPREME COURT’S FINDINGS AND DIRECTIVE IN ITS
DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

II. CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

THROUGH HER REPEATED FAILURES AND INEXCUSABLE DELAY IN ACTING UPON THE
MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE HER OFFICE, OMBUDSMAN GUTIERREZ VIOLATED SECTION 12
AND SECTION 13, PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND 3, ARTICLE XI ON WHICH HER CONSTITUTIONAL
DUTY IS ENSHRINED, AS WELL AS SECTION 16, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH
MANDATES PROMPT ACTION AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES.6

On August 10, 2010, upon the instruction of House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, Chairperson of
the Committee on Rules, the two impeachment complaints were included in the Order of Business for
the following day, August 11, 2010.

On August 11, 2010, during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred
both complaints to public respondent House Committee on Justice.

In a Resolution dated September 1, 2010, the House Committee on Justice found both complaints
sufficient in form.

On September 2, 2010, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was
published.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner attempted to file a motion for reconsideration of the September 1,
2010 Resolution of public respondent House Committee on Justice, which found both complaints
sufficient in form. However, the House Committee on Justice, did not accept the motion, and informed
petitioner that she should instead file her answer to the complaints upon her receipt of notice thereof,
along with copies of both complaints.

At the hearing on September 7, 2010, public respondent House Committee on Justice issued a
Resolution finding both complaints sufficient in substance. Posthaste, on the same date, petitioner was
served notice directing her to file an answer within ten (10) days.

Alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction by public respondent House
:
 Committee on Justice in issuing the Resolutions dated September 1 and 7, 2010, which found the
impeachment complaints sufficient in form and substance, respectively, petitioner filed the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs.

Foremost in petitioner’s arguments is the invocation of our ruling in the trailblazing case of Francisco,
Jr. v. The House of Representatives.7 Petitioner points out that in taking cognizance of the two (2)
complaints and requiring her to file an answer thereto, public respondent violated the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.8 Not unexpectedly, petitioner advances that the ruling in Francisco
definitively declares that the initiation of impeachment proceedings plainly refers to the filing alone of an
impeachment complaint. In all, petitioner is of the view that the sole act of filing one (1) impeachment
complaint forecloses all situations for the filing of another impeachment complaint within a given year.

Petitioner likewise raises the alleged violation of her right to due process of law, in both its substantive
and procedural aspects.

Essentially, petitioner claims that the House Committee on Justice committed various violations
equivalent to grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the House
Committee on Justice violated the Constitution; hence, the Court must intervene.

I believe that the issue for resolution is not yet upon us; the issues, as presented by petitioner, are
palpably not ripe for adjudication.

Curiously, despite the effusive petition before us, petitioner did not file an answer to the complaints
despite receipt of notice to do so. Instead, petitioner came directly for succour to this Court.

The power of judicial review is not boundless and not without limitation. The expanded jurisdiction of
this Court, notwithstanding, invocation of judicial review requires that the issues presented are ripe for
adjudication. Unfortunately, it is my view that the facts obtaining herein do not, as yet, permit judicial
intervention. The supplications contained in the petition are premature and ought to be brought first
before the House Committee on Justice.

Lozano v. Nograles9 instructs us on the two-fold aspect of ripeness:

An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In the United States,
courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that
may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the
twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship
to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is
generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative
road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished
or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.

Hewing closely to the foregoing is the second, albeit less popular, case of Francisco v. The House
Committee on Justice,10 where we dismissed the petition on the ground of prematurity:

Ripeness and prematurity are correlated matters. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is
a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture. Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and
when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. On the other hand, prematurity deals
with the question of whether all remedies have been exhausted before resort to the courts could be
had.
:
 In this case, the resolution of the Committee on Justice to treat the Amended Complaint as a second
impeachment complaint is yet to be passed upon by the House in a plenary session.

xxxx

Thus, the Committee on Justice should submit to the House a report on its action to treat the Amended
Complaint as a second impeachment complaint and also on its determinations on the sufficiency in
form and substance of the impeachment complaint. Then, the report shall be deliberated and acted
upon by the House. The Court should, therefore, wait until after all the remedies in the House are
exhausted. Indeed, this is not yet the auspicious time to resolve the issues raised in the petition.

We find striking similarities between the second Francisco and the case at bar. Petitioner has yet to
formally answer and appear before the House Committee on Justice. The House Committee on Justice
has not been given opportunity to address the points raised by petitioner in her petition before us,
which the latter could very well raise before public respondent.

Applying the rule on the two-fold aspect of ripeness used in other jurisdictions and the demonstration of
actual injury to pass the test of ripeness in this jurisdiction, it is quite obvious to me that, at this juncture,
petitioner has not established the fitness of the issues for our decision, hardship if we withhold
consideration, much less actual injury to petitioner.

A juxtaposition of the timeline for the initiation of impeachment complaints mapped out in Section 3(2),
Article XI of the Constitution, which provides:

SEC. 3. (1) x x x.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives
or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in
the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.

and Sections 2 and 3, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which read:

RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. – Impeachment shall be initiated by the filing and
subsequent referral to the Committee on Justice of:

(a) a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of Representatives; or

(b) a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member
thereof; or

(c) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
Members of the House.

Section 3. Filing and Referral of Verified Complaints. – A verified complaint for impeachment by a
Member of the House or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member thereof shall
be filed with the Office of the Secretary-General and immediately referred to the Speaker.

The Speaker shall have it included in the Order of Business within ten (10) session days from receipt. It
:
 shall then be referred to the Committee on Justice within three (3) session days thereafter.

do not indicate any deviation from the constitutional mandate. It cannot be overemphasized that
petitioner has yet to formally appear before public respondent, and the latter has not yet terminated its
hearing of the impeachment complaints. Clearly, there is no constitutional violation justifying this
Court’s intervention even without delving into the burning question of whether the initiation proceedings
are deemed initiated with the mere filing of a complaint, and its referral to the House Committee on
Justice, or should await the submission of a report by the House Committee on Justice.

In fact, during oral arguments, the following was limned:

JUSTICE NACHURA:

In fact, I would like to believe, therefore, Justice Cuevas, that when you make a reference to a violation
of due process in this particular case, it is really a violation of the procedural aspect of due process,
primarily the first requisite of due process which is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal with
authority to hear and decide a case. And that was the first statement you made. The Committee on
Justice deprived the petitioner of due process because of its haste, its partiality and its vindictiveness.
Those were your words.

RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Right, Your Honor.

JUSTICE NACHURA:

All right. However, when you developed this, you said there was delay in the filing or in the referral of
the first complaint because the first complaint was filed on July 22…

RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

July 22, 2010, Your Honor.

JUSTICE NACHURA:

The second complaint was filed on August 3, 2010?

RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE NACHURA:

And both complaints were referred only to the Committee on Justice on August 11, 2010?

RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

On the same day at the same time.

JUSTICE NACHURA:

The same day at the same time on August 11, 2010?

RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

We do not want to believe, Your Honor, that this was intentional. But it cannot be accidental. Same day,
same time, Your Honor. Why will it take the Speaker of the House twenty (20) days before a referral of
:
 the impeachment complaint number 1 is made to the Committee on Justice and only eight days (8)
days insofar as the second impeachment complaint?

JUSTICE NACHURA:

Justice Cuevas, I am looking at a calendar right now. On July 22, Congress had not yet started its
sessions. It was only on July 26 that sessions in Congress started with the delivery by the President of
the State of the Nation Address. And in the House, I am sure, there was still no organization of the
committees by then. It would have taken, perhaps, at least a week, maybe two (2) weeks, before the
committees could be truly organized by the leadership of the House. And if you count two (2) weeks
from July 26, you would go to around August 9 and that would be near August 11. Obviously, we
cannot impute vindictiveness or partiality on the basis of this alleged delay in the referral of the
complaints.

xxxx

RET. JUSTICE CUEVAS:

Our charge of impartiality does not merely gravitate on that particular aspect, Your Honor. x x x.11

On that point, counsel for petitioner obviously yielded.

Very apparent from all the foregoing is that a contingent event is still about to unfold, specifically, the
Answer to be filed by petitioner, which public respondent has yet to hear and rule on. The Constitution,
in no uncertain terms, declares that the Committee should hear the complaint, and after hearing, submit
a report to the House within sixty (60) days from referral thereof. A co-equal branch of government has
not committed a positive act, i.e., to hear the defenses raised by petitioner in her Answer; we have no
business to interfere, especially at this stage. Public respondent House Committee on Justice must be
allowed to conduct and continue its hearing of the impeachment complaints against petitioner. At that
stage, petitioner’s apprehensions of the Committee’s partiality and vindictiveness would, perhaps,
become justified.

I vote to DISMISS the petition.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 The act of throwing someone or something out of a window. The term is associated with political
dissidence and political assassinations in 15th to 17th century Prague where rioters made a habit
of it. There was one in 1419 at the Town Hall where a mob, demanding the release of prisoners,
threw councillors out, and a more famous one – known as the Defenestration of Prague – in 1618
which heralded the 30-Year War when a gang of Protestant nobles threw two Catholic governors
out of the window of the Royal Palace. (See
<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Defenestration+of+Prague> [visited February 14, 2011].)
2 Endorsed by Party-list Representatives, Kaka Bag-ao and Walden Bello of the Akbayan Party-
list.
3 Endorsed by Party-list Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares of Bayan Muna, Teodor Casiño
of Bayan Muna, Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Luzviminda C. Ilagan of Gabriela, Raymond V.
:
 Palatino, Antonio L. Tinio of Act Teacher, Emerenciana A. De Jesus of Gabriela.
4 Art. XI, Sec. 3(2).

5 Annex "F" of the Petition.

6 Annex "G" of the Petition.

7 460 Phil. 830 (2003).

8 CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 3(5).

9 G.R. Nos. 187883 and 187910, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 356, 358-359.

10 Extended Resolution, G.R. No. 169244, September 1, 2005.

11 TSN, October 5, 2010, pp. 88-91.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:

I dissent from the ponencia’s conclusion that the proceedings before the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice (Justice Committee) are constitutional. These proceedings were undertaken
without the benefit of duly published and fully effective rules of impeachment and are, thus, fatally infirm
for violation of the petitioner’s right to due process.

I believe, too, that we should revisit our ruling in Francisco v. House of Representatives1 as we did not
apply the proper consideration when we determined the back-end of the initiation phase of the
impeachment proceedings. The initiation phase should start at the filing of the impeachment complaint
and end when the Justice Committee determines that the impeachment is sufficient in form and
substance.

Thus, I vote to grant the petition.

I. Publication and Due Process

a. The Due Process Objection

In the course of assailing the actions of the House of Representatives in its impeachment proceedings,
the petitioner raised various due process grounds, both substantive and procedural. The threshold
issue, however, that must be met before any substantive due process consideration can be made, is
whether there were valid and effective rules of impeachment in place, as required by Section 3(8) of
Article XI of the Constitution, when the House of Representatives embarked on the impeachment
process.

To the petitioner, the Justice Committee failed to properly determine the sufficiency in form of the two
impeachment complaints against her since no valid and effective rules of impeachment were in place
when the Justice Committee ruled on these matters; the impeachment rules of the 15th Congress were
published a day after the Justice Committee ruled that the complaints were sufficient in form. While the
impeachment rules were published on September 2, 2010, they were not yet effective when the Justice
:
 Committee ruled that the impeachment complaints were sufficient in substance on September 7, 2010.
Because no valid rules were in place when the Justice Committee initially acted and ruled on the
impeachment complaints, a fatal transgression of the petitioner’s right to due process occurred.

b. Justification for Judicial Intervention

Impeachment proceedings are political processes that the Constitution places within the exclusive
domain of the legislature. Section 3(1), Article XI of the Constitution plainly states that: "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment." Section 3(6) of
the same article grants to the Senate the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Even
the drafting of the impeachment rules is specifically entrusted to the House of Representatives.

At the same time that it entrusts the impeachment process to the House of Representatives, the
Constitution also provides clear standards and guidelines for the House of Representatives to follow to
ensure that it does not act arbitrarily. Among these are: the specification of the grounds for
impeachment,2 the periods within which an impeachment complaint should be acted on,3 the voting
requirements,4 the one year bar on initiating an impeachment process,5 and the promulgation of the
impeachment rules.6 Unwritten in the article on impeachment but, nevertheless, fully applicable are the
guaranteed individual rights that the House of Representatives must absolutely respect.7 To the extent
of these standards and guidelines, the Court – otherwise excluded from the impeachment process –
plays a part in its traditional role as interpreter and protector of the Constitution.8 The House of
Representatives must act within the limits the Constitution has defined; otherwise, the Court, in the
exercise of judicial review, can act and has the duty to strike down any action committed with grave
abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction.9

c. The Need for Prior Publication

The Constitution specifically provides that the House of Representatives must promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3, Article XI that, together with Section 2,
deals specifically with the House of Representatives’ power of impeachment.

To "promulgate" means to publish or to announce officially.10 By law, publication is necessary for a

statute, law or rule to become effective;11 Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect
after 15 days following their publication, unless the law provides for another period. Publication is
required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the
law, rules or regulations before these enactments take effect and affect the public’s rights and
interests.12 As a matter of basic fairness, "notice" is required before the public’s rights and interests are
placed at risk. In constitutional law terms, this is the guarantee of due process.13

We explained in Lorenzo M. Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, etc., et al.14 that the failure to
publish a law or rule offends due process; it denies the public knowledge of the laws that affect them
and removes the basis for the presumption that every person knows the law. The term "law" covers
laws of general, as well as local, application; it embraces legislative enactments as well as executive
orders, presidential decrees, and administrative rules. The only exceptions to the rule on publication
are interpretative regulations and those that are merely internal in nature, i.e., those regulating only the
personnel of an administrative agency and not the public.

The impeachment rules do not fall under the exceptions. Like the Monetary Board circulars that do not
only interpret but also "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act, the impeachment rules which interpret,
implement and fill in the details of the constitutional impeachment provisions must also be published.15
Significantly, even the ponencia states that the impeachment rules mandated by Section 3(8), Article XI
:
 of the Constitution were intended "to fill the gaps in the impeachment process."16 These rules cannot
be considered as internal rules that merely regulate the performance of subordinates and, hence, are
exempted from publication. They are rules that gravely affect the rights of impeachable officials; an
impeachment conviction results in the public official’s removal from office and disqualification to hold
any public office in the Philippines. The impeachment rules likewise affect a public right; it is a matter of
public interest to uphold standards applicable to public officials in the highest positions in the
performance of their duties; they are the balancing measures to ensure that our public officials are
continually held accountable in the performance of their functions. The fact that the Constitution itself
allows "any citizen" to file an impeachment complaint already draws the public as a party with an
interest to protect in the impeachment process.

It is a matter of record that the House of Representatives of the 15th Congress has seen it fit and
proper to publish the rules of impeachment, although the publication came too late for the proceedings
before the . Records show that the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the Fifteenth
Congress (Rules of Impeachment) was published on September 2, 2010. Under Article 2 of the Civil
Code, these Rules became valid and binding only on September 17, 2010. However, both parties admit
that before September 17, 2010, the two impeachment complaints had already been filed17 and
referred to the Justice Committee;18 that it had already held a hearing and voted that both complaints
were sufficient in form; and that it had subsequently conducted another hearing and voted that both
complaints were sufficient in substance.19

To rebut the petitioner’s allegation of due process violation for non-publication of the impeachment
rules, the ponencia asserts that the petitioner was fully apprised of the impeachment procedure and
had even invoked the rules. This justification, however, cannot fully suffice to do away with full
publication.20 Compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be excused based on allegations
that the party or parties involved had been notified of the existence of the rules.21 In National
Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Commission,22 the participation
of the parties involved in a previous public consultation and their submission of comments on the
proposed rules did not do away with the requirement to publish these rules before they could take
effect. The plain and obvious reason for this ruling, of course, is that the binding effect of laws, rules
and regulations cannot be made to depend on the actual knowledge of their terms by the affected
individuals and entities. The fact of publication assumes, by legal fiction, that all affected parties have
been notified and are aware of applicable laws, rules and regulations; thereafter, the published
enactments govern affected parties and their actions.

According to the ponencia, publication is not required since "promulgation" is not the same as
"publication"; she alludes to certain legal provisions on the Judiciary’s issuance of judgments where the
"promulgation" of orders or decisions does not require publication. The ponencia further cites National
Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms23 as justification.

The comparison of impeachment rules with court rulings is far from apt. Court rulings are
pronouncements by the judicial branch of government on specific cases affecting specific parties on
defined issues. As a rule, these rulings affect only the immediate parties to the case and their
successors-in-interest;24 hence, the public has no immediate interest that may be directly affected, and
need not be informed about the court rulings.

In contrast, laws, rules and regulations, as a rule, affect the public in general and for this reason, they
must be brought to the attention of the public. This reason underlies the rule on publication under
Article 2 of the Civil Code and the rule under the complementary Article 3 that ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance with its terms. These provisions fully apply to impeachment rules as
these rules affect everyone – the impeachable officials; the House of Representatives itself as the
:
 constitutional body charged with the initiation of the impeachment process; the members of the House
of Representatives; the citizenry who can bring impeachment complaints; and the public at large who
have a stake in the due performance of duties by their public officers.

From these perspectives, the term "promulgation," as used by the courts with respect to its decisions
and rulings, cannot be directly compared and equated with "promulgation," as used with respect to laws
and other enactments passed by the legislature; the latter require publication before they become fully
effective. Notably, the Judiciary itself is not exempt from the obligation to publish rules that bind the
public in general before these rules acquire binding effect. The Supreme Court publishes its procedural
rules because they affect the litigating public; the Rules of Court requires the element of publication in
"in rem" cases where court rulings are intended to bind the public in general.

Incidentally, the ponencia’s cited National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms case25
cannot be used to support the proposition that promulgation excludes the act of publication. In this
case, the Court did not come up with a categorical statement that promulgation should be construed to
exclude publication. Even if the term "promulgation"26 had been loosely used, the focus of the case
was on the need to publish rules before they become effective.

The ponencia also points out that even if Section 3 of Article VII of the Constitution requires the
promulgation of rules for the canvassing of election certificates, the House of Representatives did not
publish these rules.27 This justification likewise carries very little supportive weight as the failure of the
House of Representatives to publish rules – that, by law, must be published – does not do away with
the publication requirement.

I particularly reject the ponente’s statement that there is no other single formal term in the English
language to appropriately refer to an issuance without the need of it being published.28 Several terms
contradicting this statement immediately come to mind; instead of using the word "promulgate," the
words issue, adopt, set forth, establish, and determine may be used, depending on the context. Thus, I
cannot give any merit to the ponencia’s claim.

I, likewise, cannot accept the implication from the ponencia that the Constitutional Commission may
have used the word "promulgate" in Section 3(8), Article XI in a sense different from its established
legal meaning. The members of the Constitutional Commission are legal experts whose deliberative
records this Court did not hesitate to cite as authorities in the earlier Francisco case29 that first ruled on
impeachment under the 1987 Constitution. At the time the 1987 Constitution was discussed and
passed, Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Tañada ruling were already both in place. In both rulings, the
general legal usage of the term "promulgation" with respect to laws, rules and regulations denotes
"publication." Had a meaning other than this usage been intended, the members of the Constitutional
Commission could have plainly so stated, i.e., that publication of the rules on impeachment is not
necessary. The reality is that the Constitutional Commission members did not see the need to so state
because publication is a given. Significantly, even the members of the 15th Congress – who
themselves are experts in crafting legislations – impliedly recognized the need for publication as they,
in fact, did publish their rules on impeachment,30 although their publication was too late for the
proceedings of the . Under these circumstances, it requires a considerable stretch of the imagination to
claim that the term "promulgate" should be understood to be divorced from the requirement of
publication.

Even if I were to accept the ponencia’s position that "to promulgate" simply means "to make known"
and not necessarily "to publish," the ponencia does not state how the 15th Congress made its
impeachment rules known to the public other than through the publication it undertook31 (which
rendered the rules of impeachment effective only on September 17, 2010 or after the Justice
:
 Committee had acted on the impeachment complaints). With this omission, the 15th Congress cannot
be said to have complied with Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution in relation to Article 2 of the
Civil Code and with existing jurisprudence on this point prior to September 17, 2010.

In Romulo L. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al.32
we ruled that the Senate must publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or
otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed, to sufficiently put the public on notice on the
applicable rules.33 As the Court explained then, the Senate is not bound by the rules adopted by the
previous Senate. In the same manner, a succeeding House of Representatives cannot simply adopt the
rules of the preceding House of Representatives without publication of the rules or the fact of their
adoption. Simple adoption of the rules, without the required publication, leaves the House of
Representatives with no effective rules binding on the public.

Contrary to the ponencia, the fact that the applicable provision in Neri34 – Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution – uses the word "publish" instead of "promulgate" does not justify a different interpretation
of Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution. A justification for the need to publish the rules in aid of
legislative inquiries is to protect the witnesses who may be cited for contempt. Impeachable officials
and witnesses in impeachment proceedings are no less entitled to the same protection as they are
likewise subject to the contempt powers of the House of Representatives in these proceedings.
Additionally, impeachable officials stand to be removed from office, prevented from taking any other
government post, and made to experience the humiliation that an impeachment necessarily brings.
These risks define the standards of fairness an impeachable officer is entitled to in an impeachment
proceeding, whether at the House of Representatives or in the Senate. At the very least, duly published
and effective rules of impeachment must be in place to afford the official sought to be impeached the
fairness that Section 1, Article III of the Constitution demands.35

To be sure, the belated publication of the Rules cannot have the retroactive effect of curing the infirmity
that existed before the publication took place; the guarantee of due process is not served by a belated
notice as a violation has by then already occurred. Precisely, publication is a condition precedent to the
effectivity of the law.36

The ponencia also posits that the lack of publication would not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the
effectivity of the impeachment rules, because the 15-day period after publication would run counter to
the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

I find this argument unpersuasive for two very practical reasons.

First, the due process guarantee does not strictly require that the time gap between the publication and
the effectivity of an enactment be fifteen (15) days. The clear terms of Article 2 of the Civil Code show
that the House of Representatives has the discretion to specify a period lesser than 15 days before a
statute, law or rule becomes effective. Thus, it could have provided for a shorter period if its intent had
been to ensure compliance with the impeachment periods imposed by the Constitution. Unfortunately, it
did not so provide and this failure cannot now be used as an argument against the application of the
publication requirement.

Second, three (3) periods regulate the actions of the House of Representatives on the impeachment
proceedings. The first is the inclusion in the Order of Business which shall be made within 10 session
days from the filing of the impeachment complaint. The second is the three-session-day period within
which to refer the complaint to the proper committee. The third is the sixty-session-day period for the
committee to report out its actions and recommendations to the plenary. All these are mandatory
periods. But of these periods, the first two involve specific actions of the House of Representatives that
:
 are required by the Constitution itself and cannot, thus, be affected by the Rules. The committee
actions, on the other hand, have been left by the Constitution37 for the House of Representatives to
determine and undertake at its discretion, subject only to the requirement of a hearing; to the vote
required to decide at the committee; and to the general provisions of the Constitution on the protection
of the constitutional rights of the impeachable official. The temporal constitutional limitation is on the
period given to the committee to act – it must complete its proceedings and report back to the House of
Representatives in plenary within 60 session days from the referral.

Under the attendant facts of the case where the publication of the adopted Rules of Impeachment
came after the impeachment complaints had been referred to the Justice Committee for action, the
required 15-day period before it took effect necessarily fell within the mandatory 60-session-day period
given to the Committee. Thus, the opportunity to act within the mandatory 60-session-day period was
lessened by the 15-day waiting time for the impeachment rules to take effect.

The intrusion of the publication period on the mandatory period for action by the Justice Committee,
however, does not necessarily mean that the publication requirement must give way to the
constitutional mandatory period because the mandatory 60-session-day period has not repealed or
modified, impliedly or expressly, the publication requirement. No facial repeal is evident from Section
3(8) of Article XI of the Constitution, nor is there any plain intent to do away with the publication
requirement discernible from the terms of the constitutional provision. Neither is there any irreconcilable
inconsistency or repugnancy between the two legal provisions.38 Thus, no reason exists in law
preventing the two legal requirements from standing side by side and from being applied to the
attendant facts of the case.

An important consideration in the above conclusion relates to the length of the respective mandatory
periods. The Justice Committee is given 60 session days (i.e., not only 60 calendar days) within which
to act, while the period involved under Article 2 of the Civil Code is 15 calendar days. Under these
terms, the simultaneous application of the two requirements is not an impossibility, considering
especially that the Justice Committee has control over the impeachment proceedings and can make
adjustments as it sees fit to ensure compliance with the required 60-session-day period.

Under the given facts of the present case, the House of Representatives had ample time to pass and
publish its rules on impeachment soon after it convened, given particularly that its action was merely to
adopt the Rules of Impeachment of the 14th Congress. However, it chose not to undertake any
immediate publication. The House of Representatives, too, could have provided in its adopted Rules of
Impeachment for an effectivity period of less than the 15 days that Article 2 of the Civil Code generally
provides, as provided by this Article itself. This was not also done; thus, a tight time situation resulted
for the Justice Committee.

This tight timeline, however, is not an argument or justification to defeat the publication requirement as
this requirement cannot be defeated by the negligence or inaction of a party burdened with the duty to
publish. A saving grace in this case is that the full 60-session-day period has not lapsed counting from
the time the impeachment complaints were referred to the Justice Committee.

d. Consequence of Failure to Publish

In light of the House of Representatives’ initial failure to publish its impeachment rules, all the
proceedings prior to the effectivity of the subsequently-published rules must necessarily be void for
violation of due process. This is a conclusion the Court cannot shy away from; it must, as a duty,
declare the nullity of laws, rules and regulations affecting individual rights that are not published. This is
not the first time, in fact, that this Court will so act; jurisprudential history is replete with instances of
laws, rules and regulations that the Court has voided for lack of the required publication.39 As the
:
 present case stands, no discernable reason exists not to apply the fundamental rule on publication.

For clarity, nullity applies to all the proceedings so far taken before the Justice Committee. These are
the hearing on the sufficiency of form and the vote thereon taken on September 1, 2010, and the
hearing on the sufficiency of the substance and the vote thereon taken on September 7, 2010. All other
committee actions necessarily drew their strength from these early actions and are, therefore, affected
also by the lack of publication. The invalidity does not attach to actions taken by the House of
Representatives itself – i.e., the inclusion in the Order of Business and the referral to committees – as
these are specific actions taken pursuant to the terms of the Constitution. Given that published rules of
impeachment now exist and have been effective starting September 17, 2010, nothing should now
prevent the House of Representatives from resuming its proceedings from its last valid action – the
Speaker’s referral of the impeachment complaints to the Justice Committee which can now undertake
its constitutional role on impeachment.

II. The One-Year Bar Rule

My second point of disagreement with the ponencia is on the interpretation of Section 3(5), Article XI of
the Constitution (the one-year bar rule) which states that:

No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.

As explained by Mr. Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna in his Concurring Opinion in Francisco,40 "the purpose of
this provision is two-fold: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and to allow the legislature to
do its principal task of legislation." I highlight these purposes as I believe that they should drive our
interpretation of the above-quoted Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution.

a. The Contending Positions

The petitioner argues that the filing alone of an impeachment complaint initiates an impeachment
proceeding and the referral of the complaint is already the "initial action" taken by the House of
Representatives. Hence, no other impeachment complaint can be filed within a year counted after the
filing of the first impeachment complaint.

The private respondents – the proponents of the second impeachment complaint (Reyes group) –
argue that the petitioner may invoke the one-year bar only after a referral to the committee (in
accordance with Francisco), or at some point between the conclusion of the committee report and the
transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, specifically posits that an impeachment
proceeding is initiated only when the House of Representatives disposes the impeachment complaint
"by the vote of at least one-third of all the members of the House,"41 i.e., through a disposition against
the impeachable officer.42 The OSG and the Reyes group commonly ask, however, for a reexamination
of Francisco43 on the ground that its interpretation of Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution has
rendered the impeachment mechanism "virtually, if not completely, ineffectual"44 since it allows public
officials to escape constitutional accountability by simply obtaining the filing of a frivolous impeachment
complaint to preempt the filing of a meritorious one.45

The ponencia declined to adopt either position and applied the Francisco46 ruling that the filing and the
referral of the impeachment complaint to the proper committee "initiated" the impeachment proceedings
and triggered the operation of the one-year bar rule.

I disagree with these positions. Nevertheless, as the OSG did and as the Reyes group reflected in their
:
 positions, I believe that our ruling in Francisco47 must be re-examined, particularly its interpretation of
what the constitutional proscription against the initiation of more than one impeachment complaint
within a year covers.

b. The Facts of Francisco

Francisco48 is inevitably the starting point of discussion of the one-year bar rule, if only because this
case definitively ruled on the interpretation of the word "initiate" which this Court determined with finality
to be the acts of filing and referral of the impeachment complaint to the proper House committee. In
Francisco,49 the following facts transpired:

1. On June 2, 2003, President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (the first complaint)
against Chief Justice Davide and seven other associate justices.

2. On August 5, 2003, the first complaint was referred to the Justice Committee.

3. On October 13, 2003, the Justice Committee ruled that the first complaint was "sufficient in
form," but voted to dismiss it on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The
Committee Report, however, was never submitted to the House of Representatives in accordance
with Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution.

4. On October 23, 2003, Reps. Gilbert C. Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella filed with the
Secretary General a second impeachment complaint, which was accompanied by a "Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives. This was followed by a deluge of petitions filed before the Court seeking to
restrain the House of Representatives from further acting on the second complaint or for the
Court to dismiss those petitions mainly on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction.

Notably, under these facts, at the time the second impeachment complaint was filed, several acts in the
impeachment process had already been completed – i.e., the first complaint had been filed and
referred to the proper committee; the complaint had been determined to be sufficient in form but was
also found to be insufficient in substance. At that point, the Justice Committee only had to submit its
report to the House of Representatives, but this was never undertaken. Before any report could be
submitted, a second impeachment complaint was filed. Thus, the issue of whether the second
impeachment case was barred under Section 3(5), Article XI, arose.

The first complaint’s insufficiency in substance notwithstanding, the Court held (as echoed by the
present ponencia) that an impeachment proceeding had already been initiated "by the act of filing of
the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice,"50 adopting the view of amici curiae
Constitutional Commissioners Florenz Regalado and Father Joaquin G. Bernas that the word "initiate"
as used in Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution, means to file, both adding, however, that "the
filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving." This ruling was primarily directed
against the position that the vote of one-third of the House of Representatives in a resolution of
impeachment will initiate the impeachment proceedings.51

c. Refutation of the Petitioner’s Position

The petitioner’s position – that the mere filing of an impeachment complaint should serve as a complete
trigger for the one-year bar rule – is a repetition of the view that the Court rejected in Francisco.52 The
petitioner obviously equated a "verified complaint for impeachment" that may be filed under Section
3(2) of Article XI, to the "impeachment proceedings" that may not be "initiated" against the same official
more than once within a year under Section 3(5) of the same article. As in Francisco,53 the ponencia
:
 favorably considers the reasoning of Father Bernas that a "proceeding" before the House of
Representatives (as distinguished from a "case" which is the "legal controversy that must be decided
by the Senate) is progressive in character, having a beginning, a middle and an end. An impeachment
"proceeding" begins when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the proper Committee;54 the filing
of an impeachment complaint sets off the initial phase of the impeachment proceeding, this phase is
not completed and the impeachment proceeding is not fully "initiated" until the House of
Representatives itself initially acts on the impeachment complaint.

I completely agree with the ponencia that the petitioner’s position should be rejected. Aside from the
reasoning based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the petitioner’s restrictive view
unduly limits the people’s right to file impeachment complaints, at the same time that it ties the hands of
the House of Representatives – the body constitutionally answerable to the electorate – by effectively
placing the power of impeachment in the hands of random complainants whose acts can preclude or
suspend the filing of other impeachment complaints for at least a year.

Thus, it is only proper that the act of initiating the impeachment process should go beyond the act of
mere filing and should extend to initial action by the receiving entity on the complaint to fully signify that
an impeachment proceeding has been "initiated." To what acts the initiation phase shall extend is a
point of disagreement with the ponencia and is fully discussed at the appropriate topic below.

d. The OSG Position

At the other end (in fact, the back-end) of how an impeachment proceeding is "initiated" for purposes of
the one-year bar rule is the OSG’s position that the back-end is signaled by the favorable vote of a third
of the House of Representatives on the intrinsic merits of the impeachment complaint. This view
disagrees with the ponencia that the referral by the House of Representatives of the complaint to the
proper committee completes the initiation phase of the impeachment process.

Independently of the reasons propounded in Francisco,55 I reject this submission for two reasons.

First, to "impeach" simply means "to formally charge with a violation of the public trust"56 or "to bring an
accusation against."57 The power of impeachment is lodged with the House and not with the Senate;
the power of the Senate is to "try and decide an impeachment case." Once one-third of the House of
Representatives membership votes in favor of impeachment, the public official is effectively impeached
– i.e., indicted of an impeachable offense. At this point, the impeachment proceedings before the
House of Representatives (again contrasted with the totality of the impeachment "case") already
terminates; and an entirely different proceeding begins – i.e., the trial of the impeachment case at the
Senate.

Second, the OSG’s interpretation disregards the purposes of the one-year bar to the point of defeating
these purposes. If we pursue the argument to its logical conclusion, as long as the one-third vote
required to "impeach" has not been obtained, then the House of Representatives and the Justice
Committee can continuously receive and entertain impeachment complaints; only a favorable House of
Representatives vote (effectively, the endorsement of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate) can
serve as a bar to another impeachment complaint within one year. This position, to be sure, is a
prescription for the successive filing of impeachment complaints and "hearings" held one after another,
terminated only by the successful consideration by the House of Representatives of one of the filed
complaints. The possibility of multiple impeachment complaints is exemplified, not only in the present
case, but in the records of previous impeachment complaints before the House of Representatives
under the present Constitution.

I do not believe that this impeachment scenario is what the Constitution intended when it provided for
:
 the one-year bar rule; the operation of this scenario cannot but have the effect of causing undue delay
and prejudice to legislative work. To state the obvious, undue harassment of the impeachable official
shall also result, again to the prejudice of public service. All these run counter to the purposes of
Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution.

e. Revisiting Francisco

All the above having been said, the ponencia’s conclusion of strictly adhering to the Francisco58 ruling
leaves much to be desired as the ruling still leaves open the more specific question of what completes
the initiation process in light of the established purposes of the one-year bar rule.

An examination of Francisco shows that it extensively discussed the constitutional meaning of

"initiation" in Article XI by relying heavily on the records of the Constitutional Commission.59 Yet, it was
eerily silent on the purposes behind Section 3(5) which was the provision directly in issue.

Basic in construing a constitution is the ascertainment of the intent or purpose of the framers in framing
the provision under consideration. This should include, aside from the reason which induced the
framers to enact the particular provision, the particular purpose/s intended to be accomplished and the
evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. Constitutional interpretation must consider the whole
instrument and its various parts in a manner that would align the understanding of the words of the
Constitution with the identified underlying intents and purposes.60

Aside from discussing the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission in considering the initiation
aspects of an impeachment proceeding, the Court in Francisco61 gave the word "initiate" its ordinary
meaning, i.e., "to begin, commence, or set going" in accordance with the principle of verba legis. Thus,
the word "initiate" in Section 3(1), Article XI of the Constitution was read to mean to commence a
"case" that the Senate shall consider after the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment on the one-
third vote of all the members of the House of Representatives affirming the favorable resolution of the
Justice Committee or overriding it.

The majority in Francisco,62 however, never discussed the meaning of "initiate" for purposes of the
one-year bar based on the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. Only the Concurring Opinion
of Mr. Justice Adolfo Azcuna referred to the purposes of Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution, as
reflected in the Constitutional Commission deliberations. He quoted the proceedings as follows:63

MR. VILLACORTA. Madam President, I would just like to ask the Committee three questions.

On Section 3, page 2, lines 12 to 14, the last paragraph reads as follows: "No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
Does this mean that even if an evidence is discovered to support another charge or ground for
impeachment, a second or subsequent proceeding cannot be initiated against the same official within a
period of one year? In other words, one year has to elapse before a second or subsequent charge or
proceeding can be initiated. The intention may be to protect the public official from undue harassment.
On the other hand, is this not undue limitation on the accountability of public officers? Anyway, when a
person accepts a public trust, does he not consider taking the risk of accounting for his acts or
misfeasance in office?

MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, in
this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its
work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple
impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else but
that.64 (Emphases supplied).
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 Without doubt, the silence of Francisco65 (and of the present ponencia) on the purposes of Section
3(5), Article XI of the Constitution contributes in no small measure to the clamor for a revisit to
Francisco66 since it did not address the intent of the one-year bar rule, yet laid down a doctrine on the
provision that this intent produced.

e.1. An Alternative View of Francisco

e.1.i. The Back-End of the Initiation Process

I agree with the conclusion of Francisco67 on when an impeachment proceeding starts. Indeed, the
initiation phase of the proceeding cannot start at any point other than the filing of the impeachment
complaint. I cannot but agree, too, that the initiation phase is not confined solely to the fact of filing; the
House of Representatives as the receiving entity has to intervene for a complete and meaningful
initiation process. But beyond these, the question arises – up to what point does the initiation phase of
the impeachment proceedings end considering the totality of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution?

This question must inevitably arise since the presented reasons – either from the amici curiae or the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on Section 3(1) and Section 3(3), Article XI of the
Constitution – do not present ready answers. For one, the term "initiate" under Section 3(1) does not
carry the same sense as the term "initiated" in Section 3(5); the first refers to the power of the House of
Representatives to impeach as against the power of the Senate to try an impeachment case brought
forward by the House of Representatives, while Section 3(5) specifically refers to the internal
proceedings of the House of Representatives.

I submit on this point – i.e., on the outer limit or back end of the initiation phase of the impeachment
proceedings – that the intent and purpose behind Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution must
necessarily come into play. The complete interpretation of the Section must consider the point beyond
which another impeachment complaint shall constitute undue harassment against the impeachable
official, as well as the point that should serve as a cut-off to ensure that the House of Representatives
is not unduly taken away from its mandated lawmaking activities.

For a bird’s eye view of the impeachment process at the House of Representatives, the proceedings
run as follows:

a. A Member of the House files or endorses a verified impeachment complaint;

b. The verified complaint is included in the Order of Business of the House of Representatives;

c. The House of Representatives refers the verified complaint to the proper committee;

d. The committee determines the sufficiency in form and substance of the verified complaint and
submits its recommendations to the House of Representatives.68

i. If the Committee determines that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return the
complaint to the Secretary General with a written explanation of the insufficiency.

ii. If the Committee finds the complaint insufficient in substance, it shall dismiss the
complaint and make the proper report to the House of Representatives in plenary. (If the
House of Representatives disapproves the finding of insufficiency, thus effectively deciding
that the impeachment complaint is sufficient, then it returns the complaint to the Committee
for the proceedings described below.)

e. After a finding of sufficiency, the committee proceeds to require the respondent to answer and
:
 to hear the merits of the complaint.

i. If the committee finds that the complaint lacks merit, it shall submit to the House of
Representatives a resolution of dismissal. A vote of 1/3 of the House of Representatives
overrides the resolution, in which case the committee shall prepare the Articles of
Impeachment.

f. The House of Representatives in plenary considers the committee’s favorable recommendation

expressed through a resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment. By a vote of at least 1/3
of the House of Representatives, the Articles of Impeachment shall be endorsed to the Senate for
trial.

i. If the 1/3 vote on the resolution on the Articles of Impeachment is not attained, then the
complaint is dismissed and the impeachment proceedings end.

e.1.ii. The Ponencia’s Deficiencies

The ponencia demarcates the referral by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint
to the proper committee as the outer or back end limit of the initiation phase apparently because
referral is the initial action of the House of Representatives action on the matter. The appropriate point,
however, cannot be based solely on the first overt action the House of Representatives takes, if the
purposes of the "initiation" of the impeachment complaint are to be respected. Specifically, the purpose
and intent of Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution, as gleaned from the word "initiated" and the
one-year bar rule, must be considered. I believe that on this point, the ponencia made an incomplete
consideration that should be corrected.

e.1.iii. The One-Year Bar Rule and Its Purposes

The one-year bar rule and its purposes and effects, once considered, unavoidably introduce into the
word "initiate" the idea of knowing and meaningful action sufficient to have the effect of preventing the
filing of another impeachment complaint within one year. The import of what the bar signifies can be
gleaned from the importance the Constitution gives public accountability and the impeachment process;
public accountability is a primary constitutional interest that merits no less than one complete and
separate Article in the Constitution, while impeachment is one of the defined means of holding the
highest government officials accountable. They are prominent, not only in the Constitution, but in the
public mind as well.

In this light, the bar against impeachment that Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution speaks of
cannot simply be confined to the mechanical act of filing an impeachment complaint. As every citizen
enjoys the right to file a complaint, a bar triggered by the mere physical act of filing one complaint is
practically a negation of the granted right without a meaningful basis. Thus, the initiation of an
impeachment complaint, understood in the sense used in Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution,
must involve a process that goes beyond this physical act of filing; initiation must be a participatory act
that involves the receiving entity, in this case, the House of Representatives.

To be consistent with the nature and effects of the bar, the participation of the House of
Representatives in the initiation phase must itself be meaningful; it must be an act characterized by the
exercise of discretion in determining that the filed impeachment complaint is valid and can be the basis
for the impeachment proceedings to follow, subject to supporting and duly admitted evidence. To state
the obvious, only a valid impeachment complaint should serve as a bar; otherwise, no meaningful
balance would exist between the impeachment and the bar that can frustrate it.

The receipt by the House of Representatives of the filed impeachment complaint, like the filing of the
:
 complaint, involves a mechanical act that leaves the House be the basis for the impeachment
proceedings to follow with no discretion to exercise; a filed complaint must be received as the filing of
the complaint is in the exercise of a right granted by the Constitution. In like manner, the initial overt
action by the House of Representatives – the referral of the impeachment complaint to the appropriate
committee – is no different from the prior act of receiving the complaint. It is essentially a mandatory act
that the Constitution commands. In fact, the act of receiving an impeachment complaint cannot really
be divorced from the act of referral since both acts are products of constitutional directives couched in
the mandatory language of Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution.

The next action following the referral of the impeachment complaint to the Justice Committee is the
latter’s consideration of the complaint for sufficiency in form and substance. The determination of
sufficiency is essentially a test for validity and is the first opportunity for a meaningful action, involving
the exercise of discretion, that would justify the imposition of a bar. It is at this level, with the complaint
declared as valid, that impeachment proceedings can be fully recognized to be validly initiated.

From this perspective, the Francisco69 ruling – while essentially referring to aspects of the initiation
phase of the impeachment proceedings – does not fully cover its complete initiation phase. The act of
referral that passed Francisco’s70 approval is a purely mechanical act that does not consider the
validity of the complaint and the exercise of discretion in the determination of its validity as essential
elements. At the core, Francisco71 is incomplete because it did not consider the purposes of Section
3(5), Article XI of the Constitution.

e.1.iv. The Undue Harassment Purpose

From the perspective of the purposes of the one-year bar rule, it should be noted that up to the point of
the referral by the House of Representatives, nothing is expected to be done by the public official
against whom the complaint is filed. In fact, both the Constitution and the impeachment rules do not
require that the complainant furnish the official sought to be impeached a copy of the verified
impeachment complaint. Only after the Justice Committee finds the complaint sufficient in form and
substance that the respondent official is formally furnished a copy of the verified complaint.

It should be considered, too, that the mere filing of an impeachment complaint is not per se an act of
harassment. The filing of an impeachment complaint is a remedy that the Constitution itself provides
and defines. The concept of harassment only enters the picture in any subsequent complaint filed; the
Constitution itself bars a second complaint within a year from the initiation of the first complaint on the
presumption that the second complaint only serves to harass an impeachable officer.

Since "undue harassment" is practically a legal reason or justification for the one-year bar rule, it can
only be understood in terms of the legal effects that the filing of an impeachment complaint carries with
it. As against the impeachable official against whom a complaint is filed, legal effects start only from the
time a valid complaint is recognized. The mere referral of a complaint by the House of Representatives
to the proper committee does not in any way legally affect the public official against whom a complaint
is filed; at this point, he/she is only a passive participant in the proceedings – a person named in a
complaint that may not even prosper. Legal effect takes place only when the complaint is found valid for
sufficiency in form and substance, and the public official is formally furnished a copy and is required to
answer. At this point – i.e., when the House of Representatives, through its appropriate committee, has
exercised its discretion in taking concrete action against an impeachable public official – a valid
complaint can be said to have been formally recognized by and fully "initiated" in the House of
Representatives.

It is at this point, too, that the constitutional intent of preventing undue harassment of an impeachable
officer is triggered. Beyond this point, a second impeachment complaint, whether valid or invalid,
:
 becomes too many for an impeachable official to face within a year.

e.1.v. Interference in Lawmaking

From the perspective of interference in the House of Representatives proceedings, note that the
determination of sufficiency of the verified complaint in form and substance requires committee action
but not any hearing where the respondent official must be present as a matter of due process.
Sufficiency in form only requires a facial consideration of the complaint based on the mandated formal
requirements.

The Constitution requires the bare minimum of verification of the complaint, and the allegation that it is
filed by a Member of the House of Representatives or the endorsement by a Member if the complaint is
filed by a citizen. Additionally, following the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Rules of Court72 that
applies as suppletory rules, the form should be appropriate if a proper respondent, occupying an office
subject to impeachment, is named in the complaint, and if specific acts or omissions are charged under
one of the grounds for impeachment defined by the Constitution.

The complaint should be considered sufficient in substance if the acts or omissions charged are
appropriate under the cited grounds and can serve as basis to hear and to bring the Articles of
Impeachment forward to the Senate. It is at this point that the Justice Committee can determine, as a
matter of substance, if the impeachment complaint is one that – because of its validity – can serve as a
bar to a second complaint within a one-year period.

Notably, all these would only require the examination of the verified complaint and whatever component
annexes it may contain, without need for any formal hearing or any explanation from the respondent
whose opportunity to explain and dispute the case against him/her only comes after an Answer. It is at
this hearing before the Justice Committee that the determination of "probable cause" transpires.

Incidentally, the Constitution expressly requires that there be a hearing before the Justice Committee
submits its resolution on the Articles of Impeachment. Notably, too, the Constitution requires a hearing
only at this point, not at any other stage, particularly at the determination of the sufficiency in form and
substance stage, although no law prohibits the Justice Committee from calling the parties to a
"sufficiency" hearing.

Up until the determination of the validity of the complaint in form and substance, all of which are internal
to the Justice Committee, interference on the lawmaking part of the House of Representatives can be
seen to be negligible. The records of the present Justice Committee themselves show that it devoted
only two meetings to determine the sufficiency of the complaint in form and substance.

Thus, from the point of view of both possible undue harassment effects and interference in the
lawmaking activities of the House of Representatives, no justification on these grounds exists to restrict
the back-end or outside limit of the initiation phase of the impeachment proceedings to the referral of
the verified complaint to the Justice Committee. In fact, the nature of a referral as a mandatory and
non-discretionary action of the House of Representatives dictates that the initiation phase be extended
beyond this point. The appropriate point that serves both the "undue harassment" and "interference in
lawmaking" purposes of Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution is when the impeachment complaint
is determined to be valid. Beyond that point, the possibilities of undue harassment and interference in
lawmaking become real.

e.1.vi. From Prism of Experience and Practical Application

Admittedly, the alternative view dictates a result different from the result the Court arrived at under the
facts of Francisco;73 with the dismissal of the first impeachment complaint for insufficiency in
:
 substance, no complaint stood to trigger the one-year bar rule so that the second complaint should
have been recognized. But this consequence should not deter the Court from reconsidering its position;
experience in impeachment cases from the time of Francisco74 has shown that this ruling has not
served the overall purposes of impeachment at all.

As the OSG argued, the Francisco ruling can indeed encourage naughty effects; a meritorious
impeachment case can effectively be barred by the filing of a prior unmeritorious impeachment
complaint whose mere referral to the Justice Committee already bars the recognition of the meritorious
complaint. Its disregard of the purposes of Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution leaves the
impeachment process highly susceptible to manipulation. In contrast, this naughty effect can be
minimized with the adoption of the alternative view that fully takes the purposes of Section 3(5), Article
XI of the Constitution into account, as the alternative:

a. recognizes that the referral is a mandatory non-discretionary act on the part of the Speaker or
the leadership of the House of Representatives; all complaints must be referred to the Justice
Committee for its action and recommendation; and

b. recognizes that the Constitution grants the Justice Committee the initial discretionary authority
to act on all matters of form and substance of impeachment complaints, including the finding and
recommendation that a second complaint is barred by the one-year bar rule.

To be sure, an unmeritorious complaint can still be filed ahead of time under the alternative view and be
recognized as sufficient in form and substance by the Justice Committee in order to bar an expected
meritorious complaint. This is a political dimension of the impeachment process that neither this Court
nor the public can directly remedy under the terms of the present Constitution. The alternative view,
however, would prevent the unilateral refusal at the level of the Speaker or leadership of the House of
Representatives to refer the complaint to the Justice Committee on the ground of the one-year bar rule.
Once a second complaint is referred, the Justice Committee – as the body granted by the Constitution
with the initial authority and duty to rule – would then have to rule on the applicability of a bar and,
subsequently, report this out to the plenary for its consideration. At both levels, debates can take place
that can effectively bring the matter of public opinion to the bar where the political act of the House of
Representatives can properly be adjudged.

The ponencia, incidentally, posits that:

Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone xxx. It is the
House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its own chamber into
special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a second
impeachment proceeding xxx.

x x x. With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a
subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further
debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already
been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired xxx. Far from being
mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House[.]

The ponencia added:

Allowing an expansive construction of the term "initiate" beyond the act of referral allows the
unmitigated influx of successive complaints… Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping
hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a
resolution for impeachment…. or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House
plenary regardless of the recommendation… Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose
:
 behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. (Underlining supplied).

With all due respect and as discussed above, these statements disregard the clear wording of the
Constitution and the purposes of the one-year bar rule.

First, the constitutional directive to refer an impeachment complaint to the Committee is clear and
unequivocal; it does not set terms or procedures and provides only for a period. Also, the House of
Representatives itself does not appear – from the terms of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution – to
have the authority at the first instance to undertake any direct action on subsequently-filed
impeachment complaints other than to refer them to the proper committee. The House of
Representatives, therefore, must refer a filed impeachment complaint to the Justice Committee within
the mandated period. Any attempt to read into the Constitution any procedure other than what it clearly
provides is to introduce further complications into the impeachment process, and is an intervention
inconsistent with the terms of the Constitution.

Second, the question that the ponencia has not even ventured to answer is when an impeachment
proceeding is initiated in light of the purposes of the one-year bar. As pointed out above, until the
Justice Committee finds the impeachment complaint or complaints sufficient in form and substance, no
"hearing" is required under the terms of the Constitution and it is pointless to claim that overlapping
hearings will take place. The Justice Committee acts as the constitutional sentry through its power to
determine the validity of the complaints’ form and substance; the judicious exercise of this power is
enough to avoid the feared "overlapping hearings." Any subsequent complaint filed while an
impeachment proceeding, based on a valid impeachment complaint, is in progress, or within a year
from the declaration of the validity of an impeachment complaint’s form and substance, can only be
dismissed for insufficiency of substance as the consideration of its substance is barred by the one-year
bar rule.

It is in the same light that I find it difficult to fully appreciate the ponencia’s analogy – i.e., the referral of
the impeachment complaint is like the burning of the candle wick that ignites, that is, initiates
impeachment proceedings. Using the same analogy, lighting a candle unless done deliberately, i.e.,
with the purpose of lighting the candle in mind, would be no better that a candle lit in the winds’ way.
The purposes of Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution must be considered in determining when the
initiation phase of impeachment proceedings ends; otherwise, a manipulation of the process can
intervene, putting the impeachment process to naught.

III. SUMMARY
To summarize:

a. The House of Representatives properly referred the impeachment complaints filed against the
petitioner to the pursuant to the express terms of Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the referral is valid.

b. The proceedings were undertaken without the benefit of fully effective rules on impeachment
as required by Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, in relation to Article 2 of the Civil Code.
These proceedings violated the petitioner’s right to due process and, hence, are invalid.

c. In light of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the Fifteenth Congress,

promulgated on September 2, 2010 and which became effective on September 17, 2010, no legal
stumbling block now exists to prevent the from taking cognizance of the referred complaints and
from undertaking its constitutional role under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

d. The initiation phase of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the verified
impeachment complaint by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
:
 resolution of an endorsement by any member of the House of Representatives. The initiation
phase ends when the Justice Committee determines and the House of Representatives approves
the sufficiency of the impeachment complaint in form and substance.

e. The finding of the validity of the impeachment complaint in form and substance completes the
initiation phase of the impeachment proceedings and bars the filing of another impeachment
complaint for a period of one year therefrom.

f. Any question posed by the filing of separate complaints by two separate parties in the present
case is a matter for the Justice Committee and, ultimately, for the House of Representatives, to
resolve under the terms of the Constitution and its Rules on Impeachment. In light of the invalidity
of the proceedings of the Justice Committee, there is no concrete action that this Court can act
upon; the matter, at this point, is not yet ripe for adjudication.

On the basis of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 460 Phil 830 (2003).

2 Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution.

3 Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution.

4 Section 3(3), (4) and (6), Article XI of the Constitution.

5 Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution.

6 Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution.

7 Article III of the Constitution.

8 IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 5, 2000, 338 SCRA 81.

9 Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 562 SCRA 251, 271.

10 Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th edition.

11 Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc., 424 Phil 372, 393 (2002); and Pilipinas
Kao, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 834, 859 (2001). Article 2 of the Civil Code reads:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.

12 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, 368 Phil. 478, 491
(1999).
13 See Senate v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168777, 169659, 169660, 169667, 169834 and 171246, April
:
 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1, 72.
14 230 Phil. 528, 534-535 (1986).

15 Id.

16 Ponencia, p. 19.

17 Memorandum of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice dated October 26, 2010,
pp. 6-7; and Memorandum of petitioner dated October 21, 2010, pp. 4-7. The two complaints
were filed on July 22, 2010 and on August 3, 2010.

18 Memorandum of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice dated October 26, 2010,
p.7; and Memorandum of petitioner dated October 21, 2010, p. 8. Both complaints were referred
to the Justice Committee on August 11, 2010.
19 Memorandum of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice dated October 26, 2010,
pp.7-8; and Memorandum of petitioner dated October 21, 2010, pp. 8-16. On September 1, 2010,
the Justice Committee conducted a hearing on the sufficiency in form of both complaints. On
September 7, 2010, the Justice Committee conducted a hearing on the sufficiency in substance
of both complaints.
20 Ponencia, p. 21.

21 Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 173918, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA
680, 693.

22 G.R. No. 163935, February 2, 2006, 481 SCRA 480, 521.

23 Id.

24 Padilla and Phoenix-Omega Development and Management Corp. v. Court of Appeals and
Susana Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 123893, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 218; and National
Housing Authority v. Jose Evangelista, G.R. No. 140945, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 478-479.
25 Supra note 22.

26 Id. at 518 and 522. The term "promulgation" was used alternately in reference to orders and
rules.
27 Ponencia, p. 17. It is Section 4(6), not Section 3, Article VII of the Constitution that refers to the
promulgation of canvassing rules.

28 Id. at 18.

29 Supra note 1.

30 Urbano v. Government Service Insurance System, 419 Phil. 948, 969 (2001); and Corona v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97356, September 10, 1992, 214 SCRA 378, 392, citing Ruben
Agpalo, Statutory Construction.
31 Ponencia, p. 18.
:
 32 G. R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152, 230.

33 Tañada v. Tuvera, supra note 14.

34 Supra note 32.

35 Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum, supra note 21.

36 Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, supra note 12.

37 Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution.

38 See Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992, 216 SCRA 506;
Republic v. Asuncion, G.R. No. l-108208, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 230-232; Secretary of
Finance v. Ilarde, G.R. No. 121782, May 9, 2005, 450 SCRA 233; and Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,
G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 251-252.

39 Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 164026, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 113,
121-123; Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, supra note 21, at 689-694; Senate v.
Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168777, 169659, 169660, 169667, 169834, and 171246, supra note 13, at 71-
72; Pilipinas Kao, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 11, at 860-861; Philsa International
Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 408 Phil. 270, 290 (2001);
and Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, supra note 12.
40 Supra note 1.

41 Memorandum of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, pp. 78 and 80.

42 This is a step further than the interpretation of the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress of Article XI, Section 3(5) in Francisco. The Rules on Impeachment of the 12th
Congress provides that an impeachment proceeding is deemed initiated, among others, on the
date the House of Representatives votes to overturn or affirm the findings of the Justice
Committee that the verified impeachment complaint is not sufficient in substance. Simply, the
House of Representatives’ disposition of the impeachment complaint need not be against the
impeachable officer to "initiate" an impeachment proceeding.

43 Supra note 1.

44 Memorandum of respondents Reyes et al., pp. 30-31.

45 Memorandum of The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, pp. 80-83.

46 Supra note 1.

47 Supra note 1.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Id. at 169-170.

In Francisco, the Court stated that for Commissioner Regalado, the sponsor of Section 3(5),
:
 Article XI, "initiate" means "to file" adding that the act of initiating "included the act of taking
initial action on the complaint."

Father Bernas’ argument goes:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a complexus of acts

consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of
impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to
the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of
the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.

51 Id. at 164.

52 Id.

53 Ibid.

54 Id. at 169.

55 Id.

56 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed.

57 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.

58 Supra note 1.

59 I entertain doubts on the completeness of Francisco’s arguments in construing the word

"initiate"(which the ponencia effectively adopted) in so far as they rely on Commissioner
Maambong’s observations. The Commissioner’s remark on the need to be "very technical" on the
word "initiation" obviously referred to Section 3(3) of Article XI where the word "initiate" no longer
appears, but was read in relation to Section 3(1). The word "initiate" in Section 3(1), however, is
used in a different sense, that is, to bring an impeachable officer to impeachment trial in the
Senate. The word "initiate" in Section 3(1) is expressly used in the Constitution as a "power" –
and not with reference to procedure. The same word as used in Section 3(5) was understood in
Francisco to mean the "filing and referral to the Justice Committee" for action, which essentially
refers to procedure. In this consideration of Section 3(5), its purposes were not taken into
account.
60 See Civil Liberties v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317.

61 Supra note 1.

62 Ibid.

63 Id. at 1053

64 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 282; see also Separate Opinion of Justice
Azcuna in Francisco v. House of Representatives, id. at 313.
65 Supra note 1.

66 Ibid.
:
 67 Ibid.

68 A. COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS

Section 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form and Substance. - Upon due referral, the
Committee on Justice shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and
substance. If the committee finds that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return the
same to the Secretary General within three (3) session days with a written explanation of
the insufficiency. The Secretary General shall return the same to the complainant(s)
together with the committee's written explanation within three (3) session days from receipt
of the committee resolution finding the complaint insufficient in form.

Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in form, it shall then determine if the
complaint is sufficient in substance. The requirement of substance is met if there is a recital
of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee. If the committee finds that the complaint is not sufficient in substance, it shall
dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder.

Section 5. Notice to Respondents and Time to Plead. - If the committee finds the complaint
sufficient in form and substance, it shall immediately furnish the respondent(s) with a copy
of the resolution and/or verified complaint, as the case may be, with written notice thereof
and serve a copy of the answer to the complaint(s). No motion to dismiss shall be allowed
within the period to answer the complaint.

The answer, which shall be under oath, may include affirmative defenses. If the respondent
fails or refuses to file an answer within the reglementary period, he/she is deemed to have
interposed a general denial to the complaint. Within three (3) days from receipt of the
answer, the complainant may file a reply, serving a copy thereof to the respondent who may
file a rejoinder within three (3) days from receipt of the reply, serving a copy thereof to the
complainant. If the complainant fails to file a reply, all the material allegations in the answer
are deemed controverted. Together with their pleadings, the parties shall file their affidavits
or counter-affidavits, as the case may be, with their documentary evidence. Such affidavits
or counter-affidavits shall be subscribed before the Chairperson of the Committee on
Justice or the Secretary General. Notwithstanding all the foregoing, failure presenting
evidence in support of his/her defenses.

When there are more than one respondent, each shall be furnished with copy of the verified
complaint from a Member of the House or a copy of the verified complaint from a private
citizen together with the resolution of endorsement by a Member of the House of
Representatives and a written notice to answer and in that case, reference to respondent in
these Rules shall be understood as respondents.

69 Supra note 1.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Section 7, Rule 17.

73 Supra note 1.

74 Ibid.
:
 The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it
cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends
to become.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

The Common Law, Lecture 1 (1881)

At the heart of this controversy is the interpretation of the rule enshrined in Article XI, Sec. 3(5) of our
Constitution, that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year." With due respect to my esteemed colleague, Mme. Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales, I do not agree that there may be multiple complaints embraced in only one
impeachment proceeding.

Recall that Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives1 involved two impeachment complaints filed
on separate occasions, the first of which had been resolved long before the second complaint was filed.
The first complaint was filed on June 2, 2003 by former President Joseph E. Estrada against then Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Associate Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, Josue N. Bellosillo,
Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio, Renato C. Corona, Jose C. Vitug, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.
Upon referral to the House Committee on Justice, the Committee ruled that the complaint was sufficient
in form, but voted for the dismissal of the complaint for being insufficient in substance. Subsequently, a
second complaint was filed on October 23, 2003 against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
accompanied by the endorsement of at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

The Court in Francisco faced this question: when a first impeachment complaint is filed against an
impeachable officer, subsequently referred to the House Committee on Justice, and then dismissed,
may another impeachment complaint prosper? We said then that from the moment that the first
complaint was referred to the proper committee, the filing of a second impeachment complaint was
prohibited under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. Though the first impeachment
complaint was found to be insufficient in substance, it still served as a bar to a subsequent complaint
within the same year.

The Court ruled that "initiation [of an impeachment proceeding] takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the
filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General
of the House x x x"2 Thus, "[o]nce an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period."3 It was on that basis that
the Supreme Court invalidated Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the 12th Congress, and declared that the second impeachment complaint filed against
Chief Justice Davide was barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

The rule seems simple enough, and has since been readily applied. But what of a case where two
impeachment complaints are separately filed and then simultaneously referred to the Committee on
Justice. Does it then follow that only one proceeding has been initiated? To put it differently, is it
:
 possible to have two impeachment complaints but just one proceeding?

Mme. Justice Carpio Morales posits that multiple complaints within one proceeding are possible,
because the purposes of the one-year ban as enunciated by the framers of our Constitution – to
prevent harassment of the impeachable officials and to allow the legislature to focus on its principal
task of legislation4 – reveal that the consideration behind the one-year ban is time and not the number
of complaints.

Unfortunately, while we are in agreement as to the reckoning point of initiation, I cannot find any
reasonable justification for the conclusion that there can be multiple complaints in one proceeding. I
posit this view for two reasons: first, it does not appear to be entirely accurate that both complaints
were simultaneously referred to the Committee on Justice. Second, even assuming that there was
simultaneous referral, upon referral of the First Complaint5 to the Committee, an impeachment
proceeding had already been initiated, so as to bar any further proceedings on the Second Complaint.6

As regards the simultaneous referral, as shown in the Congressional records,7 and acknowledged by
counsel for the respondents during the October 12, 2010 Oral Arguments (interpellation of Mr. Justice
Antonio Eduardo Nachura), it appears that during the House plenary session on August 11, 2010, each
complaint was read separately by the Secretary General and individually referred to the Committee on
Justice by the Chair.8 Thus there was, strictly speaking, no simultaneous referral.

No doubt this Court should be more concerned with overarching principles rather than the ephemeral
passing of minutes or seconds. But even if we were to assume that there was, indeed, simultaneous
referral, it would be no less true that the filing and referral of each individual impeachment complaint
amounts to the initiation of two separate impeachment proceedings.

The word "proceeding" has been defined as "the regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including
all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment; any procedural
means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency; an act or step that is part of a larger action."9 This
is in contradistinction with a "complaint," which is "[t]he initial pleading that starts a[n] x x x action and
states the basis for the court's jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff's claim, and the demand for
relief."10

In Francisco, this Court stated that the impeachment "proceeding" consists of the following steps:

(1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a
private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing
of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3)
whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be
forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by
the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides
a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. x x x11

Here, both the First and Second Complaint separately went through these steps – they were filed,
referred to the Speaker of the House, included in the Order of Business, referred to the House
Committee on Justice, and separately considered by the Committee. In fact, the records bear out that
each individual complaint was separately scrutinized to determine whether each was sufficient in form
and substance, and the petitioner was required to answer both complaints. In all respects, there were
two proceedings.

To summarize:
:
 First Complaint Second Complaint
Date of Filing July 22, 201012 August 3, 201013

Complainants Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Renato Reyes, Mother Mary

Danilo Lim, Felipe Pestaño, and John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos,
Evelyn Pestaño Atty. Edre Olalio, Ferdinand
Gaite, and James Terry Ridon

Endorsers from the House AKBAYAN Representatives Hon. Representatives Neri

of Representatives Hon. Arlene Bag-ao and Javier Colmenares, Rafael
Walden Bello Mariano, Teodoro Casino,
Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio
Tinio, and Emeranciana A. De
Jesus

Grounds raised Betrayal of Public Trust Betrayal of Public Trust

1. dismal conviction rate of the 1. the delay and failure in

Ombudsman from 2008 prosecuting those involved in
onwards the Fertilizer Fund Scam

2. failure to take prompt and 2. the failure to prosecute "Euro

immediate action re former General" PNP Director Eliseo
President Arroyo and her de la Paz for violating BSP
husband, Jose Miguel T. Arroyo regulations on taking out of the
with regard to the NBN-ZTE country currency in excess of
Broadband Project US$10,000,000 without
declaring the funds to the
3. delay in conducting and Philippine Bureau of Customs
concluding the investigation on
the death of Ensign Philip Culpable Violation of the
Andrew Pestano Constitution

4. decision upholding the 1. the delay or inaction in

legality of the arrest and conducting the investigations
detention of Rep. Risaand filing criminal cases against
Hontiveros-Baraquel by the responsible COMELEC officials
Philippine National Police in pursuant to the directive given
2006 by the Supreme Court in
Information Technology
5. failure to conduct an Foundation of the Philippines, et
investigation into the al. v. COMELEC, et al.
PhP1,000,000.00 dinner at Le
Cirque in New York

Culpable Violation of the

Constitution

1. repeated delays and failure to

take action on cases impressed
with public interest

2. refusal to grant access to

:
 public records such as the
Statement of Assets Liabilities
and Net Worth

Transmittal to the Speaker July 27, 201014 August 4, 201015

of the House

Directive regarding August 2, 201016 August 9, 201017

inclusion in the Order of
Business

Referral by the Speaker of August 11, 2010 August 11, 2010

the House to the
Committee on Justice
Results of Vote on whether 39 in favor, 1 against 31 in favor, 9 against
or not the complaint was
Sufficient in Form
(September 1, 2010)

Results of vote on whether 41 in favor, 14 against 41 in favor, 16 against

or not the Complaint was
sufficient in substance
(September 7, 2010)

These two complaints have, in all respects, been treated separately by the House, and each stands
alone. In fact, the complaints have been treated in separate proceedings, as indicated by the fact that
there was no identity in the votes received by each complaint.18

To use the analogy of the candle, each matchstick is a separate impeachment complaint, and referral
may ignite the wick. But in reality, only one matchstick will cause the candle to melt; the other may feed
the flame, but a candle, once lit, stays lit, the second matchstick becomes superfluous. In
Shakespeare’s immortal words, "what’s done is done."19 In truth, each matchstick ignites a separate
candle, because separate and distinct proceedings are contemplated.

But perhaps we need not venture so far for an analogy. Just like in a regular lawsuit, different parties
may prepare their initiatory complaints and file them in court. The Clerk of Court then refers the
complaints to the branch for appropriate action. Even if the Clerk of Court refers two complaints to the
same branch at exactly the same time, this does not detract from the fact that two proceedings have
been initiated, particularly where each complaint alleges different causes of action. And though the
branch may hear the two complaints in one hearing, the two proceedings remain separate and distinct.

To summarize, notwithstanding simultaneous referral, once the First Complaint was initiated, that is to
say, filed and referred to the Committee on Justice, no other proceeding could be initiated against the
petitioner. This protection granted by the Constitution cannot be waved away merely by reference to the
"layers of protection for an impeachable officer" and the likelihood that the number of complaints may
be reduced during hearings before the Committee on Justice. As such, the filing and referral of the First
Complaint against the petitioner precluded the Committee on Justice from taking cognizance of the
Second Complaint.

However, though the Second Complaint is barred by Section 3(5) of the Constitution, the House
Committee on Justice should be allowed to proceed with its hearing on the First Complaint.
:
 I believe the Members of this Court are well aware of the tension here between the clamor for public
accountability and claims of judicial overreach vis-à-vis the demand that governmental action be
exercised only within Constitutional limits. In fact, our work here has been called unjustifiable arrogance
by an unelected minority who condescends to supplant its will for that of the sovereign people and its
elected representatives.20 Nonetheless, try as we might, we cannot shirk from our duty to "say what the
law is."21 Particularly, if one conceives of the law as both the reflection of society’s most cherished
values as well as the means by which we, as a nation, secure those values, then this Court can do no
less than ensure that any impeachment proceedings stand on unassailable legal ground, lest the
provisions of our fundamental law be used to work an evil which may not be fully measured from where
we stand.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote that: (1) the status quo ante order should be LIFTED; and (2) the proceedings
on the First Impeachment Complaint should be allowed to continue. However, proceedings on the
Second Complaint are barred by Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 460 Phil. 830 (2003).

2 Id. at 932.

3 Id. at 933.

4 See Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives (Azcuna, Separate Opinion), id. at 1053,
citing the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. During said deliberations, Mr.
Romulo, in response to queries regarding the one-year limitation, stated:

MR. ROMULO: Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public
officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the
legislative body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of
time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place,
the legislature will do nothing else but that.

5 Used here to refer to the Verified Complaint for the Impeachment of Ombudsman Ma.
Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez filed by Ms. Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Mr. Danilo Lim, Mr. Felipe
Pestaño, and Ms. Evelyn Pestaño with the Resolutions of Endorsement filed by Representatives
Bag-ao and Bello filed on July 22, 2010.

6 Used here to refer to the Verified Complaint for the Impeachment of Ombudsman Ma.
Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez filed by Mr. Renato Reyes, Mo. Mary John Mananzan, Mr. Danilo
Ramos and Atty. Edre Olalia with the Resolutions of Endorsement filed by Representatives
Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus filed on August 3, 2010.
7 House of Representatives (15th Congress of the Philippines), Journal No. 9, August 11, 2010,
available online at http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/journals_15/J09.pdf.

REFERENCE OF BUSINESS
:
 On motion of Rep. Romulo, the Body proceeded to the Reference of Business, and the
Chair directed the Secretary General to read the following House Bills and Resolutions on
First Reading, which were referred to the appropriate Committees hereunder indicated:

xxxx

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

Verified complaint for the Impeachment of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez

filed by Ms. Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Mr. Danilo Lim, Mr. Felipe Pestano, and Ms. Evelyn
Pestano with the Resolutions of Endorsement filed by Representatives Bag-ao and Bello

TO THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

Verified complaint for the Impeachment of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez

filed by Mr. Renato Reyes, Mo. Mary John Mananzan, Mr. Danilo Ramos and Atty. Edre
Olalia with the Resolutions of Endorsement filed by Representatives Colmenares, Casiño,
Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

TO THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE (Rollo, p. 576)

8See also, the Congressional Record of the Plenary Proceedings of the 15th Congress, First
Regular Session, Volume 1, No. 9, Wednesday, August 11, 2010, available online at
http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/congrec/15th/1st/15C_1RS-09-081110.pdf. The records
indicate that "[t]he Secretary General read the following House Bills and Resolutions on First
Reading, and the Deputy Speaker made the corresponding references."

[8] The TSN of the Oral Arguments before this Court dated October 12, 2010, pages 146-
150 states:

Associate Justice Nachura: Ah, one final thing, if this Court should decide not to
revisit Francisco, a question I asked Assistant
Solicitor General Laragan is that, when there are two
complaints, [is it] the second complaint that is [infirm]
if the second complaint is referred [to] the House
Committee, after the first complaint shall have been
referred? [Thus] the second complaint that will now
be [infirm] and barred by Francisco.
Ret. Justice Mendoza: Yes with particular reference to the facts of this case,
it would be the second complaint (interrupted)
Associate Justice Nachura: The second complaint (interrupted)
Ret. Justice Mendoza: That would have [to] be dropped, if Your Honor
please, for the simple reason that in the proceedings
of the (interrupted)
Associate Justice Nachura: House
Ret. Justice Mendoza: . . . House, on August 11 (interrupted).
Associate Justice Nachura: Eleven
Ret. Justice Mendoza: … 2010, the Order of Business. If you look just at the
Order of Business listed the first complaint filed by
:
 Risa Hontiveros-Baraquiel and three others ahead of
the second complaint, and not only that, set or,
rather, shows after reading the (interrupted)
Associate Justice Nachura: Order of Business
Ret. Justice Mendoza: … title of the complaint, this is the action taken by the
Speaker, refer it to the Committee on Justice
accompanied by the banging of the gavel, so that if
we have to be (interrupted)
Associate Justice Nachura: Technical
Ret. Justice Mendoza: Concerned with, not only our second, ah, minute and
seconds of what is done, then I would say just
looking at these, that there are time difference
between the action taken here in referring the first
complaint and the action taken in referring the
second complaint which was similarly, read
afterward, and then the Speaker said to the
Committee on Justice accompanied or followed by
the banging of the gavel to signify the action of the
Chair.
Associate Justice Nachura: That - that is what?
Ret. Justice Mendoza: But – But that’s not [a] concern and I am sure that
this Court did not intend that when it wrote the
Francisco ruling.
Associate Justice Nachura: Ah, that is precisely what I asked Assistant Solicitor
General Laragan, that it would not [have] been
possible to say that both complaints were referred at
the same time, because the House in plenary would
have acted on each individual complaint in the Order
of Business separately. And the referral technically
could not have happened at the same time, to the
exact minute and the exact second. And so if we
were to x x x apply Francisco very strictly the second
complaint would be barred.
Ret. Justice Mendoza: Yes.

9 Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (available online at www.westlaw.com).

10 Id.

11 Supra note 1 at 931, adopting the explanation of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.

12 Rollo, p. 91.

13 Id. at 133.

14 Id. at 561.
:
 15 Id. at 563.

16 Id. at 562.

17 Id. at 564

18 On the question of sufficiency in form, the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on Justice
held on September 1, 2010, Wednesday, 9:30 AM (Id. at 76-82), provide:

xxxx

Rep. Fariñas then moved to declare the first impeachment complaint filed [sic] Risa
Hontiveros-Baraquel as sufficient in form. The motion was duly seconded. x x x

xxxx

With 39 votes in favor and 1 against, the Chair declared the first impeachment complaint
filed by Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel as sufficient in form.

Rep. Casiño also moved that the Committee likewise vote to declare the second complaint
file [sic] by Mr. Renato Reyes, et al. sufficient in form. The motion was duly seconded. With
31 members in favor of the motion and 9 members against, the motion to declare the
second impeachment complaint sufficient in form was carried. (Id. at 80-81)

On the question of sufficiency in substance, the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee on
Justice held on September 7, 2010, Tuesday, 9:30 AM (Id. at 555-560), provide:

xxxx

Thereafter Rep. Fariñas repeated his previous motion to find the Hontiveros complaint
sufficient in substance, which was duly seconded by Rep. Remulla. The Chairman
proceeded with the voting on the motion, and with forty-one (41) members in favor and only
fourteen (14) against, the Chairman declared the impeachment complaint of Hontiveros, et
al sufficient in substance.

Rep. Fariñas then made a motion to find the impeachment complaint filed by Reyes, et al.
sufficient in substance. x x x (Id. at 560)

xxxx

With forty one (41) votes in favor of the motion, and sixteen (16) against, and one (1) refusal
to vote, the Chairman declared the impeachment complaint filed by Reyes, et al. sufficient in
substance.

19 Macbeth, act 3, scene 2, line 12.

20 The phrase "counter-majoritarian difficulty" as an issue in constitutional law theory is widely

attributed to Alexander Bickel’s 1962 book entitled The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics.
21 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803), 1803 WL 893.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

:
 SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

ABAD, J.:

The Facts and the Case

On July 22, 2010 respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel and others filed with the Secretary General of
respondent House of Representatives (the House) a verified impeachment complaint (First Complaint)
against petitioner Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez for betrayal of public trust and culpable
violation of the Constitution. Two members of the House endorsed this complaint. To sum up, the
complaint alleges:

1. Betrayal of Public Trust

a. The dismal and unconscionably low conviction rates by the Office of the Ombudsman from
2008 onwards;

b. The failure to take prompt and immediate action on the complaints filed against former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband, Jose Miguel T. Arroyo, with regard to the
NBN-ZTE Broadband Project;

c. The inexcusable delay in conducting and concluding an investigation on the death of Ensign
Philip Andrew Pestaño aboard a Philippine Navy vessel;

d. The decision upholding the legality of the arrest and involuntary detention of Risa Hontiveros-
Baraquel by the PNP in March 2006; and

e. The failure to conduct an investigation with regard to the ₱1,000,000 presidential party dinner
at Le Cirque Restaurant in New York in August 2009;

2. Culpable Violation of the Constitution

a. The repeated failures to take prompt action on cases involving official abuse and corruption in
violation of Section 12, Article XI, and Section 16, Article III, of the Constitution; and

b. The refusal to grant ready access to public records such as the Statement of Assets and
Liabilities and Net Worth in violation of Section 13(6), Article XI and Section 7, Article III of the
Constitution.

On July 23, 2010 the 15th Congress opened its regular session. Shortly after or on August 3, 2010
respondents Renato M. Reyes, Jr. and others filed with the Secretary General of the House another
verified impeachment complaint (Second Complaint) against Ombudsman Gutierrez also for betrayal of
public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. Seven members of the House endorsed the
complaint, which alleges:

1. Betrayal of Public Trust

a. The gross inexcusable delay in investigating and failure in prosecuting those involved in
the anomalous transactions arising from the Fertilizer Fund Scam despite the blatant
anomalous transactions revealed in the COA Findings, Senate Committee Report 54 and
the Complaints filed with the Ombudsman on the said Fertilizer Fund Scam;

b. The failure to prosecute General Eliseo De La Paz for violating BSP Circular 98 (1995),
as amended by BSP Circular 507 (2006), in relation to Republic Act 6713, which prohibits
the taking out of the country of currency in excess of US$10,000 without declaring the same
:
 to the Philippine Customs, despite the public admission under oath by General De La Paz
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee; and

c. The gross inexcusable delay or inaction by acting in deliberate disregard of the Supreme
Court’s findings and directive in its Decision and Resolution in Information Technology
Foundation of the Philippine, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al.

2. Culpable Violation of the Constitution

a. The repeated failures and inexcusable delay in acting upon matters brought before her
office, thus violating Sections 12 and 13(1)(2)(3), Article XI and Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution, which mandates prompt action and speedy disposition of cases.

On even date, the House provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of
the 14th Congress.1 On August 11, 2010 it simultaneously referred the first and second complaints to
the House Committee on Justice (the Justice Committee).

During its hearing on September 1, 2010 the Justice Committee found the first and second complaints
sufficient in form. On September 6, 2010 Ombudsman Gutierrez filed a motion for reconsideration of
the committee’s finding on the grounds that:

1. Such finding violates Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which bars more than one
impeachment proceeding against the same impeachable officer within a period of one year;

2. The contemplated consolidation of the two complaints also violates Section 3(5), Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution and would permit Congress to do indirectly what it is proscribed from doing
directly; and

3. The finding of the Justice Committee violates Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which
provides that a complaint must charge only one offense.

The Justice Committee declined to accept Ombudsman Gutierrez’s motion for reconsideration for being
premature. It advised her instead to just include in her answer the grounds she cited in her motion.

During its hearing on September 7, 2010 the Justice Committee found the two complaints sufficient in
substance. On even date, it caused the service of summons and copies of the two complaints on
Ombudsman Gutierrez with a directive for her to file her answer to the same within ten days. This
prompted her to file the present action, assailing the constitutionality of the Justice Committee’s action
in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and substance.

The Key Issue Presented

The key issue in this case is whether or not the House Justice Committee’s findings that the two
complaints against Ombudsman Gutierrez are sufficient in form and substance violate Section 3(5),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a year.

Discussion

The impeachment of public officials has been established for removing otherwise constitutionally
tenured and independent public officials—the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman—for culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust.2 The power to initiate impeachment cases rests with the House while the power to try the
:
 same rests with the Senate.3

The pertinent provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution summarizes the steps that lead
to the impeachment of the above public officials:

Sec. 3. x x x

(2) A verified complaint may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President
of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall
not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.

To sum up the various steps leading to the impeachment of a public official are:

One. A verified complaint for impeachment is filed by a member of the House or endorsed by him;

Two. The complaint is included in the order of business of the House.

Three. The House refers the complaint to the proper Committee;

Four. The Committee holds a hearing, approves the resolution calling for impeachment, and
submits the same to the House.

Five. The House considers the resolution and votes to approve it by at least one-third of all its
members, which resolution becomes the article of impeachment to be filed with the Senate when
approved; and

Six. The Senate tries the public official under the article.

The root of the present problem is that the impeachment of a public official may be said to be "initiated"
in two ways under the above steps. The first is the complaint "initiated" in the House under Step One.
Section 3 (1) of Article XI provides that the House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
"initiate" all cases of impeachment. The second is the article of impeachment "initiated" in the Senate
under Step Five following a favorable vote in the House.
:
 Ombudsman Gutierrez’s view is that there is just one impeachment proceeding and this covers the
actions of both the House and the Senate in one unified process. She infers from this that it is actually
the filing of the complaint in the House that initiates the one "impeachment proceeding" and this bars a
second one filed within the year. In the Francisco case, the Court interpreted the term "to initiate" under
Section 3(5) as the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of
said complaint.4 Such initial action consists of the referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the Committee.5

As amicus curiae, Fr. Bernas said in the Francisco case that "the Constitution is ratified by the people,
both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning
into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it."6

Based on common usage in this jurisdiction, a "proceeding" described in the terms of an initiated action
refers to a proceeding filed before the court, body, or tribunal that ultimately has the jurisdiction to hear
and decide such action. For example, an "expropriation proceeding" is one instituted in the court that
can hear and decide it, namely, the Regional Trial Court.7 It is the same with an "escheat or reversion
proceeding,"8 an "ejectment proceeding," an "estate proceeding," or an "adoption proceeding." Each of
these proceedings or actions is lodged in the body or tribunal in which the law ultimately vests the
power to hear and decide it.

Thus, when the Constitution speaks of "impeachment proceedings" it should be understood to refer to
the action or case instituted in the Senate in which the power to hear and decide such proceedings is
ultimately lodged. In this jurisdiction, the terms "case" and "proceeding" are often interchangeably used.
A "case" is a legal action or suit.9 "Proceeding" means the carrying on of an action or course of
action.10 The Constitution does not appear to draw any distinction between these two terms. At any
rate, the power that the Constitution gives the House is only the power to initiate all cases of
impeachment, not the ultimate power to hear and decide such cases. Thus:

Sec. 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.

For the above reason, it cannot be said that it is the party who files a verified complaint against the
public official that initiates an impeachment case or proceeding. It is the House that does. Actually, the
House exercises this power of initiation by filing the article of impeachment with the Senate. The power
to initiate belongs to the House, not to any of its committees, provided the House is able to muster at
least one-third vote of all its members in session assembled as the Constitution requires when the
impeachment resolution is taken up.

The initiation of an impeachment case by the House of course follows a process: the filing of the
complaint, the referral to the Justice Committee, the hearing by such committee, the committee voting
over its resolution, the submission of the committee report to the plenary, and the vote to initiate an
impeachment case. But this process should be correctly characterized as the House "initiation
proceeding," not the "impeachment proceeding" itself.

Besides, one needs to be guided only by the purpose of this constitutional provision. The initiation of
the impeachment proceeding in the House is intended to be a preliminary step for the determination of
the sufficiency of the allegations against the impeachable public official. It is akin to a preliminary
investigation in a criminal case where probable cause is determined against the accused. If there is
probable cause to indict the impeachable public official, then the Articles of Impeachment is transmitted
to the Senate. In a criminal case, a criminal complaint or information is then filed in court against the
:
 accused.

It is a settled principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be
given to it by the judiciary.11 While the one year bar was provided to ensure that the public official is not
subjected to considerable harassment and to allow the legislature to do its principal task of legislation,
the constitutional provision on impeachment must be viewed, foremost, as a means to protect the State
and the people from erring and abusive high ranking public officials. To interpret the one year bar to
commence from the disposition by the vote of at least one-third of all the members of the House gives
the constitutional provision on impeachment more meaning and effectiveness. It affords more
protection to the public interests since the initiation of impeachment complaints would no longer be a
race against time. A slippery impeachable public official would not be able to pre-empt the filing within
the year of a meritorious impeachment complaint against him by the simple expedience of colluding
with someone to file first a baseless impeachment complaint against him.

In the end, the protection of the vast majority must be of paramount importance over and above any
perceived inconvenience on the part of any impeachable public official.

At any rate, the issue of whether or not a case of impeachment initiated in the Senate can embody
multiple of unrelated charges is not before this Court. I reserve my view on such issue when it arises.

I vote to dismiss the petition based on the above reasons.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 On September 2, 2010 the 15th Congress published its Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings.
2 Section 2, Article XI. Accountability of Public Officers, 1987 Constitution.

3 Section 3 (1) and (4), id.

4 415 SCRA 44, 169.

5 Id. at 169-170.

6 Id. at 169.

7 Section 12, Chapter 4, Title, Book III.

8 Section 13, id.

9 Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 217.

10 Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 1072.

11 Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120363, September 5,
1997, 278 SCRA 819, 826.
:
 The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

PEREZ, J.:

The present case asks: Did the referral to the House of Representatives Committee on Justice of two
complaints for the impeachment of the petitioner violate Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution? I
respectfully submit that the successive referrals of the complaints are constitutionally prohibited.

The Impeachment Complaints

Petitioner Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez is the incumbent Ombudsman of the Republic of the
Philippines.1

On 22 July 2010, an Impeachment Complaint against the petitioner was filed before the House of
Representatives2 by private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo D. Lim, Felipe Pestaño and
Evelyn Pestaño.3 The complaint (First Complaint) charges the petitioner of Betrayal of Public Trust and
Culpable Violation of the Constitution, allegedly committed thru the following acts and omissions:

A. Betrayal of Public Trust

1. The dismal and unconscionable low conviction rate of the Ombudsman from 2008 onwards;

2. The failure to take prompt and immediate action against former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and her husband, Jose Miguel T. Arroyo, with regard to the NBN-ZTE Broadband project;

3. The delay in conducting and concluding an investigation on the death of Ensign Philip Andrew
Pestaño aboard a Philippine Navy vessel;

4. The decision upholding the legality of the arrest and detention of Rep. Risa Hontiveros-
Baraquel by the PNP in March 2006;

5. The failure to conduct an investigation with regard to the Php 1,000,000.00 dinner at Le Cirque
Restaurant in New York in August 2009;

B. Culpable Violation of the Constitution

6. The repeated delays and failures to take action on cases impressed with public interest; and

7. The refusal to grant ready access to public records such as the Statement of Assets and
Liabilities.

The First Complaint was referred to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Feliciano R.
Belmonte, Jr., on 27 July 2010.4 On 2 August 2010, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. forwarded the First
Complaint to the House Committee on Rules for its inclusion in the Order of Business.

On 3 August 2010, another impeachment complaint (Second Complaint) against the petitioner was filed
with the House of Representatives. This time around, the complainants were private respondents
Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Atty. Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite
and James Terry Ridon.5

The Second Complaint, like the First Complaint, also accuses the petitioner of Betrayal of Public Trust
and Culpable Violation of the Constitution, but is premised on different acts and omissions. Thus:
:
 A. Betrayal of Public Trust

1. Ombudsman Gutierrez committed gross inexcusable delay in investigating and failure in

prosecuting those involved in the anomalous transactions arising from the Fertilizer Fund Scam
despite the blatant anomalous transactions revealed in the COA Findings, Senate Report 54 and
the Complaints filed with respondent on the said Fertilizer Scam;

2. Ombudsman Gutierrez did not prosecute General Eliseo de la Paz for violating BSP Circular 98
(1995), as amended by BSP Circular 507 (2006), in relation to Republic Act 6713, which prohibits
the taking out of the country of currency in excess of US$10,000.00 without declaring the same to
the Philippine Customs, despite the fact that General Eliseo de la Paz publicly admitted under
oath before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee that he took out the country currency in excess of
US$10,000.00 without declaring the same to the Philippine Customs;

3. Ombudsman Gutierrez committed gross inexcusable delay or inaction by acting in deliberate

disregard of the Supreme Court’s finding and directive in its Decision and Resolution in
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al.;
and

B. Culpable Violation of the Constitution

Through her repeated failures and inexcusable delay in acting upon the matters brought before her
Office, Ombudsman Gutierrez violated Section 12 and Section 13, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, Article XI on
which her constitutional duty is enshrined, as well as Section 16, Article III of the Constitution, which
mandates prompt action and speedy disposition of cases.

The Second Complaint reached the desk of Speaker Belmonte, Jr. on the same day it was filed. On 9
August 2010, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. forwarded the Second Complaint to the House Committee on
Rules.

Then, on 11 August 2010, the plenary simultaneously referred the First and Second Complaints to the
public respondent House Committee on Justice.

The Proceedings Before the House Committee on Justice

On 1 September 2010, the House Committee on Justice conducted a hearing to determine whether the
First and Second Complaints were sufficient in form. The hearing was presided by the Chairman of the
House Committee on Justice, Representative Niel C. Tupas, Jr.

After taking up preliminary matters,6 the House Committee on Justice found the First Complaint
sufficient in form by a vote of 39 in favor and 1 against. Upon a separate vote of 31 in favor and 9
against, the House Committee on Justice also found the Second Complaint to be formally valid. In
assessing formal validity, the House Committee on Justice took into account the fact that the two (2)
complaints were referred to it at exactly the same time and that both were duly verified.

On 6 September 2010, the petitioner attempted to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the House
Committee on Justice. In it, she sought to question the authority of the House Committee on Justice to
take cognizance of two (2) impeachment complaints against her—in light of the constitutional
proscription against the initiation of multiple impeachment proceedings against the same official within
a one-year period. The House Committee on Justice, however, refused to receive this motion.7

On 7 September 2010, the House Committee on Justice reconvened to determine the sufficiency in
substance of the First and Second Complaints. By votes of 41 in favor and 14 against for the First
Complaint and 41 in favor and 16 against for the Second Complaint, the House Committee on Justice
:
 declared both to be sufficient in substance. The House Committee on Justice, thereafter, issued
summons directing the petitioner to file an answer within ten (10) days from its receipt. The summons,
as well as copies of the First and Second Complaints, was served upon the petitioner at 5:05 in the
afternoon of the very same day.

The petitioner did not file an answer.

Resort to the Supreme Court and the Status Quo Ante Order

Aggrieved by the actions of the House Committee on Justice, the petitioner came to this Court via the
instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. In sum, the petition asks for the nullification of the House
Committee on Justice’s findings that the First and Second Complaints were sufficient in form and
substance.

On 14 September 2010, this Court issued a Resolution directing the parties to observe the status quo
prevailing before the House Committee on Justice made the contested findings.

DISCUSSION

The submission of the petitioner may be summarized into two principal issues.

The first is whether the House Committee on Justice, in taking cognizance of two (2) impeachment
complaints against the petitioner, violated Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution. It is the primary
contention of the petitioner that the House Committee on Justice is already precluded from acting upon
the Second Complaint—the same having been barred under the Constitution by virtue of the filing of
the First Complaint.

The second is whether the hearings conducted by the House Committee on Justice violated the
petitioner’s right to due process.8

In this opinion, however, I only wish to articulate my reflections on the first.

Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution succinctly states:

No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.

In practical terms, the provision operates to bar the initiation of an impeachment proceeding against an
official, when the following conditions are present:

a.) an impeachment proceeding against such official was previously initiated; and

b.) one year has not yet elapsed from the time of the previous initiation.

Initiation of an impeachment proceeding was, in turn, the subject of the landmark case Francisco, Jr. v.
Nagmamalasakit na Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.9 In that case, this Court laid
down the rule that, unless the verified complaint is filed by at least 1/3 of the members of the House of
Representatives, initiation takes place upon the filing of the complaint coupled by its referral to the
proper committee.10

Invoking Francisco as their guide, the respondents proffer the position that the House Committee on
Justice may validly act on both the First and Second Complaints. The filing of the First Complaint did
not bar the Second Complaint because the mere filing of a verified complaint does not mark the
initiation of an impeachment proceeding. The respondents emphasized that Francisco associated the
:
 initiation of an impeachment proceeding not only with the filing of a complaint but also with the referral
thereof to the proper committee.

It is argued that since there was, in this case, but a single referral of the two (2) complaints to the
House Committee on Justice—the logic of Francisco dictates that there was also only one
impeachment proceeding initiated. Thus, the respondents concluded, there can be no violation of
Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution.

I disagree.

No Simultaneous Referral of Two Complaints

To begin with, there never was a "single" or "simultaneous" referral of the two (2) impeachment
complaints against the petitioner. Contrary to what the respondents adamantly profess, the complaints
were not referred to the House Committee on Justice "at exactly the same time." A perusal of the
records of the House of Representatives plenary proceedings on 11 August 201011 reveals that the two
(2) impeachment complaints were actually referred to the House Committee on Justice one after the
other. Thus:12

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE OF BUSINESS

Verified Complaint for the Impeachment of Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez filed by Ms.
Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Mr. Danilo Lim, Mr. Felipe Pestaño, and Ms. Evelyn Pestaño with the
Resolutions of Endorsement filed by Representatives Bag-ao and Bello

TO THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

Verified Complaint for the Impeachment of Ombudsman Mr. Renato Reyes, Mo. Mary John Mananzan,
Mr. Danilop Ramos at Atty. Edre Olalia with the Resolutions of Endorsement filed by Representatives
Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

TO THE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

The above entries plainly attest that, in fact, the reading and referral of the First Complaint preceded
that of the Second Complaint. True, the impeachment complaints were referred to the House
Committee on Justice on the same date and during the same session, but there can be no mistake that
each complaint was, nevertheless, the subject of a separate and distinct referral.

This fact has immense constitutional consequences. A prior referral of the First Complaint to the House
Committee on Justice would mean that an impeachment proceeding against the petitioner was, by
then, already completely initiated. This, by the Francisco ruling, renders inutile the succeeding referral
of the Second Complaint and makes such referral together with its subject, which is the Second
Complaint, unconstitutional excesses that can be given neither force nor effect. Francisco prohibits
rather than justifies a second referral.

Cognizance of this fact necessitated the creation of the fiction that the referrals of the impeachment
complaints were done "at the same time." This is shown by the floor exchanges following the
successive referrals of the complaints.

Representative Tupas rose on a parliamentary inquiry to seek, among others, a clarification on "what
was the exact time the two impeachment complaints were referred to the Committee on Justice."13 The
answer would become the battlecry of the respondents:

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Daza). The Dep. Majority Leader is recognized.
:
 REP. TUPAS. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Daza). The Gentleman may state his inquiry.

REP. TUPAS. Mr. Speaker, with respect to the impeachment complaints, may this Representation
know: number one, Mr. Speaker, when were the complaints filed; number two, when were they referred
to the Committee on Rules; and number three, Mr. Speaker, what was the exact time the two
impeachment complaints were referred to the Committee on Justice?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Daza). The Dep. Majority Leader will please respond.

REP. ROMULO. Mr. Speaker, in response to the query of the Honorable Tupas, the Committee on
Rules received the verified complaint for impeachment from the Speaker of the House yesterday. The
date of the first verified complaint filed by Miss Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al., based on the letter of
the Speaker, was dated July 22. The complaint filed by Mr. Renato Reyes, et al., based on the date of
the letter of the Speaker, was dated August 3. Both letters were received during the Committee on
Rules’ meeting on August 10 at the same time at 2:00 p.m. yesterday, and both complaints were jointly
referred by the Committee on Rules to the Committee on Justice.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Daza). Is the Gentleman from Iloilo satisfied with the response of the
Dep. Majority Leader?

REP. TUPAS. Partly, Mr. Speaker, but the third question is: what is the exact time of the referral to the
Committee on Justice? This Representation would like to know the exact time the two complaints were
referred to the Committee on Justice, Mr. Speaker.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Daza). Is the Dep. Majority Leader prepared to answer the query now?
The Gentleman from Iloilo, the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, is querying with regard to a time
frame, schedule or a cut-off time.

REP. TUPAS. Mr. Speaker, what I am asking is the exact time of the referral to the Committee on
Justice.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Daza). Yes. The Dep. Majority Leader will please respond.

REP. ROMULO. Mr. Speaker, the complaints were referred to the Committee on Justice at the same
time at 4:47 p.m. today.

REP. TUPAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker.14 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied].

I cannot, however, accept as possible, in fact or fiction, that the First and Second Complaints have
been "referred to the Committee at the same time." The announcement of simultaneity did not alter the
true manner of the referrals as clearly reflected in the records of the plenary session.

Interestingly, during the Oral Arguments on 12 October 2010, even the esteemed collaborating counsel
for respondent House Committee on Justice, former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente
Mendoza, admitted the "physical impossibility" of referring two (2) separate complaints at the same
time, as shown by the following exchange:
Associate Justice Nachura:

Ah, that is precisely what I asked Assistant Solicitor General Laragan, that it would not had [sic] been
possible to say that both complaints were referred at the same, because the House in plenary would
have acted on each individual complaint in the Order of Business separately. And the referral
technically could not have happened at the same time, to the exact minute and the exact second. And
:
 so if we were to in – aah, wait, if we were to apply Francisco very strictly the second complaint would
be barred.

Ret. Justice Mendoza:

Yes.15 (Emphasis supplied).

The recorded reality is that the First Complaint was referred to the House Committee on Justice before
the Second Complaint. An impeachment proceeding was already initiated against the petitioner even
before a single word about the Second Complaint was read before the plenary. On this score alone, the
Second Complaint should be held barred.

One Complaint, One Impeachment Proceeding

The fact as big as the recorded successive referrals is that the contrived simultaneous referral or single
referral to the House Committee on Justice of multiple impeachment complaints is not allowed under
Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution.

The initiatory act of "filing and referral," envisioned in the Francisco case, can only have one (1)
impeachment complaint as its subject. Allowing a referral to the House Committee on Justice of
multiple complaints would not only amount to a distortion of both Francisco and the constitutional
provision it interprets, but would also circumvent the very purpose of the one-year impeachment ban.

The Proper Context of Francisco

While Francisco may have identified what "acts" make up the initiation of an impeachment proceeding,
it was far from being categorical as to just how many complaints can be the "subject" thereof. Indeed,
other than defining what "acts" are necessary to accomplish initiation, Francisco never really ventured
on the possibility of several complaints being the subject of only one referral to the House Committee
on Justice and, for that matter, of only one impeachment proceeding.

In Francisco, a second impeachment complaint16 against then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. was
filed with the House of Representatives after a first complaint,17 which concerns him and seven other
justices of the Supreme Court,18 was already filed, referred to, and even dismissed by the House
Committee on Justice.

Under those facts, Francisco simply ruled that an impeachment proceeding against Chief Justice
Davide was already initiated upon the filing and referral to the House Committee on Justice of the first
complaint.19 Consequently, the second impeachment complaint was held barred because it was filed
within one year from the filing of the first.20

The impeachment complaints in Francisco, it may be observed, were never parts of only a single
proceeding. Each complaint was the subject of a separate proceeding—precisely the reason why the
second complaint was held barred under the one-year impeachment ban. Verily, the limited factual
context of Francisco offers no support to the conclusion that an impeachment proceeding may be
driven by more than one (1) complaint. There is simply nothing in Francisco from which that may be
derived.

The Underlying Purposes of Section 3(5), Article XI

of the Constitution

The discussion in Francisco of the underlying purposes of the one- year impeachment ban renders
unquestionable that it cannot be relied upon to sanction a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints
:
 to the House Committee on Justice. This is because an impeachment proceeding based on more than
one (1) complaint brings about exactly the evils the constitutional proscription seeks to avoid.

The framers of our Constitution formulated the one-year ban in order to forestall possible abuses of the
impeachment process. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission so divulge:

MR. VILLACORTA. Madam President, I would just like to ask the Committee three questions.

On Section 3, page 2, lines 12 to 14, the last paragraph reads as follows: ‘No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.’ Does this mean that even if an evidence is discovered to support another charge or ground for
impeachment, a second or subsequent proceeding cannot be initiated against the same official within a
period of one year? In other words, one year has to elapse before a second or subsequent charge or
proceeding can be initiated. The intention may be to protect the public official from undue
harassment. On the other hand, is this not undue limitation on the accountability of public officers?
Anyway, when a person accepts a public trust, does he not consider taking the risk of accounting for his
acts or misfeasance in office?

MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials
who, in this case, are of the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative
body to do its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we
allow multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the legislature will do
nothing else but that.21 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied].

Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution, therefore, serves to curb two (2) possibilities that may arise
should several impeachment proceedings against the same official be initiated within a one-year
period:

a.) the possibility of harassment on the part of the impeachable officer; and

b.) the possibility that the legislative work of Congress would be compromised.

Construing the initiatory acts of "filing and referral" as able to encompass multiple impeachment
complaints would encourage, rather than discourage, the occurrence of these possibilities. There is no
practical difference, at least in terms of their deleterious effects, between a simultaneous institution of
multiple impeachment complaints against the same official and the initiation of separate impeachment
proceedings against him within a one-year period.

First. Allowing the House Committee on Justice, under the guise of a single referral, to take
cognizance of more than one complaint against the same official would undoubtedly expose the
latter to the risks of undue harassment. Without a cap on the number of complaints that can be
the subject of an impeachment proceeding, the charges against an impeachable officer can easily
become limitless. The situation permits political opportunists to hurl a plethora of charges against
an impeachable officer who, in the midst of answering those charges, must also perform vital
governmental duties.

Second. An impeachment proceeding saddled with multiple complaints draws the prospect of a
protracted impeachment process. A long drawn-out impeachment proceeding would require the
House of Representatives to spend more time as a prosecutorial body, effectively distracting it
from the exercise of its law-making functions.22 This contradicts the very nature of the legislature.

I am, as a result, constrained to read the "and referral" part of the Francisco definition of impeachment
initiation as pertaining to one and only one complaint that is allowed to be filed and referred within a
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 period of one year.

Consistent with the proposition I have accepted, that the initiation of impeachment consists of the filing
of the complaint coupled by its referral to the proper committee, I accept likewise the delineation that
while referral is the logical step that follows the filing of a complaint, a referral does not necessarily
happen once a complaint is filed. I agree with the ponencia of my senior, Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales, that the House of Representatives has the power to "guard against the initiation of a second
impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint." May I incorporate into
mine, the position in the ponencia of Justice Morales that:

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided
without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is
common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be
debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. With respect to
complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment
complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an
impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred [to] the
said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in
perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical,
before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact,
grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral.23

In this case, the First Complaint was, by the House in plenary session, referred to the Committee on
Justice such referral having been included in the Order of Business of the House. There appears to be
no record of a debate on the propriety of the referral obviously because the official records at that point
do not show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already
been referred to the Committee; and the one year period has not even started. It is precisely the
referral of the First Complaint that started the one-year period of the ban against the Second
Complaint. The subsequent impeachment complaint, or the Second Complaint, could no longer be
referred because the first referral was already on record and no further debate is needed to prove the
documented fact nor can such debate disprove the fact. 1avvphi1

The observation that the Constitution affords the House a period of deliberation and grants it a
maximum period of three session days within which to make the proper referral is of utmost
significance. For one, it underscores the validity of my opinion that while referral is a step subsequent
to the filing of a complaint, a referral is not an unavoidable consequence of such filing. I agree with
Justice Carpio Morales that referral is not a mechanical action. It is a deliberate act, and, may I add,
with or without debate. The House ought to have been cognizant of this considering that it adopted as
its own rules the Francisco definition of initiation of impeachment as filing and referral of the complaint.
It is during the three-day allowable period of pre-referral deliberation that the House should decide
which of the two complaints should be referred to the proper committee. The First Complaint was
referred after a decision that it was proper for referral. This must be assumed, it having been done by
no less than the House in plenary. The assumption is now an unassailable fact since there was no
recorded objection to the referral. After that referral in due course, the one-year ban on another
initiation started. The referral of the Second Complaint subsequent to the first officially recorded and
undebatable referral is a constitutionally prohibited second initiation of an impeachment proceeding
against the same impeachable officer.

The clear conclusion cannot be avoided, proceeding as it does from the fact of first and prior referral.
Thus, the effort to avoid the fact. This cannot be done as adverted to above, simply because a
"simultaneous" referral, which did not happen and cannot happen, was obviously resorted to in order to
cure a constitutional defect. The Constitution cannot be violated directly or indirectly.
:
 Indeed, the existence of two complaints and of their separate referrals are further pronounced by the
facts that there were separate votings on the sufficiency in form of the First and then the Second
Complaints; and there were different numbers of votes for and against the sufficiency in form of the two
complaints. The same separate acts and different results transpired in the determination of the
sufficiency in substance of the First and Second Complaints. So separate were the complaints that the
possibility of consolidation was even discussed at the committee level – a matter that can no longer be
done at that stage because of patent, even implicitly admitted, unconstitutionality.

Alternative Theory of Initiation

Perhaps foreseeing that Francisco will give them no refuge, the respondents have alternatively asked
for its abandonment in favor of the theory that an impeachment proceeding is only initiated once the
House of Representatives, as one body, acts on either the report of the House Committee on Justice
or, when applicable, on the complaint filed by one-third (1/3) of its members. In brief, the initiation of an
impeachment proceeding ought to mean the entire proceedings in the House of Representatives.

The respondents insist on equating the initiation of an impeachment proceeding with the power given to
the House of Representatives to "initiate all cases of impeachment" under Section 3(1), Article XI of the
Constitution.24 Filing and referral could not be the initiation of the proceeding because at that point the
plenary has not yet determined whether to file an impeachment case with the Senate or not. Unless
and until such a determination is made, an impeachment proceeding cannot be validly considered as
initiated.

Finally, the respondents expressed their fear that, should the Francisco formula be upheld, frivolous
impeachment complaints may be used to bar more meritorious complaints against erring public
officials.

These are desperate arguments.

The alternative position espoused by the respondents had already been dealt with quite incisively in
Francisco. In the main ponencia, Justice Carpio Morales dismissed the very same position because it
gives the term "initiated" found in Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution, a meaning other than the
actual commencement of an impeachment proceeding.25 The lengthy disquisition of Francisco
provides:

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence,
or set going. As Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it,
it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado’s position, and that
of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5,
2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a
beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the
Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of
impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and
Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does
not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is
recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a
time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
:
 As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law.
Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions
on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some
time for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment
proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my
experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which
took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the
information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings
starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the
report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

xxxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the
amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do
not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed
out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the
floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the
body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the
initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment
proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House
of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case
of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of
the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2,
Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE
ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so
that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment of the Committee or
to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the
United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to
impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-
:
 third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will
not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.26 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied).

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee
on the Accountability of Public Officers.27

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus
curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to
initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to
settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with
the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does
not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint
under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution.28

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who
was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI,
Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to
set the complaint moving.29 [Italics, emphasis and underscoring in the original].

In Francisco, this Court also clarified that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding is vastly different
from the initiation of an impeachment case by the House of Representatives.30 Thus:

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing
in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.

xxxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year. (Emphasis supplied).

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the
first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding."
Following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the
term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate.
Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can
bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases
of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the
Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To
initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a
progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the
House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of
the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may
either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds
the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable
:
 resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members.
If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared
and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at
this point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of
another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the
House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series
of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the
line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the
filing of a complaint does.31 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified
complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to
begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as
they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not
abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment
proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint.32 [Italics,
emphasis and underscoring in the original].

I find no sufficient and cogent reason to deviate from Francisco. That the initiation of an impeachment
proceeding must be reckoned from the filing and subsequent referral of the verified complaint is an
interpretation of the Constitution anchored on the very intent of its framers and the honored principles
of statutory construction. It is, without a hint of doubt, what the Constitution conveys.

Neither can Francisco simply be disregarded out of the fear that it will allow erring officials - who, the
respondents say, may just cause a frivolous complaint to be filed ahead of more meritorious ones - to
easily escape impeachment. This fear is not grounded on reason. The Constitution already provides
ample safeguards to prevent the filing of sham impeachment complaints.

For one thing, impeachment complaints are required to be verified.33 The complainants are, under the
pain of perjury, mandated to guarantee that the allegations embodied in the complaint are true and
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 within their personal knowledge.

Moreover, the requirement of verification is supplemented by another constitutional safeguard, i.e. the
condition that every impeachment complaint, unless filed by at least one third (1/3) of the members of
the House of Representatives, must be endorsed by a member thereof.34 The endorsement of a
representative seeks to ensure that the allegations of the complaint are at least, on first glance, serious
enough to merit consideration by the plenary.

And, to reiterate, a three-day pre-referral proceeding can be availed of by the House in plenary to
determine the propriety of referral. Needless to state, an unreferred complaint does not initiate an
impeachment proceeding.

Indeed, the Francisco doctrine is not as arbitrary or reckless as the respondents portray it to be. In
marking initiation of an impeachment proceeding from the filing of the verified complaint and its referral
to the proper committee, Francisco did not destroy the effectiveness and integrity of the impeachment
procedure. It only applied the Constitution.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I VOTE to GRANT the petition IN PART. The Second Complaint
against the petitioner is BARRED under Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the
actions taken by the House Committee on Justice relative to the Second Complaint, including the
finding that it was sufficient in form and substance, are hereby declared NULL and VOID.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Petitioner assumed as Ombudsman on 1 December 2005.

2 The complaint was received by the Secretary General of the House of Representatives

3 The First Complaint was endorsed by representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.

4 The Fifteenth (15th) Congress formally opened its sessions on 26 July 2010.

5 The Second Complaint was endorsed by representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Rafael V.
Mariano, Teodoro A. Casiño, Luzviminda C. Ilagan, Antonio L. Tinio and Emerancia A. de Jesus.
6 Representatives Marc Douglas C. Cagas IV and Fernejel G. Biron, both members of the HCJ,
initially called for the inhibition of Chairman Tupas, Jr. from the proceedings. As it turned out, the
father of Chairman Tupas, Jr., former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., was the subject of a
previous investigation of the petitioner and was, in fact, charged by the latter with violations of
Republic Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. The case against Tupas, Sr. is still pending
before the Sandiganbayan. Chairman Tupas, Jr., however, refused to inhibit from the proceedings
and, instead, assured the other HCJ members of his utmost impartiality.
7 The petitioner, instead, caused her motion to be served personally upon each member of the
HCJ.
8 The due process concerns are: (a) the lack of a published Rules of Procedure for Impeachment
cases; (b) the perceived partiality of Chairman Tupas, Jr.; (c) the apparent haste with which the
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 HCJ determined that both complaints were sufficient in form and substance; and (d) the refusal of
the HCJ to receive petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

9 460 Phil. 830 (2003).

10 Id. at 940.

11 Congressional Record, Plenary Proceedings of the 15th Congress, First Regular Session,
House of Representatives, Vol. 1, No. 9, 11 August 2010.
12 Id. at 13.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 TSN, Oral Arguments, 12 October 2010, p. 150.

16 This complaint was filed by then Representatives Gilbert C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella, and was accompanied by an endorsement of at least one-third (1/3) of the members
of the House of Representatives.
17 This complaint was filed by former President Joseph E. Estrada and was endorsed by then
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen.
18 The other justices implicated in Estrada’s complaint were then Associate Justices Artemio V.
Panganiban, Josue N. Bellosillo, Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio, Renato C. Corona, Jose C.
Vitug and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.
19 Supra note 9 at 940.

20 Id.

21 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates, p. 282 (1986).

22 See Separate and Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez in the
Francisco case, supra note 9 at 983-1006.
23 In the majority opinion in G.R. No. 193459.

24 Section 3(1), Article XI of the Constitution provides: "The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment."

25 Supra note 9 at 940.

26 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates, pp. 342-416 (1986).

27 Id. at 416.

28 Commissioner Maambong’s Amicus Curiae Brief, p. 15 (submitted in the Francisco case, supra
note 9).
29 Supra note 9 at 927-930.
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 30 Id. at 932.

31 2 Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates, p. 416 (1986).

32 Supra note 9 at 930-932.

33 See CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 3(2).

34 Id.

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