481601

research-article2013
AAS47610.1177/0095399713481601<italic>Administration & Society </italic>Head and Alford

Article
Administration & Society
2015, Vol. 47(6) 711­–739
Wicked Problems: © The Author(s) 2013
DOI: 10.1177/0095399713481601
Implications for Public aas.sagepub.com

Policy and Management

Brian W. Head1 and John Alford2,3

Abstract
The concept of “wicked problems” has attracted increasing focus in policy
research, but the implications for public organizations have received less
attention. This article examines the main organizational and cognitive
dimensions emerging from the research literature on wicked problems.
We identify several recent approaches to addressing problem complexity
and stakeholder divergence based on the literatures on systems thinking,
collaboration and coordination, and the adaptive leadership roles of public
leaders and managers. We raise some challenges for public management in
some key functional areas of government—strategy making, organizational
design, people management, and performance measurement. We argue that
provisional solutions can be developed, despite the difficulties of reforming
governance processes to address wicked problems more effectively.

Keywords
wicked problems, complex problems, new public management, problem
solving, collaboration, risk and uncertainty

Introduction
At their best, and contrary to negative stereotypes, government organizations
are good at implementing policies and delivering services that are relatively

1Universityof Queensland, St Lucia, Australia

2Universityof Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
3The Australia and New Zealand School of Government, Victoria, Australia

Corresponding Author:
Brian W. Head, Institute for Social Science Research, University of Queensland, St Lucia,
Queensland 4072, Australia.
Email: [email protected]
712 Administration & Society 47(6)

standardized, routine, and high volume. As Kettl (2009) has shown, they per-
form tasks like delivering entitlements, treating patients, and administering
tests efficiently, and in most if not all cases, with empathy and responsiveness
to the citizens they serve. But they seem to be less well equipped to respond
effectively to nonroutine and nonstandard service challenges. Not unexpect-
edly, some public officials find it challenging to handle the more difficult prob-
lems facing them. This is especially true of what have been called “wicked
problems”—those that are complex, unpredictable, open ended, or intractable.
At first sight, grappling with wicked problems might seem like taking up
lost causes. As originally defined (Churchman, 1967; Rittel & Webber,
1973), wicked problems seem incomprehensible and resistant to solution. In
this context, a sensible public official or public policy scholar might look for
a more amenable object of work or analysis. But in this article, we adopt a
cautiously hopeful stance in respect of wicked problems based on decom-
posing their challenging features into more nuanced categories and seeking
to understand those governmental factors that make them especially difficult
for policy makers, public managers, and policy scholars to address.
We argue, first, that there are degrees of “wickedness,” which can be
understood by reference to multiple dimensions. We contend that while con-
clusive “solutions” are very rare, it is possible to frame partial, provisional
courses of action against wicked problems. We then consider how the struc-
tures and processes of public policy and management complicate the task of
understanding these problems and of designing responses to them. On the
basis of this critical analysis, we explain and assess some strategies for tack-
ling wicked problems, each encompassing a variety of alternative approaches.
In keeping with the recognition that all wicked problems are in some measure
unique, we call for judicious combinations of aspects of these approaches,
suited to the particular circumstances.

The Nature of Wicked Problems

Analyses drawing critical attention to the significance of complex policy
problems, and the unforeseen consequences of policy intervention in areas of
risk and uncertainty, emerged in several fields during the 1970s. These analy-
ses reflected widespread dissatisfaction with rational–technical approaches
to decision making, planning, and implementation. According to the critics,
rational–technical approaches assume that efficient and effective achieve-
ment of objectives can follow from adequate information, carefully specified
goals and targets, and choice of appropriate methods. However, frameworks
based on rational–technical decision making came under increasing fire from
several quarters in the 1970s and 1980s.
Head and Alford 713

First, a general critique was launched from the perspective of systems

theory, according to which social and economic problems cannot be under-
stood and addressed in isolation.

Every problem interacts with other problems and is therefore part of a system of
interrelated problems, a system of problems . . . I choose to call such a system a
mess . . . The solution to a mess can seldom be obtained by independently solving
each of the problems of which it is composed . . . Efforts to deal separately with
such aspects of urban life as transportation, health, crime, and education seem to
aggravate the total situation. (Ackoff, 1974, p. 21, italics in original)

Second, a number of writers concerned with social policy and professional

education argued that the major social issues of modern life are grounded in
value perspectives, and that gathering more information for scientific analy-
sis was insufficient to understand and resolve major problems (Rein, 1976).
The database for rational planning could not supplant the rich experiential
knowledge of professionals concerned to enhance the quality of human ser-
vices (Schon, 1983). Technical rationality could not come to grips with the
professional norms and practical knowledge of those who provide valued
services to individual clients experiencing real problems. Nor could it com-
prehend the experiences of diverse citizens who are supposed to be helped by
these interventions and the values underlying their needs and desires (e.g.,
equity, respect, opportunity, adequacy of resources). Accordingly, the devel-
opment of ever more comprehensive scientific expertise could not resolve the
many difficult policy problems of the modern era. These should be under-
stood as grounded in competing value frameworks rather than arising from
gaps in scientific knowledge (Schon & Rein, 1994).
Third, within the planning and design disciplines, a radical critique of
expert-driven rational comprehensive planning became widespread
(Churchman, 1967; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Webber, 1978). The most tren-
chant emerged in Rittel and Webber’s (1973) now-famous article “Dilemmas
in a General Theory of Planning.” They declared that the days of solving
major problems through an “engineering” approach have ended. Modern
society was now seen as pluralistic rather than homogeneous, and not ame-
nable to top-down general solutions. Social groups increasingly exhibit
important differences in aspirations, values, and perspectives that confound
the possibility of clear and agreed solutions. Modern problems of “social or
policy planning,” they claimed, are different from the technical puzzles
tackled by the physical and engineering sciences. The latter problems are
typically “tame” or “benign” in the sense that the elements of the puzzle
(e.g., a mathematics or engineering problem) are definable and solutions are
714 Administration & Society 47(6)

verifiable. By contrast, they claim that modern social problems are generally
“ill defined,” and rely on political judgments rather than scientific certi-
tudes. In this sense, most major public policy problems are “wicked” (Rittel
& Webber, 1973, p. 160), that is, they are inherently resistant to a clear defi-
nition and an agreed solution.
Rittel and Webber identified 10 primary characteristics of wicked problems:

1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.

2. Wicked problems have no “stopping rule” (i.e., no definitive
solution).
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, but good or bad.
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked
problem.
5. Every (attempted) solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot opera-
tion”; the results cannot be readily undone, and there is no opportu-
nity to learn by trial and error.
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively
describable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described
set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan.
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another
problem.
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be
explained in numerous ways.
10. The planner has no “right to be wrong” (i.e., there is no public toler-
ance of experiments that fail).

Challenges of Wicked Problems

The concerns about wicked problems, and their challenges for contemporary
governance and policy making, are linked in part to ongoing debates around
the proper role and scope of government. Clearly, the role of the modern state
has expanded greatly during the last century or so. But in the 1970s and
1980s, some political leaders were attempting to reduce the “overloaded”
role of government, and to lower community expectations about the capacity
of governments to address a wide range of major issues. Rather than further
extend public regulation to solve problems, they advocated greater responsi-
bility for individuals and communities, and greater use of market mecha-
nisms (Reagan, 1987; Rose, 1979). However, in more recent decades, some
political leaders have remained determined to undertake large initiatives to
address complex problems—even though such interventions might be based
Head and Alford 715

on imperfect knowledge, and even though the desired outcomes could take
many years to emerge. The methods available to understand and respond to
such problems are therefore of great significance.
Concerns about wicked problems have also arisen in relation to dealing
with disasters and crises of various kinds that throw into relief the (in-) capac-
ities of governmental systems to prepare, coordinate, and rapidly mobilize
resources. Donald Kettl (2009), in reflecting on the inadequacy of govern-
mental responses to disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, has argued for the
adoption of what he calls “nontraditional/adaptive/networked strategies” to
address nonroutine problems. The argument that exceptional events, such as
disasters, may require new types of policy response may be more plausible
than the claim by Rittel and Webber four decades ago that new approaches
would become necessary to deal with fundamental aspects of modern life that
tend to promote complexity, interconnectedness, pluralism, and uncertainty.
Roberts suggests that a heightened awareness of value differences has
emerged in parallel with the expansion of democracy, market economies,
international travel, and social exchanges (Roberts, 2000). In addition, the
literature suggests that many problems are marked by deep-rooted disagree-
ments about the nature and significance of particular problems and possible
solutions (e.g., policies concerning environmental protection, poverty, crime,
welfare services, immigration, and citizenship). The diverse sources of policy
divergence on complex value-laden issues underline the point that there is no
“root cause” of complexity, diversity, uncertainty, and ambiguity—hence,
there is no root cause of “wickedness” and no single best approach to tackling
such problems.
If, for example, it is claimed that the fundamental cause of wicked prob-
lems is stakeholder disagreement (i.e., conflicting values and perceptions),
this claim already implies a preferred “solution” pathway of reducing conflict
through dialogue. Thus, some analysts tend to favor participatory and dia-
logue-based approaches to goal setting, planning, and strategizing (e.g., the
urban planning work of Healey, 1997, and Innes & Booher, 1999). If, how-
ever, it is claimed that the fundamental problem is insufficient knowledge
about social processes, the implied pathway is further research and data col-
lection to fill knowledge gaps and improve the information base for decision
makers and stakeholders (e.g., Mosteller & Boruch, 2002; Petticrew &
Roberts, 2005). Thus, problem definition tends to imply a preferred solution.
Some caution is therefore required with any proposed methods or approaches
for addressing wicked problems, as they are likely to be provisional and
incomplete in various degrees.
“Wicked problems” have been considered in a variety of case studies,
since the 1970s, across several scholarly disciplines, including public
716 Administration & Society 47(6)

management and governance (Australian Public Service Commission

[APSC], 2007; Fischer, 1993; Harmon & Mayer, 1986; Head, 2008c; Roberts,
2000), climate change response policy (Lazarus, 2009), natural resource
management (Allen & Gould, 1986; Freeman, 2000; Kepkay, 2002;
Salwasser, 2004; Weber & Khademian, 2008), health care policy and pro-
grams (Blackman et al., 2006; Glouberman & Zimmerman, 2002; Kreuter,
De Rosa, Howze, & Baldwin, 2004), urban and regional planning (Christensen,
1985, 1999), business management (Camillus, 2008; Pacanowsky, 1995),
and cybernetics research (Conklin, 2006). Recent writers have tended to
emphasize that attempts to address wicked problems often lead to poor results
or unforeseen outcomes.
Wicked problems are generally seen as associated with social pluralism
(multiple interests and values of stakeholders), institutional complexity (the
context of interorganizational cooperation and multilevel governance), and
scientific uncertainty (fragmentation and gaps in reliable knowledge). Rittel
and Webber (1973) made the radical claim that there are no reliable criteria
by which to assess the success of different approaches, and that learning by
experience is not readily available in these matters. However, we take a more
pragmatic view. Along with more recent writers (e.g., Dobuzinskis et al.,
2007; Head, 2008b; Nutley, Walter, & Davies, 2007), we argue that although
every “solution” for dealing with a wicked problem is necessarily open to
further interrogation and adaptation, this is no bad thing. Robust evaluation
frameworks are not always in good shape for helping public officials under-
stand successive attempts to address ongoing social issues (such as poverty,
crime, child abuse, and urban decay), and different value perspectives on
many issues preclude consensus formation. However, we argue that impor-
tant learning and evaluation processes emerge from the adaptive manage-
ment experience of working at multiple levels with a range of policy
instruments. The process of democratic political debate provides a robust
testing ground for sifting the practical merits of options and for assessing
support for policy choices.

Complexity, Diversity, and Uncertainty

We propose it is useful to identify a spectrum of problem types, which would
not only help to explain the features typical of wicked problems generally but
which would also throw light on the differential features and intensities of
different problems. Not all problems are simply tame or simply wicked, as
Heifetz (1994) and Roberts (2001) pointed out. In his work on leadership,
Heifetz proposed a typology of different problem situations confronting man-
agers, ranked in ascending order of difficulty. Type 1 situations are those
Head and Alford 717

where both the definition of the problem and the likely solution are clear to
the decision maker (e.g., the manager or policy expert). These situations
require technical work on the part of decision makers and those subject to
their decisions. Type 2 situations are those where the definition of the prob-
lem is clear, but the solution is not—typically because the relevant cause-
and-effect relationships are hard to discern—and therefore learning and
discussion are required by both the governmental managers and the stake-
holders they lead. In Type 3 situations, both the problem definition and the
solution are unclear, and more extensive learning and discussion are required
for all concerned. We suggest that Type 1 situations constitute “tame” prob-
lems, whereas Type 3 situations, and perhaps many Type 2 ones, will contain
some features of “wicked” problems. Roberts (2001) suggested a similar tax-
onomy distinguishing between tame, complex, and wicked problems.
Thus, at one end of the spectrum, tame problems are those currently
regarded as capable of standard or routine solutions. They have low levels of
complexity and disputation and thus low perceived levels of uncertainty. Of
course, over a period of time, some of these problems may come to be seen
as more controversial or more complex and thus as requiring other approaches
and solutions. Tackling key challenges through nonstandard processes of
adaptive management and networked governance becomes more important
as problems exhibit higher levels of uncertainty and stakeholder contestation,
for example, where key actors take divergent approaches to problem defini-
tions and possible solutions.
The policy literature suggests that what counts as a problem and what
counts as a solution are heavily shaped by institutional history and stake-
holder perspectives (e.g., Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier, 2007). The ideas and
practices underpinning different views of policy problems and solutions are
only partially shaped by scientific knowledge. In a world of constrained or
“bounded” rationality (Jones, 1999), lack of consensus reflects differences in
values and experience; appeals to scientific expertise will seldom generate
acceptable solutions. Calls for more rigorous use of evidence in policy mak-
ing demonstrate the inherent difficulties of achieving consensus about the
knowledge bases required to address complex problems. These difficulties
may arise from intricate interdependencies of processes and structures, uncer-
tainties inherent in the dynamic nature of social issues and processes, the
incommensurability of potential risks, and the diversity of stakeholders
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The scientific research sector attempts to improve
the knowledge bases to better understand complex patterns of causality and
the interdependence of issues. However, the authority of “science” has itself
been deeply compromised in the modern context of social media and values-
based political debate (Pielke, 2007).
718 Administration & Society 47(6)

Provision of a more secure knowledge base is therefore only one part of

the challenge of dealing with ambiguity, uncertainty, and value disagree-
ments. There are not only cognitive-analytical challenges but also commu-
nicative, political, and institutional challenges to building a more shared
understanding. As the number and variety of actors, groups, and organiza-
tional units involved in a complex issue increases, the need for high-quality
management and leadership processes becomes more crucial (Conklin,
2006; Feldman & Khademian, 2007; Kettl, 2009). From the decision mak-
er’s point of view, diversity of either actors or institutional locations poses
broadly similar kinds of difficulties. Both entail a range of perspectives,
values, and knowledge bases relevant to the issue. Actors may have diver-
gent interests or values that prompt them to be in conflict about the nature
of the problem and how to deal with it. They all have expectations of the
decision maker, and they all constitute or mobilize potential sources of
information, permission, or resources. These divergent contributions need
to be shared to identify/define problems and consider appropriate responses
to them.
In general, the more complex and diverse the situation, the more wicked
the problem. For the decision maker, complexity and diversity create higher
levels of uncertainty or ambiguity. The forms they take in a particular case
will be tied to a range of factors—institutional arrangements, group behav-
ior, ideologies, issue histories, research findings, media biases, and so on.
We argue there are different kinds of wicked problems, and by implication
there could be different types of appropriate responses to them. In particular,
there is more to tackling wicked problems than engaging in a process of col-
laboration, which has tended to be the most characteristic response of gov-
ernments and policy makers. We argue for a more pragmatic approach, in
which the type of response is tailored to the types of wickedness the problem
seems to exhibit. Moreover, in the absence of clear and definitive solutions,
according to Conklin (2007), “You don’t so much ‘solve’ a wicked problem
as you help stakeholders negotiate shared understanding and shared mean-
ing about the problem and its possible solutions. The objective of the work
is coherent action, not final solution” (p. 5). The initial challenge for public-
sector managers and policy analysts may be to establish enabling conditions
whereby provisional solutions can be discussed and decided. Public decision
makers may occasionally claim to offer solutions to wicked problems (e.g.,
by redefining them or by advocating a preferred policy instrument such as
markets to handle some of the “messy” trade-offs). We argue here that some
approaches are likely to be better than others, and that some combinations of
approaches may be relatively effective for finding provisional solutions to
some problems.
Head and Alford 719

Public Management’s Shortcomings

in Dealing With Wicked Problems
Tackling wicked problems is challenging not only because of their inherent
complexity but also because the mechanisms of public-sector management
tend to complicate and hamstring efforts to resolve such issues. These struc-
tures and processes have evolved over time, with each new phase overlaying
rather than completely eliminating its predecessor. Each phase has mani-
fested its own characteristic approaches to the key management functions of
deciding what to do, organizing, budgeting, financial management and con-
trolling performance, and exhibited its own typical cultural norms.
Traditional hierarchical forms of public administration have not been
conducive to grappling productively with wicked problems. Hierarchical
forms of organization and systems of control, focused on input monitoring
and process compliance, substantially limited the opportunities to think
expansively about policy issues of the type that might be thrown up by
wicked problems. The tendency to recruit administrative employees at entry
level and retain them in the same organization, and to foster specialization in
areas of professional expertise, made each department a cultural fortress. It
tended to create “silos” or “stovepipes” demarcating functional areas within
organizations (Wilson, 1989). All of this was reinforced by a budgetary pro-
cess that featured line-item appropriations of inputs. The combination of
traditional bureaucracy and interest-group politics led to a “muddling
through” approach (Lindblom, 1979) that could not address the big issues in
a comprehensive way.
The sets of practices introduced from the 1980s generally termed “New
Public Management” (NPM) were designed in part to address some of these
shortcomings of traditional administration (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1990).
However, we argue that NPM practices have generally been ill-suited to deal-
ing with wicked problems. This is so whether we are referring to its initial
intraorganizational focus—sometimes labeled “managerialism” or “corporate
management”—or its more contractualist focus entailing purchaser–provider
splits, outsourcing, and privatization.
Managerialism—best characterized as “managing for results”—entails
orienting the public-sector organization’s structure, coordination mecha-
nisms, financial management, staffing, and rewards toward the achieve-
ment of results, broadly conceived as either sets of program purposes or as
groups of people served by programs. It was modeled on the multidivi-
sional form of leading private-sector corporations, each with a corporate
headquarters overseeing various business units, which it controlled through
setting and monitoring performance outcomes (Alford, 1998; Boston,
720 Administration & Society 47(6)

Martin, Pallot, & Walsh, 1996). Staffing at senior levels increasingly

focused on general managerial skills rather than professional or technical
content knowledge. Budgeting systems were typically oriented to appro-
priations by programs.
Central to managerialism has been a rational–technical approach to
making decisions, adopting corporate strategy methods from the private
sector. Initially, this took the form of rational comprehensive planning—the
very phenomenon to which Rittel and Webber’s original paper was a
response. It entailed formulating corporate objectives for the organization,
delineating discrete programs related to those objectives, setting out clear
outcomes for each program, drawing up action plans for achieving those
outcomes, and measuring the extent of achievement at regular intervals
(Frederickson & Frederickson, 2006; Radin, 2006). This model assumes
that each public organization has settled goals, a supportive political envi-
ronment, and control over the resources and capabilities necessary to
deliver on the goals—none of which necessarily apply in the presence of
wicked problems.
However, it is not only its decision-making approach that limits the
capacity of managerialism to grapple with wicked problems but it is also
the structures and processes through which it implements those decisions.
To the extent that performance-based managerialism moves away from a
focus on inputs and processes, and focuses attention further down the chain
of “program logic” toward outcomes, managerialism potentially allows
flexibilities in finding alternative means of achieving the desired results.
But to the extent that it holds managers responsible for a specific set of
programs or for serving a specific set of clients, the corporate management
framework tends to isolate from each other those programs that may actu-
ally have subterranean connections in respect of certain wicked problems.
This fragmentation manifests itself in tensions between program-based
subcultures, competing policy priorities, and, at worst, turf wars within and
between agencies.
This fragmentation was intensified by contractualism in three ways. First,
contract-based service-delivery models tended to shift the focus back along
the “program logic” chain from outcomes to outputs. This stemmed from the
necessity to delineate very precisely what was required of producers in con-
tracts; it is usually easier to specify specific outputs than broader outcomes
(Carter, Klein, & Day, 1992; Wilson, 1989). But prescribing a particular out-
put as the means for achieving an outcome tends to limit the scope for imag-
ining other means for doing so. Second, contractualism entailed separating
service-delivery functions from those devoted to formulating policy, decid-
ing what services were needed, and arranging with providers to deliver them.
Head and Alford 721

This “policy/delivery” separation, or “purchaser–provider” split, also had the

effect of fragmenting knowledge and understanding about factors that might
cause or at least influence wicked problems. In particular, they tended to
block opportunities for service providers, who were closer to the “coal-face,”
to provide feedback to purchasers about operational problems and about ser-
vice-users’ concerns that might be indicators of underlying problems (Stewart,
1996). To the extent that the providers may be private-sector firms or volun-
tary/community organizations, the separation is all the greater, because of the
different incentives and cultural norms they exhibit. Third, contractualism
entailed the establishment of competition between service providers (O’Flynn
& Alford, 2008). Designed to drive efficiency and effectiveness, this also had
the effect of undermining cooperation among those who might collectively
have significant information or insights relating to wicked problems.
Competition gave them an incentive to withhold rather than share knowledge
(deHoog, 1990).
These impediments to addressing wicked problems are reinforced by
some of the systems and controls that have also accompanied NPM.
Financial management processes have been recast in the form of output
budgeting and accrual accounting, which demand in an unchallengeable
technical fashion that entities and relationships be thought of in terms of
results, and generally make it harder to explore cross-agency solutions
relevant to wicked problems. Individual employment contracts and perfor-
mance-based remuneration of staff, especially of managers, also reinforce
this tendency, enjoining employees to give priority to their silo’s concerns.
However, the greater emphasis on employing more generalist managers,
and the increased flexibility of movement of staff across public agencies,
may foster broader knowledge and experience more likely to be conducive
to thinking laterally about the types of issues that involve wicked
problems.
In the same vein, although almost all organizations publish well-crafted
corporate plans and report earnestly on performance against those plans, the
further evolution of NPM has given potential scope for less linear approaches,
such as the processes that agencies utilize for developing strategies, from top-
down edict-issuing to bottom-up consultative mechanisms involving all lev-
els of the organization (and beyond) in their formulation. Thus, there is some
space opening up for modes of purpose setting and decision making other
than the rational goal-directed model. In particular, the recent trend toward
more robust community consultation and stakeholder engagement by public
agencies (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003) implies
a greater willingness to open the processes of goal setting and strategy
development.
722 Administration & Society 47(6)

In short, the conventional structures and systems of the public sector are
not scoped to address the tasks of conceptualizing, mapping, and responding
to wicked problems. Project management for tackling wicked problems
through long-term targeted interventions would require a substantial and
unaccustomed degree of flexibility in the structures and systems of public
governance. More generally, addressing wicked problems calls for public
officials to forge new ways of thinking, leading, managing, and organizing
that recognize the complexity of the issues and processes, and that make new
demands not only on their own organizations but also on other relevant actors
and institutions in their environments. The remainder of this article addresses
these possibilities.

Strategies for Dealing With Wicked Problems

Public management research and practice have begun to address not only
the conceptual difficulties but also the practical challenges of tackling
“wicked problems.” This work requires attention to complexity, uncer-
tainty, and disagreement. Moreover, calls for “more research” or “more
science” to address knowledge gaps are not a sufficient response, even
though better information is obviously a valuable contribution both for
“evidence-informed” policy making (Head, 2008b; Sanderson, 2006) and
for increasing the scope of consensus. Public managers and researchers
have been actively considering a range of strategies and processes to tackle
these problems. Perhaps most widespread is some form of collaborative or
networked management, wherein managers work across boundaries with
others who have relevant knowledge and a stake in the complex issue they
are grappling with (Weber & Khademian, 2008). In our view, this wide-
spread focus on “collaboration” as a process solution to wicked problems
is important but requires other measures. It is not always the primary or the
best option among possible responses to wickedness, primarily because
collaboration alone does not necessarily address all aspects of the com-
plexity challenges. Therefore, we additionally consider two further
approaches: broader ways of thinking about variables, options, and link-
ages; and new models of leadership that better appreciate the distributed
nature of information, interests, and power. We also include a brief consid-
eration of the secondary changes to management structures and processes
that might support these strategies. Not only is each of these strategies
important in itself in tackling wicked problems but the literature also high-
lights the important role of the interaction between them (see Chrislip &
Larson, 1994; Crosby & Bryson, 2005; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Lasker
& Weiss, 2003).
Head and Alford 723

Broader Ways of Thinking

About the Variables, Options, and Linkages
There have been many calls in recent decades for more holistic approaches to
thinking broadly about major social problems and about the possible ways of
addressing them. Taking a broad contextual approach allows greater room to
discover alternative means of solving problems. We will briefly note three
aspects of this style of thinking.
First, Schon and Rein (1994) advanced an approach founded in what they
called “frame reflection.” They argued that there are endemic problems in
social policy that are not amenable to definitive solution either by authorita-
tive determination (e.g., regulation) or through appeals to scientific knowl-
edge. Intractable disputes, according to Schon and Rein, are likely to be
grounded in different “frames” and value perspectives rather than in dis-
agreements about scientifically verified knowledge. Wicked problems there-
fore are not able to be understood and solved by scientific reports and new
research. Such issues can only be understood and discussed clearly by
addressing the value perspectives that frame the understanding of issues and
possible solutions. Much policy debate takes the form of bargaining in the
political marketplace to achieve temporary compromises on difficult issues,
but the underlying differences may persist. According to Schon and Rein, an
alternative approach is to construct a metaframe that builds on the conflicting
frames of reference deployed by key actors. Depending on the scale of the
issue, it may be feasible for policy designers to involve the antagonists them-
selves in constructing a shared narrative that recognizes multiple voices,
teases out the implications of these value preferences, and seeks to resolve
conflicts.
This activity is partly analytical and partly discursive—stakeholders are
confronted with the responsibility for working through the implications of a
more coherent approach. There may also be an important contributing role
for researchers and policy analysts by delineating the factors shaping a com-
plex situation, mapping the complex patterns of causality at work, and cali-
brating the likely effects of new interventions or programs. In some cases, the
analytical task may be assisted by deeply involving nongovernment stake-
holders who have expertise in delivering services and in evaluating perfor-
mance. For example, Schorr (2003) has developed workshop methodologies
for mapping the challenges faced by human service professionals in both
understanding the complex issues and developing more effective approaches
to address the well-being of children and youth in poor suburbs.
Second, systems thinking, in the nontechnical sense adopted by Senge
(1992), Chapman (2004), and Seddon (2008), attempts to overcome the
724 Administration & Society 47(6)

mechanistic and linear metaphors of “command-and-control” that tend to be

common in organizations, taking instead a more holistic and interactive
approach to causes and impacts. Systems thinking accepts that social knowl-
edge is provisional and context dependent. It entails consideration not only
of the desired outcomes but also of the complex web of inputs, processes,
and outputs that lead to these outcomes. This includes considering not only
the core production process within the relevant organization but also the
auxiliary or parallel processes outside each organization, across other orga-
nizations, or in the wider society. This approach can be deployed to search,
in a relatively comprehensive way, for factors that may contribute to the
nature of a wicked problem and factors that can contribute to its being
addressed. Systems thinking in this way can be helpful in understanding the
complexity dimension of wicked problems, but it is less applicable for deal-
ing with the political and communicative aspects of wicked problems. Other
analytical approaches to establish the program logic for particular policy
settings include cognitive mapping (Toulmin, 2001), causal mapping
(Axelrod, 1976; Bryson, Ackermann, Eden, & Finn, 2004), and logic model-
ing (Millar, Simeone, & Carnevale, 2001).
Third, complexity theory has been used to highlight some of the chaotic
and contradictory aspects of policy interventions in complex settings. It was
developed in the physical and computational sciences and has recently been
applied to policy and institutional issues (Geyer & Rihani, 2010; Kiel, 1994;
Schneider, 2012; Tiesman et al., 2009). Key ideas from complexity science,
such as interdependence, feedback loops, emergent features, and surprises,
have been adopted in environmental policy to explain ecological processes
and the impacts of human interventions (Berkes et al., 2003). Much of this
work has been closely linked with accounts of how “adaptive management”
is required to respond flexibly to the changing social and institutional con-
texts and challenges, and how policy networks can positively respond to rap-
idly changing circumstances (Berkhout, Leach, & Scoones, 2003; Haynes,
2003; Tiesman et al., 2009). The main uses of complexity theory have been
to aid the analysis of complex trends and challenges rather than to demon-
strate more effective solutions. These aids to analysis can usefully supple-
ment the other major approaches to be considered below: collaboration and
coordination, the role of leadership, and the need for enabling processes in
public governance.

Collaboration and Coordination

The research literature on addressing complex problems suggests that coop-
erative approaches are likely to be central instruments (e.g., Alford &
Head and Alford 725

O’Flynn, 2012; Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005; Lovan et al., 2004;
O’Leary & Bingham, 2009). In recent decades, more collaborative arrange-
ments have been emerging between many different types of partners (Kickert,
Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997; Mandell, 2001; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).
Collaboration and partnering can take many different shapes—for example,
between organizations within the same governmental jurisdiction or between
different levels of government, or alternatively the relationships might be
forged across sectors, that is, between government agencies, private firms,
and nonprofit/community organizations (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003;
Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Imperial, 2004). It can entail different mixes in
the roles played by partners, such as defining policy, implementation, or
resource provision (Agranoff, 2007; Savas, 1987).
The literature reflects this diversity with varying perspectives based on
(inter alia) policy network theory, resource dependency theory, exchange the-
ory, and collaboration as a management issue—which not only differ from
each other in defining respects, founded in their disciplinary origins, but also
converge in other respects (for a useful survey, see Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002).
There are also important conceptual distinctions between degrees of closeness
of relationships, for example, cooperative, coordinative, and collaborative
approaches (Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004). For our purpose,
collaborative working may include greater or lesser degrees of either volun-
tarism or formal contractual partnering. At its core, however, it entails at least
some degree of shared understanding, agreed purposes, mutual trust, and usu-
ally an element of interdependence (Huxham & Vangen, 2005), which usually
require time, effort, and skill to bring about. These processes are part of a
potentially virtuous circle: they enable more successful collaboration, but in
turn they are reinforced by the resultant cooperation (Ansell & Gash, 2008).
With that in mind, our focus here is not so much on what facilitates collabora-
tion as on the impact of collaboration on wicked problems. We find many
points of convergence between the different literatures on this critical aspect.
The presence of collaborative relationships is likely to enhance the under-
standing and addressing of those wicked problems where there are multiple
parties with differential knowledge, interests, or values. This is one form of
what Huxham and Vangen (2005) called “collaborative advantage,” a term
that includes, inter alia, a role for collaboration in tackling the kinds of prob-
lems we normally regard as “wicked” and for which there is no other way,
such as poverty, crime, or drug abuse. Where collaboration is operating effec-
tively (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Head, 2008a), it can help in addressing wicked
problems in three ways.
First, the presence of functioning cooperative networks increases the like-
lihood that the nature of the problem and its underlying causes can be better,
726 Administration & Society 47(6)

if not entirely understood (North, 2000; Padilla & Daigle, 1998). This mani-
fests itself as a shared understanding of the problems and overarching pur-
poses (Bentrup, 2001; Pahl-Wostl & Hare, 2004). This not only arises in part
from a shared ownership of the deliberative process (Gunton & Day, 2003;
Tett, Crowther, & O’Hara, 2003) but also arises from the involvement of a
wider array of actors, offering more diverse insights into why a situation has
arisen.
Second, collaboration increases the likelihood that provisional solutions
to the problem can be found and agreed upon, not only because a wider net-
work offers more insights but also because greater cooperation improves the
prospect that diverse parties (who may have differing interests concerning the
issue) may reach an understanding about what to do. This follows from hav-
ing pooled knowledge and openness to joint problem solving (Chrislip &
Larson, 1994), and is sustained by “small wins” as collaboration evolves
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Levine & White, 1961).
These roles of problem and solution identification in collaborative gover-
nance are equally significant in the network literature (Rhodes, 2007). As
noted by Agranoff (2007),

It is rare that a single government or agency has a monopoly on potential problem

solutions . . . Some problems such as nonpoint source pollution involve a wide
range of actors . . . The information function in networks is core to its operations
because multiple parties must be convened to explore the various dimensions of a
problem, to become aware of the technology used to deal with each facet of a
problem. (p. 222)

Third, it facilitates the implementation of solutions, not only because the

parties are more likely to have agreed on the next steps but also because it
potentially enables shared contributions, coordinated actions, and mutual
adjustments among them as problems arise in putting the agreed solution into
practice (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Mandell, 2001), enhanced by bestowing
autonomy and hence flexibility on organizational representatives (Bardach,
1998).
A number of characteristics of collaborative arrangements enable these
effects to be realized. Some of them reside in the practices of managers in
networks. Feldman and Khademian (2007), for instance, identified “inclusive
management” as a set of practices that create “communities of participation,”
including informational work (“recognizing ways of understanding policy
issues and disseminating information about these different ways of knowing”)
and relational work (“creating connections between the people who need to
work together”; Feldman & Khademian, 2007, p. 311). This enables parties
Head and Alford 727

with different ways of knowing a contentious issue to recognize other

viewpoints.
Equally important is that collaborative networks can tap into a wider body
of specific knowledge and skills than can unilateral decision makers. The
broader array of parties within such networks may bring to the cooperative
arena different and in some cases complementary expert knowledge, based
on their professional and other training, and situational knowledge, based on
their social or institutional location. To the extent that some of the parties
already have experience in dealing with collaborative arrangements, they
may also bring useful skills concerning the establishment and maintenance of
working relationships.
Of course, there is no guarantee that these different elements of knowl-
edge will come together in a fruitful fashion. In particular, parties with con-
flicting interests may wield their knowledge to engage in gaming
behavior—indeed, this may well be part of what makes the problem “wicked.”
Moreover, expertise may be harnessed to sharpen and inflame political con-
flicts. Consequently, two other characteristics of collaborative arrangements
are also important in enabling this knowledge to be productively brought to
bear upon intractable problems. The first is that collaborating parties are
likely to engage in regular communication as a normal part of their collective
endeavor. This means there will be more circumstances arising in which par-
ties raise matters that may be symptoms of wicked problems, increasing the
likelihood that someone may “join the dots” and discern an underlying issue.
Communication among the parties increases the likelihood of them engaging
in problem-solving behavior and finding ways forward, for example, by iden-
tifying “win–win” solutions, which typically depend on contending parties
revealing pieces of information about their own situation and preferences.
Communication also assists in the processes of mutual adjustment as prob-
lems arise in implementation. Where parties are far apart, an intensive pro-
cess of facilitated dialogue may be necessary to allow these views to be
adequately voiced as a basis for further negotiation and common ground
(Campbell, 2003; Forester, 1999; Lewicki et al., 2003).
The second characteristic of collaboration that assists in dealing with
wicked problems is that it entails a degree of trust and mutual commitment
among the parties (Bardach, 1998). This increases the probability that parties
will feel comfortable about revealing information that may make them vul-
nerable to opportunistic behavior by other parties. To the extent that they trust
each other, actors will be more likely to take the risk of disclosing such infor-
mation, thereby enhancing the extent to which differential knowledge is
brought to bear on the problem. They are also more likely to proceed with
collaborative courses of action to tackle such problems where they are depen-
728 Administration & Society 47(6)

dent on the trustworthiness of others. Trust is therefore an important founda-

tion stone for harnessing collaborative working to address wicked problems.
However, although trust is necessary for collaborative arrangements, it is
also very difficult to establish and build, especially in the public sector
(Alford & O’Flynn, 2012). Ideally, for trust to grow, it is necessary for parties
to demonstrate reciprocity and to avoid reneging on undertakings. The trust-
building effects of these actions take time to be realized (O’Leary & Bingham,
2009). They also require some autonomy on the part of the people in the
relationship. These conditions can be difficult to maintain in the context of a
public sector that is prone to turbulence (and inconsistency over time), and
where accountability regimes reduce managers’ autonomy and constrain their
ability to avoid reneging or to engage in reciprocity. Indeed, these character-
istics of the public sector may in themselves contribute to the “wicked” char-
acteristics of some situations. To a degree, their effect on collaboration and
trust building can be ameliorated, but not eliminated, by devices such as staff
development, flexible organization structures, and conscious attention to
anticipating risks and “managing the authorizing environment,” including
good communication between political and administrative leadership groups
(Bardach, 1998; Moore, 1995). Collaborative ventures can also be prone to
other shortcomings, such as vulnerability to political or financial barriers that
diminish energy, power asymmetries, excessive focus on process, vague
understanding of (often multidimensional) performance, and many others
(see McGuire & Agranoff, 2011).
In summary, collaboration offers one way of recognizing the complexity
of problems and engaging the multiplicity of actors affecting the “wicked-
ness” of a problem. But it can be difficult to establish and sustain robust col-
laboration in a public-sector context subject to turbulence and strict
accountability rules. As Huxham and Vangen (2005) caution, “Seeking col-
laborative advantage is a seriously resource-consuming activity . . . Our mes-
sage to practitioners and policy makers alike is don’t do it unless you have to”
(p. 13, italics in original). Wicked problems are usually ones where “we have
to,” but that does not make them any easier to address.

New Leadership Roles

Overlapping these collaborative strategies and processes is growing attention
to a third factor in tackling wicked problems: the role of leadership. Whereas
collaboration by its nature is prone to the vicissitudes of multiple parties with
varying interests and capabilities, leadership can be seen, if it is effective, as
bestowing a degree of coherence and mindfulness, if not control, on its
workings.
Head and Alford 729

It is necessarily about the practices of managers rather than structures. It

focuses on the role of leaders, particularly in inducing others to adapt to new
circumstances or to accommodate contending positions. Here, we consider
three main approaches to the field of leadership.
The first is the dominant orthodoxy in leadership studies, represented by
writers like Jaques and Clement (1991), Kotter (1990, 1996), or Kouzes and
Posner (1987), which we consider if only to register its shortcomings in deal-
ing with wicked problems. Sometimes called “transformational leadership,”
it typically focuses on the CEO as “corporate hero” (Currie & Lockett, 2007).
According to this orthodoxy, common in government as well as in business,
a leader has two key roles (Kotter, 1990; Kouzes & Posner, 1987). One is to
frame a vision (or set a direction, purpose, or strategy) for the organization—
usually implying an ability to recognize what is wrong with “where we are
now.” The other role is to get others to pursue that vision/direction/strategy
by inspiring, enabling, and empowering them to do so.
However, this conception sits awkwardly with the task of working on
wicked problems. The assumption that the leader should frame a vision or set
a direction implies that he or she should be capable of diagnosing problems
and devising solutions to them. But Heifetz (1994) argued that leaders quite
often encounter situations where it is beyond the cognitive capacities of any
individual to identify what is wrong and determine ways of addressing it. The
knowledge and insights relevant to the issue are instead distributed among
those who are led. Moreover, the new situation may pose difficult issues for
those who are led, confronting them with the need to make major accommo-
dations with a changing reality. These situations can validly be seen as wicked
problems.
Instead of transformational leadership, Heifetz (1994) offered a second
approach to dealing with complex, intractable situations: adaptive leadership
(see also Heifetz & Linsky, 2002; Parks, 2005). “Adaptive challenges” hap-
pen to be very common for public-sector leaders. Although Heifetz does not
use the term, he is effectively talking about wicked problems. He proposes
that these situations require the leader not to announce a strategy and expect
compliance but rather to engage in a process he terms the mobilizing of adap-
tive work. Public managers (here understood as including both elected and
appointed officials) need to go beyond the traditional notion of top-down
direction. Such leaders instead should lead organizational members and/or
stakeholders in undertaking themselves the collective work of grappling with
the problem (Heifetz, 1994). In effect, those who are led are asked to perform
the shared leadership role of setting a direction.
Of course, this is a complex process, and one that requires particular lead-
ership skills on the part of the leader, but different from those in the orthodox
730 Administration & Society 47(6)

model. What makes it especially difficult is that followers expect the leader
to provide them with a direction; they get anxious when challenged to do this
for themselves. The leader’s role, therefore, is not only to challenge people to
do this work but also to provide the right circumstances in which it might
thrive. Heifetz (1994) called these circumstances a “holding environment”—
a context (such as a deliberative forum or a set of agreed behavioral ground
rules) for containing the stresses of organizational members’ adaptive efforts
(p. 103). The leader needs to steer a delicate course between provoking peo-
ple to examine uncomfortable issues and having them cope with the stress
this engenders. Thus, the role is one of “identifying the adaptive challenge,
keeping distress within a productive range, directing attention to ripening
issues and not diversions, giving the work back to the people, and protecting
voices of leadership” (Heifetz, 1994, p. 207).
Mobilizing adaptive work is therefore relevant to our spectrum of prob-
lems. It offers a facilitative method for addressing complexity by bringing
forth knowledge that is beyond the compass of a leader acting alone. And it
deals with diversity by involving multiple parties in a manner that not only
brings out their differential knowledge but also enables the surfacing of con-
tending values and interests, and dialogue between those in whom they
reside. Depending on institutional context, there will be important and dis-
tinctive roles and responsibilities for political leaders and administrative offi-
cials in encouraging and guiding these processes.
Kindred approaches are visible in Feldman and Khademian’s (2007) work
on the practices of inclusive management, which can contribute to creating
holding environments (see also Conklin, 2006). Stoker (2006) suggested that
dialogue-based work across stakeholders, and networked arrangements to
tackle shared problems, can provide useful motivation in the creation of pub-
lic value. Bentley and Wilsdon (2003) argued that adaptability and agility are
increasingly necessary features of governmental leadership capable of work-
ing with stakeholders to seek new approaches. However, in the governmental
world of organizational power and political interests, the availability of such
facilitative methods may not suffice to break through the institutional inertia
and entrenched practices to produce new solutions.
The third approach is collaborative leadership, or what Crosby and Bryson
(2005) called “leading in a shared-power world,” which encompasses a range
of perspectives united in their recognition of the interaction between collabo-
ration and leadership. Indeed, many of them see collaboration as a significant
aspect of leadership, and leadership as a necessary impetus for collaboration
(e.g., Chrislip & Larson, 1994; Crosby & Bryson, 2005; Gray, 1989). Indeed,
some of the skills regularly cited as quintessentially those of leadership—such
as reading people, big-picture thinking, communication, influencing, trust
Head and Alford 731

building, and persuading—also regularly appear on lists of collaboration skills

(see Bingham et al., 2005; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004; Williams, 2012).
Collaborative leadership entails leading without the levers of control or
monetary incentives normally available in hierarchy or managerial command
(Nowell & Harrison, 2010). Some might infer from this that collaborative
leaders lack all but a nebulous capacity to persuade, and therefore cannot
really achieve much. But the lack of powers to remunerate, or to hire and fire,
by no means exhausts the panoply of ways leaders can elicit cooperation
from partners. Others include the capacity to determine who is in the collabo-
ration by virtue of who gets invited, frame the issue(s), orchestrate the agenda,
recognize particular expertise, engage in win–win negotiations, spot entre-
preneurial opportunities, and generally engage in diplomacy (Alford &
O’Flynn, 2012; Bingham et al., 2005; Goldsmith & Kettl, 2009; Huxham &
Vangen, 2005; Williams, 2012).
Both the adaptive and the collaborative leadership perspectives offer
something which the orthodox transformational model does not: a means of
eliciting collaborative contributions without having formal authority. But
they are limited as leadership approaches to the extent that they entail the
shortcomings of adaptive work and collaboration that we have already noted.

Enabling Structures and Processes

So far, we have been considering how public managers might think and act in
their efforts to tackle wicked problems. But whatever their practices, they can
be constrained by the structure and processes of government administration.
Pursuing these strategies proposed could be a little more practicable if
changes were made to structures and systems in the public sector, which we
consider only briefly here. First, this new approach is likely to be easier to
establish and adapt if the organizational structure is flexible. Typically, this
involves some form of matrix structure, in which staff have a “home” respon-
sibility in a particular function or program, but it is understood that they may
occasionally be “re-posted” to a strategic project, perhaps for an extended
period. Organizations need to be able to assemble and reassemble project
teams as problems emerge, progress, and come to some sort of resolution.
Some illuminating examples of this have been organization structures adopted
by the devolved Scottish government, which has structured all of its activities
around six broad objectives and various outcomes (Scottish National
Government, 2012), and the Dutch civil service, where two program minis-
tries have been established, each responsible for broad outcomes, such as the
integration of immigrants into the society, and each required to draw, with the
732 Administration & Society 47(6)

help of a big budget, on other ministries for capabilities as required (Karre,

van Twist, Alford, & van der Steen, 2012).
Second, it calls for more flexible budgeting and financial systems. Output
budgeting constrains funding to particular product and service groupings.
Yet, there is no compelling reason why budgeting and appropriation rules
could not enable a given allocation to be either for an outcome, an output, or
a process, all within the same budget. Importantly, it should also be possible
to allow collaborating agencies to “pool” budgets. Finally, as some govern-
ments have already shown, authority can readily be devolved to make limited
reallocations closer to local project management level. These new approaches
would also require some careful and negotiated attention to resolving joint
accountability issues that are acceptable not only to the parties but also to
audit and oversight bodies (Wilkins, 2002).
Third, new strategic approaches would call for a more sophisticated or
nuanced approach to performance measurement and program evaluation
(Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2010). Typically, this should focus
more on the results end of the program logic, because this allows more flex-
ibility concerning the processes by which outcomes are achieved, but it
should also recognize two other things: (a) the complex feedback loops per-
meating these processes, and (b) the long lead times often required to address
wicked problems, through greater focus on evaluating intermediate and pre-
cursor steps.
Fourth, in relation to human resources management, processes for the
recruitment, promotion, and skills development of staff would need to be
reconsidered. New approaches would require more emphasis being placed on
the knowledge, experience, and skills suitable to working in more open-
ended, collaborative, and adaptive situations (Alford & O’Flynn, 2012;
Williams, 2012).
These changes to processes and attitudes may require rebuilding the
capacity of the public sector in important ways and will therefore be subject
to ongoing debate and adjustment. In particular, the enhancement of flexibil-
ity to deal with wicked problems may cut across the ongoing need to maintain
conventional systems for more routine tasks—which, as Kettl (2009) pointed
out, serve us well for those kinds of responsibilities.

Conclusion
Followed to its logical conclusion, the intractability of wicked problems, as
defined in Rittel and Webber’s (1973) generic terms, could be taken to mean
that grappling with them is a futile endeavor. After all, if they are virtually
impossible to comprehend and any solution throws up more problems, then
why bother?
Head and Alford 733

But we have put forward a more calibrated understanding of their serious-

ness and a realistic sense of possible responses to them, founded in the practi-
cal circumstances within which public-sector managers and organizations
grapple with them. We have sought to demonstrate that efforts to deal with
wicked problems are impeded by the working mechanisms of the public sector—
its characteristic ways of making decisions, organizing, financing, staffing,
and controlling. At the same time, we have proposed some strategies for deal-
ing with wicked problems under these governmental and administrative con-
straints—such as going beyond technical/rational thinking, collaborative
working, new modes of leadership, and reforming the managerial infrastruc-
ture of government. These strategies can enable partial and provisional
responses to problems, amounting to shared understandings about their
nature and about ways of dealing with them. They inform courses of action
that make sense even if they do not conclusively solve the problem. Public-
sector organizations that adopt them are more likely to at least cope with
complex and/or turbulent situations. But these strategies and processes typi-
cally must coexist with those underpinning the organization’s “business as
usual” obligations. Moreover, they call for broad managerial capabilities,
which take time and resources to develop.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article.

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Author Biographies
Brian W. Head is a professorial research fellow at the Institute for Social Science
Research, University of Queensland. His research interests include evidence-based
policy capacity, program evaluation, collaboration to address complex challenges,
early intervention approaches in social policy, and environment and sustainability
strategies. He is on the editorial board of several journals and an executive member of
two professional associations.
John Alford is professor of public sector management at the University of Melbourne
and the Australia and New Zealand School of Government. His most recent book
(with Janine O’Flynn) is Rethinking Public Service Delivery (2012). His previous
book, Engaging Public Sector Clients: From Service-Delivery to Co-production, won
the SPAR award from the American Society for Public Administration for the best
public administration book of 2011.