Caste in Modern India

Author(s): M. N. Srinivas
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies , Aug., 1957, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Aug., 1957), pp. 529-
548
Published by: Association for Asian Studies

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Caste in Modern India

M. N. SRINIVAS

IT IS my aim in this essay' to marshal evidence to show that during the last
century or more, the institution of caste has found new fields of activity.
The manner in which the British transferred political power to the Indians
enabled caste to assume political functions. In independent India, the provision
of constitutional safeguards to the backward sections of the population, espe-
cially the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, has given a new lease of life to caste.
It is hardly necessary to add that this contrasts with the aim of bringing about
a casteless and classless society which most political parties, including the In-
dian National Congress, profess.
The political system of pre-British India was characterized by clear territorial
cleavages marking off the territory of one chieftain or raja from the territories
of others. Usually, above the chieftain or the raja, there was the viceroy of an
emperor or the emperor himself, and below the chief were the headmen of single
villages. The boundaries of a chief's or raja's domain were mobile, being subject
to expansion or contraction depending upon the military prowess of the chief
vis-a-vis other chiefs, and also upon the firmness with which the viceroy or
emperor exercised his control. However, while the boundaries were mobile over
a period of time, at any single moment they constituted effective barriers be-
tween people living in different chiefdoms. Such a political system naturally
imposed severe limits on the horizontal extension of caste ties. In short, politi-
cal frontiers determined the effective, if not the maximum, social space of each
caste living within them.2 The fact that over a period of time the boundaries
were mobile meant that cultural ties frequently cut across the existing political
boundaries. The coincidence of the cultural and political frontiers, a principle
which is explicitly recognized in the Report of the States Reorganization Com-
mission, is, on the whole, a new event in Indian history.
A natural consequence of the territorial limits imposed by the political system
on the horizontal tendency of castes was the stimulus it gave to castes living in
an area to co-operate with each other. Occupational specialization stressed this

Dr. Srinivas, D. Phil., M.A. (Oxon.), is Professor of Sociology in the M. S. University,

Baroda, and is the author of Marriage and Family in Mysore (Bombay, 1942) and Religion
and Society among the Coorgs of South India (Oxford, 1952). He was awarded the Rivers
Memorial Medal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, London, in 1955.
1 This essay was my presidential address to the Section on Anthropology and
Archaeology of the Indian Science Congress at its forty-fourth session in Calcutta
in January 1957. I take the present opportunity of republication of the essay to make a few
minor alterations.
2 In Kerala, however, the Nabuthri Brahmans were superior to the territorial cleavages.
See Dr. E. Miller's essay "Village Structure in North Kerala" in India's Villages, West
Bengal Government Press, Calcutta, 1955.
529

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 530 M. N. SRINIVAS

interdependence, as each caste was dependent for its livelihood on the work
done by the other castes. Again, the fact that the members of a caste were all
competitors for the goods and services offered by the other castes, meant that
relations between the former involved conflict. This tendency of economic ties
to cut across caste barriers was also supported by political and religious ties.
It was the establishment of Pax Britannica which set the castes free from the
territorial limitations inherent in the pre-British political system. British rule
freed the jinn from the bottle.
The building of roads all over India, and the introduction of railways, postage,
telegraph, cheap paper, and printing-especially in the regional languages-
enabled castes to organize as they had never done before. A postcard carried news
of a caste meeting, and the railway enabled members scattered in far-flung
villages to come together when necessary, while the availability of cheap news-
print facilitated the founding of caste journals, whose aim was to promote the
interests of their respective castes. It is usual to point out that railways and
factories relaxed rules of pollution regarding eating and drinking and other
forms of contact. But that is only one side of the story. The availability of
cheap paper enabled caste disputes to be recorded, and this gave permanent
form to rules and precedents which were till then dependent upon the fallible,
and therefore challengeable, memory of elders. I learn that several castes in
Gujarat have had their "Constitutions" printed.
The effects of British rule upon the caste system have been discussed with
much erudition and ability by Professor G. S. Ghurye,3 and I do not propose to
cover the same ground here. However, I shall draw freely upon the material
brought to light by him to make my points.
It is widely held that the civil and penal codes introduced by the British over
the subcontinent of India took away much of the power previously exercised by
caste panchayats. The British also introduced a new principle of justice, viz.,
that all men are equal before the law, and that the nature of a wrong is not af-
fected by the caste of the person who is committing it, or by the caste of the
person against whom it is committed. It is necessary to emphasize in this con-
nection that the use of law courts by some peasants did not put an end to caste
panchayats. The peasants made use of both the systems of justice. The tradi-
tional panchayats, caste as well as village, are still functioning in many parts of
the country. This fact is specially relevant in all schemes for the revitalization of
panchayats. In certain parts of the country, British rule set in motion economic
forces which upset the traditional hierarchy, but this did not mean that caste
was weakened thereby. In fact, it is arguable whether such a disturbance did not
actually increase caste consciousness all round. A low caste which made money
as a result of new opportunities presenting themselves to it, made attempts to
raise its status vis-a-vis other castes, and this resulted in opposition from the
latter. Even eventual consent to such a claim did not lessen immediate opposi-
tion. Again, it is important to note that the newly rich castes only pressed for a
higher status for themselves-they did not urge that the caste system should be

I Caste and Class in India (New York, 1952).

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 CASTE IN INDIA 531

abolished. It is true that the economic forces released under British rule resulted
in greater mobility within the caste system, but that is quite different from
making progress towards an egalitarian society.
I would like to refer in this connection to Dr. F. G. Bailey's study of an Orissa
village.4 In Bisipara the policy of the then Government of Bengal, of which
Orissa was formerly a part, regarding the sale of liquor resulted in the sudden
enrichment of two low castes, the Boad Distillers and the Ganjam Distillers.
The prosperity of these two groups resulted in disequilibrium, as they both
wanted to lay claim to having higher status than before. Previously, in that vil-
lage, the Warriors owned all the land, but by 1910 when prohibition was intro-
duced, the Boad Distillers owned as much land as the Warriors, and the Ganjam
Distillers owned more land than anyone else. The acquisition of land by the two
castes was followed by the Sanskritization of their custom, ritual, and way of
life, and all this was part of the process of stating their claim to being a high
caste.'
While the two Distiller castes have succeeded in raising themselves up, the
Boad Outcastes, an Untouchable caste, the members of which made money by
trading in hides, found that Sanskritization did not help them. Their claims for
a higher position in the hierarchy are opposed by everyone, including other
Untouchable groups such as the Sweepers, whose economic position has not
improved. The Boad Outcastes are getting increasingly estranged from all local
castes, and they are seeking the help of officials and law courts to secure the
rights which the Constitution of this country guarantees to them. The special
difficulties in the way of the Untouchables' raising their collective status heighten
intercaste tensions.
Increased economic mobility led to increased social mobility, and the tradi-
tional process of Sanskritization ensured that such mobility did not lead to
revolution. But Untouchables by and large seem to be unable to take advantage
of it. This is one indication that the problem of the Untouchables is different
from that of the other low castes; the latter have a means of pushing themselves
up in the system, while the former do not.'
The decennial census, introduced by the British, recorded caste, and it unwit-
tingly came to the aid of social mobility. Prosperous low castes, and even those
which were not prosperous, sought to call themselves by new and high-sounding
Sanskrit names. The recording of these names in the census was part of the
struggle to achieve a higher status than before. Thus the census provided a new
field for caste conflict.
While British rule occasionally did confer economic benefits on low castes, it

4Dr. F. G. Bailey made a field study of Bisipara, a village in Phulbani District in Orissa,
during the years 1952-53, and I am grateful to him for permission to refer to his unpublished
data. His book will be published by Manchester University Press in Autumn 1957.
5 See my earlier article in this journal, "A Note on Sanskritization and Westernization,"
FEQ, XV (Aug. 1956), 481-496.
6 See, however, Dr. A. C. Mayer's paper, "Some Hierarchical Aspects of Caste," in
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, XII (1956), 139: ". . . The Balais are trying to move
from the Sudra-Harijan varna to the Sudra varna."

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 532 M. N. SRINIVAS

was more usual for these benefits to go to those castes which were already at the
top of the hierarchy. It must be remembered that in the examples cited above,
ideas regarding pollution prevented the higher castes from getting into the liquor
and hides trade. In other words, the institution of caste obstructed their benefit-
ing from the new economic opportunities. But the same institution benefited the
higher castes in certain other fields. Western education provided an indispensable
passport to these fields, and the high castes which had a tradition of literacy,
such as the Brahman, Vaishya, and Kayastha, were in a more advantageous
position to exploit the new opportunities than those which did not have such a
tradition. Members from the former privileged castes became clerks, school-
masters, officials, lawyers, and doctors. The Vaishyas or Banias naturally led
the other castes in taking advantage of the new commercial opportunities offered
by British rule. The bulk of the new intelligentsia came from the three groups of
castes, and the leadership of the nationalist movement fell mainly upon their
shoulders. It is not surprising that they were disliked by the British rulers. The
upper castes were not only the first nationalists but they were also conscious of
the fact they were Hindus. This was specially true of the Brahman, who enjoyed
a privileged position in the traditional hierarchy. European missionaries have
abundantly testified to the hold the Brahman had over the bulk of the Hindus,
and this hold had to be broken if Christianity was to make headway in India.
The policy pursued by the British Government in India of giving preference
to the low castes was in accordance with its humanitarian sentiments, but it also
had the effect of making the lower castes look up to the British for protection. It
drove a wedge between the higher and lower castes, and this was especially seen
in peninsular India. The leaders of the non-Brahmans and the other high castes
were to be found in the nationalist movement. It was Mahatma Gandhi who was
chiefly responsible for carrying nationalism to all sections of the population.
Professor Ghurye writes that before the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the Bengal
Army was composed largely of Brahmans and Rajputs, and that soldiers belong-
ing to these castes took a leading part in the Mutiny. Soon there was an agitation
in England to rid the army of the higher castes. A Coommission was appointed
under Lord Peel to go into the question of reorganization of the Indian Army.
The Commission, after recording evidence from high British officials who had
served in India, recommended that "the native Indian Army should be composed
of different nationalities and castes and as a general rule mixed promiscuously
through each regiment." Ever since then the Indian Army has been steadily
purged of the higher castes. Professor Ghurye thinks that the Mutiny drove
home to the British rulers that the safety of British dominion in India was very
closely connected with keeping the Indian people divided on the lines of castes.
He quotes the opinions of contemporary Britons like Sir Lepel Griffin and James
Kerr, who knew that caste divided the Indian people into small groups and ob-
structed the emergence of a nationalist sentiment. Towards the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, the maxim of "Divide and Rule" began to be openly
preached by historians and journalists (Ghurye, pp. 175-176).
Throughout Indian history attempts have been made to reject Brahmanical

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 CASTE IN INDIA 533

supremacy, but the non-Brahman movement of the present century differs from
earlier movements not only in regard to scale and intensity but also as to ideology.
The speeches made by the leaders of the non-Brahman movement in Madras in
the twenties, for instance, reveal the influence of the liberal and radical thought
of Western Europe.7 The non-Brahman leaders asserted that they were as good
as the Brahmans, and that they wanted the British rulers to give them preferen-
tial treatment for a time in order that this could become an established fact.
The non-Brahman movement of peninsular India was the response of a down-
trodden section of Hindu society to the challenge of caste in the new context of
British rule and Western liberal-rationalist ideology. One of the founders of this
movement was Jyotirao Phule, of Poona, a man of the Gardener caste, who
founded the Satya Shodak Samaj in 1873 with the object of asserting the worth
of a human being irrespective of his birth in a particular caste. In certain re-
spects, Phule's reforms anticipate the program of the non-Brahman movement
in Madras. He urged the non-Brahmans not to engage Brahman priests to con-
duct their ritual. He saw the need for education of the non-Brahmans, and in
1848 he started a school for non-Brahman boys and girls. In 1851, he started a
school for Untouchables in Poona. He demanded adequate representation for
members of all castes in the services and local bodies.
The measures which Phule advocated in the second and third quarters of the
nineteenth century were to become the main items in the program of the non-
Brahman parties of Bombay and Madras in the first half of this century. Profes-
sor Ghurye records that Phule's demand for special representation for non-
Brahmans in the services and local bodies went unheeded till the last decade of
the nineteenth century, when the Maharaja of Kolhapur (Shri Sahu Chatrapati)
took up the non-Brahman cause. Thanks mainly to his efforts, special represen-
tation through mixed electorates was conceded to the non-Brahmans in the
Montague-Chelmsford Reforms. These reforms divided the people of Bombay
into three political tiers: the first tier consisted of Brahmans and Allied Castes;
the second consisted of the Intermediate Castes, the Mahratas and others; and
finally, the Backward Classes, including Untouchables. This principle was also
made use of in appointments to Government posts. Professor Ghurye quotes a
resolution of the Finance Department of the Government of Bombay, dated
September 17, 1923, prohibiting the recruitment of Brahmans and Allied Castes
to the lower services, till a certain proportion of the posts were held by the
Intermediate and Backward Castes. This policy of reserving a certain percentage
of the posts to the non-Brahman castes was followed by other provincial govern-
ments. The logical consequence of this policy was seen in Madras as early as
1924. "The hundreds of small communities into which Indian society is divided
were not slow to take advantage of the opportunity which was so conveniently
afforded them, and began to clamor for special representation in the legislature,
local bodies, the public services and even educational institutions. The Govern-

7See the Proceedings of the First Provincial Conference of the League of Non-Brahmin
Youth (Central), Madras, 1927; and the Administrative Report of the League of Non-Brahmin
Youth, Madras, 1926-27.

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 534 M. N. SRINIVAS

ment, in which also the non-Brahmin element was very influential, tried to
satisfy the ever-increasing demand for the plums of office, but naturally could not
succeed. It created jealousies and enmities which have now reacted with disas-
trous effect on the party [the non-Brahman Party]."8 About the same time the
Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Meeting of the Madras Non-Brah-
man Party in 1924, made a strong appeal "to abandon the communal policy
pursued hitherto and to transform the party into an organization representing
the forces working for reform along constitutional lines into which everyone
without distinction of caste, religion or color would have free admission."9
Twelve years later, in the 1936-37 elections, the non-Brahman Party suffered a
decisive defeat at the hands of the Congress. This happened in both Madras and
Bombay, but it did not mean that the non-Brahman movement came to an end.
The more moderate non-Brahmans entered the Congress and soon dominated it.
In Madras the extreme non-Brahmans under the leadership of Shri E. V. Rama-
swamy Naicker joined the Dravida Kazhagam, a militant, atheistic, anti-Aryan,
anti-North Indian, anti-Hindi, and anti-Brahman movement. The Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam, an offshoot of the Dravida Kazhagam, claims to be more
"progressive" than the latter, admitting even Brahmans as members. It is also
pro-nationalization and anti-landowner in outlook.
One feature of the peninsular non-Brahman movement may be disposed of
now. The unifying feature of that movement was dislike of, if not hatred for, the
Brahman. Right up to the beginning of the First World War, the Brahmans
dominated the administration and the liberal professions everywhere in penin-
sular India excepting Kerala. It is alleged that during the period of Brahmanical
domination, favoritism towards Brahmans and discrimination against non-
Brahmans were both widespread. When power and influence passed into the
hands of the non-Brahmans, they seem to have harassed the Brahmans working
under them. Professor Ghurye quotes from the memorandum of the Government
of Bombay to the Indian Statutory Commission in 1928 to show that in those
District School Boards in which the non-Brahmans were in a majority, attempts
were made to oust Brahmans regardless of all consideration for efficiency.'0
Anti-Brahmanism assumed a violent form in the riots which occurred in Kolha-
pur and elsewhere following the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. Anti-Brah-
man demonstrations, the looting and burning of Brahman houses, printing
presses, factories, and shops were widespread. The Brahman-owned and edited
Marathi press had been very critical of Mahatma Gandhi for some weeks before
his assassination."
Shri A. B. Latthe, one of the leaders of the non-Brahman movement in Bom-
bay in the twenties and thirties, commented on the riots: "As an humble friend

8 Quoted from the Indian Daily Mail (Bombay), Oct. 14, 1924. See Ghurye, p. 183.
9 See works cited in note 7. See also N. Rama Rao, Kelavu Nenapugalu (Bangalore, 1954),
p. 11.
10 Ghurye, pp. 175, 183.
11 See Miss M. L. P. Patterson, "Caste and Politics in Maharashtra," Economic Weekly,
VI, No. 39 (Sept. 25, 1954), 1066-1067.

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 CASTE IN INDIA 535

of the non-Brahmin movement of thirty years ago, I still think [that] the move-
ment was essentially justified, but later on it degenerated into the naked com-
munalism of several non-Brahmin communities which ultimately broke it up.
The vicarious punishment of all the Brahmins for the sins of a few among them
is foolish, and hatred of one community against another is suicidal to democracy.
The days of caste oligarchies have gone and cannot and ought not to be revived.
Those in the State who encourage narrow communal pride are the worst enemies
of the people and the State."'12
I shall now try to demonstrate that the power and activity of caste has in-
creased in proportion as political power passed increasingly to the people from
the rulers. The transfer of power to the people began under the British, and it
finds its culmination in the Constitution of the Republic of India, under which
every adult has a vote which is exercised quinquennially at the elections. I shall
consider each linguistic region of peninsular India, and then refer briefly, and I
fear very inadequately, to India north of the Vindhyas. It is hardly necessary for
me to add that this is due to my ignorance of the North and to nothing else.
The non-Brahman movement in peninsular India is over a century old. I have
already mentioned Phule's efforts in Poona in the 1840's. About the same time
in Madras, the artisan castes made a representation to the Board of Revenue to
the effect that all men should be appointed to public offices without distinction
and to the destruction of Brahmanical monopoly. The movement gathered
strength slowly. According to Professor Ghurye, Phule's ideas did not make
progress among non-Brahmans for several years after he had propounded them,'3
but caste consciousness seems to have suddenly become sharp in 1916 when
Montague arrived in India to consult the people and the Government of India
about the future form of government. But the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms
were not announced till after the end of the First World War. Non-Brahman
leaders in peninsular India felt that the granting of power to their countrymen
might lead to a Brahmanical tyranny. The Maharaja of Kolhapur pleaded
before the announcement of the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms for "Communal
Representation" for at least ten years if Home Rule was not to culminate in
oligarchy.'4 On the occasion of the celebration of the tenth birthday of the Madras
non-Brahman party paper, Justice, the Raja of Panagal declared that at the
conclusion of the First World War, the non-Brahman leaders felt that a certain
amount of political power would be given by the British to Indians. "The late
leaders felt that before any political power is conceded to the people, the latter
or a majority of them must be in a position to assert themselves against any one
community which would try to appropriate it to itself."'5 That watchdog of non-
Brahman interests, the newspaper Justice, was founded on February 26, 1917,
and it was followed by the starting of other similar newspapers, Kudiarasu and
Dravidar (Tamil), and Samadarshini (Telugu). The interwar years may be

12 Ghurye, p. 202.
13 Ghurye, p. 197, 179.
14 Ghurye, p. 179.
15 Administrative Report of the League of Non-Brahmin Youth, Madras, 1926-27.

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 536 M. N. SRINIVAS

described as a period of intense anti-Brahmanism in the South. The leaders of

the non-Brahman party collaborated with the Government, and took measures
to reserve a certain percentage of posts in the administration and seats in the
local bodies and legislatures for the non-Brahmans. The principle of reservation
was also extended to seats in educational institutions.
In a penetrating article on "Caste and Politics in Maharashtra," Miss Maureen
Patterson has analyzed the forces of caste underlying politics in Maharashtra
(excluding Vidarbha and Marathwada).16 Miss Patterson discusses the part
played by the three important castes, viz., Brahmans, Mahrata, and Mahars, in
the politics of Maharashtra. The Brahmans were the first to become westernized
in Maharashtra, and this resulted in a near monopoly of posts for them in the
new setup. The early political leaders were mostly Konkanastha Brahmans. The
Brahmans constitute only 4 % of the population of this region, while the Mahra-
tas constitute 25 %, and the Kunbis who wish to pass off for Mahratas, 8 %, and
the Mahars, 10 %. The Mahratas are landowners in the rural areas and have not
yet taken kindly to education in spite of the pioneering efforts of their caste
leader, the Maharaja of Kolhapur. They have only 7 % literates as compared
with the Untouchable Mahars who have 11 % literates. The ties of the Mahars
with the land to not seem to be as strong as those of the Mahratas-traditionally,
the former were hereditary village watchmen owning little or no land. The Ma-
hars, like the Mahratas, saw army service in the First World War, and large
numbers of Mahars are to be found now in Bombay engaged as laborers in mills.
Miss Patterson tells us that in the twenties, Mahratas in Kolhapur, Satara,
and other towns made a concerted effort to drive out Brahmans from their
positions as priests, petty government officials, and teachers.'7
In Maharashtra as in Madras, the Congress achieved a notable victory at the
1936-37 elections, and the non-Brahman party candidates suffered a severe
defeat. According to Miss Patterson, the Congress was able to attract Mahratas
and other non-Brahmans into its fold partly because its leader Mahatma Gandhi
was not a Brahman. In her opinion, "all along in various ways caste has exerted
an important though at times subtle effect on the Congress organization in
Maharashtra" (p. 1066).
In April 1948, a large block of the Maharashtra Congress left it to form the
Peasants' and Workers' Party. The leaders of the new party were Shri K. Jedhe
and Shri S. S. More. Miss Patterson says "that the formation of this party may
be regarded both as an attempt to protest against what was considered overtly
'Capitalist' domination of the Congress and to by-pass what was claimed to be
continued Brahmin control over positions of leadership in the Maharashtra
Congress organization" (p. 1067).
In 1954, the P. W. P. split into two groups, one led by Shri Jedhe, and the

18 Economic Weekly, VI, No. 39 (Sept. 25, 1954), 1065 if.

17 It is interesting to note that a similar move was afoot in Madras Province. The leaders
of the non-Brahman movement in Madras were in touch with their counterparts in Belgaum,
Satara, and Amravati. See the Proceedings of the First Provincial Conference of the League
of Non-Brahmin Youth (Central), Madras, 1927.

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 CASTE IN INDIA 537

other by Shri More. The former rejoined the Congress in August 1954, while a
hard core of leftists remained with Shri More in the P. W. P.
The recent movement in favor of the union of all Marathi-speaking areas in a
single state seemed to unite most Maharashtrians, irrespective of caste. There
was, however, one notable exception: it was Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the leader of
the Scheduled Castes. Dr. Ambedkar stated that "in a monolithic Maharashtra,
Mahratas having the absolute majority would dominate." He added further that
history had shown that the minorities, especially the Scheduled Castes and
Tribes, would not get justice at the hands of the Mahratas. Dr. Ambedkar
wanted Maharashtra to be divided into three Marathi-speaking areas, East,
West, and Central, with a view to seeing that the Mahratas did not get a chance
to dominate the Scheduled Castes and Tribes.'8
Mr. Selig S. Harrison, in a recent paper entitled "Caste and the Andhra Com-
munists,'9 has made a brilliant analysis of the forces at work in the politics of
Andhra State. I make no apology for quoting extensively from Mr. Harrison's
paper; it provides conclusive evidence of the decisive role played by caste in the
politics of South India, if not India as a whole. Mr. Harrison writes: "As an
example of Hindu caste discipline in political motionl, the postwar decade in
Andhra merits special attention. Caste has played so fundamental a role during
this period that this examination becomes in effect a case history in the impact of
caste on India's representative institutions" (p. 379, italics mine).
I can only present here a brief summary of Mr. Harrison's paper. According
to him, most of the Communist leaders of Andhra belong to the peasant caste,
Kammas. "Since the founding of the Andhra Communist party in 1934, the party
leadership has been the property of a single subcaste, the Kamma landlords, who
dominate the Krishna-Godavari delta. This fact carries enormous importance in
view of the rising influence of the Kammas in Andhra life. The war and postwar
years were a boom period for the Kamma farmers, who own an estimated 80 per
cent of the fertile delta land. High prices for both food and cash crops made many
Indian peasant proprietor castes newly rich, but for the Kammas, presiding over
land as productive as any in all India, the boom was especially potent" (p. 381).
While the Kammas dominate the Communist Party, the rival landowning
caste of Reddis dominate the Congress. Kamma-Reddi rivalry is an old affair,
and the present-day political competition between them "is only a modern recur-
rence of an historic pattern dating back to the fourteenth century" (p. 382).
"Both Kammas and Reddis were probably warriors in the service of the early
Andhra kings. Later they became farmers, some feudal overlords and others
small peasant proprietors who to this day take part in the cultivation of their
land. Between them they dominated rural Andhra, leaving Brahmans beyond
the pale of economic power in the countryside" (p. 383).
These two famous castes are concentrated in two different regions of Andhra-
the Kanunas in fertile deltaic Andhra and the Reddis in the Five Rayalaseema

18 Times of India, Oct. 1, 1955.

19 American Political Science Review, L (June 1956), 378-404.

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 538 M. N. SRINIVAS

Districts of West Andhra.20 The deltaic region seems to have been called once
upon a time "Kamma Rashtra," while Rayalaseema is in parlance referred to as
"Reddiseema." Both the castes are, however, rurally oriented. Political aware-
ness in Andhra, as in other parts of peninsular India, came first to the Brahman.
Like the Mahrata, the deep chthonic roots of the Kamma and Reddis seem to
have come in the way of their acquiring English education. "Only about 1900
A.D., Kammas awakened to the fact that without English education they cannot
better their position. The few educated Kammas who joined government service
had to struggle hard to come up due to lack of patronage and the opposition of
Brahman vested interests."'2'
The educational advancement of the two castes only increased their mutual
rivalry. But the two combined as members of the Justice Party in Madras to
oust the Brahmans from power and position in Andhra. Between 1934 and World
War II, the Reddis gained control of the Congress; and the Kammas, of the
Communist Party.
I must mention here that I do not find Mr. Harrison's explanation for the two
leading peasant castes' joining rival political parties entirely convincing. Accord-
ing to him, the fertile and rich deltaic area of the Circars-incidentally the
region of the heaviest density in Andhra, from 900 to 1,200 persons per square
mile as compared with 316 in the rest of Andhra is the center of Andhra's
intellectual and political ferment. The Brahmans in this area were the first to be
drawn into the Congress, and the challenge to the Brahmans came from the
leading local non-Brahman caste of Kammas. "In addition, in the delta's legions
of landless laborers there was the grist of a mass movement plain to any Marxist
intellectual looking for a cause" (p. 384). According to Mr. Harrison, the Reddis
who lived in the politically backward area of Rayalaseema, gravitated almost
by default into the Congress.
This account of Mr. Harrison is not consistent with his earlier statement:
"Both Kammas and Reddis, pushing forward with the anti-Brahman movement
that swept all South India, supported the Andhra branch of the short-lived
Justice party" (p. 384). The latter statement implies that there was no lag
between Kammas and Reddis in political consciousness. A simpler explanation,
and one that is more consistent with traditional Reddi-Kamma rivalry, is that
the two castes fell apart after pushing the Brahman out. One joined the Com-
munists and the other the Congress. The two rival castes now found a new field
for their rivalry.
Between 1948 and 1951, Communism in Andhra took a violent form.

20 This kind of relationship between a caste and a region is widespread in India, and it
should be noted that regional claims are often only a disguise for caste claims. The con-
ferring of vast powers on panchayats, which is a widespread feature of modern Indian
administration, will only place great temptations before the locally dominant caste, to
use the money and power in favour of its members and at the expense of the other and
dependent castes.
21 Harrison, p. 384, quoting K. B. Choudary, A Brief History of the Kammas
(Sangamjagarlamudi, Andhra: published by the author, 1955), p. 122.

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 CASTE IN INDIA 539

This was the so-called Telengana movement, organized along standard Communist guer-
rilla lines with wholesale land redistribution and parallel village governments. Clusters of
villages in the delta and nearly all Warangal and Nalgonda districts in Hyderabad went
under Communist control from 1948 through 1950. Andhra and Telengana Communist lead-
ers directed a two-way offensive, north into Telengana and south into the delta, from a 40-
village base of operations in Munagala Jungle in northwest Krishna District. Communist
squads raided villages by night, police battalions by day. When Indian Army troops con-
ducted their 1948 "police action" against the Nizam of Hyderabad, they stayed on in
Warangal and Nalgonda to drive the Communists out. It took them until 1951 to restore
normal local government. (p. 390)

Communist violence did not, however, affect the Kamma landlords, and this
was noticed by Shri B. T. Ranadive, then Secretary of the Communist Party of
India. He said that the Andhra Communist Party was dominated by "rural
intellectuals, sons of rich peasants and middle peasants.... The party politi-
cally based itself on the vacillating politics of the middle peasants and allowed
itself to be influenced even by rich peasant ideology."22
The Kammas supported the Communists in the 1951 elections. "Whatever the
understanding between the Communists and Kamma patriarchs, a significant
section of the Kammas plainly put their funds, influence, and votes behind the
Communist Kamma candidates. This factor appears to have tipped the scales in
the delta.... While the Kamma vote was divided, the share of Kamma support
won by the Communists provided the margin of victory in 14 of the 25 delta
general constituencies where Communist deputies were elected" (p. 395). Mr.
Harrison states that in a substantial number of cases powerful Kamma sup-
porters gave even more decisive support to the Communist candidates, viz., that
of identification with village-level authority. Kamma influence is so evenly
spread over the delta that even in those deltaic constituencies where non-Kamma
Communists were successful, Kamma support was probably extended.
In the 1955 elections, the Congress sent one of their ablest organizers, Shri S.
K. Patil, to organize the Congress to defeat the Communists at the polls. The
Andhra Congress closed its ranks, and this minimized the splitting of votes
among a number of candidates, which was a feature of the 1951 elections. The
Congress also secured the support of the outstanding Kamma leader, Professor
N. G. Ranga, and his support was a crucial factor in the defeat of the Communist
candidates. Shri S. K. Patil matched caste with caste in the choice of candidates,
and this ensured that the Communist candidate did not have the advantage of
caste against his Congress rival. Finally, vigorous anti-Communist propaganda
seemed to split the Kammas in their support of the Communists. The Communist
press bitterly complained that the propertied interests had ganged up against
them. On his side, Shri N. G. Ranga showed that he could drive a hard bargain
for his caste within Congress councils.
What will be the pattern of forces in the new Andhra State? The Times of
India of August 25, 1956, reported that there were two groups, one supporting
the then Chief Minister Shri B. Gopala Reddi, and the other supporting the then

22 Harrison, p. 391, quoting from the Communist, II (June-July 1949), 34.

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 540 M. N. SRINIVAS

Deputy Chief Minister, Shri N. Sanjiva Reddi, for the leadership of the Congress
Legislative Party in the enlarged Andhra Pradesh. In this contest, the decision
of the Telega subeaste (with twenty-two members in the Legislature) to support
Shri Gopala Reddi strengthened the latter's chances of success. The followers of
Shri N. G. Ranga also decided to support Shri Gopala Reddi. The Harijans were
deliberating as to whom to support, and it was likely that their vote would go to
the highest bidder.
In Telengana, the leaders in the political field are the Reddis, who are distinct
from the Rayalaseema Reddis. The Telengana Brahmans are their local rivals.
A complicated pattern of alliances and rivalries is likely to emerge in the new
Andhra. Mr. Harrison writes, "Already the Reddi-Brahman rivals in Telengana
and the Kamma-Reddi antagonists in Andhra can be seen each jockeying to
establish ties across the border. To complicate matters still more, the Telengana
Conununist leadership lacks caste homogeneity. Ravi Narayana Reddi and a
Brahman, D. V. Rao, lead rival factions. How will these rivals adjust to their
new common relationship to the delta Communist leaders?" (p. 404).
It is to be regretted that analyses of elections similar to Mr. Harrison's are not
available for other parts of India. But some idea of the forces at work in the
1951-52 elections could be obtained even from newspaper reports. It is relevant
to mention here that it is widely believed that the Congress Party in Madras is
pursuing in the spheres of education and recruitment to services a policy which
meets with support from the Dravida Kazhagam. In fact, as mentioned earlier,
the success of the Congress in Madras is partly attributed to its pursuing a policy
which makes a non-Brahman party unnecessary. In an article entitled the "Na-
tional Scene" in the Times of India of July 12, 1955, "Darem" wrote: "But it is
futile denying that a large majority of the people [which means the non-Brahman
majority] in Tamilnad sympathize with the Kazhagam's ideology. Indeed the
present Chief Minister of Madras [Shri K. Kamaraj] owes his return to the
Assembly to the support of the Kazhagam in the election. It is further believed
that a majority of Congressmen actively back the Kazhagam."
During the elections the Communist Party of India, in accordance with its
policy of supporting candidates and parties having a "social base," supported
the Dravida Kazhagam candidates. The Communists argued that though the
Kazhagam was in origin a result of depressed non-Brahmans rising against
Brahman privilege, it had an economic and social basis, and a "progressive" or
Leftist ideal. (See the Times of India, January 2, 1952). In the same report, the
Times of India correspondent remarked that the Scheduled Castes Federation
was very powerful in Madras, and that the Harijans, constituted as they were of
landless laborers and other impoverished sections of the community, were at-
tracted to the extreme Left in thousands. The poorer Christians, mostly converts
from Harijan castes, were also supporting the Communists, though in their case
there was the counterinfluence of the Church to the Right.
The Vanniya Kula Kshatriyas are a dominant caste of petty landowners and
poor peasants in the four districts of North Arcot, South Arcot, Salem, and
Chingleput. In the year 1944 this caste organized itself as a pressure group to

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 CASTE IN INDIA 541

promote its interests. But just before the elections, the caste split into two
parties, now known as the Toilers' Party and the other as the Commonwealth
Party. The former had Leftist leanings and was active in South Arcot and Salem,
while the latter had no particular program. The Toilers' Party was supported at
the elections by both the Kisan Mazdoor Party and the United Front of Leftists.
The Times of India correspondent remarked, "it is astonishing how much caste
feeling is being evoked by the elections" (January 2, 1952).
I have mentioned earlier the Dravida Kazhagam movement in Madras. Some-
time in June 1956, the founder of the Kazhagam, Shri E. V. Ramaswamy Naick-
er, declared that he had given up the goal of Dravidistan, a sovereign state con-
sisting of Tamilnad, Kerala, Karnatak, and Andhra, the four Dravidian-speaking
areas of South India. He declared himself only in favor of Tamilnad, a tacit
acknowledgment of the fact that the movement had never made any headway
outside Tamil-speaking areas.
But the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, an offshoot of the Dravida Kazhagam,
has not given up the demand for Dravidistan. A conference of the D. M. K. held
in Trichy in the third week of May 1956, passed a resolution demanding the
creation of Dravidistan instead of Dakshina Pradesh.23 The demand for Dravidi-
stan as distinct from Dakshina Pradesh, is a demand for the creation of a sove-
reign and independent State. An acute controversy is raging at present between
the advocates of Dakshina Pradesh, led by Shri C. Rajagopalachari, and the
advocates of a Tamil State, but this need not detain us here. It is relevant to
mention that in a recent speech Shri C. Rajagopalachari charged both the D. K.
and D. M. K. with ". . . openly preaching a creed of hatred based on ethnological
conjectures and unrecorded and unproved historical conflicts." "It was claimed
by these 'hatred-mongers' that the Dravidians were very strong and powerful
and that the Aryans, who conquered them, were none else than the forebears of
present-day Brahmins. This theory would not stand even half-an-hour's exam-
ination." He asked, "Is it not remarkable that this hatred-mongering is going on
meeting with little disapproval or discouragement from those in authority?"24
Caste is omnipresent in modern Mysore. As in Andhra, the Congress Party is
dominated by two leading peasant castes, one of which is the Lingayat and the
other, Okkaliga. Lingayat-Okkaliga rivalry is coloring every matter, whether it
be appointment to government posts or reservation of seats in colleges, or elec-
tion to local bodies and legislatures. A detailed account of the way in which caste
functions in modern Mysore was given in the Economic Weekly.25
The Okkaligas of Mysore are apprehensive that in a large Kannada-speaking
state composed of Mysore, Coorg, and South Kan.ara, and the Kannada-speaking
areas of Madras, Hyderabad, and Bombay, they would be dominated by the
Lingayats. This is why they wanted Mysore to remain a separate state. They
continued to press for this even after the States Reorganization Commission had

23 Hindu, May 22, 1956.

24 Hindu, June 16, 1956.
25 See "Profile of a Southern State-Mysore," Economic Weekly, VIII, No. 29 (July 21,
1956), 859-865. See also No. 32, p. 943; and No. 34, pp. 1005-1006.

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 542 M. N. SRINIVAS

recommended the creation of a single state embracing all Kannada-speaking

areas, including Mysore. It was Shri Hanumanthaiah's support for the S. R. C.
proposal which changed the course of events. The supporters of separate Mysore
even welcomed the creation of Dakshina Pradesh as a counter to a single Kan-
nada-speaking state-in the former state no single group would be able to dom-
inate. One of the dilemmas of modern India is that while smaller states will
make for the more intimate association of the people with the Government, they
are also likely to make for the tyranny of the dominant caste. Devolution of power
in India is seriously complicated by caste.
That the members of the States Reorganization Commission were keenly
aware of the apprehensions of the Okkaligas is evident in par. 324 (p. 91 Ch. iv)
of their Report:

It has been suggested to us that the basic reason why two States have been demanded in-
stead of one is either political or religious apprehension or perhaps a combination of both.
It has been estimated that Lingayats or Veerasaivas constitute about 35 to 40% of the
population in the Kannada areas outside Mysore at present. The other important section
of the Kannadigas, namely, the Vakkaligas, similarly constitute a little less than 29% of
the population of Mysore. In the united Karnataka, it has been estimated that a little more
than 20% of the population may be Lingayats, between 13 and 14% Vakkaligas, about 17 to
18% Harijans. It is clear that no one community will, therefore, be dominant, and any one
section can be reduced to the status of a minority, if other groups combine against it. These
estimates of the communal composition of the new State are naturally not firm, because the
figures which have been quoted vary considerably.26 They serve however to illustrate the
problem.

Shri Hanumanthaiah's advocacy of the cause of a single Kannada state cost

him the Chief Ministership of Mysore. His action has been interpreted as harm-
ing Okkaligas. With the approach of the formation of the new state, Okkaliga-
Lingayat relations have become bitter. It is likely that in New Mysore besides a
straightforward tussle between the two groups there will be regional conflicts.
In fact, regionalism will be the pattern in India south of the Vindhyas, if not all
over India. This is an inevitable consequence of the formation of large states
within the Indian Union. Regionalism is an offspring of linguism, and caste is
active in both.
Another feature of modern Mysore is the recognition given to caste in ap-
pointments to government posts, seats in medical and engineering colleges, etc.
Brahmans may apply for only one in five posts, and only 30 % of the seats in
medical and engineering colleges are allotted on the basis of merit. (In Andhra,
conditions seem to be worse, Brahmans being eligible to apply for only one in
seven posts, and only 20 % of the seats in colleges being open to competition.)
It may be recalled in this connection that Article 29 (2) of the Constitution
guaranteeing that "No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational
institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds, on grounds
only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them," was amended in 1951 to

26 According to the 1931 Census, the percentage of Lingayats, Vakkaligas, and Harijans
in the areas proposed to be included in the Karnataka State was 17, 11, and 13, respectively.

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 CASTE IN INDIA 543

provide for reservation of seats in schools and colleges on the grounds of caste.
The Constitution (First Amendment) Act was passed in 1951 and added the
following to Article 15 of the Constitution: "(4) Nothing in this Article or Clause
(2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for
the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens
or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes." The Amendment Act arose
out of the case of Champakam Dorairajan vs. the State of Madras. Miss Doraira-
jan, a Brahman girl, was refused admission to a college in Madras, and she filed
a writ petition. The Madras High Court held that the Communal Government
Order under which the action was taken was ultra vires of the Constitution. The
Madras Government appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the decision
of the Madras High Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court declared that
the classification made in the Madras Government order regarding admission to
colleges proceeded on the basis of religion, race, and caste, and was therefore
opposed to the Constitution, and constituted a clear violation of the Fundamental
Rights guaranteed to the citizens under Article 29 (2) of the Constitution, and
therefore void under Article 13. The Amendment to the Constitution was
prompted by the decision of the Supreme Court.
Kerala, or the Malayalam-speaking area, on the west coast of South India,
differs in certain important respects from the rest of South India. For instance,
it includes a large and influential Christian population, and in the northern part
of the State, a well-knit group of Muslims. The Nabuthri (Nambudri) Brahmans
of Kerala, who may be said to be Brahmans among Brahmans, have not taken
to Western education in the way their eastern and northern counterparts have
done. The Nayars are the important Hindu group in an educational, administra-
tive, and political sense. The Izhavans or Tiyyans, a "backward" caste with the
traditional occupation of toddy-tapping, have Sanskritized their way of life
under the leadership of their revered leader, the late Shri Narayana Guru. Among
Hindus, there is a certain amount of rivalry between the Nayars and Tiyyans,
and in Travancore-Cochin there is rivalry between Hindus and Christians.
Kerala teaches us that it is not so much the ritual superiority of the Brahman
that is resented by others, but his political and economic domination.
In the 1951 elections, the major cleavage in Travancore-Cochin was between
Hindus and Christians. For a whole year before the elections, the Democratic
Congress carried on a steady and virulent campaign that the local Indian National
Congress was dominated by Christians. This led to the departure of some Nayars
and Tiyyans from the National Congress. Then came a sudden electoral alliance
between the National Congress and Democratic Congress, which confused many
followers of the former. Many Izhavans turned Left. The Christian vote did not
go to the National Congress because the State Government tried to obtain con-
trol of tuition in schools, which are mostly run by Christian missionaries. The
Church resisted this attempt by the State, and the Government of India reversed
the decision of the State Government. The clergy and the Catholic Congress
supported Independent Catholics against the Congress nominees. Independent
Catholics in Trichur called themselves the Cochin Party. When Hindus saw

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 544 M. N. SRINIVAS

that the clergy we

nominees of the Congress and supported Hindu Independents and Leftists. The
Congress vote was thus split. Five of eleven Independents elected to the Assembly
were from Trichur.27
A report in the Times of India of August 27, 1956, contained a revealing analy-
sis of the forces at work in Travancore-Cochin State since its inception:

For a long time Travancore and Cochin were two separate States ruled by two royal
families and their advisors, called Dewans. In those days, it was not a sin to distribute
favours. At least, the royal right was not challenged. The best available place to distribute
favours was the expanding field of public administration.
When self-rule replaced autocracy, it inherited the old machinery intact. But the units
and components of this machinery were never seriously disturbed. In fact, some of the
critics of ministerial rule in the State point out that the services enjoyed more opportunities
for favouritism during the initial rise and temporary decline of representative government
here.
The Public, the newspapers and the people's representatives, all tended to identify and
equate Government employees with this or that community. Appointments and promotions of
clerks and sub-inspectors of police became front-page news and reached the agenda of Cabinet
meetings. The failures and fortunes of Government employees were identified with the failures
and fortunes of their respective communities. The employees enjoying rare privileges soon
searched for and always succeeded in getting "god-fathers", promoters and sponsors, among the
leaders of public life. [italics mine]
In this small and compact area, everyone knew everyone else. Family connections and
communal parity were much too important. Personal considerations and obligations held
sway over efficiency and independence. Progress stopped. Inertia set in. This is the critical
analysis of the recent history of the State Services by responsible officials.
Into this stagnant pool flew the Presidental Agent, Mr. P. S. Rau. He detected the ma-
laise. His writ that the President's administration shall be strictly impartial ran through
all departments. He felt that being a newcomer from beyond the State's borders he could do
something in this direction. Mere seniority would not be the sole criterion for promotions,
he said. Efficiency would be the keynote of the administration.

I may be permitted to remark here that it is not unlikely that the absence of
powerful Brahman groups in the North has prevented the rising of an anti-
Brahman movement, and this has probably led to the popular impression that
caste is more powerful south of the Vindhyas than to the north. There are signs,
however, that caste is becoming stronger in the North. Whether caste conflict
will ever become as strong as it is in the South today, remains to be seen.
Strong caste rivalries were seen in the Bihar Congress during the 1951 elec-
tions. The three chief castes were the Rajputs (led by the Finance and Food
Minister, Shri A. N. Sinha), the Bhumihar (led by the Chief Minister, Dr. Shri
Kishna Sinha), and the Kayastha (led by Shri K. B. Sahay, Minister for Revenue
and Excise). A Times of India report, dated January 3, 1952, stated that many
Congressmen were supporting surreptitiously, and in some cases even openly,
many Independent candidates and disgruntled Congressmen standing against
the party's official nominees. In short, Rajputs supported Rajputs, and Bhumi-
hars supported Bhumihars, occasionally in contravention of party loyalty. The

27 Times of India, Jan. 26, 1952.

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 CASTE IN INDIA 545

Kayasths, however, were split into two groups, one of them supporting Shri A. N.
Sinha.
While some Congressmen supported caste fellows at the expense of the party
nominees, some members of the party of Rajput landlords, the Janata Party (led
by the Raja of Ramgarh), expressed their preference for Shri A. N. Sinha.
The Congress exploited the principle of caste in the elections. Rajkumari
Amrit Kaur was brought to tour the tribal areas to wean away tribesmen, a good
many of whom are Christians, from a separatist demand for a tribal state, to be
called Jharkhand. The leader of the Jharkhand Party, Shri Jaipal Singh, himself
a Christian tribal, wanted a new state to be carved out of the tribal areas of
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa.
In 1951 there was in existence in U. P. an organization called the Shoshita
Sangh, comprising the lower castes, which had as its aim the improvement of the
conditions of the latter.28 This seems to be but one indication of the fact that
caste-consciousness is on the rise in U. P. The tussle between the Rajputs and
Chamars for political power is likely to get keener in the near future. In the rural
areas the Rajputs, who were until recently an exclusive group, seem to be more
willing nowadays to grant Rajput status to aspiring groups, with a view to
strengthening themselves at the next elections.
An incidental effect of the abolition of the zamindari system in parts of North
India was the outbreak of dacoity in parts of U. P. and Madhya Bharat. The
dacoit gangs in U. P. were recruited almost exclusively among the Thakur,
Mallah, and Gujar castes, which collaborated effectively to protect the criminals
wherever they went. Punitive police were posted in the affected areas during
December 1952-January 1953, by the U. P. Government. Similarly, in Madhya
Bharat, the Rajputs, Thakurs, and Gujars who were adversely affected by the
post-Independence agrarian reforms took to dacoity.29 In the latter half of 1952,
in certain villages in Bhind and Morena Districts of Madhya Bharat, Harijans
were frequently victims of loot, arson, and murder at the hands of the dacoits.
These assaults were described by the Times of India correspondent as a kind of
"class war" waged by the Zamindars (who had suffered by the abolition of zamin-
dari) against the people (Harijans) whom they had oppressed formerly.30
In the Punjab, the conflict is not between castes but between two systems of
castes-the Hindu and Sikh. The Hindu-Sikh conffict took on the guise of a
linguistic conflict, and this was in spite of the fact that "the Punjabi and Hindi
languages as spoken in the Punjab are akin to each other and are both well under-
stood by all sections of the people of the State."'" "The problem of language in the
Punjab is, therefore, one of scripts...."32 The Sikhs wanted Gurmukhi script
while the Hindus wanted the Devanagari script. The States Reorganization
Commission turned down both the Sikh demand for the creation of a Punjabi-

28 Times of India, Nov. 14,1951.

29 Times of India, Jan. 26, 1953.
30 Times of India, Nov. 25, 1952.
31 Report of the States Reorganization Commission, S. 520, p. 141.
32 Ibid., S. 527, p. 143.

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 546 M. N. SRINIVAS

speaking state as well as the Hindu demand for a Maha (bigger) Punjab state.
They proposed the creation of a new Punjab in which was merged the existing
states of the Punjab (except the Lohari sub-tehsil of Hissar District), PEPSU,
and Himachal Pradesh. The Commission criticized Sikh as well as Hindu com-
munalism, and gave their support to a compromise plan: "As for the possible
unfavorable repercussions of enlarging the present State of Punjab on the existing
communal equilibrium, the position is that the proposal which we make about
this region will no doubt result in the formation of a larger unit, but the Sikh
percentage in the enlarged unit will not be adversely affected as compared with
their percentage in the existing State of Punjab. The Sikh percentage in the
proposed State will in fact show a small improvement of a little more than 1.5 %,
resulting in a corresponding decrease in the Hindu percentage."33 It is ironical
that the S. R. C. proposal makes an appeal to the same communal sentiments
which it so loudly deprecates.
It was the Shiromani Akali Dal, the organization of orthodox Sikhs, which
sponsored the idea of a Punjabi-speaking state. The reasons which prompted it
to do so are not difficult to guess. In a recent speech, Sardar Gyan Singh Rare-
wala, formerly Chief Minister of PEPSU, stated that the Sikhs were suffering
from frustration ever since Independence because of the denial of "due status to
Punjabi language and Gurmukhi script," discrimination against Sikh Scheduled
Castes, and discrimination against the Sikhs in government service both in
appointments as well as promotions.34
The Congress Government have evolved a "regional formula" to set at rest
Sikh apprehensions of domination by Hindus. This solution has been opposed by
the Hindus. The Times of India reported that at an emergency meeting of the
Maha Punjab Samiti Working Committee held on September 5, 1956, a resolu-
tion was passed declaring that the "unpatriotic regional formula for the Punjab
was intolerable and would have to be resisted by measures sterner in nature than
those adopted by the Samiti previously."35
I have nearly come to the end of my sketchy survey of the role which caste is
playing in modern India. There is one important matter, however, to which I
must make a reference, necessarily inadequate, before I conclude. Under the
Constitution, the practice of Untouchability in any form is forbidden. Enforce-
ment of any disability arising out of Untouchability shall be an offence punishable
according to law (Article 17 of the Constitution). Articles 15, 25, 29 (2), 38, and
46 deal with both the positive and negative aspects of Untouchability, i.e., pre-
venting all forms of discrimination against any group of people as well as the
adoption of positive measures to put an end to Untouchability, and to help pro-
mote the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people,
and in particular, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
The Constitution grants statutory protection to the Scheduled Castes, and
there are specific provisions which guarantee protection in various contexts. Thus

33 Ibid., S. 568, p. 153; S. 550, pp. 148-149.

34 Hindu, June 11, 1956.
36 Times of India, Sept. 7, 1956.

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 CASTE IN INDIA 547

there is a reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes in the Lok Sabha and in the
State Legislative Assemblies. Out of 495 seats in the Lok Sabha, 72 seats have
been reserved for Scheduled Castes. In the State Legislative Assemblies, against
a total number of 3,283 seats in all states, 477 seats have been reserved for
Scheduled Castes.
The Constitution has also provided for the reservation of appointments for
Scheduled Castes in the services of the Union and State Governments. Under
Article 35, the claims of the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
are taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of the efficiency
of administration, in making appointments to services and posts in the Union
and State Governments. 1212% of the vacancies filled by open competitive
examinations in the Central and All-India Services are accordingly reserved for
members of the Scheduled Castes. The reservation is increased to 163 % in the
case of posts and services filled otherwise than by open competition on an all-
India basis. Besides the above, the various State Governments have also made
some efforts to improve the economic, educational, and social conditions of
Scheduled Castes. Some of them have resorted to legislation to give special
protection to the Scheduled Castes.36
The conscience of enlightened Indians demands that Untouchability be abol-
ished, and that everything that is possible be done to bring the Scheduled Castes
and Tribes and the various other groups subsumed under the blanket term of
Backward Classes, to the level of the so-called advanced groups. But it is begin-
ning to be realized increasingly that the measures devised to bring about social
and economic equality might themselves perpetuate the evil system of caste.
In fact, this question was raised in a pointed manner by Pandit Pant in his
concluding address to the Seminar on Casteism (p. 152). It is understandable
that groups which are classed as "backward" show reluctance to give up the
privileges of "backwardness."
As I write these lines, a news item in the Times of India (September 5, 1956)
reports that the Government of India has found the report of the Backward Classes
Commission vague and inadequate, as it has failed to establish objective and
acceptable criteria for defining "backwardness." The Commission was appointed
in 1953 under Article 340 of the Constitution, with Kaka Kalekar as Chairman.
Its terms of reference were to determine the criteria to be adopted in considering
whether any sections of the people-in addition to those listed as Scheduled
Castes and Tribes-should be treated as socially and educationally backward,
to prepare a list of such classes, and to recommend ways and means of assisting
them and improving their condition.
The Commission's list contains as many as 2,399 communities, of which 913
alone account for an estimated population of 116 millions, while the Scheduled
Castes and Tribes will make up another 70 millions. All women have been re-
garded as backward, though they are not listed among the Backward Classes,
since they cannot be regarded as a separate community.

36 Report of the Seminar on Casteism and Removal of Untouchability, Bombay, 1955. See
Shri Shankar Saran's address, pp. 95-104.

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 548 M. N. SRINIVAS

According to the Commission, then, about three-fourths of the country's pop-

ulation would be "backward." It is difficult to see how special privileges could be
given to such a large section of the population, and this is clearly recognized in
the Government's Memorandum on the Commission's Report.
A majority of the members of the Commission were of the opinion that caste
determined the degree and extent of backwardness. The Government of India
did not accept this view, but it admitted that the caste system is the greatest
hindrance to progress towards an egalitarian society. It added the warning that
the recognition of the specified castes as backward may serve to maintain and
even perpetuate the existing distinctions on the basis of caste.
It is time, then, to give serious thought towards evolving "neutral" indices of
backwardness, indices which also include the Scheduled Tribes and Castes. The
criteria of literacy, landownership, and income in cash or grain, should be able
to subsume all cases of backwardness. This is admittedly a huge and difficult
task but not impossible. And the end may make it worth while.
One last point. Caste is so tacitly and so completely accepted by all, including
those who are most vocal in condemning it, that it is everywhere the unit of
social action. Some caste conferences have been urged by their leaders "to seize
the opportunities afforded under the Five Year Plan to the fullest advantage and
contribute their share to the industrial development [of the country]."37 Shri S.
Chenniah, President of the Mysore Pradesh Congress Committee, was giving
expression to a widespread sentiment when he stated in an address to the con-
ference of a particular caste in Nanjanagud in October 1955 that "communal
bodies striving for economic and social uplift cannot be dubbed as harmful.
Human psychology being what it is, it often was the communal bond which urged
them to action." He expressed his pleasure at his having won the confidence of
the members of the caste in question. He pointed out that the hostel which had
been built for students of this caste had now been thrown open to students of all
castes. He held out the assurance that when candidates were selected for the next
general election the claims of the members of this caste would receive due atten-
tion. But even Shri Chenniah argued that there must be a limit to caste organi-
zations.
Commenting on the above Report, the Times of India remarked in a leader
(October 23, 1955): "The politician who wants caste and communal distinctions
should disappear is at the same time aware of its vote-catching power, and is
thus faced with a real dilemma. Where should he draw the line when he is asked
to extend help and patronage to communal organizations? Should a Union
Minister grace by his presence a function arranged by a sub-caste among Mara-
thas? Could a newly-elected Congress President allow himself to be garlanded by
caste fraternities?" The leader concluded by saying: "The first step towards
solving the dilemma facing the politician is to recognize its [caste's] widespread
incidence and implications." It is, however, only the first step.

17Silver Jubilee of the Nadar Mahajana Sangam at Virudhanagar. See the Hindu, May
29, 1956.

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