Causes of Disinheritance

Pecson v. Mediavillo, 1914

FACTS:

The last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented for probate. Mr. Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed
the legalization of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased, in accordance
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court had denied the opposition. The deceased had eight
children by his wife Nicolasa Manjares, likewise deceased.

Teresa, another daughter of Florencio, married Basilio Mediavillo, whom she had two children: one of them is
Rosario, who was disinherited by the testator and Joaquin, who died without isssue but is represented by his father,
Basilio. Teresa died. Joaquin died before the death of the testator. Rosario is the only living child of Teresa and the
latter‘s husband, Basilio, is also living. Evidence shows that Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva
Caceres to study college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather
and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator stated in his will, he disinherited her.

ISSUE: Was Rosario validly disinherited by his grandfather?

RULING: The disinheritance was invalid. Disinheritance of a lawful heir can only be made for one of the causes
expressly fixed by law. Such disinheritance can only be effected by a will in which shall be mentioned the legal
grounds or causes for such disinheritance. Article 850 of the civil code provides that the reason for the disinheritance
shall be established by the heirs of the testator. In other words, if the person disinherited shall deny the truthfulness
of the cause of disinheritance, he may be permitted to support his allegations by proof. The courts may inquire into
the justice of disinheritance, and if they find that the disinheritance was without cause, that part of the will may be
pronounced null and void.

Taking into consideration of the tender years of Rosario and the fact that she very soon thereafter lost the use of her
mental faculties, the Court reached the conclusion that she was not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience
shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895. Inasmuch, however, as there was a descendant in the direct line,
surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for that reason Basilio can not inherit that share of the estate that
would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living.

Legacies and Devises

Pascual v. Rigor, 1979

Facts:Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac and the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, diedin 1935, leaving a
will naming as devisees his nearest relatives—his three sisters. Additionally,the will contained a bequest in favor of
the testator’s nearest male relative who would studyfor the priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the
actual Catholic Priest of theRoman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, or his successors.The project of partition was
later judicially approved, including the sum due to the church ofthe Victoria parish. However, since no nephew of the
testator claimed the devise and as theadministratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had
no right toadminister the rice lands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic.About thirteen years after the
approval of the project of partition, the parish priest of Victoriafiled in the pending testate proceeding, a petition
praying for the appointment of a newadministrator, who should deliver to the church the said rice land.

Issue:Did the bequeathal in favor of the testator’s nearest male relative who would study for thepriesthood,
contemplate only of the nearest male relative “at the time of his death” or “at anytime after his death”? - AT THE
TIME OF HIS DEATHHeld:SC held that the said bequest refers to the testator’s nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. “In order to be capacitated toinherit, the heir, devisee or
legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, exceptin case of representation, when it is proper.” (Art.
1025, Civil Code)The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construethem as
referring to the testator’s nearest male relative at any time after his death wouldrender the provisions difficult to
apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of hisestate. That could not have been his intention.In 1935, when
the testator died, his nearest legal heirs were his three sisters or second-degreerelatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs.
Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testatorspecified his nearest male relative, he must have
had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister,who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But
since he could notprognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearestmale
relative would be living at the time of his death, he could not specify that his nearestmale relative would be his
nephew or grandnephew (the son of his nephew or niece) and so hehad to use the term “nearest male relative.

The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at thetime of his death, who
would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high schoolor was not yet in the seminary. In that case,
the parish priest of Victoria would administer thericelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the
moment the testator's nephewentered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the
ricelands andreceive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.Inasmuch as the
testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, theunavoidable conclusion is that
the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the
parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged inthe will, was likewise inoperative.The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
this case is covered by article 888 of the Old CivilCode, now Article 956, which provides that if “the bequest
for any reason should beinoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those
inwhich the right of accretion exists.”

Rosario vda. De singson v. de lim, 1943

Don Vicente Singson Pablo, a lawyer of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, died on April 15,1938, without any descendant or
ascendant, his nearest surviving relatives being his widow Doña Rosalia Rosario, four brothers, and four nieces,
the children of a deceased sister. He left a will which was duly probated, clause 8 of which reads as follows:

"Octavo. Ordeno y mando que todos mis bienes no dispuestos de otro modo en este testamento, se distribuiran en
partes iguales a todos los que tienen derecho a ello."

The widow, as administratrix, presented a project of partition in which the properties not disposed of in the will
were adjudicated to the four brothers and the four nieces of the deceased "in the proportion provided in paragraph
8 of the will." The brothers, appellants herein, objected to the project of partition insofar as it includes the nieces
of the deceased, on the ground that under clause 8 of the will, in relation to article 751 of the Civil Code, they were
not entitled to any share. The nieces also objected to the project of partition, alleging that certain other specified
properties had been omitted therefrom, which formed part of the properties not disposed of and which under clause
8 of the will "should be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled thereto." The trial court sustained the
contention of the nieces (appellees herein) and ordered the administratrix "to amend the project of partition so as
to include therein the said properties and that all of those not disposed of in the will be adjudicated in equal
parts to the brothers and nieces of the deceased."

The only question raised in this appeal is the interpretation of clause 8 of the will above quoted. Said clause
provides that "all of my properties not disposed of otherwise in this testament shall be distributed in equal parts to
all who are entitled thereto." In this connection appellants invoke article 751 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"a disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of
those nearest in degree."

The trial court noted that the testator, who was a lawyer, did not use the word "relatives" in the clause in question.
We do not need to decide here whether, had the testator used the word "relatives," the nieces would be excluded.
The authorities differ on the interpretation of article 751. Some hold that under said article the nephews and nieces
inherit by representation together with the brothers and sisters of the testator, as in legal succession; while others,
Manresa among them, hold that said article excludes nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive. We
think the testator, by referring to "all who are entitled thereto," instead of referring to his "relatives," precisely
meant to avoid the uncertainty of the interpretation of article 751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his
estate be distributed in equal parts to all who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he died intestate.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.