Boys Will Be Boys Cows Will Be Cows

Boys Will Be Boys; Cows Will Be Cows: Children's Essentialist Reasoning about Gender
Categories and Animal Species

Author(s): Marianne G. Taylor, Marjorie Rhodes and Susan A. Gelman
Source: Child Development, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2009), pp. 461-481
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Society for Research in Child Development
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Child Development, March/April 2009, Volume 80, Number 2, Pages 461-481
Boys Will Be Boys; Cows Will Be Cows: Children's Essentialist Reasoning

About Gender Categories and Animal Species
Marianne G. Taylor Marjorie Rhodes and Susan A. Gelman
Pacific Lutheran University University of Michigan
Two studies (N = 456) compared the development of concepts of animal species and human gender, using a
switched-at-birth reasoning task. Younger children (5- and 6-year-olds) treated animal species and human
gender as equivalent; they made similar levels of category-based inferences and endorsed similar explana?
tions for development in these 2 domains. In contrast, 10-year-olds and adults treated gender and species
concepts as distinct from one another. They viewed gender-linked behavioral properties as open to environ?
mental influence and endorsed environment-based mechanisms to explain gender development. At all ages,
children demonstrated differentiated reasoning about physical and behavioral properties, although this
differentiation became more stable with age. The role of psychological essentialism in guiding conceptual
development is discussed.
A number of theorists have compared children's essences has led to the proposal that psychological
and adults' reasoning about gender and other essentialism results from early emerging cognitive
human social categories to their reasoning about biases that guide conceptual development (Gelman,
animal species, proposing that people appeal to a 2003).
notion of a category "essence" in their reasoning The proposal that children apply the same
about both kinds of categories (Allport, 1954; Atran, explanatory framework to understand both animal
1990; Atran et al., 2001; Gil-White, 2001; Haslam, species and human social categories has fostered
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Hirschfeld, 1996; Rothbart rich theoretical questioning and debate regarding
& Taylor, 1992; Taylor, 1996). Psychological essen the onset of psychological essentialism in children's
tialism indicates that people treat certain categories biological and social reasoning. For example, do
as having an underlying reality or true nature that children transfer essentialist reasoning from their
gives category members their identity and observa? concepts of animal species to understand the social
ble properties (Medin & Ortony, 1989). Evidence world (Atran, 1990; Gil-White, 2001), or is psycho?
that young children, like adults, reason about cate? logical essentialism instantiated separately in the
gories as if they are determined by underlying biological and social domains (Hirschfeld, 1996)?
How similar is children's reasoning about animal
and human social categories with respect to their
This research was supported by National Institute of Child
Health and Human Development Grant HD-36043 to Gelman.
ideas about what might constitute a category
We thank the parents, teachers, and children at the following essence and how an essence is obtained (Kanovsky,
institutions in Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan 2007)? Yet, despite the richness of these theoretical
Children's Centers, the Jewish Community Center, St. Thomas
Elementary School, and the YMCA. We also thank participating
questions, little empirical work has directly com?
families and schools in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, and sur? pared children's reasoning about human social cat?
rounding areas: the University of Illinois Child Development egories and animal species (for exceptions, see
Lab, the Learning Tree, Royal Elementary School, Schneider Ele?
Astuti, Solomon, & Carey, 2004; Rhodes & Gelman,
mentary School, St. Matthew's Elementary School, St. John's
School, Washington Elementary School, the Montessori School, 2008). The goal of the present set of studies was to
the Don Moyers Boys and Girls Club, the University of Illinois compare children's reasoning about animal and
Summer Science Program, the Thomas Paine Computer Camp,
and the University of Illinois Summer Fitness Camp. We extend
gender development regarding several aspects
our appreciation to Cindy Andress, Mandy Davies, Galena Kline, of psychological essentialism: the immutability
Tracey Kramer, and Aisling O'Driscoll for their assistance with of category identity, the inherent nature of
data collection and coding.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Marianne Taylor, Department of Psychology, Pacific Lutheran ? 2009, Copyright the Author(s)
University, Tacoma, WA 98447-0003. Electronic mail may be sent Journal Compilation ? 2009, Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.
to [email protected]. All rights reserved. 0009-3920/2009/8002-0012
462 Taylor, Rhodes, and Gelman
category-linked properties, and the causal mecha? ioral properties typical of their birth category, not
nisms responsible for development. the category in their environment (Gelman & Well
man, 1991). Preschoolers do so even on more chal?
lenging tasks where they are not told the kind
Category Immutability and Category Properties
identity of the animals at birth, but have to deter?
We used a version of the "switched-at-birth" mine category membership based on knowledge of
task, which has been commonly used to examine the animal's parents (Johnson & Solomon, 1997;
children's beliefs about the immutability of cate? Sousa et al., 2002; Waxman et al., 2007) or when
gory membership. In this task, children are told they are asked to reason about unfamiliar proper?
stories in which a baby (animal or human) is born a ties (Sousa et al, 2002; Waxman et al., 2007). Essen
member of a certain category and then raised tialist reasoning about animal development has
entirely by members of another category. For exam? been found across diverse cultures in both children
ple, a baby pig is raised entirely by cows (Gelman and adults, suggesting that representing animal
& Wellman, 1991), or a human male infant is raised species in an essentialist manner may be universal
entirely by females (Taylor, 1996). The test ques? (Astuti et al., 2004; Atran, 1990; Atran et al., 2001;
tions ask what the baby will be like when it has Sousa et al, 2002).
grown up?will it develop the category-typical Whereas numerous studies have examined chil?
properties of its birth category or of the category dren's beliefs about animal development using a
members in its environment? Thus, these questions switched-at-birth task, only one set of studies has
pit nature against nurture, asking children to rea? examined beliefs about gender in this context. Tay?
son about whether the category identity present at lor (1996) found that young children predicted that
birth will lead to the development of typical cate? infants would develop the physical and behavioral
gory-linked properties (consistent with essentialist characteristics associated with their birth gender
thought), or whether development will be influ? category even if they were raised entirely by mem?
enced by the environment of upbringing. bers of the other gender. Although preschoolers
In other studies, switched-at-birth tasks have viewed certain properties as more resistant to envi?
also been used to tap children's beliefs about bio? ronmental influence than others (e.g., physical vs.
logical inheritance and how category identity is behavioral characteristics), they nonetheless
acquired (Gim?nez & Harris, 2002; Hirschfeld, allowed for little environmental influence overall.
1995; Johnson & Solomon, 1997; Solomon, Johnson, In these experiments, younger children attributed
Zaitchik, & Carey, 1996; Sousa, Atran, & Medin, more predictive power to gender categories than
2002; Springer, 1996; Waxman, Medin, & Ross, did older children and adults, especially for behav?
2007). Because the present studies focus on gender ioral properties; adults and 10-year-olds reliably
(which differs from animal species and other social predicted that characters would develop the behav?
categories, such as race, in that it cannot be pre? ioral properties associated with their environment
dicted based on characteristics of birth parents), we of upbringing (i.e., the gender-atypical behavioral
cannot speak directly to the important question of properties; see also Smith & Russell, 1984; Ullian,
how children understand biological inheritance. 1976).
Rather, in the present studies, children are directly Although only one study has used the switched
told the category identity that characters have at at-birth methodology to examine beliefs about
birth, and we examine whether children predict gender, research using other experimental tasks
that category membership will be stable over time provides converging evidence for children's essen?
and lead to the development of typical category tialist beliefs about gender. For example, preschool?
linked properties (Gelman & Wellman, 1991; ers expect members of the same gender to share
Taylor, 1996). Thus, we assess the extent to which novel physical and behavioral properties, even
gender and animal species membership are treated when they have diverse appearances (Gelman,
as inherent and stable (Hall & Waxman, 1993; Macna Coliman, & Maccoby, 1986) or personalities (Die
mara, 1986), not the extent to which they are sendruck & haLevi, 2006). Young children also
treated as inherited. exaggerate gender group differences by denying or
Prior work has demonstrated that children as misremembering gender anomalies (Liben & Signo
young as 4 years old consistently predict that ani? relia, 1987), evaluating anomalies as morally wrong
mals who are raised entirely by members of (Levy, Taylor, & Gelman, 1995), assuming that
another species will retain their category identity cross-gender roles are mutually exclusive (De?k &
across time and develop the physical and behav Maratsos, 1998; Florian, 1996), and emphasizing
Boys Will Be Boys; Cows Will Be Cows 463
within-group similarity in natural language (Gel? We also go beyond prior work by examining the
man, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004). Although adults flexibility of children's beliefs. Particularly, we
display relatively more flexible beliefs about gender examine the extent to which children maintain their
(Berndt & Heller, 1986; Biernat, 1991; Diesendruck original predictions when presented with an alter?
& haLevi, 2006; Rhodes & Gelman, 2008; Taylor, nate suggestion (e.g., Gim?nez & Harris, 2002).
1996), elements of essentialist reasoning can be Inclusion of these questions allows for a stronger
found in adults' concepts of gender as well (Ha test of the prediction that children reason similarly
slam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Hoffman & Hurst, about animal species and human gender by allow?
1990; Prentice & Miller, 2006). ing more sensitive measurement of their beliefs.
Based on this prior work, in the present studies Further, we extend prior work on gender
we expected young children to treat human infants concepts by examining the categories "male" and
and baby animals in equivalent ways, as maintain? "female" separately. Some prior work suggests that
ing identity over time and developing the physical young children may hold stricter gender stereotypes
and behavioral characteristics associated with their about boys than girls (e.g., Berndt & Heller, 1986;
birth categories. These predictions are consistent Biernat, 1991; Levy et al., 1995). For example, Levy
with prior work but before now have never been et al. (1995) found that although children and adults
examined directly. By precisely comparing reported that female behavior was flexible and open
responses to questions about gender and animal to cultural variation, they judged male gender role
development in within-subject (Study 1) and violations to be highly inflexible and just as unac?
between-subjects (Study 2) designs, the present ceptable as moral transgressions. Differences in
studies allow us to examine the extent to which reasoning about male and female have not been
gender is treated as equivalent to species kind. For examined previously in research on essentialism.
example, do children view a preference for trucks
as an inevitable consequence of being born a boy to
Children s Explanations
the same degree as they believe that saying moo is
an inevitable consequence of being born a cow? Another central aim of the present research was
We also examined developmental changes in to compare the explanations that children provide
how individuals reason about species and gender. for species- versus gender-linked development. In
Prior work indicates that older children and adults Study 1, we examined how children explained why
allow for more environmental influence on devel? animals and humans would develop certain prop?
opment, especially for behavioral (as compared to erties. Of particular interest was whether and when
physical) properties. Yet the extent to which older children explicitly reference category identity. Fur?
children and adults allow environmental influence ther, we examined how children characterize cate?
on behavioral properties for species and gender has gory-property relations. Recent work in adult
not been compared. According to Atran (1990), chil? cognition has distinguished between two distinct
dren initially apply an essentialist framework to ways of describing category-property relations:
understand animal species and then later transfer formal explanations, in which category identity
this explanatory framework to social categories. provides an acceptable explanation for why an
From this perspective, we should find increasing individual has a particular property (e.g., the fact
convergence in how individuals represent gender that an animal is a dog can explain why it is
and animal categories with age. four-legged), and association-based explanations,
An alternate theoretical account of psychological in which properties are viewed as strongly associ?
essentialism suggests, however, that essentialism ated with a category but cannot be explained by
represents a more general mode of understanding reference to category identity itself (e.g., the fact
that is instantiated separately in the biological and that an animal is a dog cannot explain why it wears
social domains (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Hirschfeld, a collar, even though dogs generally wear collars;
1996). From this perspective, psychological essen? Prasada & Dillingham, 2006). Adults reliably distin?
tialism plays a particularly important role in early guish between property-category relations that
conceptual development, by guiding children to license formal explanations and those that license
focus on the similarities across diverse instances of associational explanations, even when they judge
a category. With age, as children appreciate the the properties in question as equally probable
importance of within-category variability, they may in how often they apply to category members.
revise their concepts, and essentialist biases may Further, this distinction has implications for how
play a less central role (Gelman & Coley, 1991). adults reason about categories; for example, adults
have normative expectations regarding properties through which we expect to find developmental
understood as formally linked to category member? change in representations of gender (e.g., Taylor,
ship (e.g., they believe that dogs should be four-leg? 1996). This work is the first study of gender con?
ged; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006). cepts to examine beliefs about flexibility on a
Drawing on this framework, we examined switched-at-birth task, the first study of gender con?
whether children's explanations for category-based cepts to provide a systematic examination of chil?
predictions appear to be formal or associational, dren's explanations, and the first study of gender
and whether these descriptions differ by property concepts to provide a head-to-head comparison
type, domain, and participant age. This analysis with species concepts. Our use of converging meth?
also speaks to the broader question of how children ods (predictions, flexibility, and explanations) per?
view the relations between categories and proper? mits a particularly in-depth look at these issues.
ties (Rakison & Oakes, 2003; Sousa et al., 2002). In
Study 2, we examined children's explanations more
explicitly by asking participants to judge a series of
Study 1
possible causal mechanisms.
Comparing children's explanations for gender Method
linked and species-linked development is central to
Participants
identifying the extent to which they represent the
social and biological domains in a similar manner. Participants included 160 children of two age
For example, if children have transferred a mode of groups, recruited from preschools, elementary
reasoning developed specifically for understanding schools, and summer programs in two Midwestern
the biological world to reasoning about human university towns and rural surrounding areas.
social categories (Atran, 1990), we should expect to Younger children (referred to as "5-year-olds")
find a great deal of similarity in children's explana? were assigned to either an adoption condition or
tions for development in these domains. Alter? a control condition (see below) and ranged in
nately, if essentialism represents a more general age from 4,0 to 6,1 (adoption condition, n = 68,
mode of understanding with distinct instantiations mean age = 4,10; control condition, n = 32, mean
in different domains (Gelman, 2003; Hirschfeld, age = 4,11). The older children (referred to as
1995), we may find more variability in the explana? "10-year-olds") were all assigned to the adoption
tions that children provide across domains. For condition, and ranged in age from 8,11 to 11,2
example, we may find less appeal to birth when (n = 64, mean age = 9,11). Also, 32 college students
children explain gender than animal development participated in the adoption condition. There were
(Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999; Kanovsky, 2007). equal numbers of females and males at each age
Although some prior work has examined how chil? and in each condition. Participants were primarily
dren justify their responses on switched-at-birth White, with some African American participants
tasks, this has been done primarily on questions and a range of socioeconomic backgrounds.
designed to tap children's understanding of inheri?
tance (e.g., Johnson & Solomon, 1997), which is not Materials and Procedures
directly relevant to the current work.
A female experimenter interviewed children
Overview individually in two 15- to 20-min sessions, approxi?
mately 1 week apart. Children answered questions
Studies 1 and 2 make use of switched-at-birth about animals in one session (animal task) and
tasks to examine beliefs about animal kinds and humans in the other (gender task). Half of the boys
human gender. In Study 1, we use a within-subject and half of the girls at each age and in each condi?
design to examine 5-year-olds', 10-year-olds', and tion completed the animal task first; half completed
adults' predictions about development, beliefs the gender task first. On the gender task, half of the
about property flexibility, and open-ended explana? boys and half of the girls at each age were asked
tions for their choices. In Study 2, we use a about a female target, half about a male target (by
between-subjects design to examine 6-year-olds', 8 random assignment).
year-olds', and 10-year-olds' predictions about Warm-up task. Younger children completed a
development, beliefs about property flexibility, and short warm-up task during their first session. Chil?
endorsement of possible causal mechanisms. We dren viewed a color photograph of a baby bear and
selected these ages to span the range of ages learned that it had been raised from birth with a
different bear family. They were asked two ques? of the four targets in the animal task (16 total) and
tions about what the baby would be like when it 16 questions about the human child in the gender
grew up: "Does Tiltan eat honey or does Tiltan eat task, which were asked in a separate random order
ketchup?" and "Is Tiltan brown or is Tiltan pur? for each child. Questions were asked in a forced
ple?" All children were able to answer these ques? choice format, such that children were asked to
tions correctly. select between properties associated with the tar?
Adoption condition. For the animal task, there get's own species or gender category (category
were four separate stories presented in one of two based prediction) and properties associated with
orders. (The two orders?rabbit, cow, mouse, cat the environment of upbringing (environment-based
and cat, mouse, cow, rabbit?were balanced by age prediction). For example, during the animal task,
and sex of participants. A preliminary analysis the experimenter asked, "When Gana has grown
revealed no significant order effects.) For each story up, what does Gana say? Does Gana say 'moo' [cat?
in the animal task, children were shown a picture egory-based] or does Gana say 'oink' [environment
of a baby animal (e.g., a baby cow named Gana) based]?" An example question from the gender
and told that it had been raised from birth by ani? condition is, "When Zillah is a big kid, what does
Zillah like to do? Does Zillah like to sew [category
mals of another species (e.g., a pig family, including
a mother and one or more offspring; see Appen? based] or does Zillah like to build things [environ?
dix A). The experimenter pointed to pictures of the ment-based response]?" The order of presentation
newborn animal and the adoptive animal family for the two choices was randomized. The 16 items
during the story to maintain children's attention. for both tasks included four different types of prop?
The newborn pictures were color photographs of erties: behaviors, preferences, physical traits, and
newborn animals with few characteristics of an category traits (physical traits that explicitly men?
adult member of the species. The pictures showed tion the category label; these were designed such
none of the features about which children were that the properties were identical [except for the
subsequently questioned. Children were asked sev? category label] for the animal and gender tasks).
eral memory questions to ensure that they recalled For the gender task, children were asked four addi?
and understood the story (e.g., "Is Gana a cow or a tional questions about the target's physical appear?
pig?" "Does Gana live with cows?" "Does Gana ance (e.g., "When Zillah is a big kid, does Zillah
live with pigs?" "Are there any cows where Gana have long hair or does Zillah have short hair?") for
lives, besides Gana?"). If children responded incor? exploratory purposes. We excluded these questions
rectly to any of these questions, the experimenter from the analyses because there were no compara?
repeated the story before proceeding. ble questions for the animal task.
For the gender task, children were told one story Category-based predictions were scored as 1;
about an infant who was raised from birth on an environment-based predictions were scored as 0.
island with members of the other sex (see Appen? Preliminary analyses indicated few differences in
dix B). Children were told about a baby girl who the pattern of responses obtained for questions
went to live with her uncle on an island inhabited about preferences and behaviors, so answers to
by boys and men or about a baby boy who went to these questions were summed to form one score
live with his aunt on an island inhabited by girls referred to as "predictions about behavioral proper?
and women. Children were shown color photo? ties." Similarly, there were few differences in chil?
graphs of the infant, the other-sex relative, and the dren's predictions about category traits and
island. The same photo was used to represent the physical traits, so these responses were summed to
female and male infant. The infant had no distin? form one score referred to as "predictions about
guishing gender characteristics (e.g., the baby had physical properties." Higher scores represent a
very little hair, wore a diaper, and was labeled with greater number of birth category-based predictions.
an unfamiliar name: Zillah for the girl, Arza for the Explanations. Open-ended questions were used to
boy). The island picture showed an aerial view of assess children's explanations for their predictions
Hawaii. A variety of small magazine clippings of (adults were not asked to provide explanations).
children and adults were attached to the island For each target, the experimenter asked children to
photo and represented the island's inhabitants. provide explanations for one of each type of prop?
Prediction questions. Children were asked a series erty, by asking "How come?" after the children
of questions about what properties the baby animal responded. These items were randomly selected
or human infant would have when it grew up (see before the testing session. If children justified their
Tables 1 and 2). There were four questions for each answers for any of the other items, their responses
Table 1
Items for the Animal Task, Studies 1 and 2
Property type Target Environment Properties
Behavioral Rabbit Monkeys Eats carrots/bananas*

Cow Pigs Says moo/oink
Mouse Dogs Runs away from/chases cats
Cat Elephants Licks its fur, sprays itself with water
Rabbit Monkeys Likes to hop around/climb in trees
Cow Pigs Likes to chew on grass/get dirty*
Mouse Dogs Likes to eat cheese/chew on bones
Cat Elephant Likes to drink milk/eat peanuts*
Physical3 Rabbit Monkeys Has long/short ears
Cow Pigs Has a straight/curly tail
Mouse Dogs Has round/floppy ears
Cat Elephant Has whiskers/a trunk
Rabbit Monkeys Has a rabbit/monkey body*
Cow Pigs Has cow/pig blood inside*
Mouse Dogs Has a mouse/dog brain
Cat Elephant Has a cat/elephant heart*
Note. All items were used in Study 1; items marked with an asterisk were used in Study 2.
aFour of these properties included explicit mention of the category label and were included in order to have one set of properties that
was identical for the animals and humans (except for the label).
Table 2 subtypes: formal explanations, association explana?

Items for the Gender Task (Female/Male Target) tions, and other (see Table 3). Initial interrater reli?
ability was 96% and disagreements were resolved
Property type Properties
by discussion.
Behavioral Plays with a tea set/toy truck* Flexibility. After recording the participant's initial
Plays dress-up/baseball cards* response to the prediction questions, as well as
Will be a nursery school teacher/construction the child's explanation (on selected questions), the
worker experimenter next asked whether the target animal
Collects dolls/tools and nails
could also have the other property. For example, if
Likes to sew/build things on the initial prediction question the child said that
Likes to put on make-up/go fishing* the cow would say "moo," the experimenter asked,
Wants to be a nurse/firefighter
"When Gana has grown up, can Gana also say
Wants to be a ballet dancer/football player
'oink'?" Similarly, in the gender condition, if a par?
Physical Can grow up to be a mommy/daddy
Can grow up to be a wife/husband ticipant said that a girl would like to sew when she
Will grow up to have breasts/a beard grows up, the experimenter asked, "When Zillah
Voice will stay the same/get deep and low grows up, would she also like to build things?"
Has girl/boy blood inside* Children were asked to explain their answers for
Has a girl's/boy's body* the same items that had been selected prior to the
Has a girl's/boy's brain* testing session. Items were scored as 1 if the
Has a girl's/boy's heart participant said the character could have the other
property and 0 if the participant said they could
Note. All items were used in Study 1; items marked with an
asterisk were used in Study 2. not. Items were summed (separately for physical
and behavioral properties and for human and ani?
were noted but are not included in the analy? mal targets), such that higher scores indicate
ses. Two independent raters coded children's greater flexibility (i.e., more often indicating that
explanations from transcripts of the testing ses? other properties were possible).
sions. Responses were initially coded into four Memory questions. To assess children's memory
coding categories: category-based explanations, bio? for story details, we also included questions con?
logical mechanisms, environment, and preferences cerning the target's environment, for example,
(see Table 3). Subsequently, category-based expla? "Who does Gana live with, cows or pigs?" These
nations were further subdivided into three items were interspersed with the other items, with
Table 3
Coding Scheme for Oven-Ended Explanations, Study 1
Explanation code Definition and examples
Category States that the target does/does not belong to a particular category or is a generic statement
about the category. Ex.: ''Because cows like to chew on grass, and he7s a cow"
Formal Subtype of category explanation that indicates that category membership explains the
presence of a property. Ex.: "Because she's a girl"
Association Subtype of category explanation that describes category-property associations. Ex.: "Because
girls usually like dolls better"
Other category Category-based explanations that did not fit criteria for formal or association were coded as
"other." Ex.: "Because she's not a boy"
Biological mechanism Refers to biological mechanism or biological consequences, even if incorrect. Ex.: "If it drank
the pig mother's milk"; "Because he was not born a girl"
Environment Refers to environmental influences, including learning or being taught, or environmental
factor that prevents target from acquiring the property. Ex.: "Well, he's gonna be all around
monkeys all his life, and his mom and his brothers and sisters and friends will be climbing
in trees"
Preferences Refers to the characters' preferences or desires. Ex.: "Because she loves to collect dolls"
three memory questions for the gender task and Results

three memory questions for the animal task (one
Experimental Task Memory Questions
for each target).
Children were highly accurate on the memory
Control Condition questions (92% correct). This indicates that the task
was understandable to even the youngest partici?
The purpose of the control condition was to pants.
ensure that the properties used were ones which
children found to be strongly associated with the Prediction Questions
target categories. The materials and procedures
were identical to those for the adoption condition The data from the prediction questions are pre?
with the following exceptions. First, children were sented in Table 4. We analyzed these data
told that the babies were raised with members of through a 2 (domain: animal, gender) x 2 (prop?
the same species (animal task) or sex (gender task). erty: physical, behavioral) x 3 (age group: 5, 10,
For example, they were told that a baby monkey adult) x 2 (sex of human target: boy, girl) x 2
went to live with another monkey family, or that a (participant sex: male, female) repeated-measures
baby girl went to live with her aunt on an island analysis of variance (ANOVA), with domain and
where there were only girls and women. Half of property as within-subject variables. This analysis
the children who completed the animal task heard revealed a number of main effects and interac?
stories about baby animals from the target species tions, which were all subsumed under two signifi?
described in the adoption condition (rabbit, mon? cant four-way interactions: Domain x Property x
key, cow, pig); the remaining children heard stories Age x Sex of Human Target, F(2, 149) = 3.76,
about baby animals from the species associated p < .05, and Property x Age x Sex of Human
with the environment of upbringing in the adop? Target x Participant Sex, F(2, 149) = 2.97, p = .05.
tion condition (mouse, dog, cat, elephant). This pro? We examined these effects through a series of
cedure ensured that children were familiar with the post hoc analyses. All post hoc contrasts that are
properties associated with both the target animals discussed throughout this article were significant
and the animal families who adopted them (e.g., at p < .05 after Bonferroni corrections; we present
they heard about either a rabbit raised with other Cohen's d as a measure of effect size for critical
rabbits or a monkey raised with other monkeys). contrasts.
The corresponding questions for the two stories Comparing species and gender. For physical prop?
were identical (e.g., "Does X like to hop around or erties, there were no differences in children's or
does X like to climb in trees?" "Does X have long adults' predictions about species and gender.
ears or short ears?"). For behavioral properties, however, 5-year-olds,
Table 4
Mean Proportions of Category-Based Predictions and Flexibility Judgments by Age, Target, and Property Type, Study 1
5-year-olds 10-year-olds Adults
Physical Behavior Physical Behavior Physical Behavior

Predictions
Animal .86** (.20) .84** (.24) .95** (.11) .73** (.27) .95** (.09) .60+ (.32)
Male .88** (.12) .66** (.14) .95** (.08) .60* (.22) .94** (.09) .29** (.20)
Female .86** (.18) .52 (.23) .92** (.14) .37* (.34) .90** (.18) .18** (.18)
Flexibility
Animal .27** (.33) .31** (.36) .23** (.25) .40 (.28) .21** (.15) .69** (.23)
Male .19** (.32) .381" (.39) .20** (.25) .62* (.30) .20** (.18) .94** (.10)
Female .29** (.35) .68** (.36) .16** (.17) .68** (.35) .32* (.31) .97** (.07)
Note. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses. Higher numbers for predictions mean higher numbers of birth category-based
predictions; higher numbers for flexibility judgments mean increased flexibility. Mean proportions were compared to the proportion
expected by chance (.5) in a series of one-sample t tests.
fp < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
10-year-olds, and adults all made fewer category

Individual Response Patterns
based predictions about the behavioral properties
associated with gender (for both male and female We next examined whether individual partici?
targets) than the behavioral properties associated pants had consistent response strategies. Partici?
with animal species (ds = 0.87-1.40). pants were designated as "category-based" if they
Comparing physical and behavioral properties. Five made category-based predictions on at least six out
year-olds did not make differentiated predictions of the eight questions for both physical and behav?
about the physical and behavioral properties associ? ioral properties for each kind of target (with sepa?
ated with animal species. In contrast, 10-year-olds rate codes for questions about animals and
and adults made fewer category-based predictions humans). Alternately, participants were designated
about behavioral than physical properties for ani? as "differentiated" if they made category-based
mals (ds = 1.04, 3.86). On questions about gender, predictions on at least six questions about physical
participants from all age groups made fewer cate? properties and environment-based predictions on
gory-based predictions about behavioral than phys? at least six questions about behavioral properties.
ical properties, for both male and female targets Participants were designated as "environment
(ds = 1.38-1.95). based" if they made environment-based predictions
Comparing across age. Predictions about physical on at least six out of the eight questions for both
properties did not change with age, for either human physical and behavioral properties for each kind of
or animal targets. For behavioral properties, mean target. However, only 2 participants (of 192) fell
levels of category-based predictions declined with into this last category, so the environment-based
age, for both human and animal targets (see Table 4). pattern was not considered further. All other
Sex of human target. Five-year-olds and 10-year response patterns were coded as "other."
olds made fewer category-based predictions about Five-year-olds rarely showed a differentiated
the behavioral properties associated with the cate? response pattern, more often showing category
gory "female" than the category "male" (age 5, based and "other" response patterns (animal task:
d = 0.74; age 10, d = 0.81). There were no other 0 differentiated, 54 category-based, and 14 other;
effects of this variable. gender task: 4 differentiated, 28 category-based,
Participant sex. There were two effects associated and 36 other). These patterns shifted toward
with participant sex. Five-year-old girls made more increasingly differentiated response patterns for 10
category-based predictions about the physical prop? year-olds and adults, especially for gender (age 10,
erties associated with "female" than 5-year-old animal task: 5 differentiated, 41 category-based,
boys did (d = 0.76). Also, 10-year-old girls made and 18 other; age 10, gender task: 20 differentiated,
fewer category-based predictions about the behav? 30 category-based, and 14 other; adults, animal
ioral properties associated with "female" than 10 task: 8 differentiated, 17 category-based, and 7
year-old boys did (d = 0.99). other; adults, gender task: 16 differentiated, 1
Table 5
category-based, and 15 other). Chi-square analyses
confirmed that the distributions of these codes dif? Subtypes of Category-Based Explanations for Category-Based Predic?
tions, by Age, Domain, and Property Type, Study 1
fered by domain for each age group (ps < .01); cate?
gory-based codes were more common in the animal 5-year-olds 10-year-olds
than gender domain, whereas differentiated codes
Formal Associational Formal Associational
were more common in the gender domain. The dis?
tribution of codes also differed by age?for animals,
X2(4) = 20.48, p < .001, for gender, %2(A) = 40.16,
Animal physical 68 10 75 32
Animal behavior 49 35 37 34
p < .001?reflecting the increase in the number of Gender physical 58 9 69 20
differentiated codes with age. Gender behavior 63 27 22 51
Explanations
and associational explanations by age, domain, and
Next, we examined the explanations that chil? property type. For 5-year-olds, the distribution of
dren gave for their predictions. After each response explanation type did not differ by domain (animal
was coded, we calculated the percent of total expla? or gender) for either physical or behavioral proper?
nations attributed to each code, separately for envi? ties (ps > .5). For 10-year-olds, the distribution of
ronment-based and category-based predictions, by explanation types differed by domain for behav?
age, target, and property-type. Environment-based ioral properties, %2(l) = 7.19, p < .01; they gave a
predictions were rarely provided on questions higher proportion of associational explanations for
about physical properties (across less than 10% of gender than for animal behavior. For both 5-year
trials), so these explanations were not examined. olds and 10-year-olds, the distribution of formal
Explanations for category-based predictions. For cat? and associational explanations differed by property
egory-based predictions, participants often gave type, for both animals?age 5: x2(l) = 16.78,
category-based explanations. This explanation code p < .001; age 10: x2(l) = 5.90, p < .05?and gen?
includes responses in which participants referenced der?age 5: %2(1) = 5.96, p < .05; age 10:
category identity to explain their property predic? X2(l) = 36.61, p < .001. As shown in Table 5, in each
tions (see Table 3). No other explanation was given case children gave a higher proportion of formal
across more than 10% of each type of question; explanations for physical than behavioral proper?
therefore, for questions on which participants made ties. There were two effects of age: (a) 5-year-olds
category-based predictions, we report data only on gave a higher proportion of formal explanations for
children's category-based explanations. animal physical properties than 10-year-olds did,
Total category-based explanations: We first X2(l) = 7.51, p < .01, and (b) 10-year-olds gave a
examined the total number of category-based expla? higher proportion of associational explanations for
nations for these predictions (including formal, gender behavioral properties than 5-year-olds did,
associational, and other explanations). Five-year X2(l) = 25.67, p<. 001.
olds gave category-based explanations on 76% of Explanations for environment-based predictions. We
trials, and 10-year-olds gave category-based expla? next examined the explanations that children gave
nations on 77% of trials. Chi-square analyses for their environment-based predictions. For
revealed that the proportion of category-based 5-year-olds the most common code was for psycho?
explanations did not differ by age, property, or tar? logical causes, indicating that children or animals
get (all ps > .1). had environment-based properties because they
Formal and associational explanations: We next wanted them or liked them (25% of questions). In
divided these category-based explanations into contrast, for 10-year-olds, the most common code
three subcategories. Formal explanations explicitly was for environmental mechanisms, indicating that
stated that the property was developed because of children and animals had environment-based prop?
category membership, with no further qualifica? erties because they were taught to have them,
tions (e.g., "because she is a girl"; "because it is a learned to have them, wanted to fit in, or could not
cow"). These were distinguished from statements have been able to develop their category-based
of category-property associations (e.g., "because a properties (e.g., a girl had to play football instead
lot of girls sew"; "because cows usually have of do ballet because there would have been no
straight tails"). Most explanations fit one of these ballet schools on the island; 89% of questions). Chi
two criteria (92%); the rest were coded as "other" squares confirmed that the explanations given by
(see Table 3). Table 5 presents the number of formal either 5- or 10-year-olds did not differ by target
(p > .5), although the distribution of these explana?

Control Group Analyses
tions did differ by age, %2(6) = 141.77, p < .001.
The purpose of the control group was to ensure
that the youngest participants associated the experi?
Flexibility
mental properties with the relevant categories for
Next, we examined participants' responses to both animals and human gender. On this task,
questions about property flexibility (Table 4) 5-year-olds were asked to predict what properties
through a 2 (domain) x 2 (property) x 3 (age) x 2 animals or humans would have if they were raised
(sex of human target) x 2 (participant sex) repeated in environments consisting only of members of
measures ANOVA, with domain and property as their own birth category (species or gender). As
within-subject variables. This analysis revealed a expected, children readily made category-based
number of main effects, subsumed under inter? predictions on these questions (95% of questions
actions between domain and property, F(l, 144) = about animal physical properties, 92% of questions
58.46, p < .001, and property and age, F(2, 144) = about animal behavioral properties, 91% of ques?
49.03, p < .001. tions about gendered physical properties, and 82%
Comparing species and gender. For physical prop? of questions about gendered behavioral properties).
erties, there were no differences in participants' A series of paired t tests indicated that children
judgments about property flexibility for species made fewer category-based predictions about the
and gender. For behavioral properties, however, behavioral properties of gender than any other type
participants viewed those associated with gender of question (ps < .01). Children's responses on these
as more flexible than those associated with spe? questions were not influenced by whether the
cies (age 5, d = 0.54; age 10, d = 0.69; adults described character was male or female (for the
d = 1.46). gender task) or by participant sex.
Comparing physical and behavioral properties. For The findings from the control group raised the
both species and gender, participants judged possibility that younger children's differentiated
behavioral properties to be more flexible than phys? predictions about gender-linked behavioral and
ical properties (age 5: animals, d = 0.11, gender, physical properties (on the experimental tasks)
d = 0.76; age 10: animals, d = 0.81, gender, d = 1.72; reflected only baseline differences in their beliefs
adults: animals, d = 2.54; gender, d = 3.81). about the associations between the properties we
Comparing across age. For physical properties, selected and gender. To address this possibility, we
there were no changes in participants' judgments of selected the four gender behavior items (out of
flexibility related to age. For behavioral properties, eight) about which children in the control condition
however, flexibility judgments increased with age, made the strongest category-based predic?
for both species and gender (see Table 4). The inter? tions?89%, which does not differ from the propor?
action between age and property also indicated tion of times they made category predictions for
that, though participants of every age group pre? gender-linked physical properties or either type of
dicted more flexibility for behavioral than physical animal property (ps > .1). Next, we reran our
properties, these judgments became increasingly analyses of children's property predictions and
differentiated with age. responses to flexibility questions in the experimen?
The interaction among domain, property, and tal switched-at-birth task using this selected subset
age was not significant. However, to ensure that of items. We reasoned that if children in the experi?
participants of every age group made differentiated mental task had predicted more environmental
predictions about physical and behavioral proper? influence for behavioral properties only because
ties for both species and gender, we conducted they viewed some of the behavioral properties as
follow-up paired t tests separately by age and less strongly associated with gender categories to
domain. These analyses confirmed that participants begin with, then young children should no longer
in all age groups predicted more flexibility for differentiate between gender-linked physical and
behavioral than physical properties for both species behavioral properties on this follow-up analysis.
and gender (ps < .05). Also, in every age group, However, we found an identical pattern of results.
participants made similar predictions about flexibil? Specifically, for property predictions, this analysis
ity for physical properties for species and gender, replicated the four-way interactions among domain,
but predicted more flexibility for the behavioral property, age, and sex of child target, F(l,
properties associated with gender than species 123) = 7.54, p < .001, and property, age, sex of child
(ps < .001). target, and participant sex, F(l, 123) = 3.98, p < .05.
Post hoc analyses confirmed the same pattern of In contrast, for physical properties, to the extent
findings as reported above, including that young that children view the choices as mutually exclu?
children made more category-based predictions for sive (e.g., long vs. short ears), children could only
gender-linked physical than gender-linked behav? interpret the flexibility questions as asking whether
ioral properties. Using this restricted set of gender the character could display the suggested property
behavior items also did not change our pattern of instead of their original choice. Thus, children's
findings for analyses of responses to flexibility greater acceptance of alternate suggestions on the
items; using this subset, participants of every age flexibility questions about behavioral properties
group judged the behavioral properties associated may relate to these differences in interpretation and
with gender as more flexible than the gendered should be considered cautiously. However, to the
physical properties, as well as more flexible than extent that our analyses of flexibility items are con?
animal behavior (ps < .001). sistent with our findings on our other tasks (as is
the case with older children and adults), this task
Discussion may be interpreted as providing evidence that par?
ticipants view physical development more than
Study 1 revealed many similarities in how young behavioral development to be constrained by cate?
children reason about species and gender. Partici? gory identity.
pants of all ages viewed physical development as The finding that young children allow more
strongly constrained by category memberships for environmental influence on gender-linked behavior
both species and gender. The youngest participants, than animal-linked behavior may suggest that
however, also tended to make category-based pre? "innateness" plays a stronger role in animal than
dictions for the behavioral properties associated social concepts, consistent with the proposal that
with gender, indicating that they view gender cate? essentialism is instantiated separately, and takes on
gories as more constraining, and more similar to different meaning, in biological and social domains
animal species, than adults do. A similar pattern (Gelman, 2003; Hirschfeld, 1996; Kanovsky, 2007).
was found in our analyses of flexibility questions. Also, the finding that concepts of gender and spe?
The youngest children also equally often explained cies become more (as opposed to less) differenti?
species-linked and gender-linked development with ated with age is consistent with this more general
formal explanations, whereas older children gave conceptualization of essentialism, and not with the
fewer formal explanations when explaining gender proposal that children transfer an essentialist
linked as compared to species-linked behavioral framework from the biological to the social domain.
development. Despite the similarities in young chil? However, our analyses of younger children's
dren's reasoning about species and gender, how? explanations did not reveal differences across
ever, their responses were not identical across domains, as 5-year-olds commonly used the formal
domains. Even 5-year-olds viewed the behavioral mode of explanation to account for both species
properties associated with gender as more open to linked and gender-linked development. Prasada
the environment and more flexible than the behav? and Dillingham (2006) point out, however, that the
ioral properties associated with species, though formal mode of explanation makes no commit?
these predictions became more differentiated with ments about the mechanisms involved in mediating
age. We also found that, though 5-year-olds did not category-property relations. For example, the for?
make differentiated predictions about physical and mal mode applies equally well to artifacts (e.g.,
behavioral properties regarding animals, they did "that sign is red because it is a stop sign") as to
so regarding gender, indicating that the develop? animals (e.g., "that animal is four-legged because it
ment of differentiated beliefs about gender pre? is a dog"), even though the mechanism that medi?
ceded differentiated beliefs about animals. ates the link between being a stop sign and being
In considering children's responses to the flexi? red is different from the mechanism that mediates
bility questions, it is important to acknowledge that between being a dog and being four-legged. Thus,
children may have interpreted these questions dif? the formal mode may, but need not, incorporate an
ferently for behavioral and physical questions. For expectation of a causal essence. This raises the pos?
behavioral properties, an affirmative response may sibility that although both gender-linked and spe?
mean either that children believe that the story cies-linked properties are viewed as formally
characters would display both properties or that the linked to category membership, the mechanisms
character would display the suggested alternate that children believe mediate these links differ by
property instead of the participant's original choice. domain. We examine this possibility directly in
Study 2, by presenting children with five possible participants heard a single story and were asked
specific mechanisms that could be responsible for three questions each for physical and behavioral
the development of category-linked properties. properties. The order of presentation was balanced
within subjects so that participants received each
type of item first half of the time. For the female
and male-target conditions, items were presented
Study 2
in a separate random order for each child. Predic?
Method tion, flexibility, and memory questions were asked
Participants
and scored using the same procedures as in
Study 1.
Participants included 264 children, randomly
assigned to one of three conditions (animal target, Causal Mechanisms
female target, and male target), with the constraint
that each condition had approximately equal After making their initial predictions, children
numbers of males and females, from three age were asked to consider five different causal
groups: 75 six-year-olds (M = 6,3, range = 4,10 mechanisms and to determine whether each mecha?
6,10, Ns = 21-28 per condition), 89 eight-year-olds nism could explain how the target may have
(M = 7,9, range = 6,11-8,10, Ns = 28-32 per condi? acquired the property: birth, wanting, environmen?
tion), and 110 ten-year-olds (M = 10,3, range = tal pressure, learning, and being taught. For exam?
8,11-11,6, Ns = 33-34 per condition). There were ple, if a child in the animal condition said that a
approximately equal numbers of boys and girls in baby rabbit raised with monkeys would grow up to
the 8- and 10-year-old age groups. In the 5-year-old eat carrots, the experimenter asked, "Is it because
group, there were 16 girls and 10 boys in the Javan was born that way?" (birth), "Is it because
animal target condition, 14 girls and 7 boys in the Javan really wanted to eat carrots?" (wanting), "Is
male target condition, and 15 girls and 13 boys in it because the monkeys really wanted Javan to eat
the female target condition. The sample was from carrots?" (environmental pressure), "Is it because
the same population as in Study 1, but no child Javan learned to eat carrots?" (learning), and "Is it
participated in both studies. because the monkeys taught Javan to eat carrots?"
(teaching). Children could answer affirmatively to
more than one causal mechanism. These mecha?
Materials and Procedures
nisms were presented in a separate random order
Children in the animal target condition heard for each question for each child.
three different animal stories, presented in a sepa?
rate random order for each child. Children in the
female target condition heard a story about a baby Results
girl; those in the male target condition heard a story
Memory Questions
about a baby boy. The stories and pictures were
identical to those used in Study 1 (see Appendix A Children were highly accurate on the memory
and Appendix B). questions (99% correct), indicating that participants
To reduce task length, we used only three of the of all ages were able to follow the stories.
animal targets from Study 1: the rabbit raised with
monkeys, the cow raised with pigs, and the cat Prediction Questions
raised with elephants. We also included fewer
property pairs: three behaviors and three physical Table 6 presents the results. To examine the
traits per condition (see Tables 1 and 2). The physi? influence of domain and age on children's predic?
cal traits we chose were the category traits from tions, we conducted a 3 (domain: animal, boy, girl)
Study 1. As there were no significant differences x 2 (property: physical, behavioral) x 3 (age: 6, 8,
between the physical traits and category traits in 10) x 2 (participant sex: male, female) repeated
Study 1, we selected the category traits, so we measures ANOVA, with property type as a within
would be able to compare them directly across the subject variable, followed by a series of post hoc
animal and human target conditions. analyses. This analysis revealed main effects of age
For each of the three animal targets, there were and property, which were qualified by two 2-way
two questions, one concerning a behavior and one interactions: Domain x Age, F(4, 246) = 3.63, p <
concerning a physical trait. For the gender task, .01, and Property x Age, F(2, 246) = 15.90, p < .001.
Table 6
Mean Proportions of Category-Based Predictions and Flexibility Judgments by Age, Target, and Property Type, Study 2
6-year-olds 8-year-olds 10-year-olds
Physical Behavior Physical Behavior Physical Behavior

Predictions
Animal .85** (.30) .63 (.39) .89** (.26) .61 (.41) .94** (.15) .40 (.41)
Male .92** (.18) .79** (.34) .85** (.29) .61+(.37) .93** (.14) .51 (.42)
Female 1+ (.00) .77** (.29) .85** (.28) .55 (.44) .79** (.31) .22** (.38)
Flexibility
Animal .15** (.30) .37 (.40) .11** (.26) .39 (.41) .06** (.15) .60 (.41)
Male .08** (.18) .21** (.18) .15** (.29) .38f (.37) .07** (.14) .49 (.42)
Female 0+ (.00) .23** (.29) .15** (.28) .45 (.44) .21** (.31) .78** (.38)
Note. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses. Higher numbers for predictions mean higher numbers of birth category-based
predictions; higher numbers for flexibility judgments mean increased flexibility. Mean proportions were compared to the proportion
expected by chance (.5) in a series of one-sample t tests.
aSignificantly different from chance according to a binomial test, p < .001.
V < .10. **p < .01.
Comparing species and gender. The Domain x Age individuals as differentiated if they showed the
interaction indicated that 6- and 8-year-olds made differentiated pattern (category-based predictions
similar predictions in all conditions; that is, predic? for the physical properties only) on at least five out
tions did not vary by domain. In contrast, 10-year of the six questions. Participants were classified as
olds made fewer category-based predictions about environment-based if they made environment
girls than about animals or boys (d - 0.53, d = 0.70). based predictions on five out of six questions. As in
Comparing physical and behavioral properties. The Study 1, however, very few children fit these crite?
interaction between property and age indicated that ria (1 six-year-old, 2 eight-year-olds, and 1 ten-year
children at each age group made more category old), so this pattern was not considered in analyses.
based predictions for physical than for behavioral All other response patterns were coded as "other."
properties (age 6, d = 0.66; age 8, d = 0.79; age 10, Six-year-olds rarely showed a differentiated
d - 1.6), and that category-based predictions about response pattern (4 total), more often showing cate?
behavioral properties declined with age (see gory-based response patterns (36 total). These pat?
Table 6). The three-way interaction among age, tar? terns shifted toward increasingly differentiated
get, and property was not significant, implying that response patterns at ages 8 (12 differentiated, 32
the effect of property (i.e., more category-based pre? category-based) and 10 (43 differentiated, 20 cate?
dictions for physical than behavioral properties) gory-based). Chi-square analyses indicated that
held across age groups and conditions. To examine these distributions differed by age?for animal
this effect more closely, we conducted paired f-tests items, %2(2) = 10.18, p < .01; for boy items,
comparing children's judgments about physical X2(2) = 10.19, p < .01; for girl items, %2(2) = 22.28,
and behavioral properties separately for each age p < .001?but did not differ by domain in any age
group and condition (domain). Consistent with the group (ps > .20).
analysis above, in every age group and condition,
participants made category-based predictions more
Explanations
often for physical than behavioral properties (all
ps < .001). Next, we examined children's explanations, sep?
arately for category- and environment-based pre?
dictions. For each type of prediction, we calculated
Individual Response Patterns
the proportion of times children endorsed each
We next examined individuals' overall response explanation (see Table 7). The number of times chil?
patterns. We classified individuals as category dren endorsed each explanation was divided by the
based if they made category-based predictions on number of times they made the prediction of inter?
at least five out of the six total questions (summing est. For example, a child who made category-based
behavioral and physical properties). We classified predictions on all three questions about physical
Table 7
than those of animals (boys, M = .60, SD = .46;
Mean Proportions of Endorsements for Causal Explanations by Type of animals, M = .32, SD = .43).
Prediction, Study 2
Comparing physical and behavioral properties:
6-year-olds 8-year-olds 10-year-olds Children commonly said that characters had physi?
cal properties because they were born with them;
Category-based predictions about physical properties children of each age group and in each condition
Borna .96 (.18) .93 (.26) .97 (.16) (domain) endorsed "born" more often for physical
Want3 .50 (.41) .20(33) .04 (.13) than behavioral properties. These patterns were
Learn3 .38 (.42) .17(30) .06 (.15)
reversed for "wanting" and "learning"; children
Taught .18 (.31) .01 (.06) .01 (.05) endorsed these explanations more often for behav?
Environment .26(38) .06 (.18) 0(0)
ioral than for physical properties (though for 6
Category-based predictions about behavioral properties
Born3 .44 (.44) 36 (.42) .18(37) year-olds' judgments about "wanting," this effect
Want3 .65 (.41) .44 (.45) .25 (.41) was marginal, p < .1).
Learn3 .53 (.43) 38 (.42) .14(32) Comparing across age: Endorsement of the
Taught .17 (.28) .03 (.13) .03 (.17) "born" explanation for physical properties did not
Environment .20 (32) .06 (.19) .04 (.17) vary with age. In contrast, endorsement of "born"
Environment-based predictions about behavioral properties for behavioral properties, as well as endorsement of
Born .02 (.07) .01 (.07) .07 (36) "want" and "learn" for both types of properties,
Want3 .08 (.24) .05 (.16) .22(36) declined with age. For behavioral properties,
Learn3 .13(32) .19(36) .59 (.47)
6-year-olds endorsed each explanation type equally,
Taught3 .08 (.26) .11 (.27) 32 (.42) but 8- and 10-year-olds endorsed "born" less often
Environment3 .12 (.29) .23 (39) .56 (.47) than "want" or "learn."
indicates explanation types that were endorsed often enough to Explanations for environment-based predic?
be included in analyses. tions. Because environment-based predictions for
physical properties were made so rarely, we did
properties and who indicated that targets had their not examine these explanations. We examined chil?
category-based physical properties because they dren's explanations for their environment-based
were born with them on two of these three ques? predictions for behavioral properties through a 3
tions was assigned a score of 2/3 (.66) for the (domain) x 4 (explanation: want, learn, taught,
"born" explanation. Because children could environment) x 3 (age: 6, 8, 10) ANOVA. We found
endorse more than one explanation for each of their significant effects for explanation, F(3, 507) = 28.45,
predictions, it was possible for these scores to sum p < .001, and age, F(2, 169) = 20.53, p < .001, as well
to more than 1. For each type of prediction, we first as a significant Explanation x Age interaction, F(6,
identified explanations that were endorsed rela? 507) = 5.77, p < .001. Ten-year-olds were more
tively often; only explanation types that were likely to endorse each type of explanation than
endorsed more than 15% of the time across age either 6- or 8-year-olds, indicating that young chil?
groups for each type of prediction were included in dren were generally unable to explain their envi?
subsequent analyses. ronment-based predictions, whereas older children
Explanations for category-based predictions. We con? readily appealed to environmental mechanisms.
ducted a 3 (domain: male, female, animal) x 2 (prop? There were no main or interactive effects of
erty type: physical, behavioral) x 3 (explanation: domain, indicating that children endorsed similar
born, want, learn) x 3 (age: 6, 8, 10) repeated mea? mechanisms to explain animals and gender.
sures ANOVA, with explanation type and property
type as within-subject variables. This analysis
revealed a number of main effects and interactions, Flexibility
which were all subsumed under two significant Next, we examined the influence of domain,
three-way interactions: Domain x Property x Expla? property, and age on children's beliefs about the
nation, F(4, 264) = 4.09, p < .01, and Prop? flexibility of properties (see Table 6). We conducted
erty x Explanation x Age, F(4, 264) = 7.95, p < .001. a 3 (domain: animal, boy, girl) x 2 (property: physi?
Comparing species and gender: For the most cal, behavioral) x 3 (age: 6, 8, 10) x 2 (participant
part, children endorsed similar mechanisms for sex: male, female) repeated measures ANOVA,
human gender and species. The only domain effect with property as a within-subject variable. Chil?
was that children were more likely to endorse dren's flexibility increased with age, F(2, 245) =
"want" to explain the behavioral properties of boys 12.12, p < .001, and was greater for behavioral than
physical properties, F(\, 245) = 167.21, p < .001. youngest participants had some differentiated
These main effects were subsumed under two beliefs about the development of physical and
important interactions. The increase in flexibility behavioral properties.
associated with age was specific to behavioral prop?
erties, as evidenced by a significant Age x Property
Comparing Concepts of Human Gender and Animal
interaction, F(2, 245) = 15.84, p < .001, and 10-year
Species
olds viewed girls' properties as more flexible than
the properties of boys or animals, as evidenced by Before age 10, children displayed similar con?
a significant Age x Domain interaction, F(4, cepts of species and gender, making a relatively
245) = 3.64, p < .01. high proportion of category-based predictions for
both. This is a striking finding, as it means that
Discussion young children treat the concepts of "boy" and
"girl" as equivalent to species, in the extent to
In Study 2, only the oldest participants, 10-year which features are inborn, inflexible, and intrinsi?
olds, reasoned differently about gender and animal cally linked to category membership. For physical
species, and they did so only about the category properties, children of all ages typically made cate?
"female," not "male." Younger children made simi? gory-based predictions for both domains. For
lar levels of category-based predictions, gave similar behavioral properties, although younger children in
judgments about flexibility, and endorsed the same Study 1 viewed gender-linked development as
causal mechanisms when reasoning about gender more open to the environment and more flexible
and species. In contrast, 10-year-olds viewed female than species-linked development, these differences
gender-linked behavior as more open to environ? were small and were not replicated in Study 2. Fur?
mental influence than animal-linked behavior. ther, in both studies, young children applied a simi?
Children's explanations suggested that they lar explanatory framework for understanding
viewed physical properties as an inherent part of species and gender: The importance of category
being born in a particular category, regardless of identities present at birth played a central role in
category type. In contrast, children viewed three their conceptual representations in both domains.
explanations as possible mechanisms driving the With age, however, children increasingly treated
development of category-based behavioral proper? the two domains differently. Specifically, older
ties (birth, wanting, and learning), with no differ? children and adults made fewer category-based
ences by domain. Finally, whereas younger predictions about gender than species. Among
children failed to endorse any mechanisms to 10-year-olds, this change was qualified by the gen?
explain their environment-based predictions, older der of the target?they viewed female behavior as
children readily endorsed environmental explana? more open to environmental influence than male
tions for these predictions. behavior?but, by adulthood, participants viewed
both male and female behavior as more open to the
environment and flexible than animal behavior.
General Discussion
Further evidence comes from children's explana?
We compared children's and adults' concepts of tions. In Study 1, 10-year-olds (but not 5-year-olds)
gender to their concepts of animal species, with a gave more formal explanations for explaining cate?
focus on the extent to which participants view these gory-based animal behaviors than for explaining
categories as constraining development and the category-based gender behaviors. In fact, 10-year
mechanisms they endorse. The studies reveal four olds provided associational explanations a majority
key findings: (a) gender concepts were initially of the time for gendered behaviors, indicating that
treated by young children as equivalent to concepts they viewed gender-linked behaviors as associated
of animal species in their innateness and inflexibil? with, but not explainable by, category identity.
ity; (b) the gender concepts of "boy" and "girl" did In sum, our examination of the development of
not develop in tandem, but rather an understand? species and gender concepts across childhood sug?
ing of environmental influences on "girls" emerged gests a threefold progression: (a) gender and species
at a younger age than the comparable understand? are initially treated as equivalent to one another; (b)
ing for "boys"; (c) young children displayed sur? next, "girls" are distinguished from boys and spe?
prising difficulty reasoning about environmental cies; and (c) finally, gender concepts ("boys" and
mechanisms that could influence species and gen? "girls") are consistently distinguished from species.
der-linked behaviors; and (d) nonetheless, even our The distinction between gender and species may in
part reflect children's beliefs about the behaviors in properties and viewed behavioral properties as
question, and not solely their concepts of the catego? more flexible. They were also more likely to indi?
ries per se. For example, "likes to sew" (gender cate that physical properties were caused directly
property) may be seen as a choice, whereas "runs by birth, whereas they endorsed three mecha?
away from cats" (species property) may be seen as nisms?birth, wanting, and learning?to explain
an evolutionary imperative. This is further compli? category-based behavioral development.
cated by the possibility that how children interpret a Although we found consistent differentiation
behavior could interact with domain. For example, between physical and behavioral properties among
even when controlling for property content, older young children, these differences were typically
children may believe that behaviors are more physi? small. In general, 5- and 6-year-olds viewed behav?
ologically motivated for animals but more volition ioral properties as predicted by birth categories,
ally motivated for people (e.g., rabbits like carrots inflexible, and explainable by category member?
because they are programmed to do so, whereas ship, but did so less consistently than they did for
women like quiche because of socialization and physical properties. The most striking differences
choice). It would be interesting to vary the behaviors in children's reasoning about behavioral and physi?
tested so as to examine this factor more directly cal properties were in their Study 2 explanations,
(e.g., including physiological behaviors for gender, where they endorsed "born" over 90% of the time
such as a boy having a deeper voice, analogous to a for physical properties but only half the time
cow saying "moo"). for behavioral properties. Moreover, individual
The developmental pattern we obtained is incon? response patterns showed little differentiation
sistent with the transfer model of conceptual devel? among the youngest participants. Altogether, these
opment proposed by Atran (1990), which suggests results suggest that the differentiation revealed by
that individuals transfer an essentialist framework the other tasks at the youngest age is more fragile
from the biological to the social domain ontogeneti and less consistent than that demonstrated by the
cally, and thus would predict increasing conver? older participants.
gence over time. Instead, this developmental We will first discuss implications of these find?
pattern is consistent with the proposal that essen ings for understanding children's reasoning about
tialism represents more general cognitive biases, physical properties, followed by implications for
which become instantiated separately and follow their reasoning about behavioral properties. Chil?
distinct developmental trajectories in different dren's reasoning about physical development was
domains (Gelman, 2003). However, it is also possi? consistent with psychological essentialism. They
ble that transfer may happen earlier in develop? viewed physical development as constrained by
ment (i.e., below age 5 years, which was the category identities acquired at birth, consistent
youngest age tested in these studies). This could be with the proposal that they view category identity
tested by examining children's beliefs earlier in as determined by an underlying, immutable, cau?
development. sal force. These findings do not speak directly to
the biological nature of children's beliefs, as we
did not examine the extent to which children
Beliefs About Behavioral and Physical Development
understand birth as a biological process (see Gel?
Additional evidence that psychological essential man, 1990; Johnson & Solomon, 1997). Recent
ism is best characterized as a more general cogni? results from other studies, however, suggest that
tive bias with a number of distinct instantiations children expect that the essences that determine
comes from our analyses of children's reasoning category identity are bodily in nature. For exam?
about behavioral and physical properties. Children ple, a number of cross-cultural studies have dem?
consistently distinguished physical and behavioral onstrated that in communities where blood is a
properties. In Study 1, 5-year-olds made more cate? central focus of discourse, young children may
gory-based predictions for gendered physical than come to believe that the category essence is, in
gendered behavioral properties. They viewed fact, in the blood (Sousa et al., 2002; Waxman
behavioral properties as more flexible than physical et al, 2007).
properties for both species and gender. They also A related question is whether children's reason?
provided a higher proportion of formal explana? ing on these tasks is properly characterized as cau?
tions for physical than behavioral properties. In sal. Prasada and Dillingham (2006) note that formal
Study 2, 6-year-olds made more category-based explanations indicate only that category identity is
predictions for physical properties than behavioral responsible for a property, which may or may not
involve causal beliefs. For example, one might say being a category member. In contrast, young chil?
that a sign is red because it is a stop sign, indicating dren rarely endorsed externally motivated explana?
that category identity is responsible for the prop? tions?that the characters had been taught or that
erty "red," but it would not be correct to say that others wanted them to do these behaviors. Thus,
being a stop sign caused a given sign to be red. On children's frequent category-based predictions
the other hand, from an adult perspective it would about behavioral properties, as well as their expla?
be correct to say that being a dog caused an animal nations, support the interpretation that young chil?
to have four legs (Prasada & Dillingham, 2006). dren appealed to an essentialist framework for
Other recent studies of children's reasoning on understanding behavioral development. Children's
switched-at-birth tasks, however, suggest that chil? more specific ideas about how essences mediate
dren will use category identity to make predictions category-property relations, however, were some?
about novel properties on switched-at-birth tasks what different when they were asked to reason
(when they cannot rely on prior associative knowl? about behavioral, as compared to physical, devel?
edge), indicating that they attribute broad causal opment.
power to category essences (for a full argument of If young children view the development of
how switched-at-birth tasks provide evidence for behavioral properties as an intrinsically motivated
causal essentialist reasoning see Sousa et al., 2002). part of category identity, why did they make fewer
On the other hand, Gelman and Bloom (2007) category-based predictions about these properties?
found that preschool children may represent prop? There are at least two possible reasons. One possi?
erties as having an intrinsic connection to a cate? bility is that children believe that some behavioral
gory in the absence of understanding that the properties are causally related to category member?
connection is causally mediated. Thus, the present ship, whereas others are only statistically associ?
findings suggest that children may reason about ated. This would explain why young children
the physical development of animal species and provided a higher proportion of associational
gender in a causal essentialist manner, as well as explanations for behavioral than physical proper?
that their expectations regarding the nature of the ties in Study 1. Preliminary item-level analyses did
category essence in this context draw on their intui? not identify particular behavioral properties on
tive understanding of biology (see Gelman, 2003), which children were especially likely to make envi?
although more direct work in these areas is clearly ronment-based predictions, but individual children
needed. may have different beliefs about which behaviors
One possible interpretation of the findings are formally related to categories and which are
regarding young children's differentiation of physi? not, resulting in an overall lower proportion of cat?
cal and behavioral properties is that they view only egory-based predictions. In future work, however,
physical, and not behavioral, development in essen? it will be necessary to examine whether children do
tialist terms. There are several features of these in fact make fewer category-based predictions for
data, however, that we believe conflict with this properties that they view as statistically, but not
interpretation. First, as noted above, young children formally, connected to categories.
reliably made category-based predictions about A second possibility is that young children
behavioral properties (though less often than about believe that behavioral properties are formally con?
physical properties). Although one possibility is nected to category membership but also incorporate
that they based their predictions about behavioral knowledge of exceptions into their predictions. A
properties on their knowledge of category-property number of authors have noted that children (and
associations, as opposed to beliefs about the role of adults) may view a property as caused by a cate?
category identity in guiding behavioral develop? gory essence, while at the same time recognizing
ment, this seems unlikely, given the high frequency that the property will not be manifest by all cate?
of formal explanations that children provided in gory members (Hollander, Gelman, & Star, 2002;
Study 1. Second, children typically endorsed Prasada, 2000). For example, individuals may
intrinsic mechanisms?born, wanting, learning?to believe that flying is an inherent property of birds
explain behavioral development in Study 2. Each of while at the same time recognizing that not all
these mechanisms implicates the character as an birds fly. The reality that anomalies exist does not
active initiator of developmental change, rather undermine the belief that, in general, birds fly
than resulting from external forces. Thus, it appears because they are birds (Prasada, 2000).
that children believed that wanting or learning to Thus, essentialism does not imply that all mem?
engage in category-typical behaviors is inherent to bers are alike (see also Gelman, 2003). Children are
also confronted with variation and anomalies (e.g., inconsistent with their theory; therefore, their work?
flightless birds; tomboys), which they seem to ing theory does not provide an explanatory frame?
accept. Indeed, in natural language, generic noun work for this question.
phrases seem particularly well-suited to referring to In sum, younger children appear to believe that
variable categories, as they express generalizations both the behavioral and physical properties associ?
that admit of exceptions (e.g., "birds fly" does not ated with category identity are inherent to member?
mean that all birds fly; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995). ship, consistent with essentialist thought. The
Within this framework, young children may believe biggest areas of difference are in the mechanisms
that behavioral properties are causally related to that they believe mediate these category-property
categories, while at the same time acknowledging relations. This diversity of mechanisms is consistent
that not all individuals manifest such properties. with a broader conceptualization of essentialism,
Why they admit of exceptions more for some cate? whereby an essence is represented as an internal
gories than others (e.g., "female" more than "male" property, which may or may not be specifically bio?
or "animal") remains an open question. It is possi? logical and may or may not operate through
ble that they have encountered more variation specifically biological mechanisms (Gelman, 2003;
in feminine behaviors due, for example, to the Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999; Waxman et al, 2007).
more serious negative implications for males than More specific ideas about what constitutes an
for females who engage in counterstereotypical essence and how an essence operates are filled in
behaviors (Hort, 1989). It is also possible that the throughout conceptual development, as are chil?
relatively higher status of males in our culture con? dren's beliefs about which categories (gender vs.
tributes to the greater essentializing of boys than species) and properties (physical vs. behavioral) are
girls (see Mahalingam, 2003, for analogous effects best understood from an essentialist perspective.
of status on essentialism regarding Indian caste). The present and prior work suggests that children's
Interestingly, environment-based predictions essentialist ideas about physical development are
appeared to be inconsistent with younger children's later incorporated into intuitive theories of biology,
general explanatory framework for understanding whereby birth and other bodily mechanisms (e.g.,
species and gender development. Even though blood) take on special significance. In contrast, rea?
young children made environment-based predic? soning about behavioral properties appears to be
tions a substantial minority of the time, they failed less closely linked to biological mechanisms, and
to explain their choices in Study 1 and often more open to revision with age.
rejected all of the offered explanations in Study 2.
Thus, although they predict that not all category Conclusions
members have category-linked behavioral proper?
ties, they do not yet have a coherent explanation The present findings suggest that younger chil?
for why a category member will have an environ? dren reason in an essentialist manner about both
ment-linked behavioral property. species and gender categories, but appeal to differ?
In contrast, older children appear less likely to ent specific mechanisms to explain the relation
appeal to an essentialist framework to explain between category identity and different kinds of
behavioral development. Ten-year-olds readily gen? properties. Despite this diversity, younger children
erated and endorsed environment-based explana? reference internal causes for both physical and
tions (learning, teaching, and environmental behavioral properties and tend to reject environ?
pressure) to explain the development of behavioral mental influence. In contrast, with age, children
properties. Thus, older children seem to view increasingly distinguish between gender and ani?
behaviors as linked to environmental, rather than mal species and develop a new conceptual frame?
wholly intrinsic, causes, especially when reasoning work for understanding gender development that
about gender. incorporates an important causal role for environ?
Furthermore, older children were less likely than mental factors. Future research should address the
younger children to endorse explanations for their processes by which children update their na?ve the?
category-based predictions. For example, although ories about development and the kinds of knowl?
they sometimes predicted that a boy raised with edge, experiences, and evidence that facilitate
girls would retain boylike behavioral properties, conceptual change. It will also be important to
they tended to reject all of the given explanations explore relationships among essentialist reasoning,
for why this might be. In this case, from our per? gendered self-concepts, and behavior. Essentialist
spective, children have made a prediction that is beliefs have the potential to influence children's
developing gender identity as well as their atti? Gelman, S. A., Taylor, M. G, & Nguyen, S. (2004).
tudes and actions toward others. Mother-child conversations about gender: Understand?
ing the acquisition of essentialist beliefs. Monographs
of the Society for Research in Child Development, 69, 1
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Control questions
category and concept development: Making sense of
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Now, I have another picture to show you. This is
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kinds? In G. R. Semin & F. Fiedler (Eds.), Eanguage, This picture is a surprise for later, but I want you
interaction, and social cognition (pp. 11-36). Newbury to think about what Gana is like now that Gana has
Park, CA: Sage. grown up, and I'm going to ask you some ques?
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biological basis for parent-offspring relations. Child
Female Target (Study 1) and the Female Target
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Condition (Study 2)
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ferences. Child Development, 67,1555-1571. named Zillah. Look, here's a picture of Zillah when
Ullian, D. (1976). The development of conceptions of Zillah was a baby. [Show Zillah]. Right after Zillah
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Zillah's uncle?
Now, I have to tell you something about this
island. On this island there were only boys and
men. Zillah was the only girl. Can you point to
Appendix A all the boys and men on the island? Zillah's
uncle loved Zillah and took care of Zillah.
Zillah lived with her uncle and became part of
Sample Story for the Adoption Condition Animal Task
the uncle's family. Zillah grew up on the island
(Study 1) and the Animal Condition (Study 2)
with only boys and men and had a happy life,
Now, I'm going to tell you about a baby cow but Zillah never got to see another girl or
woman.
named Gana. Look, here's a picture of Gana when
Control questions picture is a surprise for later, but I want you to

Is Zillah a girl or a boy? Does Zillah live with think about what Zillah is like now that Zillah is a
boys and men on the island? Does Zillah live with big kid, and I'm going to ask you some questions
girls and women on the island? Are there any girls (e.g., prediction: When Zillah is a big kid, does Zil?
and women on the island besides Zillah? lah play with a tea set or does Zillah play with a
toy truck? explanation, Study 1: How come? flexibil?
Test questions
ity: Can Zillah also play with a X (opposite of
Now, I have another picture to show you. [Show
child's response)? How come?
closed cardboard door covering picture]. This is a
picture of Zillah now that Zillah is a big kid. This

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Boys Will Be Boys; Cows Will Be Cows: Children's Essentialist Reasoning about Gender

Categories and Animal Species

Boys Will Be Boys; Cows Will Be Cows: Children's Essentialist Reasoning

Property type Target Environment Properties

Behavioral Rabbit Monkeys Eats carrots/bananas*

Table 2 subtypes: formal explanations, association explana?

Explanation code Definition and examples

three memory questions for the gender task and Results

5-year-olds 10-year-olds Adults

Physical Behavior Physical Behavior Physical Behavior

10-year-olds, and adults all made fewer category

(p > .5), although the distribution of these explana?

6-year-olds 8-year-olds 10-year-olds

Physical Behavior Physical Behavior Physical Behavior

Control questions picture is a surprise for later, but I want you to

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