Internship Report Final

Internship Report 2022
INTERNSHIP REPORT
Internship Report Submitted to GGSIP University

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of
Bachelor of Law (H)
Batch: 2017 – 2022
Submitted By:
Name: Devashish Tiwari
Enrollment No: 01025503517
Semester: 10th
JEMTEC SCHOOL OF LAW

GREATER NOIDA GAUTAM BUDDHA NAGAR, U.P.-201308, INDIA
2022
LIST OF CONTENT
1. DETAILS OF THE INTERNSHIP
2. CERTIFICATE OF INTERNSHIP
3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
4. UNDERTAKING REGARDING THE AUTHENTICITY BY THE STUDENT
5. EMPLOYER FEEDBACK FORM
6. OBJECTIVE OF THE INTERNSHIP
7. MONTHLY REPORT OF LEX FAVIOS
8. MONTHLY REPORT OF ADP & ASSOCIATES
9. MONTHLY REPORT OF KHAITAN & CO.
10. CONCLUSION
DETAILS OF THE INTERNSHIP
The internship for the tenth semester was done under the supervision of:
1. Lex Favios
Office Address: E-299, Kailash Colony, Greater Kailash 1, New Delhi – 110048
Duration of the Internship: 7th February 2022 – 7th March 2022 (One Month)
2. ADP & Associates
Office Adress: 53A, 2nd Floor, Padav Nagar Main road, New Delhi – 110092.
Duration of the Internship: 8th march 2022 to 4th April 2022 (Four Weeks)
3. Khaitan & Co.
Office Address: 7th & 8th Floor, Max Towers, Sector 16B, Noida – 201301
Duration of the Internship: 4th April 2022 to 29th April 2022 (Month of April)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I express my gratitude and a deep sense of indebtedness to JIMS School of Law, affiliated
with Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University for encouraging and providing me with
this opportunity to undergo legal training before entering into the profession.
I am thankful to Lex Favios, ADP & Associates and Khaitan & Co., who allowed me to
intern.
I am very grateful that the mentors in Lex Favios, ADP & Associates and Khaitan & Co.,
who trained me under their guidance and gave me wide exposure. I am thankful to them for
their invaluable teachings, guidance & advice given to me, for helping me in exploring and
understanding the legal field better. Nothing concrete can be achieved without an optimal
combination of inspiration and perspiration.
No work can be accomplished without taking the guidance of experts. It is only the
critiques from ingenious intellectuals that help to transform a product into a quality product.
I would especially like to thank Mr. Mohit Wilkinson, Mr. Arun Vir Singh & Mr. Umang
Katariya, for their guidance during my internship. Their deep sense of commitment towards
their work and their want for perfection inspired me to put my best during the course of the
internships.
INTRODUCTION
“Not only does an internship allow you to work hard and gain experience, but it also allows
an employer to experience how hard of a worker you are.”
-R.J. Calvo
With practical legal skills, a law student is equipped with essential professional skills.
Practical training enables one to meet the demands of legal practice, business, industry, or
wherever the law degree takes you.
In practical legal skills, a law student uses highly developed research and analytical skills
and then translates this knowledge into a persuasive and convincing argument. A law
graduate emerges from a law degree with not only theoretical knowledge but technical
competency and appreciation of how the law operates in practice.
Law internships in particular are a great way to gain real-life. Students get to know
themselves better in a real work environment because they come face to face with the reality
of being able to know whether they can finish the task required or not, though most
internships require completion of at least the 2nd year of law school course. An internship
provides the opportunity to gain hands-on work experience that you just can’t get in the
classroom. An internship can be seen as the pinnacle of one’s undergraduate education as it
gives you the chance to use the skills you’ve learned in the classroom in a real-world setting.
It’s a chance to prove the worth of your qualifications and to show that you can perform in
the role that you have been given.
Probably because of the abovementioned reason, it is seen that almost all professional
courses have included a semester of compulsory internships in their course curriculum.
During the year 2022, I got the opportunity to intern in the Lex Favios, ADP & Associates
and Khaitan & Co. All the Firms are multi-disciplinary law firm providing a wide range of
transactional, regulatory, corporate advisory and dispute resolution services. All the Firms
are committed to finding practical solutions that produce tangible and cost-effective results
for its clients. The cornerstone of the firm’s philosophy is to safeguard and advance the
clients’ interests effectively and efficiently.
I interned at Lex Favios, ADP & Associates and Khaitan & Co., for a period of one month
each. I was expected to research various propositions of law, besides drafting key
documents & applications. The Associates working in the organization was very
understanding and always assisted me in performing legal research, besides making me feel
part of the team.
The Objective of the Internship
The Legal Internship Program is not designed to teach students how to be good lawyers (or
how to be lawyers at all) - it takes more than study at University to do that. The objectives
are to:
• Expose you to the law in operation in contexts where you will come to perceive aspects of
the law that cannot be learned from reading or hearing about it;
• Allow you to perceive ways in which the formal learning you acquire at University may
be applied in practice and therefore to develop an appreciation of the practical dimensions of
legal principles;
• Enable you to relate the different areas of legal practice to the importance of developing
the skills of legal research, communication, drafting, practice management and problem-
solving; and
• Enable you to observe and reflect upon the values, ethical standards and conduct of the
legal profession in practice and to develop your own attitudes of professional responsibility.
Letter of Undertaking
I, DEVASHISH TIWARI, student of BBA LLB, JIMS, School of law hereby declare that
the internship report I have prepared is solely my own effort. It contains the work
accomplished during the internship which was assigned during the internship. This work
was done in respect of the partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree
of LLB (HONS) DEGREE.
This internship report has not been submitted either in whole or in part to any other Law
university or affiliated Institute recognized by the bar council of India for the award of any
law degree or diploma within the territory of India. If I am found guilty of misleading or
concealing the fact at any stage then the college is authorized to take disciplinary action
against me according to university rules and regulations.
Signature for the Authenticity
Monthly Report
[Lex Favios]
An Overview of the Internship Work
7th February 2022
1. Researched on the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, revolving around the
concept of placing on record additional documents.
Concluded that the same comes under the purview of Order 7 Rule 14(3) read with Section 151,
the relevant excerpts of which is produced below:
Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies
(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is
presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or
entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his
behalf at the hearing of the suit.
Also produced the judgements in support of the research:
1. S. Rathinaswamy vs S. Bhanumathi, AIR 2006 Mad 221
“The main object of Order 7, Rule 14(3), C.P.C., conferring the power upon the Court to receive
the documents in genuine cases is to receive the documents if good cause is shown to the
satisfaction of the Court for the non-production of the documents at the earlier stage. The Courts
are expected to receive the documents and give an opportunity to the parties.”
2. Further, I Tracked the application status of over fifty trademarks on the website of
ipindiaonline.gov.in. The reproduction of which is stated below:
Serial Proprietor’s Name Status Objection Tm

Number Application
No.
1. Mahesh Advani Dispatching Of Two Different 4354437
Single Firm Examination Labels Cannot Be
Report As On Claimed In Single
21/07/2020 Application
Unless It’s A
Series Mark
Unless It Is A
Series Mark
Unless It Is A
Series Mark
4. Eagle Home Appliances Opposed Opposed By 1868955
Pvt.Ltd. Eagle Glass Deco
(P) Ltd. On
12/11/2014
5. Abdulla S. Khatri Registered NA 2756
Trading As : Khatri Art
Jewellers
Body Incorporate
6. Eagle Vacuum Bottle Mfg. Registered NA 193366
Co. Private Ltd. But Renewal
Body Incorporate Request
Pending
Co. Private Ltd. But Renewal
Body Incorporate Request

Pending
8. Eagle Flask Industries Ltd. Registered NA 495056
Single Firm But Renewal
Request
Pending
9. Sankar Basak Registered NA 790729
Trading As : Tirthamoyee
Aluminium Products
Single Firm
10. Eagle Glass Deco (P) Ltd., Registered NA 937689
Trading As : Eagle Glass But Renewal
Deco (P) Ltd., Request
Body Incorporate Pending
11. Eagle Glass Deco (P) Ltd. Registered NA 1208329
Body Incorporate
12. Eagle Home Appliances Registered NA 1298076
Private Limited
Body Incorporate
13. Future India Abandoned Application Form 1289077
Trading As : Future India Not Digitized
Single Firm
14. Ramesh Kundanmal Jain. Opposed Opposed By Kunj 1724343
Trading As : Oswal Aluminum (P)
Appliances Ltd, Eagle Home
Single Firm Appliances
Pvt.Ltd., Eagle
Glass Deco (P)
Ltd.
15. Sankar Basak Opposed Opposed By 1725162
Trading As : Tirthamoyee Eagle Home
Aluminium Products Appliances Pvt.
Single Firm Ltd.
Private Limited
Body Incorporate
17. Eagle Home Appliances Renewal of NA 2265874
Pvt. Ltd. trademark is
Body Incorporate overdue
Private Limited
Body Incorporate
Private Limited
Body Incorporate
Private Limited
Body Incorporate
Co. Private Ltd.
Single Firm
22. Mohd. Nafis Renewal due NA 202632
Trading As : Mohd. Hanif
Mohd. Anis.
Partnership Firm Details :
Shahid Nafis
23. Banarsi Dass Bhambri Renewal due NA 229955
Single Firm
24. Eagle Vacuum Bottle Mfg. Renewal due NA 237135
Co. Private Ltd.
Body Incorporate
Private Limited
Body Incorporate
26. Trade Team Limited Abandoned Application Form 1298075
Body Incorporate not Digitized
27. Mr. Pankaj Babu Jain Abandoned NA 1332817
Trading As : Eagle Light
Enterprises
Single Firm
28. ASHOK J. SHAH Abandoned NA 1562512
Trading As : SHAH
TRADERS
Partnership Firm
29. Prakashbhai K Patel Registered NA 1582782
Trading As : Bhagwati
Enterprise
Single Firm
30. Vikramkumar Registered NA 1685503
Chandrakantbhai Ashar
Trading As : M/S. Eagle

Ceramics
31. Prashanth Jain Renewal due NA 1739796
Trading As : Eagle
Technologies
Single Firm
32. Vikrakumar Registered NA 1823052
Chandrakantbhai Ashar
Trading As : M/S. Engle
Ceramics
33. R. Gopalakrishnan Abandoned NA 1841327
Single Firm
34. Eagle Flask Private Renewal due NA 420247
Limited.
Single Firm
35. Eagle Flask Private Renewal due NA 420244
Limited.
Single Firm
36. Eagle Flask Industries Ltd. Registered NA 374886
Body Incorporate
37. Eagle Flask Industries Renewal due NA 374887
Limited
Trading As : Eagle Flask
Industries Limited
Body Incorporate
38. Eagle Flask Industries Renewal due NA 387285
Limited.
Body Incorporate
39. Eagle Flask Industries Ltd. Renewal due NA 495058
Single Firm
Single Firm
Single Firm
Body Incorporate
Single Firm
Co. Private Ltd.
Body Incorporate
45. EAGLE GAZ & Renewal due NA 842280
APPLIANCES PVT. LTD.
Body Incorporate
Co. Private Ltd.
Body Incorporate
47. EAGLE VACUUM Registered NA 185011
BOTTLE MFG. CO.
PRIVATE LTD.
Body Incorporate
48. Sunil Sikka Removed NA 1117471
Trading As : Micro Optical
Specialities
Single Firm
49. Bhavna Nanda Registered NA 2188376
Single Firm
50. Bhavna Kohli Objected Show cause 3542625
Trading As : Bhavna Kohli notice issued on
Single Firm 23/10/2019 for
31/12/2019
51. Lucid Holdings, Llc Registered NA 3328510
Body Incorporate
52. Lucid Holdings, Llc Registered NA 3328511
Body Incorporate
53. LUCID HOLDINGS, LLC Registered NA 3328512
Body Incorporate
54. LUCID HOLDINGS, LLC Registered NA 3328513
Body Incorporate
55. INACCES GEOTECNICA Refused Application has 3706541
VERTICAL, S.L been refused
Body Incorporate under Section
18(4) on
21/05/2019 by the
tribunal
56. INACCES GEOTECNICA Abandoned NA 3076542

VERTICAL, S.L
Body Incorporate
57. KANCHAN Removed NA 1045955

DINKARRAO MALI
Trading As : CHIKOO
MUSIC
Single Firm
58. KANCHAN Removed NA 1045956
DINKARRAO MALI
Trading As : CHIKOO
MUSIC
59. KANCHAN Abandoned NA 1045957
DINKARRAO MALI
Trading As : CHIKOO
MUSIC
Single Firm
60. MAHESH ADVANI Objected Request for 3204395
Single Firm amendment is
Pending for
processing
61. MAHESH ADVANI Opposed Opposed by Soma 3465437
Single Firm Vine Village Pvt
Ltd
Vine House,
Saptashrungi
Colony, Gangapur
Road, Nasik -
422005,
Maharashtra on
08/06/2021
62. MAHESH ADVANI Objected Ready for Show 3465438
Body Incorporate cause Hearing
8th & 9th February 2022
1. Researched and wrote a comprehensive article on the topic of “Marital Rape”, for the
website of Lex Favios. In the article, I covered aspects like the present legal position of
marital rape in India, the Report of Justice J.S. Verma Committee, legal precedents
and India’s International Legal obligations on the matter. The reproduction of which is
stated below:
Impunity to Marital Rape: An Opportune Time to Show it the Door?
Introduction
“A forced sexual intercourse against a women is considered one of the most heinous offences
in our statue boook, but the same outrageous act becomes lawful if committed in wedlock,
perhaps in our country the institution of marriage is far more superior to human rights”
Marital rape can be referred to as forced sexual intercourse by a husband against his wife in
wedlock. The gut-wrenching behavior compromises the dignity, basic human rights, and
bodily autonomy of a married woman, besides contravening our international obligations to
extend protection to married women from any form of sexual abuse. It is surreal to know that
marital rape, a grave affront to married women, has not been treated like an offense in our
country, rather express impunity is granted to the offense in our country in the form of an
exception given under Section 3751, penalizing rape, Such is the level of patriarchal deeply
entrenched thought process we have towards married women in our society.
India is no stranger to the fact that marital rape occurs, the survey of National Family Health
Survey 4—for the year 2015-16 only certifies that fact.2 We pride ourselves in having one of
the biggest constitutions, a reservoir of rights for our citizens yet we fall short of giving one
section of our society (Married Women) the most cardinal right, that of equality with their
counterpart. This is deeply reflected in the offense of marital rape, which assumes the
consent of a woman in every sexual intercourse with her husband from the point of marriage
till her death without any exception, putting the husband on a pedestal. The present article
will dwell on the legality of the impunity to marital rape, our international obligations, legal
repercussions, and why it should be shown the door.
The Present Legal Position of Marital Rape in India
The exception given under Section 3753 creates an unnecessary distinction between a married
woman and unmarried women with respect to forceful sexual intercourse. The provision
strives to penalize rape against unmarried women but spares married women of similar
protection on the erroneous notion that the wife is the property of the husband. The said
provision treats women as a chattel or instrument of the husband, deeming the consent of the
women immaterial in intercourse. The exception entitles the husband to rape her wife with
impunity.
1
The Indian Penal Code, 1908, Section 375, Exception 2
2
National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4), 2015-16: India., http://rchiips.org/NFHS/NFHS-4Reports/India.pdf
3
supra 1
The Supreme Court has dealt with the matter of marital rape, but only with respect to the
minor married women aged between 15 and 18 years old in the case of Independent
Thought Vs. Union of India and Anr. 4 but missed the opportunity to look at the bigger
opportunity to pacify the suffering of adult women too. As a result, we have a section of
women who are victims of non-consensual sex at the hand of their husband but are devoid of
any criminal remedy other than to plead it as cruelty, to seek divorce/judicial separation. On
that too, the views of the various high court are sharply divided, some view it as a ground of
divorce whereas others view it as the right of the husband.
Why Should the Impunity to Marital Rape be shown the Door?
Report of Law Commission of India and Outdated Notion of Marital Rape
The law commission of India via its “Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal
Law” through Justice J.S. Verma Committee recommended many reforms in criminal law,
marital rape being one of them. The committee took cognizance of our international
obligations, outdated notion on which the law of marital rape is based, looked up to countries
that have criminalized marital rape and suffering of the married women to rightly conclude
that the second exception of Section 3755 needs to be removed. The committee further
recommended a further addition in the legislative book, that the relationship between the
parties must not be the mitigating factor while awarding a sentence for the Rape. However,
these recommendations were turned a blind eye to by the legislature.
Further, there is no denying the fact that marital rape is based on an outdated notion that, the
wife is the property of the husband and the wife has no bodily autonomy over her body.
Being marital rape an exception is none other than the denial to the fundamental rights
enshrined under Article 146, Article 157, Article 19(1)(a)8 & Article 219. we are relying on a
set of land mark judgements of the apex court, beginning from the decision of K.S.
Puttaswamy10, where a nine-judge bench acknowledged the right to privacy as a fundamental
right in 2017. Furthermore, in Navtej Singh Johar11, the apex court struck down section
37712 and decriminalize the same sex relationship and after this, the Apex Court has frowned
down on such a notion, it is worth recalling the landmark pronouncement in the case of
4
Independent Thought Vs. Union of India and Anr., AIR 2017 SC 4904, (2017) 10 SCC 800
5
supra 1
6
The Constitution of India, 1949
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. vs Union Of India And Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1
11
Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4321
12
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Joseph Shine Vs. Union of India 13, whereby the Apex Court decriminalized the offense of
adultery on the ground that it treats husband like a master and wife as a chattel. These
recognition of the apex court through judgements, has concreted a way for rescinding the
marital rape as an exception and to held it unconstitutional. As we go past our 75 th year of
independence, we need to introspect the need to have such laws which are subservient to
women, denying equality to them. Time has again come for the judiciary to undo the
injustice meted out to the married women, which it has always done in the face of adversity.
Is Impunity to Marital Rape Helping in Protection the Institution of Marriage?
It has been often argued that marital rape is to protect the institution of marriage, however, the
very offense can be pleaded as a ground of cruelty to seek judicial separation/divorce. Kerala
High Court on 30th July 2021 had recently rightly held that marital rape though not recognized by
law, comes under the ambit of physical and mental cruelty, hence can be a valid ground to claim
divorce. The relevant excerpts of the judgments are as follows:
“Merely for the reason that the law does not recognise marital rape under penal law, it does not
inhibit the court from recognizing the same as a form of cruelty to grant divorce. We, therefore,
are of the view that marital rape is a good ground to claim divorce.”14
Therefore the argument that marital rape is to protect the institution of marriage is ill-thought and
obtuse. Additionally, the argument that supports marital rape is in the line that it can be misused
as a weapon to harass the husband in the institution of marriage. There are long strings of
judgments by the Apex Court stating that the mere possibility of the misuse of the legislation
cannot be the sole ground to strike it off from the book of the legislature. 15 Also, there are
adequate judicial discourses in the form of Section 211 16, providing for prosecution in the event
of malicious prosecution by a party, with the intent to cause injury. Thus the apprehension that
the law of marital law may cause a great deal of injury to the institution of marriage is
unfounded, as there is a judicial discourse available in the event of it being used as a weapon of
harassment.
India’s International Obligations
We have laws affording protection to unmarried women against rape, however, the same
protection is not extended to women in wedlock. The non-recognition of marital rape as an
offense is costing dearly to married women in terms of human rights. Article 1 of the CEDAW 17,
13
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2018) SC 1676.
14
LIVE LAW, https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/marital-rapewatermark-398094.pdf (Last visited Feb. 02, 2022)
15
Collector of Customs, Madras & Anr. v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty & Anr., AIR 1962 SC 316.
16
supra at 12
17
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979
of which India is a signatory, obliges us to treat women with parity, irrespective of their marital
status but the non-recognition of marital rape is discriminatory since the same level of protection
is not being afforded to both the groups, i.e Married and Unmarried Women.
Moreover, along the same lines (General Recommendation - 19)18 says that any form of violence
against women, which deprives them of exercising their fundamental and human rights goes
against the principle of equality. (General Recommendation – 35)19 expounds that marital rape is
rape due to lack of freely given consent and should be condemned. The provisions of
international conventions extend similar protection towards married women, like Article 26 of
ICCPR20 and Article 1 of UDHR21 that propagate a similar sense of equality among all classes of
citizens, without making a distinction between married and non-married women.
Moreover, other countries have shown the way in enacting legislation criminalizing marital rape,
with an exception of just 32 countries worldwide, each nation has undertaken to criminalize
marital rape to preserve the bodily autonomy of married women.22 It is time that India, follows
the humanitarian approach too to promote the ethos of our Constitution and fulfill its
constitutional mandate as a welfare state towards women.
Conclusion
It may not be an opportune time to remove impunity to marital rape and show it the door, as the
opportune time is long gone by, however, better late than never, it is high time to strike off
marital rape as an exception. Failure to do so shall demonstrate our non-committal attitude to
safeguard the very cardinal right of equality to married women. As the matter is sub judice
before the Delhi High Court, the onus is on court to take stern cognition of the sinful act,
stemming from an outdated notion. It is time we see the outrageous act through the prism of the
constitutionality and challenge the deeply entrenched patriarchal attitude. An impetus is required
to further a course correction in the form of striking down of second exception of Section 375 23,
otherwise the posterity will never forgive us for our dilatory attitude of denying the basic human
rights to married women of refusing to get RAPED.
18
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General
Recommendation No. 19: Violence against women, 1992, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/52d920c54.html [accessed 6 March 2022]
19
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General
Recommendation No. 35: Violence against women updating General Recommendation No. 19, 2017, available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/gr35.aspx#:~:text=On%2014%20July%202017%2C%20the,19.
[accessed 6 March 2022]
20
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
21
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
22
Marital Rape is Not a Crime in 32 Countries. One of Them is India, News 18, (AUGUST 26, 2021, 16:31 IST),
https://www.news18.com/news/india/marital-rape-is-not-a-crime-in-32-countries-one-of-them-is-india-
4130363.html
23
supra 12
1. Researched and worked on the comprehensive article on the topic of “CSR Policy and
the Recent Amendments”, covering aspects like the Applicability of Corporate Social
Responsibility, Role of CSR Committee, Activities under the purview of CSR and the
amendments brought forth by the recent amendments on CSR. The reproduction of
which is stated below:
Brief Summary of Corporate Social Responsibility
What is Corporate Social Responsibility?
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is the way and mean through which corporates can repay
the obligations made by the Society by contributing the resources in its various forms as required
for the efficient operation of the Business. Corporate Social Responsibility is strongly connected
with the principles of sustainability. Organization make decisions based not only on financial or
operational factors, but also on the social and environmental consequences. Therefore, it is the core
corporate responsibility to practice its corporate values through its commitment to grow in a
socially and environmentally responsible way, while meeting the interests of its stakeholders.
Applicability of CSR on the Companies
Every company is mandated as per the provision of Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013,
having:
> Net Worth of Rs.500 Crores or More
> Turnover of Rs.1000 Crores or More
> Not Profit of Rs.5 Crore or More (Net Profit before Tax)
During the immediately preceding financial year shall establish a Corporate Social Responsibility
Committee of the Board involving of three or more directors, out of which at least one director
shall be an independent director. Provided that where a company is not required to appoint an
independent, it shall have in its Corporate Social Responsibility Committee two or more
directors.
What is the Role of Corporate Social Responsibility Committee?
(a) Formulate and recommend to the Board, a Corporate Social Responsibility Policy,
(b) Recommend the amount of expenditure to be incurred on the activities and
(c) Monitor the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy of the company from time to time.
(d) Approve the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy for the company and disclose contents of
such Policy in its report and also place it on the company’s website,
(e) Ensure that the activities as are included in Corporate Social Responsibility Policy of the
company are undertaken by the company,
(f) Ensure that the company spends, in every financial year, at least 2% of the average net profits of
the company made during the three immediately preceding financial years.
Penalty- If a company contravenes the provisions shall be punishable with fine which shall not be
less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to twenty-five lakh rupees and every
officer of such company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to three years or with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees
but which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both.
Activities that have been included in the CSR as per Schedule 7 of the Companies Act, 2013
Activities which may be included by companies in their Corporate Social Responsibility Policies
Activities relating to:-
(a) Eradicating hunger, poverty and malnutrition, promoting health care including
preventive health care and making available safe drinking water.
(b) Promoting education, including special education and employment and livelihood
enhancement projects.
(c) Promoting gender equality, empowering women, setting up homes and hostels for
women and orphans; setting up old age homes, day care centres and such other facilities
for senior citizens.
(d) Ensuring environmental sustainability, ecological balance, protection of flora and fauna,
animal welfare, agroforestry, conservation of natural resources.
(e) Protection of national heritage, art and culture including restoration of buildings and
sites of historical importance and works of arts.
(f) Measures for the benefit of armed forces veterans, war widows and their dependents.
(g) Training to promote rural sports, nationally recognized sports, paralympic sports and
olympic sports
(h) Contribution to the prime minister’s national relief fund or any other fund set up by the
central govt. for socio economic development.
(i) (a) Contribution to incubators or research and development projects in the field of
science, technology, engineering and medicine, funded by the Central Government or
State Government or Public Sector Undertaking.
(j) (b) Contributions to public funded Universities; Indian Institute of Technology (IITs);
National Laboratories and autonomous bodies, engaged in conducting research in
science, technology, engineering and medicine aimed at promoting Sustainable

Development Goals (SDGs)
(k) Rural development projects
(l) Slum area development.
Changes Incorporated through the Amendments
Activities that can now be Included as CSR
(a) COVID-19-related activity in the normal course of business: This covers companies
undertaking research and development into vaccines, medical devices, and drugs related to
COVID-19, even if such activity is in their normal course of business. This exemption is
allowed up to the financial year 2022-2023.
(b) Acquisition or creation of a capital asset provided that it is not owned by the company: The
asset created using CSR funds must be owned either by the organisation supported, or the
people served by the project (for instance, collectives such as self-help groups), or by a
public authority.
Activities that have been excluded by the CSR Amendment Rules, 2021
(a) Any activity that is done by the company in its original course of business apart from this the
exception granted for companies is undertaking Research and Development activities for Covid-
19 related activities like vaccines, drugs, and medicines.
(b) Any activity that is done outside India, apart from training of sports personnel representing
India in national or international competitions.
(c) Any activity to donate or contribute any amount to political parties under Section 182 of the
Companies Act.
(d) Any activity which benefits employees of the companies as per Section 2(k) of the Code on
Wages, 2019.
(e) Any activity that the companies support on a sponsorship basis, for deriving marketing
benefits or goods and services.
(f) Any activity that is done to fulfill the statutory obligations under any statute.
It must be ensured by the companies that their CSR policy does not include these activities, as
these are statutorily excluded from the ambit of ‘Corporate Social Responsibility.’ Any
expenditure incurred with respect to these activities cannot be accounted for as CSR expenditure.
New obligations of the Board and CSR Committee besides exclusion of certain activities
from CSR via Amendment
In accordance with the amendment, the board and CSR committee has certain obligations. Where
a company is not willing or not required to appoint an independent director under this act, then it
shall have so in its Corporate Social Responsibility Committee of two or more directors. As per
Section 135(2) the composition of Corporate social responsibility shall be disclosed in the
board’s report. According to Section 135(9), there is no need for the CSR committee to be
constituted if the company spends an amount that exceeds fifty lakh rupees as these functions are
to be carried on by the Board of directors of such a company.
Utilization of Surplus
According to the new CSR Regime, the utilization of surplus is the surplus arising out of CSR
projects. This Utilization of Surplus should not be a part of the business profit of the company.
The Amendment rules provide that such surplus should be invested again into the same project
or it must be transferred to the identified CSR fund/government fund within a period of 6 months
of the expiry of the financial year
Impact Assessment
There is a new requirement for mandatory impact assessment of CSR projects.

(a) This requirement applies to companies that have an average CSR spend of INR 10 crore
or more in the past three financial years.
(b) It must be conducted for all CSR projects that have budgets of INR 1 crore and more; and
have been completed one year prior to undertaking the impact assessment.
(c) An ‘independent’ agency must be appointed to undertake the impact assessment. The
costs of such an agency cannot exceed INR 50 lakh or five percent of the total CSR spend
for that financial year (whichever is lower).
Support from ‘international organizations’
The rules permit companies to appoint an international organisation for designing, and
monitoring and evaluation of CSR projects or programmes as per its policy, as well as for
building the capacity of their own CSR teams. However, the costs or fees paid to such entities
may be subject to the cap of five percent on administrative overheads, if it relates to the general
management and administration of CSR functions in a company. (This might be the case if the
international organisation is providing capacity building services.
Registration of CSR Undertakings
With effect from April 1st, 2021, every entity listed above is required to mandatorily register
itself with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA). Such entities are required to apply in the
prescribed form (providing details of their legal entity, directors, trustees, and so on) and
thereafter obtain a unique CSR registration number
14th February 2022
1. Researched extensively on the requirement of public health licence in the state of

Himachal Pradesh and the penalty for not complying with the requirement. Also,
researched extensively on the requirement of licence for the eating housing, lodging
house, hotel, boarding house, restaurant or any other public place in the State of
Himachal Pradesh and the penalty for not complying with the requirement. The
reproduction of which is stated below:
THE HIMACHAL PRADESH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, 1994
Requirement for Public Health Licence
324. Premises not to be used for certain purposes without licence.-

Section 324 makes it mandatory for any person to obtain licence from the commissioner and
comply with its terms, if in the opinion of the Commissioner the purpose is dangerous to life,
health or property or is likely to create a nuisance;
Requirement of licence for eating housing, lodging house, hotel, boarding house, restaurant
or any other public place
328. Eating houses etc. not to be used without licence from Commissioner. -
Section 328 of The Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 provides that no person
can keep an eating housing, lodging house, hotel, boarding house, restaurant or any other public
place for the sale of any food or drink without obtaining the licence by the commissioner or
anyone from his behalf. The Section also provides that in case of non-compliance with the terms
of the licence, the commissioner can suspend the licence.
330. Power of Commissioner to stop use of premises used in contravention of licences.-

Section 330 entitles the commissioner to stop the use of any eating housing, lodging house, hotel,
boarding house, restaurant or any other public place for a specified period as it deems necessary,
if the same has been opened without obtaining the licence from the commissioner or the terms of
the licence has been violated.
Penalty
383. Punishment for certain offences

Section 383 of the Act provides that of case of a violation of the provisions of this Act, then the
same shall entail a punishment of three years of imprisonment or penalty of Rs. 10,000/- .
1. Drafted a written statement under Section 9, read with Rule 6 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016, in the case of M/s Empowertrans Pvt Ltd. Vs. M/s Power
Machine. on behalf of the Corporate Debtor. The reproduction of which is stated
below:
IN THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL,

CUTTACK BENCH, CUTTACK
COMPANY PETITION (IB) NO. 225/2022
IN THE MATTER OF:

M/s Empowertrans Pvt Ltd. ………Applicant/Operational Creditor
Versus
M/s Power Machine (India) Ltd. ……. Respondent/Corporate Debtor
INDEX
S. No. Particular Pg. No.

1. Reply to the Petition filed under section 9 of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 read with Rule
6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules 2016.
2. Vakalatnama
3. Proof of service
4. List of documents
Place Respondent/Corporate Debtor

Date Through

IN THE MATTER OF:
Versus
REPLY TO THE PETITION FILED UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE INSOLVENCY AND

BANKRUPTCY CODE 2016 READ WITH RULE 6 OF THE INSOLVENCY AND
BANKRUPTCY RULES 2016.
1. That the instant replay is being filed by the Respondent in the captioned matter, through
its authorised Representative Ivan Koltsov authorized vide board resolution dated
26.06.2020.
Copy of board resolution dated 26.06.2020 is herein annexed as Annexure A.
2. That the present petition filed by the petitioner under section 9 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code 2016 read with Rule 6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules 2016
seeking insolvency of the Respondent Company is bad in law as the present petition
conceals material facts and is based on false and frivolous claims.
3. At the outset, the Respondent denies and dispute all the averments made and submissions
put forth in the Petition except those that are matters of record or expressly admitted
hereinafter. The said Respondent state that the denial shall be treated as a specific denial.
That subject to the forgoing, the Respondent submits the following preliminary submission
and objections:
PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION AND OBJECTIONS
Preliminary Submission
A. That the fact of the matter is that the parties entered into a commercial relation in the
year 2006. That the Petitioner was providing services related to installation of Electro
Technical Equipment’s. That the Petitioner provided services to the Respondent from
… to …. That the work order in question was issued on 01/03/2006 and the invoice as
was raised on 23/04/2008. Although shockingly, in 2018 the petitioner raised a
frivolous Demand i.e., after a period of 10 year from the date of Invoice so raised.
B. That, in terms Clause 4 of the said Work Order, Petitioner were required to obtain a
clearance certificate from Orissa Hydro Power Corporation Limited (hereinafter
referred to as “OHPC”) and the said clearance certificate had to be specifically
submitted along with the Invoice, for receiving the final payment. It was also a
condition precedent that the final payment shall be released only on the basis of
submission of the Invoice duly supported by the clearance certificate. However,
Petitioner failed to provide the said Clearance Certificate from OHPC and completion
certificate along with the invoice as Petitioner had failed to complete the work in
satisfaction to the said Work Order.
C. That further, as per clause 7 of the said work order, the said work undertaken by
Petitioner, had to be specifically completed by September 2006, however, admittedly
Petitioner had allegedly completed the said work only in the month of April 2008.
Petitioner were in blatant breach of the Work Order so executed between the
Undersigned and Petitioner and accordingly were liable for deduction in terms of para
14 of liquidated damage. That the Petitioner has breached the terms of the work order
on multiple occasions by failing to complete the work on time and attaining Clearance
Certificate from OHPC. That the Petitioners insufficient execution of work caused
wrongful loss to the Respondent
D. That in the year 2011, the petitioner filed a frivolous petition under Companies Act,
1956 before the High Court of Odisha in order to extract money from the respondent.
Eventually during pendency of the matter, vide order dated 13.12.2019 the Hon’ble
High Court transferred the matter to NCLT, Cuttack observing that the Companies
Act, 2013, has envisaged that all proceedings under the Companies Act, 1956
including proceedings relating to arbitration, compromise, arrangements and
reconstruction and winding up of companies, pending before any District Court or

High Court.
E. That vide order dated 17.12.2021 the NCLT, Cuttack dismissed the company petition
filed by the Petitioner as the same was was filed under the Companies Act 1956
which stands repealed and directed the Petitioner to file petition under Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code 2016 within four weeks.
Preliminary Objections
F. That the petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has not followed due
process.
I. That as per Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, it is

mandatory for an operational creditor to serve demand notice to debtor in
prescribed format before institution of insolvency proceeding. That Section 8
of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 is a mandatory provision to be
adhered by an operational creditor which the Petitioner has failed to do.
Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 is reiterated as follows:
8. (1) An operational creditor may, on the occurrence of a default, deliver a

demand notice of unpaid operational debtor copy of an invoice demanding
payment of the amount involved in the default to the corporate debtor in such
form and manner as may be prescribed.
(2) The corporate debtor shall, within a period of ten days of the receipt of the
demand notice or copy of the invoice mentioned in sub-section (1) bring to the
notice of the operational creditor—
(a) existence of a dispute, if any, and record of the pendency of the suit or
arbitration proceedings filed before the receipt of such notice or invoice in
relation to such dispute;
(b) the repayment of unpaid operational debt—

(i) by sending an attested copy of the record of electronic transfer of the unpaid
amount from the bank account of the corporate debtor; or
(ii) by sending an attested copy of record that the operational creditor has
encashed a cheque issued by the corporate debtor.
II. That in terms of Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 an
operational creditor must serve a claim notice along with the invoice of unpaid
financial/operational debts to the corporate debtor. That an insolvency
proceeding can be initiated only if the debtor fails to respond to the notice
within 10 days, and/or the admitted debt is unpaid within 10 days.
III. That the Petitioner had served a demand notice in 2010 under The Companies
Act, 1956, before filing a winding up petition under the Companies Act,1956.
That vide order dated 17.12.2021 the NCLT, Cuttack dismissed the company
petition filed by the Petitioner as the same was was filed under the Companies
Act 1956 which stands repealed. That the company petition filed by the
Petitioner and the Companies Act 1956 both stands repealed hence the
demand notice dated 06.07.2010 also stands redundant. That in the present
case the Respondent did not receive any demand notice as per the prescribed
format under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rule 2016 therefore, the Petitioner
has failed to follow due procedure hence the present petition is not
maintainable and liable to be dismissed
G. That the petitioner is not an Operational Creditor as claims made by the

petitioner is not an Operational debt
I. That Section 5(20) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 defines
Operational Creditor as follows:
"Operational Creditor" means a person to whom an operational debt is owed

and includes any person to whom such debt has been legally assigned or
transferred.
II. That the petitioner is not an Operational Creditor in terms of Section 5(20) of
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 as no Operational Debt is owed to
them by the Respondent. An Operational creditor refers to a person to whom
an operational debt is owed and includes any person to whom such amount
has been legally assigned or transferred for goods or services done by them,
which is not the present case that the Petitioners has a made a frivolous claim
against incomplete work. The frivolous claims made by the petitioner is not an
Operational debt in terms of Section 5(21) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code 2016 as the claims raised by the Petitioner are disputed payments.
III. Section 5(21) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 defines
Operational Debt as follows:
"Operational Debt" means a claim in respect of the provision of goods or

services including employment or a debt in respect of the repayment of dues
arising under any law for the time being in force and payable to the Central
Government, any State Government or any local authority.
IV. That the Petitioner had raised frivolous invoices without completing the
assignment and attaining competition certificate therefore the Respondent
refused to accept the invoices. That, in terms Clause 4 of the said Work Order,
Petitioner were required to obtain a clearance certificate from Orissa Hydro
Power Corporation Limited and the said clearance certificate had to be
specifically submitted along with the Invoice, for receiving the final payment.
It was also a condition precedent that the final payment shall be released only
on the basis of submission of the Invoice duly supported by the clearance
certificate. However, Petitioner failed to provide the said Clearance Certificate
from OHPC and completion certificate along with the invoice as Petitioner
had failed to complete the work in satisfaction to the said Work Order hence
the Petitioner is not entitled to any payment or claims made in this Petition.
That the Petitioner has filed the present case based on unaccepted invoices and
disputed payments which does not fall under the definition of Operation Debt
hence the present petition is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed.
PARA WISE REPLY
1. That the contents of Part I of the Petition are a matter of record and needs no reply on
merit.
2. That the contents of Part II of the Petition are a matter of record and needs no reply
on merit.
3. That the contents of Part III of the Petition need no reply.
4. That the contents of Part IV of the Petition are wrong and denied to the extent that
Operational debt is owed by the Respondent. That the petitioner is not an Operational
Creditor in terms of Section 5(20) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 as no
Operational Debt is owed to them by the Respondent.
5. That the contents of Para 1 of Part IV of the Petition are a matter of record and needs
no reply on merit.
no reply on merit.
no reply on merit.
no reply on merit
no reply on merit.
10. That the contents of Para 6 of Part IV of the Petition
11. That the contents of Para 17 and 18 of Part IV of the Petition are wrong and denied.
That no Operational debt is owed by the Respondent to the Petitioner. That the
petitioner is not an Operational Creditor in terms of Section 5(20) of the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code 2016 as no Operational Debt is owed to them by the
Respondent. An Operational creditor refers to a person to whom an operational debt
is owed and includes any person to whom such amount has been legally assigned or
transferred for goods or services done by them, which is not the present case that the
Petitioners has a made a frivolous claim against incomplete work. The frivolous
claims made by the petitioner is not an Operational debt in terms of Section 5(21) of
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 as the claims raised by the Petitioner are
disputed payments. That the Petitioner had raised frivolous invoices without
completing the assignment and attaining competition certificate therefore the
Respondent refused to accept the invoices. That, in terms Clause 4 of the said Work
Order, Petitioner were required to obtain a clearance certificate from Orissa Hydro
Power Corporation Limited and the said clearance certificate had to be specifically
submitted along with the Invoice, for receiving the final payment. It was also a
condition precedent that the final payment shall be released only on the basis of
submission of the Invoice duly supported by the clearance certificate. However,
Petitioner failed to provide the said Clearance Certificate from OHPC and completion
certificate along with the invoice as Petitioner had failed to complete the work in
satisfaction to the said Work Order hence the Petitioner is not entitled to any payment
or claims made in this Petition.
12. That the contents of Para 19 and 20 of Part IV of the Petition are wrong and denied.
That it is wrong and denied that the Respondent is unable due to liability being more
than assets. That the Respondent has a healthy financial status and has not made
payments to the Petitioner as the claims made by the Petitioner are false and
frivolous. That the Petitioner has filed the present case to based on unaccepted
invoices and disputed payments. That the Respondent is not liable to any unadmitted
payments based on frivolous invoice raised without completing assignment and

attaining completion certificate.
13. That the contents of Para 21 of Part IV of the Petition are wrong and denied. That the
present petition filed by the petitioner under section 9 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code 2016 read with Rule 6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Rules
2016 seeking insolvency of the Respondent Company is bad in law as the petitioner is
not an Operational Creditor and the petition is based on false and frivolous claims.
That the Respondent does not owe any operational debt hence it is not liable for
winding up. That the Petitioner is not an operational creditor, nor the present petition
has been filed following due process hence the present petition is not maintainable
and liable to be dismissed.
14. That the contents of prayer clause are false and frivolous and hence denied. It is
denied that the Petitioner is entitled to any of the relief sought in the Petition under
reply. It is submitted that the facts and contentions under the present reply clearly
shows that the Petitioner is not an operational creditor, nor the present petition has
been filed following due process hence the present petition is not maintainable and
liable to be dismissed in its entirety with exemplary costs for it being deliberately
misleading, false, frivolous and contemptuous in nature.
15. That the contents of Point 2 of Part IV of the Petition are wrong and denied. That no
Operational debt is owed by the Respondent to the Petitioner. That the petitioner is
not an Operational Creditor in terms of Section 5(20) of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code 2016 as no Operational Debt is owed to them by the Respondent.
16. That the contents of Point 1 to Point 7 of Part V of the Petition are a matter of record
and need no reply on merit.
17. That the contents of Point 8 of Part V of the Petition are wrong and denied. That the
Petitioner has made an absolutely false and frivolous statement. That the Petitioner
had served a demand notice in 2010 (marked as Annexure 8 of the Petition) under
The Companies Act, 1956, before filing a winding up petition under the Companies
Act,1956. That vide order dated 17.12.2021 the NCLT, Cuttack dismissed the
company petition filed by the Petitioner as the same was was filed under the
Companies Act 1956 which stands repealed. That the company petition filed by the
Petitioner and the Companies Act 1956 both stands repealed hence the demand notice
dated 06.07.2010 also stands redundant. That the Respondent did not receive any
demand notice as prescribed in Form 3 & Form 4 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Rules 2016. That Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 is a
mandatory provision to be adhered by an operational creditor which the Petitioner has
failed to do and is making a frivolous statement on oath hence the present petition is
not maintainable and liable to be dismissed in its entirety with exemplary costs for it
being deliberately misleading, false, frivolous and contemptuous in nature.
That further it is wrong and denied that the Petitioner has not received any notice
relating to dispute relating to the unpaid debt. That the Respondent on multiple
occasions has raised dispute with respect to the frivolous claims made by the
Petitioner. That the Petitioner has filed the present case to based on unaccepted
invoices and disputed payments. That the Respondent is not liable to any unadmitted
payments based on frivolous invoice raised without completing assignment and
attaining completion certificate.
18. That the reply is made bonafide and in the interest of justice and in case the present
reply is allowed, no prejudice would be caused to the Petitioner and an effective
assistance will be given to this Hon’ble Court in adjudication of the captioned
petition.
PRAYER
In view of the above stated facts and circumstances this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to.
A. Take the present reply on record and dismiss the captioned petition
B. Pass such other and further order(s) as may be deem fit and proper in the facts and
on the circumstances of the case in favour of the Respondent in the interest of
Justice.
Respondent/Corporate Debtor
Through
Place:
Date:
IN THE MATTER OF:

Versus
AFFIDAVIT
I, Ivan Koltsov , S/o , aged ….. residing ……., do solemnly affirm and say as follows:
1. That I am authorised representative of the Respondent in the captioned matter authorised

vide board resolution dated 26.06.2020 and I am conversant with the facts and
circumstances of the present Reply and therefore competent to depose the present
Affidavit.
2. I state that I have read and understood the contents of the accompanying Reply which has
been drafted under my instructions.
3. I further state that the facts contained in the accompanying reply are true and correct to
the best of knowledge. The submissions are made on the basis of the legal advice which I
have received and believed to be true.
DEPONENT
VERIFICATION
Solemnly verified at …… on this the.... 2022 that the contents of my aforementioned Affidavit
are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and nothing material has been concealed
therefrom.
DEPONENT
Place:
Date:
17th February 2022
1. Researched on the grounds on which the Court can implead out a party from a suit
under Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The reproduction of which is
stated below:
1. RAMESH HIRANAND KUNDANMAL Vs. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF

GREATER BOMBAY AND ORS.
Citation - 1992 SCC (2) 524
Court – Supreme Court of India
Link - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1084618/
Findings – “The line has been drawn on wider construction of the rule between the direct interest
or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be
directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may
lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights.”
2. Kasturi Vs. Uyyamperumal & Ors.

Citation – (2005) 6 SCC 733
Findings – Para 11 - “The question of jurisdiction of the Court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 of the
CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a
party proposed to be added has direct interest in the controversy involved in the suit.”
3. Razia Begum vs Sahebzadi Anwar Begum & Others

Citaion - 1958 AIR 886
Findings – “To the same effect is the decision in Re I. G. Farbeninadusrie A. G. Agreement (1).
The Court held that in order that a party may be added as a defendant in the suit, he should have
a legal interest in the subject-matter of the litigation-legal interest not as distinguished from an
equitable interest, but an interest which the law recognizes.”
4. Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt.
Ltd. & Ors.
Citation - (2010) 7 SCC 417
Findings – Para 10 - “This Court also explained that a person who has a direct interest in the
subject matter of the suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale may be impleaded as a
proper party, on his application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC.”
5. Vidur Impex & Traders Pvt.Ltd.& ... vs Tosh Apartments Pvt.Ltd.

Findings – Para 36 - “The Court can, at any stage of the proceedings, either on an application
made by the parties or otherwise, direct impleadment of any person as party, who ought to have
been joined as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the Court is necessary for
effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit.”
Also,
Para 26 - “Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 gives a wide discretion to the Court to meet every case of
defect of parties and is not affected by the inaction of the plaintiff to bring the necessary parties
on record. The question of impleadment of a party has to be decided on the touchstone of Order
1 Rule 10 which provides that only a necessary or a proper party may be added. A necessary
party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose
absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final
decision on the question involved in the proceeding. The addition of parties is generally not a
question of initial jurisdiction of the Court but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised
in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”
18th & 21st February 2022
1. Executed comprehensive research on the legal proposition of enforceability of

indemnity bonds in loan agreement against a surety under the Contract Act, 1872,
possible defenses available to guarantors, circular of Reserve Bank of India on the
matter and produced landmark legal precedents on the matter. The reproduction of
Enforcement of Indemnity Bond in a Loan Agreement
Legal Provisions Involved –
Section 128 of Indian Contract Act, 1872
Surety’s Liability - The liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor
unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. - The liability of the surety is co-extensive with
that of the principal debtor unless it is otherwise provided by the contract."

Co-Sureties Liable to Contribute Equally - Where two or more persons are co-sureties for the
same debt or duty, either jointly or severally, and whether under the same or different contracts,
and whether with or without the knowledge of each other, the co-sureties, in the absence of any
contract to the contrary, are liable, as between themselves, to pay each an equal share of the
whole debt, or of that part of it which remains unpaid by the principal debtor.
Circular of Reserve Bank of India
RBI's circular dated September 9, 2014, issued concerning the Master Circular on Wilful
Defaulters DBOD.No.CID.BC.3/20.16.003/2014-15 dated July 1, 2014, clarified that when a
payment default is made by the principal debtor, the bank is entitled to proceed against the
guarantor/surety even without exhausting the remedies against the principal debtor. In case the
said guarantor refuses to comply with the demand made by the creditor/bank, despite having
sufficient means to make payment of the dues, such guarantor would also be treated as a 'wilful
defaulter'. In nutshell, the liability of the guarantor is well established and co-extensive with that
of the debtor. The link of the said circular is stated below -
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/CGC090914FC.pdf
Leading Judgments with Relation to that of Surety against the Enforcement of Indemnity
Bond in a Loan Agreement
The liability of the principal borrower is coextensive with that of Guarantor. It is for the secured
creditor to choose the property against which it decides to proceed.
1. Ram Kishun Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

Citation - (2012) 11 SCC 511
Link - https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b48d5c607dba348fff290f
Findings – Para 10 – There can be no dispute to the settled proposition of law that in view of the
provisions of Section 128 of the Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter called “the Contract Act”), the
liability of the guarantor/surety is coextensive with that of the debtor. Therefore, the creditor has
a right to obtain a decree against the surety and the principal debtor. The surety has no right to
restrain execution of the decree against him until the creditor has exhausted his remedy against
the principal debtor for the reason that it is the business of the surety/guarantor to see whether
the principal debtor has paid or not. The surety does not have a right to dictate terms to the
creditor as to how he should make the recovery and pursue his remedies against the principal
debtor at his instance.
2. State Bank Of India vs Indexport Registered And Ors

Citation – 1992 AIR 1740

Findings - A surety's liability to pay the debt is not removed by reason of the creditor's
ommission to sue the principal debtor. The creditor is not bound to exhaust his remedy against
the principal before suing the surety, and a suit may be maintained against the surety though the
principal has not been sued.
3. Central Bank Of India vs C. L. Vimala & Ors

Citation – AIR 2015 SC 2280
Findings - We are of the opinion that the questions that need to be decided by us are regarding
the liability of the guarantor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The legislature
has succinctly stated that the liability of the guarantor is co-extensive with that of the principal
debtor unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. This Court has decided on this question,
time and again, in line with the intent of the legislature.
4. United Bank of India vs Satyawati Tondon & Ors

Findings - The liability of the guarantor and principal debtor is co-extensive and not in
alternative and the creditor/decree-holder has the right to proceed against either for recovery of
dues or realization of the decretal amount.
5. Laxmi Pat Surana vs Union Bank Of India on 26 March, 2021

Citation – LL 2021 SC 186
Findings - The liability of the guarantor is coextensive with that of the principal borrower.
Possible Defenses Available to Guarantors
Even though the possible defenses available to a guarantor against his liability under the contract
of guarantee are limited, the guarantor can take certain defenses against his liability in certain
cases as discussed below.
1. Clause in the Contract – If there is a clause in the agreement to the effect specifically stating
that the liability of the guarantor will not be extensive or will be limited to a certain amount, and
then the liability will be limited or non-extensive, as the case may be.
Central Bank Of India vs C. L. Vimala & Ors

Citation – AIR 2015 SC 2280
Findings - We are of the opinion that the questions that need to be decided by us are regarding
the liability of the guarantor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The legislature
has succinctly stated that the liability of the guarantor is co-extensive with that of the principal
debtor unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. This Court has decided on this question,
time and again, in line with the intent of the legislature.
2. Variance in Contract - In case the guarantor successfully establishes that there have been
subsequent variations to the contract of guarantee to which the guarantor was not privy to or
had no knowledge of, the guarantor can be excused from performing his obligations under
law for all the subsequent transactions post the variance.
Section 133 of Indian Contract Act 1872 - Discharge of surety by variance in terms of contract
Any variance, made without the surety’s consent, in the terms of the contract between the
principal 1and the creditor, discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to the variance. —
Any variance, made without the surety’s consent, in the terms of the contract between the
principal and the creditor, discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to the variance.
1. Keshavlal Hari Lal Setalvad and Ors vs Pratapsingh Moholalbhai Sheth and Ors
Court – Bombay High Court
Citation - 137 Ind Cas 564
Findings - It is true that this was do eat the request of the principal debtor, but as the sureties
were not consulted it cannot be said that they agreed to the variance Here there could be no
question of certain transactions being prior to the variance and certain other transactions being
subsequent thereto. The only fact that can be definitely stated about it is that the contract on the
fulfilment of which the sureties' liability could arise was not carried out.
2. State Bank of India vs Dharam Kumar And Anr.
Court – Madras High Court
Citation - 2000 102 CompCas 166 Mad
Findings - Section 133 of the Act itself would indicate that any variance would entitle the surety
to claim for discharge provided there is no consent in the terms of the contract by the surety
regarding the variation.
3. Release of Debtor by Creditor:
In terms of Section 135 of the ICA, if without the consent of the surety, the creditor and debtor
enter into a contract, whereby the creditor agrees to make composition/compromise with or gives
time to or agrees not to sue the surety, in such a case, guarantor being the surety stands
discharged by law to fulfil his obligations under the contract of guarantee unless the surety
assents such contract.
Section 135 of Contract Act, 1872
Discharge of surety when creditor compounds with, gives time to, or agrees not to sue, principal
debtor.—A contract between the creditor and the principal debtor, by which the creditor makes a
composition with, or promises to give time to, or not to sue, the principal debtor, discharges the
surety, unless the surety assents to such contract – “A contract between the creditor and the
principal debtor, by which the creditor makes a composition with, or promises to give time to, or
not to sue, the principal debtor, discharges the surety, unless the surety assents to such contract."
Ramswaroop And Anr. vs State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur
Citation - 2002 (3) WLN 430
Court – Rajasthan High Court
"It is true that in each and every case of compromise surety cannot claim discharge of the
liability under the surety bond but when the creditor accepted that the decree be passed against
all the defendants and this decree is to be satisfied by defendant No. 1 and when the creditor
himself agrees to accept entire decretal amount from only the borrower defendant, then it
amounts to voluntarily entering into new contract by the creditor with the debtor. This new
compromise (agreement), by necessary implication, discharges the guarantor."
4. Guarantee Obtained by Misrepresentation & Concealment
If the guarantee was obtained by the creditor by means of keeping silence as to certain material
circumstances and in such circumstances the guarantee can be challenged as invalid. Also, where
a guarantee has been obtained by means of misrepresentation made by the creditor, or with his
knowledge and consent, concerning a material part of the transaction, such a guarantee is invalid.
In terms of Section 142 of ICA, any guarantee which has been obtained by means of
misrepresentation made by the creditor, or with his knowledge and assent, concerning a material
part of the transaction, is invalid.
Guarantee obtained by misrepresentation, invalid. —Any guarantee which has been obtained by
means of misrepresentation made by the creditor, or with his knowledge and assent, concerning a
material part of the transaction, is invalid. —Any guarantee which has been obtained by means
of misrepresentation made by the creditor, or with his knowledge and assent, concerning a
material part of the transaction, is invalid."
1. Krishan Kumar vs. Syndicate bank & Ors

Citation - (RFA No. 1/1997 decided on Februray 19, 2009
Court – Delhi High Court
Findings - The finding of the trial court in holding the guarantor liable as much as the principal
borrower was erroneous in light of the fact that the plaintiff bank had miserably failed to prove
the authenticity of the guarantee forming the subject matter of the case & hence was set aside.
2. M/S Poysha Oxygen Pvt. Ltd. vs Sh. Ashwini Suri & Others
Citation - OMP No.126/2001
Findings - Reference is also made in the award to Sections 142 & 143 of the Contract Act laying
down that any guarantee obtained by means of misrepresentation is invalid.
5. Remedy of Surety impaired by the act or omission of the Creditor
Where the creditor either does something, which is inconsistent with the rights of the surety or
omits to do his duty towards the surety and because of this, the eventual remedy of the surety
that he had against the principal debtor is impaired, the surety/guarantor is discharged from his
liability towards the creditor in accordance with section 139 of the ICA.
Section 139 of Indian Contract Act – Discharge of surety by creditor’s act or omission impairing
surety’s eventual remedy. - If the creditor does any act which is inconsistent with the rights of
the surety, or omits to do any act which his duty to the surety requires him to do, and the
eventual remedy of the surety himself against the principal debtor is thereby impaired, the surety
is discharged. —If the creditor does any act which is inconsistent with the rights of the surety, or
omits to do any act which his duty to the surety requires him to do, and the eventual remedy of
the surety himself against the principal debtor is thereby impaired, the surety is discharged.
Jose Inacio Lourence vs Syndicate Bank and Another

Citation - 1989 65 Comp Cas 698 Bom
Court – Bombay High Court
Findings - The failure in not registering the charge is also an act which is inconsistent with the
rights of the surety within the meaning of Section 139 of the Contract Act and it is obvious that
the eventual remedy which the surety may have against Krishna Naik or the purchaser in Andhra
Pradesh is impaired resulting in the discharge of the surety.
22nd February 2022
Researched on the ambit of the enforceability of employment bonds with reference to

Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The reproduction of which is stated below for
your kind perusal.
Indemnity Bond
An Indemnity Bond is an undertaking providing a surety that the party shall be compensated
monetarily in event of the breach of the contract. Indemnity bonds are enforceable provided they
don’t run contrary to the public policy & test of reasonableness. Such a contract is governed by
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and comes under the purview of section 74 of the said Act, which
provides for compensation for breach by way of liquidated damages.
Judicial Precedents
Employment Bonds
1. Super Superintendence Co. of India v. Krishan Murgai

Findings – “The drafting of a negative covenant in a contract of employment is often a matter
of great difficulty. In the employment cases so far discussed, the issue has been as to the
validity of the covenant operating after the end of the period of service. Restrictions on
competition during that period are normally valid, and indeed may be implied by law by
virtue of the servant's duty of fidelity. In such cases the restriction is generally reasonable,
having regard to the interest of the employer, and does not cause any undue hardship to the
employee, who will receive a wage or salary for the period in question. But if the covenant
is to operate after the termination of services, or is too widely worded, the Court may refuse
to enforce it.”
2. The Brahmaputra Tea CO. Ld. Vs. E. Scarth

Citation - (1885) ILR 11 Cal 545
Court – Calcutta High Court
Findings – “An agreement to serve a person exclusively for a definite term is a lawful
agreement,
and it is difficult to see how that can be unlawful which is essential to its fulfilment, and to the
due protection of the interests of the employer, while the agreement is in force. It is
unnecessary
to consider all the conditions in the 10th clause”
3. Dr. S. Gobu Vs. State of Tamil Nadu

Citation - 2010 SCC Mad 3389
Court – Madras High Court
Link - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1730294/#:~:text=1%20obliges%20a%20candidate
%20to,not%20as%20a%20direct%20candidate.
Findings - The result of the above discussion is that considerations against restrictive
covenants
are different in cases where the restriction is to apply during the period after the termination of
the contract than those in cases where it is to operate during the period of the contract.
Negative
covenants operative during the period of the contract of employment when the employee is
bound to serve his employer exclusively are generally not regarded as restraint of trade and
therefore do not fall under Section 27 of the Contract Act. A negative covenant that the
employee
would not engage himself in a trade or business or would not get himself employed by any
other
master for whom he would perform similar or substantially similar duties is not therefore a
restraint of trade unless the contract as aforesaid is unconscionable or excessively harsh or
unreasonable or one-sided as in the case of W.H. Milsted & Son Ltd. Both the trial court and
the
High Court have found, and in our view, rightly, that the negative covenant in the present case
restricted as it is to the period of employment and to work similar or substantially similar to
the
one carried on by the appellant when he was in the employ of the respondent Company was
reasonable and necessary for the protection of the companys interests and not such as the court
would refuse to enforce. There is therefore no validity in the contention that the negative
covenant contained in clause 17 amounted to a restraint of trade and therefore against public
policy."
4. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai & Co. Vs. Chittaranjan Chandulal Pandya

Citation - 1965 (11) FLR 299
Court – Gujarat High Court
Findings - An agreement to serve a person exclusively for a definite term is a lawful
agreement, and it is difficult to see how that can be unlawful which is essential to its
fulfilment, and to the due protection of the interests of the employer, while the agreement is
in force.
5. Chairman & Managing Director, Indian Airlines v. Binod Kumar Sinha

Findings – “If a person is in employment he is certainly subject to certain terms and
conditions and he can quit his employment under those terms and conditions only which
cannot be stated to be violative of Articles 14, 16, 21 and 23, much less Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution unless on examination such conditions are held invalid.”
6. Satyam Computer services Limited v Ladella Ravichander

Citation – MANU/AP/0416/2011
Court – Andhra Pradesh High Court
Link - https://blog.ipleaders.in/key-features-employment-contracts/#_ftnref9
An employee left the job suddenly and was charged to pay Rupees two lakhs in addition to
stipend charges and additional expenditure meted out by the employer for his purpose as per
the
bond agreement he had entered into. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that as the
employee
had not caused any damage to the organisation he should not be charged abnormally and fixed
an amount of Rupees one lakh considering his job period and the actual cost incurred.
7. Sicpa India Limited v Manas Pratim Deb

Citation - MANU/DE/6554/2011
Link - https://blog.ipleaders.in/key-features-employment-contracts/#_ftn10
An employee left the job suddenly and was charged to meted out by the employer for his
purpose
as per the bond agreement he had entered into.
23rd February 2022
Researched the legal validity of the arbitration clause in the former agreement with
reference to Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The reproduction of which is
stated below:
Legal Proposition
If one agreement supersedes the other agreement, then the arbitration clause has to be
incorporated again
Legal Provision of Relevance
1. Section 62 of the Contract Act - Effect of novation, rescission, and alteration of contract
- If the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter
it, the original contract need not be performed. —If the parties to a contract agree to
substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be
performed.
Judicial Precedents
1. Sanjiv Prakash v. Seema Kukreja & Ors.

Citation - Arbitration Petition Number 4/2020
Findings - The Delhi High Court has reiterated that novation of an agreement would necessarily
result in destruction of the arbitration clause contained therein. In this regard, it was observed
that an arbitration agreement being a creation of an agreement may be destroyed by agreement.
When a contract with arbitration clause gets novated /superseded, the arbitration clause perishes
and the same cannot be invoked.
2. Damodar Valley Corporation Vs. KK Kar

Citation - AIR 1974 SC158
Findings - As the contract is an outcome of the agreement between the parties it is equally open
to the parties thereto to agree to bring it to an end or to treat it us if it never existed. It may also
be open to the parties to terminate the previous contract and substitute in its place a new contract
or alter the original contract in such a way that it cannot subsist. In all these cases, since the
entire contract is put an end to the arbitration clause, which is a part of it, also perishes along
with it, Section 62 of the Contract Act incorporates this principle when it provides that if this
parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract or to rescind or alter it, the original
contract need not be performed. Where, therefore, the dispute between the parties is that the
contract itself does not subsist either as a result of its being substituted by a new contract or by
rescission or alteration, that dispute cannot be referred to the arbitration as the arbitration clause
itself would perish if the averment is found to be valid. As the very jurisdiction of the arbitrator
is dependent upon the existence of the arbitration clause under which he is appointed, the parties
have no right to invoke a clause which perishes with the contract.
3. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. Vs. Mohan Lal Harbans Lal Bhayana
Citation - 2015 (2) SCC 461
Findings - The arbitration agreement stands modified by the supplementary agreement when the
terms of the supplementary agreement changed the entire edifice of the principal arbitration
agreement, there could be no arbitration between the parties for the claims raised by the appellant
and an application filed under Section 11 would thus be misconceived.
4. Union of India Vs. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros.

Citation - AIR 1959 SC 1362
Findings - The principle laid down is that if the contract is superseded by another, the arbitration
clause, being a component part of the earlier contract, falls with it. But where the dispute is
whether such contract is void ab intio, the arbitration clause cannot operate on those disputes, for
its operative force depends upon the existence of the contract and its validity. The various other
observations were made by this Court in the above-mentioned judgment in respect of "settlement
of disputes arising under the original contract, including the dispute as to the breach of the
contract and its consequences".
5. M/s Young Achievers vs. IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd.

Citation – CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6997 OF 2013
Findings - Once new contract supersedes the former contract containing arbitration clause, the
operative effect of said arbitration ends with the end of former agreement. The parties deciding
to enter into a fresh contract and while doing so mutually agrees upon the mode and manner of
settlement of dispute, if any arising in the future and there is no reference to previously executed
contract vis-a-vis settlement of disputes arising therefrom, is clearly indicative of novation of
contract.
24th February 2022
Researched on the legal proposition as to at what stage the jurisdiction of the civil court
can be challenged under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The reproduction
of which is stated below:
Relevant Legal Provision
Section 21 of CPC
[(1)] No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or Revisional Court
unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity
and in all cases where issues or settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice.
[(2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its
jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was
taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and in all cases where
issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of
justice.
(3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of
its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was
taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice.]
Order 14 Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure
Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.-(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of
on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce
judgment on all issues.
(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that
the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first
if that issue relates to -
(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it
thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined,
and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue".
Landmark Precedents
1. Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v DLF Universal Ltd.

Findings - The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important
categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction
over the subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection
to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or
before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken
at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-
matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute,
charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having
no jurisdiction is a nullity.”
2. Hasham Abbas Sayyad v Usman Abbas Sayyad
Link – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71315/
Findings - We may, however, hasten to add that a distinction must be made between a decree
passed by a court which has no territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the light of Section 21 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, and a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction in regard to
the subject-matter of the suit. Whereas in the former case, the appellate court may not interfere
with the decree unless prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second category of the cases would be
interfered with.
3. Arun Agarwal v. Nagreeka Exports (P) Ltd.
Citation - (2002) 10 SCC 101
Findings - In a case where the suit can be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court was
obliged to decide that question first without compelling the parties to undergo the stress of a
regular trial.
4. Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan,
Citation - (1955) 1 SCR 117: AIR 1954 SC 340

Findings - It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a Court without
jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought
to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings.
A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the
subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and
such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.
5. Union of India & Ors vs Adani Exports Ltd. & Anr

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 6320-6321 of 2000
Link – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1307808/
Findings - Having considered the arguments addressed on behalf of the parties and having
perused the records, we are of the considered opinion that the question of jurisdiction should be
first decided by us before going into the merits of the case in hand. As a matter of fact, we feel it
would have been more appropriate on the facts of these cases if the High Court had proceeded
under Order XIV Rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code by deciding the question of jurisdiction as a
preliminary issue first instead of deciding the case on merit.
6. Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig

Citation - 1964 AIR 497
Findings - Under Order 14, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure where issues both of law and of fact
arise in the same suit, and the court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be
disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it
thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been
determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised
only where in the opinion of the court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law
alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and
fact as preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the court; not to do
so, especially when the decision on issues even of law depend upon the decision of issues of fact,
would result in a lopsided trial of the suit.
25th February 2022

o Had to take leave from the law firm on account of the submission of the internship report to
the college, in person.
28th February & 2nd March 2022

Made a very comprehensive note on the Section 8 Company. The reproduction of which is stated
below for your kind perusal:
Section 8 of Companies Act – An Overview
Introduction
A company is referred to as Section 8 Company when it registered as a Non-Profit Organization

(NPO) i.e. when it has motive of promoting arts, commerce, education, charity, protection of
environment, sports, science, research, social welfare, religion and intends to use its profits (if
any) or other income for promoting these objectives.
Eligibility to Apply for Section 8 Company
An individual or associations of individuals are eligible to be registered as Section 8 Company if

it holds below-mentioned intentions or objectives. The objectives have to be confirmed to the
satisfaction of the Central Government. When the company intends to promote science,
commerce, education, art, sports, research, religion, charity, social welfare, protection of the
environment or alike other objectives; when the company holds an intention to invest all the
profits (if any) or any other income generated after incorporation in the promotion of such
objects only; when the company does not intend to pay any dividend to its members.
Noncompliance with the same shall entail strict legal action against the company.
Name
As per rule 8(7) of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014, for the Companies under Section
8 of the Act, the name shall include the words foundation, Forum, Association, Federation,
Chambers, Confederation, council, Electoral trust and the like etc
Incorporation of a Section 8 Company
To incorporate a Section 8 Company, an application shall be made to the Registrar of

Companies, which shall be accompanied, inter alia, by the following documents:
Draft Memorandum of Association (MOA) and Articles of association (AOA) of the Company
in prescribed format (Form no. INC – 13) where the photographs of subscribers are affixed.
A Declaration is to be attached in Form no. INC-14 (on the stamp paper, duly notarized) by an
Advocate, a Chartered Accountant, Cost Accountant or Company Secretary in practice, that the
draft memorandum and articles of association have been drawn up in conformity with the
provisions of section 8 and rules made there under and all the requirements under section 8 have
been complied with.
An estimate of the future annual income and expenditure of the company for next three years,
specifying the sources of the income and the objects of the expenditure.
A declaration (in Form no. INC-15) on stamp paper duly notarized by each of the persons
making the application and
Form no. INC-9 from each subscribers and first directors, on appropriate stamp paper of the
State and duly notarized
Documents Requirement for the Registration of Section 8 Company
Digital Signature Certificate

Memorandum of Association
Articles of Association
Passport Size Photographs
Members’ Id Proof such as Aadhar Card, Passport, Voter Id
Details of Director (When the Members Are Other Companies/LLPs)
Address Evidence
Director Identification Number
Who is Authorized to Issue License to Section 8 Companies
Registrars of Companies of respective jurisdictions are delegated with the powers of Central
government to issue license to Section 8 Companies
Number of Directors in a Section 8 Company
There is no minimum or maximum prescription for section 8 company though Under Section
149(3) – Section 8 company must have a minimum of one Resident Director i.e. a director who
has resided in India at least for a total period of 182 days (one hundred and eighty-two days) or
more within the previous calendar year.
Can a Company with Limited Liability or Unlimited Liability be registered under Section 8
of Companies Act
Rule 20(1) of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 provides that only a limited company
registered under this Act or under any previous company law shall make an application to the
Registrar for issue of license. Therefore, a company with unlimited liabilities cannot be
registered as a Section 8 Company.
Membership in Section 8 Companies
One Person Company - Rule 3(6) of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 prohibits one
person company to invest in securities of any corporate.
Partnership Firm or Limited Liability Partnership - Yes, under the Companies Act, 2013, a
Partnership firm or an LLP can become the member of Section 8 Company. The provisions of
respective Acts need to be complied with by the partnership firm or LLP as the case may be.
Trust - There is no restriction in the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 for a registered Trust
to become a member of Section 8 Company. In case of unregistered trusts, provisions of section
89 would be applicable.
Co-operative Society - In terms of Section 8, any person or an association of persons intending

to register a limited liability company for objects specified in section 8(1)(a), subject to the
restrictions provided in section 8(1)(b) and (c), can opt to apply for registration of Section 8
Company. Co-operative society can be regarded as Person and thus capable of becoming
subscriber of a company including Section 8 Company.
Conversion of Organizations to Section 8 Companies
Foreign Companies - Now since a Company or a body corporate incorporated outside India for
doing not for profit activities, which has opened a branch office in India, cannot fall in definition
of a foreign company as business activity is missing. Therefore, such company cannot be termed
as foreign company. However, subject to compliance of FEMA regulations, it can open branch.
Such not for profit companies or bodies corporate incorporated outside India can promote and
register a Section 8 Company in India as a distinct entity.
One Person Companies - Rule 3 of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 prohibits a one
person company to be incorporated as section 8 company or to convert into a Section 8
Company. Also, Rule 3(6) of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 prohibits one person
company to invest in securities of any corporate.
Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Section 8(1) of the Companies Act, 2013
allows person or association of persons to be registered as a Section 8 Company on fulfillment of
certain conditions and procedure as prescribed therein. The term “person” has not been defined
in the Companies Act, 2013. Section 2(41) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that
“person” shall include any Company, or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated
or not. Accordingly, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is a person.
Therefore, Society can be registered/converted as a Section 8 Company.
Co-operative Society - Cooperative Society is a person and accordingly can be registered as a

Section 8 Company in terms of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 after completion of
necessary formalities prescribed therein.
Trust - A Trust is a person. Therefore, there is no bar in conversion of trust to Section 8

Companies.
Limited Liability Partnership - Section 8(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 allows person or
association of persons to be registered as a Section 8 Company on fulfillment of certain
conditions and procedure as prescribed therein. The term “person” has not been defined in the
Companies Act, 2013. Section 2(41) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that “person”
shall include any Company, or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.
Accordingly, a Limited Liability Partnership is a person. Therefore, it can be registered/
converted as a Section 8 Company.
Partnership Firm - Section 8(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 allows person or association of
persons to be registered as a Section 8 Company on fulfillment of certain conditions.
Conversion of Section 8 Companies
One Person Company - Rule 7(1) of the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 prohibits
conversion of Section 8 Company to one Person Company.
Advertisement at the Time of Conversion
Rule 20 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 provides for the procedure for conversion of
an entity into a Section 8 Company. Sub-rule (3) of rule 20 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules,
2014 provides that any entity which is desirous of being registered as section 8 Company, it,
interalia, shall be required to publish a notice in Form No. INC- 26 within a week from the date
of making the application to the Registrar in at least once in a vernacular newspaper in the
principal vernacular language of the district in which the registered office of the proposed
company is to be situated or is situated, and circulating in that district, and at least once in
English language in an English newspaper circulating in that district. A copy of the notice, as
published, shall be sent forthwith to the Registrar and also to be placed on the websites as may
be notified by the Central Government.
Stamp Duty
Stamp duty on memorandum & articles of association of a Company or on any increase in share
capital is governed by Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as adopted by respective state or stamp act of
respective state, as the case may be. Some of the states provide privileged rates for stamp duty on
MOA/ AOA of Section 8 Companies or on increase in authorized share capital. No relaxation of
special rate of stamp duty has been provided by any of the state in respect of stamp duty payable
on issue of share certificates by Section 8 Company.
Altercation in MOA & AOA
A Section 8 Company can alter the provisions of its Memorandum or articles by passing a
special resolution; however such alteration requires the approval of the Registrar of Companies.
Corporate Social Responsibility
Section 135 applies to every company including section 8 company fulfilling the criteria laid
down in that section. The amount needs to be spending on activities other than normal activities
of the company and not for the benefit of the company or its employees. Spending by the
company in its own activities will not qualify as CSR spend. MCA General circular No 21/2014
dated June 18, 2014 clarifies that contribution to corpus of a Trust / Society / Section 8
Companies etc. will qualify as CSR expenditure.
Amalgamation
Section 8(10) provides that a company registered under section 8 shall amalgamate only with
another company registered under section 8 company and having similar objects. In view of
section 8(10), Section 8 Company cannot be amalgamated with a company which is not a
Section 8 company.
Section 8 Company can be amalgamated with another Section 8 Company. However section
8(10) provides that the other company be “having similar objects”. What are similar objects is
not specified. Therefore a view is possible that so long as the main objects of two section 8
companies are within the objects specified under section 8 (1) (a) the objects will be considered
similar because the similarity between the objects is established by the fact that with either of
such objects the said companies can be registered as section 8 companies.
Contributions from Overseas
There are special requirements to be complied with under the Foreign Contribution and
Regulation Act, 2010 before a Section 8 Company can receive any contributions or donations
from overseas/outside India from non-residents. The provisions of the said Act are in addition to
the provisions under the Companies Act.
Cancellation of License
Section 8 companies require a grant of a license by the Central Government. All such licenses are
revocable as well on the following grounds: the company contravenes provisions of Section 8;
terms of the license are violated; when its conduct is fraudulent, or it violates its own objectives
and public policy. The Government can even order the company to be wound-up or amalgamated
with another similar company under certain circumstances. The Government has to hear the
company before passing such orders.
Winding Up
Section 8 companies can wind-up or dissolve themselves either voluntarily or under orders given by
the Central Government. If any assets remain after satisfaction of debts and liabilities upon such
winding-up, the National Company Law Tribunal can order the transfer of these assets to a similar
company. It can also order that they must be sold and the proceeds of this sale should be credited to
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Fund.
Punishment for Contravention
Any company that contravenes provisions of Section 8 is punishable with a fine ranging from Rs.
10 lakhs to Rs. 1 crore. Further, directors and officers of the company are liable to punishment with
imprisonment up to 3 years and a fine between Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 25 lakhs. Such officers can also
face prosecution under stringent provisions of Section 447 (dealing with fraud) if they conduct any
affairs with fraudulent motives.
3rd & 4th March 2022
Wrote a comprehensive article for the firm, on the issue of the recent amendment to IT
Rules, 2021. The reproduction of which is stated below for your kind perusal.
Information Technology Rules, 2021 – A Blemished Approach towards Unbridled

Regulations
Introduction
Ever since the notification of the Information Technology (Guidelines for Intermediaries and
Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, the government of the day has been receiving backlash
from all corners of society. Under the guise of promoting self-regulation, there has been an
attempt to compromise the freedom of speech of digital media. Aspersions are often cast upon
the intentions of the actions of the present government; however, the same is not unfounded,
given the precedents of this very government in matters concerning public importance. For
many, these rules denote the rise of fascism & the breakdown of democracy in the country. Amid
this political slugfest, let us take a moment to analyze what this regulation is & how it abridges
the very foundation on which our constitution is based.
The ruling government on 25th February 2021 notified the IT rules 2021 via its official gazette .
What followed after was an enraged response from the public. A three-tier mechanism has been
announced through the new rules; the first two tiers elucidate self-regulatory measures by the
platform itself, whereas the third tier is an oversight mechanism in case of a contingency that
warrants instant remedial action against the content. The first tier recommends the appointment
of a grievance redressal officer to be appointed by the content creator itself, which is bound to
act on a receipt of a complaint within 15 days. The second tier embodies the self-regulatory
method of the streaming methods headed by a retired Supreme Court judge or High Court judge.
The final & third tier encompasses an inter-departmental committee for the resolution of the
grievances.i
Procedural Blemishes – Legal Challenges
The present rules are a case of excessive delegation, suffering from procedural defects. When
regulation & oversight is not prescribed by the parent Act then bestowing the same via delegated
legislation raises inevitable legal challenges, on which the Apex Court has already made its stand
amply clear. If delegated legislation goes beyond the scope envisioned by the parent Act, then it
can’t be sustained and is liable to be struck down.ii If a rule goes against the authority of the
parent Act or statute, on this ground alone the rule is liable to be set aside. iii The Supreme Court
reiterated its stand that the delegated legislation can’t enlarge the objective of the Act, the rules
have to be in line with the objectives & provisions of the parent Act, contrary to which the
legislation becomes ultra vires & is liable to judicial scrutiny.iv
In the case of Shreya Singhal Vs. Union of India, the Apex Court rightfully struck down Section
66-A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 which penalized content that causes “annoyance”
or is “offensive”, on the ground of vagueness. The Information Technology Rules 2021 exceeds
the scope contemplated by the Information Technology Act, 2000, the parent Act, besides going
against the spirit of the ruling of Shreya Singhal rendered by the Supreme Court. By bringing
back the impugned rules emanating similar objectives through its code of ethics, thus undoing
the result of Shreya Singhal's judgment. Simultaneously, attempting to do something indirectly,
that is prohibited directly, nullifying the effect of the established legal dictum, Quando aliquid
prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum, which has been upheld by various legal
precedents.v
Over-regulations of Digital Media – Conundrum of Rights & Restrictions
The fundamental right to freedom of speech & expression is regarded as one of the basic
elements of an active & vibrant democracy since it allows the citizens to participate in the
political process of the country, including expressing their dissent against the government
policies. It is axiomatic that no right is absolute, but restrictions imposed should not be more than
what is required. The Supreme Court rightfully recognized that Article 19(1)(a) of the
constitution guarantees freedom of speech & expression to receive information regarding matters
of public concern.vi
One cannot rule out the possibility of misuse of these rules to target outspoken journalists who
are critical towards government draconian actions & policies, hindering journalistic freedom, the
fourth pillar of democracy. By means of these rules, the line between the rights & restrictions has
been further blurred, leaving it to the whims & fancies of the government of the day via its
emergency powers to decide the degree of restriction, therefore, strangulating free speech. The
government by its actions has arrogated itself the functions of deciding disputes, which ought to
have been discharged by the judiciary & which it did not possess earlier.
With the introduction of the draconian IT rules, 2021, digital media can be subjected to a code of
ethics, allowing the government to block content provided it goes against the sovereignty,
integrity & other grounds which are indeed legitimate restrictions. However, blocking the
content based on “public order” is a very vague ground, to say the least, and is heavily prone to
misuse.vii If anyone from the society lambastes the functioning of the government or expresses its
disagreement with the policies of the government on an online platform, the government can
invoke the defence of “public order”, which it is known to do for face-saving, therefore, stifling
any kind of dissent.
The immunities that intermediaries earlier possessed in respect of their functioning, as held in
Avnish Bajaj Vs. Stateviii confront the peril of being done away with since, under the new IT
rules, intermediaries can be compelled to track the originator of the message. Therefore, end-to-
end encrypted chats can potentially be a thing of the past & mockery will be made of privacy. ix
Also, the data retention period has been extended to 6 months. The repercussions of these rules
will have a chilling effect on the landmark ruling of K.S. Puttaswamy Vs. Union of India,
enunciating the right to privacy, which can result in a state of surveillance. Adding insult to
injury, the absence of robust data protection laws shall ensure that the privacy of the internet
users will go for a toss.
Ousting Judicial Scrutiny - Strangulating Democratic Framework
It is also worth highlighting that to contain the spread of hate, defamatory, false & obscene
content; we already have a dearth of penal provisions including civil & criminal law, courtesy of
provisions like Section 153A, 295A 499, & 505 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 & Section 66E,
67 & 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, providing for judicial recourse in case a
person is aggrieved by digital content, however by the means of this rules, the judicial process
has been attempted to be ousted by empowering the executive to act against the content that it
deems “objectionable” in its opinion as per its whims & fancies, hence doing away with any
form of accountability. We ought to strengthen our judicial system by timely filling of vacancies
across the courts rather than creating an imbalance of powers among the institutions, by letting
the executive subjugate other institutions.
The rules also entrust emergency power to the law enforcing agencies (On the Directions of
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting) that they are authorized to take down any content if
necessary without rendering the opportunity of being heard to another party, again a provision
which can be misused to the height of absurdity. x The power to adjudicate such matters should
have been vested with the judiciary, the third pillar of the democracy, denoting an overreach of
power by the executive. It comes as no surprise that we have fallen to 53rd position in the 2020
Democracy Index’s Global Ranking & 111th position in the 2020 Human Freedom Index.
Conclusion
As an opportunity cost of regulating the online digital platforms, fundamental rights of the
citizens have been proposed to be compromised. The present government is indeed by the people
but apparently not for the people. As the matter has reached various High Courts challenging the
vires of the Rules, now it’s up to the Courts to obliterate this imbroglio, a lot would depend upon
the courage of the court to call a spade a spade & stand up as an institution to defend the right of
the citizens & not to abdicate its responsibility. The balance of powers among the democratic
institutions in a democracy is much required, which is being attempted to be imbalanced. It can
be said without an iota of doubt that regulation is required in the context of digital media but that
cannot come at the cost of the fundamental rights of the citizens, without any data protection
laws & procedural blemishes. Judicial review should be the way to go rather than executive
exhortations.
i
Rule 9(3) of Information Technology Rules, 2021.
ii
Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 127.
iii
Union Of India & Ors vs S. Srinivasan, (2012) 7 SCC 683.
iv
Assam Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (2001) 4 SCC 202.
v
State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252, M/S. M.R.F. Ltd. Vs. Manohar Parrikar & Ors., Civil Appeal No.
4220 of 2002 & Rajiv Agarwal Vs. Union of India, W.P.(C) 7978/2020
vi
State of U.P vs Raj Narain & Ors, 1975 AIR 865.
vii
Code of Ethics, Information Technology Rules 2021.
viii
Avnish Bajaj Vs. State (2005) 3 CompLJ 364 Del.
ix
Rule 4(2) of Information Technology Rules, 2021.
x
Rule 16 of Information Technology Rules, 2021.
7th March 2022
Made a note on the issue of Moment Marketing: Whether it is a Case of IPR Infringement or
not? The reproduction of which is stated below:
The existing precedent comprises of a few cases which have read the right to privacy with the right of
publicity to hold that an individual acquires a right of publicity by virtue of their association with an
event, sport or movie. An important case here is ICC Development (International) Ltd v Arvee
Enterprises where this right was created and the court held that any effort to take away the right of
publicity from the individual would be violative of Articles 19 and 2l of the Constitution of India. The
court has held that the right of publicity rests with the individual alone and that they alone may profit
from it. However, the approach of the court here has been through fundamental rights and the right to
privacy and noticeably not through Intellectual Property.
In the United States, Pavesich v New England Life Ins Co marked the beginnings of the understanding
of the right of publicity through the concept of privacy. Initially courts adopted a more narrow
application of the right to privacy on celebrity’s rights until a court in Georgia recognised publicity as a
property right based on commercial considerations. The current framework for understanding celebrity
rights in the US is both by common law and statutory recognition. Noticeably, in France personality
rights remain protected under Article 9 of the French Civil Code and if a person’s personal history or
image is used without authorisation, it is actionable as per French law.
An Indian IPR Perspective
In India, protection of an athlete or celebrity’s rights from the perspective of trademark law is quite
limited in scope. Courts have previously accorded protection to names, characters and even film titles
in the past under trademark laws. Trademark registration by celebrities allows them to defend those
specific aspects of their personality against unauthorised use while also allowing for limited
commercialisation of their personae. From the realm of copyrights, not much can be said on the
protection of celebrity rights as the scope of its protection is limited to images, sketches or portrayals of
the celebrity. It has been previously held in Sim v Heinz & Co Ltd that voice, likeliness or other
identifier of personality can not form the subject matter of a copyright. While copyright laws may
accord celebrities or athletes the right to control the sale, dissemination and use of their images the
same can not be said of the more abstract concepts of fame, goodwill or reputation.
The common law tort of “passing off” is connected closely with Intellectual property rights and it
generally covers infringement of non-registered trademarks. In cases where a person’s name, likeliness
or image is misused, a cause of action may lie in a suit for “passing off.” When there is injury to the
goodwill or reputation of a person which may be caused by misrepresentation to pass off one’s goods
as the goods of another, a passing off remedy may be available. In the context of celebrity or athlete’s
rights being infringed by brands purporting to “congratulate” them, it may be argued that it constitutes
exploitation of their fame or goodwill in order to indicate that celebrity’s endorsement of that brand or
product. In Henderson v Radio Corporation Pvt Ltd the claimants succeeded in a suit for passing off
when the defendants wrongfully used their picture in a cover illustration. A few of the alleged brands
which capitalised on Sindhu’s victory in fact used her image alongside their brand logo in their posters
and social media posts without her consent which closely resembles the fact scenario of the above case.
Monthly Report
[ADP & Associates]
An Overview of the Internship Work
1. 8th March 2022 to 11th March 2022
In my first week of the Internship, I wrote an article on the topic of Pegasus Spyware. The reproduction
of which is stated below:
Pegasus Spyware: Privacy of People at Peril
Introduction
The right to privacy is innate and inherent to everyone. It is a fundamental human right to be left alone,
free of intrusion or disruption. "A state in which one is not watched or disturbed by other people,"
according to the Oxford English Dictionary, or "the state of being free from public attention." Article
21 of the Indian Constitution protects the right to privacy, which is an extension of the right to life and
personal liberty.However, as technology progresses, the operation of these rights has grown
increasingly difficult with the introduction of complex data storage and administration programmes.
Spyware is an example of a potentially dangerous technology that might intrude on one's privacy.
Spyware is malicious software that infiltrates a person's computer, mobile device, or other devices in
order to collect information about them and send it to a third party without their permission. This type
of dangerous software is designed to make money of stolen information. Spying is a violation of a
person's privacy, dignity, and freedom to exercise civic and political rights by exerting near-complete
control over his or her life. Spyware first appeared in the early 1990s and has since grown into a
booming industry with tens of thousands of users. Pegasus is currently the most widely used and
functional spyware in the world. The NSO Group (NSO stands for Niv, Shalev, and Omri, the
company's founders' names) produced Pegasus, a proprietary surveillance software developed in Israel.
Because it provides its developer or owner influence over the user devices, proprietary software does
not respect the freedom of its users.
How is the use of Pegasus Spyware against the Tenets of Privacy?
When spyware is put on a device, it immediately begins taking images, videos, and other digital data to
send to the criminal. It can even record calls and track a target's location while running the phone's
microphone and camera on its own and invisibly. The attacker can exploit this feature to listen in on
private and sensitive chats and relay them back to the user. Even a missed WhatsApp call could start a
chain of events that leads to the smartphone being hacked. This demonstrates that claims of end-to-end
encryption and security are false and speculative.
NSO Group insists on only licencing its spyware to approved government clients under the pretence of
combating international crime and terrorism. To do this, the company entered into its first partnership
with Mexico in 2011, while former President Felipe Calderon was still in power, and gave the
government its flagship product Pegasus, which is used to follow drug gangs. Pegasus assisted in the
arrest of Joaqun Guzmán alias El Chapo, a famous Sinaloa Cartel drug boss, in 2016 by gaining access
to his phone and tracking his travels. It's a good thing that this malware is being used to catch criminals
and terrorists. According to allegations from 17 news organisations, the NSO-made Pegasus spyware
was allegedly used to try to hack into the phones of political leaders in India, the United Arab Emirates,
Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Morocco, and Hungary, including heads of state, lawyers, activists, and
journalists. There has been evidence of Pegasus's mistreatment in the past. It was related to the
suspected hacking of Jeff Bezos' and journalist Jamal Khashoggi's phones by Saudi Arabia's crown
prince in 2018.
According to the Pegasus Project, Pegasus has been linked to the monitoring of roughly 300 Indian
phone lines, including those belonging to opposition leaders like Rahul Gandhi and leading journalists.
22 of these phones were forensically examined by Amnesty International, which was then peer-
reviewed by the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto. Ten of them were positively recognised as
Pegasus targets, while the other eight were unconfirmed. According to The Wire, the database includes
over 40 journalists, three prominent opposition leaders, one constitutional authority, two sitting
ministers in the Narendra Modi administration, current and former security chiefs and personnel, and
hundreds of business people.
Existing Privacy and Surveillance Related Laws in India
In India, there is no separate personal data protection law that protects personal data and information
submitted or acquired. The majority of the safeguards are dispersed throughout a slew of laws,
standards, and recommendations. The most essential clauses are found in the Information Technology
Act of 2000 (IT Act, 2000). The IT Act of 2000 is the primary law in India that governs electronic trade
and cybercrime. Section 72 of the IT Act is the only explicit clause dealing with privacy and
confidentiality breaches. Anyone who reveals the contents of any electronic record, register, book, or
other object without the approval of the person involved faces a two-year prison sentence, a fine of one
lakh rupees, or both under Section 72 of the IT Act, 2000.
Awful things can happen when sensitive information slips into the wrong hands. A security breach at a
government entity, for example, could provide unauthorised access to critical information. When it
comes to data privacy, it appears that users have every option available to them except the one they
want, which is data control. Understanding who collects data, where it is stored, how it is used, and
what can be done if the data is misused are all part of the Data Protection bill. There have been far too
many instances of personally identifiable information being misused, whether anonymised or not.
According to Canalys research, the data of nearly three-quarters of the adult population of the country
has been in threat since 2017. The majority of these intrusions took place while India pushed its IT
reforms, digitising various papers, and the risk of future incursions is certain to increase.
Data Protection Bill
With the increase of user-generated data and the ever-increasing industrial value of data, governments
must defend individual data rights more than ever. Personal data is safeguarded by data protection
regulations, which control the collection, use, transfer, and disclosure of such information. They also
give individuals access to their data and hold businesses that collect personal data accountable, as well
as providing remedies for unauthorised or harmful processing. This bill, however, has several flaws.
The PDP Bill creates a monopoly in which the state and its agencies will have exclusive access to all
personal and non-personal data. While it gives Indians main rights over their personal data, it also gives
the federal government exemptions that go against the norms of data processing. This bill safeguards
people's fundamental rights, including as their right to privacy and data protection, but it also allows
the government to process sensitive personal data as needed without the data owners' express approval.
Conclusion
In August 2017, the Supreme Court unanimously confirmed the right to privacy as a fundamental right
under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution in the landmark case of K. S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v.
Union of India and Others. The Supreme Court declared in this landmark decision that privacy is a
cornerstone and important component of future judicial battles over the government's surveillance
powers. India is a democratic nation with its people at its heart. When instances like Pegasus espionage
occur, citizens' fundamental rights are compromised. Surveillance in and of itself is a violation of
personal rights, and so breaches both Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution. Such an intervention
chills the populous, prompting people to practise self-censorship in the event that someone is listening.
As a result, it is vital to ensure that every individual has the right to regulate his or her personal data
and the ability to govern his or her own life, including the right to control one's own life and online
presence.

I was asked to do legal research on the legal enforceability of oral agreements and to make a note on it,
the reproduction of which is stated below:
Oral Contracts
Agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a
lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.
Nothing herein contained shall affect any law in force in [India], and not hereby expressly repealed, by
which any contract is required to be made in writing or in the presence of witnesses, or any law relating
to the registration of documents.
An oral contract by which the parties intend to be bound is valid and enforceable,unless required by
any other law to be in writing; but, oral contracts require clear and satisfactory evidence about
formation and contents
So from this section, we can conclude the following necessary things for making an Agreement a valid
contract:
I. Competent parties: Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority
according to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind and is not disqualified
from contracting by any law to which he is subject.
II. Free consent: Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by—
a. coercion,
b. undue influence
c. fraud,
d. misrepresentation,
e. mistake,
III. Lawful consideration and Lawful object: The consideration or object of an agreement is
lawful, unless—
a. it is forbidden by law; or
b. is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or
c. is fraudulent ; or
d. involves or implies, injury to the person or property of another; or
e. the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy
By fulfilling these 4 necessary requirements, an agreement becomes a contract under Section 10 of the
Act. Hence it can be understood that an agreement plus the essentials tabled in Section 10 will deem
the contract valid. Section 2(e) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 says that an Agreement is defined as
“every promise and every set of promises forming the consideration for each other”.
On the validity of oral agreements while dealing with several cases the courts recognised the
acceptability of oral agreements once they were found to be fulfilling the essentials provided in section
10. As we see in the case of Alka Bose vs. Parmatma Devi & Ors, the Supreme Court by coming to the
conclusion of the case observed that how oral agreements are valid. A sale agreement can be oral also
and valid. It is not necessary that agreement should be written, what is more important is that it should
be within the ambit of Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act. All oral and written agreements will be
valid if they fulfil the conditions specified in Section 10.
In the case of Aloka Bose v. Parmatma Devi the Supreme court observed that An agreement of sale
comes into existence when the vendor agrees to sell and the purchaser agrees to purchase, for an agreed
consideration on agreed terms. It can be oral. It can be by exchange of communications which may or
may not be signed. It may be by a single document signed by both parties. It can also be by a document
in two parts, each party signing one copy and then exchanging the signed copy as a consequence of
which the purchaser has the copy signed by the vendor and a vendor has a copy signed by the
purchaser. Or it can be by the vendor executing the document and delivering it to the purchaser who
accepts it.
In the case of S.V. Narayanaswamy vs. Savithramma Karnataka High Court, appellant successfully
proved the existence of an oral agreement. The appellant filed the case for specific performance of sale
agreement. The sale agreement was oral in nature. Appellant showed the cheques given by the
respondent for the consideration of the subject matter. Respondent willfully acted towards the
agreement. Even from the witnesses who were examined, it was clear that there was an agreement
between the appellant and respondent. After considering the shreds of evidence produced by the
appellant, the court held that there was an oral agreement between the two. The cheques were shown as
an evidence that entire considerable amount was paid. This clearly proves the oral agreement.
Then in the case of T Jayaram Naidu vs. Yasodha and Ors Madras High Court, the case was for relief
of specific performance. The court by referring Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act said that even
oral agreement for sale is valid and also enforceable through court. The main point is that the burden of
proof lies on the person claiming the right to prove the existence of such agreement. In this case,
appellant failed to establish that there was an oral agreement. It is necessary that for proving the
existence of an oral agreement, a person should have some evidence to prove it, whether by a witness
or anything. Appellants also failed to furnish the date of oral agreement on the reply notice which was
sent by them to the respondents. This could have been the evidence but appellants were unable to do so.
Hence it is held that there was no oral agreement.
In the case of Y V Narasimha Sarma vs. Soorampalli Appalaraju held that it is not necessary that a
contract should be written only, an oral contract is also valid. Under section 54 of Transfer of Property
Act, an oral sale of a contract is true and valid. It is upon the plaintiff who has filed the case to prove
that oral agreement is true. He has to show a true evidence in support of his contention. It is true that
written contract has some valid authenticity, but if there is some oral agreement of sale, one has to
prove it with sufficient evidence. Court also has to scrutinize the matter very carefully to come to any
conclusion.
Then in the case of Sheela Gehlot vs. Sonu Kochar & Ors Delhi High Court observed that oral
agreements are valid and enforceable and there could be no dispute about it. Until there is anything
which needed to be written, an oral agreement will enforce. Further for a contract, there has to be some
proposal and acceptance. And for the oral agreement, there should be some circumstances surrounding
the alleged oral agreement. No one can question the oral agreement as invalid.
This was substantiated by the Delhi High Court, in the case of Nanak Builders and Investors Pvt. Ltd.
vs. Vinod Kumar Alag, whereby the Court held that even an oral agreement can be a valid and
enforceable contract. Therefore, in the strict sense, it is not essential that a contract must be in writing,
unless specified by law or the parties themselves contemplate the reduction of terms of agreement to
writing.
In my second week of the Internship at ADP & Associates, I wrote an article on homosexuality, the
reproduction of which is stated below:
Homosexuality and the Law
Introduction
Science has reached an agreement on homosexuality, stating that a person's attraction to people of the
same sex or gender is natural. They are neither compelled or persuaded by anyone, and their feelings
are instinctive. They are based on inbreeding. Our forefathers and mothers, on the other hand, could not
embrace or comprehend the concept of this unchangeable sex. This lack of clarity has resulted in the
devastation of the youth, who are now experiencing self-doubt. As a result, discussing it with parents
and children is frowned upon. As a result of society's suppression of LGBTQ rights, such persons are
distressed and experience emotional breakdowns. Many families reject their children for this reason,
and the children suffer from serious mental and emotional problems as a result. Families are concerned
about what others would think if their children are gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Society holds them in low
regard.
Homosexuality vis-á-vis Constitutional Law
St. Peter Damian coined the phrase LGBTQ to explain the term "Sodomy," which is a short term for
"Sin of Sodom," alluding to the Genesis tale of the males who tried to have intercourse with two angels
and became obsessed with blindness. In the year 1050, this was provided. William Blacksmith, a well-
known scholar, overruled this. He took sodomy in a really obnoxious manner. For his ideas, he enacted
anti-sodomy legislation and wielded considerable power in the British colonies. As a result, section 377
of the Indian Penal Code was enacted, which was initiated by Lord Macaulay and was regarded as the
country's most conservative view.
The Naz Foundation, a non-governmental organisation dedicated to the prevention of AIDS and the
upliftment of bisexual minorities, is a well-known case that went against section 377 of the Indian
Penal Code. In the year 2001, a campaign to change this clause was launched. Furthermore, the Delhi
High Court knocked down section 377 of the Indian Constitution, which authorised harmonious sexual
actions of adults in private, stating that it infringed the fundamental rights of life and liberty, as well as
the right to equality, as stated in articles 21 and 14. It also went against the Indian Constitution's article
15(1), which states that no one can be discriminated against on the basis of sex or gender.
The Naz Foundation also argued that the LGBTQ community's fundamental rights under Article 19
were being violated because they were unable to move freely as they desired. Then, on September 6,
2018, a five-judge bench led by Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra sullied section 377 of the Indian
Penal Code in the well-known case of Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India. This was done to
acknowledge the people's bisexual nature in the books of law and to give them a social position.
Minorities and animals are protected by the law against sexual assaults. The law establishes that
minorities and animals are protected from sexual assaults. Section 377 cites the unnatural offence, and
those who violate it will face life imprisonment or a minimum of 10 years in prison, with the possibility
of life imprisonment. As a result, section 377 makes it plain that acts that are against the nature of the
law, whether heterosexual or homosexual, would be regarded criminal. Following this decision, it was
stated that all people should be treated equally, and the state should adhere to constitutional morality.
As a result of these investigations, the gay community's belief grew stronger, and it was certain that the
gay community link must exist. Michel Foucault's work "The History of Sexuality Appetites"
enlightened people's minds about sexual desires. Sexual desires are the ones that are in us and have the
desire to find the truth, according to that book. Sexual desires aid in the discovery of our sexual
identities. It has been viewed as a political and social issue that has been utilised to oppress the LGBTQ
community because of their differences.
Various human rights development programmes have been performed on a global scale on numerous
occasions. When it comes to LGBT rights, though, the situation is far more dangerous. The United
Nations Declaration on Human Rights, which protects all human rights, included no mention of LGBT
rights since homosexuality was deemed a mental disease at the time it was formed. “In 2003, the State
of Brazil presented a resolution to the UN Commission on Human Rights to affirm rights based on
sexual orientation.” However, the proposal was deferred to 2004 and faced a dead end when, it expired
from the UN agenda in 2005. In 2005, New Zealand’s statement supporting the rights of these sexual
minorities was backed by 32 states in the UN, but did not result in a formal vote.
According to the Special Marriage Act, any Indian citizen or foreign national can marry anyone,
regardless of caste, creed, sex, or religion. There have been no such acts for the same-sex, but the apex
court will have to deal with it eventually. Despite the fact that multiple petitions have been filed before
the Supreme Court, the situation has not altered. Marriage is significant because it is founded on a love
tie and commitments. As a result, the community should maintain their optimism and persevere in their
efforts.
Conclusion
By examining the entire problem, we can see that society should help the LGBTQ community rather
than being the cause of people's emotional and mental breakdowns. Society should be open enough to
accept and respect the decisions of those who are born with disabilities. People should strive to be the
best versions of themselves while maintaining sound morality. They should be treated like everyone
else, not as if they were aliens from society. Whether or not we assimilate such variation in ourselves is
determined by our biological matrix, which is reinforced by our character strength. However, just as we
have the freedom to accept or reject this variation, the LGBT community should have the same
freedom. To them, what society considers normal could just as easily be a variety. As a result,
criminalising homosexuality is not a viable option. The goal is to keep a robust, liberal, and healthy
attitude toward all members of society.
4. 21st March 2022 to 24th March 2022
Cinematograph Bill
Films have always been a popular form of entertainment in India. Bollywood is one of the world's
major film industries, with around 1800 films released each year in a variety of languages. I They are
the only forms of expression in India that have been found to be valid prior to censorship and prior
constraint. [ii] Under the Constitution, pre-censorship is considered unconstitutional for other types of
expression. [iii] The Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) is authorised under the
Cinematograph Act to recommend cuts or restraints on a film's exhibition. [iv]
Many films have been subjected to protracted legal battles that have reached the Supreme Court. Many
of these disagreements have stemmed from concerns of outright vulgarity, profanity, and sensitive
political and humanitarian topics. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting issued a notice
proposing modifications to the quinquagenarian Cinematograph Act in June 2021. [v] The proposed
amendment, which directly addresses the state's revisionary powers, has generated concerns about the
Constitution's creative freedoms and rights to free speech and expression.
Proposed Amendment of Concern
The proposed modification, which has sparked fears of "super-censorship," is related to the Central
Government's revisionary powers. [vi] The Central Government has been given the authority to prevent
the screening of a film that has previously been approved by the CBFC. If the Union Government
believes the film does not comply with the guidelines set out in Section 5B (1) of the Cinematograph
Act, it will be able to do so. These limitations are analogous to Article 19(2) of the Indian
Constitution's restrictions on freedom of expression. Section 6(1) of the Cinematograph Act contains
the clause relating to revisional rights. These limitations are analogous to Article 19(2) of the Indian
Constitution's restrictions on freedom of expression. Section 6(1) of the Cinematograph Act contains
the clause relating to revisional rights. In KM Shankarappa v. Union of India, the Karnataka High
Court struck down this provision. [vii] In this case, the petitioner argued that Section 6(1) is
unconstitutional since it grants the Central Government the ability to overturn any decision made by the
Tribunal.
The petitioner went on to say that the presence of such a provision is unconstitutional in law. The
Supreme Court (SC) later affirmed the Karnataka High Court's decision, calling it a farce of the rule of
law, which is enshrined in the Constitution's core framework. The Supreme Court further declared that
the legislature cannot ignore a judicial order issued by any tribunal without implementing appropriate
legislation. As a result, the Ministry of Broadcasting noted in the notification, citing the Shankarappa
decision, that the legislature can nullify the order through legislative action. This is significant because
the legislature can choose to disregard a judicial declaration by passing laws repealing it.
Any film that is submitted to the CBFC for consideration goes through a lengthy and complicated
procedure of review, document filing, translated versions, and so on. The final step before a film is
released for public viewing is its certification. The certificate issued by the CBFC will no longer be the
final authority after this revision. The government now has the authority to impose restrictions on film
distribution. If this power is misused, it might have a negative impact on the film business. Films have
recently been analysed for the prevalence of profanity, decency, morality, and obscenity. "One man's
vulgarity is another man's song," Justice Harlan once famously quipped about obscenity. [viii] In the
well-known Bandit Queen case, the Supreme Court ruled that the overall impact of the picture should
be examined rather than individual elements of the film that were significant to the storyline and
intended to have an impression on the audience. [ix] The interpretation of "sovereignty and security"
may result in extensive censorship of films based on historical events, current events, or sensitive
subjects.
Films have the ability to influence public opinion. Bollywood has produced a number of films that are
based on and intended to address current situations. A couple of these films have been scrutinised by
the CBFC and have sparked debate in the film industry. The dispute surrounding the film 'Udta Punjab,'
which was initially outright prohibited by the CBFC due to 'excessive profanity, abusive language, and
drug consumption,' but was ultimately permitted after around 90 changes. Films have the power to
sway public opinion. Bollywood has produced a lot of films that are based on contemporary events and
are intended to address them. The CBFC has examined a few of these films, which have stirred
criticism in the film industry. The controversy surrounding the film 'Udta Punjab,' which was initially
banned by the CBFC owing to 'excessive vulgarity, harsh language, and drug consumption,' but was
eventually approved after approximately 90 revisions. The amendment will only make things more
difficult for filmmakers. The Film Certificate Appellate Tribunal (FCAT) was a valuable resource for
the film industry when it came to resolving disputes. The abolition of this tribunal, on the other hand,
was a further setback for the sector.
Abolishment of the FCAT
The Tribunal Reforms Ordinance of 2021 made a significant alteration to the Cinematograph Act,
replacing the phrase "tribunal" with "high court." The FCAT was practically abolished as a result of
this. The Film Certification Appellate Tribunal (FCAT) was a quasi-judicial organisation tasked with
resolving disputes about film certification. The FCAT played a critical role in defending filmmakers'
right to free speech and preserving their interests. Filmmakers fear that now that the FCAT is no longer
in existence, their difficulties and challenges will be overlooked. A tribunal's objective is to deliver
rapid justice in cases where a decision must be made promptly.
In terms of chronology, the FCAT was abolished long before the Cinematograph Act was intended to
be changed. To put it another way, the dedicated quasi-judicial authority that could defend the interests
of filmmakers was disbanded, and the Central Government was given the last say. Filmmakers can take
their objections to the High Court, but many are unconvinced that the High Courts would be able to
comprehend and protect their interests, especially when High Courts around the country are
overburdened with cases that have yet to be heard.
The Supreme Court held in KM Shankarrapa that a decision by a quasi-judicial body formed by the
government, namely FCAT, is binding on the government. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that
the government could not use its revisionary powers to intervene and overturn an FCAT ruling. The
government cannot intervene if an expert body has appraised a film and its influence on the general
population. As a result, in this scenario, the CBFC will evaluate a film using the principles set forth in
Section 5B (1) of the Act. They can also guess on the film's impact on an audience, as well as its
immediate reaction and other key factors. Because there will be no quasi-judicial body to keep the
administration in check, the proposed change could make it exceedingly easy for the government to
exercise its revisionary powers because it will no longer be subject to judicial proclamation. The
proposal to eliminate the tribunal has endangered the judiciary's independence by giving the Central
Government broad and arbitrary powers. This extends beyond the Constitution's supremacy, basic
framework, equal protection of the law, and separation of powers.
Conclusion
The planet has progressed from its previous state. People today are hungry for new ideas and unique art
forms. Films are more than just a business, and they deserve to be protected in the same way that other
kinds of expression do. Cinema limitations should be made more free in such a modern society, but
recent revisions and advances suggest the reverse. Government intervention in movies and the media
has long been frowned upon. Mrs. Leela Samson, for example, resigned as CBFC chief, alleging
government pressure and corruption as grounds. As a result, Mr. Pahlaj Nehlani's tumultuous term
exemplifies how government intervention may be disastrous for the film sector.
The most recent revisions are against Shankarappa's ideas. The judiciary examines decisions made by
the legislature and the executive branch, not the other way around. The elimination of the FCAT and
subsequent amendments to the Cinematograph Act impose arbitrary limits on film expression and give
the Central Government broad powers, which is illegal and requires reevaluation. It is past time for film
to be treated similarly to other forms of expression.
5.25th & 26th March 2022

I was asked to make a short note on Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the reproduction of
Note on Order XXXVII CPC
 Rule 1
 Summary suits should be instituted in High Courts, City Civil Courts, Courts of small
causes or any other court notified by the High Court
 Summary suits could be instituted only in matters of specified documents such as
promissory notes, bills of exchange or hundies
 In case of summary suits, plaintiff should seek to recover a debt through a written
contract only
 The sum which is sought to be recovered must be fixed
 The nature of the sum must be of a debt or a guarantee
 Rule 2
 Suit must be instituted by presenting a plaint
 It shall contain a specific averment that the suit is filed under this Order
 Relief claimed must fall within the ambit of this rule
 Title must contain the order no.
 Summons- Form 4 Appendix B
 Defendant must enter an appearance. In case of failure, plaint shall be admitted, and
plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree for a sum, not exceeding the one which is
mentioned in summons, along with interest.
 Rule 3
 It mentions about the procedure of the appearance of the defendant
 As and when the notice is served on the address given by the defendant, he must enter
an appearance in the Court within 10 days of the service.
 On the date of appearance, the defendant must serve a notice of his appearance to the
plaintiff.
 After defendant’s appearance, plaintiff must serve summons for judgment in Form No.
4A in Appendix B- returnable not less than 10 days from the service date and it must
contain-
 cause of action
 amount claimed
 affidavit stating that he believes there is no defence to the suit
 Within 10 days of the service of the summons, defendant must apply for leave to defend, leave
to defend could be granted either unconditionally or with certain conditions. Leave to defend
can be rejected in case the defence is-
 unsubstantial
 frivolous
 vexatious
 If it is admitted by the defendant that the amount is due from him, leave to defend
will not be granted till the time he doesn’t deposit the admitted amount in the Court
 If defendant has not applied for leave to defend, plaintiff will be entitled to a decree straight
away
 If leave to defend is granted to the defendant, he must deposit some security in the Court
 Delay could be condoned in case the defendant shows some sufficient cause.
6.28th March 2022 to 31st March 2022
Hijab Controversy and the Law
Introduction
It's an ancient saying that the way you pose a question will determine the answer you give yourself.
That giveaway can be found on page 39 of today's Karnataka high court order maintaining a ban on the
wearing of the hijab in classrooms, where the Full Bench poses four questions for discussion. The
second question is as follows:
“Whether prescription of school uniform is not legally permissible, as being violative of petitioners
Fundamental Rights inter alia guaranteed under Articles, 19(1)(a), (i.e., freedom of expression) and
21, (i.e., privacy) of the Constitution?” [Emphasis supplied]
It's worth noting that the court asks itself a question that no one else has asked, and that no one could
ask, given how ridiculous the topic is: whether a school uniform is unconstitutional in and of itself.
However, that framing permits the court to elide the essential point – that wearing the hijab with a
school uniform is consistent with the greater purposes of constitutionalism and education – in favour of
the uniform's purity. On every page of the judgement, the uniform haunts the court's imagination,
culminating in the astonishing remark on page 88, when the court states that "no reasonable mind can
envisage a school without a uniform." The judgment's unstated premise is that the right to wear the
hijab is a claim against the fundamental concept of a school uniform, and that granting the former
would lead to the destruction of the latter. Respectfully, this omission causes the court to misconstrue
and misapply a number of well-established constitutional principles, and the verdict should be reversed
on appeal.
To begin with, a short recap: the court's decision to uphold the hijab ban is based on three constitutional
grounds. The first is that wearing the hijab is not a "essential religious practise" under Islam, and thus is
not immune from state regulation; the second is that to the extent that wearing the hijab is an aspect of
freedom of expression or the right to privacy, the ban is a reasonable restriction on the exercise of those
rights; and the third is that the government order under challenge is facially neutral and non-sectarian
(i.e., does not discriminate based on religion); and finally, because the government.
Essential Religious Practices
I don't want to linger too long on the first point. I've previously written about why framing the
argument in terms of the essential religious practises test is unsatisfactory, not least because it denies
Muslim women any agency in the matter, and essentially argues that wearing the hijab is not a matter
of choice (no matter how situated, complex, or otherwise messy the context of that choice may be), but
is objectively compelled by Islamic tenets.
The court concludes that the petitioners have failed to prove that wearing the hijab is vital to Islam —
that it is necessary, non-optional, and that Islam would lose its essence if women did not wear it. These
are the general contours of the examination under the essential religious practises doctrine (leaving
aside the fact that, as most people have pointed out, neither the court nor external observers are
especially well-positioned to conduct this study). After establishing this, the court can conclude that the
right to wear the hijab is not protected from governmental restriction as a matter of religious freedom.
Of course, there is a flaw in the approach in that it effectively denies Muslim women the chance to
frame their case in terms of religious choice, forcing them to argue in terms of religious coercion
instead. This is especially amusing when we consider the right as a "right to religious freedom"; the
fault, however, lies squarely with the basic religious practises test as it has evolved over the previous
seventy years, and it is evident that there is no way out of this conundrum unless that criteria is
overridden.
Freedom of Expression and Privacy
Let us now turn to the point in which, in my humble opinion, the court's analysis is incorrect. The
freedom of expression and the right to privacy have already been discussed on this site as fundamental
rights implicated by this case. To summarise the reasoning, the Supreme Court concluded in NALSA v
Union of India that dress might be a form of "symbolic expression" that is protected by Article 19(1)(a)
of the constitution on some circumstances and depending on the context (why it should be treated as
such in this case has been argued in the linked posts). It is also clear that the right to privacy is applied
in terms of decisional autonomy. It's worth noting that the reasons for freedom of expression and
privacy aren't always neatly separated from the arguments for religious liberty: in certain
circumstances, it's possible that wearing the hijab is a kind of symbolic expression because it's worn to
defend a besieged identity.
Following the activation of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, the analysis shifts to
constraints, which are subject to the proportionality test. Proportionality demands the state to use the
least restrictive approach to achieve its objectives, among other considerations. As a result, where
something less than a ban would suffice, a ban is excessive. When dealing with situations regarding
dress rules and uniforms, the proportionality framework provides the broad intellectual scaffolding
under which numerous countries around the world, including India in the NALSA verdict, have
adopted the standard of reasonable accommodation.
Reasonable accommodation requires the court to consider whether, in the presence of a default, a
specific claim for deviating from that default, based on constitutional rights, may be properly
accommodated by the state (or a private party) without the activity losing its character. The claim for
reasonable accommodation in the case of the hijab is straightforward: that wearing the hijab (especially
hijab that is the same colour as the uniform and is draped over the head like a shawl) can be
accommodated alongside the uniform without harming or vitiating the overall public goal of education.
Previously, thorough arguments were made on this blog regarding how the hijab ban violates the
constitutional provision of non-discrimination. The court just briefly considers this point, noting simply
that the proscription – which was based on a government directive – was facially neutral and non-
sectarian. Unfortunately, while this reasoning holds true in the case of direct discrimination, it does not
hold true in the case of indirect discrimination, in which seemingly neutral rules and regulations have
disproportionate effects on various groups. The Supreme Court has long recognised the idea of indirect
discrimination, and it is now part of Indian law. Indeed, the court's own analysis – particularly its
distinction of the South African case – demonstrates how indirect discrimination is plainly applicable in
this case. The court's distinction between "ocularly insignificant" and (presumably) "ocularly
significant" is a classic example of a "facially neutral rule" (which, in the court's interpretation, would
allow "ocularly insignificant" adornments to a uniform but not others) that has a disproportionate
impact, in this case, grounded at the intersection of religion and burden). The court's omission to
address this ground at all, in my opinion, presents even another compelling reason why this judgement
should be reversed on appeal.
Conclusion
The first is that the court expressly states that its decision is applicable to schools (i.e., not even school
premises, but classrooms). It expressly mentions this on page 124, following some quite unpleasant
remarks about how outlawing the headgear is emancipatory "for women in general, and Muslim
women in particular," in my opinion. Second, I believe that the judgement is erroneous for the reasons
stated above, and that it should be overturned on appeal. It is incorrect for the following reasons: first,
it incorrectly assumes that the rights to freedom of expression and privacy are diminished, or
derivative, in this case; second, it misapplies the reasonable accommodation test, failing to show how
allowing the hijab as a uniform accessory is incompatible with the goal of education; third, it fails to
consider that the ban amounts to indirect discrimination against Muslim women; and fourth, it fails to
consider that the ban amounts to indirect discrimination against Muslim women. This results in an
overarching structure of thinking in which the sanctity of the uniform is prioritised over both
educational purposes and constitutional rights. A proper calibration, in my opinion, requires us to
recognise that educational settings in a plural and diverse society should represent that plurality and
diversity, and that facilitating freedom of choice and expression is one important way to do so. This
approach is more in line with our founding documents.
7. 1st April, 2nd April & 4th April 2022

Executed research and made a comprehensive note on the requirement of trade license for hotels
in Rajasthan
Trade License for Hotels in Rajasthan

 Rajasthan Tourism Trade (Facilitation and Regulation) Act, 2010
 Section 2(q)- "service provider" shall include hotels, heritage hotels, motels, restaurants,
dhabas, Paying Guest 1-louses, handicraft shops or emporiums, travel agents, tour
operators, excursion agents, travel transport agencies, taxi-cabs, Guides and similar service
providers who are providing services to the tourists whether they are recognized and
registered as such or not by the prescribed authority;
 Section 3- Expert Committee for setting out norms, standard and general principles
for recognition and registration of service providers. –
(1) For the purpose of ensuring that services provided by service providers to the tourists
are of acceptable standard, the State Government shall appoint a Committee to set out
standards for service providers of various categories.
(2) After considering the recommendation of the Committee referred to in sub-section (1),
the State Government shall declare standards and norms for recognition and registration
of service providers and general principles governing such recognition and registration
by framing and publishing a scheme of recognition and registration for general
information. The scheme shall also classify the norms and standards, contravention of
which shall be deemed minimal, graver or gravest for the purposes of Section 4.
 Section 4- Recognition and registration of service providers, their obligations and
consequences of non-adherence to norms and conditions of recognition. –
(1) Any service provider operating or intending to operate as a service provider in the State,
if and when desire to have itself/himself recognized by the Department of Tourism of
the State, may apply to the prescribed authority in such manner and in such form as may
be provided in the scheme framed under Section 3.
(2) Every application presented under sub-section (1) shall be disposed of by the prescribed
authority within ninety days from the date of receipt thereof.
(3) The prescribed authority shall, unless the application is rejected and recognition and
registration is disallowed or refused, record particulars of the concerned service provider
in the prescribed register of service providers which are recognized and registered as
such. The register shall contain such particulars and shall be maintained in such form as
may be prescribed.
(4) Whenever the application of a service provider is allowed and registered under sub-
section (3), the prescribed authority shall issue a certificate of recognition and
registration, in such form and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed.
(5) Where any application is rejected under sub-section (3), the prescribed authority shall
record reasons thereof and communicate the same, in writing, to the applicant:
Provided that no application for recognition and registration shall be rejected or refused
unless the applicant is heard and reasonable opportunity of being heard is afforded to
him in the matter.
(6) Every service provider who is recognized and registered under this Section shall be
under an obligation to maintain the requisite standard and follow the norms of trade
specified under the scheme framed and published under Section 3.
(7) When any service provider fails to maintain the requisite standard of services provided
by him or to comply with the norms of the trade or services offered and make default in
discharging responsibility as recognized service provider as set out for him in the
scheme made and published under Section 3, then such service provider shall, besides
being liable for imposition of penalty not exceeding the amount specified for each
category of service providers in the schedule, be derecognised and his name shall be
struck off from the register and his certificate of recognition and registration shall be
cancelled.
Provided that before imposing penalty and/or derecognising, cancelling registration of any
service provider after striking off his name from the register, the prescribed authority
shall serve a notice upon him calling him to show cause as to why the purported action
should not be taken against him and afford him a reasonable opportunity of being heard
in the matter.
(8) Where the non-adherence to norms and standards is found to be minimal, the prescribed
authority may, instead of proceeding against the service provider under sub-section (7),
censure the service provider and ask him to be careful in future and where the breach of
norms is graver, the prescribed authority, instead of proceeding under sub-section (7),
impose upon the defaulting service provider a penalty, not exceeding the amount
specified in the Schedule appended to this Act :
Provided that action under sub-section (7), may he taken only in such of the cases of
default where violations of norms and standards are gravest and where situation does not
improve even after censuring and/or penalizing the service provider.
(9) The register containing names and particulars of service providers shall constantly be
maintained, updated and shall be available on the website of the Department of Tourism
of the State Government for information of tourists and people in general and may also
be published in Newspapers, other periodicals as also through other modes, at such
intervals, as the Commissioner of the Department of Tourism may consider appropriate.
 Schedule- [See sub-section (7) of Section 4]
Categories of service providers Amount of penalty which

may be imposed for non-
adherence to standard
1. Hotel—
(a) having upto 40 rooms Rupees 10,000/-
(b) having more than 40 rooms Rupees 20,000/-
2. Motel— Rupees 10,000/-
3. Heritage Hotel—
(a) basic Rupees 10,000/-
(b) classic and grant Rupees 20,000/-
4. Tour operator or Travel Agency Rupees 20, 000/-
5. Excursion Agent or Elephant, Horse, Camel Safari Rupees 15,000/-
Operator
6. Restaurant or Cafeteria Rupees 5,000/-
7. Handicraft Emporium Rupees Rupees 25,000/-
8. Tourist Village Operator Rupees 10,000/-
9. Ropeway Service Provider Rupees 25, 000/-
10. Amusement Park Operator Rupees 25,000/-
11. (a) Government of India approved Guide Rupees 10,000/-
(b) State Level Guide Rupees 5,000/-
(c) Local Level Guide Rupees 5,000/-
12. Any other service providers Rupees 5,000/-

Note:- The above penalty is for first offence. For second offence the amount of penalty shall be
doubled. For other subsequent offence the licences of operation shall be forfeited.
 Section 14- Duties of local authorities towards public health and sanitation etc. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any Rajasthan Law, the local authorities under
whose local areas, the places of tourist destination or tourist areas are situate, shall have
the duty to ensure cleanliness and check defacement and defiling of the properties in
their respective local areas as also to effectively enforce the laws prohibiting littering on
streets and public places and to maintain general cleanliness at all roads, streets and
public places and therefore, it is hereby declared their statutory duty to keep all places
and areas of tourist destination, clean and hygienic and concerned local authorities shall
ensure cleaning of roads, drains, main-holes and maintenance of Street lights and
prevention of encroachments in and around those places and heritage sites in respective
areas, which are known as tourist area or an area frequented by tourists.
(2) The State Government, in the Department of Urban Development shall oversee the
compliance of provisions contained in sub-section (1) and may issue directions to the
concerned local authorities for strict compliance of their statutory duty and in cases of
persistent non-compliance and default, initiate action against erring local authorities in
accordance with the laws governing such local authorities.
 Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009

 269. Licensing markets, slaughter-houses and certain business. –
(1) It shall be lawful for the Municipality to direct that no place not belonging to or vested in
it, shall be used for the purposes specified in clause (j) of sub-Section (1) of Section 340
except under and in accordance with the conditions of a licence from the Municipality
which may from time to time grant, suspend, withhold or withdraw such licences either
generally or in individual cases.
(2) Whoever uses or permits the use of any place contrary to such direction, without the
licence required as aforesaid, or in contravention of any of the conditions or during the
suspension or after the withdrawal of such licence shall be punished with fine which shall
not be less than one thousand rupees but which may extend to two thousand rupees.
(3) Upon a conviction being obtained in respect of any place under sub-Section (2) of this
Section, the Magistrate shall on the application of the Municipality, but not otherwise, order
such place to be closed, and thereupon appoint persons or take other steps to prevent such
place being so used and every person who so uses or permits the use of place after it has
been so ordered to be closed shall be punished with fine which shall not be less than fifty
rupees but which may extend to one hundred rupees for each day during which he continues
so to use, or permits such use of the place after it has been so ordered to be closed.
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Municipality under sub-Section (1) granting,
suspending, withholding or withdrawing any licence may, within thirty days of the such
order exclusive of the time requisite for obtaining a copy thereof appeal to the Collector and
the order of the Appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in
any Court.
 Section 340- Power of Municipality to make bye-laws. –
(1) Every Municipality may, from time to time, make bye-laws not inconsistent with this Act
and the rules made thereunder
(a) for regulating the payments from the municipal fund;
(b) for prescribing all matters relating to the imposition, levy, assessment and collection of
user charges under Section 104;
(c) for prescribing the form of and the manner of keeping of maps, drawings and
description of underground utilities and maps of fire hydrants and sewerage manholes;
(d) for regulating the permission for temporary erection of a booth or any other structure
on any public place;
(e) for prescribing the terms and conditions subject to which the precautions to be taken
during construction or repair of street, drain or premise;
(f) for regulating the erection of all kind of buildings;
(g) for determining the technical qualifications and experience for the person seeking
licence to act as a plumber;
(h) for regulating the projections of the building under Section 192;
(i) for the regulation and inspection of markets, public places used for the sale of articles
and slaughter houses, all places used by or for animals which are for sale or hire, or the
produce of which is sold, and for the proper and clean conduct of business therein; for
regulating the sale of fruits and vegetables in the municipal markets or other charges to
be levied for the use of any of them which belong to the Municipality;
(j) prescribing the conditions on or subject to which, and the circumstances in which, and
the areas or localities in respect of which, licences may be granted, refused, suspended
or withdrawn for the use of any place not belonging to the Municipality
(i) as a slaughter house;
(ii) as a market or shop for the sale of animals intended for human food, or of meat,
or of fish, or as a market for the sale of fruits or vegetables;
(iii) for any of the purposes mentioned in Section 282;
(iv) as a dairy, hotel, restaurant, eating-house, coffee-house, sweet, meat-shop,
bakery, camping-ground, sarai, dhobi-ghat, flour mill, sawmill, ice-candy
factory, food grain-godown, Municipality house, lodging-house (other than a
students' hostel under public or recognized control) or for manufacturing ice or
aerated water;
(v) as a place for the preparation or manufacture of oil;
(vi) for parching grain or Bengal grain on a large scale; or
(vii) for any other purpose for which the issuing of a licence may be prescribed,
and providing for the inspection and regulation of the conduct of business in any
place used as aforesaid, so as to secure cleanliness therein or to minimize any
injurious, offensive or dangerous effect arising or likely to arise therefrom;
(k) prohibiting the stabling or herding of horses, camels, donkeys, sheep or goats,
otherwise than in accordance with such rules prescribed in such bye-laws in regard to
the number thereof, and the places to be used for the purpose, as may be necessary to
prevent danger to the public health;
(l) (i) for the inspection of milk cattle; and prescribing and regulating the construction,
dimensions, ventilation, lighting, cleansing, drainage and water-supply of dairies and
cattle-sheds in the occupation of persons following the trade of dairymen or milk sellers;
(ii) for securing the cleanliness of milk-stores, milk-shops and vessels used by
milksellers or butter-men for milk or butter;
(m) for the registration of births, deaths and marriages, and the taking of a census within
the Municipality and for enforcing the supply of such information as may be necessary
to make such registration or census effective;
(n) regulating the disposal of the dead and of the carcasses of dead animals and the
maintenance of all places for the purpose in good order and in a safe sanitary condition,
due regard being had to the religious usages of the community or Section of the
community entitled to the use of such places for the disposal of the dead;
(o) enforcing the supply of information as to any cases of dangerous disease, and
carrying out the provisions of Section 273;
(p) enforcing the supply of such information by inhabitants of the Municipality as may
be necessary to ascertain their respective liabilities to any tax imposed therein;
(q) regulating the use of public bathing and washing places within municipal limits;
(r) regulating sanitation and conservancy;
(s) regulating the conditions for the construction, sue and disposal of houses intended for
the homeless under sub-clause (c) of clause (iv) of Section 46;
(t) regulating the conditions on which permission may be given for the temporary
occupation of, or the creation of temporary structures on public streets, or for
projections over public streets;
(u) regulating the structure and dimensions of plinths, walls, foundations, floors, roofs
and chimneys of new buildings for the purpose of securing stability and the prevention
of fires and for purposes of health;
(v) regulating the erection or use of buildings for grain shops or grain stores, the use of
sites for erection of buildings and, in localities intended for residential purposes, the
erection or use of buildings for shops, market places, manufacturing, places of public
resort or for any other purpose;
(w) preventing the erection of building without adequate provision being made for the
laying out and location of streets;
(x) ensuring the adequate ventilation of buildings by the provision and maintenance of
sufficient open space either internal or external and of doors and windows and other
means for securing a free circulation of air;
(y) regulating, in any other particular manner not specially provided for in this Act, the
construction, maintenance and control of drains, sewers, ventilation shafts, receptacles
for dung and manure, cess-pools, water-closets, privies, latrines, urinals and drainage or
sewage works of every description, whether the property of the Municipality or not;
(z) determining the conditions, restrictions, norms and specifications for all kinds of
constructions looking to the local need for the purpose of operation of Section 194 and
Section 236 in conformity with the directions issued and restrictions prescribed if any,
from time to time, by the State Government;
(za) prohibiting the transit of any vehicles of such form, construction, weight or size, or
laden with such machinery or other unwieldy objects as may be deemed likely to cause
injury to the roadway or any construction thereon, or risk or obstruction to other
vehicles or to pedestrians, along or over any street, except under such conditions as to
time, mode of traction or locomotion, use of appliances for protection of the roadway,
number of lights and assistants and other general precautions as may be prescribed,
either generally in such bye-laws or in special licences to be granted in each case upon
such terms as to time of application and payment of fees therefore as may be prescribed
in such bye-laws;
(zb) securing the protection of public parks, gardens and open spaces, vested in or under
the control of the Municipality from injury or misuse, regulating their management and
the manner in which they may be used by the public, and providing for the proper
behaviour of persons in them;
(zc) regulating or prohibiting any description of traffic in the streets and providing .or
the reduction of noise caused thereby;
(zd) rendering licences necessary for the proprietors or drivers of vehicles or animals
kept or plying for hire within the limits of the Municipality, and fixing the fees payable
for such licences and the conditions on which they are to be granted and may be
revoked;
(ze) limiting the rates which may be demanded for the hire of any carriage, cart or other
conveyance or of any animals hired to carry loads or persons, or for the service of
persons hired to carry loads or to impel or carry such conveyance, and limiting the loads
which may be carried by any animal, or carriage, cart, or other conveyance, plying for
hire, within the limits of the Municipality;
(zf) for the licensing, inspection and proper regulation of places of public resort,
recreation or amusement;
(zg) regulating the posting of bills and advertisements, and the position, size, shape and
style of sign-posts;
(zh) rendering licences necessary for hand-carts employed for transport, or hawking
articles for sale, and for, the persons using such hand-carts, and prescribing the
Conditions for the grant and revocation of such licences;
(zi) generally for the regulation of all matters relating to municipal administration; -and
every Municipality may prescribe fine for the infringement of any such bye-laws.
(2) Every Municipality shall, before making any bye-laws under this Section, publish, in
such manner as shall in its opinion be sufficient, for the information of persons likely to
be affected thereby, a draft of the proposed by-laws together with a notice specifying a
date on or after which the draft will be taken into consideration and shall, before making
the bye-laws, receive and consider any objection or suggestion with respect to the draft
which may be made in writing by any person before the date so specified.
 For Section 340, Udaipur Municipal Corporation of Udaipur has framed “The Hotel and
Restaurant Licensing Bye Laws, 2014”

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Internship Report 2022

Internship Report Submitted to GGSIP University

JEMTEC SCHOOL OF LAW

1. DETAILS OF THE INTERNSHIP

4. UNDERTAKING REGARDING THE AUTHENTICITY BY THE STUDENT

5. EMPLOYER FEEDBACK FORM

6. OBJECTIVE OF THE INTERNSHIP

7. MONTHLY REPORT OF LEX FAVIOS

8. MONTHLY REPORT OF ADP & ASSOCIATES

9. MONTHLY REPORT OF KHAITAN & CO.

DETAILS OF THE INTERNSHIP

2. ADP & Associates

3. Khaitan & Co.

The Objective of the Internship

Signature for the Authenticity

An Overview of the Internship Work

7th February 2022

Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies

Also produced the judgements in support of the research:

1. S. Rathinaswamy vs S. Bhanumathi, AIR 2006 Mad 221

Serial Proprietor’s Name Status Objection Tm

Body Incorporate Request

Trading As : M/S. Eagle

56. INACCES GEOTECNICA Abandoned NA 3076542

57. KANCHAN Removed NA 1045955

8th & 9th February 2022

Impunity to Marital Rape: An Opportune Time to Show it the Door?

The Present Legal Position of Marital Rape in India

Why Should the Impunity to Marital Rape be shown the Door?

Report of Law Commission of India and Outdated Notion of Marital Rape

Is Impunity to Marital Rape Helping in Protection the Institution of Marriage?

India’s International Obligations

10th & 11th February 2022

Brief Summary of Corporate Social Responsibility

What is Corporate Social Responsibility?

Applicability of CSR on the Companies

What is the Role of Corporate Social Responsibility Committee?

science, technology, engineering and medicine aimed at promoting Sustainable

Changes Incorporated through the Amendments

Activities that can now be Included as CSR

There is a new requirement for mandatory impact assessment of CSR projects.

Support from ‘international organizations’

Registration of CSR Undertakings

14th February 2022

1. Researched extensively on the requirement of public health licence in the state of

THE HIMACHAL PRADESH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACT, 1994

Requirement for Public Health Licence

324. Premises not to be used for certain purposes without licence.-

330. Power of Commissioner to stop use of premises used in contravention of licences.-

383. Punishment for certain offences

15th & 16th February 2022

IN THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL,

IN THE MATTER OF:

M/s Power Machine (India) Ltd. ……. Respondent/Corporate Debtor

S. No. Particular Pg. No.

Place Respondent/Corporate Debtor

IN THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL,

IN THE MATTER OF:

M/s Empowertrans Pvt Ltd. ………Applicant/Operational Creditor

M/s Power Machine (India) Ltd. ……. Respondent/Corporate Debtor