A Global History of The Cold War
A Global History of The Cold War
A Global History of The Cold War
HISTORY of the
COLD WAR,
1945–1991
Philip Jenkins
A Global History of the Cold War, 1945–1991
Philip Jenkins
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Contents
1 Introduction 1
4 Nuclear Perils 57
5 Asian Theaters 73
v
vi Contents
15 Endgame229
Index255
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Near Omaha, Nebraska, stands Offutt air base, which from 1948 through
1992 was the home base for the US Strategic Air Command (SAC). Founded
in 1946, the SAC was tasked with organizing vast nuclear-armed bomber fleets
which ideally would deter any foe tempted to attack the country. Within a few
years, these were increasingly augmented by missiles. Offutt was chosen as
headquarters because Nebraska stood at the heart of the continental United
States and was furthest removed from potential enemy bomber attacks. From
1959, Offutt was defended by powerful surface-to-air missiles. The SAC
remained active and on perpetual watch until it stood down in 1992, following
the end of the global confrontation that we call the Cold War.
Offutt became home to a museum displaying key aircraft in US military his-
tory, which later moved to another Nebraska location to become the Strategic
Air Command and Aerospace Museum. This is an extraordinary place, with
many tangible remains of that frightening era. The stars of the large collection
include such astonishing items as a gigantic Convair B-36 bomber, with its
230-foot wingspan. With a combination of jet engines and multiple piston-
driven propellers, some versions of the B-36 had an intercontinental range of
10,000 miles. From the time it entered into service in 1948 until its replace-
ment by the B-52 in 1955, the B-36 was a mainstay of the US strategic arsenal,
and over 360 such aircraft were built. These aircraft, and other later weapon
systems, were intended to bear the nuclear arms that would annihilate the
Soviet Union, causing many millions of deaths. At the same time, Soviet equiv-
alents would be extinguishing great cities in the US and Europe.
What makes this museum so distinctive is that it commemorates a war that
was never fought or, at least, in anything like the way that was contemplated.
In consequence, no B-36 ever engaged in combat of any kind. The B-36 never
achieved the legendary fame of other aircraft like the Flying Fortress or the
Spitfire, and never featured in popular culture depictions of heroic deeds or
such key Asian and clearly non-Western nations—Japan, as well as South Korea
and Taiwan (the Republic of China). In the 1970s, Israel sought to expand the
concept of the West and its struggles beyond that central anti-Communist
theme. Israeli leaders presented the country as a part of the “West” engaged in
common cause against terrorism and against hostile Arab and Islamic states.
association was a powerful theme throughout these years. Of its nature, the
Cold War created a hothouse atmosphere for the breeding and cultivation of
conspiracy theories.
and the West European points of view, the Second World War marked a brief
and unusual period of alliance and cooperation, which speedily and inevitably
collapsed not long after Nazi Germany was destroyed. Between the wars,
Winston Churchill was legendary as a fire-breathing anti-Communist, a role he
promptly resumed after 1945, when he popularized the term “iron curtain.”
Other countries had their own chronologies. For Poland, the post-1945 con-
flict was a phase in a much longer historical struggle for freedom from Russian
rule, which dated back to the eighteenth century. Poles regarded their defeat
of a Soviet Communist invasion in 1920 as a near-miraculous vindication of
that struggle and of their national identity.
Such rewritings affect our sense of historical period. Scholars sometimes
describe the East-West tensions of the 1980s as a “Second Cold War,” the
assumption being that the first or “real” Cold War occurred in the 1950s and
1960s. That whole post-1945 history was itself a second phase, resuming the
open hostility that had prevailed between 1917 and 1941.
However standard it may seem today, the notion that the fundamental
Soviet-Western rivalry was somehow new after 1945 was chiefly an American
perspective. US armed forces had intervened against the Bolsheviks in 1918,
and the country had a lively domestic Red Scare that ran through the 1920s.
In the US Congress, the House Committee on Un-American Activities began
its fervent quest for Communist infiltrators in 1938. Even so, the nation’s poli-
tics through the interwar years had emphasized isolationism, and avoiding con-
frontation with other powers. (The US still felt entitled to intervene freely in
its poorer neighbors in the Caribbean and Central America.) The administra-
tion of Franklin Roosevelt (1933–1945) sought peaceful relations with the
Soviets, and in 1933, the US finally gave diplomatic recognition to the Soviet
state. Roosevelt also placed the US in opposition to the European powers in
matters involving the colonial empires and decolonization. Only after some
serious internal debate was the US prepared to take the lead against Soviet
advances after 1945. From such an American viewpoint, the Soviet confronta-
tion appears more novel and demanding of explanation than it might appear
elsewhere in the world. American predominance over popular culture and the
academic world ensured that the US chronological perspective became the
norm in other nations that increasingly forgot their own older experiences.
Although the period used here for the Cold War—from 1945 through
1991—does have a clear unity and historical utility, it was to some extent an
American construct.
between Soviet tyranny and Western freedom. But the conflict was at least as
much geopolitical as ideological.
Historically, states tend to follow certain long-term policies regardless of the
administration in power at any given time, or its ideological coloring. For rea-
sons of economics or geography, they define their spheres of influence in par-
ticular ways. Such long continuities are evident in the Soviet case. In the
nineteenth century, the absolute monarchy of the Tsars regarded certain
regions as essential to its security, and the country’s future growth. The
Russians occupied most of Poland, and a potent pan-Slavist vision presented
Russia as the ultimate guardian of all Slavic and/or Orthodox peoples in
Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Russian governments looked south for the
future expansion of which they dreamed, into the Ottoman Empire and the
Levant, and toward Persia and Afghanistan. A map of Tsarist territorial ambi-
tions around 1900 would also provide a valuable guide to the directions of
Soviet policy through the Cold War. In 1940, Stalin’s government declared
that, beyond redrawing borders in Europe, “its territorial aspirations center
south of the national territory of the Soviet Union, in the direction of the
Indian Ocean.”1 During the Cold War as I am defining it here, both Turkey
and Persia (Iran) would repeatedly be the setting for superpower tensions and
clashes. In pursuing its international goals, the Tsarist regime used intelligence
and secret police systems in ways that strongly foreshadowed later Soviet
behavior. That included the use of surrogates and proxies to carry out terrorist
acts on Western soil, with a view to discrediting the regime’s enemies.
Long continuities are no less apparent in the US instance. From the 1820s,
the US had attempted to exclude European powers from the Americas, north
and south, suggesting that it saw all these territories as within its sphere of
influence: this was the so-called Monroe Doctrine. Throughout the early twen-
tieth century, US forces frequently intervened in Caribbean or Latin nations,
sometimes in countries that would later be pivotal to Cold War rivalries, such
as Cuba and Nicaragua.
Historians dislike counterfactuals, but as a thought experiment, we might
imagine how affairs might have developed if we take Communism out of the
political picture. Suppose that the Russian regime in power in the 1940s was
neither Soviet nor Communist, that it was monarchist or even democratic.
Further assume that this alternative Russia had played such a decisive role in
smashing Nazi Germany, leaving a world balance much like what we actually
know in 1945. The hypothetical non-Communist Russia would still see a vital
interest in expanding its power over Eastern Europe, to supply a buffer against
future invasion, and it would be an obvious tactic to create puppet regimes.
Further West, Russia would confront a vast power vacuum in what had been
the heart of Europe, with the collapse of Germany and Italy, and the extreme
weakness of the Allied victor states, of France, Britain, and the Netherlands.
1
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945: series D. US Department of State
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960).
1 INTRODUCTION 9
Europe was conspicuously in play, and both Russia and the US would face
heavy pressure to fill that resulting vacuum. The twilight of the colonial and
imperial powers created a host of new opportunities and pressures on a global
scale inviting Russian expansion into that country’s historically defined sphere
of expansion, and beyond.
The fact that US and Russian military forces were by far the world’s most
powerful would be central to any future relationships. Even without the ideo-
logical element, something like the Cold War would have been easily imaginable.
But pursuing such a mental exercise also points to its limitations. Of itself,
Marxist ideology did not determine Soviet views of the wider world, but with-
out that ideology, the Soviet Union would never have secured the broad and
devoted international support that so often proved vital to its interests. In
Tsarist times, liberals and radicals around the world had loathed Russia as a
symbol of tyranny and authoritarianism, just as, after 1917, so many would
laud the Soviets as the exemplars of a heroic future. However much outsiders
admired the cultural achievements of Tsarist Russia—all the magnificent litera-
ture, music, and art—these splendors were evidently not associated with the
regime or its policies. Matters were quite different under the Soviets, who com-
manded vast and highly appealing resources in the form of propaganda and soft
power, which exercised immense influence in many parts of the world.
Moreover, these messages were inextricably associated with Communist ideol-
ogy and Soviet politics. This sympathy acquired an institutional foundation
through flourishing Communist parties and affiliated movements in many
nations. In the post-1945 context, this ideological power gave Communism
and Soviet causes real advantages in societies struggling against colonialism in
Africa and Asia, or against imperialism and exploitation in the Americas. The
resulting ideological contest shaped every aspect of Cold War thought, policy-
making, and rhetoric.
coming of the hydrogen bomb, which raised the stakes in the struggle to an
almost infinite degree. The first US weapon tested, in 1952, was 450 times
more powerful than the bomb used against Nagasaki, and the Soviets tested
their own device the following year. Actual deployable weapons followed a
couple of years later. Ballistic missiles enormously accelerated the speed with
which such weapons could be delivered anywhere in the world. By 1959, both
the US and the Soviets deployed their intercontinental ballistic missiles,
or ICBMs.
Together, these changes transformed both warfare and international poli-
tics. From the start, they gravely undermined the great Soviet superiority in
conventional military forces in Europe. Although the US and Britain had
deployed very large armies against the Germans, the nature of their societies
made these efforts very difficult to support for any lengthy period. The nuclear
element changed everything. Before 1949, the Soviets had no such resource
themselves, and the West retained a crushing superiority in nuclear arms into
the early 1960s. The existence of thermonuclear weaponry raised the prospect
that a Western attack might swiftly eliminate the Soviet state and much of the
population. Without the potential nuclear threat, it is difficult to imagine how
the Soviets could have resisted military actions against a profoundly weakened
Western Europe during numerous crises from the late 1940s onward. But even
the weaker Soviet nuclear forces could still pose enough of a threat to the
Western powers, and above all to the US, to discourage conventional military
operations that would otherwise have proved very tempting. This would for
instance have included a US invasion of Cuba in 1962. Nuclear weapons played
an essential role in ensuring that the Cold War did not become an outright
world war and also in determining its long time-span.
The nuclear balance of terror ensured that a direct confrontation between
the two key players had to be avoided, literally as a matter of life and death.
This determined the nature of conflict and the means through which rivalries
would be pursued, commonly through clandestine and covert tactics. This
placed a high premium on subverting the rival’s position in his own territories,
to combating his allies and supporters, and building up friendly forces. Guerrilla
and low-intensity operations proliferated, as it was vital to allow each super-
power to deny that it was directly involved in military assaults on its rival. When
the Soviets orchestrated major military interventions in several African nations
in the mid-1970s, they did so largely through Cuban allies and proxies (who
had long dreamed of aggressively expanding their revolution in these direc-
tions). Rather than using massed military forces of their own, the two sides
deployed small numbers of personnel as advisors, trainers, or special forces.
Intelligence and surveillance, both international and domestic, acquired
unprecedented significance. So did effective internal security mechanisms and
policing. All that would have been true regardless of the ideological coloring of
the respective sides, and the key protagonists.
The Cold War is much more than merely “the nuclear age,” or indeed
“nuclear paranoia.” But it is incomprehensible without the nuclear dimension.
1 INTRODUCTION 11
For Americans at least, the heroic image of the conflict was the normal
interpretation well into the 1960s. Even then, there were dissident voices
who presented a very different view of specific confrontations such as the
Korean War, and one much more sympathetic to Communist motivations
and behavior. Such minority views became much more commonplace as the
US became ever more disenchanted with its experience in Vietnam. In the
1970s, the exposure of vast amounts of materials about the misdeeds of
Western intelligence agencies caused a radical rethinking of many aspects of
the post-1945 Cold War, both within Western nations and, especially, in the
Third World or Global South. Liberal and left-oriented historians became
much more sympathetic to narratives that would once have been confined to
devoted Communist writers. In particular, domestic “Red Scares” and anti-
Communist purges in Western nations were treated as monstrously wrong
and unjustified, as cynical “witch-hunts.” (We will repeatedly describe these
events in the present book.)
The balance changed again in the 1990s, with the release of masses of hith-
erto secret material from Eastern Bloc nations and also of declassified Western
intelligence materials. This often confirmed the reality of Soviet and
Communist clandestine activities around the world and further allowed a
thorough revision of historic confrontations like the Cuba Missile Crisis. The
release of Eastern Bloc materials has utterly revised our interpretation of ter-
rorist movements in Western nations and often confirmed what were once
speculations about clandestine Communist involvement. Meanwhile, the US
has released information about their surveillance activities in Eastern Bloc
nations, with data that were once regarded as the most secret crown jewel of
the intelligence community.
In the past quarter century, the Cold War has been an immensely fruitful
field for historical research, with a huge outpouring of scholarship that can
barely be touched upon here. Some key themes should however be mentioned.
One is the globalization of research, with the much greater coverage of affairs
in Global South nations. This allows us to understand particular conflicts in
terms of the specific and local forces at work in a society, without imposing the
simplistic East-West framework that might once have been used. This approach
has the added advantage of allowing us to see local groups and individual actors
operating according to their own interests and ideologies, which might or
might not coincide with those of Moscow or Washington.
Throughout the modern wave of globalized studies, scholars must wrestle
with the question of intent. When a situation developed in a particular way, can
we assume that a state or group actively sought that outcome? When, for
instance, we see the expansion of Communist power in Eastern Europe in the
1940s, earlier historians might have seen a simple Soviet plot, directed by Stalin
personally. Closer examination suggests a much more nuanced and contingent
view, closely attuned to diplomatic needs and pressures at any given moment.
In Vietnam, similarly, we have also seen how scholars debate the motivations of
14 P. JENKINS
Further Reading
As the Cold War affected so much of the world over such a lengthy period, the
volume of possible sources is immense, even if we confine ourselves to mate-
rials in English. The sheer breadth of topics and ongoing debates is sug-
gested by the articles appearing in the prestigious Journal of Cold War
Studies, which has been publishing since 1999. Throughout this book, each
chapter will suggest readings, but from the nature of the topic, these are very
selective indeed, and they lean heavily toward recent work, mainly from the
past decade.
One indispensable collection of essays is Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne
Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War (three volumes, 2010),
and see the important contributions in Richard H. Immerman and Petra
Goedde, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (2013). Each of these
volumes contains multiple essays on detailed aspects of the Cold War, with
specific chronological, regional, and thematic studies. I have not referred to
these studies individually in the chapters that follow, but they are highly rel-
evant and extremely informative about the particular topics discussed.
There are several fine single volume surveys of the Cold War, including John
Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (2005); Michael L. Dockrill
and Michael F. Hopkins, The Cold War, 1945–1991 2nd ed. (2006); Melvyn
P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind (2007); Norman Stone, The Atlantic and
its Enemies: A Personal History of the Cold War (2010); and John Lamberton
Harper, The Cold War (2011).
Odd Arne Westad stresses global and Global South dimensions in The Global
Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (2005),
and in his The Cold War: A World History (2017). Compare Lorenz M. Lüthi,
Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe (2020). Global conflicts also form
the subject of Paul Thomas Chamberlin’s important study of The Cold War’s
1 INTRODUCTION 15
Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace (2018). Robert Cowley, ed., The
Cold War: A Military History (2005) addresses the military dimensions of
the conflict. See also Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold
War: The Politics of Insecurity (2012); Ralph B. Levering, The Cold War: A
Post-Cold War History (2016); and Christopher R. W. Dietrich, ed., A
Companion to U.S. Foreign Relations: Colonial Era to the Present (2020).
Dianne Kirby addresses a critical theme in Religion and the Cold War (2003).
For (very) long continuities in political attitudes, see David S. Foglesong, The
American Mission and the “Evil Empire”: The Crusade for a “Free Russia”
Since 1881 (2007).
Throughout this book, I will often refer to works of fiction, whether films,
television productions, or novels, as excellent illustrations of strictly contem-
porary attitudes. Some works in particular are fine historical sources in their
own right, in showing how shrewd individuals responded to the situations
they observed. Some of these fictional productions actually contributed sig-
nificantly to contemporary debates about the issues they were covering. A
list of such possible fictional items could be extended indefinitely.
PART I
In 1946, two Western leaders delivered speeches in which they offered radically
different visions of the world. On March 5, at Fulton, Missouri, recently
unseated British Prime Minister Winston Churchill warned of growing Soviet
dominance in Eastern Europe:
The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of
Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers
and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments are
prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no
true democracy.1
1
“The Sinews of Peace (‘Iron Curtain Speech’), March 5, 1946,” https://winstonchurchill.
org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/
Stalin
Repression in the Soviet Union escalated under Joseph Stalin, who led the
country from 1927 through 1953, and who created a god-like cult of personal-
ity and absolute authority. In Stalin’s view, the country’s very success in pro-
gressing toward socialism stimulated further class conflict, demanding ever
greater vigilance and repression. Globally too, as capitalism faced a growing
threat to its very existence during the Crash and Depression of the 1930s, it
responded with ever-more savage and aggressive innovations, such as Fascism
and Nazism, and the Soviet state could never relax its iron discipline if it was to
survive. From 1934 through 1946, the Soviet secret police was known as the
NKVD, the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Repressive state power
was directed against many internal enemies, resulting in the mass starvation of
peasants who resisted Soviet rural policies, and ever-widening persecutions and
denunciations of anyone thought to be hostile to the regime. During the most
extreme eras, such as 1937–1938, sweeping purges drew in millions for execu-
tion or imprisonment. Fueling such purges were the confessions drawn from
suspects under torture, which implicated ever-wider networks of acquaintance
in fantastic and groundless charges. Show trials, with their ritualized confes-
sions and denunciations, became a fundamental part of Stalinist rule.
From Lenin’s time, the Soviet Union developed a vast network of labor
camps, which were administered through an agency titled by the acronym
GULAG (Glavnoye Upravleniye Ispravitelno-Trudovykh Lagerey, i.e., “Chief
22 P. JENKINS
the Allied coalition, and the key contributor to the war effort. The Soviets
made some gestures toward accommodation, formally abolishing the
Comintern in 1943. In occupied countries, the Soviet involvement raised the
vision of imminent armed liberation. Communists won high regard for their
activities in armed anti-Nazi resistance. Where active Communist Parties were
legal, membership rolls swelled, as did the influence of party newspapers. The
US Communist Party reached a high of at least 80,000 by 1944; the British
peaked at 60,000.
Western admiration for the Soviets reached new heights with the stunning
Soviet advances through Poland into Germany in 1944–1945, which were
commanded by Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Ivan Konev. Two actions, in
particular, inspired awe among military observers, namely Operation Bagration
(June–August 1944) and the Vistula-Oder offensive (January–February 1945).
The vast scale of those campaigns was deeply impressive. In Bagration, over
two million Soviet soldiers destroyed a whole German Army Group, deploying
6000 tanks, 40,000 guns, and 8000 aircraft, as they advanced 450 miles in just
five weeks. In the campaign of early 1945, the Soviets advanced 300 miles in
two weeks. But however gratefully the West received these efforts at the time,
they also cast a long shadow in the colder diplomatic climate following 1945.
Through the 1950s, Western war planners would think back nervously to those
triumphant Soviet campaigns as possible blueprints for that country’s future
actions.
Soviet forces soon controlled most of Eastern Europe beyond what Churchill
would describe as the Iron Curtain, and in May 1945, they took Berlin itself.
That of itself need not have concerned the Western Allies, who had already
formulated plans for the division of Germany and Austria into occupation
zones, each controlled by one of the major allies. Even so, the Soviets made no
secret of their growing dominance over other occupied nations in the east.
Throughout the war, anti-Nazi forces and movements throughout Europe
had often been divided into multiple factions, in which the Communists were
one of the several forces. With Soviet backing, Communist factions excluded
and persecuted their rivals. One of the bloodiest such actions occurred in
Yugoslavia, where multiple resistance movements and militias had existed dur-
ing the war, often clashing with each other. In 1945, the new Communist
government headed by Josip Broz Tito undertook mass killings of rivals,
including not just former pro-Axis forces, but also many who had resisted Nazi
occupation. In France and Italy, Communist resistance forces persecuted thou-
sands whom they accused of being Nazi collaborators, and in the process, they
targeted many patriotic anti-Nazi fighters whose crime was their affiliation to
anti-Communist movements.
Western protests against Communist actions were muted in light of the
warm memories of the Soviet alliance during the war and a shared loathing of
collaborators. When US and Soviet forces met each other on the River Elbe in
April 1945, it was in an atmosphere of high celebration. Beyond general good-
will, the Western powers believed that the Soviets would be crucial allies in the
24 P. JENKINS
forthcoming assault on Japan. In 1945, the British had to decide on the fate of
many thousands of Russians who had defected to the German cause and had
fought alongside German forces. Although they were enemy combatants, their
reasons for fleeing Stalinist rule had usually been excellent, and all faced death
or imprisonment if they again fell under Stalin’s power. Nevertheless, these
Russians, including many Cossacks, were repatriated in their tens of thousands.
The British, likewise, handed pro-Axis Croatian forces over to Tito’s
Communists, who slaughtered tens of thousands. At the same time, Western
publics were unmoved by the atrocities committed against either German citi-
zens or German residents of the East European states. In massive ethnic cleans-
ing in these years, some 15 million ethnic Germans were relocated to Germany
or Austria, and at least a million died in the process. In Germany itself, the
Russians enthusiastically plundered the zone they occupied, dismantling facto-
ries for removal to their own country, with little concern for the future of the
local population.
Communist policies in these years are usually presented in terms of a ruth-
less grab for power and influence, and that element is undeniable. But matters
were actually more complex, and Stalin’s actions were often more flexible and
even conciliatory than this stereotype might suggest. He emerges as an oppor-
tunist, but one tempered by realism: he knew when he had to give ground.
When Soviet propaganda in 1945–1946 proclaimed a hope of good relations
with the West, this was not simply deceptive. At the same time, it is necessary
to understand the Stalinist ideological context, in which the Soviet Union
played a pivotal role in the cause of progress and human liberation so that
Great Russian nationalism became indistinguishable from Communism.
Extending Soviet power into Europe helped fulfill the onward march of his-
tory. That vision conditioned Soviet attitudes to the newly occupied countries
of the East, where establishing Communist regimes would benefit the masses
of ordinary people. The creation of new states—of people’s democracies—was
a fraternal act. Indeed, failure to reconstruct societies on radical socialist lines
would be a betrayal. In the aftermath of Nazism, the opponents of Communism
were viewed in the most sinister light, as de facto allies of Nazi savagery, and
those reactionary enemies were dehumanized accordingly. In that context, any
action that furthered the advance of Communism was fully justified. Obviously,
many in these occupied countries themselves understood things very
differently.
Poland
Poland was critical to the new situation, and the East-West antagonism that
now became obvious had deep historical roots. In the eighteenth century, the
once-mighty Polish kingdom was partitioned between the three great powers
of the day, namely Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and Warsaw became a Russian
city. A Polish state re-remerged in 1918, although it had to fight a bitter war
for survival against the Soviet Bolsheviks. That state in its turn was destroyed
2 ORIGINS: THE WORLD IN 1946 25
by the German invasion of 1939, as the Soviets again intervened to seize the
eastern part of the country. In 1944, Soviet forces again conquered the whole
territory from its German occupiers. The subsequent fate of Poland was a
deeply sensitive question for the West, not least because it was the German
invasion of 1939 that had actually detonated the Second World War, and the
British had intervened specifically to secure Polish independence. Large num-
bers of Poles served under British command during the ensuing war. For the
British, national prestige was at stake.
If all the Allies accepted the existence of a post-war Polish state, it remained
unclear how far this entity would be truly independent, as opposed to a Soviet
puppet. During the war, one body of patriotic resistance forces had maintained
a government in exile in London, while other Communist-oriented leaders
operated under Soviet control in Lublin. The British naturally favored the
London contingent as the representatives of the older Polish state, while the
Soviets wished to install their own people. That division was debated at the
Allied conference held at Yalta in the Soviet Crimea in February 1945, between
Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill. The Western leaders agreed to allow a
Communist-leaning provisional government in Poland, to the horror of non-
Communists. Following fraudulent elections, a Communist government was
created, and over the next three years, it established a pro-Soviet and totalitar-
ian model of government. In June 1946, a (rigged) victory in a national refer-
endum confirmed what Communists claimed as a mandate.
Among other controversial decisions, the new government agreed to a far-
reaching restructuring of Poland’s national boundaries. Large sections of pre-
war eastern Poland were annexed to the Soviet Union and incorporated into
the republics of Ukraine and Belorussia (Belarus). For Poland, that meant the
loss of some important historic cities and population centers. In recompense,
the Poles annexed western territories that had previously been the possession
of Germany, marking a new German border along the rivers Oder and Neisse.
Both shifts involved large-scale relocation of existing populations, and the eth-
nic cleansing of older communities. Poland’s new borders were ratified at the
next conference of Allied leaders held at Potsdam in July 1945.
As often in Eastern Europe in this era, Polish Communists initially worked
with members of socialist and other parties to give the impression of a broad
coalition. Leaders of those parties were divided in their response to such over-
tures. In Poland, some socialists favored allying with other non-Communist
factions to hold back Soviet advances at all costs. Others supported a tactical
alliance with Communists to promote social reforms, and in the hope of mod-
erating Soviet ambitions. But through all these shifting alliances, Communists
maintained control over key ministries and bureaucratic agencies, especially
those controlling police or internal security. Between 1945 and 1947,
Communists expanded their power at the grassroots level, building up the
Communist party from a small fraction to a mass organization a million strong,
with strong paramilitary forces.
26 P. JENKINS
Facing the Unthinkable
Even if Western nations had wished to halt the spread of Soviet influence across
Europe, it is far from clear what they might have done. In the last months of
the European war, Germany’s Nazi leaders had been startlingly confident that
they would form common cause with the Western Allies against the Soviets.
After all, they reasoned, the West could not possibly want to see a Communist-
occupied Europe, and it was very much in their interests for them to use the
still potent German armed forces in this cause. Through 1945, the legendary
American military commander George S. Patton caused consternation by
advocating just such aggressive policies against the “Asiatic” Soviets. In retro-
spect, such hopes seem ridiculous. Ultimately, the West would indeed integrate
German forces into its military plans, but only after the Third Reich had been
crushed, and the country was at least officially purged of its Nazi inheritance.
But the Allies explored ideas that were not too far removed from Nazi
wishes. In Spring 1945, the British drew up a contingency plan for driving the
Soviets out of Poland; this plan involved the use of a reorganized and reconsti-
tuted German army. The plan was aptly termed Operation Unthinkable, and it
is beyond credibility that such a scheme might have been approved, especially
after the revelation of the Nazi death camps and the Holocaust. If the opera-
tion had been undertaken, the spread of leftist ideas within the various Western
armies would have sparked mass mutinies. Western planners duly noted that
28 P. JENKINS
even their most optimistic visions still left the Soviets heavily outnumbering
any possible assailants. Unthinkable remained unthinkable.
Adding immeasurably to the awareness of war’s risks was the new nuclear
dimension (which will be discussed at length in Chap. 4). After the US attacked
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was obvious that the new weapons would trans-
form the world order. At first, “the bomb” was popularly associated with
extreme strength and power, often read in a sexual sense, and was even used in
advertising. Early American tests occurred at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall
Islands, and in 1946, French designers appropriated the word “bikini” for a
swimsuit design that at the time was considered outrageously daring. But the
more the nuclear devices were studied and reported, their truly unthinkable
nature became ever more apparent. One of the literary sensations of the era was
John Hersey’s 1946 magazine account of the Hiroshima attack (with the sub-
sequent book, Hiroshima), which became one of the most influential pieces of
twentieth-century journalism. It marked a powerful revival of apocalyptic
themes in the modern secular world and raised the prospect that the horrors
described could someday afflict New York, London, or Moscow.
2
Pauline Moullot, “Le Parti communiste français était-il le parti des collabos ou des ‘75000
fusillés’?” Libération, May 24, 2019, https://www.liberation.fr/france/2019/05/24/
le-parti-communiste-francais-etait-il-le-parti-des-collabos-ou-des-75000-fusilles_1729388/.
2 ORIGINS: THE WORLD IN 1946 29
won 26 percent of the national vote, rising to 28 percent the following year,
giving it the largest share of any party. PCF leader Maurice Thorez served as
Vice-Premier from 1946 to 1947. At its height, the Party attracted
800,000 members
As we will see, Communist hopes in France and Italy did not last long, as
they would soon be expelled from government in both countries. Unlike in
Eastern Europe, neither the PCF nor PCI controlled the armed strength
derived from Soviet occupation. But at least in 1946, an informed observer
listening to Churchill’s Fulton Speech might well have thought him optimistic.
From this perspective, the Iron Curtain was threatening to extend much deeper
into Western Europe, and perhaps to the English Channel.
Superpowers
Quite apart from the spread of Communism, the war transformed the balance
of military and political power in Europe and initiated a radically new and dif-
ferent global order. For centuries, Europe had included a number of large
influential states which were acknowledged as the Powers, or the Great Powers.
The actual balance might shift from time to time, and new Powers arose, but
there were normally five or six representatives. The Second World War resulted
in the swift collapse of this system, and its replacement by two global states,
each so vastly stronger than its nearer rivals as to constitute a wholly new con-
cept, the superpower. That quality was based on military might but also popu-
lation and economic production, and the capacity to operate on a global scale.
Even before the expansion of nuclear arsenals, these were greater than merely
Great Powers. Simple geography reinforced that trend. With their vast land
areas, the US or the Soviet Union could withstand multiple nuclear strikes on
its home territory in a way that was quite unthinkable for the far smaller
European nations. Both the US and USSR could test nuclear weapons on their
home territory: the British had to use sites in Australia.
It is difficult to exaggerate the global dominance of the US as the Second
World War drew to its close. By 1945, the US armed forces counted over
twelve million personnel. US economic hegemony was close to absolute, with
a thriving financial system that had sustained the war efforts of its near-bankrupt
allies. US military production had been astonishing, allowing it to fight two
virtually separate wars, against Germany and Japan. Although the country had
sustained 400,000 military deaths, that was a tiny proportion of its population
when compared to most combatant nations. In contrast to all potential com-
petitors, its industrial strength had suffered no damage from wartime violence.
After 1945, that economy was ready to turn enthusiastically to civilian con-
sumer production, targeted toward a vast domestic market: in 1950, US popu-
lation surpassed 150 million. It was to characterize the new reality that political
scientist Nicholas Spykman coined the term “superpowers” which he popular-
ized in his book The Geography of the Peace (1944).
30 P. JENKINS
The American contrast with Europe was telling. By 1945, most of the tradi-
tional powers lay in ruins after years of invasion or occupation. Only two
European-centered states had any degree of military power or influence,
namely the Soviet Union and the British Empire, and both traditionally had
regarded Europe only as a part of its natural sphere of interest and operations.
The Soviets suffered terribly from the war, losing perhaps 27 million dead, and
a famine in 1946–1947 inflicted even more ruin. Even so, the Soviets had per-
formed a near miracle in maintaining and expanding their industrial produc-
tion to meet the challenges of war. At its wartime height, the Soviet army had
13 million personnel. By mid-1945, Soviet armed forces in Europe alone were
over seven million, and the country commanded 228 infantry divisions and 36
armored divisions (divisions varied in size, but customarily included around
10,000–12,000 soldiers). These force levels contracted after 1945, but the
very large Soviet population offered a powerful base to draw upon. In 1950,
even after that wartime devastation, the Soviet population was still 180 million,
which was about the same as the combined figures for Britain, France, Italy,
and emerging West Germany.
Fading Britain
In his 1944 analysis, Spykman counted Great Britain among the dominant
realities of the post-war world, based on its imperial span and its naval reach.
Technically, the British Empire remained the world’s most populous political
entity, with over 450 million people, and those overseas territories had contrib-
uted mightily to its survival. Canadian forces played a disproportionate role in
the British war effort: Canada ended the war with the world’s third biggest
navy and fourth largest air force. But Britain itself was profoundly weakened by
the war, especially in economic terms, and the country was mired in deep aus-
terity. The country faced a disastrous balance of payments situation, and the
rationing system actually became harsher following the end of the war. A ster-
ling crisis in 1949 was acute. The number of British service personnel plunged
from almost five million in 1945 to below a million by 1948, and to under
700,000 by 1950. Complicating the British situation was the sharp decline of
its imperial position. Most of those 450 million subjects lived in countries that
would shortly gain their independence, chiefly in the Indian subcontinent.
British naval power contracted steadily, as American sea forces expanded. The
events of the Pacific War taught Australia and New Zealand that they would
have to rely at least as much on the US as on their traditional British guardians.
Britain was simply in no position to compete with the two giants of East
and West.
Early commentators on the Cold War stressed the central British role. In
1946, George Orwell remarked that recently, “Russia began to make a ‘cold
war’ on Britain and the British Empire”—not, we note, on the US, or the West
2 ORIGINS: THE WORLD IN 1946 31
3
George Orwell, “Russia Began to Make a ‘Cold War’ on Britain and the British Empire,”
Observer, March 10, 1946.
32 P. JENKINS
destroyed, while the Dutch lost control of their wealthy East Indies to the
Japanese. The Japanese also took French Indo-China. In each case, the loss
of imperial prestige was irreparable, and European powers struggled to
regain their former possessions in the face of widespread nationalist insur-
gencies. The French faced a revolutionary war in Indo-China, and insur-
gency in the Dutch East Indies culminated in the creation of a new state of
Indonesia in 1949. In the short term, the British alone maintained their
global power, but they could not long afford to exercise this role as the Last
Empire Standing. As in Europe, the fall of the older Great Powers opened
abundant opportunities and challenges for the two nations that actually
could intervene worldwide, namely the US and the Soviet Union—what the
French called les deux Grands.
George Kennan
In February 1946, American diplomats analyzed Soviet intentions in a lengthy
message sent to the US Secretary of State. This brilliant “Long Telegram”
became a crucial document of the developing Cold War, and it had a profound
effect on policy. Kennan’s analysis was impressive, all the more so for his
restraint, and his willingness to acknowledge flaws in Western systems. Nor did
he engage in the then-popular idea on the right of seeing Stalin as a second
Hitler, with a detailed scheme for world conquest. As Kennan rightly stressed,
“Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker
force.” 4
Kennan began with the fundamental issue of Soviet ideology, which was that
the “USSR still lives in antagonistic ‘capitalist encirclement’ with which in the
long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence.” An “instinctive
Russian sense of insecurity” produced a “neurotic view of world affairs.” In
response to this sense of siege, the Soviets would pursue
internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet
state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed
forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal
matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark… build
up their industrial and especially military resources.5
4
“Telegram: The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” February 22,
1946, at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm.
5
Ibid.
34 P. JENKINS
The Soviets would advance their global interests through propaganda and
soft power, particularly through sympathetic “democratic progressive” ele-
ments. Diplomatically, the USSR would seek advantage as opportunities arose,
especially along disputed borderlands—in Iran or Turkey, or the Baltic. If Spain
became a Soviet Communist state, that would open whole new fronts. Although
he was in no sense offering a full global analysis, it is interesting that Kennan
does not refer to East Asian countries where Communist prospects were bright,
in China or Korea.
Kennan’s conclusions were surprisingly restrained. Although international
crises would occur, they could be dealt with through firmness:
Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventur-
istic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious
to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can
easily withdraw—and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any
point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to
use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no
prestige-engaging showdowns.6
6
Ibid.
7
“X” (George Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, at
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-
conduct.
2 ORIGINS: THE WORLD IN 1946 35
Further Reading
For the Communist background, see David Priestland, The Red Flag:
Communism and the Making of the Modern World (2009), and Archie Brown,
The Rise and Fall of Communism (2009).
For Soviet policies at the end of World War Two, see Robert Gellately, Stalin’s
Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War (2013); and Norman
M. Naimark, Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for
Sovereignty (2019).
The transition from the end of the Second World War is discussed in Frank
Costigliola, Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the
Cold War (2011); Fraser J. Harbutt, Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the
Crossroads (2010); S. M. Plokhy, Yalta: The Price of Peace (2010); Kevin
E. Grimm, America Enters The Cold War: The Road to Global Commitment,
1945–1950 (2018); and Diana Preston, Eight Days at Yalta: How Churchill,
Roosevelt, nd Stalin Shaped the Post-War World (2019).
For the catastrophic impacts of the war, particularly in Europe, see Keith Lowe,
Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II (2012).
Several books focus on pivotal years, when key events were so abundant. See
Ian Buruma, Year Zero: A History of 1945 (2013); Victor Sebestyen, 1946:
The Making of the Modern World (2014); Jonathan Fenby, Crucible: Thirteen
Months that Forged Our World (2019), on 1947–1948; or Elisabeth Åsbrink,
1947: Where Now Begins (2016).
36 P. JENKINS
Debates and rivalries within the incipient post-1945 “West” are the subjects of
Marc Selverstone, Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great
Britain and International Communism 1945–1950 (2009); Derek Leebaert,
Grand Improvisation: America Confronts the British Superpower, 1945–1957
(2018); and Ian Buruma, The Churchill Complex: The Rise and Fall of the
Special Relationship (2020).
John Lewis Gaddis describes a crucial policymaker in George Kennan: An
American Life (2011). See also Nicholas Thompson, The Hawk and the
Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War (2009).
CHAPTER 3
Palmiro Togliatti was the veteran head of the Italian Communist Party, the
PCI, who had long organized resistance to the country’s Fascist regime and
its German Nazi ally. When the Second World War ended, he led one of the
strongest Communist Parties in the whole of Europe, East or West, and he
came close to national power. In July 1948, a Fascist student shot him in an
assassination attempt. Togliatti barely survived, but the response to the
crime produced a near-revolution, with a general strike. Tens of thousands
of workers, many armed, occupied key strategic points throughout north-
ern Italy, seized factories, and began a sabotage campaign. Police who
attempted to intervene were rapidly disarmed by the insurgents. It was
almost as if the wartime Resistance had revived en masse, and Italy seemed
close to civil war.
The story suggests the tense situation that prevailed over much of
Europe in the late 1940s, a period of repeated East-West confrontations
that at several points threatened to develop into a general war. Beyond the
military threat, these years witnessed a historic transformation within
Europe, namely the fragmentation of older regional and cultural distinc-
tions, and their replacement by a crude division between Eastern and
Western halves of the continent. However stark and inevitable that division
came to appear, at the time it represented a shocking novelty, and the exact
borderlines might easily have been drawn other than they actually were. As
the Togliatti case suggests, it was not obvious that Italy, for instance,
really would form part of the newly defined West. The European political
framework that existed through the 1980s might have developed quite dif-
ferently from what actually occurred.
1
Quoted in Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “Stalin’s Danish Mystery,” History Today, March 2020, at
https://www.historytoday.com/miscellanies/stalin%E2%80%99s-danish-mystery.
3 THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE 39
out of its own particular history. Bulgaria was the only one of the new socialist
nations that resembled Russia in its Slavic speech and Orthodox Christian
underpinnings, and this long remained one of the most closely aligned states
within the larger bloc. Otherwise, “Eastern” Europe was a label imposed on
regions that until recently had been classified quite differently, for instance as
part of the Balkans. The powerful but ill-defined concept of Mitteleuropa cer-
tainly included Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and probably Poland. Prague
was no more “East European” than Vienna or Munich. Some countries fitted
the stereotypes of peasant societies long dominated by aristocratic elites. Others
like Czechoslovakia or East Germany did not.
Ethnic purges during and after the war contributed to the brutal simplifica-
tion. Before 1939, Eastern European states had been very diverse ethnically
with substantial minorities, including Jews, but also ethnic Germans. The Nazis
massacred Jews, and Germans suffered terribly after that nation’s defeat.
Coupled with territorial revisions, this made eastern states more ethnically
monochrome, and lacking groups that had otherwise oriented them to Western
or Central Europe. Poland, for instance, now became an overwhelmingly Slavic
state for the first time in its history.
against their will,” and similar trends were in progress elsewhere.2 By implica-
tion, the promise of aid extended widely.
Later that year, the National Security Act reorganized the nation’s military
and intelligence operations, among other things creating the National Security
Council, and making the US Air Force an independent service. Another out-
come was a new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which marked a departure
from historical precedent in being the country’s first peacetime intelligence
agency not affiliated with the armed services. Drawing heavily on the experi-
ences of wartime agents in the former Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the
CIA built up opposition to Communism across Europe and beyond. The
agency developed networks in political parties and labor unions, and sponsored
favorable media outlets. The nascent CIA cooperated with British intelligence
agencies, which retained a high level of expertise despite that country’s decline.
US and British agencies cooperated to support the armed resistance move-
ments which were then active in many parts of the Eastern Bloc.
In June 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall announced an ambi-
tious plan to aid European economic recovery, a proposal that initially included
the Soviets. This became the basis of the Economic Recovery Program formally
launched in 1948, with the then-astonishing price tag of twelve billion dollars.
That was apart from the very large sums then being directed to rebuild Japan.
Beyond the general goal of reconstruction, the Marshall Plan aimed to pro-
mote modernization and to remove trade barriers between nations. Britain was
the largest recipient of aid, with a quarter of the outlay, followed by France (18
percent) and the new West Germany (11 percent).
The Marshall Plan proved hugely divisive. Soviet Vyacheslav Molotov pre-
sented it as an explicit attempt to draw European states into a US hegemonic
system, making that country the “center of worldwide reaction and anti-Soviet
activity.”3 He claimed that the US was actively moving on the road to blatant
fascism. Poland and Czechoslovakia considered accepting aid, but Soviet pres-
sure forced them to refuse. One immediate consequence of the Plan was to
confirm Europe’s new political map, with the refusing nations constituting the
new Eastern bloc. That rejection extended to Finland which was desperate to
avoid provoking Moscow, although it otherwise succeeded in maintaining its
distance from the bloc. In September 1947, delegates from Europe’s
Communist parties gathered in Warsaw to create the Cominform, or
Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, a successor to the
Comintern, which would be headquartered in Belgrade. At this meeting,
Soviet delegate Andrei Zhdanov declared that the world was irreconcilably
divided into two camps, imperialist and anti-imperialist: class conflict was pro-
jected onto a global stage. Taken together with the Truman Doctrine, this was
close to an official declaration of a Cold War.
Quoted in Gerhard Wettig, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe (Rowman & Littlefield,
3
2008), 139.
3 THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE 41
Modern historians debate at length about the divisive effects of the Marshall
Plan, and some argue that the US was deliberately trying to place the Soviets
in an impossible position that would exclude them from an emerging capitalist-
oriented European system. In this view, it was the US move that drove the
Soviets to more radical and intransigent steps in 1948, which included the
formal takeover of Czechoslovakia and the blockade in Germany. It should
though be said that Soviet takeovers in the east were already well advanced
even before Marshall’s speech and that subsequent conflicts only formalized
the existing processes.
Drawing Lines
Generally, a map of the location of Allied armies in 1945 gave a strong sense of
where countries would fit into the new European order. But at the time, it was
by no means obvious which regions would become Communist, and which
not. In the Warsaw meeting in 1947, the parties represented countries thor-
oughly under Soviet control such as Bulgaria, but also such then-contested
societies as Czechoslovakia, Italy, and France.
The imposition of Soviet models was not surprising in countries like Bulgaria
and Romania, with their traditions of authoritarian rule, and backward econo-
mies. But Czechoslovakia between the two World Wars had been a conspicu-
ous example of economic sophistication and democratic government. Prague
in the 1930s was a progressive European city, a center for cultural experiment
and Modernism. After 1945, Soviet military domination encouraged the
growth of a local Communist party apparatus, and in 1946 the Communist
Party of Czechoslovakia, the Komunistická strana Č eskoslovenska (KSČ ), won
38 percent of the popular vote. The Party held key offices in government,
including the Interior Ministry. It controlled substantial armed force through
its armed workers’ militias, which severely limited effective police action. The
decisive transformation came in February 1948, when the Party organized a
coup d’etat that forced the removal of non-Communist ministers and officials.
Although the government was still notionally a coalition, the other parties were
dominated by crypto-Communists and Communist sympathizers. The only
exception was Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, who in March 1948 was found
dead, apparently thrown from a window by government agents. The country’s
other statesman, Edvard Beneš, died shortly afterward, of natural causes.
Sovietization followed very shortly, and by the early 1950s, Czechoslovakia
was subject to repression as brutal as any in the Soviet sphere. The country’s
experience was alarming for Europeans living in non-Communist nations, as it
suggested how easily a Communist coup might occur in a country where dem-
ocratic norms seemed deeply rooted. This was an obvious issue for countries
such as France and Italy where popular Communist parties commanded wide
political support and were represented in government. The years of 1947–1948
forced a political realignment.
42 P. JENKINS
Fighting for Italy
In Italy, not only did Communists serve in government, but party leader
Togliatti was Minister of Justice. In May 1947, as in France, Communists were
removed from government. Also as in France, rising East-West tensions placed
intense pressure on non-Communist parties to refuse alliance with Communists,
and the US government made that a precondition for the country receiving
Marshall Aid.
The ideological conflict reached new heights with the national election
held in April 1948, which was so critical coming so soon after the coup in
Prague. US and British intelligence agencies worked to combat Communist
influence, promoting anti-Communist media and propaganda, and spending
heavily to support anti-PCI parties. They also enlisted organized crime forces
on a sizable scale. (The Soviets also sent substantial aid to their Communist
allies.) The conflict developed a strong religious coloring, as the Catholic
Church campaigned vigorously against the Communists, and served as the
mainstay for the conservative anti-Communist political party, the Christian
Democrats. In the event, the Christian Democrats, led by Alcide de Gasperi,
3 THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE 43
won a decisive victory, with 48 percent of the popular vote, and a strong par-
liamentary majority. Even so, the Popular Democratic Front, which included
Togliatti’s Communists and the Socialist Party, secured an impressive 31 per-
cent of the vote.
The country decisively aligned with the West, and in 1949 it became a
founding member of the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or
NATO. Under Interior Minister Mario Scelba, the Christian Democrat gov-
ernment thoroughly revamped and strengthened its internal security struc-
tures, creating new paramilitary and riot police, the Celere. At the same time,
Scelba purged the senior ranks of all police units of anyone deemed dangerous
to the new political order. The Italian state would never again be as vulnerable
as it showed itself following the attempt on Togliatti’s life.
The outcome certainly did not destroy Italian Communism, which remained
strong at the grassroots level and which almost constituted a parallel state.
Over the next quarter century, the PCI continued to command around 20
percent of the electorate, and it was very strong in the labor unions. The Party
had an actual membership of around a million. But the political danger it posed
faded rapidly with the fast-rising prosperity of the 1950s, the country’s “eco-
nomic miracle.” As in most of Western Europe, this era produced striking pros-
perity and a new consumer society. France remembered the three decades of
boom after 1945 as the trente glorieuses.
Between the Giants
The Soviets struggled to maintain control of their own sphere of influence in
Eastern Europe, suffering setbacks and making serious concessions. Yugoslavia
proved the greatest challenge. During the war, Tito’s Partisans enjoyed great
success and had largely succeeded in liberating most of the country before the
involvement of Western or Soviet armed forces. Tito himself was anything but
a moderate, and his dictatorial regime slaughtered and imprisoned political
rivals according to the grimmest Stalinist models. He also had aggressive ambi-
tions on Italian territory. But Churchill’s reference to Trieste marking the
southern extremity of the Iron Curtain assumed that Yugoslavia was a faithful
ally of Moscow, which it would not long remain. In 1948, Tito’s refusal to
submit to Soviet direction in economic affairs placed him at ever greater odds
with that country. Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, as Soviet pro-
paganda depicted Tito as a Nazi ally. Tito’s political independence was increas-
ingly reflected in economic liberalization, decentralization, and Western ties: in
1949, he secured US aid. In 1951, a Soviet invasion seemed imminent, and
such fears would recur over the following decades. Those threats raised night-
mare scenarios for Western planners, who had to consider whether to intervene
in a land that the Soviets regarded as within their natural sphere of influence.
But Yugoslavia survived as a model of neutralism, if not of democracy.
Few countries were able to escape the neat East-West dichotomy, but those
that did suggest alternatives to the straightforward path of confrontation. As
44 P. JENKINS
remarked earlier, Stalin was, on occasions, prepared not to exploit Soviet power
to impose a full Communist system. That was the case in Finland, which had
historically been included in the Russian Empire, and which had fought bitter
wars against the Soviet Union. In 1945, Finland was a defeated nation, and the
prospect of formal absorption into the Soviet realm was at least possible.
However, the Soviets decided to acknowledge the country’s independence in
treaties in 1947 and 1948. The price of independence was Finnish neutrality,
which the country strictly observed throughout the ensuing Cold War decades.
Western hardliners would become deeply unhappy with the compromise, but
Finland flourished as a thoroughly democratic state with a booming mixed
economy.
Other examples illustrate that the Soviets were capable of withdrawing from
lands they had occupied. On a small scale, for over a year in 1945–1946, the
Soviet army occupied the Danish island of Bornholm but voluntarily ended
that presence. The most surprising example of a concession came in Austria,
which had been incorporated into Hitler’s Reich and which was a defeated
nation in 1945. After the Soviets took Vienna in 1945, both the city and coun-
try were divided into occupation zones, respectively controlled by the US,
Britain, France, and the Soviets. That replicated the situation in Germany, but
in the Austrian case, the situation ended peacefully, and the country avoided
partition. In 1955, the Soviets agreed to a military withdrawal, marking the
end of occupation and the beginning of a newly independent nation.
The reasons for these different outcomes are complex. In the Finnish case,
the Soviets were anxious to avoid any recurrence of the savage resistance they
had encountered during earlier military interventions. In Austria, the peaceful
solution owed something to the situation in neighboring Germany, as the
Soviets wanted to offer the Germans an encouraging model for a possible
future status as a united but neutralized nation. Whatever the reasons, those
cases show that the post-1945 situation could have outcomes other than the
bitter struggles raging in Rome and Prague. On occasion, the Iron Curtain
could be flexible.
Divided Germany
Despite tensions elsewhere, Germany was the major focus of concern and the
most likely location for an eruption of direct hostilities. The occupation-
settlement divided occupied Germany into four zones, each controlled by one
of the major wartime allies: the Soviet Union, the US, Britain, and France.
Separately, the four powers had organized control zones for the city of Berlin,
which lay entirely within the Soviet zone. Soviet and Western armed forces
confronted each other in substantial numbers, while the Western sections of
Berlin constituted an odd island within increasingly hostile Communist-
controlled territory.
For both sides, controlling Germany offered many potential advantages. For
decades, Germany had been the strongest state in continental Europe, and it
3 THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE 45
might one day resume something like that position. This was still one of
Europe’s most populous countries, which could, in theory, offer the basis for
substantial armed forces. Many Germans had extensive experience in the mili-
tary, intelligence, or police. As the CIA developed its European networks, it
drew heavily on older German intelligence resources associated with General
Reinhard Gehlen, who was a knowledgeable and determined foe of
Communism. At the same time, most Europeans, whether Communist or oth-
erwise, felt real fear about any possible revival of Germany as an aggressive mili-
tary state. Europeans were deeply conflicted about the prospect of reusing
personnel who had voluntarily served the Third Reich. Throughout the Cold
War years, Soviet propaganda regularly charged that the West was reviving the
German aggression associated with the Nazis. The possibility of a German fin-
ger on the nuclear trigger troubled many.
In 1947 and 1948, the three Western powers combined their occupation
areas into a new entity, the Trizone, which marked an important stage in the
reconstitution of a German nation. The US directed Marshall Aid to the area
and, in June 1948, undertook a currency reform that created the Deutsche
Mark. In the same month, the Soviets responded by cutting all land ties
between Berlin and the Western-controlled portions of Germany and thereby
seeking to purge a tumor in the socialist body. They reasoned that the Western
Allies would face the grim choice of resorting to war to save the starving city,
or else letting it become entirely part of the Communist eastern zone. At a time
of unusually cold European winters, the lack of fuel would presumably bring
besieged Berlin to its knees within months. President Truman’s advisers were
deeply pessimistic.
The West responded to this blockade with an innovative and logistically dar-
ing airlift. Through an incredible organizational effort, US and British air
forces defeated this blockade through air supplies, which over a period of 15
months brought in 2.3 million tons of supplies, including food and coal. By the
Spring of 1949, Allied aircraft were bringing in up to 13,000 tons of supplies
in a single day. Soviet forces could certainly have shot down those Western
aircraft, but any such action would have been an act of war, which would pre-
sumably have led to Western strategic assaults on the Soviet homeland.
Reinforcing that message, President Truman dispatched 60 nuclear-capable
B-29 bombers to Britain, although in fact, they were not carrying actual nuclear
weapons. In May 1949, the Soviets renounced the blockade, although flights
continued for some months longer.
The airlift led to the formal division of the country and the continent. In
May 1949, a new Federal Republic of Germany was declared, the Bundesrepublik,
incorporating the US, British and French occupation zones (although all those
countries maintained sizable military forces on German soil through the end of
the Cold War). The new republic, West Germany, strove at every point to calm
fears of a return to militarism. The country was strictly a federal republic with
many safeguards to prevent a return to the centralism of the Nazi years, and
stringent laws forbade any expressions of Nazi symbolism or ideology. The
46 P. JENKINS
republic’s capital was at Bonn, rather than any larger urban center tainted by
memories of the Third Reich. Even so, any prospect of German rearmament
was deeply sensitive, and only gradually could a German army re-emerge, ini-
tially drawing on militarized police units like the Border Protection,
Bundesgrenzschutz (1952). The new Bundeswehr operated under laws limiting
its possible role, which was to be explicitly defensive in character.
Developments in the west found a close echo in the east. In October 1949,
Germany’s Soviet zone became a new state as the German Democratic Republic,
the DDR, with its own armed forces, and its capital in the Soviet zone of
Berlin, the new East Berlin. The new state was ruled by a coalition, by far the
most important component of which was the Socialist Unity Party, the SED,
the Communist organization. The nation’s leader was Walter Ulbricht, a vet-
eran of Communist activism during the Weimar Republic. He retained power
until 1971.
4
“The North Atlantic Treaty,” April 4, 1949, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_
texts_17120.htm.
3 THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE 47
between the two ideological systems, vastly increasing the share of the world
that lived within the Communist “camp.” That change also gravely under-
mined any hope of containment. Most terrifying of all was the sudden invasion
of South Korea by the Communist North, on June 25, 1950, which will be
discussed further in Chap. 5. At the time, this was viewed as a masterstroke
launched under direct Soviet command, and as such, it was a likely precedent
for other assaults that could well follow in Europe.
The integration of West Germany into international affairs served multiple
purposes, including serving as a check on a possible revival of militarism in that
country. Although presented as a joke, an often-quoted comment stated the
purpose of NATO quite accurately: it was intended to keep the Americans in,
the Russians out, and the Germans down. West Germany was incorporated
into growing efforts to achieve European integration, including the European
Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community
(EEC) in 1957. Although explicitly economic in nature, the EEC strengthened
political unity against outside threats. Those Western developments alarmed
the Soviets. In response to the West German admission to NATO, in 1955 the
Eastern Bloc states retaliated with their own military alliance, the Warsaw Pact.
The Soviets revived their own organization to promote trade and investment,
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), originally formed
as a riposte to the Marshall Plan. Although the new organizations only formal-
ized existing divisions, they neatly symbolized the radical East-West schism that
reshaped every aspect of trade, commerce, travel, and media, closing most
means of contact and communication across the Iron Curtain. The two regions
became almost separate continents. Americans, and many West Europeans,
thought that “Europe” ended where Communism began.
Confrontation: The 1950s
Many points of tension between the two German entities prohibited any kind
of peaceful existence, above all the continuing existence of West Berlin as a
Western-oriented island in the heart of the DDR. For decades, Berlin contin-
ued to be a center for espionage and propaganda on an epic scale. East and
West Germany disagreed on the fundamental matter of where German borders
lay. Under Soviet direction, post-war boundary revisions left the eastern border
of the DDR at the Oder-Neisse line, thereby excluding sizable areas of the old
pre-war Germany, which were subject to Poland. The Federal Republic rejected
that model and suggested that a reunified German state would demand a return
to pre-war maps. Such a stance stirred fears that the West might use those land
claims as the basis for new aggressions. At the same time, the sizable communi-
ties of German refugees from those eastern territories—the homeland expel-
lees, or Heimatvertriebene—constituted a powerful West German voting bloc
that was reluctant to accept compromise.
Another obstacle to peace was the endemic weakness of the East German
state. The harsh nature of Communist rule encouraged many residents to flee
48 P. JENKINS
to the West, draining the new socialist republic of many of its most talented
people. In the early 1950s, both Germanies suffered harsh economic depriva-
tion, but as the decade went on, the West became hugely and visibly more
prosperous, enhancing still further the temptation to flee. The population dif-
ference between the two countries grew steadily, as East Germany stagnated.
Already in 1951, West Germany had 51 million citizens compared to 18 mil-
lion in the East. By 1968, the respective numbers were 61 million and 17 mil-
lion. It was natural to think of the Federal Republic as the true Germany.
The Soviets sporadically floated schemes for German reunification, and in
1952, a Stalin Note proposed a unified and neutral state. The West rejected this
advance with little debate, predictably given the recent track record of Soviet-
affiliated parties in securing dominance over Eastern Europe. A second instance
in 1953 was more intriguing. In Stalin’s time, one of the most powerful Soviet
figures was Lavrentiy Beria, head of the NKVD, who was a leading contender
to succeed the dictator when he died in March 1953. Beria was at least contem-
plating a far-reaching offer to the West that would include German reunifica-
tion in exchange for massive US aid and economic cooperation to rebuild the
Soviet Union. He might even have considered some kind of independence for
the Baltic states. If his plans were seriously intended, and that is a major “if,”
that would have effectively marked the end of the Cold War three decades
before Mikhail Gorbachev.
But as often in later years, prospects for liberalization were destroyed by the
threat of unchecked political unrest and uprisings. Stalin’s death raised hopes
of liberalization in the DDR. In June, strikes and protests mobilized a million
people against the government, requiring the massive deployment of Soviet
and DDR armed forces, with tanks on the streets of East Berlin and other cen-
ters. Western propaganda radio stations denounced the Eastern Bloc regimes,
coming close to advocating open resistance. That led at least some listeners to
believe that military support would be forthcoming. Although casualties were
relatively light by the standards of other such uprisings, with perhaps a hun-
dred fatalities, the affair further discredited the East German state. It ensured
the collapse of Beria’s dreams, as Nikita Khrushchev and his colleagues dreaded
the further growth of revolution and disorder: Beria was executed in
December 1953.
The intractable German situation made it all but impossible to make prog-
ress toward peace in Europe as a whole, or to reductions in armaments. In
1955, Geneva was the setting for a critical summit conference that brought
together the leaders of the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. Ideally,
Khrushchev would have liked to see both military blocs removed from a neu-
tral and demilitarized Germany, but West German membership in NATO
proved an intolerable obstacle. Western powers, in turn, feared that a neutral
Germany could easily be destabilized or subverted to join the Communist bloc.
3 THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE 49
Despite their often strident propaganda, the US and Britain both conspicu-
ously failed to intervene. Complicating the Western response was the ongoing
Suez affair, which as we will see in Chap. 6 posed the starkest threat to the
unity of the Western Alliance since the end of the previous war. But in shaking
the old image of monolithic Communism and in confirming the worst images
of repressive violence, the 1956 revolution proved a watershed for the
Communist world. Many hitherto powerful Communist parties in Western
countries suffered mass defections.
The Hungarian meltdown indicates the limits of possible reform in the
People’s Democracies. However much Soviet leaders might, in theory, have
considered granting a degree of national independence, they could scarcely
have contemplated a reversal of the socialist system. Soviet fears of revived
German militarism were also sincere. In justifying their actions in Hungary, the
Soviets emphasized Nazi and far-right motivations among the resistance, which
was not in itself incredible in a country that had a dark record of anti-Semitic
violence. But the consequences were grim. Memories of 1956 made East
European states profoundly nervous about granting any degree of liberaliza-
tion, political or economic.
Confrontations continued, with Berlin the usual flashpoint. A new series of
crises began in 1958, when Khrushchev demanded that the three Western allies
remove all forces from Berlin, leaving it a free and demilitarized city. If they did
not comply, then he would transfer control of all routes in and out of the city
to the DDR. That began a series of dangerous standoffs and negotiations that
proceeded through 1961, and which we will examine in more detail in Chap.
7. Meanwhile, the number of people fleeing to the western sector had become
so sizable as to threaten the survival of the DDR itself. By 1961, perhaps 4.5
million East Germans had moved West. The crisis culminated in August 1961
with the sudden and shocking building of the Berlin Wall, the Antifaschistischer
Schutzwall, or “anti-fascist protection rampart.” The Wall, as it became known,
served its immediate function of limiting defections, but it was a propaganda
catastrophe. Far from offering an attractive or inspiring example to the world,
the Eastern Bloc was reinforcing its image as a land of poverty and dictatorship,
whose people risked death to escape. This was the primary impression of Soviet
Communism imbibed by the rising generation of baby boomers born since
1945, who had no recollection of Soviet wartime heroism, or still less the
1930s Popular Front. If many were prepared to adopt radical stances, their
views were likely to attack the entrenched establishments of both East and
West blocs.
1944 and 1945, which we have already encountered, such legendary cam-
paigns as Operation Bagration.
The sophistication of Soviet warfare demands notice. A common stereotype,
largely offered by German commanders to explain their defeats, depicts primi-
tive Russian hordes crushing defenders by the sheer weight of numbers. In
reality, much Soviet military equipment was excellent, as were Soviet tactics.
These included sophisticated methods of Deep Battle or Deep Operations,
glubokaya operatsiya, a more advanced and developed version of the German
blitzkrieg. This involved fast-moving operations to surround and cut off enemy
formations, and to strike in depth far behind the front lines. The Soviets were
experts at deception operations, maskirovka, to confuse the enemy about their
intentions; and they made superb use of partisans behind enemy lines. Those
triumphs must be set aside quite comparable Western victories in the same
period, which included some stunning armored advances in France. But in the
post-war period, it was simply not possible for the US (or Canada) to maintain
huge armies on European soil, while the Soviets were operating close to their
home territory.
For Western planners, the implications were sobering. If the Soviets in 1944
could so utterly smash the mighty German Wehrmacht, what might very simi-
lar forces achieve in Europe just five or ten years afterward? The victors of those
earlier battles remained in place to confront the Americans. Marshal Zhukov
remained a dominant figure in the country’s military affairs through the late
1950s, and Konev commanded Soviet ground forces in Europe after 1945. It
was Konev, then Commander of Warsaw Pact forces, who suppressed the 1956
revolution in Hungary, and in 1961 he supervised the creation of the Berlin
Wall. If the Soviets could mount something approaching a new Operation
Bagration in the 1950s, then they would conceivably conquer the whole of
Germany and advance to the English Channel and the North Sea to prevent
Allied resupply. On this occasion, they would be supported by Warsaw Pact
armies, including the Poles and East Germans. By the 1960s, the Polish army
alone would be 800,000 strong on full mobilization.
In retrospect, we know that such fears were ill-founded, in the sense that the
Soviets had a realistic sense of the advantage that the West gained from its
nuclear superiority. Soviet war plans through the 1950s were chiefly defensive,
aimed at preventing or responding to a Western invasion. Even so, it was always
conceivable that political tensions elsewhere could provoke war in Europe, and
both sides planned accordingly. During the Berlin blockade, the Allies could
find around 300,000 troops (including 90,000 Americans) to resist 20 Soviet
divisions in eastern Germany, and at least a million soldiers in the rest of Eastern
Europe. In 1951, NATO estimated East Bloc strength in Europe at 175 Soviet
divisions with 62 further divisions from satellite countries. That would dwarf
the 35 NATO divisions then available. In 1953, an imagined Eastern bloc inva-
sion of Western Europe would involve between 75 and 120 divisions. Western
forces rapidly grew within the new NATO framework. In 1950, Dwight
Eisenhower became the first supreme commander of European forces
52 P. JENKINS
Defending Europe
Through the 1970s, NATO planners repeatedly war-gamed possible Soviet
invasions, which all involved titanic tank battles in central Germany. The Allies
would mount a fighting retreat to the Rhine, where they would await full rein-
forcements. Those plans focused attention on certain key strategic zones,
which would play as central a role in the Third World War as the Normandy
Beaches had in the Second World War. Two areas, in particular, were pivotal to
any future land war, namely the two routes that massed Soviet tanks could use
to storm Western forces. One was the North German Plain, and the other, the
Fulda Gap, Fulda-Lücke, between Frankfurt-am-Main and Kassel. For decades,
the two sides competed to perfect the best weapons for these battlefields, espe-
cially in terms of tanks. From the early 1950s, the Americans relied chiefly on
the M-48 Patton, the British on their Centurions, and the Soviets on their
T-54 and T-55. In all, over a hundred thousand T54-55s were produced, many
of which saw service with many foreign armies. Through the years too, the
West developed detailed plans to defend the Gap and evolved new generations
of artillery and ground attack aircraft to kill legions of Soviet tanks. Other
countries formed their own defensive plans: the Netherlands developed its
IJssel-line, which envisaged holding off Soviet forces by extensive flooding.
All these scenarios, to varying degrees, assumed that the Soviets would win
a land victory, which the West must delay long enough for US reinforcements
and supplies to arrive in full strength. This placed special weight on control of
the seas, and NATO exercises often involved combined operations between
US, British, Canadian, French, and Dutch fleets and others. In 1952, NATO
initiated its Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) under the Supreme Allied
Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). One naval exercise in 1957, titled
Strikeback, involved over 200 warships and 650 aircraft, an event on a scale
paralleling the largest operations of the Second World War
The coming of nuclear weapons transformed what we might call the
Bagration model. Facing defeat on the conventional battlefield, the West would
deploy non-conventional weaponry, and the Soviets recognized that fact very
well. From 1953, the US was testing nuclear artillery shells to destroy enemy
armored formations, and air- or ground-launched weapons would eliminate
even well-fortified command centers. The lethal problem was that when either
side played the nuclear card, it was forcing a similar response from its rival, and
opening the way to an escalation that would involve attacks on enemy cities.
What one side viewed as an attack on a military staging area might to its enemy
appear as the destruction of a populous civilian target, demanding retaliation in
kind. Such confusion was very likely in densely populated Europe. Soon, both
3 THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE 53
Soviets and Americans would be attacking each other’s homelands. For the
West, then, holding back Soviet advances in the European theater through
conventional means was essential to give time for negotiations, and to prevent
or delay that nuclearization.
Irregulars and Partisans
Both sides intended to reduce their enemy’s strategic advantage on the battle-
field by deploying highly trained special forces on the lines of Britain’s wartime
Special Air Service, the SAS. Such forces could, for instance, carry out attacks
far behind enemy lines, even using portable nuclear weapons. The US had their
elite special operations units, and the Soviets had their Spetsnaz.
Both sides likewise recalled the wartime experience of resistance movements,
partisans, and irregular forces. If the activities of some groups were later exag-
gerated for political effects, some forces proved very useful in undermining the
enemy’s war effort and came to control whole liberated areas. Those wartime
experiences were not too far from people’s memories in 1950 when many
Europeans still had such extensive recent experience in clandestine warfare and
sabotage. Still, in the late 1940s, anti-Communist insurgencies were raging
across much of Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe, and within the USSR itself.
Polish resistance networks continued into the mid-1950s, and the last known
“doomed soldier” perished as late as 1963. Lithuanian partisans mounted a
prolonged struggle against Soviet occupiers from 1945 through 1953, with
other movements in Latvia, Estonia, and Romania. Anti-Soviet insurgency in
Ukraine reached a symbolic finale in 1959 when the KGB assassinated nation-
alist leader Stepan Bandera in Munich. Some of these wars were extraordinarily
bloody, and the Lithuanian struggle alone claimed tens of thousands of lives.
Realistically, the fact that these wars were conducted in areas wholly under
Soviet military control made it virtually impossible that they might have suc-
ceeded in their goal of overthrowing Communist domination. In the circum-
stances of the time, however, it was by no means far-fetched to think that those
resistance fighters might serve as valuable auxiliaries to advancing Western
forces in a larger international war. If a Third World War ever had erupted, they
would have become frontline soldiers. Western intelligence agencies, CIA and
MI6, sponsored, armed, and trained such guerrillas over several years, with
naval support from German units, and the programs existed into the mid-1950s.
In Western Europe too, those same agencies made detailed preparations for
irregular warfare in the event of invasion. They trained and organized “stay
behind” forces whose task would be to resist Soviet occupation from behind
the lines, using weaponry stashed in secret arms dumps. On the other side,
Soviet invaders in Western Europe would likely have found support from leftist
insurgents and saboteurs, in Greece, France, and elsewhere. Italy would have
faced a potent insurgency.
Throughout the Cold War, dangerous crises developed in many parts of the
world, and on all continents. But throughout, Europe remained perennially
54 P. JENKINS
sensitive theater. Even during the Cuba missile emergency of 1962, American
policymakers were strongly conscious of new threats to Berlin, a concern that,
in retrospect, seems surprising. The long stasis in European borders—the
maintenance of the Iron Curtain—reflected the knowledge on both sides that
there, more than anywhere, tensions could easily erupt into a nuclear exchange.
Further Reading
Alessandro Brogi discusses Western attempts to prevent the spread of
Communism in Confronting America: The Cold War Between the United
States and the Communists in France and Italy (2011), and compare Elena
Agarossi and Victor Zaslavsky, Stalin and Togliatti: Italy and the Origins of
the Cold War (2011).
For Western interventions, see Stephen Long, The CIA and the Soviet Bloc:
Political Warfare, the Origins of the CIA and Countering Communism in
Europe (2014), and Scott Anderson, The Quiet Americans: Four CIA Spies at
the Dawn of the Cold War (2020). Benn Steil discusses The Marshall Plan:
Dawn of the Cold War (2018).
Tony Judt offered a classic overview of long continuities in Europe’s history in
his Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (2005), and compare Ian
Kershaw, The Global Age: Europe 1950–2017 (2019).
Soviet policy is analyzed in Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet
Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (2007). For British atti-
tudes, see Andrew Adonis, Ernest Bevin: Labour’s Churchill (2020).
For Eastern Europe, see Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of
Eastern Europe, 1944–1956 (2012). A. Kemp-Welch traces the development
of Poland under Communism (2008), and see Patryk Babiracki, Soviet Soft
Power in Poland: Culture and the Making of Stalin’s New Empire, 1943–1957
(2019). For the Baltic lands, see John Hiden, Vahur Made, David J. Smith,
eds., The Baltic Question during the Cold War (2008). For Czechoslovakia,
see Roman Krakovsky, State and Society in Communist Czechoslovakia
(2018). William Klinger and Denis Kuljiš offer a revisionist view of
Yugoslavian affairs in their Tito’s Secret Empire How the Maharaja of the
Balkans Fooled the World (London: Hurst, 2021). For anti-Communist resis-
tance, see Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and
the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (2006).
For the larger global crises of 1956, see Simon Hall, 1956: The World in Revolt
(2016); Evan Thomas, President Eisenhower’s Secret Battle to Save the World
(2012); Alex Von Tunzelmann, Blood And Sand: Suez, Hungary, And
Eisenhower’s Campaign For Peace (2016).
German divisions, with a natural focus on Berlin, are the subject of Edith
Sheffer, Burned Bridge: How the East and West Germans Made the Iron
Curtain (2011); Steve Vogel, Betrayal in Berlin: George Blake, the Berlin
Tunnel and the Greatest Conspiracy of the Cold War (2019); Iain MacGregor,
3 THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE 55
Checkpoint Charlie: The Cold War, the Berlin Wall, and the Most Dangerous
Place on Earth (2019); and Mark Fenemore, Fighting the Cold War in Post-
Blockade, Pre-Wall Berlin: Behind Enemy Lines (2020). See also Giles Milton,
Checkmate in Berlin The Cold War Showdown That Shaped the Modern World
(2021), and Harald Jähner, Aftermath: Life in the Fallout of the Third Reich
(2021). Richard Reeves discusses the Berlin Airlift in Daring Young Men:
The Heroism and Triumph of the Berlin Airlift (2010).
Visions of future warfare are analyzed in Jan Hoffenaar and Dieter Krüger, eds.
Blueprints for Battle: Planning for War in Central Europe, 1948–1968
(2012). NATO is the subject of Timothy Andrews Sayle, Enduring Alliance:
A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (2019). For clandestine
operations, see Annie Jacobsen, Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Secret History of
CIA Paramilitary Armies, Operators, and Assassins (2019).
CHAPTER 4
Nuclear Perils
In 1964, Stanley Kubrick’s film Dr. Strangelove offered a savage yet hilarious
take on nuclear war (its full subtitle was How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Bomb). A crazed far-right US general deliberately ignites a war by
sending his bomber aircraft to attack the USSR. This in turn provokes a Soviet
Doomsday weapon that would end human life on most of the planet. Facing
such a prospect, US commanders and war planners hope to create a system of
deep bunkers in which they alone would survive, together with large numbers
of glamorous young women with whom they can breed to replenish the popu-
lation. Although Strangelove is an outrageous comedy, at so many points it
accurately caught the mood of the nuclear confrontation of the time and of the
various plans concocted by both sides. The Soviets were indeed working on
such a Doomsday weapon, and both sides operated on the assumption that key
leaders would ride out the holocaust that was destroying most of humanity.
Both sides believed in deterring war through a balance of terror, so that neither
the US nor the USSR would initiate a war that would annihilate both their
societies. Not long before the film’s release, a US strategist created an apt name
for this doctrine, namely Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).
Bombs
The path to a MAD world had been remarkably short. During the Second
World War, the Allied Manhattan Project built an atomic bomb, a fission
(“splitting”) weapon, in which the atoms of isotopes of plutonium or enriched
uranium split to form lighter atoms. In the process, they emit neutrons that
sustain the process through a chain reaction, and that releases enormous
amounts of energy. In 1942, the first ever human-created self-sustaining
nuclear chain reaction was initiated, which showed the feasibility of such fission
weapons. An actual bomb was tested in the New Mexico desert in 1945, and
shortly afterward, actual weapons were used against the Japanese cities of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The two attacks claimed some 200,000 lives, not
counting later losses to radiation over the decades.
Although the nuclear bomb is often presented as a wholly American innova-
tion, both British and Canadian scientists were heavily involved in the process,
until all foreign involvement was abruptly terminated by the US through the
McMahon Act of 1946, the Atomic Energy Act. The US monopoly in the
technology was troubling for any hopes that post-war peace might be pre-
served by cooperation between equally balanced nations, and there were short-
lived hopes that the US might share its secrets with the Soviets. Such a hope
inspired some key scientists working on the bomb, and motivated a few to pass
information secretly to the Soviets. When the Soviets detonated their own
bomb in 1949, they used technologies taken clandestinely from the Americans
through extensive espionage networks. Their first device was a close facsimile
of the Nagasaki bomb.
The prospect of a nuclear exchange with the Soviets drove US policymak-
ers to seek larger and more effective arsenals that would overwhelm any pos-
sible opposition. US stocks of nuclear weapons expanded from 300 in 1950
to 18,000 in 1960, and 31,000 in 1965. This was vastly more than the
Soviets could produce in those years. If a war had erupted in 1955, the US
would have deployed 2400 warheads against the Soviet 200. During the
Cuban missile affair, the US potentially “out-bombed” the Soviets by some
eight to one in overall warheads, although in terms of weapons actually ready
for use, the US commanded 3500 to the Soviet 300. Most of the Soviet
weapons would be deployed on crewed bombers, which would find it diffi-
cult to reach US territory, as opposed to missiles. Only after that point did
the Soviets launch a building program that brought them to parity with the
US in the late 1970s. By 1986, the world’s combined stock of nuclear weap-
ons pecked at 70,000.
Raw numbers give no sense of the size or effectiveness of the weapons
involved, and their scale and lethality grew steeply. The two bombs used
against Japan were tiny by the standards of later weaponry. Each yielded an
explosion comparable to 20,000 tons of TNT high explosive, placing them at
the level of 20 kilotons, or 20 Kt. Over the next decade, US scientists devel-
oped fission weapons as far as was possible, reaching a height of 500 Kt with
their Ivy King test of 1952 (the British achieved 720 Kt a few years later). But
after the Soviets detonated their atomic bomb, the US pushed for weapons
with enormously larger destructive power, which used fusion rather than fis-
sion, reproducing the mechanisms that powered the heat of the sun. In such
super-bomb weapons, which were not nuclear but thermonuclear, hydrogen
atoms fused or merged to form helium, with a colossal release of energy. These
bombs were rated in the megaton range, where one megaton (Mt) corre-
sponded to an explosion of one million tons of TNT, 50 times larger than a
Hiroshima device.
4 NUCLEAR PERILS 59
Containment and Rollback
In January 1950, President Truman approved a crash program to develop such
armaments.
This formed part of a larger rethinking of US policy that followed directly
from the first Soviet nuclear test. In April 1950, a team of policymakers from
the State and Defense Departments, together with CIA, headed by Paul Nitze,
submitted to the President a report known as NSC-68. This portrayed a critical
and even apocalyptic threat to the world order, and to the survival of civiliza-
tion. The Soviets were set to expand their nuclear arsenal rapidly, reaching
something like parity with the US by the mid-1950s (as we have seen, that
prediction was wrong by two decades). This demanded a swift and aggressive
US response, involving an enormous military buildup with the expansion of
nuclear and thermonuclear arms as well as conventional resources. The US
would redefine its goals in the Cold War from containment to an active roll-
back or destruction of Communism. Although Truman was concerned by
some of the arguments, the Korean War made the document’s views seem
more plausible, and it was approved that September. NSC-68 supplied the
framework for US policy over the coming decade.
NSC-68 assumed a situation in which the US presently dominated the inter-
national balance, but that reality might change swiftly. That perception shaped
the thinking of General Curtis LeMay, whose attitudes were critical to nuclear
policy. From 1948 through 1957, he commanded the Strategic Air Command
(SAC), which he built into a formidable military power, and his ideas contin-
ued to influence that force for years afterward. LeMay made no secret of his
view that the US should take advantage of its crushing nuclear superiority to
destroy the Soviet Union before it could rise to challenge the US, and repeat-
edly, he advocated aggressive or pre-emptive attacks. In any prospective war, he
planned to use his SAC bombers and missiles to deliver huge nuclear assaults
within the opening hours and days of conflict, denying the Soviets the oppor-
tunity to regroup. The proposed new policy of rollback exactly fitted his view,
as did the emphasis on thermonuclear weaponry. Ideally, he dreamed of a sin-
gle weapon that could destroy the whole USSR.
the new devices were aptly termed “hell-bombs.” The Soviets quickly achieved
this technology, detonating their first deployable weapon in 1955.
All the powers needed to test the effectiveness of their devices, but the fact
of detonating ever larger weapons became a propaganda statement in its own
right, almost a display of national virility. All such weapons emitted radioactiv-
ity, but these goliath weapons became a pernicious source of radioactive pollut-
ants around the whole planet. They were especially disastrous when exploded
in the atmosphere, as opposed to on the ground. Both the US and Soviets
detonated many weapons in 1956–1957, but then began an unofficial morato-
rium which ended dramatically in 1961. That October, the Soviets detonated
their Tsar Bomba, which was originally intended for an inconceivable yield of
100 Mt, but which was actually scaled down to 50 Mt. That initiated a new
wave of testing, mostly of hugely destructive and very dirty weapons. Shortly
afterward, the Soviets followed with a 24 Mt device, and several 20 Mt weap-
ons followed in 1962. Each was a thousand times larger than the devices
dropped on Japan.
Eisenhower made like use of such symbolic actions. On the other side,
Khrushchev was an adept bluffer, who ably concealed the weaknesses of his
own nuclear arsenal. The danger in such cases was that an enemy might misin-
terpret a tactical gesture as if it represented a real first step in an attack, and
respond accordingly. The consequences of such a misreading became incon-
ceivably higher when states were armed with hydrogen bombs. Time and again,
the superpowers pressed situations to dangerous confrontations, but at the last
moment pulling back from the brink of all-out war.
Delivery
The means of delivering weapons to their targets improved at a revolutionary
rate. Quite apart from ethical concerns, the new bombs posed grave hazards to
the role and even existence of existing armed services. Inter-service feuds raged
in the US in the late 1940s, as the Air Force demanded investment in long-
range bombers, while the Navy stressed the importance of carrier-borne nuclear
air strikes (technically, the air service was the US Army Air Corps until
September 1947). In 1947, the government leaned toward the air force side by
advancing the B-36 bomber program while canceling a proposed super-aircraft
carrier, the United States. The resulting political furor was so intense as to be
termed the Revolt of the Admirals.
After the Korean War and the ensuing military buildup, the US in effect
elected to support the positions of both the Navy and the Air Force. While
manned bombers initially formed the basis of the SAC, the Navy secured its
new generation of sophisticated aircraft carriers, with their nuclear resources.
That made the Navy incontestably the most powerful force of its kind in the
world. At any given point between 1954 and 1970, the Navy had 20 aircraft
carriers, 20 or 30 cruisers, and 250 destroyers, besides a hundred submarines.
Many US warships had access to nuclear weapons. That arsenal gave the US
enormous power to project its influence globally. From 1950, the US reorga-
nized the official names of its various units around the world. The Seventh
Fleet was and remains a dominant military reality in the Pacific Ocean, and the
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The Second Fleet patrolled the Atlantic and
Caribbean and was at the forefront of the Cuban clash of 1962.
The principle of deterrence demanded that neither side believed that it
could knock out its enemy’s defenses through a sudden surprise attack, in what
was described as a nuclear Pearl Harbor. The quest in these years was for deliv-
ery systems that were effective but survivable, that could withstand such an
early assault. Initially, US nuclear strategy relied on long-range bombers like
the B-36, but long-range attacks were dangerously exposed to interception by
anti-aircraft missiles, as well as by enemy fighters. The US developed aircraft
that could fly much faster and higher than such older models, and which relied
on jets rather than propellers. The first of these all-jet bombers was the B-47
Stratojet which became the centerpiece of the SAC through the 1950s, until it
62 P. JENKINS
was replaced by the B-52 Stratofortress. A significant share of the SAC’s force
would always be in the air, ready to retaliate for any surprise Soviet assault.
The Soviets developed their own bombers, initially by reverse engineering
the American B-29 as the Tupolev Tu-4. However, the lack of forward bases
from which to strike the US homeland demanded a new long-range jet bomber,
which emerged in 1954 as the Myasishchev M-4 Molot (“Hammer”) which the
West knew as the Bison. At least in appearance, this was an extremely sophisti-
cated design that alarmed the Americans. Despite the bomber’s multiple fail-
ings, especially in its limited range, the Soviets successfully gave the impression
that they had built a sizable air fleet, creating an America panic over a “bomber
gap.” More valuable in practice was the Tu-16 Badger, the mainstay of Soviet
bomber forces from 1954 through the end of the Soviet Union: Badger air-
fields usually stood at the top of US target lists in the event of war. Also valu-
able was the very large and propeller-driven Tu-95, the Bear, first introduced
in 1956 and still in service today.
In response to fears of such Soviet air attacks, the US concentrated its mili-
tary resources in the country’s heartland, which bombers could reach far more
slowly than the imperiled coasts. The main American strategic air forces were
concentrated far inland, at centers like Offutt (Nebraska) and Dyess (Texas).
The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) was based in Colorado.
Of course, the Soviets could easily deliver nuclear attacks against US allies in
Europe or the Pacific and could strike US bases and forces overseas.
Missiles
Both sides invested in missile technology and long-range rocketry. The
Germans had set the precedent for this with their wartime V-2 rockets, with a
range of 200 miles, allowing them to target London. Both the Americans and
Soviets benefited from these advances as they captured German scientists at the
end of the war. The Americans initially concentrated on medium-range missiles
that could be used against battlefield targets, principally in Europe, and in
1958 they deployed the new Jupiter missile. Soon, the focus shifted to longer-
range weapons intended to strike the enemy homeland. Under the leadership
of the brilliant rocket engineer Sergei Korolov, the Soviets made rapid prog-
ress, and in 1957, they tested the multi-stage R-7 Semyorka, with an initial
range of 3700 miles, which in later models grew to 5500 miles. This was the
world’s first real intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). By the early 1960s,
the Soviets had deployed their ICBMs, but these proved expensive and difficult
to conceal from Western attack.
Disturbed by Soviet advances, the US deployed their own ICBMs. By 1959,
the SAC had placed the nuclear-armed Atlas missile on combat-ready alert,
prepared to launch within 15 minutes of command. The Atlas itself proved to
have many failings, and it was gradually replaced by the greatly superior Titans.
The Titan I dominated the missile arsenal from 1959 to 1962, when it in turn
was supplanted by the much more powerful Titan II, which could deploy a
4 NUCLEAR PERILS 63
Beneath the Seas
The coming of ICBMs did much to eradicate the geographical obstacles that
had to some measure protected both homelands. Compared to bombers,
ICBMs were much harder to detect and prevent, although it was still theoreti-
cally possible that a pre-emptive attack could strike the missile fields sufficiently
hard to weaken defenses. That fear led the Americans to develop a third deliv-
ery system, namely by missiles launched from submarines, the exact location of
which would remain unknown to enemies. Greatly enhancing the power of
such weapons was the coming of nuclear propulsion technologies in the
mid- 1950s, a trend forcefully advocated and guided by Admiral Hyman
Rickover, known as the Father of the Nuclear Navy. Nuclear engines ensured
that such vessels could remain under water for lengthy periods, with no need
to surface, and they could launch their missiles from underwater. The US
launched its first nuclear submarine in 1954. In 1957, the US armed diesel-
power submarines with missiles, but this was followed by the nuclear subma-
rines of the George Washington class. Each was equipped with 16 Polaris
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In 1960, the George Washington
successfully launched a Polaris SLBM, and the new submarines began regular
patrols. SLBMs came to represent a critical core of US nuclear weaponry. At
every stage, the Soviets closely echoed US developments, launching their first
missiles from submarines only weeks after the Americans. By 1963, the Soviets
too had the capacity to launch SLBMs with live warheads.
In 1960, the US coordinated the various systems into its Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SIOP). By this point, the US was relying on three distinct
systems to deliver nuclear weapons, namely through bombers, submarines, and
land-based ICBMs. The three together constituted the strategic triad, which
remained the basic structure of US strategic defense until the end of the Cold
War. When the US and Soviets engaged in arms limitation talks in the early
64 P. JENKINS
documents that estimated the likely course and effects of a war that “went
nuclear.”
One early US war plan was Operation Dropshot, developed in 1949 at a
time when the country’s nuclear arsenals were quite limited. This imagined a
war in the near future, in 1957. Three hundred nuclear weapons would be used
as part of a much larger assault using conventional bombs, directed against
Soviet industrial centers and, inevitably, the populated cities in which they
stood. A hundred of the nuclear weapons would be concentrated on crippling
Soviet air power on the ground. Also in 1949, the SAC’s first Emergency War
Plan envisaged 133 atomic bombs on 70 Soviet cities within 30 days, which
would be the whole duration of the war. This meant “killing a nation.” But
further discussion suggested that the Soviets would be resilient enough to sur-
vive even such assaults, so that the US should triple the number of cities to be
targeted. By 1956, the Atomic Weapons Requirement Study described 2000
potential Designated Ground Zero targets, including 179 in the Moscow area
alone. Civilian populations were explicitly included on the target list.
The 1949 plans seem modest when compared with those of a decade later.
One harrowing text was prepared for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff during the
tension surrounding Berlin in June 1961, which imagined nuclear war against
the Communist bloc. At the time, the Soviet Union had a population of 217
million. The planners of SIOP-62 estimated that if the US attacked with its full
forces, with 3200 warheads targeting a thousand sites, then the USSR would
lose half its population, or 108 million fatalities. A more limited assault with
bombers, the Alert Force, would use some 1700 nuclear weapons, with the
likely deaths of 80 million.
The sheer numbers of warheads to be used would be vast, too large in fact
to find enough targets to justify their use. This was a recurrent problem with
the SAC plans of LeMay’s era, which began with the number of available war-
heads and tried to find enough targets for them. In the 1961 plan, besides
attacks on obvious military targets—airfields, missile sites, air defense facilities,
and other installations—US forces would strike quite modest Soviet cities with
populations of 50,000 or larger. Beyond the USSR, SIOP envisaged attacks on
Soviet allies, with little distinction according to political subtleties, or the
Communist loyalties of particular populations. Poland would lose perhaps 2.6
million dead. An attack on China would kill an additional hundred million, a
far smaller proportion of the population than the Soviets because of the lower
levels of urban concentration in China. Even so, US planner warned that a pre-
emptive assault could not be guaranteed to eliminate the Soviet potential to
attack the US, so that second and third waves of mutual strikes would be
expected. In October 1962, US preparations for a nuclear strike against the
Soviets would have involved weapons with a combined power of seven thou-
sand megatons.
All these plans can be faulted in many ways, moral and practical, but in ret-
rospect, it is striking how little attention they paid to environmental conse-
quences. At the time, planners did indeed consider the long-term effects of
66 P. JENKINS
radioactive fallout. But nuclear destruction on anything like the imagined scale
would have released incalculably vast amounts of smoke and pollutants into the
air, darkening skies worldwide and transforming the climate, possibly so badly
as to destroy food production. In the 1980s, projections of such outcomes
foresaw a “nuclear winter” that could threaten the continued survival of
humanity, or of life itself.
Landscapes of Survival
The pressing danger of actual war resulted in heavy investment in building
military sites, many of which survive today as material remains of the war that
never was. In the US, most major cities preserve the remnants of the missile
systems that were once deployed to protect population centers against Soviet
attack. Particularly imposing were the defensive installations in which leaders
or elites could survive a nuclear attack, at least for the crucial time necessary to
organize a response. Rival powers massively invested in alternative centers of
command, control, and communication which would replace destroyed formal
centers of government. The result was the creation of a whole alternative geog-
raphy, as potential seats of power developed in highly defended and often secret
locations.
That meant titanic civil engineering projects, tunneling deep within moun-
tains. In 1951, the US began building its vast Raven Rock complex in remote
rural Pennsylvania. This miniature city would serve as an alternative to the
Pentagon and was meant to survive after Washington had been destroyed.
Civilians would take refuge at Virginia’s Mount Weather Emergency Operations
Center. Greenbrier in West Virginia would accommodate a thousand, includ-
ing all 500-plus members of Congress. Construction projects became ever
larger and more ambitious with the threat of thermonuclear weapons. In 1961,
construction began on a fortified headquarters for NORAD at Cheyenne
Mountain in Colorado, where the bunker was intended to survive a nearby
explosion of a hydrogen bomb. The concept of survivable bunkers, so mocked
in Dr. Strangelove, had some basis in reality.
Other countries developed their own bunker systems, very powerful in their
way, although few came near the mightiest US fortifications. As the certain
target of nuclear attack, Britain built a network of bunkers and refuges far from
the center of a London that was clearly doomed. One early center would be
“Burlington,” at Corsham, Central Government War Headquarters, a whole
underground city. A secret train system would allow 4000 government person-
nel to be evacuated to continue the war. Throughout the 1950s, the govern-
ment created a network of Regional Seats of Governments (RSGs) in secluded
areas, from which civil and military authority could still be exercised after the
cities had perished. The construction of deep British bunkers, Underground
Operational Centers, accelerated in 1959–1960 with the growing likelihood
that the Berlin collision would escalate to war. Kelvedon Hatch (Essex) gives a
powerful sense of the underground society that might have survived. In 1959,
4 NUCLEAR PERILS 67
Whose Bombs?
In the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima, the mass media suggested that
nuclear weapons were the product of extremely advanced technology, which
feasibly could be confined to just one nation, the US. That impression helps
explain the shock when the Soviets acquired their weapon. Spies did indeed
play their role in that Soviet achievement, but other countries too showed how
relatively easily an advanced technological society could develop its own
devices. As nuclear pioneer J. Robert Oppenheimer warned in 1945, “They are
not too hard to make. They will be universal if people wish to make them
universal.”1
Such development was all the more essential in a world where nuclear status
was a prerequisite for any claim to Great Power status. Despite being cut off
from US resources, the British detonated their own fission bomb in 1952, with
a fusion weapon in 1957. France followed suit, detonating its thermonuclear
weapon by 1968. By the mid-1960s, the British deployed almost 450 war-
heads, the French 32. The British developed their own delivery systems, nota-
bly the nuclear armed “V-bombers,” like the Vulcan.
The British never fully reconciled the problem of their ultimate dependence
on the US. In 1960, the British agreed to use the new US air launched ballistic
missile, the Skybolt, and accordingly canceled a number of its own missile
programs. That left the country in severe difficulties when in 1962 the
Americans in their turn canceled Skybolt. In desperate need of a substitute,
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan met US President John F. Kennedy
1
“Oppenheimer’s Farewell Speech,” November 2, 1945, https://www.atomicheritage.org/
key-documents/oppenheimers-farewell-speech.
68 P. JENKINS
to plead for an alternative. The Americans agreed to supply Britain with Polaris
missiles, requiring the British to develop their own missile-capable submarines.
From 1968, the submarine force replaced manned bombers as the mainstay of
the country’s nuclear deterrent. The French likewise sought independence
from the US, and from NATO. After Charles de Gaulle became President in
1958, he encouraged the creation of the independent strike force, Force de
Frappe (later the Deterrent Force, Force de Dissuasion). This originally relied
on Mirage bombers, but by the 1970s, the country had a full strategic triad,
incorporating missile silos and nuclear-capable submarines.
The fact that those two countries had joined the nuclear club in itself did not
destabilize the international order, as it was wildly unlikely that either would
use them except as part of a larger Western effort against the Soviets. Nor did
that assumption change when France formally withdrew its forces from NATO
in 1966, as an assertion of geopolitical independence. But other nations had
their ambitions, and these threatened to prove more destabilizing. As we will
see, in the early 1960s, growing tensions with the USSR drove China to assume
ever more independent and even hostile positions, and nuclear weapons were
vital to deter possible aggression from either the Americans or the Soviets.
China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964, its hydrogen bomb in 1967.
Other countries followed. No later than 1966, Israel acquired an opera-
tional nuclear weapon and by the end of the century had created a fully surviv-
able system of delivery mechanisms. By the turn of the century, India, Pakistan,
South Africa, and North Korea made the historic move to nuclear status, with
several other aspirants close behind. That proliferation greatly enhanced the
likelihood that a regional conflict would “go nuclear” and conceivably drag in
one or other of the Superpowers. Concern about the nuclear spread led to
vigorous efforts for non-proliferation from 1965 onward. In 1968, the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signa-
ture, and this came into force in 1970. However, India, Pakistan, and Israel
have never signed the agreement.
Apart from worries about rogue nuclear states, governments were pro-
foundly aware of the risk of nuclear exchanges developing through accident or
malice. On several occasions, technical mishaps or loss of electrical supplies
persuaded one or other superpower that its enemy had begun a nuclear attack,
although on every occasion, each avoided the temptation to retaliate. One of
the very closest calls occurred in May 1967 when a solar flare led Western
forces to assume that the Soviets were jamming their radars as a precursor to
attack. Some nuclear accidents (what the US called Broken Arrow episodes)
were potentially disastrous. In 1961, a US B-52 dropped two hydrogen bombs
on North Carolina, and these came very close to detonation. In 1966, a midair
crash involving another B-52 released four similar bombs over Spain, causing
some contamination. Another truly perilous event occurred at Thule, in
Greenland, in 1968, when yet another bomber crashed and spilled four bombs.
That disaster raised an ugly question. If the Thule monitoring station had been
4 NUCLEAR PERILS 69
destroyed by accidental detonation, it was highly likely that the US would have
decided that it had fallen victim to Soviet assault, and would have retaliated
accordingly.
Further Reading
See also Ian Klinke, Cryptic Concrete: A Subterranean Journey into Cold War
Germany (2018).
One aspect of US biological and chemical warfare research is the subject of
Stephen Kinzer, Poisoner in Chief: Sidney Gottlieb and the CIA Search for
Mind Control (2019).
For the impact of military research on scientists and the scientific community,
see Paul Rubinson, Redefining Science: Scientists, the National Security State,
and Nuclear Weapons in Cold War America (2016); and Audra J. Wolfe,
Freedom’s Laboratory: The Cold War Struggle for the Soul of Science (2020).
Parallel Soviet debates are the subject of Hiroshi Ichikawa, Soviet Science and
Engineering in the Shadow of the Cold War (2019). See also Alex Abella,
Soldiers of Reason: The RAND Corporation and the Rise of the American
Empire (2008); and Annie Jacobsen, The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored
History of DARPA, America’s Top Secret Military Research Agency (2015).
For some of the obvious ethical issues associated with weapons research, see
James L. Nolan, Atomic Doctors: Conscience and Complicity at the Dawn of
the Nuclear Age (2020).
For the manufacture of nuclear materials, see Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear
Families, Atomic Cities, and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium
Disasters (2013).
CHAPTER 5
Asian Theaters
On April 12, 1951, a savage air battle developed in the skies above North
Korea. The US had dispatched a fleet of 48 B-29 bombers, protected by 100
fighters. They were attacked by 30 fast and maneuverable MiG-15 jet fighters,
piloted by Soviet or Soviet-trained pilots. The US lost three of the powerful
and expensive B-29s, with several more badly damaged, forcing a halt of several
months in the bombing campaign against the Communist north. The US
reduced its daytime attacks and turned to night raids. US flyers remembered
this grave setback as “Black Thursday.”
The combat illustrates many aspects of the Cold War, including the crucial
significance of conventional weapons in a world otherwise focused on nuclear
arms. It also reminds us of the direct fighting that broke out on occasion
between US- and Soviet-backed forces and not necessarily through proxies.
Above all, it indicates the critical significance of Asian theaters of conflict in the
global confrontation. By 1951, while the Korean War was still raging,
Communist or Communist-led insurgencies were flaring in Malaya, Indo-
China, and the Philippines, and that was quite apart from the violent consoli-
dation of Communist power in progress in China itself. It required little
imagination to believe that, in the words of the later anthem of China’s Cultural
Revolution, “The East is Red.” If Europe offered the most likely trigger for
global war, then Asian conflicts posed their special dangers. It was in Korea and
Vietnam that Americans engaged in the bitterest armed conflict with
Communist foes. The complexity of those Asian situations grew as the
Communist bloc fractured, revealing stark divisions between Soviet and
Chinese interests.
Liberation and Loss
Asian Communism achieved its greatest victory in China. The vast country
had been in political chaos since the fall of its ancient Empire in 1911, and
Communist forces emerged as a significant faction in the 1920s, under the
leadership of Mao Zedong. Although they maintained a guerrilla struggle,
they could make little headway against the Nationalist government led by
military commander Chiang Kai-Shek (Jiang Jieshi), who ruled the country
from 1926. With major US aid, Chiang led China against Japanese invasion
and occupation. After 1945, civil war resumed between the Nationalists—the
Guomindang or KMT—and the Communists. In October 1949, Communist
forces secured control of China, proclaiming a new People’s Republic (PRC),
which the US would know as Red China. That triumph extended Communist
rule over the world’s most populous nation, with its 400 million citizens. The
new state closely followed the precedents of Lenin and Stalin in eradicating
traces of the old pre-revolutionary order and hurrying to establish party con-
trol over all aspects of life. Within a few years after the Liberation, purges of
real and alleged class enemies had claimed several million lives.
American concern about the new situation was vastly enhanced by the long-
standing US hopes that China would become a modern state on Christian and
American lines. This would ideally be a counter-example to exploitative
European imperialism. US churches, Protestant and Catholic, were appalled at
the destruction of their missions in China. Chiang Kai-Shek often exploited his
own credentials as a Christian (Methodist) leader. The question of “Who lost
China?” became an explosive issue in US politics, further galvanizing the quest
for surreptitious Communist agents in the administration.
Chiang’s Nationalist government, with its armed forces, fled to Taiwan,
which in these years was often known internationally by its Portuguese colonial
name of Formosa, the “beautiful island.” The KMT initially controlled Hainan
and some smaller islands, although PRC forces took Hainan in 1950. The
76 P. JENKINS
KMT established their new regime with extreme brutality and had already
undertaken an appalling massacre of local Taiwanese populations in 1947.
After 1949, they began the bloody era that was remembered as the White
Terror. Initially, the US saw little hope of defending that rump regime, but in
the 1950s, it acknowledged Chiang’s government as the authentic government
of the whole of China. In 1954, the US signed a mutual defense treaty with
this tiny Republic of China, or ROC, which held a permanent seat in the
United Nations Security Council until 1971. From the PRC perspective, it
meant that predatory foreign regimes were supporting a rebel province in
secession from the homeland.
Korea
Communist victory in China opened the door for further expansion into much
of East and Southeast Asia. A kind of “domino theory” was well entrenched in
American views of the region long before the outbreak of the Vietnam conflict.
The most urgent situation developed in Korea, which had since 1910 been
incorporated into the Japanese Empire. In 1945, the peninsula was divided
into two occupation zones separate by the 38th parallel. In 1948, South Korea
declared its statehood as the Republic of Korea (ROK) under the robustly anti-
Communist Syngman Rhee. As in Taiwan, Rhee’s regime was ruthless and
violent, and bloodily suppressed leftist risings. The Soviet-occupied North
became the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK, under the
Stalinist Kim Il-Sung, who ruled until 1994. The 38th Parallel became a peril-
ous new frontier in the Cold War. From mid-1949, Kim had been seeking
Stalin’s permission to invade the South. After some hesitation, Stalin granted
that in April 1950, with the condition that Mao would supply forces if needed.
On June 25, the DPRK invaded the South, arousing panic far beyond the pen-
insula itself.
In response, President Truman persuaded the United Nations to condemn
the invasion and to provide military assistance to the ROK. The Soviets could
have vetoed the resolution, but since 1950, they had boycotted proceedings in
protest at the refusal to give the PRC the Chinese seat on the Security Council.
The ensuing military effort was thus technically a United Nations campaign,
although there was never any doubt about the central role of US forces. United
Nations combat strength peaked at around a million, which included 600,000
ROK forces and 320,000 Americans. (In all, 1.8 million Americans served in
the theater.) British and Commonwealth forces contributed significantly to the
Allied effort, as did contingents from 20 other nations, including Turkey and
Ethiopia. The diverse character of the war effort was invaluable for propaganda
purposes, as it suggested a global effort against aggression ultimately directed
by Stalin, rather than an equally balanced struggle between the superpowers.
That international context profoundly affected the conduct of the war, as the
US had of necessity to take account of Allied views, which would often be more
reluctant to risk open conflict with the great Communist powers.
5 ASIAN THEATERS 77
The North Korean invasion won rapid successes, occupying most of the
South, and confining US and Allied forces to a besieged bastion around the
southeastern city of Pusan, which could be supplied by sea. In August, that
Pusan Perimeter was in a sense, the military front line of the Cold War. The
balance of the war changed fundamentally in September when General
MacArthur, whose military career was nothing like as unfailingly brilliant as his
publicists proclaimed, devised a masterly counter-attack. Between September
15 and 19, a UN force of 75,000 landed in the port city of Inchon, far behind
Communist lines. This Operation Chromite was a very high-risk venture, but
it succeeded thoroughly. UN forces liberated Seoul on September 25 and
crossed the 38th Parallel into the North. The UN captured the Northern capi-
tal of Pyongyang in October 1950. It was reasonable to think that the war was
won and in a decisive defeat for Communism.
MacArthur then made a grave blunder, pushing his advance throughout the
North, and approaching the country’s borders with China, at the Yalu River.
Consciously or otherwise, his move was seen as threatening China itself. Since
the start of the war, the Soviet and Chinese governments had discussed deploy-
ing Chinese forces in support of the North Koreans, but the new situation
demanded a Chinese response. In late October, a massive Chinese force crossed
the Yalu River, defeating ROK units, and soon encountering the Americans.
This began an expansive new phase in the war, and by March 1951 the front
line once again extended well into the south.
MacArthur proposed a drastic widening of the conflict. That would include
bombing across the Chinese border, and probably using nuclear weapons
against military staging areas. He planned to use ROC Nationalist forces for a
direct invasion of China. Whatever its military virtues, the plan was deeply
dangerous, in drawing the US into direct conflict not just with China, but with
the Soviet Union. It was perilous in constitutional terms, as MacArthur was, in
effect, trying to direct US foreign policy in a matter of the utmost sensitivity.
The general’s role in winning the Pacific War against Japan had made him
immensely popular, arousing fears that the civilian government was losing con-
trol of its military: he was looking alarmingly like an “American Caesar.”
Truman relieved MacArthur, from his command and ending the immediate
prospect of expansive escalation. By June 1951, the battle lines had stabilized
at a frontier close to the 38th parallel. Meanwhile, the US maintained a punish-
ing air campaign against the North, which in the whole war involved dropping
635,000 tons of bombs, including 32,500 tons of napalm.
The expanded war brought US and Allied forces into direct combat with
units from the Soviets as well as China. The Soviets had substantial ground
forces on the Yalu border and offered extensive support to Communist allies in
the peninsular itself. By 1952, some 25,000 Soviet personnel were involved in
the conflict.
The Soviets were heavily engaged in the air war that now developed. Since
the closing phases of the Second World War, military airpower had moved
overwhelmingly to using jet engines, as the speed and power of aircraft had
78 P. JENKINS
grown steadily. A typical wartime fighter like the Spitfire operated at 350 MPH,
compared to the 650 MPH of the swept-wing Mikoyan-Gurevich (MiG)-15
that entered service in 1949. America’s first jet fighter, the P-80 Shooting Star
(1945) approached 600 MPH. Initially, many observers meant that such high
speeds made impossible the kind of dogfights between rival fliers that had been
such a notable feature of the two world wars, but that assumption proved
incorrect. In November 1950, an American P-80 shot down two MiG-15s in
the first example of a dogfight between jet aircraft. But the Americans faced
real challenges. Flying under North Korean or Chinese colors, Soviet pilots
wreaked havoc in UN air forces until the US developed an effective response in
the form of its F-86 Sabres. Sabres and MiG-15s were often engaged in battles
in what became known as MiG Alley, in the northern part of North Korea and
its Chinese border. Ultimately, the US won a decisive victory in the air, with a
“kill ratio” of ten to one—that is, ten enemy aircraft were destroyed for every
one of its own lost.
Korea initiated a long-term race for superiority between US and Soviet
equipment, as each new generation of fighters acquired iconic significance as a
symbol for the power and technological skill for its own side. That reputation
translated into impressive sales to each side’s respective allies and sympathizers.
Forty countries flew the MiG-15, including not just the whole East Bloc and
China, but also emerging African and Asian countries. Thirty countries oper-
ated the F-86 Sabre. Including aircraft built under license, at least 18,000
MiG-15s were built, as against 10,000 Sabres. Scarcely less successful were
their respective successors: the MiG-21, which entered service in 1959 and
which flew in the colors of 60 nations; and America’s F-4 Phantom. That com-
petition continued for decades.
Hearts and Minds
Beyond the military aspects, the two sides fought an intense propaganda war.
Prisoners of war were a deeply sensitive issue. The United Nations took tens of
thousands of North Korean and Chinese prisoners, but the camps in which
they were housed proved violent and unruly, as Communists maintained their
disciplined organizations. Camp uprisings were bloody, especially those at
Geoje in 1952. This proved a microcosm of the bitter violence between the
two Korean sides throughout the war, which was often manifested in massacres
and atrocities.
Communist forces levied heavy pressure on Allied prisoners to make them
issue statements denouncing their own cause. That pressure included conven-
tional means of torture, but Allied forces were shocked to observe the appar-
ently voluntary conversion of American and other soldiers to Communist
thought-ways. Adapting a Chinese phrase for re-education, Western observers
described the process of involuntary conversion or programming as “brain-
washing,” which achieved sensational status through Western media and fic-
tional productions. The best known was The Manchurian Candidate, Richard
Condon’s 1959 novel, which became a film in 1962. The story involves a
5 ASIAN THEATERS 79
Mao’s China
The Korean experience made both sides keenly aware of the potential for future
conflict in the region. For the Chinese, the threat of a possible Western assault
on the homeland put an urgent premium on rapid development and modern-
ization. It encouraged the very hardline attitudes of Mao Zedong, who wished
to see a united Communist world front acting aggressively against the West.
That position contributed to his rejection of Soviet de-stalinization policies
after 1956, with its attendant moves to peaceful coexistence, and widened the
growing schism between the two great Communist powers. By the early 1960s,
China was openly denouncing Premier Khrushchev as a counter-revolutionary.
The loss of faith in the USSR allowed Mao to position himself as the leading
edge of the global revolution and the true heir to Stalin. The country furiously
pursued its independent nuclear program. Mao’s urgent commitment to
growth and development led to disaster in the late 1950s with an ill-considered
dash to industrialization at the expense of food production. The Great Leap
Forward (1958–1962) crippled the country and caused tens of millions of
deaths from famine. The catastrophe left Mao deeply vulnerable within the
Party hierarchy.
As the MacArthur affair of 1951 had suggested, US links with the ROC on
Taiwan gave them a potential springboard for future military action. But
Taiwan was vulnerable to Communist attack, and barely a hundred miles sep-
arated the island from the PRC mainland. Communist forces repeatedly tried
to seize smaller islands in the Taiwan Strait, and invasion was often feared.
The two sides engaged in artillery duels for the Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu
Islands. Two confrontations, in particular, were singularly dangerous. One
clash in 1954–1955 led to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending the use
of nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland, although President
Eisenhower resisted. The Americans were especially conscious of the political
consequences of another nuclear attack on East Asian targets, which would
send a disastrous message about the racial implications of the weapon. Under
the threat of heavy intervention, and lacking a Soviet willingness to retaliate
in nuclear kind, the PRC was forced to negotiate. During a second Taiwan
Straits struggle in 1958, the US deployed substantial air, ground, and sea
forces to Taiwan, and equipped the ROC with sophisticated fighters, greatly
enhancing their combat abilities. Using advanced and Sidewinder air-to-air
missiles, the ROC won significant victories in air combat, and again, the PRC
backed down from its artillery attacks. Perhaps a thousand personnel perished
on both sides. Recent research has shown that once again in this crisis, the US
came close to deploying nuclear weapons against the PRC.
As in Eastern Europe, the US pursued a forward policy through the support
of partisan and guerrilla forces on Chinese soil. The main theater of action was
in Tibet, which was historically controlled by China but which had slipped
away during the years of anarchy. The PRC reoccupied and annexed the terri-
tory in 1950–1951. The CIA supported uprisings and armed guerrilla
5 ASIAN THEATERS 81
Asian Confrontations
The Communist triumph in China offered a powerful stimulus to revolution-
ary movements throughout the region, which duly alarmed the US. Communists
led or influenced the anti-colonial revolutions that emerged in the post-war
years. The US ruled the Philippines until 1946 and retained a strong influence
in the country thereafter. During the Second World War, left-wing peasant
guerrillas organized to fight the Japanese occupation, forming the Hukbalahap
(Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, or the Nation’s Army Against the Japanese).
Some “Huks” continued their activities against the post-war Philippine gov-
ernment. In 1950, they formed a People’s Liberation Army, a name that paid
direct tribute to Mao’s forces. The US strongly supported the government,
which substantially defeated the rebels by 1954. Apart from securing the
Philippines in the US cause, the revolt powerfully influenced the US response
to the challenge it would shortly face in Indo-China. US successes against the
Huks convinced Americans that they stood an excellent chance of defeating
Communist insurgencies elsewhere in the region. In 1952, the US Army
formed its elite Special Forces, which would lead many such campaigns.
The US also gained hope from the outcome of the struggle in the resource-
rich British colony of Malaya. In 1948, Communist forces began a guerrilla
insurrection under its leader, Chin Peng, and drawing chiefly on the ethnic
Chinese population. The resulting struggle lasted until 1960 and was techni-
cally referred to as an “emergency” so that local firms would not lose their
insurance coverage, which they would in the event of an actual war. But war or
emergency, severe fighting lasted until the British won their counter-insurgency
campaign. They successfully used tactics that would later become famous in
Vietnam, including search and destroy sweeps against guerrillas, and “hearts
and minds” campaigns to secure local loyalties. Also, the British grant of inde-
pendence in 1957 undermined nationalist demands.
The other great source of Western concern, and Communist hopes, was
Indonesia, the former Dutch East Indies. The country was formed in a sweep-
ing nationalist revolution against Dutch authorities in the 1940s, and it was
one of the most populous in Asia, with 88 million citizens in 1960, half the size
of the US itself. It was already the world’s largest Muslim nation and was des-
tined to be a regional powerhouse. As often happened in these years, the coun-
try’s charismatic leader in its struggle for independence remained to lead the
new nation and became dictatorial. From 1945, Indonesia’s leader was Sukarno
(known only by a single name). After experimenting with democracy, in 1959
he established a dictatorship and swung to the radical left. He allied with the
Communist Party of Indonesia, or PKI, which at the time was the world’s
82 P. JENKINS
Indo-China
Indo-China offered the most enduring setting for East-West rivalry. In 1945, a
gravely weakened France resumed control of its imperial realm in the territo-
ries, but it faced determined resistance from the Communist-led Viet Minh
movement. This had been founded to resist Japanese occupation in 1941, and
throughout the war, it received support from both the US and the
ROC. Although not explicitly Communist, the organization was de facto con-
trolled by the Communist Party of Vietnam, and its key leaders were the
Communists Ho Chi Minh, and the military commander Vo Nguyen Giap.
After some negotiation with the French, full-scale war began in 1946.
At first, the Viet Minh fought a widespread guerrilla war against the French,
but in 1949 this expanded into a larger conflict involving conventional weap-
ons and tactics. The Soviets and Chinese supplied aid to the Viet Minh, and the
Americans gave support and equipment to the French. Local conditions placed
severe limits on the usefulness of American military largesse. Vietnam offered a
poor setting for tanks and armored warfare, and the cover offered by the jungle
setting made air attacks and supply difficult. By 1950, the French were contem-
plating the prospect of defeat, but they recovered to win some victories, press-
ing Viet Minh forces into narrow bastions and crushing them. General Giap
however proved a strong opponent, using tactics highly appropriate for the
terrain, including skilled artillery use, and deploying heavy anti-aircraft batter-
ies. The Viet Minh followed Mao Zedong in drawing on mass popular support,
especially among the peasantry.
By early 1954, the Viet Minh controlled most of the territory of what would
later become North Vietnam and the northern portions of the later South.
French military hopes were then concentrated on a fortified base at Dien Bien
Phu, deep in Communist-controlled territory, which would rely on air supply.
5 ASIAN THEATERS 83
The Viet Minh severed supply routes and besieged the base, making conditions
impossible for the defenders. The desperate French appealed for US aid, and
the US devised drastic schemes to rescue the garrison, variously involving B-29
bombing raids from the Philippines or raids from the Seventh Fleet, and the
use of nuclear weapons was considered. This Operation Vulture was however
rejected by President Eisenhower, partly because of the British refusal to sup-
port intervention. The French garrison faced a humiliating surrender in May
1954. Other fighting continued for some months, but the war was effectively
ended, at a cost of perhaps half a million dead or missing on both sides, in addi-
tion to several hundred thousand civilians. Even before formal US interven-
tion, this First Indo-China War had already claimed close to perhaps
800,000 lives.
The Viet Minh had reasonable expectations that they would take control of
the whole region. The international conference held at Geneva recognized the
17th parallel as a temporary and provisional demarcation line between the
Communist North and the non-Communist South. Over the following
months, the conference moved toward approving the unification of the two
parts following elections, but the US and the Soviets disagreed about the exact
mechanisms. Meanwhile, the anti-Communist South was consolidating as a
state, initially under the leadership of the Emperor, Bao Dai, and then under
his Prime Minister, Ngo Dinh Diem. In 1955, Diem became president of a
new Republic of Vietnam, which confronted the Northern Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, or DRV. That division violated the spirit of the Geneva
accords and left the North Vietnamese with good legal grounds for their anger.
Beyond the obvious reasons for opposing Communist rule, anti-Communist
elites were often Catholic in addition to being strongly Westernized, and the
religious element added to the conflict and the militancy. Following the depar-
ture of the French, the US became a critical supporter of South Vietnam.
Beijing, through their North Vietnamese allies. The North Vietnamese them-
selves frequently stressed the independence of Southern forces and the Viet
Cong, in order to avoid charges that they were violating the Geneva Accords.
In fact, North Vietnamese directed those activities throughout, and the direct
role of the North Vietnam Army (NVA) grew steadily after direct US interven-
tion weakened the Southern guerrilla. As in Korea, the Soviets and Chinese
offered massive aid to the DRV. That included Chinese military personnel to
support air defense. Beyond the obvious incentive to exploit a weak point in
the anti-Communist world, the two Communist powers were competing for
influence at a time when relations between them were becoming openly hos-
tile. Mao himself pushed hard for aggressive action in the region.
Yet North Vietnam was never a mere puppet of either China or the Soviets,
and the country’s rigid Communist ideology was always combined with a
potent strand of nationalism and national independence. That did not make
the country any less Communist, or anything like the neutralist and purely
nationalist cause of which some Western observers dreamed, with all the poten-
tial that might offer for drawing all Vietnam’s factions into a genuine national
coalition. But the country was fighting a local war on what it regarded as its
own territory.
The question of intention had far-reaching policy effects, notably in shaping
US understanding of the issue at stake in the war. If, in fact, the pressure in
South Vietnam was part of a systematic Communist strategy, then Western
defeat there would immediately be followed by new efforts against other coun-
tries: perhaps Japan or India would be the next dominoes to fall. But if North
Vietnam was indeed an independent actor, then Communist ambitions would
stop at control of the whole country, and perhaps Laos and Cambodia. At the
same time, the global conspiracy approach misled the US into assuming that
placing pressure on Moscow would automatically limit Communist advances in
South Vietnam. That view became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The harder the
pressure the US placed on North Vietnam, the more that country would be
forced to depend on its Soviet and Chinese mentors and guardians.
1964. Politically, the South Vietnamese regime was descending into chaos, in
the face not just of the Communist insurgency, but of religious tensions
between Catholics and Buddhists. The South Vietnamese military (the Army
of the Republic of Vietnam or ARVN) showed itself unwilling or unable to
meet the challenges, demanding an ever greater role for direct US military
involvement. Kennedy placed special hopes in Special Forces units of the kind
originally designed to resist Soviet advances in Europe, but which seemed to
offer good potential for the ongoing guerrilla conflict in Vietnam. In November
1963, the Diem regime was removed in a military coup in which Diem himself
was killed. The exact role of the US in the affair is still debated, although the
CIA probably did not foresee Diem’s death. Regardless of the circumstances,
the coup left the new government still more dependent on US aid and
assistance.
President Kennedy’s assassination a few weeks later changed little in prac-
tice, despite some suggestions that in his last days he was growing nervous with
the involvement. Politically, he could not afford to be known as the president
who lost Indo-China. The incoming president, Lyndon B Johnson, was no less
determined to defend South Vietnam. That August, two US warships in the
Gulf of Tonkin reported attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats, although
these reports were misleading. Nevertheless, the Johnson administration per-
suaded Congress to support the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which allowed the
US “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces
of the United States and to prevent further aggression.”1 Only two US senators
voted against what became a political blank check for US escalation in what
Americans call the Vietnam War and which the Vietnamese themselves would
recall as the Resistance War Against America. Vietnam became the central front
in the Cold War, which became the setting for very hot, and overt, conflict.
Direct US involvement reached its height between 1965 and 1969. One
symbolic moment occurred in March 1965, with the arrival of 3500 Marines at
Da Nang, beginning the US ground war. The number of US troops in the
country reached 400,000 in 1966, half a million by 1967, and still remained at
330,000 in 1970, even after withdrawal had begun. The US invested hugely in
the war effort, which cost US$140 billion from 1961 through 1975—
approaching a trillion in modern dollar terms. US strategy relied on total con-
trol of the air, and the ability to move troops rapidly into combat zones. The
US built vast facilities such as the Da Nang base, which at its height was the
hub of more intense air traffic than any other airport or base in the world. The
port at Cam Ranh Bay became a critical center for the US supply and logistics
system. US military fatalities give some idea of the escalation in US
involvement. Fewer than 2000 perished in 1965 and 6000 in 1966. The
figures were 11,000 in 1967, 17,000 in 1968, and 12,000 in 1969 (all figures
rounded).
1
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=
3&psid=4088.
86 P. JENKINS
Air Wars
Communist forces in the South were constantly supplied by the Ho Chi Minh
trail and from bases in North Vietnam. This posed critical dangers for the US,
which was initially reluctant to launch direct attacks on a nation that was
directly allied to the USSR and China. In February 1965, President Johnson
initiated direct raids on the North in Operation Rolling Thunder, beginning a
three-year campaign in which the US dropped 643,000 tons of bombs. North
Vietnamese defenses rapidly improved with the growth of anti-aircraft batteries
and surface-to-air missiles and Soviet-made interceptor fighters. By 1967, a
sustained air war was raging over North Vietnam, in which the US would in all
lose over 900 aircraft. Throughout the war, the US faced the recurrent dilemma
of just how far it could feasibly extend air attacks to defeat the enemy war effort
without igniting a major power conflict. Attacks on Haiphong and other har-
bors through which supplies were imported might accidentally strike Soviet or
5 ASIAN THEATERS 87
Chinese ships or personnel, raising the risk of direct confrontation. They were
right to be nervous In the Fall of 1965, the Soviet General Staff recommended
responding to Johnson’s bombing by a military demonstration against West
Berlin. (Civilian authorities dismissed the idea in horror.)
Regardless of its military effectiveness, the bombing campaign was a won-
derful gift to anti-war activism, not least in providing memorable visual images
of bombs and bombers. Such themes had a special impact in countries that had
themselves such dreadful memories of air attacks against cities in the Second
World War, both in Europe and Japan. The air campaign produced a crop of
American prisoners of war, whose fate became central to negotiations. But even
if North Vietnam itself was targeted, that still did not stem the flow of supplies
along the Ho Chi Minh trail, which were located in the independent nations of
Cambodia and Laos. Not until 1970 did US forces move directly against
Cambodia, with a smaller venture against Laos the following year.
In sharp contrast to the Korean War, the US faced intense anti-war activism
over its involvement in Vietnam. Anti-war movements flourished without the
harsh restraints they might have known in earlier years and gained mass appeal
at a time when the war was fought by military conscripts. Protesters targeted
the draft system, and many men burned draft cards. Public protests and dem-
onstrations regularly attracted tens of thousands in mid-decade, swelling into
the hundreds of thousands by 1969. As we will see, the movement inspired
mass anti-war and anti-American sentiment around the world.
Further Reading
For the long-term context of the various Cold War crises in Asia, see Michael
H. Hunt and Steven I. Levine, Arc of Empire: America’s Wars in Asia from
the Philippines to Vietnam (2012); and Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins
of the American Alliance System in Asia (2016); Colleen Woods, Freedom
Incorporated: Anticommunism and Philippine Independence in the Age of
Decolonization (2020).
The emergence of China’s Communist state is described in Frank Dikötter, The
Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution, 1945–1957 (2013)
and see also Frank Dikötter, The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History,
1962–1976 (2016). See also Yang Jisheng, The World Turned Upside Down:
A history History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Translated and edited
by Stacy Mosher and Guo Jian (2021). For the US response to the Chinese
revolution, see Kevin Peraino, A Force so Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth
of Modern China, 1949 (2017). Julia Lovell discusses Maoism: A Global
History (2019), and Lorenz M. Lüthi traces The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War
in the Communist World (2008). For global aspects of that schism, see
Jeremy S. Friedman, Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the
Third World (2015). For the US role in Tibet, see Bruce Riedel, JFK’s
Forgotten Crisis (2015).
Bruce Cumings is the author of The Korean War (2010), and also see
Charles J. Hanley, Ghost Flames (2020). H. W. Brands describes the 1951
crisis in that conflict in The General v. the President: MacArthur and
Truman at the Brink of Nuclear War (2016). Samuel F. Wells Jr. examines
the war’s wider impact in Fearing the Worst: How Korea Transformed the
Cold War (2020).
For Eisenhower and the successive Asian crises, see Jim Newton, Eisenhower:
The White House Years (2011); and William I. Hitchcock, The Age of
Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s (2018).
2
Quoted in “Guevara: ‘Create Two, Three, Many Vietnams,’” The Militant October 14, 1996,
at https://www.themilitant.com/1996/6036/6036_33.html.
5 ASIAN THEATERS 89
For the religious theme in US attitudes to Asia, see for instance Seth Jacobs,
America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and
U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950–1957 (2004).
The Indo-China War is the subject of Ted Morgan, Valley of Death: The Tragedy
at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War (2010); Fredrik
Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s
Vietnam (2012); and Pierre Asselin, Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War,
1954–1965 (2013). For the American phase of the Vietnam War, see Lien-
Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for
Peace in Vietnam (2012); Max Hastings, Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy,
1945–1975 (2018); and Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale
and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (2018).
CHAPTER 6
In his 1958 novel Our Man in Havana, Graham Greene observed, “If a
country is surrounded, as Russia is, it will try to punch a hole through from
inside.” On multiple occasions, the Soviets did indeed succeed in overcoming
that encirclement, to acquire a potent global role.1
Europe’s Decline
In 1945, European powers still ruled most of Africa and Asia, but that domi-
nance had largely evaporated by 1965. Of itself, that tectonic change had very
little to do with the Cold War, or with rivalries between the new superpowers.
Initially, there were hopes that the emerging nations might somehow escape
from that global polarization and achieve real non-alignment. In 1952, French
demographer Alfred Sauvy coined the term “Third World” for those nations,
which would be neither Communist nor capitalist. In 1955, a conference held
at Bandung in Indonesia brought together the new and very populous states in
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, raising hopes of a global power bloc. But in
the circumstances of the 1950s, visions of neutralism were difficult to maintain,
as each superpower sought to extend its power and influence to counter-act that
of its rival. The governments of India, China, and Indonesia all aspired to lead
such an emerging world, but China was firmly committed to the Soviet alliance,
and Communist influence would grow in Indonesia over the next decade.
India, too, was very friendly to the Soviets. In that instance, the relationship
was in no sense subservient: India was stable and democratic and was able to
accept friendly overtures without compromising its integrity. India gravitated
to the Soviet Union without forfeiting either its neutral stance, or its close
relationship with other Western powers, especially Britain, and that in turn
allowed the country to serve as an easy diplomatic conduit between rival pow-
ers. Khrushchev strongly cultivated India, declaring support for its positions in
its rivalry with Pakistan. The Soviets actually gave India more aid and support
than they did to China. In 1961, India was allowed the full rights and technol-
ogy needed to build MiG-21 fighters, a privilege that the Soviets had refused
to Mao. The Soviet-Indian relationship became even closer as the Sino-Soviet
schism became overt. This friendship was important during India’s frequent
clashes with Pakistan, which aligned with the US, and also with China. Tensions
reached a climax in 1971 when Pakistan tried to suppress the independence
movement in its eastern province, which became Bangladesh. Indian military
victory over Pakistan was a vital proxy success for Moscow, which discomfited
both the Chinese and the Americans.
But other emerging countries were far weaker and less stable than India,
opening a rich potential field for superpower manipulation and competition. In
1946, George Kennan had drawn attention to Soviet actions to remove or
discredit Western forces, creating a vacuum into which they themselves
could expand.
1
Graham Greene, Our Man in Havana (London: Heinemann, 1958), 188.
6 DECOLONIZATION AND THIRD WORLD STRUGGLES 93
On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and
influence of Western Powers [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. On
this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial
administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in
Western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment
among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encour-
aged to seek independence of Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political
machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respec-
tive colonial areas when independence is achieved.2
That offered a good sketch of Soviet ambitions in many regions over the
next quarter century. Of course, the US would be just as adept in the arts of
subversion and the control of Third World puppets. So were Britain and France.
Struggles and revolutions within the emerging world often raised the ques-
tion of ideological conflict. Sometimes, that content was unambiguous. The
revolutionary movement in Malaya was openly directed by the Communist
Party and fought by the Party’s military wing. In other situations, Communists
might play a far more limited role, making the nature of the conflict more con-
troversial. Such circumstances offered the opportunity for right-wing forces to
portray their enemies as Communist-directed and Communist-inspired, with
the goal of discrediting them. That question would long agonize interpreta-
tions of revolutionary movements around the Global South. It served to dis-
credit new anti-colonial regimes when they could be successfully stigmatized as
tools of Moscow.
2
“Telegram: The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” February 22,
1946, at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm.
94 P. JENKINS
Secretary of State was the hawkish John Foster Dulles, whose brother Allen
Dulles headed the CIA. Eisenhower himself was committed to covert opera-
tions as part of his wider “New Look” in defense policy.
This new establishment was very open to charges that Mosaddegh was no
mere patriot, rather a secret ally of the USSR, who was strongly supported by
Iran’s Communist Party, the Tudeh. His government included one open
Tudeh member. British and US intelligence agencies combined to destabilize
Mosaddegh, organizing mass protests, and mobilizing Islamic leaders and the
military. As Mosaddegh struggled to hold his position, he confirmed every sug-
gestion that he was a ruthless dictator in waiting. The Shah successfully dis-
missed Mosaddegh, destroying his reform efforts: Mosaddegh faced lengthy
imprisonment. The Shah meanwhile built a new authoritarian regime strongly
committed to the West. In 1955, Iran was incorporated into the British-led
Baghdad Pact or Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) which integrated
Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan into an anti-Soviet front. The departure of Iraq
from CENTO in 1959 left the grouping as an alliance of the leading non-Arab
Muslim powers.
The coup against Mosaddegh left a long record of grievance in Iran itself. It
also established a potent theme in leftist propaganda worldwide, suggesting
that any attempt to resist Western dominance—whether formal or informal—
would result in a regime being misleadingly depicted as Communist, and over-
thrown by Western plotting. Allegations of CIA plots found a villainous human
face in the form of Allen Dulles.
Arab Nationalism
During the 1950s, the rise of Arab nationalism provided the Soviets some criti-
cal bastions in the region. From the Western perspective, that was so critical
because it offered the possibility of the Soviets subverting or invading oil-rich
nations, especially in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf. Although neither super-
power launched major military interventions in the region, both sides were
deeply involved in clandestine activities, in influencing opinion, supporting dis-
sidents, and on occasion sponsoring military coups. Ultimately, the West main-
tained its position in the Arabian Peninsula itself, but the Soviets secured
impressive victories.
Religion offered an essential context here. Across the region, Islam was the
predominant faith, and in most nations, in its Sunni form. Muslim clergy
tended to be highly conservative, anti-Communist, and traditional-minded.
But progressive and anti-imperial forces were rising, including Communists in
some nations, alongside nationalist and pan-Arab movements. In the
mid-1950s, both Britain and France were deeply concerned about the rising
power of Arab nationalism, which at that stage was quite distinct from religious
or Islamic themes. From 1954, the French were engaged in a prolonged war
against nationalists in Algeria, while the British were alarmed at the influence
of Egypt’s radical nationalists, led by the country’s new leader Gamal Abdul
6 DECOLONIZATION AND THIRD WORLD STRUGGLES 95
Nasser. Egypt was so important because it was the most populous Arab state,
with enormous cultural influence. Nasser supported the guerrillas in Algeria,
and in 1956 he nationalized the Suez Canal, the traditional main artery of the
British empire. Britain and France attempted to destroy Nasser’s regime, fol-
lowing a policy that they had often employed in earlier eras. But the venture
proved disastrous and helped bring Arab politics into the Cold War era.
In 1956, Britain and France arranged what seemed like a perfect arrange-
ment, by which Israel would engage Egypt in war, allowing the two European
powers to intervene militarily to establish peace. That would restore control of
the Suez Canal, and discredit Arab nationalism. The scheme proved a historic
fiasco, as the Soviets threatened a nuclear attack on Britain and France. But the
Americans were no more sympathetic to attempts to restore European imperi-
alism. President Eisenhower condemned the action and threatened to use ruin-
ous financial pressure against the allies. The European powers withdrew, in a
humiliation that marked the end of the British Empire as an independent global
power. Henceforward, British dependence on US military and financial might
was laid bare.
Syria and Iraq
The failure of the Suez venture gave an enormous propaganda boost to Nasser
and to secular nationalism across the Arab Middle East. Other rising move-
ments included the Arab Ba’ath (Renaissance) Party, which established roots in
the former French and British possessions of Syria and Iraq. Although these
groups were not Communist, and sometimes engaged in bitter rivalries with
Communist parties, they were socialist and favored strongly secularist
approaches. As such, they won the support of religious minorities who had
everything to fear from conservative Islam: Christians supplied some of the
most potent manifestos of Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism and were promi-
nent in founding the Ba’ath Party. Further driving militancy was the confronta-
tion between the Arab states and Israel, which nationalists regarded as an arm
of Western imperialism. The Soviet bloc had initially supported the state of
Israel against its British overlords, but by the late 1950s, Soviet interests in the
region were decisively aligned with Arab powers, and with secular Arab
nationalism.
Syria was an early Soviet ally. In 1949, the country experienced a military
coup, the first of many in the region. After a disastrous war with Israel in 1956,
the country became increasingly aligned with the Soviet Union and favored
socialist and nationalist policies. This provoked President Eisenhower to pro-
claim a new Doctrine, which allowed the use of US forces in countries threat-
ened by international Communism, with an obvious focus on Middle Eastern
circumstances. In 1957, Syria’s pro-Soviet drift sparked international rivalry
when Jordan and Lebanon discussed intervention, and Turkey massed troops
along the Syrian borders. The Soviets responded by threatening Turkey with
nuclear attack. Under US pressure, Turkey stood down its forces, ending the
96 P. JENKINS
Nasser aligned himself closely with the USSR, receiving the prized award
“Hero of the Soviet Union” when Khrushchev visited Egypt in 1964. The
Soviets armed and supported Egypt against Israel and stood to gain regardless
of the military outcome. If Israel was defeated, that would be a huge setback
for the West, but even if the Arab states were defeated (as they were in 1956,
1967, and 1973), the more they would have to rely on Soviet aid and assis-
tance. In 1967, Soviet misinformation about an allegedly upcoming Israeli
attack on Syria provoked a new military escalation. Egypt and Syria prepared to
attack Israel, with the reluctant support of Jordan. The outcome demanded a
whole new vocabulary of disaster. In the Six-Day War that June, Israel compre-
hensively smashed its adversaries, eliminating most of their air power within
hours. Thereafter, Egypt’s East Bloc orientation became even closer, with
Soviet aircraft and missiles directly active against Israeli forces in an undeclared
war of attrition that persisted into 1971. Fearing excessive Soviet influence and
even control, Egypt’s new president Anwar Sadat ordered Soviet military per-
sonnel to leave the country in 1972.
In 1969, a familiar pattern reasserted itself when a Nasser-inspired army
officer named Muammar Qaddafi overthrew the conservative monarch of an
oil-rich state, namely Libya. By the 1970s, the Soviets could count on an influ-
ential network of key allies in the region, including Saddam Hussein, Hafez al
Assad, and Qaddafi, besides the radical regimes in Algeria and South Yemen.
Also valuable were the Palestinian guerrilla movements formed to resist the
state of Israel, which were organized in the Palestinian Liberation Organization,
or the PLO. Over and above the political influence, these allies provided a
greedy market for Soviet sales of weapons and particularly aircraft, which by the
1970s ran into the tens of billions of dollars. Major clients included Iraq, Syria,
Yemen, Libya, and Algeria.
From a modern perspective, one obvious point about these struggles is the
role of religion, and how little coverage Islam received at the time. In light of
modern-day conflicts, it is striking to recall a time when the US and Britain
found their most dependable allies in conservative Islam. The West allied con-
sistently with Islamic clergy and movements in Iran and Indonesia, where they
offered by far the best-organized counterweights to Communism. The
Americans favored some very militant and politicized Islamist groups, such as
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In the 1950s and 1960s, the CIA strongly sup-
ported the activities of Said Ramadan, son of the movement’s founder, who
expanded Brotherhood influence over mosques and Islamic institutions in
Europe and elsewhere. Another key Brotherhood figure was Sayyid Qutb,
notorious today as an ideological inspiration for radical Islamists like al-Qaeda.
But in the Cold War years, he was clearly the enemy of the West’s enemies. In
the 1950s, he was involved in attempts to assassinate Nasser, whose regime
hanged him in 1966. At that point, East-West alignments absolutely trumped
any possible religious divisions.
98 P. JENKINS
African Crises
From the mid-1950s, Africa became the center of the decolonization move-
ment, and the US found itself intervening in regions in which the country had
hitherto had little interest. In 1957, the British grant of independence to
Ghana began a new wave of imperial withdrawal, which among other things
created the new state of Nigeria in 1960. In the same year, British Prime
Minister Harold MacMillan spoke of the “wind of change” sweeping the con-
tinent, and in most areas, the transitions were initially peaceful.
In 1960, the Belgians relinquished control of their vast and badly misgov-
erned colony of the Congo, where European rulers had done virtually nothing
to prepare a native leadership to succeed them. Popular insurrections led to
civil wars, with extensive violence against civilians. Belgian and other Western
mining interests sponsored the secession of the resource-rich province of
Katanga, under the leadership of Moise Tshombe. Desperate to end the seces-
sion, Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba requested aid from the
Soviet Union, which (had it been forthcoming) would have represented a dra-
matic extension of Soviet influence in the region. Khrushchev responded
enthusiastically to Lumumba’s overtures. For the Belgians and the US,
Lumumba was a Soviet tool, and the CIA developed plots to assassinate him,
perhaps by poison. In September 1960, with US support, General Joseph
Mobutu undertook a coup d’etat, leading to Lumumba’s arrest. He was
handed over to the Katangans, who executed him in January 1961, making
him into a martyr for the worldwide left and for African nationalism. Also in
1961, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold perished in an air crash in
Congo, in circumstances that remain murky. Contemporary Western sources
suggested a KGB assassination, but more recent findings point the finger at
Western financial interests and intelligence agencies.
For some years, the Congo remained highly unstable, and pro-Lumumba
forces remained active as the Simbas (Lions). A rebellion in 1964–1965 gave
the Simbas control of much of the country until they were suppressed with US
and Belgian assistance and heavy CIA involvement. As we will see, the then-
Communist Cubans intervened on the Simba side. For a few years, there was
every prospect that Central Africa rather than Southeast Asia would be the vital
emerging battlefront between East and West.
The question of determining Communist involvement in an internal revolu-
tion became critical in the wealthy nation of South Africa, which since 1948
had been under the aggressively White supremacist rule of the Nationalist
Party. The government introduced a repressive and discriminatory system of
race-based rule, called apartheid, or separateness. The reasons for resenting
such a system were obvious, and black African resistance coalesced in an African
National Congress (ANC). The South African Communist Party supported
opposition to the regime and in the 1950s exercised a strong influence on the
ANC. Leading ANC members were themselves Communists, including the
later legendary Nelson Mandela. To that extent, the South African government
6 DECOLONIZATION AND THIRD WORLD STRUGGLES 99
Latin America
The concept of the Third World included Latin America as well as Africa and
Asia, and discussions of global poverty and deprivation commonly integrated
the three regions. Latin American thinkers spoke of the Tricontinental. Latin
America differed from the other continents in that only a few of its territories
were under formal imperial control in 1945, and there were many independent
nations. In many respects, though, Latin America shared crucial elements with
the decolonizing world. Most countries were scarred by gaping inequality and
extreme poverty, and often, elites that looked to Europe or the US were sharply
divided from poorer classes, many of whom were different ethnically as well as
culturally. Many Latin American economies were founded on classic models of
exploitation, producing food or raw materials for US corporations, rarely at fair
rates. If not actual colonialism, this was neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism.
Much of the continent had long traditions of military rule and dictatorship.
There were obvious opportunities for political parties to improve social con-
ditions, at a minimum by undertaking land reform and removing elite privi-
leges. Between 1946 and 1955, Argentina claimed to offer a political Third
Way between Communism and capitalism, as the government of Juan and Eva
Perón improved social conditions and nationalized foreign (mainly British)
assets. Although the regime was dictatorial and economically disastrous, such a
blend of authoritarian populist nationalism was very attractive. But any sweep-
ing reform faced the obstacle that the US would regard it as leftist or
Communist-tinged, opening a Soviet foothold in a region that Americans
viewed with sternly proprietary eyes. Both US corporate interests and local
elites were enthusiastic in applying that Communist taint to their rivals, with
varying degrees of accuracy. Besides the moderate reformers, there genuinely
were active revolutionaries, and some were Communist and were working with
Eastern bloc agencies. As in other parts of the world, the task of identifying
Communist advances was never straightforward.
Guatemala produced an early illustration of the abuse of Cold War labels.
The country was a classic example of extreme inequality, economically domi-
nated by foreign agricultural interests and above all by the US United Fruit. If
this was not the first country to be labeled a “banana republic,” the term had
much justice here. In 1950, Jacobo Arbenz was elected President with a sizable
majority. He duly began a series of constitutional reforms, expanding labor
6 DECOLONIZATION AND THIRD WORLD STRUGGLES 101
rights and democratic rights, and beginning extensive land reform. This last
attracted the ire of American interests, which denounced the government’s
potential Communist ties. Arbenz himself was attracted to Marxist ideas and
had a wide left-leaning network, while Communists did serve in his administra-
tion. If he had lived in contemporary Europe, he would likely have been labeled
a conventional democratic socialist, rather than a Communist. Having said
that, his decision to accept arms supplies from Communist Czechoslovakia
seemed to confirm the worst US fears. As the red label stuck, the CIA began
measures to overthrow him, in Operation PBSUCCESS. This included the
now-standard package of psychological warfare, with deceptive radio propa-
ganda, coupled with symbolic attacks by air and sea. The US also sponsored an
invasion by local forces. Fearing the prospect of US invasion, the Guatemalan
military removed Arbenz, beginning a lengthy and bloody era of military
dictatorship.
Despite Guatemala’s tiny size, the coup here exercised wide influence. It
gave the US government a blueprint that would often be applied elsewhere.
Revolutionaries meanwhile learned the lesson about the limitations of consti-
tutional reform and the likelihood that any true reform would promptly invite
US intervention. The only solution in that case would be to move rapidly to
disarm or destroy potential sources of resistance. One of the many foreign resi-
dents radicalized by the event was the young Argentine Ernesto “Che”
Guevara, who attempted to organize resistance on behalf of Arbenz, and what
he called “the last Latin American revolutionary democracy.”3
Cuba
Memories of Guatemala shaped the revolutionary movement in Cuba.
Dominated by US finance and business, Cuba for many years had been ruled
by successive military regimes. From 1952, the president was Fulgencio Batista,
whose dictatorship worked closely with US corporate interests. Havana was a
glittering center for US leisure and entertainment, although the resulting pros-
perity did not extend far outside the city. At the same time, the country had
well-established radical and revolutionary traditions, including a small
Communist Party. In 1953, a small band of radicals led by Fidel Castro began
an armed movement, which at first achieved little success. Even so, its first
actions, on July 26, gave its name to the wider revolutionary movement. In
1956, Castro returned with Guevara and a group of followers who began a
guerrilla war in the Sierra Maestra region. The movement became a serious
competitor to the government forces and came to control large sections of the
countryside. Suffering mass defections from its military, the Batista regime
became untenable. In January 1959, the revolutionaries entered Havana and
established a new government.
3
Quoted in Douglas Kellner, Ernesto “Che” Guevara (New York: Chelsea House, 1989), 32.
102 P. JENKINS
Many Cubas?
Cuba offered an intoxicating example of a grassroots revolution, in which
Communism was represented not by East European bureaucrats, but by
romantic young revolutionaries. In 1960, Alberto Korda photographed
Guevara in a way that made the subject look not just determined and coura-
geous but almost Christ-like. That photograph of the Guerrillero Heroico
(“Heroic Guerrilla Fighter”) was popularized as a poster, which became a
ubiquitous symbol in demonstrations around the world, and on college cam-
puses in Europe and North America. The Cuban regime was evangelistic in
spreading its message, offering support for revolutionaries across Latin America.
Racial factors added to the international appeal of the Cuban model. As the
revolution became more openly leftist, traditional elites fled the country, largely
to the US, where they became a vigorous voice for intervention against Castro.
That emigration had a sizable demographic effect on the new society, as so
4
“Fidel Castro Speaks on Marxism-Leninism December 2, 1961,” http://www.walterlippmann.
com/fc-12-02-1961.html.
6 DECOLONIZATION AND THIRD WORLD STRUGGLES 103
many of those who left were white, while the poor who remained were dispro-
portionately of African or Native heritage. Cuban or Soviet propaganda stressed
the non-white character of this anti-imperialist upsurge (although key leaders
like Castro and Guevara were indubitably white and Hispanic). Revolutionary
Cuba made much of its solidarity ties to insurgencies across Africa. In 1965,
Guevara traveled to the Congo in an attempt to organize Simba rebels into a
disciplined Marxist force, and the Cubans sent limited armed forces, all black
by racial origin. The Cubans established a military presence in the former
French colony of Congo-Brazzaville, which in 1969 became a Marxist-Leninist
People’s Republic, which endured until 1992. The Cubans offered support
and direct aid to other leftist insurgencies, including the FRELIMO forces
struggling against Portuguese rule in Mozambique. Black Cuban fighters
strengthened anti-Portuguese resistance in Guinea-Bissau. In 1967, Che
turned his efforts to Bolivia, where he was killed following a failed attempt to
foment a guerrilla war.
Further Reading
I have already cited two wide-ranging books on the global aspects of the Cold
War, namely Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World
Interventions and the Making of Our Times (2005), and Lorenz M. Lüthi,
Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe (2020). See especially Paul Thomas
Chamberlin, The Cold War’s Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace (2018).
The end of empire and the process of decolonization are the subject of Martin
Thomas and Andrew S. Thompson, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Ends
of Empire (2018). For different national approaches, see Calder Walton,
Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire
(2012); Michael Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places: The Genesis of the
Modern World: 1945–65 (2013); Martin Thomas, Fight or Flight: Britain,
France and Their Roads From Empire (2014); and R. T. Howard, Power and
Glory: France’s Secret Wars with Britain and America, 1945–2016 (2016).
See also Sara Lorenzini, Global Development: A Cold War History (2019) and
Steven L. B. Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s,
Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values (2017).
Struggles for influence in the Global South are explored in Robert B. Rakove,
Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (2013); and see Russell
Crandall, America’s Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on
6 DECOLONIZATION AND THIRD WORLD STRUGGLES 105
Terror (2014). For a critical player in these struggles, see John D. Wilsey,
God’s Cold Warrior: The Life and Faith of John Foster Dulles (2021).
African conflicts are addressed in Sue Onslow ed., Cold War in Southern Africa:
White Power, Black Liberation (2009); Lise Namikas, Battleground Africa:
Cold War in the Congo, 1960–1965 (2013); and Philip Roessler and Harry
Verhoeven, Why Comrades Go to War: Liberation Politics and the Outbreak of
Africa’s Deadliest Conflict (2017).
For the Cold War background in the Middle East, see David Nichols, Eisenhower
1956: The President’s Year of Crisis: Suez and the Brink of War (2011); James
Barr, Lords of the Desert: The Battle Between the United States and Great
Britain for Supremacy in the Modern Middle East (2018); Randall Fowler,
More than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East (2018). The
Lebanese crisis is the subject of Bruce O. Riedel, Beirut 1958: How America’s
Wars in the Middle East Began (2020).
For South Asia, see Manu Bhagavan, ed., India and the Cold War (2019).
For Latin America, see Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (2010); Jerry
Dávila, Dictatorship in South America (2013); Herbert S. Klein and Francisco
Vidal Luna, Brazil, 1964–1985: The Military Regimes of Latin America in the
Cold War (2017); and Thomas C. Field, Stella Krepp, and Vanni Pettinà,
eds., Latin America and the Global Cold War (2020). For the enormous
impact of the Cuban revolution, see Jonathan C. Brown, Cuba’s Revolutionary
World (2017).
CHAPTER 7
Khrushchev and Kennedy
On October 27, 1962, the world lived through one of the most frightening
moments in the whole Cold War. The US had declared a naval quarantine or
blockade of Cuba, so that Soviet ships entering the exclusion zone would be
stopped and searched. US forces were ready to launch an invasion of Cuba,
which would almost certainly have escalated to involve nuclear weapons. War
in Cuba would shortly have led to direct attacks in the respective homelands,
using thousands of nuclear weapons. On this Black Saturday, the Soviet subma-
rine B-59 was operating near the quarantine line, and it had been out of con-
tact with its home country for some days. When a US warship dropped small
Practice Depth Charges as a warning sign, the submarine’s captain interpreted
this as an actual attack, which showed that war must have broken out.
Accordingly, he proposed to deploy his principal weapon, a nuclear-tipped tor-
pedo, against the escort carrier, the USS Randolph. But the three senior offi-
cers had to agree on such an action, and one—Vasili Arkhipov—resisted, so the
weapon was not used. If the Soviets had initiated such a nuclear attack against
the US Navy, the consequences would have been catastrophic, so that Arkhipov
has been described with some seriousness as the man who saved the world.
However clichéd the phrase may sound, for 13 days, from October 16 to
28, the fate of human civilization really did stand in the balance.
Kennedy
In 1960, John F. Kennedy was elected President of the US on a platform that
involved confronting Communism more efficiently than his predecessor. He
particularly highlighted a supposed (and fictitious) missile gap, which had
given the Soviets an advantage in ICBMs. When he took office in January
1961, he faced a roster of perilous situations: in Laos and Vietnam, Cuba, and
in Berlin, while aggressive figures like Nasser and Sukarno were dangerous
1
“Transcript of President John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address (1961),” https://www.our-
documents.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=91&page=transcript.
7 KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY 109
eight serious plots were in progress at various times between 1961 and 1963,
mostly involving toxins, and Cuban sources suggest literally hundreds of lesser
efforts. After President Johnson assumed office in 1963, he was shocked to
discover the scale of these clandestine plots, and especially the organized crime
links, which involved the US in running “A damned Murder Incorporated in
the Caribbean.”2 Beyond any moral qualms, the greatest criticism of the plots
was that all failed. Despite all the immense scientific and military resources of
the US, Fidel Castro retired peacefully from his leadership role and died peace-
fully in 2016, long out-living all his American foes.
2
Max Holland, “The Assassination Tapes,” Atlantic June 2004 https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2004/06/the-assassination-tapes/302964/.
7 KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY 111
contemplated demolishing the new Wall and related emplacements. The com-
manding general, Lucius Clay, was a leading advocate of a robust resistance to
Communist demands: indeed, he had given the initial order to begin the Berlin
Airlift in 1948. On October 27–28, US and Soviet tanks confronted each other
on either side of the dividing line, with each equipped with live ammunition.
(Coincidentally, that was exactly one year before the still more critical confron-
tation in the Caribbean.) Cautious diplomacy allowed both sides to withdraw,
as the crisis relented. The occupation was saved, but the failure to prevent or
remove the Wall reinforced the impression of Kennedy’s weakness.
paper warned, “if they exercise this option, we would likely be unable to remove
them without initiating World War III.”3 The military construction in Cuba
could not have gone unnoticed by local residents, so that reports soon made
their way to US intelligence. Through the Summer, conservative politicians
campaigning for the upcoming midterm elections were speaking openly of the
likely Soviet military move in Cuba, which the administration duly denied.
After a period of speculation and mounting intelligence, on October 14, a U-2
reconnaissance aircraft offered definite photographic evidence of the missile
installations. These showed that the missiles were actually in the process of
being readied for use.
Thirteen Days
Responding to this situation raised critical difficulties for US policymakers, and
the new realities were presented at a special Executive Committee of the
National Security Council (EXCOMM) convened by the president on October
16. Initially, the group debated the impact of the Soviet move, and Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara expressing the moderate view that the new mis-
siles would make little difference to the overall military balance. But military
solutions were strongly to the fore, primarily through air strikes, but alterna-
tively through invasion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with several key
advisers, favored an immediate assault, to destroy both the Soviet installations
and the Cuban regime. One strong advocate of an immediate attack was Air
Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay, who proposed the use of 1500 aircraft,
besides hundreds of missiles. Given the presence of Soviet personnel, such a
move posed an obvious danger of open war, and the likelihood of a Soviet
response in Berlin was often mentioned. What the Americans did not know was
that Soviet military commanders on the ground in Cuba had been given
authority to deploy tactical nuclear warheads when these became operational,
without needing approval from Moscow.
For several days, EXCOMM debated the options, as the airstrike solution
remained popular. Kennedy came to favor a policy that was determined, but
which fell short of direct attack. The US would blockade Cuba, searching any
Soviet or East Bloc vessels seeking to enter the region, and denying entry to
any supplies intended to support the missile deployment. He insisted on the
removal of the facilities already present. The concept of blockade was itself
problematic, as technically that constituted an act of war. To avoid this sensitive
issue, the US preferred the term quarantine, framed within the structure of the
Organization of American States, with the goal of excluding offensive weapons
from the hemisphere. Although this represented a compromise among his
advisers, it was still a hardline position, which offered a strong likelihood of
3
Gideon Grudo, “Newly Released Docs Show Heavy USAF Contribution Needed for 1962
Cuba Invasion,” Air Force Magazine, Oct. 31, 2017 https://www.airforcemag.com/
newly-released-docs-show-heavy-usaf-contribution-needed-for-1962-cuba-invasion/.
7 KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY 113
open conflict. In particular, it made it difficult for the Soviets to stand down
from their position without suffering grave humiliation.
The president announced the policy in a stark television address on Monday,
October 22. Emphasizing the pan-American dimensions of the threat—and
not merely US concerns—he declared that “It shall be the policy of this nation
to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the
Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the US, requiring a
full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” Besides support in the
Americas, the US sought support from the familiar roster of Western Allies,
which would find themselves on the front line in any conflict. The results were
mixed, with Canada and Britain urging a solution within a United Nations
framework. British Prime Minister Macmillan even proposed that the US could
disable its Thor Missiles in Britain as part of a deal, which Kennedy rejected.
The US continued its preparations for invasion. A plan already formulated
that August imagined an invasion force of 100,000 soldiers and marines, which
would overwhelm the island within some 15 days. The planned October inva-
sion was part of Operation ORTSAC—CASTRO reversed. The initial attack
would have involved the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions, together with two
Marine divisions. It would have been combined with a heavy pre-emptive
attack from the air. Both sides used harsh and provocative language, as the
Soviets rejected US “aggression” and “piracy,” and the Chinese offered full
support to the Communist cause. Meanwhile, the first encounters between US
and East Bloc shipping began in the Caribbean. Tensions reached a new height
on October 25, and the following day, President Kennedy himself believed that
invasion would be necessary. US intelligence warned that the Soviet missile
bases would be operational within days. On October 26, the US raised its sta-
tus of military preparedness to DEFCON 2, the only time that this has
occurred. SAC bombers were placed on alert, ready to strike targets at notice
as short as 15 minutes, as ballistic missiles were readied. That readiness status
extended to several hundred fighters and tactical aircraft.
Castro pleaded with the Soviets to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike
against the US, and ordered anti-aircraft weaponry to target US flights. He did
this knowing that Cuba would be annihilated in a war, but he felt that this
would be a worthwhile sacrifice in the larger historical cause, an ultimate act of
revolutionary martyrdom. Guevara likewise appeared unconcerned by the
threat of nuclear war, on the grounds that the US would assuredly lose. Even
if they had been correct about the nuclear balance of forces, the Cuban leader-
ship was startlingly callous about the vast level of destruction that such a con-
flict would cause to all participants.
Against this background, the difficulty of direct communication between
the two capitals seems almost incredible, as no facilities existed for direct com-
munication between the two leaders. As the Soviets issued multiple statements,
it became apparent that these were inconsistent and rushed, to the point of
making simple errors in editing. That indicated confusion and divisions among
the Soviet leadership, and growing panic by Khrushchev himself. As in the US,
114 P. JENKINS
different factions were taking very different stances, leaning toward peace or
military action. The most direct and effective negotiations occurred on a highly
secret basis in conversations between Robert F. Kennedy, the President’s
brother, and the Soviet Ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin. These
negotiations reached broad areas of agreement, and on October 26, Khrushchev
offered a reasonable proposal for settlement. The US would pledge not to
invade Cuba, and the Soviets would declare that their ships did not contain
armaments, so that both sides would stand down. However, as the US was
considering its response, further Soviet messages took more aggressive stances
and demanded the removal of US missiles from Turkey and Italy as the price of
peace. US officials decided to respond to the first communication, ignoring
latter statements, and agreement seemed likely.
Even so, conditions remained fraught, and some events that occurred dur-
ing this time were so provocative that it seems as if some military forces were
actually seeking conflict. On October 26, the US fired an Atlas ICBM from
Vandenberg Air Force Base, in California, across the Pacific. Although the test
was previously scheduled, carrying on with the firing at this time seemed wildly
irresponsible. On the 27th, a Soviet missile shot down a US U-2 flight over
Cuba, killing the pilot, while other reconnaissance aircraft were fired on. The
Americans faced enormous pressure to retaliate immediately, but they chose to
warn the Soviets that any future attacks would be met with the swift destruc-
tion of all their missile sites in Cuba. Other incidents on Black Saturday showed
the extraordinarily high level of tension. When another U-2 flew over the east-
ern Soviet Union, that in turn led to a confrontation between US and Soviet
fighters.
On October 28, Kennedy dispatched a message to Khrushchev that secured
agreement, and peace. The Soviets would remove their weaponry from Cuba,
and the US pledged not to invade the island. So much was well known at the
time, but the US made a secret commitment to remove its own Jupiter missiles
from Turkey and, possibly, southern Italy. At the time, the US position was that
Kennedy had stood firm against Soviet pressure and intimidation, and made no
serious concessions in exchange. That was untrue, and both sides duly removed
their missiles.
Historians have debated at length how serious the war danger was. The fact
that the US responded so relatively calmly to the shooting down of the U-2
suggests that restraint could and did prevail. At the same time, conflicts were
accumulating fast, and it was quite possible that individual officers or forces
might deliberately seek to provoke war. Adding to the risk was the fact that so
many ships and aircraft were armed with nuclear weapons, so that the nuclear
threshold would easily be crossed. Even without evil intent, it would have been
all but impossible to soothe the tensions that would have arisen if, for instance,
the B-59 had sunk the Randolph, and moreover with nuclear weapons. The
President would have faced irresistible pressure for retaliation.
7 KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY 115
Leaving Armageddon
The immediate consequence of the peaceful resolution was worldwide relief. In
the immediate aftermath, a still shocked Khrushchev approached Kennedy
with a far-reaching list of proposal for negotiation. That would include at mini-
mum a non-aggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and
discussions that could lead to the disbanding of those alliances, and reduction
or elimination of nuclear weapons. The superpowers should resolve the German
issue promptly, and the US should recognize the PRC.
In the event, none of those bold ideas came close to immediate implementa-
tion, but the Americans too were open to new initiatives. In June 1963,
Kennedy gave a historic address at American University in Washington, “A
Strategy of Peace,” which was devoted to promoting peace and disarmament:
indeed, Kennedy used the word “peace” 49 times in an address lasting barely
27 minutes. Unusually in Western rhetoric of the era, Kennedy treated Soviet
concerns very seriously, acknowledging the hideous devastation visited on their
country during the Second World War. The speech became widely available
worldwide, including in the Soviet Union itself. Khrushchev praised it warmly.4
The new mood produced some significant results. As one measure to limit a
repetition of recent events, in June 1963, the US and Soviets agreed to estab-
lish a Direct Communications Line, a teleprinter “hot line” for use in future
crises. The obvious question was why such a system had not been created five
or ten years earlier. Increased concern about nuclear weapons spurred action to
control or regulate them. In August 1963, the Soviets, the US, and British
signed a Limited Test Ban Treaty—technically a Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water. Soviet
concerns about intrusive verification procedures prevented a more comprehen-
sive prohibition of all testing.
But for all the quite genuine good will, it was far too early to speak of an end
to the Cold War. Even in his American University address, Kennedy had reas-
serted the firm Western line on issues on which Khrushchev had urged com-
promise, notably Germany and Berlin. The president did so again just weeks
after that earlier address when he undertook a sensationally successful visit to
Europe, culminating with a speech to a vast crowd in West Berlin. Although
the superpowers were pledged to avoid nuclear war, that did not necessarily
mean any diminution in ideological fervor, and Kennedy’s speech proclaimed
uncompromising faith in democratic values. West Berlin, he said, symbolized
freedom from tyranny. He said,
Two thousand years ago, the proudest boast was Civis Romanus sum [“I am a
Roman citizen”]. Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is “Ich bin
4
“Commencement Address at American University Washington DC June 10, 1963,” https://
www.jfklibrar y.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/american-
university-19630610.
116 P. JENKINS
ein Berliner!”… All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and
therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words “Ich bin ein Berliner!”5
5
“Remarks of President John F. Kennedy at the Rudolph Wilde Platz, Berlin, June 26, 1963,”
https://www.jfklibrar y.org/ar chives/other-r esour ces/john-f-kennedy-speeches/
berlin-w-germany-rudolph-wilde-platz-19630626.
6
“Wanted For Treason” flyer, uploaded to https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/com-
mons/9/90/Wanted_for_treason.jpg.
7 KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY 117
Soviets or Cubans really had sponsored the assassination, then the conse-
quences for global peace would be catastrophic. The subsequent commission
of investigation of the killing chaired by Chief Justice Earl Warren went to
great lengths to discredit all claims of conspiracy or international participation
and emphasized the strictly individual character of the act. Even if Oswald per-
sonally held Communist or pro-Castro views, that did not imply any actual
East Bloc involvement in the assassination.
Goldwater and Reagan
The American hard right found a champion in Barry Goldwater, who secured
the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1964, and who famously
refused to condemn the extreme movements then making frantic charges about
pervasive Soviet subversion in the US. As he famously declared, “extremism in
the pursuit of liberty is no vice.”7 Following the recent war scare, many moder-
ate Americans found Goldwater’s aggressive views terrifying, and he lost in one
of the worst electoral disasters in the nation’s history. Ironically, another factor
in his defeat was that he was felt to be far more likely than Johnson to commit
US combat forces to Vietnam. But his campaign laid a firm foundation for later
conservative campaigning, especially in foreign policy.
In retrospect, one surprising aspect of his movement was the apocalyptic
sense that the West faced a real danger of defeat in the Cold War and that
Communism stood an excellent chance of triumphing. This nightmare was
ably expressed in a famous speech delivered by a leading Goldwater supporter,
California governor Ronald Reagan, who now established himself as a conser-
vative star. He viewed Communism not just as a rival ideology, but as a world
view that was simply evil, on a moral par with Nazism: “We are faced with the
most evil enemy mankind has known in his long climb from the swamp to the
stars.” As he declared, in near-apocalyptic terms, “We’ll preserve for our chil-
dren this, the last best hope of man on earth, or we’ll sentence them to take the
last step into a thousand years of darkness.”8
7
“Goldwater’s 1964 Acceptance Speech,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/poli-
tics/daily/may98/goldwaterspeech.htm.
8
Ronald Reagan, “A Time for Choosing (aka The Speech),” October 27, 1964, https://www.
americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreaganatimeforchoosing.htm.
118 P. JENKINS
from 2000 warheads to 19,000 and in the late 1970s, the USSR finally
achieved parity in warheads with the US. That expansion was however a lim-
ited blessing: if a country could destroy its rival five times over, then it really
made little difference spending huge sums on resources to raise that factor to
ten or twelve.
But if nuclear confrontation was too risky, that moved the locus of rivalry to
other forms of competition that would weaken the enemy gradually. In the
developed world, the goal would be to separate the US from its allies, by
decoupling the NATO nations and achieving a degree of neutralization. In the
Third World, the Tricontinental, the Soviets would fund and arm proxy forces,
whether regular armies, like that of North Vietnam, or guerrillas and terrorists.
Even without the risk of total war, much could still be achieved. The West in
its turn pursued the emerging conflicts, with the consequences we have already
witnessed, of coups and dirty wars. If the Cuban missiles affair proved that full-
scale war was far too high a risk, it certainly did not imply peace or safety for
much of the world’s population.
The Cuban affair marked a critical turning point in the Cold War. As Winston
Churchill remarked in another context, if it was not the end of the conflict, nor
even the beginning of the end, then it should be counted as the end of the
beginning. Such a transition allows to turn our attention from the seemingly
endless cascade of crises to take stock of the impact of the worldwide confron-
tation on the competing powers themselves. What did it mean to live in a Cold
War world, in a near-wartime?
Further Reading
For an excellent recent account of the Cuban events, see Serhii Plokhy, Nuclear
Folly: A New History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (2021). Sheldon M. Stern
studied The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory (2012). Jim Wilson
examined the British aspects in Britain on the Brink: The Cold War’s Most
Dangerous Weekend, 27–28 October 1962 (2012). See also Håkan Karlsson
and Tomás Diez Acosta, The Missile Crisis from a Cuban Perspective:
Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Reflections (2019).
For the other great flashpoint of the era, see Frederick Kempe, Berlin 1961:
Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth
(2011). Theodore Voorhees traces connections between the Berlin and
Cuban confrontations in The Silent Guns of Two Octobers: Kennedy and
Khrushchev Play the Double Game (2020).
The thawing of relations after the Cuban crisis is covered in Thurston Clarke,
JFK’s Last Hundred Days: An Intimate Portrait of a Great President (2013).
PART II
governments and publics were prepared to accept abuses and violence that
were inflicted on non-White Global South peoples in a way that would be abso-
lutely unacceptable if perpetrated against fellow Euro-Americans. That was
even more true when denying full democratic rights. Understanding the abuses
of state power—and the underlying prejudices that made them possible—is
essential to appreciating the issues at stake in the larger Cold War.
Eastern Europe
From 1946, the Soviet model was faithfully reproduced in the new Communist
states of Eastern Europe. All the new states were highly repressive in character,
partly following Soviet tradition, but reflecting their own particular situations.
Communist elites were well aware that they represented only a minority of the
population and that their power rested on the Soviet occupation. Across the
region, dedicated or experienced Communists had faced lengthy periods of
persecution, either in the independent states as they had existed before the war
8 NATIONAL SECURITY AND REPRESSION 125
or during the Nazi occupation. Many had taken refuge in the Soviet Union,
where they had become accustomed to Soviet ideas and discipline. Inevitably,
they returned as outsiders to the lands that they notionally ruled.
Adding to tensions with the larger population, Jews represented a dispro-
portionate share of the new Communist elites. Pre-war Communist parties had
attracted many Jewish members, and wartime experience had driven surviving
Jews to Communism as the most forceful antithesis of the Nazi nightmare. As
the new regimes consolidated, they relied on those veteran Jewish militants.
Although they utterly rejected the religion, and commonly changed their
names, Jews were prominent, and dominated the higher ranks of the regimes
in Hungary and elsewhere, and especially in the internal security apparatus.
Mátyás Rákosi himself was Jewish by birth, as were his key associates. In
PolandS, Jakub Berman dominated the secret police mechanisms in the found-
ing years of Communist rule. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, that Jewish
role increased the Communist elite’s sense of living under siege, and its vulner-
ability to resistance by the Catholic church. In later years, it helps explain the
anti-Semitic campaigns that would become such a pervasive part of life in the
Eastern Bloc.
While East Bloc regimes often seem paranoid, they genuinely did face severe
internal dangers. As we know, resistance movements flourished in most coun-
tries for several years after the Communist seizures of power. In fact, if we take
the post-1945 decade, armed insurgency was a constant fact of life for most of
the new socialist states, culminating in open revolution in Hungary in 1956.
Throughout, Western powers genuinely were seeking to undermine and over-
turn the socialist regimes, supporting and sponsoring dissidents and insurgents.
As those states established themselves, they swiftly created secret police
forces closely based on the NKVD model, and under direct NKVD supervi-
sion. Those agencies continued to operate until the end of Communism, and
their names became notorious. Czechoslovakia had its State Security (StB);
Poland its Department of Security (UB); and the German Democratic Republic
acquired its State Security, the Staatssicherheit or Stasi. The Hungarian equiva-
lent was the ÁVH (Államvédelmi Hatóság, or “State Protection Authority”).
In 1948, Romania founded its General Directorate for the Security of the
People, the Securitate.
The socialist states struck at any organizations that refused total assimilation
to the new order, including political parties and unions. They violently sup-
pressed any potential sources of anti-Communist resistance or propaganda.
That meant traditional social elites such as landowners and aristocrats, but
churches and clergy were particularly targeted. Repression manifested in well-
publicized trials that were intended to deter and terrify potential dissidents. In
the post-1945 decade, Eastern Europe produced a series of notorious show
trials, including the Yugoslav proceedings against Croatian Cardinal Aloysius
Stepinac (1946) and the Hungarian prosecution of Cardinal József Mindszenty
(1949). Those cases poisoned international relations and reinforced worldwide
126 P. JENKINS
After Stalin
The level of repression declined after Stalin’s death. In the immediate succes-
sion contest, NKVD chief Lavrentiy Beria was executed, but that marked the
end of the systematic murder that had marked intra-party conflict for a genera-
tion. Thereafter, even when leaders were forcibly removed, as Nikita Khrushchev
was in 1964, he lived to enjoy several years of obscure retirement. After the
Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, the country’s democratic-leaning
Communist leaders escaped execution, unlike their Hungarian counterparts
just a decade earlier. Khrushchev’s own Secret Speech in 1956 signaled an eas-
ing of repression, and the population of the concentration camps fell steeply.
This certainly did not mean full democratization, and through the 1960s the
Soviets continued to treat dissidents with a heavy hand, incarcerating some of
the most visible in mental institutions. But the mass Gulag system faded.
Over and above direct sanctions, state hostility could have disastrous conse-
quences in a society where the state and the Communist Party controlled all
employment, housing, and education. A person regarded as suspect faced the
prospect of being confined to menial jobs and conditions amounting to beg-
gary. That was what occurred in Czechoslovakia after 1968, when half a million
Party members were purged. They lost their jobs, while their children forfeited
their chance of higher education and were forced into a kind of internal exile.
Even for the most trusted citizens of the Bloc, foreign travel was a rare luxury
and privilege, exercised under supervision. Throughout the Cold War, a series
8 NATIONAL SECURITY AND REPRESSION 127
Democracy and Dictatorship?
With a handful of exceptions, no Western nation treated its own citizens with
anything like the same ferocity as the Eastern Bloc. Concentration camps did
not exist in the US, Canada, Britain, France, Italy, or West Germany, nor were
citizens executed or tortured for their dissident politics. Nor, in most cases, did
those regimes face a constant threat of insurrections and guerrilla campaigns
such as occurred in Poland. Unlike the East, Western states did not act as if
they were constantly sitting on bayonets. Western nations found it easy to pres-
ent the Cold War as a straightforward clash that pitted democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law against the “Orwellian” world of secret police, con-
centration camps, and thought control.
But any claims of Western freedom and democracy have to take into account
the racial and imperial structures of the era. Just to take the example of the US,
in 1950, the country had a black minority population of 10 percent, some 15
million people. Most had little access to electoral democracy, and they faced
severe violence if they attempted to assert their rights. They faced gravely
oppressive structures of policing and criminal justice, which in other contexts
we would call a police state. If we imagine that population in terms of a free-
standing nation, then it would be comparable to a mid-sized European state. It
128 P. JENKINS
1953 the US-Spanish Pact of Madrid allowed American bases in the country.
Greece, likewise, kept leftists under harsh restraint after its Civil War, and the
Communist party was banned. Restrictions on democratic rights were limited
still further in 1967, following the military coup d’etat, and leftists and dissi-
dents suffered dreadfully. The Communist Party remained illegal in Portugal,
under slightly less draconian conditions. All these states operated tight censor-
ship. Yet Portugal was a founder member of NATO in 1949, and Greece fol-
lowed in 1952. Not until the 1970s would these three nations liberalize, to the
point of granting full rights to Communists.
Other Western countries created regimes that were authoritarian and
military-oriented, even if not totalitarian. As social crises pitted left- and right-
wing factions against each other, it was natural for rightists to denounce their
enemies as Communists, and to seek US or British aid, even to the point of a
military removal of a democratically elected government. In 1960, Turkish
officers carried out the first military coup in the nation’s modern history, justi-
fying the action in terms of loyalty to NATO and to anti-communism. (The
nation had joined NATO in 1952.) The new regime executed the Prime
Minister and two other leading politicians. Unrest and leftist agitation led to a
second coup in 1971, followed by martial law and repression, and yet another
military takeover took place in 1980. Again, the Western alliance emerges as a
two-tier framework, where some states fell far short of democratic principles.
Italy was another setting for recurrent plots. Facing strong Communist and
left-wing pressure, Rightists agitated for an authoritarian or even fascist take-
over on the lines of the Greek coup of 1967, and one limited attempt was made
in 1970. From the late 1960s, the far right devised a radical approach by which
Italian democracy would be destabilized by terrorism and violent conflicts
between extremists of different shades, through a “strategy of tension.” In the
1970s, extensive terrorist violence seemed to be implementing that strategy of
tension and came close to destroying the country’s democracy. Even in Italy,
the democratic system appeared tenuous.
1
The Smith Act, 76th United States Congress, 3d session, Ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
8 NATIONAL SECURITY AND REPRESSION 131
1951, the US Supreme Court upheld the convictions. In 1954, the Communist
Control Act prohibited the Party and criminalized membership in the Party
itself or its controlled organizations.
HUAC and McCarthy
Since the 1930s, the US Congress had organized well-publicized legislative
investigations into foreign subversion within the US. In 1945, the House
Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) became a permanent com-
mittee, and it became a critical theater for exposing Communism in unions, the
media, and many aspects of American life. In 1947, the group addressed
Communist influence in the influential motion picture industry, focusing on a
group of filmmakers and writers called the Hollywood Ten. This began a period
of blacklisting known or suspected Communists in the movie industry, which
did not relax until the 1960s.
HUAC’s proceedings acquired a predictable and even ritualistic quality.
Simply refusing to answer a question resulted in contempt charges, with severe
criminal penalties. Witnesses could rely on the Fifth Amendment to the US
Constitution—hence the notorious phrase so often repeated in these hearings,
“I’ll take the Fifth.” That however had the effect of making them appear
obstructive, or even admitting that they were concealing sinister behavior. The
only alternative was to make a humiliating surrender to the Committee’s
authority and to prove full repentance from a Communist past by naming
names, by denouncing old friends and associates.
Besides the celebrated HUAC, many individual states formed comparable
investigative bodies and pursued their own investigations. One trial of many
suggests the issues at stake and the delicate balance between civil liberties and
the legitimate defense of national security. Born in Croatia, Steve Nelson
became a US citizen. From the 1920s, he became a leading figure in the
CPUSA, and he served with distinction in the Spanish Civil War. He was a
courier and later agent for the NKVD, tasked with finding information about
the Manhattan Project, and was in contact with some scientists in that project.
The widow of one of his close friends from Spain married J Robert Oppenheimer,
who later headed the Manhattan Project. By any reasonable standard, Nelson
was a grave security threat. In 1950, at the height of the fighting in Korea,
Pittsburgh authorities raided the headquarters of the Pennsylvania Communist
Party, prosecuting Nelson and others for sedition. A federal trial followed, but
the cases collapsed in 1957, and Nelson was freed.
Such investigations made for sensational media reporting, including in the
new medium of television. The foundation they offered for public visibility was
exploited by Joseph McCarthy, US Senator from Wisconsin, who in 1950 gave
an incendiary speech at Wheeling, West Virginia. Beyond declaring that the US
State Department was filled with active Communists, he claimed to have a list
naming those malefactors. McCarthy parlayed this sudden fame to begin
sweeping investigations of the allegedly disloyal, using wild tactics of
132 P. JENKINS
Witch Hunts?
Popular revulsion against McCarthy found a literary echo in Arthur Miller’s
1953 lauded play The Crucible, which ostensibly concerned the Salem witch
trials of 1692, but which was commonly recognized as a thinly veiled attack on
McCarthyism. But that witch-hunt analogy is troubling in its implication that
the various investigations were attacking individuals who were blameless or
innocent. Particularly in the late 1940s, the great majority of those targeted
genuinely were Communists, and many were keenly active in the Party and in
many associated organizations. Some, like Steve Nelson, really were for-
eign agents.
The power of the witch-hunt theme must be understood in light of later
official investigations of US Communism, which proceeded after the CPUSA
had been virtually destroyed. Although the Party continued after 1954, it was
irreversibly weakened, and its activities were subject to intense surveillance.
Law enforcement agencies, especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), thoroughly penetrated party structures, persuading or coercing many
activists to inform on its doings. That included some highly placed individuals
in the Party leadership, including figures who channeled Soviet funds to the
CPUSA, and who laundered its money. In 1956, the FBI formed a Counter-
Intelligence Program, COINTELPRO, to disrupt and discredit the Party, to
encourage schisms and defections. That program provided the matrix for later
efforts against radicals and anti-war protesters, including most notoriously
Martin Luther King Jr. Witnessing the later exposure of official misbehavior
against domestic dissidents of all shades, liberals and radicals saw no reason to
think that matters had been any different during the earlier anti-Communist
years, which were presented as a baseless witch hunt. Particularly during the
1970s, a considerable outpouring of books and films depicted the years of the
8 NATIONAL SECURITY AND REPRESSION 133
Red Scare wholly in those terms, focusing especially on creative artists and film-
makers ruined by official sanctions.
In popular media, the Red Scare was analyzed alongside other forms of
“Cold War paranoia,” of numbing conformity and repression. That approach
dominated the study of the popular culture productions of the time, especially
the horror and science fiction films that so regularly depicted an America under
siege by monstrous alien beings. The 1956 science fiction film Invasion of the
Body Snatchers showed the inhabitants of a small city being taken over by sinis-
ter aliens who appear in pods, but who grow to assume their shapes and absorb
their identities. At the time, the pod beings were probably intended to symbol-
ize Communist infiltrators. In most later writing, however, the story is usually
taken as an allegory of anti-Communist paranoia, as rational people fall prey to
McCarthyite vigilantism, and individualism falls to Red Scare conformity.
the organization by means of infiltrators and informants. The near total access
that the authorities had to the Party’s innermost secrets contributed powerfully
to the fact that the British never contemplated banning the movement. A
banned party would be forced underground, where its activities would be far
more difficult to track.
A similar picture emerges of other key countries in the Alliance. Canada
banned its Communist Party in 1940 because of the Soviet non-alignment pact
with the Nazis. After the war, Communist activities continued through the
Labor-Progressive Party, a transparent front, which elected a number of
Members of Parliament and public officials. However, Party activities remained
heavily constrained. In 1957, American investigations of highly placed subver-
sives briefly spilled over into the country when the US Senate’s Internal Security
Subcommittee charged a Canadian diplomat, Edward Norman, as a subversive
threat. Norman’s subsequent suicide stirred public outrage and led the
Canadian government to threaten to refuse future security cooperation with
the US. Despite their close alliance, different standards prevailed in the two
countries.
Also closely aligned to Britain was Australia, where debates over Communism
produced one of the country’s most celebrated national debates. In 1940,
Australia had like Canada attempted to ban the Communist Party, but unsuc-
cessfully. Communism continued to concern the political right after the war,
largely because the Party’s strong position in certain key unions would make it
dangerous in the event of a new war. Following the 1949 election, the new
Liberal-Country government dissolved and banned the Party through legisla-
tion, which the Supreme Court overturned in 1951. The government then
sought to change the Constitution to grant it the necessary powers, which
meant securing national approval in a referendum. That referendum became a
far-reaching debate about party and class loyalties, but also about fundamental
values of civil liberties and free speech. As in other countries, the Catholic
church was a key voice in the anti-Communist cause. Despite furious cam-
paigning, the referendum rejected dissolving the Communist Party by a paper-
thin majority of just 50.6 percent.
Orwell’s 1984 imagined the world divided into three rival super-states, each
absolutely repressive and totalitarian, morally and politically indistinguishable
from each other. Projecting three, rather than two, superpowers was quite
prophetic for the time, but the political vision bore little resemblance to the
real world of the emerging Cold War. Quite apart from the conduct of any
individual politician or bureaucrat, Eastern and (most) Western states were
divided fundamentally by their social organizations, with totalitarianism in the
east and complex civil societies in the west, with multiple independent and
competing structures, each with its public voice. We must be struck by how
frequently Western courts struck down over-broad anti-Communist legisla-
tion, even at the direst times of public panic or even hysteria. However flawed
they might be, and however vulnerable they sometimes appeared, those dem-
ocratic structures gave the core Western nations immense advantages over
their Communist rivals.
8 NATIONAL SECURITY AND REPRESSION 135
Further Reading
For Soviet repression, see for example Michael David-Fox ed., The Soviet Gulag
(2016); and compare Molly Pucci, Security Empire: The Secret Police in
Communist Eastern Europe (2020).
Anti-Communist purges in the West have been exhaustively examined. Some
important recent American examples include Thomas Doherty, Show Trial:
Hollywood, HUAC, and the Birth of the Blacklist (2018), and Larry Tye,
Demagogue (2020) on Joseph McCarthy. Harvey Klehr studies The
Communist Experience in America: A Political and Social History (2010).
Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse describe parallels to the US experience in
Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State,
1945–1957 (1994).
Repression in Western-allied Global South nations has been widely discussed.
See for instance Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran second edi-
tion (2018), or Jeremy Seal, A Coup in Turkey (2021).
Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions
and State Violence (2016).
CHAPTER 9
In 1951, a US court convicted Ethel and Julius Rosenberg for spying for the
Soviet Union, activity that involved passing crucial nuclear secrets. The two
were sentenced to death in the electric chair, which was eventually carried out
at Sing Sing prison in June 1953. Critics cited the case as a glaring example of
injustice and intolerance, which proved so potent because the couple seemed
so ordinary. Ethel was a young mother, typical of so many other urban Jewish
families, who was presented as a martyr to “Red Scare paranoia.” The Rosenberg
affair became a worldwide cause celebre, which attracted such celebrities as
Albert Einstein and Jean-Paul Sartre. Mass protests occurred in many nations,
as the campaign to save the couple from execution offered a huge propaganda
advantage to the Soviets and to Communists worldwide. The case later fea-
tured in many fictional works, including E. L. Doctorow’s novel The Book of
Daniel (1977), which became a popular 1983 film. In Tony Kushner’s play
Angels in America (1991–1993), Ethel’s ghost appears to confront and com-
fort the fanatical anti-Communist Roy Cohn, who had prosecuted her.
By the end of the twentieth century, there was no question that both
Rosenbergs were indeed guilty of the espionage with which they were charged,
although it is possible to debate the infliction of the death penalty. The impor-
tance of their activities is questionable. Although their work assisted Soviet
nuclear efforts, they alone did not “give Russia the Bomb.”1 But beyond this,
the case demonstrates the reality of espionage, variously defined, as a factor in
Cold War conflict. It shows the powerful cultural and symbolic dimensions of
such activity, which were comparable to any military advantage that might have
been gained. Spies and secret agents defined Cold War culture.
Quoted in J. Sorkin, Politics and the Muse: Studies in the Politics of Recent American Literature
1
activities against the Soviets relied on aircraft flying close to Soviet air space or
within it, although these were vulnerable to attack. From the mid-1960s, these
were supplemented and then largely replaced by elaborately equipped
submarines.
SIGINT was critical to every international struggle of these years, from the
Korean and Indo-China wars onward. Although the US primarily targeted its
Communist adversaries, it monitored the communications of neutral and
friendly countries. The work of this agency long remained highly secret, to the
point that its activities were commonly denied: the acronym NSA was said to
stand for No Such Agency. The British counterpart was the Government
Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), which was equally shy of public
attention.
The Soviets maintained their own equivalent operations, working respec-
tively under the KGB and the GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie,
Military Intelligence). By the 1970s, Soviet efforts were much larger than
those of the US in terms of the number of individuals involved: perhaps
350,000 personnel against 70,000 Americans. Like the US, the Soviets oper-
ated an extensive worldwide network in friendly countries. Among the most
important of its overseas facilities was that at Lourdes in Cuba, established in
1962 and located conveniently close to US territory.
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Enemy nuclear weapons were naturally central to all such efforts at intelligence
gathering. Beyond the immediate threat of war, detailed information of enemy
capacities was essential to any kind of arms control or reduction. Any and all
negotiations depended on accurate knowledge of the number of warheads and
delivery systems controlled by either side, and for obvious reason, neither
superpower was willing to accept the sworn word of its rival about such mat-
ters. Such information could be obtained by random physical inspection by
teams allowed to wander the enemy’s territory freely to gauge compliance with
treaty agreements, but the Soviets were deeply reluctant to contemplate such
an approach. The only other alternative was surveillance from the skies, or from
space, which became a fundamental fact of the nuclear age.
The US developed a highly secret program to supply aerial photographs of
Soviet territory, a project that was difficult given the Soviet willingness to attack
any aircraft that ventured near its territory. The main solution was the Lockheed
U-2, which was designed to fly at 70,000 feet, far above the capacity of most
air defenses then available. The first U-2 entered service in 1956 and carried
out flights across Eastern Bloc and Soviet territory. The intelligence gained
allowed the US to gain crucial information about Soviet resources, and dis-
proved claims about the alleged “bomber gap” and “missile gap.” However,
the surveillance project detonated an international crisis in 1960, when a
surface-to-air missile brought down a U-2 over the USSR and the Soviets cap-
tured its pilot, Gary Powers. That event poisoned relations between the then
140 P. JENKINS
US leader Eisenhower and Khrushchev, who had, over the previous year, devel-
oped a good working relationship; this event also derailed the vital Four Power
Summit scheduled to be held in Paris. Other U-2 reconnaissance missions were
critical to the outcome of the Cuban confrontation in 1962.
In these same years, the Americans turned to space-based reconnaissance,
with the CORONA program introduced in 1959. That project became still
more urgent following the loss of Gary Powers’ U-2. Satellites supplied visuals
of astonishing clarity, allowing the Americans to observe the Communist pow-
ers through a metaphorical keyhole—hence the KH acronym used for succes-
sive launches. A total of 144 such satellites were launched. Between 1971 and
1986, the center of activity shifted to the KH-9 Hexagon or Big Bird, a series
of superbly accurate photographic reconnaissance satellites. Space-based sur-
veillance was the function of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
founded in 1961, and at the time considered far more secret even than the
NSA. Suggesting the continuing importance of space-based surveillance, the
mere fact of NRO’s existence remained classified until 1992.
The US devoted much effort to obtaining physical examples of East Bloc
equipment, to understand the enemy’s resources. One astonishing example of
such activity occurred in 1974 when US ships sought to retrieve a nuclear-
armed Soviet missile submarine that had sunk deep in the Pacific Ocean some
years before. The resulting effort, Project Azorian, demanded technological
expertise on a scale that has been compared to the Moon landing.
one of the West’s best sources in the Cold War. Among other things, he con-
firmed the genuineness and depth of the split between the Soviets and China,
which contributed to President Nixon’s decision to seek a détente with China
in 1971–1972. Polyakov was eventually arrested and executed in 1986.
The Soviets, likewise, had their sources, who contributed to undermining
the West’s technological advantages. Among the most effective was naval offi-
cer John Walker, who worked for the Soviets from 1968 through 1985. Among
many other treasures, his information helped the Soviets determine where US
submarines would be at any given time, a fact that would be immeasurably
significant in the event of actual combat.
False Flags
Beyond gathering intelligence, spies could affect the behavior of enemy powers
in many ways. As agents in place within enemy countries, they could mount
propaganda or even shape policy. Through proxies and surrogates, they carried
out actions to destabilize or discredit rivals. Such actions were all the more
important when the nuclear threat made it impossible for nations to risk overt
acts of war, but they could inflict a great deal of damage on rivals through clan-
destine and deniable means. That included disinformation and propaganda but
also more direct forms of provocation.
To take one illustration from many, in 1967, a West Berlin police officer shot
and killed a student during a violent protest. The incident was traumatic for
democratic West Germany, and it sparked the student mass movement that
would become so powerful in the tumultuous year of 1968 and over the fol-
lowing decade. Decades later, it emerged that the police officer responsible was
a Communist who was working with the East German secret police, the Stasi,
although it is not certain that the shooting was specifically commanded by that
agency. If it was a deliberate provocation, it succeeded beyond any reasonable
expectation. This is not to say that the student movement would not have
emerged without the backing of Communist agencies, or that the movement
would not have developed its terrorist fringe. But this direct human interven-
tion contributed to weakening a crucial member of the Western alliance. Spies
and secret agents really could affect national policy.
Double Agents
Some cases of espionage and infiltration became so celebrated that they shaped
popular interpretations of the Cold War, and left a significant mark on popular
culture. In turn, they guided the conduct of future investigations.
Britain produced one of the most significant examples in the case of the
Cambridge Ring of Five, which had its roots in the Communist upsurge of the
9 SPIES, SABOTEURS, AND DEFECTORS 143
American Spies
Spy scandals in the US not only had a huge social impact but repeatedly
reshaped national politics. Some of the most sensational such cases coincided
closely with the investigations described in the previous chapter and naturally
affected perceptions of the disloyalty of domestic Communists.
During the war years, the US had developed its nuclear capability through
the Manhattan Project, which was based at Los Alamos, New Mexico. This
facility was kept under the highest possible security, but later investigation
showed how vulnerable it had been to Soviet penetration. The “Atom Spies”
included a remarkably large cohort of individuals. Among the most important
was the German-born British physicist Klaus Fuchs, who supplied the Soviets
with key intelligence about the amount of uranium or plutonium that the
Americans would use for their bombs. It is still debated whether his informa-
tion laid the foundation for the later hydrogen bomb. The British tried and
convicted him in 1950. But Fuchs was far from alone. Only in the late 1990s
was it confirmed that another physicist, Theodore Hall, had been a vital Soviet
source of nuclear information for the Soviets. Hall reportedly was anxious to
avoid any one power having a monopoly of the nuclear secret.
Another key figure was David Greenglass, who formed a spy network with
his sister Ethel and her husband Julius Rosenberg. The courier for Greenglass’
material was Harry Gold, who performed the same role for Klaus Fuchs. The
Rosenbergs were arrested in 1950, alongside many other investigations and
arrests in that key year. Sentencing them to death, the judge, Irving Kaufman,
virtually accused them of being accomplices to mass murder. By placing the
nuclear bomb in Soviet hands years earlier than would otherwise have been
possible, the Rosenbergs had directly caused “the Communist aggression in
Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding 50,000 and who knows but that
millions more of innocent people may pay the price of your treason.”2
Another scandalous case involved the head of the Manhattan Project,
J. Robert Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer had many Communists in his circle of
friends and family, including some who were involved in espionage. He admit-
ted those contacts in HUAC hearings in 1949, and subsequent research sug-
gest that he resisted blandishments to work for the Russians. Concerns were
revived in the McCarthy years, and in a sensational hearing in 1954, he was
deprived of his security clearance. The case sharply divided America’s scientific
community, as some of the impeccably anti-Communist credentials defended
Oppenheimer. Particularly damaging was the hostile testimony of Edward
Teller, the father of the US hydrogen bomb.
2
Quoted in Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage
and America’s Traitors (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).
9 SPIES, SABOTEURS, AND DEFECTORS 145
VENONA
Since the 1920s, the Soviets had operated intelligence operations in the
US. The sheer scale of those ventures was revealed by the VENONA program,
which was only publicly acknowledged in 1995, and it has been the subject of
much subsequent scholarship. VENONA was a successful effort by US intelli-
gence agencies, together with British, Canadian, and Australian allies, to deci-
pher the secret communications of their Soviet counterparts from the
mid-1940s onward. The project produced a vast trove of information that
pointed to legions of Soviet spies operating in the West. In virtually every case,
agents were identified only by code names, but these could be penetrated easily
enough by incidental information about times, places, and travels. Even so,
many cables remain unbroken, and hundreds of agents’ names still cannot be
convincingly associated with named individuals. Most presumably died unde-
tected and unpunished.
The VENONA documents leave no doubt about the scale of Soviet espio-
nage and the existence of high-level defectors and agents of influence. If
Franklin Roosevelt had died between 1941 and 1944, his successor would have
been Vice President Henry Wallace, who had identified Laurence Duggan as
his favored candidate for Secretary of State and Harry Dexter White as his
Treasury Secretary. VENONA records reveal that both were Soviet agents. So
was senior OSS officer Maurice Halperin. So was President Roosevelt’s aide
Lauchlin Currie. This suggests a degree of successful penetration at least com-
parable to anything the Soviets achieved in Britain. Harry Dexter White was a
key architect of the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement that laid the foundation
for the post-war financial system.
One still controversial case involved Alger Hiss, who enjoyed a distinguished
career in several agencies under the Roosevelt administration, culminating in a
position in the State Department. In that role, he attended the 1945 Yalta
conference and was involved in the establishment of the United Nations. In
1948, former Communist Whittaker Chambers alleged that he and Hiss had
both been members of a clandestine Communist cell in the 1930s, which had
as its goal the infiltration of the US government. In 1950, Hiss was convicted
of perjury and received a prison sentence. Prominent on the Congressional
investigation was Richard Nixon, whose efforts made him a rising star for the
Republican right and ensured his candidacy as Vice President on the 1952
Republican ticket. Nixon would, of course, be a deeply controversial figure,
and his role in the case reinforced a general sense among liberal observers that
Hiss had been falsely accused. As with the Rosenbergs, Hiss’ case inspired
much later writing, and as with those other suspects, his guilt would later be
confirmed. Hiss had been named as a likely Soviet agent by several defectors,
and the VENONA documents reveal the existence of an agent called ALES,
who was probably Hiss. Although Hiss still has his defenders, the overwhelm-
ing weight of evidence points to his guilt and to Chambers’ truthfulness.
146 P. JENKINS
offered his services to the agency in 1962. Like the CIA, the FBI spent years
seeking out moles in its own ranks.
The CIA’s internal struggles had a substantial impact on public opinion.
Different factions publicized their competing views through stories leaked to
friendly media outlets, where they were amplified through subsequent discus-
sion and speculation. Particularly during the 1970s, right-wing activists in the
US and Western Europe drew on the views of like-minded allies in the intelli-
gence community to portray the Soviet Union in the harshest and most con-
spiratorial terms. Such media debates brought the technical language of
intelligence and espi9onage into common parlance.
Partly reflecting CIA concerns, other Western intelligence agencies became
deeply concerned about possible Communist subversion in their own nations.
During the late 1960s, Angleton was convinced that the experienced Canadian
security officer Leslie James Bennett was himself a Soviet mole, and a lengthy
inquiry followed. Bennett was forced to resign, although no evidence was
found of his guilt, and he was subsequently exonerated. Other allegations
pointed to possible moles at high levels of government. In Great Britain, a
number of Members of Parliament certainly did have connections to Eastern
Bloc agencies, although their actual usefulness to their patrons was debatable.
Central to right-wing speculations was Harold Wilson, who served as Prime
Minister from 1964 to 1970 and again from 1974 to 1976. In right-wing
mythology, he was an active agent of Eastern Bloc regimes, and he even owed
his leadership of the Labour Party to the clandestine murder of his predecessor
(That charge was also false). During the mid-1970s, dissident rightist members
of the British intelligence community carried out strenuous propaganda cam-
paigns against Wilson and his allies, promoting claims of an imminent coup
d’etat against the elected government.
Spies as Superheroes
Of its nature, the intelligence world is clandestine. Yet during the Cold War,
spies and their doings occupied center stage in popular consciousness, com-
monly as the warriors on the front lines of global struggles. Spies had a long
pedigree in literature, and even Sherlock Holmes had combated espionage at
the turn of the previous century. But new forms of mass media vastly enhanced
that popularity, and disseminated awareness of the language and thought-
world of intelligence.
The most famous fictional exemplar was James Bond, who first appeared
combating Soviet agents in Ian Fleming’s 1953 novel Casino Royale. Bond
became a global sensation through a series of other novels and film adaptations.
President Kennedy was a devoted reader of Bond books, with From Russia
With Love as a special favorite. The triumphant successes of the Bond franchise
opened the door to countless other spy and secret agent heroes, some fantastic,
others painfully realistic. The well-informed John Le Carré offered a highly
nuanced view of the global conflict, and in his first literary hit—The Spy Who
148 P. JENKINS
Came in from the Cold (1963)—he presented Western agencies as scarcely less
sinister and manipulative than their Eastern counterparts. Le Carré echoed the
betrayals of Britain’s Cambridge spies in his Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy (1974),
which became enormously popular through film and television adaptations.
Spy stories, broadly defined, became a mainstay of popular culture in
Communist countries. Those included fictionalized glorifications of Felix
Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Soviet secret police system in the 1920s. Spy
themes were commonplace in East European cinema, in productions like the
Hungarian Fotó Háber (1963) or the Polish Rendezvous with a Spy (1964).
Western audiences would immediately recognize the characters and themes in
such productions, except that the political sides are reversed, with Western
agents as the evil enemies seeking to subvert Communist advances.
In the 1960s, Yulian Semyonov’s fictional series Seventeen Moments of Spring
told the story of Max Otto von Stierlitz, a Communist agent who infiltrated
the Nazi regime and ran a powerful intelligence operation throughout the war.
He targeted Americans who wanted to arrange a separate peace with Germany.
Although the subject matter predated the later East-West Cold War, it popular-
ized the work of the NKVD and glorified their campaigns against Western
infiltration and subversion. The series reinforced the popular Soviet theme of
the continuity between German Nazism and American Cold War aggression.
Von Stierlitz was often termed “the Soviet James Bond.” His fame became still
greater in 1973 when Seventeen Moments of Spring became a television series,
one of the most popular productions in Soviet television history. When describ-
ing his decision to enter the KGB, Vladimir Putin cited his deep interest in the
many popular works of spy fiction with which he grew up in the 1960s, best
represented by writers like Semyonov.
asking reasonably, “What fool will sell us his secrets?”3 But with little argu-
ment, the British government did in fact agree to sell the engines to the USSR,
which promptly reverse-engineered them, and produced excellent engines of
their own. Those Soviet engines powered the MiG-15 fighter, which came
close to dominating the skies over Korea. Few spies could have dreamed of
such a triumph by clandestine means.
Reinforcing the human element in this story, the fact that a country had
access to certain information said little about how they proposed to use it.
Through multiple means, including signals intelligence, the Soviets had repeat-
edly been informed that a German attack on their country was imminent in
June 1941, yet for whatever reasons, they chose to ignore that intelligence.
Even the best intelligence could achieve little when not combined with wise
policy decisions.
Accounts of Cold War espionage, fictional and factual, constitute an immense
library, but few ever give enough space to the failures of such ventures, when
even the cosmically large investments in intelligence gathering did not tell
nations some critical facts about their enemies. For all their sophistication,
Western intelligence services did a poor job of predicting such momentous
developments as the first Soviet nuclear test, the outbreak of the Korean War,
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. In
later years, the US over-estimated the strength of the Soviet economy. It is only
a little unfair to say that despite all their vast expenditures, the US knew abso-
lutely everything about the USSR in the 1980s except that it was about to
evaporate. Soviet analysts, in their turn, badly misjudged Western abilities and
intentions, notably when in the early 1980s many foresaw an imminent US
attack on the Soviet homeland. Each blunder in its way potentially threatened
horrific consequences.
Intelligence gathering and espionage were fundamental facts of the Cold
War, but they have to be kept in perspective.
Further Reading
The obvious romantic appeal of espionage and intelligence has attracted many
writers. Far more has been published on, for instance, the Cambridge Spies
than on several specific crises and wars of the Cold War era that killed many
thousands.
For intelligence operations in general, see James Callanan, Covert Action in the
Cold War: US Policy, Intelligence and CIA Operations (2009); Thomas Rid,
Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political
Warfare (2020).
3
Sebastien Roblin “Fact: Britain Helped Russia ‘Build’ Their MiG-15 Fighter Jet,” National
Interest August 26, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/fact-britain-helped-russia-
build-their-mig-15-fighter-jet-167663.
150 P. JENKINS
In 1982, the documentary Atomic Café used American public information and
propaganda films to reconstruct the attitudes of the 1950s. The overall impres-
sion was of a deeply paranoid society, facing the menaces of nuclear war and the
Red Menace, yet at the same time unable to confront challenges in a realistic
way. An animation from the Duck and Cover film of 1952 showed Bert the
Turtle teaching children how to survive a nuclear attack by hiding under their
desks. Together with (often distorted) memories of McCarthyism and images
of unyielding social conformity, such themes have long dominated American
reconstructions of the Cold War as it affected everyday life. As with all stereo-
types, the picture contains some elements of truth, but even in the US context,
it conceals many nuances. Moreover, each different society had its own distinct
Cold War realities, and the nature of those impacts and perceptions changed
substantially over time. But often in surprising ways, the political and military
confrontation between East and West shaped many aspects of everyday reality,
even the most intimate.
A Militarized Order
To varying degrees, no one alive and conscious in these years could avoid some
familiarity with Cold War realities and imagery, at least if they had any access to
mass media. To take a year at random, we might choose 1954, when television
still remained a minority luxury outside the US, and most still found their news
through radio, newspapers, or the popular newsreels shown in cinemas. In
1954, the most shocking theme for consumers of news was the hydrogen
bomb tests in the Pacific, but other stories concerned the artillery combat
between the PRC and Taiwan, the revelation of the USSR’s Bison jet bomber,
the McCarthy hearings in the US, the coup in Guatemala, and the French
debacle in Indo-China. Images of war, revolution, and international
Domestic Impacts
The long decades of the Cold War coincided with enormous changes in the
ways of life and thought of all the societies involved, and it is rarely easy to
determine which of those might have been consequences or products of that
struggle. The fact that a trend occurred during the 1950s, say, does not of itself
10 COLD WAR CULTURES 153
women were heavily engaged both in the workplace and in the military. But
rarely did that equality extend to real power, or to holding senior ranks in the
Party or government.
Sexualities
Cold War ideologies formed attitudes to alternative sexualities. Since the
1920s, psychiatrists and psychologists had offered a grim view of homosexu-
ality, contextualizing it together with other forms of deviance, including
pedophilia, sexual violence, and murder. In the late 1940s, the US experi-
enced a notorious panic over “sex fiends” of all kinds, as persecution of
homosexuals reached grim heights. Other countries were scarcely less fero-
cious: Germany vigorously enforced its anti-gay laws until 1969. Further
poisoning that atmosphere were successive revelations of cases of spies or
traitors who were gay or “lavender,” suggesting a direct linkage between
deviant sexuality and disloyalty. The British instance of the Cambridge Five
contributed much here, as did the 1960 defections of NSA cryptologists
William Martin and Bernon Mitchell (see Chap. 9). In 1953, President
Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10450, which extended the loyalty sys-
tem in federal employment to include sexual perversion. A “lavender scare”
justified anti-gay purges through the 1960s.
The red/lavender stereotype became a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. If
homosexuality was so stigmatized, then its exposure was a potentially devastat-
ing act, which a government official would be desperately anxious to avoid.
This left him open to potential blackmail, and actually increased the chance
that he might be induced to give away secret information. In 1959, Allen
Drury’s popular novel Advise and Consent depicted Communists blackmailing
a conservative US Senator on the grounds of a long-past homosexual experi-
ence. The goal was to ensure the approval of a leftist Secretary of State friendly
to rapprochement with Moscow. The book provided the basis for a 1962 film
that broke dramatic new ground in its depiction of the contemporary gay
underworld.
Loyalties
Throughout the Cold War, governments sought to ensure the loyalties of their
own citizens and allies to their distinctive causes, while condemning rival sys-
tems. During the latter years of the Cold War in the 1980s, the economic dis-
parities between the two sides constituted a yawning gulf: the West was
overwhelmingly prosperous and technologically advanced, while the East Bloc
countries were desperately trying to reform. In Asia, that contrast found glar-
ing expression in the contrast between the stunning wealth of Japan, and the
grueling poverty of China. Those realities make it difficult to recall the earlier
phases of the confrontation, when East-West differences were far less marked,
and when the Communist model appeared credible and even admirable. In the
immediate post-war years, the ruin inflicted by the war left West European
nations (and Japan) in a state of extreme poverty and dislocation, and it was
not immediately obvious that they would experience the miraculous boom of
the next three decades. Through these years, later-prosperous Pacific Rim
countries such as Taiwan or South Korea remained desperately poor. Even after
reconstruction was underway, the Soviets positioned themselves as exemplars
of science, progress, and modernity. Particularly in the decade after 1955, years
of intense and perilous military rivalry, ideological conflict between the two
sides involved a real element of competition. Governments needed to win over
audiences at home and abroad.
From the founding of the Soviet state, Communist systems had preserved
the loyalty of citizens by various institutions, incorporating most of the popula-
tion in networks of Party-controlled associations, clubs, youth organizations,
and unions. Like the armed forces, all offered intense “political education,”
which consumers absorbed with varying degrees of seriousness. Ubiquitous
propaganda took the form of posters and visuals, as magazines and newspapers
presented Party messages through cartoons and graphic imagery as well as text.
Holidays and festivals offered the opportunity for parades, inevitably with
strongly patriotic and military themes. Soviet films and newsreels were a highly
156 P. JENKINS
and Italy, and a quarter of Americans were Catholic. Between 1945 and 1965,
levels of religious faith and practice remained astronomically high in the
Western world, and not until the mid-1960s did secularization become com-
monplace. The Catholic church remained very strong in Latin American
nations, even those that were officially secular, and the Philippines gave the
church an Asian bastion.
In the 1950s, Catholics were critical to the Christian Democrat parties that
were the foundation for the anti-Communist cause in West Germany, Italy, and
elsewhere, especially to the Catholic labor unions that confronted Communist
rivals. Prominent among this generation of Catholic leaders were the Trinity of
Germany’s Konrad Adenauer, Italy’s Alcide de Gasperi, and France’s Robert
Schuman. Catholic politicians were central to forming the institutions promot-
ing European unity, and unifying Western Europe against Communist chal-
lenges. In North America and Australia, Catholic leaders prominently and
dependably supported anti-Communist activism.
But religious activism was by no means confined to Catholics. In 1949,
evangelical preacher Billy Graham began the first of his sensational crusade
campaigns, which became a global phenomenon. Through the 1950s,
Graham’s preaching was fervently anti-Communist, and it exercised part of its
appeal from a popular sense that the world was living in the end ties, con-
stantly threatened by “hell-bombs.” Although he used a very different kind of
rhetoric, liberal Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr likewise gave a reli-
gious foundation for anti-Communism, and in a way that exercised broad
intellectual appeal. We have already encountered Whittaker Chambers as the
key witness against Alger Hiss, and in 1952 his bestselling book Witness
(1952) became a potent contribution to anti-Communist literature. He
unabashedly offered a religious and even diabolical context for Communism,
tracing its appeal to the serpent’s temptation in the Garden of Eden. In 1954,
the US Congress modified the Pledge of Allegiance taken by all schoolchil-
dren to stress that loyalty was directed not just to one nation, but to “one
nation under God.”
Don—into a truly impressive six-hour epic. But not all cinema offerings were
so overtly patriotic. One popular production was Amphibian Man (1962), a
wildly imaginative fantasy at least equal to anything that might have been pro-
duced in contemporary Western Europe. Also from 1962, Nine Days in One
Year was a much-praised romance set in the world of Soviet nuclear research.
Any list of the world’s greatest-ever films invariably includes three or four items
from the director Andrei Tarkovsky. Most admired in retrospect is his Andrei
Rublev, which was made in 1966 but not released for several years in its
intended form. Over and above all these achievements, Polish and Czechoslovak
studios made some of the most impressive films of the era. Particularly acclaimed
from Poland was Andrzej Wajda’s Ashes and Diamonds (1958), which tackled
the very sensitive subject of the anti-Communist guerrilla struggle in that
country in the 1940s.
Soviet literature achieved real successes in both high and low cultures. Poets
like Yevgeny Yevtushenko achieved superstar status, to the point of holding
readings in stadiums at home, and also winning international acclaim. The
relaxation of literary censorship during the Thaw allowed the appearance of
long-banned writings from the Stalin era. In 1962, the government allowed
the publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s exposé of prison camp life in his
One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. In 1967, Mikhail Bulgakov’s The Master
and Margarita finally became available, 30 years after its completion. One dar-
ing effort was Boris Pasternak’s novel Dr Zhivago, which traced its heroes from
before the Bolshevik Revolution through the Great Purges. Completed in
1956, the book was refused publication in the USSR, but a copy was smuggled
to Italy, where it was published. The CIA sponsored a Russian-language ver-
sion and encouraged the book’s wide distribution, helping to make it a global
bestseller. Pasternak won the 1958 Nobel Prize for literature, and a film version
in 1965 became one of the most successful releases of all time. Although the
US intended Dr Zhivago to embarrass the Soviets, the scheme backfired, as the
book reinforced the idea that modern Soviet culture was worth studying and
admiring.
The Soviets achieved real international success in genre writing. Particularly
successful from the late 1950s onward were the Strugatsky brothers, Boris and
Arkady, who made their impact on the hitherto Anglo-American-dominated
field of science fiction. Among their leading competitors was Poland’s Stanislaw
Lem, whose novels sold in the tens of millions. Tarkovsky’s production of
Lem’s 1961 novel Solaris is often cited as one of the greatest science fiction
films ever made. Any such listing would also include the 1963 Czechoslovak
space film Ikarie XB-1, which was also based on a Lem novel. Internationally,
such works appealed especially to teenagers and young adults, to the educated
and aspiring, and exactly the audiences that the Soviets hoped to reach by such
expressions of soft power.
10 COLD WAR CULTURES 163
offered an obvious means of stressing the country’s alleged racism. The milita-
rist theme became a strong component of the Western anti-nuclear movement,
which regularly used cartoonish visuals of heavily bemedaled American (never
Soviet) generals brandishing missiles and hydrogen bombs. The Soviets
exploited the anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements that gained such force
from the mid-1950s onward. Beyond general propaganda, they offered many
young people from the Global South the opportunity to receive higher educa-
tion in the USSR, with a view to drawing the young and talented to the
Communist camp. Those core Soviet themes—world peace, anti-imperialism,
and anti-racism—carried real weight for international audiences, in European
countries as well as emerging nations. They resonated among many Western
liberals and religious thinkers who were by no means fellow travelers.
Banning the Bomb
From the mid-1950s, concern about the Cold War confrontation grew power-
fully in the West, in the US as well as core allies such as Britain. This certainly
did not mean any sympathy for Communism or for the Soviet Union on any-
thing like the lines of the Popular Front years, and any such tendencies would
have appeared ludicrous to the emerging boomer generation in most of the
West. But the new vision involved a more nuanced attitude to the world situa-
tion, and those attitudes were reflected in mass movements and in popular
culture.
The emergence of hydrogen bombs made the threat of nuclear warfare so
pressing that it naturally stirred mass opposition. Britain took the lead in pro-
tests against nuclear testing, and also the existence of nuclear weapons as such,
with the formation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in
1957. The following year, CND organized the first of what became a powerful
annual event, with mass marches to the nuclear warfare research establishment
at Aldermaston. The movement’s slogan “Ban the Bomb” became a common
meme, much imitated and parodied. The timing of these marches at Easter
reflected the strong role of religious groups among the broad spectrum of left
and liberal activists. Partly inspired by CND, in 1961, the US movement
“Women Strike for Peace” mobilized 50,000 demonstrators in various cities.
The achievement was all the more ground-breaking for its pioneering use of
female imagery and even feminist rhetoric in the cause of disarmament.
Other countries too developed broadly based anti-nuclear movements.
Canada found itself in a near-impossible position because it officially rejected
nuclear weapons, yet at the same time, the country was integrated into a North
American defensive system that assumed the deployment of US nuclear arms.
In 1958, the government accepted the presence of US Bomarc missiles, but
without revealing that these would be nuclear-armed. When that fact became
known in 1960, it stirred a mass national protest, drawing heavily on CND
tactics and rhetoric, but also drawing inspiration from the US Civil Rights
movement. In 1964, protesters focused their attention on the missile sites at La
10 COLD WAR CULTURES 165
2
“Transcript of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Farewell Address (1961),” https://www.
ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=90&page=transcript.
166 P. JENKINS
“We won it. We really clobbered ’em!” Hart’s eyes lowered and his arms drooped.
He said, “Not that it matters.” The engine started and Randy turned away to face
the thousand-year night.
3
Pat Frank, Alas Babylon (Bantam Books 1960) 278–279.
10 COLD WAR CULTURES 167
4
Barry McGuire, “Eve of Destruction,” https://www.lyrics.com/lyric/19338134/
Barry+McGuire/Eve+of+Destruction.
168 P. JENKINS
In terms of mass popularity in this era, it would be difficult to rival the James
Bond novels and subsequent films, but from 1961, with the publication of
Thunderball, author Ian Fleming made an explicit decision not to use
Communist villains. Instead, he invented a fictional criminal syndicate called
SPECTRE, which was wholly apolitical. SPECTRE retained that role through
the series of films that appeared from 1962 onward, and many other franchises
of the era used similar devices. Alternatively, Chinese Communists replaced the
Soviets as villains, with all the racial stereotypes that implied. Soviet or Eastern
Bloc villains were no longer believable or acceptable. When the great science
fiction film 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) envisaged a then-plausible near future,
it depicted a friendly global collaboration between two equally matched space-
faring powers, the US and the Soviets. And clearly, these are Soviets, rather
than simply Russians.
This is not to suggest that US or Western nations ceased to be concerned
about Soviet or Communist threats, and anti-Communism remained a funda-
mental reality of public life in the US and elsewhere through the 1960s and
beyond. The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia revived older images of
Soviet aggression, as did the country’s new crackdowns on dissidents. But con-
cepts of the East-West conflict were shifting from what had been known over
the previous decades, to permit genuine debate and disagreement. New cul-
tural forces challenged the basic political assumptions of both sides, and pro-
foundly complicated the question of what those sides even stood for.
Further Reading
From a large literature on civil defense, see Matthew Grant, After the Bomb:
Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Britain, 1945–1968 (2009); Andrew
Burtch, Give Me Shelter: The Failure of Canada’s Cold War Civil Defence
(2012); Michael Scheibach, Alert America!: The Atomic Bomb and the Show
That May Save Your Life (2019); and Edward M. Geist Armageddon
Insurance: Civil Defense in the United States and Soviet Union,
1945–1991 (2019).
On Cold War cultures, especially film and literature, see Ann Sherif, Japan’s
Cold War: Media, Literature, and the Law (2009); Tony Shaw and Denise
J. Youngblood, Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for
Hearts and Minds (2010); J. Hoberman, An Army of Phantoms: American
Movies and the Making of the Cold War (2011); John Sbardellati, J. Edgar
Hoover Goes to the Movies: The FBI and the Origins of Hollywood’s Cold War
(2012); Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the
World of Arts and Letters (2013); Greg Barnhisel, Cold War Modernists: Art,
Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy; and Duncan White, Cold
Warriors: Writers Who Waged the Literary Cold War (2019). A sweeping
study can be found in Louis Menand, The Free World: Art and Thought in the
Cold War (2021).
10 COLD WAR CULTURES 169
For global frontiers of the cultural Cold War, see Patrick Iber, Neither
Peace Nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America (2015);
Łukasz Stanke, Architecture in Global Socialism: Eastern Europe, West
Africa, and the Middle East in the Cold War (2020). Impacts on the aca-
demic world are addressed for instance in David H. Price, Cold War
Anthropology (2016).
Soviet popular culture in these years forms the subject of some important
scholarship that seriously revises older Western assumptions about the closed
and rigid nature of that society. Major works include Kristin Roth-Ey. Moscow
Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the
Cultural Cold War (2011); and Eleonory Gilburd, To See Paris and Die: The
Soviet Lives of Western Culture (2018).
Regional and local impacts of the Cold War are discussed for instance in David
W. Mills, Fighting Communism on the Northern Plains (2015). For popular
attitudes and social movements, see Christopher R. Hill, Peace and Power in
Cold War Britain: Media, Movements and Democracy, c.1945–1968 (2018);
Nicholas Barnett, Britain’s Cold War: Culture, Modernity and the Soviet
Threat (2018).
Issues concerning sport are covered in Toby C. Rider, Cold War Games:
Propaganda, The Olympics, and U.S. Foreign Policy (2016); Toby C. Rider
and Kevin B. Witherspoon, eds., Defending the American Way of Life: Sport,
Culture, and the Cold War (2018); and Robert Edelman and Christopher
Young, The Whole World Was Watching: Sport in the Cold War (2020).
On gender and family, see Margaret Peacock, Innocent Weapons: The Soviet and
American Politics of Childhood in the Cold War (2014); Philip E. Muehlenbeck,
ed., Gender, Sexuality, and the Cold War: A Global Perspective (2017); and
Victoria M. Grieve, Little Cold Warriors: American Childhood In The
1950s (2018).
On the space race, see Teasel Muir-Harmony, Operation Moonglow (2020).
For religious factors in the story, see Uta Balbier, Altar Call in Europe: Billy
Graham, Mass Evangelism, and the Cold-War West (2021).
PART III
In November 1968, the Beatles released their song Back in the USSR. This
parody of contemporary California surf music juxtaposed lively Western popu-
lar culture with the often grim face of Soviet Communism. At once, the song
mocked both Communism and simplistic US sentimentality.
But despite that ambiguity, the triumphant popularity of the Beatles, and of
songs like Back in the USSR, suggested the broad success of “the West” in
presenting itself as superior to any ideological rivals, especially among the siz-
able cohort of baby boomers. Despite all the US efforts to wage a cultural Cold
War, the West’s greatest successes came from non-government-sponsored
commercial efforts, in the form of American rock and pop music and the musi-
cal explosion that grew out of Britain in the 1960s. That in turn manifested in
terms of personal appearance—hair styles and clothes—as well as other produc-
tions, such as the James Bond films. By the mid-1960s, Soviet bloc countries
were viscerally hostile to the emerging youth culture that they portrayed as a
sign of Western failure and decadence. They struggled to prevent that culture
from surreptitiously spreading through their own societies. Young people in
the Eastern bloc risked severe penalties to engage in that culture, and above all,
its music, which conveyed a sense of liberation, personal and social. No govern-
ment or propaganda agency could have dreamed of so crushing a cultural
triumph.
But that cultural triumph did not extend to “Western” values as they had
been conventionally defined since 1945. Politically and socially, new ideas of
liberation and pacifism were destabilizing the West as much as the East, unset-
tling anti-Communists as much as Communists. For many in Europe, these
new values led to a simultaneous rejection of both superpowers. Rising pres-
sures were explosively obvious in that year of 1968, which produced so many
potent images and symbol of change. So abundant were key events, and so
1968: Vietnam
US-Soviet tensions cooled substantially after the war threat of 1962. Of
course, the Cold War itself remained very much alive, as was apparent in such
countries as the Dominican Republic and Indonesia, to say nothing of
Vietnam. But as we have seen, the nature and dimensions of the global con-
frontation changed significantly, and especially in the US itself, where aggres-
sive anti-Communism appeared dated. In most countries, popular
consciousness of nuclear dangers declined following the ending of most test-
ing in 1963, and anti-nuclear activism faded. It became possible for ordinary
people to forget the vast arsenals of the competing superpowers, which was
ironic in light of the actual scale of investment in weaponry. By 1968, the
world still had around 40,000 nuclear weapons, so that in terms of available
armaments, the situation was in some sense even more dangerous it had been
a decade earlier.
As the war in Vietnam came to occupy center stage in political debate, it
revolutionized political ideologies. It placed a deep strain on traditional con-
cepts of “the West,” and the central role of the US, while inspiring new ideolo-
gies that challenged the familiar assumptions of the Soviet Union. In both
these trends, the year 1968 was critical.
Through 1966 and 1967, US policymakers were becoming nervous about
the seemingly endless surge in military demands for personnel—for what at the
time was termed manpower. It was quite feasible that the US commitment
could soon approach a million, which might be barely tolerable if victory was a
genuine possibility within a foreseeable future. That vision became unaccept-
able in early 1968, when the North Vietnamese broke the truce created for the
New Year festival, Tet. The resulting offensive sent 80,000 NVA and Viet Cong
against a hundred centers across Vietnam. Communist forces captured the his-
toric center of Hue and attacked the US embassy in Saigon. The battle for Hue
was particularly savage, claiming perhaps 14,000 lives in all, counting both
military and civilian dead.
By any objective measure, the resulting battles resulted in a complete US
victory. Communist forces were systematically routed with losses so heavy that
many Viet Cong units ceased to function. Worse, by exposing so many units
that had been clandestine, the Communists forfeited some of their earlier
advantages. But politically, the Tet offensive was a disaster for the US, and for
Johnson. It showed clearly that the war was nowhere near being won, and that
victory would demand an inconceivably vast new troop commitment. Also in
the first half of 1968, the US was engaged in a grueling series of battles around
the key base of Khe Sanh, which were claiming ever more US lives. The cam-
paign looked like a North Vietnamese attempt to reproduce their triumph over
11 CRISIS OF IDEOLOGIES: THE WORLD IN 1968 175
the French at Dien Bien Phu. Together with ancillary battles, the six-month
siege of Khe Sanh killed around 1000 Americans and over 5000 North
Vietnamese, not counting ARVN losses. US commanders in Vietnam devel-
oped Operation Fracture Jaw, which envisaged the use of tactical nuclear weap-
ons if defeat seemed likely at Khe Sanh.
That continuing conflict was catastrophic for US morale at home, and for its
reputation abroad. Anti-war sentiment grew within US forces in Vietnam, aug-
mented by deepening racial resentment. On the home front, many who actively
favored the war effort felt that if it was not going to be pursued with proper
determination, then the time had come to withdraw. In March 1968, a pro-
peace candidate came close to defeating Lyndon Johnson in the New Hampshire
presidential primary, demonstrating the force of public discontent. The
Democratic Party dissolved into factional warfare. On March 31, Johnson
made the sensational announcement that he would not stand for re-election in
November. He limited bombing attacks on the north. Ending the strikes that
October removed obstacles to peace negotiations involving all parties, which
began in Paris. But hopes of a speedy end to the war were dashed, and as we
will see, negotiations were slow and complex.
1
The joke is much quoted. See, for instance, Warren Treadgold, The University We Need:
Reforming American Higher Education (New York: Encounter Books, 2018).
176 P. JENKINS
Losing the West?
Among the Western allies, outrage at the Vietnam involvement placed deep
strains on traditional concepts of US global leadership. In Europe, anti-
Americanism became commonplace and overt. The war promoted the idea of
moral equivalence, the idea that Americans and Soviets were equally cynical in
pursuing their own interests, and that no great moral difference separated the
causes for which they purported to be fighting. As we have seen, few of the US’
traditional allies actively supported the war effort and none in Europe. Some
Western countries indeed publicly opposed the war and offered aid to war
resisters and deserters. Neutral Sweden was a visible opponent, but the
Canadian government was scarcely more friendly to US policies. In Britain,
strong left-wing movements urged the government to be more vigorous in
denouncing the war. Of course, countries like Britain and Canada remained
firmly committed to mutual defense against the Soviets, but the alliance had
strict limits.
Within many Western nations, Vietnam generated the most intense public
disaffection since the end of the Second World War, and most of it was directed
against the US. As the war grew in scale and became ever more divisive, anti-
war movements proliferated and drew mass support, both in the US and in
many other nations. Crucial here was the generational shift associated with the
Baby Boomers, and the revolutionary change implied by the mass extension of
higher education. Universities and colleges boomed, producing very large
audiences for radical and experimental ideas and movements. New Left ideolo-
gies became ever more prominent and evolved rapidly.
Anti-Vietnam War protests surged across Western nations in 1967–1968. In
the Spring of 1968, radicalism found a focus in mass student protests in Paris,
which offered a wide-ranging critique of capitalism, imperialism, the US, and
conservative French society. Heavy-handed police responses expanded the pro-
tests, and street violence followed. The May crisis escalated rapidly as millions
of workers struck and occupied factories, bringing the economy to a halt.
Throughout these conflicts, generational tensions were very much in evidence,
with younger radicals much in evidence in the labor protests as much as the
student movement. The movement sparked a vigorous upsurge, which was
utopian and anarchist as much as socialist or Communist.
The protests threatened the survival of the regime itself. President de Gaulle
vanished from view for several days, during which he reaffirmed the support of
his military should it be needed to crush outright revolution. In the event, that
was not required, and the movement faded after several weeks. Significantly in
light of historical experience, the mass upsurge unsettled the country’s power-
ful Communist Party almost as much as the conservatives, and the Communists
were anxious to reduce tensions. Communists were critical to achieving the
labor settlements that restarted the economy and, arguably, saved De
Gaulle’s regime.
11 CRISIS OF IDEOLOGIES: THE WORLD IN 1968 177
68’ism
The French experience, “May 68,” exercised immense influence worldwide,
and was reflected in mass upsurges in many other nations, especially Italy, West
Germany, Japan, and the US itself. Although very diverse, the new radicalism
usually stressed themes of personal liberation far removed from familiar class
issues. Over the next two years, the new radicalism was manifested in causes
such as feminism and gay rights activism, as well as environmentalism. Italians
described the multifaceted cultural radicalism that emerged from this ferment
as sessantottismo, 68’ism, a word that can usefully be applied to many societies.
The combined crises of 1956 had created a schism in Communist circles
worldwide, out of which had developed a New Left that rejected the familiar
assumptions of mainstream Soviet-aligned Communism. While that older ide-
ology placed all its hopes in the industrial working classes of the advanced
nations, newer critics viewed that working class as often conservative, consum-
erist, and selfish, and instead looked to the marginalized—to racial minorities,
to peasant populations, and to revolutionary movements within the Third
World. Insurgencies in Algeria and Vietnam fitted poorly with traditional
Communist assumptions about the social foundations of revolutionary change.
The emerging radicals enjoyed a complex and often contradictory relationship
with Communism, especially as expressed by the Communist nations. The
radical movements idolized countries such as Cuba and North Vietnam that
were Communist and avowedly revolutionary, but at least on the surface, with-
out the baggage of the Soviet experience. Many radicals were no less excited by
the images emerging from China’s Cultural Revolution, as millions of dedi-
cated young people overthrew entrenched institutions. If that experience hor-
rified mainstream Western audiences, some European radicals espoused Maoist
ideologies and symbols. A new revolutionary pantheon included Mao, Ho Chi
Minh, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara.
The newer movements were frank about the necessity of armed violence,
and indeed its redemptive character. Such ideas found expression in Mao’s
particular variant of traditional Marxist theory. His guerrilla experience stressed
the role of the peasants and the countryside, and when the Communists con-
trolled the countryside, they were able to seize the cities. Applied to a global
scale, that suggested a special role for the world’s poorer and less developed
nations, the “countryside” from which the metropolitan nations could be sur-
rounded and overcome. The developing vision of the New Left gave armed
revolution a central role in radical debate that it had not possessed since the fall
of the Nazis.
In theory, the new approach marginalized the West and its white popula-
tions, but even so it inspired new movements within those very nations.
Militants took inspiration from the innovative tactics of armed resistance then
coming into vogue. In 1956–1957, the Arab resistance against the French in
Algeria concentrated their efforts on urban warfare. Apart from choosing
urban targets, the movement developed effective new means of operation
178 P. JENKINS
American Turmoil
The US shared in the radical explosion, in 68ism, but the year had an especially
grim quality, symbolized by the assassinations of Martin Luther King that
April, and of Presidential contender Robert F Kennedy in June. Those acts
seemed to end hopes of peaceful political change and reform. Internal political
violence and polarization surged, making the familiar language of East-West
confrontation appear all but irrelevant. Many Americans, like West Europeans,
bitterly attacked the US government and its military establishment. Anti-war
themes and imagery permeated mainstream popular culture, suggested by the
widespread use of the Peace Sign. Originally designed for the British CND, by
the late 1960s, it was a logo of the US anti-war protests.
That chaos opened the way to a new administration that directly contra-
dicted the radical hopes of the year. Although anti-war dissent remained fer-
vent, many Americans were alarmed by the social chaos and racial unrest that
was underway, and which seemed to be growing worse. In the presidential
election of that November, third party hard right candidate George Wallace
secured 13.5 percent of the popular vote (Wallace’s vice presidential candidate
was Curtis LeMay, former head of the SAC). That took many Southern and
white working-class votes that would otherwise have gone to the Democrats.
Conservative Republican Richard Nixon won the presidency, although with a
tiny popular vote majority over his Democratic rival. As we will see, Nixon’s
presidency would mark a dramatic new phase in Cold War approaches and
alignments.
Dissidents
The crisis abruptly terminated any Western hopes that the Soviet Union would
grow closer to Western norms, that it would “normalize” and relax its policies.
Reinforcing that message were events in the USSR itself, where affairs in
Czechoslovakia galvanized an already stirring movement. Although the Soviet
Union experienced little overt dissidence comparable to that in Eastern Europe,
activism was growing. Some writers and intellectuals were already publishing
materials critical of the regime, either smuggling their writings abroad for over-
seas publication. In 1966, the government prosecuted two of the most visible
dissident writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, who received harsh sen-
tences in labor camps. That trial inspired other dissidents, and critical works
received wide underground domestic circulation as “self-published,” samizdat.
The most celebrated such production was the Chronicle of Current Events,
widely read from its foundation in 1968, although thoroughly illegal.
2
Harry Schwartz, “The Khrushchev/Brezhnev Doctrine at Helsinki,” New York Times, August
5, 1975, https://www.nytimes.com/1975/08/05/archives/the-khrushchevbrezhnev-doctrine-
at-helsinki.html.
11 CRISIS OF IDEOLOGIES: THE WORLD IN 1968 181
Many Vietnams
Globally, the 1968 experience sparked the growth of many radical and revolu-
tionary movements, many of which in turn found strong support in the Western
New Left. Radicalism was already surging across Latin America, inspired by the
Cuban example, and the struggle in Vietnam. In October 1968, mass protests
developed in Mexico City, coinciding with the Olympics shortly to be held in
that city, which would naturally attract a global media audience. Armed police
met the demonstrations with lethal force, killing perhaps 400.
The other great symbolic event of the year occurred in Medellín, Colombia,
that August and September, during the conference of the continent’s Catholic
prelates, CELAM (Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano). Between 1963 and
1965, the Catholic Church held its Second Vatican Council, which opened the
way to rethinking virtually every aspect of church life and social teaching.
Around the world, that transformed the political attitudes of Catholics, many
of whom moved to the forefront of liberal or left activism. In Latin America,
new theological positions insisted on the unique importance of the poor in the
Christian message, and the crying need for activism in the cause of social jus-
tice. That radical liberation theology was powerfully expressed at Medellín. It
soon became the basis for radical movements across the continent, often in de
facto alliance with Marxist causes and sects.
Revolutionary movements proliferated across Latin America, many inspired
by The Battle of Algiers. In 1969, Brazilian militant Carlos Marighela, pub-
lished his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. (Marighela perished at the
hands of Brazilian police later that year.) Urban guerilla movements began a
series of “armed propaganda” actions, which included robberies, kidnappings,
and bombings. But the Battle of Algiers model had sweeping implications for
those who defended the state, as much as those who challenged it. The same
story taught security forces the desperate means that would be needed to sup-
press an urban guerrilla rising. Movements organized in cell systems must be
182 P. JENKINS
Jews and Arabs
The traumatic year 1968 placed Jewish issues on the front lines of Cold War
conflict. Partly, this was an outgrowth of Middle Eastern conflicts. As we have
seen, Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War of 1967 made the Jewish state the
unchallenged military power in the region. In consequence, Israel became a
11 CRISIS OF IDEOLOGIES: THE WORLD IN 1968 183
symbol of Western imperialism and a magnet for Jewish populations within the
Eastern bloc who wished to migrate there.
The Soviet Union had a lengthy tradition of anti-Semitism, which now
became much more acute. Jews were viewed as being loyal to two nations, the
USSR and Israel, a grave crime in the Soviet perspective. When Jews applied for
permission to leave the country, they were denied visas, joining the stigmatized
population of refuseniks. From the end of the decade, the number of visas
issued to Jews increased substantially, in response to diplomatic needs and pres-
sures. But the fact of taking such visas, and deserting the Soviet Union, further
enhanced the image of Jews as potential traitors to the Soviet cause. Soviet
campaigns against Zionism segued easily into attacks on Judaism as such, and
on individuals Jews, regardless of their politics. That current spilled over into
eastern European nations with their own toxic history of anti-Jewish senti-
ment, especially Poland. East Bloc anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism would play
an important international role in coming years, in pushing many liberal
Americans to strongly anti-Soviet positions. This was a significant influence in
creating the neo-conservative movement that became such a strong compo-
nent of the coalition that supported Ronald Reagan.
Middle Eastern affairs also played a role for the emerging New Left. While
discrediting the Arab states, the 1967 war shifted the focus of anti-Israel resis-
tance to Palestinian groups themselves, especially the al-Fatah guerrilla move-
ment. In March 1968, Fatah fought a stubborn battle against Israeli forces at
Karameh, in Jordan, which inspired Palestinian activism, and multiple new
sects and armed militias formed over the next two years. Some, like the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), used innovative tactics of urban
terrorism and undertook sensational acts such as airline hijackings. In July
1968, three PFLP militants hijacked an El Al flight and diverted it to Algiers,
forcing Israel to free Arab prisoners in exchange for the hostages. Such actions
were greatly admired by leftists worldwide, and the Arab guerrilla groups
offered support and training for militants from Europe and elsewhere. This laid
the foundation for the international terrorism that became so notorious in the
1970s, when airline hijackings in particular became so commonplace.
At least in popular perception, the various guerrilla and terrorist movements
were free-standing and independent. As authentic voices of Third World resis-
tance, they were often idolized by young left-wing groups who had nothing
but contempt for the Soviets. Even so, it was an open secret that many of these
groups, especially among the Palestinians, cooperated with Eastern Bloc intel-
ligence services, from which they received arms and finance. Such groups gave
the Eastern Bloc useful proxies to use against Western powers through acts of
terrorism and destabilization.
184 P. JENKINS
Further Reading
For the wide-ranging protests and crises of 1968, see, for instance, Mark
Kurlansky, 1968: The Year That Rocked the World (2003); and Richard Vinen,
The Long ‘68: Radical Protest and Its Enemies (2018).
Mark Bowden, Hue 1968: A Turning Point of the American War in Vietnam
(2017) offers an excellent summary of the military situation in Vietnam dur-
ing that crucial year.
11 CRISIS OF IDEOLOGIES: THE WORLD IN 1968 185
Josef Pazderka, ed., The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: The Russian
Perspective (2019).
The growing crisis in the Middle East is described in Anat N. Kurz, Fatah and
the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle (2005).
For the pioneering era of high tech and computing, see Leslie Berlin,
Troublemakers: Silicon Valley’s Coming of Age (2017).
CHAPTER 12
April 30, 1975, marked a powerful symbolic turning point in the Cold War.
Although US forces had withdrawn from Vietnam, the war continued, and that
Spring the North Vietnamese forces launched a powerful offensive, pressing
hard on the capital, Saigon. As defenses crumbled, the US organized its
Operation Frequent Wind, the mass evacuation of US personnel and of South
Vietnamese who had worked closely with them. This culminated in the heli-
copter evacuation from the roof of the US embassy, as thousands clamored for
help. After the helicopters reached the safety of aircraft carriers waiting off the
coast, the craft were pushed into the ocean. The visual images gave a harrowing
picture of American failure and defeat, and the destruction of weapons on
which it had relied during the war. Saigon became Ho Chi Minh City.
Defeat in Vietnam coincided with many other disasters for the US both at
home and overseas, projecting an image of pathetic weakness, while the Soviets
were advancing their interests around the globe. At least for a few years, it was
not far-fetched to imagine a Western collapse not unlike what overcame the
Eastern Bloc after 1989. Albeit briefly, it looked as if the Cold War was over,
and the Eastern Bloc had won.
Détente
Although the imminent threat of Armageddon faded after 1962, both sides
remained extremely well-armed. Making that situation still more dangerous
was the arrival of Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) weaponry,
which made it nearly impossible for surveillance to determine just how many
warheads either side might be deploying. The Soviets took full advantage of
US weakness during the closing years of the Vietnam War to build up their
armed forces. Admiral Sergey Gorshkov presided over a huge expansion of the
Soviet navy, which became a potent blue-water force capable of global
interventions. That included both surface ships and nuclear submarines, with
heavy reliance on nuclear weapons. In a sense, this reproduced what had hap-
pened to the US Navy in the late 1950s.
Confronting the new situation was US President Nixon, whose political
reputation has been destroyed by the Watergate scandal, but who deserves
credit for his attempts to build a new balance between the superpowers. He
was strongly influenced by Henry Kissinger, who variously served as National
Security Adviser (1969–1975) and as Secretary of State (1973–1977). Kissinger
was deeply shaped by his historical interpretation of nineteenth-century
Europe, and its balance of power that transcended ideological conflicts. That
was vital if, as seemed likely, the US was entering a period of decline, both
absolute and relative, in which it would have to form a new relationship with
its rivals. With the Soviets, Kissinger favored détente, a reduction of tensions
or, simply, of relaxation, which fell short of full entente, of cordial understand-
ing. For Kissinger, that meant setting aside traditional ideological obsessions,
so that symbolic causes should not be allowed to get in the way of peacemaking
in a nuclear-armed world. Realpolitik, the politics of the realistic and practical,
carried the day.
The administration began diplomatic initiatives aimed at balancing rising
Soviet power. For twenty years, the US had regarded the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) as a pariah state, refusing to grant it diplomatic recognition.
The Cultural Revolution deepened Chinese isolation, and the rest of the world
found that country’s affairs obscure and baffling. In the Fall of 1971, the coun-
try experienced an elite conflict and a botched coup attempt that resulted in
the death, perhaps murder, of senior Party leader Lin Biao. This pointed to
savage internal policy debates, perhaps involving a new international orienta-
tion. Yet Nixon himself had long been positioned at the uncompromising end
of the anti-Communist spectrum and made his political career as the exposer of
Soviet espionage. It caused astonishment when in 1971 the US announced
Nixon’s upcoming visit to China. In February 1972, Nixon and Mao met in a
cordial atmosphere. Diplomatic links followed as the PRC replaced the
Republic of China (ROC), the Chinese Nationalists, on the UN Security
Council. Beyond promoting peace between historic rivals, the new policy drove
a further wedge between the old Communist partners, and the new US-China
diplomatic relationship could not fail to alarm Moscow.
In 1969, the US undertook direct talks with the Soviets on the nuclear bal-
ance. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—SALT—focused on the number of
nuclear delivery systems that each side could deploy and the relative balance of
ICBMs and submarine-launched weapons, or SLBMs. The negotiations
acknowledged the enormous Western advantage in SLBMs and limited the
total number of nuclear-capable submarines available to the US. Throughout,
both sides were conscious that even the limited number of warheads was quite
enough to annihilate both nations, but the important principle was the
12 A COLD PEACE, OR WAR BY OTHER MEANS? 189
Cambodia and Laos, Communists also took power in 1975. The victorious
regime in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge, began a purge of the population that
took the principles of Stalin or Mao to their logical limit, exterminating every-
one who could be associated with the old social order. By 1979, some two
million died, around a quarter of the population.
American Crisis
At just this time, domestic affairs in the US significantly weakened the nation’s
political establishment and overturned its older assumptions about interna-
tional relations and the Cold War itself. In the process, the country’s growing
unrest raised many ghosts from the most intense confrontations between East
and West.
The situation had its roots in elite divisions over the Vietnam War. In 1971,
analyst Daniel Ellsberg leaked classified documents concerning the origins and
development of the US role in that war, which starkly contradicted official
stances. These Pentagon Papers were gravely embarrassing, leading the Nixon
administration to create a clandestine team of “plumbers” to prevent further
leaks. That became part of a larger scheme to investigate and discredit political
opponents, using extensive wiretapping. Concern about national security
merged into clandestine efforts to secure the President’s re-election in 1972,
partly by securing illicit funding, but also by subverting any opponents who
might pose a real threat. The eventual Democratic candidate, George
McGovern, stood on the Party’s radical left wing, and Nixon crushed him at
the polls in November.
But those underground operations came at an exorbitantly high price. In
June 1972, Nixon operatives were caught in a burglary at Democratic National
Headquarters in Washington’s Watergate Complex. What at first seemed to be
a trivial episode grew into a scandal that dominated national affairs over the
next two years, as sources within the FBI and other agencies leaked extensive
material to journalists, and those revelations, in turn, formed the basis of
searching Congressional investigations. The Nixon White House was directly
linked to Watergate and other burglaries, and to making illegal payments.
Facing certain impeachment, Nixon was forced to resign in August 1974. The
Cold War context of the Watergate affair must be stressed. The immediate
quest for leaks and potential moles followed familiar tactics developed by US
intelligence agencies against penetration by Communist powers. Decades of
experience around the world, especially in Latin America, had made those same
agencies experts in tilting elections to a favored side or faction. In a sense, these
methods were brought home to the US. The Watergate team was drawn from
anti-Castro activists with strong CIA ties, and one key Nixon operative was
E. Howard Hunt, who had been involved in most of the key CIA activities in
the Caribbean over the previous two decades.
Between 1972 and 1976, the Watergate investigation metastasized into a
series of exposés about the misdeeds of US agencies throughout the Cold War
192 P. JENKINS
1
“Text of President’s Commencement Address at Notre Dame on Foreign Policy,” New York
Times, May 23, 1977, https://www.nytimes.com/1977/05/23/archives/text-of-presidents-
commencement-address-at-notre-dame-on-foreign.html.
12 A COLD PEACE, OR WAR BY OTHER MEANS? 195
Europe in the 1970s
Western and anti-Communist positions in Europe were at a low ebb in the
mid-1970s. Traditional right-wing parties had become unpopular during the
post-1973 economic recession, which further sparked corruption scandals
across the continent. Leftist parties did very well in several nations, epically
Italy, where the PCI earned 34.4 percent of the national vote in 1976, bringing
them close to replacing the Christian Democrats as the largest party.
At this time, Communist parties across Europe were stressing electoral
democracy and adopting positions critical of the Soviet Union, in a movement
that became known as Euro-Communism. This grew out of genuine horror at
the suppression of the Prague Spring, but it also reflected shock at the coup in
Chile. Could a progressive regime survive without widespread alliances with
non-Communist parties? Western Europe’s new Communist leaderships
announced their openness to alliances with other parties on the left and center.
But even in that benevolent setting, the potential election of a Communist-led
government in Italy or elsewhere would be a stumbling block for NATO, and
would inevitably affect future cooperation in matters of security and intelli-
gence. (The PCI, like other Communist parties, was still receiving major Soviet
funding.) Communist parties remained strong in France and were thriving in
Spain, Portugal, and Greece following the removal of rightist dictatorships in
those countries.
West European nations were affected by the intense wave of terrorism that
became a feature of the 1970s. This included attacks by international move-
ments, especially of Arab origin, such as the Palestinian group that targeted the
Munich Olympics in 1972. As we have seen, such groups differed in their
degree of relationships to sponsor states, but many received arms and training
from East Bloc nations or from Soviet-allied nations in the Middle East. That
relationship, whether direct or indirect, was much discussed in the context of
the domestic terrorism that assailed several European countries in these years.
The core question was whether such groups were autonomous, a response to
specific local circumstances, or did they have a larger Cold War context? That
anti-Soviet interpretation was popularized in many media pieces and books,
such as the bestselling 1980 novel The Spike, by Robert Moss and Arnaud de
Borchgrave, and Claire Sterling’s 1981 exposé The Terror Network. In the US,
these views were presented in well-publicized Congressional hearings.
West Germany offered a troubling example. Out of the 1968 student move-
ment emerged the highly active terror movement called the Red Army Faction,
the RAF or the Baader-Meinhof group, which carried out many sensational
attacks in West Germany and overseas. Although its origins were murky at the
time, later revelations confirmed that the East German Stasi had supplied train-
ing and logistic support, as had Soviet-connected Arab movements. West
German militants fleeing police could easily find refuge on the other side of the
Iron Curtain. If the Stasi were not directly controlling or directing terrorists in
the West, the existence of those groups offered rich opportunities to destabilize
196 P. JENKINS
Détente in Europe
If European nations faced domestic turmoil, international relations improved
significantly, creating a kind of European détente. In every sense, the central
front of the East-West encounter was Germany, where as we have seen the
West German Federal Republic did not acknowledge the eastern boundaries of
the East German state, the DDR, and did not recognize the Polish state that
occupied former German lands. The key Western figure here was the popular
and charismatic Willy Brandt who served as Foreign Minister from 1966 and
became Chancellor in 1969, and who made the creation of a new diplomatic
order the centerpiece of his agenda. His Eastern policy, his Neue Ostpolitik,
involved recognizing the two German states as equal and separate entities,
each of which respected the territorial integrity of the other. The two coun-
tries signed the Basic Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) in December 1972, open-
ing the way to the DDR’s recognition by the leading Western powers over the
next two years. Unlike in previous years, recognizing the East German state
would not mean granting it control over Berlin, where the rights of all four
occupying powers would be respected. Brandt’s approach also meant accept-
ing the post-war frontier settlement. A series of treaties in 1970 and 1971
promoted good relations with the Soviets, Poland, and Czechoslovakia as well
as the DDR.
Together, Brandt’s policies constituted a major step away from Cold War
standoffs, and conservative West Germans were outraged by his concessions.
12 A COLD PEACE, OR WAR BY OTHER MEANS? 197
But in accepting current realities, they closely resembled the policies that Nixon
and Kissinger were advancing in the same years. US economic policies contrib-
uted to the changes. In 1971, Nixon announced a radical financial shift when
he ended the convertibility of the US currency to gold, in effect terminating
the Bretton Woods system that had prevailed for a quarter century. This “Nixon
Shock” alerted Europe and Japan to the coming of a new global system in
which the US would act unilaterally, forcing them to look more to their own
regional concerns and interests.
German developments laid the foundation for new arrangements on a
Europe-wide scale. In 1973, the Soviet Union and Finland proposed a
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which over the next two
years debated principles that could be commonly agreed. The final phase of the
conference agreed what became the Helsinki Accords, which were signed by all
European states except Albania, as well as the US and Canada. The Accords
included ten principles—hence the description the Decalogue, or the Ten
Commandments—to govern relationships between states. These included ter-
ritorial integrity and the inviolability of frontiers, as well themes of peaceful
coexistence, cooperation, and non-intervention in internal affairs. Other “com-
mandments” included respect for human rights and freedoms, including the
freedom of speech and religious belief. Coming so shortly after the recent
US-Soviet space venture, the Apollo-Soyuz mission, the Helsinki agreement
marked the symbolic highwater mark of East-West rapprochement. But in the
context of the time, and the accumulating disasters that the US was undergo-
ing, it made it look uncomfortably as if the emerging peace was being defined
according to Soviet needs and interests. In 1976, US President Gerald Ford
made a disastrous blunder when he stated that “there is no Soviet domination
of Eastern Europe.” Although not intended as a serious analysis, it seemed to
confirm the US neglect of Soviet power.
Against Communism
The apparent Soviet triumph contained some disturbing portents of weakness
and failure. An Eastern Bloc that was willing to project its power around the
world was exposing itself to many potential commitments and conflicts, allow-
ing the Western Bloc to choose where it would focus a counter-attack. But that
military commitment demanded a massive economic foundation, which the
Soviets did not possess (we will return to this theme in Chap. 15). The Soviets
fell increasingly behind the West, as the economic disparity became even more
marked. After the mid-1960s, the country abandoned effective attempts at
economic reform, and the years of Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982) were marked
by decline and stagnation. Soviet GNP contracted steadily from the early
1970s. The country resembled a failing Third World country that happened to
be spectacularly well armed. Journalist Xan Smiley semi-seriously compared the
USSR to a bitterly poor African nation like Upper Volta (the modern Burkina
198 P. JENKINS
Faso) except that it was “Upper Volta with rockets.”2 It was hard to see how
long that paradoxical status could be sustained.
Even the diplomatic successes produced their difficulties. The more the
Soviets engaged with the West, the more vulnerable they became to political
and diplomatic pressure about their own internal policies and conduct. At
Helsinki, the East Bloc had agreed to wide-ranging principles of human rights,
in areas that they were conspicuously failing. Soviet dissidents achieved broad
international respect, marked conspicuously by the award of the 1975 Nobel
Peace Prize to Andrei Sakharov. Also highly visible was Alexander Solzhenitsyn,
who had for years been working on his exposé of the Soviet prison camp sys-
tem, The Gulag Archipelago. This created a sensation when it appeared in the
West in 1973 with an English translation, although it actually offered little
material that was new or surprising to historians. In 1974, the Soviets expelled
Solzhenitsyn and stripped him of his citizenship, and in the West, he became an
outspoken critic not just of Communism, but of Western secularism. His 1978
Commencement Address at Harvard University had a special impact.
Solzhenitsyn’s appeal to spiritual and often mystical values had a profound
influence on many Westerners, who found a new and philosophically grounded
foundation for anti-Communism at a time when that ideology was fallen into
deep disrepute.
In other nations, the Helsinki agreement stimulated new resistance and dis-
sent. In Czechoslovakia, where post-1968 repression was at its worst, unofficial
dissidence had a countercultural quality, centered on the psychedelic rock band
Plastic People of the Universe. When members of the group were arrested in
1976, opponents of the regime were stirred to sign the courageous protest that
became known as Charter 77, which specifically cited the Helsinki principles.
Although this movement too was persecuted, unofficial dissident networks
spread throughout the country. As so often, Poland offered another center of
resistance. Following rioting in 1970, a new government had instituted sub-
stantial reforms, which created a brief era of prosperity. As in the West, that
boom came to a crashing halt during the post-1973 recession, and discontent
mounted, with widespread protests in 1976. Human rights rhetoric and
democracy campaigns found a strong institutional foundation in the nation’s
powerful Roman Catholic church. One apparent exception to the regional pic-
ture was Hungary, where some degree of liberalization (New Economic
Mechanism) created a degree of prosperity and Western trade. The country
was wryly described as “the happiest barracks in the Soviet camp.” Yet here as
throughout the region, governments were incurring impossible debts through
subsidies to failing and unprofitable economic concerns, and a political reckon-
ing could not be long delayed.
Human rights activism found a focus in Jewish dissidence and the demand
to emigrate to Israel. The campaign found a prominent face in 1977, when the
2
Quoted for instance in John Horvath, “Yearning for Change—Again,” Telepolis, April 13,
2008, https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Yearning-for-Change-Again-3418101.html.
12 A COLD PEACE, OR WAR BY OTHER MEANS? 199
Soviets arrested militant activist Natan Sharansky for high treason, a charge
that could have brought the death penalty. Sharansky received a harsh prison
sentence, creating another visible martyr for the human rights cause. Those
efforts received powerful support from Jewish groups and human rights activ-
ists in other nations, particularly the US, who tried to force Soviet concessions,
to the point of derailing détente. US Senator Henry Scoop Jackson used the
issue to limit the normalization of trade with the Soviets and criticized the
SALT II process. The resulting visibility made him a plausible presidential can-
didate in 1976 and laid a foundation for a new and harder line in conservative
approaches to the Soviets. Following the ultra-liberal Democratic Party cam-
paign of 1972, some prominent former liberals adopted sternly anti-Soviet
positions that set them at odds with the party. Although Jewish issues were by
no means the only factor driving this concern, they did motivate some key
activists. The neo-conservatives, or “neocons,” gravitated toward the
Republican Party, and later became staunch supporters of Ronald Reagan.
Détente contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction.
Further Reading
The final phase of the Vietnam War is described in George J. Veith, Black April:
The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973–1975 (2011).
For President Nixon’s response to the new military and diplomatic environ-
ment, see William Burr and Jeffrey P. Kimball, Nixon’s Nuclear Specter: The
Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War (2015); Ken
Hughes, Fatal Politics: The Nixon Tapes, the Vietnam War, and the Casualties
of Reelection (2015); and James Cameron, The Double Game The Demise of
America’s First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms
Limitation (2017).
Henry Kissinger’s impact on Cold War policymaking is described in Alistair
Horne, Kissinger 1973: The Crucial Year (2009); Barry Gewen, The
Inevitability of Tragedy: Henry Kissinger and His World (2020); Thomas
Schwartz, Henry Kissinger and American Power: A Political Biography
(2020). See also Andrew L. Johns and Mitchell B. Lerner, eds., The Cold
War At Home And Abroad: Domestic Politics And US Foreign Policy Since
1945 (2018), and John Gans, White House Warriors: How the National
Security Council Transformed the American Way of War (2019).
For the Chilean crisis, see Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-
American Cold War (2014).
12 A COLD PEACE, OR WAR BY OTHER MEANS? 201
The Carter years are the subject of Brian J. Auten, Carter’s Conversion: The
Hardening of American Defense Policy (2008); Daniel J. Sargent, A
Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the
1970s (2015); and Justin Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski: America’s Grand
Strategist (2018). For African policies, see Nancy Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in
Africa: Race and the Cold War (2016).
For a somewhat more optimistic view of the Soviet economic picture, see Dina
Fainberg and Artemy M. Kalinovsky, eds., Reconsidering Stagnation in the
Brezhnev Era: Ideology and Exchange (2016)
For the powerful impact of new attitudes to human rights, see Barbara J. Keys,
Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s
(2014); Sarah B. Snyder, From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists
Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy (2018); and Jean H. Quataert and Lora
Wildenthal, eds., The Routledge History Of Human Rights (2020). The
Helsinki agreement is the subject of Michael Cotey Morgan, The Final Act:
The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War (2018).
Christopher R. W. Dietrich offers a new perspective on the energy politics of
these years in his Oil Revolution: Sovereign Rights and the Economic Culture
of Decolonization, 1945 to 1979 (2017).
CHAPTER 13
In January 1980, Jimmy Carter delivered his State of the Union Address to the
US Congress. Coming from a leader whose whole presidency had been devoted
to peacemaking and human rights, his tone was bleak, harking back to the
worst years of the 1950s. He declared, “The implications of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second
World War”—worse, by implication, than earlier crises over Cuba or Berlin.1
While not announcing a revival of the US military draft, he did re-establish
selective service registration for young American men, the essential precursor
to such a step. Carter withdrew the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT
II) treaty from Senate consideration. The US and other nations announced a
boycott of that year’s Olympics, to be held in Moscow, an event that the Soviets
avidly hoped would be a propaganda spectacular. Those moves ended US-Soviet
détente, and seemingly justified all the warnings that the American hard right
had been issuing throughout the détente years.
The new atmosphere of crisis grew out of conditions not just in Afghanistan
but also in several regions, as each side faced novel challenges to its traditional
authority within its supposed spheres of influence. It also reflected the central
importance of two novel themes that had not been central to earlier phases of
the Cold War, namely, energy—above all, oil—and much more startling to
many at the time, of religion. The result was to make the years 1979 and 1980
pivotal to the Cold War confrontation and also singularly perilous. A series of
disparate crises on three continents mapped the battlefields for the coming and
final decade of that struggle.
1
Jimmy Carter, “State of the Union Address 1980,” January 23, 1980 https://www.jimmycart-
erlibrary.gov/assets/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml.
Challenges: The Soviets
Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe became much more acute in 1978 when
the archbishop of the Polish see of Krakow, Karol Wojtyła, became Pope as
John Paul II. This was multiply surprising, as no non-Italian Pope had been
selected for several centuries. But the political implications were far reaching,
above all in Poland, where Catholicism was so central to national identity, and
to anti-Communist resistance. The new Pope’s visit to his homeland in June
1979 brought euphoric public demonstrations drawing millions and pointed
to a broad rejection of Communism and secularism, as well as Soviet domina-
tion. A frontal challenge to Soviet authority could not be far off. In August
1980, protests at the Gdansk shipyards led to the formation of the Solidarity
labor union, which became a focus of national resistance, closely aligned to the
Catholic church. Within a year, Solidarity commanded ten million members,
and its leader Lech Wałęsa was the de facto head of mass anti-Communist resis-
tance. The Polish crisis was so troublesome for the Soviets because Poland was
the linchpin of its military arrangements in Europe and could not be allowed
to slide into neutralism or hostility. A direct clash of some kind was all but cer-
tain, and the key question was whether it might involve armed Soviet
intervention.
Making the year 1980 even more sensitive were events in Yugoslavia, which
an independent Communist power had for decades been a setting for East-
West tension. The prospect of a Soviet invasion had often served as a focus for
Western war games. The country’s independence and stability found a monu-
mental focus in its veteran leader, Marshal Tito, who died at an advanced age
in May 1980. Although the situation remained stable for several years, the
prospect of a new European theater of conflict was sobering.
Beyond Europe, Castro’s Cuba remained faithful to Soviet policies, but its
economic situation was becoming increasingly disastrous, with the failures of
socialist planning, aggravated by US-enforced economic sanctions. As in other
Communist countries, dissidents were struggling against repressive constraints.
In March 1980, Cubans began seeking asylum in foreign embassies, persuad-
ing the government to allow some emigration. Seizing the chance to escape,
Cubans began a mass exodus, mainly from the port of Mariel. Many took to
the seas in ramshackle boats, in what was called the Mariel boatlift (on the anal-
ogy of an airlift). By October, 125,000 Cubans had fled their country, offering
a potent propaganda victory to critics of Communism. Like the DDR, Cuba
showed itself such an oppressive and impoverished dictatorship that its resi-
dents would risk their lives to escape.
In another key way, the older Communist world was transforming in these
same years. After China’s Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, the country’s
new leader, Deng Xiaoping was determined to reverse China’s isolation and
backwardness. His economic reforms, which used a market model, laid a foun-
dation for the very rapid expansion of the coming decades. In 1979, Deng
visited the US, where enthusiasm for good relations surged. However
13 FOUR MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT: THE WORLD IN 1980 205
Afghanistan
The most urgent threat to Soviet power came in Afghanistan, which had for
some years been subject to growing Moscow influence. In 1973, a coup
dethroned the conservative monarchy, creating a modernizing republic with
strong socialist elements. However, the country struggled to resist full Soviet
domination, until in 1978, the Communist People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) took power in a coup, the Saur Revolution, which created
a Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The new regime introduced radical
reforms and brutally suppressed opposition. But the PDPA was split between
warring factions, leading to a new coup in September 1979. Alarmed about the
regime’s stability and survival, the Soviets invaded on December 27. Soviet
special forces stormed the presidential palace, killing the president. The subse-
quent occupation involved 100,000 Soviet troops. From the Soviet point of
view, the operation was not a wanton and unprovoked invasion of a random
neighbor, as implied by Carter, but rather a fraternal intervention in a socialist
country, justified by the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Soviet assault was widely con-
demned, by the United Nations as well as the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation
The Afghan struggle focused attention on Islamic groups as the leading
opponents of Communism. In itself, this was not new, and the Soviet Union
had in the 1920s faced armed Islamic resistance across many regions of Central
Asia and the Caucasus. This Basmachi revolt was thoroughly familiar in Soviet
culture, to the point of inspiring a whole genre of romantic adventure films
known as Easterns, Ostern, on the analogy of US Westerns. Some, like the
1970 White Sun of the Desert, were among the most popular films in Soviet
history. But such productions recalled a dangerous era, and the Basmachi rising
had even led to Soviet interventions in Afghanistan itself.
Historically, the US had regarded Islam as a valuable ally against Communism
and cooperated with Islamic clergy against left-leaning secular nationalists in
Iran and elsewhere. But militant Islamist groups became much more active and
prominent in the 1970s, due in part to the perceived failure of secular national-
ist regimes across the Middle East. Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supported
206 P. JENKINS
activism by such groups, and from 1975, the two countries armed and supplied
jihadi resistance fighters—mujahideen—against the Afghan republic. They
were supported in this by the CIA. That insurgency became much more intense
following the PDPA seizure of power, as the government implemented reforms
that violated traditional Islamic norms, especially concerning the social posi-
tion of women. In his 1980 State of the Union, Jimmy Carter stressed US
cooperation with Pakistan, which would be the main channel for aid to the
resistance.
Challenges: The Americans
The US too faced the loss of control in regions it regarded as firmly its own.
South Korea suddenly loomed as a flailing source of instability. The population
was restive after decades of military rule, and mass protests threatened the
regime in 1979. Long-serving President Park Chung-hee was assassinated by
the head of the Korean CIA, and a new regime was in turn ousted in yet
another coup. In May 1980, new protests in Gwangju were suppressed with
hundreds of fatalities. Quite apart from human rights concerns, the situation
raised the strong likelihood that the North Korean regime would intervene,
whether by clandestine subversion or open invasion.
Carter’s human rights doctrine had a particular impact on Latin America,
where the US had long tolerated dictatorial regimes on the grounds of their
hostility to Communism. As Harry Truman had reputedly declared of Rafael
Trujillo, long-standing dictator of the Dominican Republic, “He’s a son of a
bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.”2 If the attribution of the quote is question-
able, it accurately reflects official attitudes. The quote was often applied to
members of the Somoza family who ruled Nicaragua for most of the period
from 1927 through 1979. The US regarded that country as clearly within its
orbit, indeed its informal empire, and US forces had actually occupied
Nicaragua from 1909 through 1933.
In the 1970s, opposition to the Somozas coalesced around the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN), which took its name from Augusto Sandino,
an early opponent of US power. The FSLN was Marxist in orientation and
looked to Cuban examples. Even so, the US did not act directly against it as the
movement expanded its influence, and it seized power in July 1979. The US
even granted the country aid, on the condition that it did not seek to assist
revolutions in other nations in the regions. By 1980, it was obvious that the
new Nicaraguan regime was indeed supporting insurgents in other nations,
particularly El Salvador, where a bloody civil war was raging. Already during
the Carter administration, the US was becoming alarmed about Nicaragua’s
possible role as a “second Cuba” in the Western hemisphere, spreading revolu-
tion throughout Central America. Meanwhile, coups established leftist or
Marxist regimes in other Caribbean nations, including Suriname and the island
2
The quote is variously attributed to others, including Franklin D. Roosevelt.
13 FOUR MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT: THE WORLD IN 1980 207
of Grenada. In 1979, the Caribbean threat became still more urgent following
misleading reports of the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.
Like the war in Afghanistan, the developing situation appeared to confirm
the New Right analysis of Soviet global ambitions. Indeed, the Soviets used
their new allies to locate SIGINT listening stations in both Afghanistan and
Nicaragua to expand their intelligence capacities. The weakening or removal of
the Sandinista regime would be a challenge facing any new US administration.
As with the Soviets in Poland, the question was whether direct military force
would be needed to achieve the goal.
3
Zbigniew Brzezinski, In Quest Of National Security (Routledge, 2019), Chap. 9.
208 P. JENKINS
4
Thomas H. Maugh, “Samuel T Cohen Dies at 89” Los Angeles Times, December 2, 2010,
https://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-me-sam-cohen-20101202-story.html.
13 FOUR MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT: THE WORLD IN 1980 211
Although the error was detected within minutes, the event caused real fear. A
similar mistake recurred the following June. In September 1980, a Titan II
missile silo in Arkansas suffered a liquid fuel fire. Later that year, the Doomsday
Clock maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists was moved to a peril-
ous four minutes to midnight, suggesting the nearness of annihilation.
Further Reading
The post-1970 era is the subject of several essays in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd
Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War (three volumes,
2010), and also in Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde, eds., The
Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (2013).
Western attitudes to the Cold War became more determinedly anti-Soviet at
the end of the 1970s. The rightward shift is discussed in Philip Jenkins,
Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties
America (2006); Kristina Spohr, The Global Chancellor: Helmut Schmidt and
212 P. JENKINS
In 1983, the US was engaged in military operations around the world, while
President Reagan was using rhetoric that the Soviets found deeply threatening.
Indeed, the Soviets became increasingly concerned about the possibility of an
imminent and direct Western attack. They intensified their Operation RYAN,
collecting information about a nuclear surprise assault (the term is an acronym
for raketno-yadernoye napadenie, “nuclear missile attack”). Fears came to a
head that November when NATO organized its huge ABLE/ARCHER exer-
cises, which mobilized forces from Norway to Turkey. Soviet forces were
alerted to expect a possible nuclear war within days. They prepared to launch
their own attack as a means of preserving their military capacity before it was
annihilated by a pre-emptive assault. Not until months afterward, when defec-
tors let it be known just how serious the menace had been, did a puzzled
President Reagan ask how the Soviets could have been so misled about Western
intentions. We can debate the seriousness of this episode, but beyond argu-
ment, tensions between the superpowers reverted to levels not seen since the
time of Kennedy and Khrushchev.
Reagan and Rearmament
As the leader in a renewed Cold War era, Reagan presented certain paradoxes,
in that he was personally opposed to the use of nuclear weapons and rejected
the concept of MAD. He believed in radical solutions that would not just bal-
ance the nuclear arsenals of both sides but would seriously shrink numbers. He
wanted to render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.”1 At the same
time, his ideological approach was stark, and arguably simplistic, in its utter
condemnation of Communism. In a 1983 speech delivered to the US National
1
“The Star Wars Speech,” Air Force Magazine February 2004, https://www.airforcemag.com/
article/0204keeperfile/.
2
Ronald Reagan, “Evil Empire Speech” March 8 1983, https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/
reagan-evil-empire-speech-text/.
3
Hal Brands, “The Vision Thing,” Miller Center, January 14, 2016, https://millercenter.org/
issues-policy/foreign-policy/the-vision-thing.
14 THE NEW STRUGGLE 215
was a well-placed KGB officer who in 1982 became the KGB’s Rezident in
London. From 1974 through 1985, Gordievsky was working for the British
Secret Intelligence Service. Gordievsky supplied much valuable information
about Soviet intentions and policies and was for instance the first to alert the
West to the Soviet panic over ABLE/ARCHER. That encouraged the West to
allay those fears through words and actions, to defuse potential crises. No less
valuable for Western policymaking, Gordievsky identified Mikhail Gorbachev as
a rising figure in the Soviet elite.
4
Serge Schmemann, “Soviet Says Reagan Has ‘Pathological Hatred’,” New York Times, March
10, 1983, https://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/10/world/soviet-says-reagan-has-pathological-
hatred.html.
5
Quoted in Gordon Martel, American Foreign Relations Reconsidered: 1890–1993 (London:
Routledge, 2002), 203.
218 P. JENKINS
have launched the Soviet missiles. His decision—for which he was repri-
manded—prevented a nuclear exchange.
That incident was not known at the time, but other episodes were very clear.
In October, North Korean agents in Rangoon, Burma (Myanmar), attempted
to assassinate the President of South Korea by a bomb attack during a state
visit. The president survived, but the resulting explosion killed over 20, includ-
ing South Korean ministers. As in the previous two decades, such violence can
only be seen as a deliberate attempt by the North Koreans to provoke a super-
power clash, which was especially dangerous given existing strains. At the start
of November, the Doomsday Clock maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists was moved to just three minutes to midnight, the most perilous posi-
tion since 1953. The ABLE/ARCHER war scare that followed so shortly
afterward fitted naturally in what seemed like an unstoppable trajectory to
open war.
attributed to Soviet plotting. If such views were correct, then the West was fully
justified in responding with its own proxies and guerrillas. Such a vision fitted
well with Reagan’s view of reversing Communist expansion. It offered the rich
prize of drawing the Soviets and their allies into costly guerrilla wars: to present
the Communists themselves with “many Vietnams.” Although not formally
stated as a Reagan Doctrine until 1985, these principles guided US actions
from the first days of the administration. These policies were successful in many
ways, but they offered the potential danger of unintended consequences for
the Western nations.
The CIA bolstered the anti-Cuban efforts already in progress across Africa.
Angola was the primary theater of combat, as the civil war expanded, and the
US offered support to the resistance movement UNITA, both directly and
through South African channels. This committed the Soviets and Cubans more
heavily into preserving the MPLA regime, and its military arm FAPLA. In
1987–1988, a prolonged campaign centered around Cuito Cuanavale pitted
UNITA and South Africans against FAPLA and Cubans, in the largest battle
on African soil since the Second World War. In 1988, a peace agreement
resulted in the withdrawal of both Cuban and South African forces, although
domestic strife continued for a decade. The MPLA eventually triumphed, but
it no longer did so as a direct proxy for Communist powers.
In Mozambique likewise, the CIA cooperated with the South Africans in
support of a rebel army, RENAMO, the Mozambican National Resistance,
which fought the Marxist government of FRELIMO. By 1990, the two sides
agreed to negotiations, which led to the creation of a multi-party government.
In Ethiopia, the pro-Soviet regime was gravely weakened by multiple rebellions
and secession movements, which coalesced into a general civil war that proba-
bly killed over a million. The US promoted and armed resistance forces, and
offered propaganda support until the leftist government collapsed in 1991.
The new democratic regime increasingly tilted toward the West.
These wars were extremely costly in their effects, with a combined death toll
running into the millions. Even so, in terms of the larger Cold War vision, US
efforts in these African conflicts were highly successful. By the end of the
decade, Soviet and Cuban influence had largely been removed from three large
and potentially powerful nations. In each case, the diplomatic successes were
achieved without direct US military involvement.
Afghanistan Continued
The most intense Western effort was in Afghanistan, where a fragile
Communist Democratic Republic survived because of Soviet armed strength,
ruling a deeply resentful population. Although resistance drew on multiple
ideological currents, the most significant groups were Islamist jihadis, the
mujahideen, who enjoyed the enormous advantage of a virtual open border
with Pakistan. This recalled the fatal difficulty the US had faced with North
Vietnam. The US drew on a wide and diverse network to support the
14 THE NEW STRUGGLE 221
Contras
With invasion not a realistic option, the US weakened the Nicaraguan regime
by developing and arming counter-revolutionary forces, the Contras. The
Contras first emerged in 1981, under CIA guidance. They drew both on for-
mer loyalists of the old Somoza regime, including members of the widely feared
National Guard, as well as democratically oriented groups fearful of Communist
advances. Several competing groups emerged, most operating from bases in
Honduras. From 1982, Contra forces carried out guerrilla attacks, including
the assassination of Sandinista officials. At first, the groups were not too effec-
tive, and they faced charges of corruption as well as human rights abuses. Even
so, the greater the pressure they placed on the Sandinistas, the more repressive
and unpopular the government became, and a military draft proved very con-
troversial. The military commitment consumed an unsustainable share of the
country’s meager budget. That pressure became intolerable after 1986, as
Contra forces came to pose a real military challenge, and grew in numbers and
influence. At their height, the combined Contra armies probably amounted to
25,000 fighters. The resulting wars claimed a terrible human toll. Combining
the three nations of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, the civil wars in
the 1980s alone claimed at least a quarter million lives, and generated yet
another refugee crisis.
President Reagan offered his full rhetorical support. The Sandinista regime,
he said, was “a Communist reign of terror,” while the Contras were freedom
fighters, “the moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers.”6 Despite this,
Congress fought hard to limit or end the Contra war. In 1982, the Boland
Amendment prohibited the use of US funds to promote the overthrow of the
Nicaraguan regime, while a congressional spending cap was intended to shut
6
Gerald M Boyd, “Reagan Terms Nicaraguan Rebels ‘Moral Equal Of Founding Fathers’,” New
York Times, March 2, 1985, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/02/world/reagan-terms-
nicaraguan-rebels-moral-equal-of-founding-fathers.html.
14 THE NEW STRUGGLE 223
Weakening Communism
Favoring Reagan’s position was the dramatic economic boom that began in
1983, and which would continue with few checks through 2007. In the new
mood, Americans were distinctly more sympathetic to military ventures, pro-
vided they were not costly or long-lasting. A historic opportunity emerged in
October 1983, when a hardline leftist coup had displaced the already radical
regime on the tiny Caribbean nation of Grenada. Citing the danger to US citi-
zens, the US ordered a military intervention, which led to direct combat with
Cuban forces and advisers. Grenada enjoyed a symbolic significance far beyond
its military importance, as a deliberate attempt to cure Vietnam Syndrome and
to accustom the American people once more to the prospect of direct confron-
tation with Communist forces, even if that meant US casualties. Far less cele-
brated was the US diplomatic success in Suriname, where a mixture of aid and
threats prevented the regime from lurching left and cooperating closely with
the Cubans. Following these successes, Nicaragua and Cuba remained as the
only leftist havens in the hemisphere, and conservatives pressed for one of
those nations to be the next item on the US military agenda. While disappoint-
ing those hopes, Reagan intensified US pressure through a new propaganda
service directed at the island, Radio Marti. He tightened the sanctions that had
strangled the Cuban economy.
Ideologically too, leftist causes in Latin America suffered crippling setbacks
in the Reagan years. Since 1968, the Catholic church in the region had been
profoundly influenced by liberation theology, which had drawn many priests to
left-wing positions. Some clergy not only supported the Sandinista regime but
actually formed part of the government. Even if they fell far short of overt
commitment, many other prelates and clergy spoke strongly on human rights
issues and were anything but dependable supporters of reactionary regimes.
The Polish background of the new Pope John Paul II made him hostile to
Marxism in any form, and over the next decade, he systematically reduced the
influence of liberation theology. That new policy was reflected in episcopal
appointments, and in the content of teaching at seminaries and colleges. The
224 P. JENKINS
strongly centralized nature of the church meant that such policies were effec-
tive, and liberationist ideas were soon in full retreat.
Quite separately from this top-down policy, during the 1980s, the tradi-
tional Catholic hegemony in many parts of the region was challenged by thriv-
ing new Pentecostal and evangelical churches, which were strongly opposed to
Marxist and liberationist ideas. Particularly in Central American nations like
Guatemala, Protestant numbers grew to challenge Catholics. Leftist critics
have complained that this success owed much to support by conservative
regimes and ultimately the CIA, but such claims are simplistic. The new
Protestantism had many sources and was usually rooted in strictly local realities
and needs. But this religious change did indeed weaken leftist causes.
My Enemy’s Enemy
As so often in the past, the US domestic debate over Central America hinged
on whether local insurgencies were actually attached to the Soviet-Cuban
cause: was this authentically part of the larger Cold War? Similar debates raged
elsewhere in the world, where observers differed greatly on the motivation of
movements and struggles, and the possible role of Communism. Such differ-
ences of interpretation shaped understandings of the conflict in South Africa
where, as we have seen, a white minority government ruled harshly over a dis-
contented population of black Africans. Since 1976, the revolutionary struggle
had found new vigor, with mass urban protests and a growing guerrilla resis-
tance, led by the African National Congress, or ANC. Supporters of the South
African regime at home and abroad complained that they were fighting a
Communist insurgency, and that view received sympathy among conservatives
in the US and Britain. That was especially true when the South African forces
were proving such valuable allies in CIA-sponsored wars in Angola and
Mozambique. By the mid-1980s, criticisms of the South African regime influ-
enced mainstream and moderate opinion in the US, leading the US Congress
to pass comprehensive sanctions legislation. Reagan vetoed this, but Congress
overruled his veto, offering the then very popular president a major pub-
lic defeat.
The most significant debate over interpretation occurred in the Middle East,
specifically in the tiny nation of Lebanon, where the Cold War lens gravely
distorted US policy. The situation originally had nothing to do with US-Soviet
rivalries. Lebanon was acutely divided between Muslim and Christian popula-
tions, and a brutal civil war had been in progress since 1975. In 1982, an Israeli
invasion of Lebanon sparked a humanitarian disaster, as large numbers of
Palestinians were besieged in Beirut. The US sent military forces to assist the
evacuation of Palestinian fighters, which duly took place. However, Christian
militias then massacred many Palestinian civilians, causing the US to dispatch
new military forces to protect survivors and to maintain its international obli-
gations. US Marines remained in Beirut, supported by British, French, and
Italian contingents. During 1983, Western forces came into increasing heavy
14 THE NEW STRUGGLE 225
combat with local fighters, especially the Hizbollah, the powerful Shi’ite militia
affiliated to Iran. US aircraft engaged in battles with Syrian fighters.
However lethal that struggle became, this conflict in itself had nothing obvi-
ous to do with the Cold War or the Soviets, except to the extent that Syria was
a close Soviet ally. During 1983, however, the US administration contextual-
ized Lebanon alongside the other struggles in Afghanistan and Central
America. In this view, strongly favored by Israel and pro-Israel media, Shi’ites
and other leftist forces in Lebanon were proxies of the Soviets just as much as
the Sandinistas were. Even in Lebanon, US forces increasingly saw their mis-
sion defending “the government” (which scarcely existed) against pro-Soviet
“rebels” (who generally loathed Communism). The US was further hampered
by a severe intelligence crisis, following the destruction of key embassies and
facilities in previous years, and a Beirut terrorist attack in April 1983 killed
many of the CIA’s most knowledgeable analysts of the region. Confused and
distorted interpretations of the struggle made the US unable to interpret
enemy intentions. In October 1983, a suicide truck bomber destroyed a US
barracks in Beirut, killing 240 Marines and effectively ending the US mission.
US forces were soon withdrawn from combat and pulled out of the country in
a humiliating withdrawal. The attack caused by far the largest number of com-
bat deaths of US forces since the Vietnam War.
The timing of the disaster served to reinforce the Cold War context in the
popular mind. The Beirut attack occurred on October 23, several weeks after
the destruction of KAL flight 007, two days before the Grenada invasion, and
at a time when protests over new medium missiles in Europe were reaching
their height. Reagan declared that the situations in Lebanon and Grenada,
“though oceans apart, are closely related. Not only has Moscow assisted and
encouraged the violence in both countries, but it provides direct support
through a network of surrogates and terrorists.”7
The Lebanese war contributed in other ways to undermining the US posi-
tion worldwide. Between 1984 and 1986, the Iranian-linked Hizbollah carried
out many terrorist attacks worldwide, often striking US targets, and in Lebanon,
they kidnapped Western hostages. Despite denials that it was paying ransom,
the US agreed to supply Iran with weaponry that it urgently needed for its
bruising war with Iraq (1980–1988). Again, nothing in these dealings of itself
had any Cold War dimension, until the administration decided to channel funds
received in these arms transactions to support the Contra forces in Nicaragua.
The policy proved ruinous at every turn. Not only were most hostages not
freed until years afterward, but the deal generated a political furor in the
US. The main Iran transaction violated the law, and so did the subsidiary deal
to support the Contras. In its pursuit of anti-Communist causes, the executive
branch was thus in the position of setting up both a private alternative fiscal
7
Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada,” October 27, 1983,
at https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-events-lebanon-and-grena.
226 P. JENKINS
system and an intelligence network to carry on its policies, and illegality was
piled upon illegality. After the resulting Iran-Contra scandal came to light in
November 1986, it dominated the headlines for the following two years and
came close to causing Reagan’s impeachment.
Victory?
Reagan-era policies were controversial, and the many attacks on the president
depicted him variously as idiotic, insane, or senile. Liberals delighted in noting
that his name, Ronald Wilson Reagan was an anagram of “Insane Anglo
Warlord.” Many feared that his administration was paving the way to nuclear
holocaust. In retrospect, then, it is striking how far this “warlord” achieved
what he sought. After the Soviets withdrew their forces from Afghanistan in
1989, the local regime could not long survive, any more than South Vietnam
could long have outlasted the US withdrawal in the 1970s. Afghanistan’s
Communist government collapsed in 1992. At the turn of the decade, pro-US
and pro-Western forces secured a series of unquestioned victories in the long
proxy struggles across Africa and Central America. International talks in
Nicaragua led to free elections in 1990, which ended the Sandinista regime,
and peace came to El Salvador in 1992. Ernesto Cardenal, a radical Catholic
priest who served as the Sandinista Minister of Culture, offered his obituary for
the movement: “liberation theology is in crisis. Capitalism won. Period. What
more can be said?”8
US-Soviet tensions cooled following the panic atmosphere of 1983. The
longer US missiles were deployed in Europe, the more obvious it became that
a pre-emptive attack was not a prospect, and the Soviets were increasingly dis-
tracted by their own internal crises. As we will see in the next chapter, relation-
ships improved enormously as the US and Soviets began a series of fruitful
negotiations. Obviously, the improved mood of those years owed as much to
new Soviet attitudes as to Reagan himself, but conditions were ripe for the kind
of reductions in strategic weapons that Reagan had long sought. Incredible as
it might have appeared at the start of the decade, Reagan lived to see his ambi-
tion of the removal of Communist power from Eastern Europe, where 1989
marked one of the great turning points in the continent’s modern history.
Further Reading
I have previously mentioned the very substantial collections of essays to be
found in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge
History of the Cold War (three volumes, 2010), and Richard H. Immerman
and Petra Goedde, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (2013). In
8
Juan O. Tamayo, “The Echo of Liberation Theology; Only Traces Remain of Revolt Within
the Church,” Baltimore Sun, January 31, 1999, https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-
xpm-1999-01-31-9902010474-story.html.
14 THE NEW STRUGGLE 227
The Cambridge History of the Cold War, see especially the third volume,
which is subtitled “Endings.”
The nuclear confrontations of the 1980s are described in Eckart Conze, Martin
Klimke, and Jeremy Varon eds., Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold
War of the 1980s (2020), and see Henrik G. Bastiansen, Martin Klimke, and
Rolf Werenskjold, eds., Media and the Cold War in the 1980s: Between Star
Wars and Glasnost (2018).
The seriousness of the war scare in 1983 is the subject of some debate, but see
Nate Jones, ed., ABLE ARCHER 83 The Secret History of the NATO Exercise
That Almost Triggered Nuclear War (2016); Marc Ambinder The Brink:
President Reagan and the Nuclear War Scare of 1983 (2018); and Taylor
Downing 1983: Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink (2018).
For particular fronts in the renewed Cold War, see Edward A. Lynch, The Cold
War’s Last Battlefield: Reagan, the Soviets, and Central America (2011);
Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the
Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991 (2013); Seth G. Jones, A Covert
Action: Reagan, the CIA, and the Cold War Struggle in Poland (2018). The
role of Western “private enterprise” in the various struggles is the subject of
Kyle Burke, Revolutionaries for the Right: Anticommunist Internationalism
and Paramilitary Warfare in the Cold War (2018).
CHAPTER 15
Endgame
marked by abysmal productivity and very low product quality. Even when the
economy was working effectively, it placed a huge emphasis on heavy industrial
production and armaments at the expense of consumer goods. Shortages of all
kinds were so frequent as to become an unremarkable part of life. The central
planning regime made matters much worse, as inefficient older industries faced
no incentive to improve. From being a large exporter of grain, by the 1970s it
was a major importer and maintained its food supply only by its ability to sell
oil and natural gas. (Since finding huge oil resources at Samotlor in Siberia in
the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union had become a key energy state.) The enor-
mous military investments since the mid-1960s consumed an unsustainable
share of Soviet economic capacity. So did the continuing quagmire in
Afghanistan.
Paradoxically, even some of the forms of modernization that actually did
occur raised real issues for the survival of the established order. The Soviet
Union created a very lively world of popular culture, especially in television and
film, and to that extent became a media society almost comparable to Western
nations. But the new media worlds created a whole society with expansive aspi-
rations for greater freedom, prosperity, and even experiment, even if these were
not immediately expressed in overt politics. Meanwhile, the network of institu-
tions that the state created to provide leisure and instruction for Soviet teenag-
ers and young adults coexisted with unofficial forms of social organization,
which were often deeply interested in Western forms of entertainment and
consumption. Acute dissatisfaction with the system was by no means confined
to dissident intellectuals. The gulf separating East and West gaped ever wider
after 1982 with the beginning of the long boom in the capitalist world, and the
impact of new information technologies.
Within the USSR, social indicators, such as life expectancy and alcohol
abuse, demonstrated a growing sense of popular despair. Very low birth rates
raised fears of demographic disaster to come, and old-stock Slavic populations
worried about the steep growth of Islamic minorities. Beyond the economic
realm, the Soviets faced growing unrest not just in the East Bloc, but also in its
own regions, where separatist pressures were mounting.
The stagnation found a good illustration in the very aged quality of the
Soviet leadership itself. In all, 19 men served on the 25th Politburo, which
served from 1976 through 1981 (all of course were men). Only four were born
after the 1917 Revolution. Ten had been born before 1910, making them
older than Ronald Reagan. Besides the issues of age and health, this meant that
over half the members had formed their world views entirely in the three
decades of Stalin’s rule, with little or no direct exposure to the situation in
other countries. If Western liberals despaired about the aged Reagan, that pres-
ident was at least forward-looking and optimistic about growth and techno-
logical advances.
But if the problems were apparent, there was no consensus about solutions.
There were no signs of any willingness to consider reforms, even on something
like the scale proposed by Khrushchev 20 years before. The main obstacle to
15 ENDGAME 231
improvement was that any kind of liberalization would challenge the entrenched
authority of party elites, and ultimately of the Communist system itself. To
reform the system was to kill it. This dilemma had been well formulated by the
dissident Andrei Amalrik, who in 1970 published an essay entitled Will the
Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? This near-prophetic essay was of course pub-
lished in Western outlets, but its arguments became widely known in the
USSR. As prophecy, Amalrik’s work was not perfect, as he envisaged the Soviets
suffering a ruinous war with the Chinese. But his larger analysis of Soviet eco-
nomic realities was acute. In a famous passage, he argued, “If … one views the
present ‘liberalization’ as the growing decrepitude of the regime rather than its
regeneration, then the logical result will be its death, which will be followed by
anarchy.”1 Amalrik himself died in 1980, but his vision unfolded with fair accu-
racy over the following decade.
Gorbachev
In his final years, Leonid Brezhnev was suffering from so many accumulated
health issues and mental failings that he could exercise little direct authority.
The country was ruled by a collective team, a troika, comprising KGB Chairman
Yuri Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and Defense Minister
Dmitry Ustinov. Brezhnev died in November 1982, as East-West tensions were
plumbing new depths, and was succeeded as General Secretary of the
Communist Party by Andropov, who had since 1967 served as Chairman of the
KGB. It is a bitter commentary on Western intelligence analysis that his acces-
sion to power, one of the most important developments in global affairs, should
have come as a shock to the CIA, which expected a continuation of collective
leadership.
Andropov’s KGB background inspired reasonable concern about a new ide-
ological hardline at home and abroad, but in fact, the consequences were more
nuanced. While Andropov yielded to no one in his defense of the Soviet sys-
tem, he was uniquely equipped to recognize its failings, and he actually had
accurate data about the dismal economic realities. He was thoroughly aware of
the pervasive corruption prevailing at all levels of officialdom. As much as any
Soviet agency, the KGB had an excellent sense of the West and its technological
capacities. Andropov in fact began a modest reform program, focused on purg-
ing the least effective individuals rather than initiating serious institutional
change. Even more valuably, he encouraged the emergence of a cohort of ris-
ing younger leaders committed to reform and efficiency.
Most important among that favored group was Mikhail Gorbachev, the
Secretary of the Central Committee, who was a natural successor when
Andropov himself died in February 1984. However, other leaders regarded
him as too young and lacking experience: at 53, he was a generation younger
than his counterparts. The new leader was Konstantin Chernenko, who
1
Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York: Harper and Row, 1981).
232 P. JENKINS
represented the party mainstream at its most hidebound and decrepit. He was
73 at the time of taking power, and persistent illnesses meant that he only sur-
vived a year in office. In March 1985, Gorbachev became General Secretary
and effective leader of the Soviet Union.
Desperately worried by economic disparities with the West, Gorbachev initi-
ated a period of extensive reform at home and new relations abroad. At its
simplest, this new approach meant discouraging anything like a cult of person-
ality centered on him, so that he prevented displays of his portrait at public
events. His reform program was termed Perestroika (restructuring). At first,
this was intended to reinforce and streamline the planned economy, but by
1986, he was proposing the introduction of new market-oriented elements. He
followed Andropov in his anti-corruption activism. No less significant was the
new policy of Glasnost (openness), a symbolic opening of national windows
that went far beyond Khrushchev’s more timid precedent. As it developed, the
new approach meant greater freedom of the press, an opening of archives to
researchers, and a greater diversity of voices in media. Most daring, it implied
a reassessment of Soviet history. In a powerful symbolic move, the Soviets
stopped jamming foreign radio stations, such as BBC and VOA. Religious
organizations gained greater freedom. By 1989, the country was moving to
real democratization, with an elected Congress of People’s Deputies. This was
nothing like an open election, and most deputies were Communist Party mem-
bers, but previous dissidents were much in evidence, and there was real debate.
When Gorbachev’s spokesman was asked what the difference was between the
new leader and Czechoslovakia’s Alexander Dubček, the reply was “Nineteen
years.”2
Negotiations
Gorbachev’s reforms depended on good relations with the West. Like many
others, he had been appalled by the apparent spiral to war since the start of the
decade, and the country had to find an effective way to respond to US eco-
nomic and military pressure. In 1986, Gorbachev warned the Politburo against
being “pulled into another round of the arms race that is beyond our capabili-
ties, and we will lose it, because we are already at the limit of our capabilities.”3
The Star Wars plan created the potential for a lavish new competition in space-
based weapons.
Gorbachev’s initiatives to improve relationships found a ready ear in the
West, initially with the implacably anti-Red Margaret Thatcher. In November
1985, Reagan and Gorbachev met at a summit in Geneva and delighted observ-
ers by their apparently warm relationship and their willingness to engage in
2
Michael T. Kaufman, “Gorbachev Alludes to Czech Invasion,” New York Times, April 12, 1987.
3
Quoted in Vladislav M. Zubok, “Gorbachev’s Nuclear Learning: How the Soviet leader became
a nuclear abolitionist,” Boston Review, April 2000, https://bostonreview.net/archives/BR25.2/
zubok.html
15 ENDGAME 233
serious discussions. Although no formal agreement was concluded, this was the
point at which the worst nuclear terrors lifted, on both sides of the Atlantic.
The two even had visions of an extraordinary global deal that would abolish the
nuclear arsenals of both sides, and these sweeping proposals surfaced briefly at
the summit meeting held in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986. In the short
term, Gorbachev proposed a 50 percent reduction in Soviet missiles. The
Reykjavik meeting failed to reach formal agreement, significantly because
Reagan refused to accept any deal that renounced Star Wars. Even so, the inter-
national political mood shifted substantially and became much more optimistic.
Despite these new gestures, the West maintained its pressure, particularly on
the economic front. The US worked with the Saudis to keep oil prices at his-
torically low levels, which removed one of the few remaining strong points in
the Soviet economy. In late 1985, the oil price was $30 a barrel, but that
plunged to $12 in March 1986, and it remained around $10 over the next two
years. Reagan ensured that improved superpower relations would not ignore
the continuing situation in Eastern Europe. In June 1987, he visited West
Berlin, recalling Kennedy’s presence there in June 1963. Like Kennedy, he
gave a memorable speech, but offering optimism rather than defiance. While
welcoming prospects for peace, Reagan stressed the need for freedom, and
directly challenged the Soviet leader in an effective soundbite when he urged,
“Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”4
In September 1987, the US and the USSR agreed the historic Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which was signed that December, and
which ordered the dismantling of long- and short-range missiles in Europe.
This was the first US-Soviet treaty actually to provide for the destruction of
nuclear weapons, and the first arms control agreement to receive Senate
approval since SALT I in 1972. Though the American right denounced the
treaty, it represented an enormous US diplomatic victory, granting Reagan his
long-mocked zero option. In December 1987, Gorbachev visited Washington,
where he received a genuinely enthusiastic welcome as something like a popu-
lar hero. After the US Senate ratified the INF Treaty, Reagan visited Moscow
for a summit meeting in May 1988, and declared that he no longer considered
the Soviets an “evil empire.” That May also, the Soviets began their military
withdrawal from Afghanistan.
At last, both sides could free spending previously devoted to military needs,
and to enjoy what in the West would be known as a peace dividend. But in the
Soviet context, any such prospect would take years to mature, and the domestic
pressures were becoming severe. The Soviets suffered a dreadful blow in April
1986 with the disaster at a nuclear reactor at Chernobyl, in Ukraine. This
caused catastrophic contamination in the immediate area, but also spread a
radioactive cloud detectable across much of Europe. The event epitomized so
many problems in the larger economy, including the incompetence of planners
4
Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate,” June 12, 1987, https://www.american-
rhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreaganbrandenburggate.htm
234 P. JENKINS
and managers. But this was also a political disaster. Aggravating the situation
were the failures of local officials to admit the severity of the situation, which
delayed any effective responses, while the national government was issuing
clearly false statements about the dangers posed. The resulting scandal sug-
gested that even under a leadership as admired as Gorbachev’s, the Soviet state
was gravely flawed, and lacked international credibility.
Besides the Soviet Union, the PRC was undergoing political and cultural
turmoil in these years, and that experience would have its impact in the Soviet
Bloc. Through the decade, the country was growing economically and relaxing
many of the repressive restraints of the Mao era. But that rapid change created
widespread expectations for still more dramatic reforms, and for full democra-
tization. That culminated in a surging national protest movement in 1989.
From April, vast crowds occupied Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, until in June,
the government used the army to suppress the movement. Several hundred
were killed. The lesson was that if economic reform were to proceed unchecked,
then it could not be in any form that challenged party authority, or Communist
ideology. That offered a potent message to hardline Soviet and East European
Communists deeply suspicious of Gorbachev’s reforms and worried that
Gorbachev was making too many concessions to the West.
5
“Sinatra Doctrine’ at Work in Warsaw Pact, Soviet Says,” Los Angeles Times, October 25, 1989,
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-10-25-mn-745-story.html
15 ENDGAME 237
Year of Revolutions
By late 1989, Eastern Europe was experiencing a wave of revolutions recalling
other transformative years of European history, such as 1830, 1848, or 1919.
In the second half of November, students demonstrations in Czechoslovakia
detonated vast protests and strikes that soon became frankly anti-Communist.
The events of the following months came to be called the Velvet Revolution.
The Communist Party abandoned its monopoly of power, and the country
acquitted its first non-Communist government since 1948. The new president
was Václav Havel, a celebrated author, dissident, and human rights campaigner.
Alexander Dubček, the hero of the Prague Spring in 1968, re-emerged into
public life as Chairman of the Federal Parliament.
The only serious bloodshed in the wave of revolutions occurred in Romania,
where Nicolae Ceaușescu had since the 1960s ruled as a classic Stalinist dicta-
tor, although sturdily opposed to the Soviet Union. Facing democracy protests
in December 1989, Ceaușescu’s regime resorted to military force, but repres-
sion stirred new resistance. Leading members of the military and the security
establishment switched their allegiance, and the regime was overturned.
Ceaușescu and his wife were executed. Over a thousand perished during the
revolutionary struggle.
By the start of 1990, Communist regimes were dead or dying cross Eastern
Europe, but attitudes to Communism as such varied. Some on the left favored
238 P. JENKINS
main expressions of international support for the plotters came from two
notoriously brutal dictators, Libya’s Qaddafi and Iraq’s Saddam. Within the
Soviet Union, coup leaders failed to arouse enough support in the military
and the political establishment, which recognized just how broad support for
reform was in the nation as a whole, and particularly in the cities. Resistance
to the coup found a public face in Boris Yeltsin, a long-standing ally of
Gorbachev’s who had nevertheless denounced his reforms as too timid. That
June, Yeltsin had been elected President of Russia—that is, officially, of the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic—defeating Gorbachev’s favored
candidate. In memorable images, Yeltsin stood on a tank in the Moscow
streets to resist the coup. Within a few days, the movement had collapsed, as
Gorbachev was released.
If the plotters received little sympathy from outsiders, they were exactly cor-
rect in their analysis of the dangers facing the Soviet Union, and their actions
accelerated the process of disintegration.
In the following weeks, the republics declared their independence, creating
16 new nations. Under Yeltsin, Russia itself re-emerged as a name on the
European map, with a new flag that abandoned the hammer and sickle emblem
of Communism. In November, Yeltsin prohibited Communist Party activities
within Russia. The following month, 92 percent of Ukrainians voted for sover-
eign independence. Like their counterparts in Eastern Europe, crowds in the
Soviet Union tore down the symbols of Communist power and history, includ-
ing that of Felix Dzerzhinsky in front of KGB headquarters, the notorious
Lubianka. Following a referendum in June 1991, Leningrad reverted to its
imperial name of St Petersburg. Other cities resumed their former imperial
names, renouncing the titles that commemorated Communist functionaries.
Sverdlovsk once more became Ekaterinburg, recalling the Empress Catherine
the Great.
In December 1991, most of the successor nations combined to form the
loosely linked Confederation of Independent States, CIS, although the three
Baltic states refused even to adhere to such a symbolic association. At least in
theory, the CIS coexisted with the Soviet Union until December 26, 1991,
when Gorbachev resigned the Presidency and entered private life. The Soviet
Union ceased to exist, and with it, the Cold War ended. Political observers
worldwide had to become accustomed to a new acronym, FSU, for the “Former
Soviet Union.”
Russian state survived to seek revenge against the various regions and nations
that had forsaken it, opening the way to years of plotting and warfare. In
August 1991, just days before the coup attempt, President Bush addressed
these issues in Kiev, where he praised Gorbachev’s reforms, and warned against
“a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.” The Ukrainians bitterly
resented the speech, and American conservatives complained about the refusal
to press for a Soviet breakup. Some accused Bush of being cowardly or chicken
and referred to the “Chicken Kiev” speech.6 Ironically, Bush, a former head of
the CIA, was one of the last international figures to oppose the collapse of
the USSR.
Matters moved too fast for even the Americans to slow the process. In the
following decade, Western nations agreed to the incorporation of most of the
former Eastern Bloc into its key institutions, including both NATO and the
European Union. As a part of an enlarged Germany, the former East Germany
automatically became part of NATO from 1990, but other nations soon fol-
lowed. In 1997, NATO invitations were extended to Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic, one of the two states to succeed former Czechoslovakia.
A new NATO enlargement in 2004 incorporated Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia, and—most sensitive of all—the three Baltic nations that had
recently been Soviet republics. Even Ukraine was a candidate for further expan-
sion, but Russian military efforts against that nation in the new century made
the issue too risky. In 2004, the European Union expanded to include Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three Baltics.
Romania and Bulgaria followed in 2007. Except in the Baltics, the borders of
“the West” marched along the western borders of the old USSR, and of the
Tsarist Empire that had preceded it.
The reformed West even sought to incorporate Russia itself, as part of a new
democratic and liberal economic order. Since 1975, the world’s largest Western
economies had formed the Group of Seven, or G-7. In 1997, the inclusion of
Russia created the G-8. There was even talk of bringing Russia into NATO,
which would have constituted an ultimate irony.
Just how thoroughly Russian influence had evaporated was suggested by
several conflicts in the 1990s, where Western powers intervened freely in
areas that the Soviet Union would have unequivocally recognized as its own
preserve—what Americans would have called its backyard. The Gulf War of
1991 was a glaring example, but in the 1990s, ethnic and political violence
overcame the former nation of Yugoslavia, which devolved into several new
states. Throughout the Cold War, Yugoslavia had been an extremely sensitive
pressure point of East-West tension, but from 1992, NATO intervened to
bring order and reduce violence. That intervention became forceful and
6
“After the Summit; Excerpts From Bush’s Ukraine Speech: Working ‘for the Good of Both of
Us,’” New York Times, August 2, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/02/world/after-
summit-excerpts-bush-s-ukraine-speech-working-for-good-both-us.html
242 P. JENKINS
military in character in 1995 and again in 1999, when the US led airstrikes
against Serbia and its forces. Russia played only a marginal role in the peace-
keeping operation. With the exception of one tense moment in 1999, when
US-Russian conflict briefly seemed possible, Russia could raise few objections
to the Western hegemony over what had been an East European Socialist
Republic
Further Reading
For the final years of the Soviet Union, see Artemy M. Kalinovsky, A Long
Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (2011); Serhii Plokhy, The
Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union (2015). Plokhy is also the
author of Chernobyl: The History of a Nuclear Catastrophe (2018). William
Taubman offers a major study of Gorbachev: His Life and Times (2017). See
also Chris Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev
and the Collapse of the USSR (2016).
For issues of consumption and aspiration in the Soviet Union’s later years, see
Kristin Roth-Ey. Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media
Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War (2011); Gleb Tsipursky, Socialist
Fun: Youth, Consumption, and State-Sponsored Popular Culture in the Soviet
Union, 1945–1970 (2016); and Eleonory Gilburd, To See Paris and Die: The
Soviet Lives of Western Culture (2018)
The closing phase of the Cold War is described in James Graham Wilson, The
Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement,
and the End of the Cold War (2014); Ken Adelman, Reagan at Reykjavik
(2014); Robert Service, The End of the Cold War, 1985–1991 (2015); Simon
Miles, Engaging the Evil Empire: Washington, Moscow, and the Beginning of
the End of the Cold War (2020); Archie Brown, The Human Factor: Gorbachev,
7
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest 16(1989), 3–18.
15 ENDGAME 243
Reagan, and Thatcher and the End of the Cold War (2020). Christopher
Mallaby’s Living the Cold War (2017) offers the informative memoir of a
British diplomat through the whole arc of the era, from the 1960s
through 1991.
For revolutions in the Soviet Bloc, see Jeffrey A. Engel, ed., The Fall of the
Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 (2009); Joachim von
Puttkamer, Włodzimierz Borodziej and Stanislav Holubec, eds., From
Revolution To Uncertainty: The Year 1990 in Central and Eastern Europe
(2020). Post-Cold War politics are analyzed in Kristina Spohr, Post Wall, Post
Square: How Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl, and Deng Shaped the World After
1989 (2020).
CHAPTER 16
This book began with a description of Offutt Air Force base in Nebraska, the
long-standing home of the SAC. Although Offutt lost its key role with the
formal end of Cold War tensions, it was once again on the front lines of his-
tory on September 11, 2001, following the Islamist terrorist attacks on
New York and Washington. President George W. Bush arrived here on the
presidential aircraft, Air Force One, to take advantage of the excellent com-
munication facilities of the Strategic Command that had replaced SAC, which
were believed capable of withstanding a nuclear strike. It was here that he
learned details of the attacks, and the presumed role of al-Qaeda, under its
leader Osama bin Laden. Bush and his advisers made the initial decisions that
would ultimately lead to decades of US involvement in wars in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and elsewhere.
The Cold War, evidently, was not the prelude to global peace, or indeed for
an end of ideological struggle, still less of history as such. Arguably, some of
those new forms of struggle evolved from the Cold War conflict itself. Three
decades after the Cold War’s end, we can address central questions of the con-
flict’s meaning, and specifically of issues of victory and defeat.
Winning the War
In 1929, a character in William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury protested,
“No battle is ever won… Victory is an illusion of philosophers and fools.”1 In
the context of the Cold War, such a view may sound ridiculous, in that the US
and its Western allies so clearly triumphed. The Soviet Union not only aban-
doned the battlefield, it also ceased to exist. From that perspective, many
historians scorn the opinion of Mikhail Gorbachev himself that the struggle
ended without winners or losers. But victory in the Cold War did not lead to
1
William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (1929. New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), 83.
straightforward US hegemony, or at least not for more than a few years. If the
US in 1991 was the last superpower standing, it would not long retain that
distinction.
Even in the headiest days of US triumph in 1991, some voices were protest-
ing that the prohibitive economic costs of the struggle had undermined the
West and opened the door to other rival powers. The nation initially cited as a
de facto global victor was Japan, which avoided direct military involvement, yet
had used its economic opportunities to build immense prosperity based on
advanced technology. When Japan’s economy encountered serious setbacks
during the 1990s, a similar analysis was applied to China. Following its deci-
sion to liberalize in 1978, China’s single-minded devotion to growth and pros-
perity made it a superpower which by 2015 matched the US itself. In dollar
terms, China’s GDP grew from $300 billion in 1980 to $1 trillion in 1998, to
$15 trillion today. That wealth is expressed in ever-growing political influence
and military power, giving it a position far greater than the Soviets ever had
during the height of their power during the Cold War. (Presently, China’s
economy is eight times larger than that of modern-day Russia.) The rise of
China is a central fact of modern world history. The relative decline of the US
was not of itself a consequence of the Cold War, as China owed its growth to
other unrelated factors, including its vast domestic market. But it does offer a
context for considering the outcome of the long US-Soviet rivalry.
For other countries too, the end of the Cold War marked a transition to
explosive growth. From its creation in 1947, the state of India had been ham-
pered by a tightly controlled economy based on both socialist principles and
visions of national autonomy. Partly due to the utter discrediting of Soviet and
socialist examples, India in 1991 began a sweeping liberalization that initiated
dramatic growth. Today, India stands among the world’s five largest economies
and is a serious contender for global influence. Opposition to further Chinese
expansion is led by the Quad—the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—which
includes the US, India, Japan, and Australia.
In strategic terms too, the end of the Cold War looks like less of a clear
dividing line than it might have done at the time. A map of the world’s leading
political powers would begin with the US and China, but it would certainly
include Russia. Even with its diminished territory and shriveled economy, the
modern Russian state still commands serious military force. Russia deploys
over 1500 nuclear warheads, 40 percent of the active global total, and quite
sufficient to destroy large portions of the world. Politically too, the Russian
state dominated by Vladimir Putin throughout the present century has exer-
cised influence far beyond what its economic strength might suggest and has
worked to restore a role in former Soviet territories. If Russia is no longer
Communist, then a US-Russian rivalry is still a central fact in international
affairs. As in the 1980s, the US has to balance its relations with both Russia and
China. Older fears of Communist subversion and espionage have transmuted
into concern about Russian disinformation and dirty tricks, commonly using
the Internet, to the point of shaping the outcome of elections in many
16 CONCLUSION: WINNERS, LOSERS, AND INHERITORS 247
countries, allegedly including the US itself. In the US, Cold War memories
revived startlingly in 2016 with unfounded but widely credited charges that
President Donald Trump was a Russian agent of influence, even a latter-day
Manchurian Candidate.
might equally well recall George Kennan’s warning against “outward histrion-
ics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward ‘toughness.’”2
2
“X” (George Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, at
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-
conduct.
16 CONCLUSION: WINNERS, LOSERS, AND INHERITORS 249
Consequences of Victory
As a vast struggle spanning decade and continents, the Cold War left a very
diverse range of impacts. Some were very clear, including the removal of
Communist rule over Eastern Europe and the prevention of that system spread-
ing West. The creation and restoration of democracy genuinely did mark a
victory, even for countries like Russia itself where new democratic systems were
flawed. For countries like Poland or Lithuania, the question of whether the
Cold War was worth fighting is too absurd to be worth asking.
250 P. JENKINS
Some of the social effects are difficult to assess. Clearly, the Cold War years
marked technological progress on an almost inconceivable scale, and as so
often in history, war proved a powerful driver and accelerator of change. That
was especially true in matters of information technology and computing, which
were so vital to military systems, from missile guidance to decrypting enemy
codes. To take one example of many, GPS originated strictly as a US military
project in the 1970s, until President Reagan extended it to civilian use in 1983
as a direct consequence of the Soviet shootdown of KAL flight 007. In 2000,
President Clinton made it generally available at its most sophisticated and pre-
cise. In modern times, GPS has had truly revolutionary effects on commerce,
planning, social policy, politics, and academic research and is the basis of many
of the most valuable functions of cellphones.
The problem is that we cannot know how technology might have developed
without the enormous boost of international conflict, initially between the
Allies and the Nazis, and almost immediately afterward between Eastern and
Western blocs. We can speculate how far science might have advanced in a
hypothetical post-1945 era of peace and harmony, but such a venture scarcely
seems profitable. What we can reasonably say is that at every stage of modern
technological development as it actually did occur, we find the traces of the
Cold War.
of other units, such as the Department of Energy. Of course, the US was only
one player in the Cold War, and those figures take no account of expenditures
by the Soviets, not to mention Britain, France, and other nations.
If the total financial cost of the Cold War is difficult to gauge precisely,
nobody would deny that it was vast. In the US alone, military spending ensured
extraordinarily high government expenditure, with all that meant for national
indebtedness, and for federal employment. The state occupied a share of the
economy that would have astonished policymakers of the 1920s, and social
spending expanded that role still further, creating a classic welfare-warfare
state. Without the patriotic impetus and the obvious need to ensure national
survival, it is very questionable whether Americans or citizens of other demo-
cratic nations would have been willing to bear the increasing taxations burdens
that became so apparent from the 1950s onward. Once the state developed an
enormous military capacity, a natural dynamic tended to find reasons to main-
tain and expand it.
Beyond any single impact of the military spending, we can ask the obvious
question of what might have been achieved if these sums, or even a small pro-
portion of them, could have been spent on peaceful causes. We can never know
the answer.
Unintended Consequences
The Cold War had its moral costs, and these too could prove exorbitant.
Throughout the long struggle, each side had an opportunistic approach to
finding allies and supporters. The Western nations, notionally pledged to dem-
ocratic principles, often compromised their values by allying with regimes or
movements that were violent, corrupt, or repressive, and those actions often
left lasting and bitter memories. In the aftermath of the Second World War,
some of the most active and dedicated European opponents of Communism
and the Soviets were irrevocably tainted with their former alliance with Nazi
regimes or military forces. As the East-West confrontation grew, the Western
powers inevitably found themselves allied with groups and individuals with
pro-Nazi and collaborationist histories, including some actual war criminals.
In later years, the US, Britain, and France supported Third World regimes
that yielded little to Communists in their excesses, and that support left long
and bitter memories. As “September 11” became so indelibly marked in US
historical memory after 2001, Latin American leftists pointed out that for
them, the date properly commemorated the bloody ouster of Salvador Allende’s
regime on that day in 1973. Memories of the US/British coup in Iran in 1953
provided abundant rhetorical ammunition for the Islamic movements in that
country, which triumphed in 1979. Below the level of formal movements or
parties, intelligence agencies often formed tactical alliances with organized
criminals or drug dealers, who were and are expert at achieving goals through
illicit means.
252 P. JENKINS
But over and above the moral compromises, such alliances posed a real risk
of strengthening groups that were almost as implacably opposed to the West as
to the Soviets. We have already traced the US support for Islamists against dif-
ferent nationalist and socialist movements in the Middle East, for in Egypt and
Iran. That alliance became intimate with the Afghanistan war of the 1980s,
which was a centerpiece of Western attempts to weaken the Soviets, and which
triumphed mightily. But the war provided a crucible for Islamist movements
that were passionately anti-Western, and which were supported by such key US
allies as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. During the 1980s, new forms of radical
Salafi jihadism became increasingly involved in violent activism against Israel
and the West. Al-Qaeda was founded in 1988, by volunteers in the mujahedeen
war in Afghanistan. The group assassinated an extremist rabbi in New York in
1990, and in 1993 Qaeda sponsored the first attempt to bring down that city’s
World Trade Center. Many other terrorist attacks against Western targets fol-
lowed over the next decade. Qaeda found refuge in Afghanistan following the
creation of the Taliban regime in that country in 1996, setting the stage for the
September 11 attacks.
It would be absurd to describe either Qaeda or the Taliban as creations of
the West or the CIA. But neither would have existed in anything like the form
they did without the war in Afghanistan, which was a primary focus of US and
British policy during the Cold War. Beyond the immediate harm inflicted by
the 9/11 attacks, those events sparked a new war in Afghanistan, which would
become by far America’s longest conflict, and contributed substantially to the
2003 invasion of Iraq. These wars caused enormous death and suffering, and
imposed a severe financial burden on the US. All Western countries suffered
from Islamist terror attacks. In the Middle East, the intervention opened the
way to the ISIS movement, and the atrocious rule of the Islamic State. The
Russians suffered their own confrontation with Islamist forces growing out of
their prolonged wars in the Caucasus, and terrorism likewise ensued. Between
1994 and 2009, successive wars in Chechnya alone claimed a hundred thou-
sand lives. As the “End of History” idea lost popularity, analysts turned to the
views of Samuel Huntington, who posited a fundamental and enduring Clash
of Civilizations.
This is not to say that the modern wave of Islamist extremism was wholly a
consequence of the Cold War. Often forgotten today, the decade or so follow-
ing the First World War was marked by Islamic risings and activism, often let by
religious figures, and the resulting struggles spread widely from North Africa
into Central and South Asia, very much the regions the West would later con-
sider an Arc of Crisis. Often, we can trace lines of continuity between those
movements and the seemingly novel upsurge at the end of the century. But if
the Cold War did not cause or birth Islamist movements, it certainly affected
the behavior of the Western powers, which looked favorably on movements
and individuals they might otherwise have regarded with much more caution.
That was reflected in the deployment of resources, political, military, and espe-
cially intelligence. Only at the end of the century did Western nations wonder
16 CONCLUSION: WINNERS, LOSERS, AND INHERITORS 253
seriously whether their conservative Islamic allies might in fact harbor ideolo-
gies just as hostile as the Communist states themselves.
view, however, the elimination of reactionary or hostile class elements was only
part of a larger revolutionary struggle, which found expression in international
rivalries. From a Stalinist or Maoist viewpoint, such acts formed a common
spectrum of revolution and class wars, which acknowledged no national
boundaries.
Viewed from the stance of the US or the Soviets, or of such major players as
Britain or Germany or Canada, we might marvel that the decades-long conflict
remained “cold,” without escalating into a full-scale hot war. Margaret Thatcher
even remarked that the Cold War was won without a shot being fired. For
many other nations, chiefly in the Global South, such a view seems parochial
and callous. Even without nuclear weapons, the Cold War genuinely was a war,
and it often became very hot indeed. It killed and maimed, and in appalling
numbers.
Conclusion
The world survived the Cold War, and a Third World War never took place.
But the costs of that victory should never be forgotten, nor should the sense of
fear that so pervaded ordinary lives through those decades. However we con-
sider the history of those years, whatever aspect of life, thought, or culture we
are contemplating, we can never forget the reality that hung over how ordinary
people lived and thought. Sometimes highly visible, often in the background,
the Cold War was a critical fact of life.
Further Reading
Retrospective interpretations of the Cold War are a major feature of Melvyn
P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold
War (three volumes, 2010), and Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde,
eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (2013). See also Odd Arne
Westad, The Cold War: A World History (2017).
Since the end of the Cold War, much scholarly writing has addressed the
remains of the struggle, both material and cultural. The extensive material
inheritance is the subject of Todd A. Hanson, ed., The Archaeology of the
Cold War (2016). Particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, memories of
the fast-receding old order are the subject of much writing. See Jonathan
P. G. Bach, What Remains: Everyday Encounters with the Socialist Past in
Germany (2017).
Index
Guatemala, 100, 101, 103, 151, 221, Jews and Judaism, 183
222, 224 John Paul II, Pope, 204, 210, 219, 223,
Guevara, Ernesto “Che,” 88, 101–103, 234, 248
113, 177, 193 Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 85–87, 104,
Gulag Archipelago, 22, 198 110, 117, 174, 175
Guyana, 103
K
H Katanga, 98, 116
Haiti, 104 Kennan, George F., 33–34, 92,
Helsinki Accords, 197, 199 242, 248
Holocaust, 27, 57, 125, 167, 226 Kennedy, John F., 67, 84, 85, 91,
Homosexuality, 154 107–119, 147, 192
House Committee on Un-American KGB, 53, 98, 124, 139, 146, 148,
Activities (HUAC), 7, 131–132, 215–217, 231, 239, 240
144, 156 Khmer Rouge, 194, 205
Huks, Hukbalahap (Hukbong Bayan Khrushchev, Nikita, 48–50, 60, 61, 92,
Laban sa Hapon), 81 97, 98, 107–119, 126, 140, 161,
Hungarian revolution, 160 213, 230, 232, 249
Hungary, 26, 38, 39, 49–51, 125–127, Secret Speech by, 49, 126, 160
161, 163, 179, 198, 216, 229, 235, Kissinger, Henry, 146, 188–190, 197
236, 239, 241 Korean War, 13, 59–61, 73, 87, 141,
149, 250
Korea, North, 68, 73, 78, 175
I Korea, Republic of (ROK), 2, 6, 34, 73,
Imperialism, 9, 11, 75, 95, 109, 126, 74, 76–79, 84, 86, 131, 143, 144,
176, 183 149, 159, 175
India, 11, 68, 81, 84, 92, 246
Indo-China, 32, 42, 73, 81–83, 85,
139, 151 L
Indonesia, 11, 32, 81, 92, 97, 128, 174 Lansdale, Edward, 91, 109
Intelligence agencies, 13, 40, 42, 53, 94, Laos, 11, 83, 84, 87, 107, 191
98, 109, 145, 147, 182, 191, Latvia, 27, 53
196, 251 Lebanon, 5, 95, 96, 224, 225
Iran (Persia), 5, 8, 19, 32, 34, 93, 94, LeMay, Curtis, 59, 60, 65, 112, 178
97, 128, 194, 205, 207, 208, 211, Libya, 97
225, 251, 252 Lithuania, 27, 249
Iraq, 94–97, 225, 239, 240, 245, 252
Islam, 94, 95, 97, 189, 205
Israel, 4, 68, 95, 97, 179, 182, 183, 189, M
194, 198, 223, 225, 252 MacArthur, Douglas, 77, 80
Italy, 3, 8, 11, 19, 23, 28–33, 37, 41–43, Malaya, 73, 81, 93, 128
46, 53, 111, 114, 127, 129, 153, 158, Mao Zedong, 3, 75, 76, 80–82,
162, 177, 195, 196, 210, 214, 249 84, 87, 91, 92, 177, 188,
191, 234, 249
Mass media, 67, 147, 151, 156
J McCarthy, Joseph, 6, 131–133, 144,
James Bond novels and films, 168 151, 167
Japan, 3, 4, 6, 24, 29, 40, 58, 60, 74–75, Military–industrial complex, 165,
77, 84, 87, 155, 165, 177, 197, 246 167, 192
258 INDEX
World Peace Council, 159 Yugoslavia, 4, 23, 26, 27, 31, 32,
World War II, 79, 219 38, 43, 99, 126, 127, 180,
204, 241
Y
Yalta conference, 145 Z
Yemen, 97 Zhukov, Georgy, 23, 49, 51, 110