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Divis~ Clerk o
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Court
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1 hird Division
DEC 2 0 2018

~epublic of tbe ~bilippines

~upreme ~ourt
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THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE'S GENERAL G.R. No. 204759

INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
PERALTA, J., Chairperson,
LEONEN,
GESMUNDO, *
-versus- REYES, J., JR., and
HERNANDO.,* JJ.

EDGARDO GUANSING and

EDUARDO LIZASO, Promulgated:
Respondents. November 14, 2018

x---------------------------------------------~-:~-~---x
DECISION

LEONEN,J.:

As a general rule, personal service is the preferred mode of service of

summons. Substituted service is the exception to this general rule. For the
sheriff to avail of substituted service, there must be a detailed enumeration
of the sheriffs actions showing that a defendant cannot be served despite
diligent and reasonable efforts. These details are contained in the sheriffs
return. Thus, the sheriffs return is entitled to a presumption of regularity.
Courts may allow substituted service based on what the sheriffs return
contains. 1

Failure to serve summons means that the court did not acqmre
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. 2 Absent proper service of

• On wellness leave.
t
1
De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 758 Phil. 706 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division].
Id.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 204759

summons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant unless
there is voluntary appearance. The filing of an answer and other subsequent
pleadings is tantamount to voluntary appearance.

This resolves a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, 3 assailing

the Court of Appeals December 10, 2012 Decision4 in CA-G.R. CV No.
96720, which granted Edgardo Guansing (Guansing) and Eduardo Lizaso's
(Lizaso) appeal 5 and set aside the Regional Trial Court January 28, 2010
Decision6 and February 23, 2011 Order7 in Civil Case No. 06115736.

On February 4, 2006, at around 9:45 a.m., Lizaso, Guansing's

employee, was driving Guansing's truck along Legarda Street, Sampaloc,
Manila when he hit the rear portion of Andrea Yokohama's (Yokohama)
Isuzu Crosswind. The strong impact caused the Isuzu Crosswind to hit other
vehicles, rendering it beyond repair. 8

Yokohama's Isuzu Crosswind was insured with People's General

Insurance Corporation. Yokohama filed a total loss claim under her
insurance policy, which paid the full amount of P907,800.00 as settlement.
Thus, People's General Insurance Corporation claimed to have been
subrogated to all the rights and interests of Yokohama against Guansing. 9

People's General Insurance Corporation sought from Guansing

reimbursement of the total amount paid to Yokohama, less the salvage value
of P470,000.00. Despite repeated demands, Guansing failed to reimburse
the amount claimed. 10

On August 28, 2006, People's General Insurance Corporation filed a

Complaint for a sum of money and damages 11 against Guansing and Lizaso.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 06115736 at Branch 41, Regional
Trial Court, Manila City. The sheriff served the summons on Guansing's
brother, Reynaldo Guansing. 12 The sheriffs return did not explain why
summons was served on his brother instead of Guansing. 13

Rollo, pp. 18-55.

Id. at 199-207. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser and concurred in by
Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Ramon R. Garcia of the Fourth Division, Court of
Appeals, Manila.
Id. at 163.
6
Id. at 146-149. The Decision was penned by Acting Presiding Judge Teresa P. Soriaso of Branch 41,

e
Regional Trial Court, Manila.
Id. at 159-161. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Rosalyn D. Mislos-Loja of Branch 41,
Regional Trial Court, Manila.
Id. at 20-21.
9
Id.at21-22.
io Id.
11
Id. at 56-62. CERTIFIED l'RU~ COP\

~ ·~
12
Id. at 20 I.
13
Id. at 203-204.

Divisfi,n Clerk of Court

Third Division
FEB o4 2019
Decision 3 G.R. No. 204759

The sheriffs return read:

SHERIFF'S RETURN

This is to certify:

1. That on September 20, 2006, I was able to served (sic) Summons,

Complaint and its Annexes thereto attached, upon the defendant
EDGARDO GUANSING at his given address in Barangay Tibagan,
Bustos, Bulacan thru the assistance of Brgy. Kagawad Nestor Reyes and
received by his brother REYNALDO GUANSING of sufficient discretion
who acknowledge[d] the receipt hereof as evidence[d by] his signature.

WHEREFORE, I respectfully return the original copy of Summons

to the Honorable Court, DULY SERVED, to the defendant EDGARDO
GUANSING ... for its records and information. 14

On September 27, 2006, Guansing filed a Motion to Dismiss 15 the

complaint for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He alleged that he did not
personally receive the summons. People's General Insurance Corporation
argued that summons was properly served since substituted service was an
alternative mode of service. 16

In its October 11, 2006 Order, 17 the Regional Trial Court denied the
Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. On November 10, 2006, Guansing filed
a Motion for Reconsideration 18 of the October 11, 2006 Order, which was
also denied in the Regional Trial Court November 30, 2006 Order. 19 On
January 28, 2007, Guansing filed a one (1)-page Answer2° containing a
general denial of the material allegations and causes of action in People's
General Insurance Corporation's Complaint. He also reiterated that the
Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over his person. 21

The case was then set for pre-trial conference. On February 2, 2008,
Guansing filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Postponement. 22 After
several postponements by both parties, Guansing submitted his Pre-trial

14
Id. at 86.
15
Id. at 80.
16
Id. at 83.
17
Id. at 89. The Order was penned by Judge Vedasto B. Marco of Branch 41, Regional Trial Court,
Manila.
18
19
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 100. The Order was penned by Judge Vedasto B. Marco of Branch 41, Regional Trial Court,
Manila.
f
20 Id. at 102.
21 CERTIFIED 'fRUi: COP\

~ v.$
Id. at 23.
22
Id. at 128.

Divisi.6n Clerk of Cou d

Third Division
~EB 0 4 2019
Decision 4 G.R. No. 204759

Brief3 dated March 8, 2008, where he again raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction over his person. 24

On December 5, 2008, People's General Insurance Corporation filed a

Motion to Render Judgment on the Pleadings, 25 which was granted by the
Regional Trial Court. In its January 28, 2010 Decision,26 the Regional Trial
Court ruled against Guansing, and ordered him to pay People's General
Insurance Corporation the remaining cost of the Isuzu Crosswind, attorney's
fees, and costs of suit. 27 The dispositive portion of this Decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Edgardo
Guansing, ordering the latter to pay the former the following:

1. The sum of P43 7 ,800 for the reimbursement of the remaining

cost of the Isuzu Crosswind plus twelve percent (12%) interest
from August 28, 2006, the date of the filing of this case, until
fully paid;

2. The sum of PS0,000.00 as attorney's fees;

3. Costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED. 28

On March 11, 2010, Guansing filed his Motion for Reconsideration, 29

where he reiterated his contention that the Regional Trial Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person due to invalid service of summons. In
its February 23, 2011 Order, 30 the Regional Trial Court denied Guansing's
Motion for Reconsideration.

On March 8, 2011, Guansing filed an appeal 31 before the Court of

Appeals. In a December 10, 2012 Decision, 32 the Court of Appeals ruled in
Guansing' s favor and held that the Regional Trial Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over him because summons was improperly served on his
brother. Moreover, the sheriff did not provide an explanation on why the
summons was not personally served upon him. It further remanded the case
to the Regional Trial Court. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals
December 10, 2012 Decision read:

23
Id. at 133-134.
I
24
Id. at 24-25.
2s Id. at 135-140.
26
Id. at 146-149.
27
Id. at 25.
28
Id. at 149.
29 Id. at 151-152.
3o Id. at 159-161.
31
Id. at 163.
32
Id. at 199-207.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 204759

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED.

The January 28, 2010 Decision and the February 23, 2011 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, in Civil Case No. 06-115736
are SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the said trial court for
further proceedings which shall include the valid service of summons.

SO ORDERED. 33 (Emphasis in the original)

On January 29, 2013, People's General Insurance Corporation filed a

Petition for Review34 before this Court.

The issues for this Court's resolution are as follows:

First, whether or not the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction

over the person of respondent Edgardo Guansing through service of
summons; and

Second, whether or not respondent Edgardo Guansing, in filing his

Answer and other subsequent pleadings, voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that

respondent's filing of an Answer and other subsequent pleadings did not
amount to voluntary appearance. 35 It also argues that Garcia v.
36
Sandiganbayan, cited by respondent, is inapplicable since it erroneously
expanded the plain and simple meaning of "voluntary appearance" in Rule
14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court. 37

In his Comment, 38 respondent Guansing asserts that petitioner is

misleading this Court by raising the issue on voluntary appearance. He
stresses that the sole issue is whether or not there was valid service of
summons; thus, the Court of Appeals ruled correctly in reversing the
Regional Trial Court January 28, 2010 Decision and February 23, 2011
Order.

By way of reply, petitioner alleges that contrary to respondent

Guansing's assertions, the issue on voluntary appearance is very much

33
34
35
Id. at 207.
Id. at 18-55.
Id. at 28-29.
f
36
618 Phil. 346 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].
RTIFfED TRUE COP l

\V(Lytuf:a\r.~
37
Rollo, p. 30.
38
Id. at 213-219.

Divisi~Clerk or Courf
Third Division
rte o~ ?n1Q
Decision 6 G.R. No. 204759

related to the issue on service of summons, especially since he filed several

pleadings and even sought affirmative reliefs. 39

This Court finds the Petition meritorious.

The rule requiring jurisdiction over the parties is based on due

process. Due process consists of notice and hearing. Notice means that
persons with interests in the subject of litigation are to be informed of the
facts and the law on which the complaint or petition is based for them to
adequately defend their interests. This is done by giving the parties
notification of the proceedings. On the other hand, hearing means that the
parties must be given an opportunity to be heard or a chance to defend their
interests. Courts are guardians of constitutional rights, and therefore, cannot
deny due process rights while at the same time be considered to be acting
within their jurisdiction. 40

Jurisdiction over the parties is the power of the courts to make

decisions that are binding on them. Jurisdiction over complainants or
petitioners is acquired as soon as they file their complaints or petitions,
while jurisdiction over defendants or respondents is acquired through valid
service of summons or their voluntary submission to the courts'
jurisdiction. 41

Violation of due process is a jurisdictional defect. Hence, proper

service of summons is imperative. A decision rendered without proper
service of summons suffers a jurisdictional infirmity. In the service of
summons, personal service is the preferred mode. As a rule, summons must
be served personally on a defendant.

Rule 14, Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide:

Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the

summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant

cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion

39

40
Id. at 259-267.
De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 748 Phil. 706 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second
j
Division], citing Manotoc v. CA, 530 Phil. 454 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
41 Id.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 204759

then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or

regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

This Court has consistently held that jurisdiction over a defendant is

acquired upon a valid service of summons or through the defendant's
voluntary appearance in court. In Interlink Movie Houses Inc. et al. v. Court
ofAppeals et al., 42 this Court reiterated:

It is settled that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired

either through service of summons or through voluntary appearance in
court and submission to its authority. In the absence of service or when
the service of summons upon the person of the defendant is defective, the
court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered
against him is null and void.

In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money and

damages, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
through personal or substituted service of summons.

Personal service is effected by handling a copy of the summons to the

defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him ... 43 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In the same case, this Court explained:

It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for

justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally served with
summons within a reasonable time. In such cases, substituted service may
be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place
of business with a competent person in charge. Because substituted
service is in derogation of the usual method of service, and personal
service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not
have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons. 44
(Emphasis supplied)

Sheriffs, in doing substituted service, must strictly comply with the

prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. In
Manotoc v. Court ofAppeals: 45

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

42
G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018
p
<http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/we b/viewer .httn I?fi le=/jurisprudence/20 l 8/january2018/203298. pdf>
[Per J. Martires, Third Division].
43
Id. at 5.
44
Id. at 6.
45
530 Phil. 454 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].
Decision 8 G.R. No. 204759

The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show

that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff
is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in
person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is
defined as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract
or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and
possibility of loss, if any, to the other party." Under the Rules, the service
of summons has no set period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or
the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the
latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons
lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of
summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to
effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt
service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven
(7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff
wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at
the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to
require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the
sheriff for service. The Sheriff's Return provides data to the Clerk of
Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be
submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10)
days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of
summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal
service on the defendant.

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several

attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to
prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" mean at least
three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the
sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts
made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be
clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts
on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s
of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all
other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on
Sheriff's Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the
Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy
requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally
and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5
dated November 9, 1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt service
should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant
personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the
proof of service.
f
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
Decision 9 G.R. No. 204759

If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or

residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion
then residing therein." A person of suitable age and discretion is one who
has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered
to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons.
"Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a
responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right
or wise may be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such
person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the
import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons
and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person
to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of
confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at
least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of
defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the
defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the
receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons.
These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of
Summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge

If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or

regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person
in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service
will be made must be the one managing the office or business of
defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must
have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in
the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the
Return. 46 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In this case, the basis for resorting to substituted service on respondent

Guansing's brother is not provided for in the Sheriffs Retum, 47 which read:

SHERIFF'S RETURN

This is to certify:

1. That on September 20, 2006, I was able to served (sic) Summons,

Complaint and its Annexes thereto attached, upon the defendant
EDGARDO GUANSING at his given address in Barangay Tibagan,
Bustos, Bulacan thru the assistance of Brgy. Kagawad Nestor Reyes
and received by his brother REYNALDO GUANSING of sufficient
discretion who acknowledge[ d] the receipt hereof as evidence[ d by]
his signature.

CERTIFIED TRU~ COP\

I 1

~~="'""~DOV~
46
Id. at 468-4 71.
47
Rollo, p. 79.

Divis" n Clerk of Court

Third Divisln11
F'tB D 4 2019
Decision 10 G.R. No. 204759

WHEREFORE, I respectfully return the original copy of Summons

to the Honorable Court, DULY SERVED, to the defendant EDGARDO
GUANSING ... for its records and information.

The Sheriffs Return did not contain a specific narration of the serious
efforts to attempt to serve the summons on the person of respondent
Guansing.

Although Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Rules of Court provides that
there is a disputable presumption that "official duty has been regularly
performed," in this case, presumption of regularity does not apply.

To enjoy the presumption of regularity, a sheriffs return must

contain: (1) detailed circumstances surrounding the sheriffs attempt to serve
the summons on the defendant; and (2) the specifics showing impossibility
of service within a reasonable time. 48 Based on these requirements, a
sheriffs return is merely pro forma.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 49 this Court explained that the

presumption of regularity in the issuance of the sheriffs return does not
apply to patently defective returns. In the case at bar, the Sheriffs Return
contained no statement on the efforts or attempts made to personally serve
the summons. It was devoid of details regarding the service of summons.
Thus, it was defective.

In this case, the sheriff should have established the impossibility of

prompt personal service before he resorted to substituted service.
Impossibility of prompt personal service is established by a sheriffs failure
to personally serve the summons within a period of one (1) month. Within
this period, he or she must have had at least three (3) attempts, on two (2)
different dates, to personally serve the summons. Moreover, he or she must
cite in the sheriffs return why these attempts are unsuccessful. 50

Sheriffs are tasked to discharge their duties on the service of summons

with care, diligence, and promptness so as not to affect the speedy
disposition of justice. They are compelled to give their best efforts to
accomplish personal service of summons on a defendant. 51 Based on the
Sheriffs Return in this case, the sheriff clearly failed to meet this
requirement.

48
De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., 748 Phil. 706 (2014) [Per. J. Leonen, Second Division].
49
530 Phil. 454 (2006) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division], citing Veturanza v. Court of Appeals, 240 Phil.
306 (1987) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
50
Interlink Movie Houses Inc. et. al. v. Court of Appeals et. al., G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018 fl
<http://sc.judiciary.gov. ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l8/january2018/203298.pdt> ..{
[Per J. Martires, Third Division]. CERTIFIED l'RU~ COP /
51
ld.at7. 1"' . ~ \

-~
Divisie6 Clerk of Cou n
Third Dhrisio 11
~~B nA ?a19
Decision 11 G.R. No. 204759

II

However, by filing his answer and other pleadings, respondent

Guansing is deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court. Generally, defendants voluntarily submit to the court's
jurisdiction when they participate in the proceedings despite improper
service of summons. 52

Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 20. Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary

appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance.

In Navale et al. v. Court ofAppeals et al. :53

Defects of summons are cured by voluntary

appearance and by the filing of an answer to the complaint.
A defendant [cannot] be permitted to speculate upon the
judgment of the court by objecting to the court's
jurisdiction over its person if the judgment is adverse to it,
and acceding to jurisdiction over its person if and when the
judgment sustains its defense.

Any form of appearance in court by the defendant, his authorized

agent or attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is
precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. 54

In G. V Florida Transport, Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corporation: 55

There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly

assailing the court's lack of jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the
court. When a party appears before the court without qualification, he or
she is deemed to have waived his or her objection regarding lack of
jurisdiction due to improper service of summons. 56 (Citations omitted)

52
53
Prudential Bank v. Magdamit, Jr., 746 Phil. 649 (2014) [Per J. Perez, First Division].
324 Phil. 70 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division]. See also La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court
f
ofAppeals, 306 Phil. 84 (2004) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
54
Id. at 78, citing Carballo v. Encarnacion, 92 Phil. 974 (1953) [Per J. Montemayor, First Division] and
Republic v. Ker & Company, Ltd, 124 Phil. 822 (1966) [Per J. Bengzon, J.P., En Banc].
55
G.R. No. 201378, October 18, 2017
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2017/october2017/2013 78.pdt>
[Per J. Jardeleza, First Division].
56
Id. at 11.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 204759

Rapid City Realty Development Corporation v. Villa 57 laid down the

rules on voluntary appearance as follows:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on

voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal
manner; and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of

the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking
affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. 58
(Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Guansing filed his: (1) Answer dated January 28, 2007;
(2) Pre-trial Brief dated February 27, 2007; (3) Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Postponement dated February 2, 2008; (4) Motion for Reconsideration dated
March 8, 2010; and (5) Notice of Appeal dated March 8, 2011. His filing of
these pleadings amounts to voluntary appearance. He is considered to have
submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction, which is equivalent to a valid
service of summons. By filing numerous pleadings, he has confirmed that
notice has been effected, and that he has been adequately notified of the
proceedings for him to sufficiently defend his interests.

In arriving at its Decision, the Court of Appeals erroneously relied on

Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 59 which involved two (2) forfeiture cases of
alleged ill-gotten wealth. The first case involved P143,052,015.29 and the
second case involved P202,005,980.55, both amounts were amassed by
retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia (Major General Carlos) and his
family.

After the filing of the first case, summons was issued and served on
Major General Carlos at his place of detention. According to the November
2, 2005 Sheriffs Return, the summons was duly served on "respondent[s]
Garcias." Instead of an answer, Major General Carlos' wife, Clarita Garcia
(Clarita), filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
her person.

On the second case, the sheriff served the summons on July 12, 2005.
In his July 13, 2005 Sheriffs Return, the sheriff stated that he gave the
summons to the Officer-in-Charge/Custodian of the Philippine National
Police Detention Center, who in turn handed them to Major General Carlos,
who signed his receipt of the summons with the qualifying note: "I'm J
57
626 Phil. 211 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, First Division].
58
Id. at 216.
59
618 Phil. 346 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].
Decision 13 G.R. No. 204759

receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy-but these
copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-named (sic )." 60

This Court ruled that substituted service made on Clarita and her
children were irregular and defective because the service of summons made
on Major General Carlos did not comply with the requirements of a valid
substituted service. It ruled that there was no voluntary appearance because
Clarita's pleadings did not show that she voluntarily appeared without
qualification. In the first case, she filed a: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion
for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for
reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case;
and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash. In the second case, she filed a:
(a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash; and (b) motion for partial
reconsideration.

This Court held that the pleadings filed were "solely for special
appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the
[Sandiganbayan] over her person and that of her three children" 61 and that all
throughout, she never abandoned her stance. Therefore, Clarita and her sons
did not voluntarily appear before the Sandiganbayan. Consequently, the
Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of Clarita and
her children. The proceedings in the cases, insofar as she and her children
are concerned, were declared void for lack of jurisdiction.

Garcia depended heavily on a single provision in the Rules of Court,

specifically on the second sentence of the provision on voluntary
appearance: "The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance." 62

A plain and simple reading of the second sentence confirms that it

pertains only to a motion to dismiss and not to any other pleading, thereby
making it inapplicable. The provision is very clear, but this Court in Garcia
gave it an expanded meaning when it ruled that "Clarita never abandoned
when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit
their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam . . . setting forth
affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. " 63

Additionally, it is basic that a claim for damages constitutes a prayer

for affirmative relief, which this Court has consistently considered as
voluntary appearance. It is incongruous to ask the court for damages while
asserting lack of jurisdiction at the same time.
60
61
Id. at 359.
f
Id. at 368. _ TRUECOP\

L~
62
Id. at 367, citing RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, sec. 20.
63
Id. at 368.
WILFIU:J(;V.
Divisioµlerk ~~: ... -
Third Division
FfS I 4 2019
Decision 14 G.R. No. 204759

Associate Justice Antonio Carpio's dissent in Garcia is insightful. He

disagreed with the conclusion that there was no voluntary appearance on
Clarita's part. He opined that an appearance without expressly objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person was voluntary appearance. 64
Clarita failed to raise lack of jurisdiction over her person in her answer even
if she filed it ex abundante ad cautelam. Likewise, she also failed to assert
lack of jurisdiction when she filed her motion to transfer or consolidate the
cases. In any case, by filing a motion to transfer or consolidate, she sought
an affirmative relief, which in tum was a recognition of the court's authority.
Having invoked the court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, she
could not now assert otherwise.

In Oaminal v. Castillo, 65 this Court further explained:

The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief - to admit answer, for

additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment,
and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration - are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Having
invoked the trial court's jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief,
respondents cannot - after failing to obtain the relief prayed for -
repudiate the very same authority they have invoked 66 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

In this case, not only did respondent Guansing file his answer and pre-
trial brief, but he also filed pleadings seeking affirmative reliefs such as the
February 2, 2008 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Postponement and March 8,
2011 Notice of Appeal. Clearly, he cannot negate that affirmative reliefs
were sought.

Moreover, respondent Guansing revealed that he was properly

informed of the contents of petitioner's action against him when he filed his
Motion for Reconsideration and Notice of Appeal.

Respondent Guansing, who actively participated in the proceedings,

cannot impugn the court's jurisdiction. To reiterate, a long line of cases has
established that the filing of an answer, among other pleadings, is considered
voluntary appearance and vests the court with jurisdiction over the person.
The rules are clear: the filing of an answer and other pleadings is considered
voluntary appearance. Respondent Guansing's actions lead to no other
conclusion other than he voluntarily appeared and submitted himself to the
court's jurisdiction.

f
6
4 Fernandez v. Court ofAppeals, 497 Phil. 748 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
65 459 Phil. 542 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. CERTIFIED TRUi: CO.t')
~~_J
66
Id.at555.

V.LAlttAN
Divhi.6. Clerk ot Court
Third Division
FE'S O4 2019
Decision 15 G.R. No. 204759

Nonetheless, technicalities should not be used as a tool to undermine

substantial justice. This Court has consistently held that if a rigid
application of the procedural rules will obstruct rather than serve the
interests of justice, courts may relax a strict application of the rules. As
emphasized in Penoso v. Dona: 67

The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's
primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of
technicalities." "Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's
thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits
and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
the unacceptable plea of technicalities .... 68 (Citation omitted)

Lastly, this Court notes that the Court of Appeals not only erred when
it ruled that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Guansing but more so
when it remanded the case for further proceedings with a directive for the
proper service of summons. A decision remanding the case for further
proceedings serves no purpose if the court never acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant in the first place. Jurisdiction is the power of the
courts to issue d~cisions that are binding on the parties. Since the Court of
Appeals ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of Guansing, the trial court would have had no power to issue binding
decisions over the parties. Hence, all the proceedings would have been
considered void.

However, it is clear that the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction

over respondent Guansing through voluntary appearance. Necessarily, the
proceedings before it in Civil Case No. 06115736 should be reinstated.
Thus, the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the January 28, 2010
Decision and February 23, 2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The Court of

Appeals December 10, 2012 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 96720 is
REVERSED and the Regional Trial Court January 28, 2010 Decision is
AFFIRMED. Respondent Edgardo Guansing is ordered to pay:

1. The sum of P437,800.00 for the reimbursement of the remaining

cost of the Isuzu Crosswind plus interest69 of twelve percent (12%)
per annum from August 28, 2006, the date of filing of this case,
until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6o/o) per annum from July 1,
2013 until fully paid; f
~IF~ TRUM co;·;
WJL~~~
67
549 Phil. 39 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
68
Id. at 45-46.

Divis~~~~!k
69
Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
ef C-0urt
Third Diyisinn
·~

FEB o4 2019
Decision 16 G.R. No. 204759

2. The sum of PS0,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

3. Costs ofthe suit.

SO ORDERED.
A

/ Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

~
PERALTA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

a.~~~
On wellness leave
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice v~~sociate Justice

On wellness leave
RAMON PAULL. HERNANDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
onsultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
ourt's Division.

~
. PERALTA
1
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
 Decision 17 G.R. No. 204759

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

~'(
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, Republic Act No. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

'V(LFR~OV. ~
-:Fc:.~,
Oivisio Clerk
T rd Divhion
DEC 2 0 2018